Archive for April, 2011

Links 4/30/11

Pigs have ‘evolved to love mud’ BBC

Why an ancient symbol of love is heading for an unhappy ending Independent (hat tip Buzz Potamkin)

Why Is Damning New Evidence About Monsanto’s Most Widely Used Herbicide Being Silenced? AlterNet (hat tip reader furzy mouse)

DOJ: FBI digital counterintelligence weakened by focus on child porn IT World

Nude dancers successfully sue ‘exotic gentlemen’s club’ over minimum wage McClatchy

Quotas and women-only shortlists aren’t popular, but they work Guardian. I’m not a fan but am prepared to hear the counter-arguments (after all, there IS a reason I blog under a man’s name!)

McCain, Graham, Lieberman and the Congressional Assassination Caucus McClatchy (hat tip Buzz Potamkin)

Dynastic lessons from the familiar Windsor flourish Simon Schama, Financial Times

Powerful Women as Likely to Cheat as Men, Study Finds Bloomberg. “Powerful” or financially independent? I wonder if there is confirmation bias in this study but have not tracked it down.

What I learned in econ grad school NoahOpinion (hat tip reader John M)

Protesters drive Koran-burning pastor out of Michigan Raw Story

Union busting in Massachusetts?!? My Left Nutmeg

Lloyd Blankfein, John Mack, Dan Loeb Et Al Sign Marriage Equality Letter DealBreaker

The Party’s Over for Buffett Joe Nocera, New York Times

Thrivent sues lenders for ‘massive frauds’ Star Tribune (hat tip reader Hillary)

A Reversal for Real Estate After Some Mild Gains Floyd Norris, New York Times

Scheme: Grow Pot, Avoid Foreclosure CBS Denver (hat tip Lisa Epstein)

Antidote du jour:

Screen shot 2011-04-30 at 2.50.55 AM

Arizona Representative Drops Chain of Title Notification Provision After Apparent Bribe by Servicer

If you thought the Friends of Angelo program, via which Countrywide gave very favorable mortgage terms to assorted Congresscritters, was pretty bald-faced, you ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

It appears the best way to get a deep principal mod in America is to represent a clear and present danger to the mortgage industrial complex.

The object lesson was Arizona Senate bill 1259, which passed 28-2 and created heart palpitations in bank offices all over the US (see the text here). It would have required that banks disclose chain of title and required that the foreclosing party reimburse legal fees when the plaintiff failed to prove ownership. Ouch!

A full bore effort was mounted to kill it. As the bill’s Senate sponsor, Senator Reagan, wrote (hat tip Matt Weidner):

I was told the bill was DOA in the House before it even got out of the Senate. It was “double-assigned” meaning it had to pass two committees instead of just one. In addition, the Chair of the Banking and Insurance committee in the House did not like the bill and was not going to give it a hearing, meaning the bill was dead. By the way, it is completely within the right of any committee chair to kill a bill.

But it gets better. Martin Andelman uncovered a seamy part of this story. A realtor who also audits trustee sales, one Darrell Blomberg, was keen to revive the bill and enlisted Representative Carl Seel. But weirdly, Seel was late to the legislative session and thus missed his opportunity to offer the amendment as planned.

This seems pretty innocent, right? Think twice. From Andelman (hat tip April Charney):

When Rep. Seel was asked what had happened to prevent him from showing up on time to propose the amendment, he explained that he had decided not to propose it because he was told there was no chance of it being adopted… something about it not being “germane,” whatever that means.

One thing though… from what Darrell explained to me, Carl Seel must have been in a very good mood the day of his unexpected tardiness, because even though he had been previously turned down twice for his own loan modification, two days before he showed up too late to propose the amendment, Ocwen granted him a PRINCIPAL REDUCTION that reduced his mortgage to $88,000 from roughly $190,000… that’s a reduction of approximately 56% give or take a few points one way or the other.

Now that is lucky, was all I could think to say. Really lucky, considering it was Ocwen, a servicer I’ve been told is among the most difficult when it comes to modifying loans. In fact, it’s almost like being the single-ticket-lottery-winner-three-days-in-a-row kind of lucky, wouldn’t you say?

So, how did Darrell know about the fortuitous timing of Mr. Seel’s generous principal reduction?
It’s quite simple really… Seel hired him to help him with his loan.

You see, according to Darrell Blomberg, Rep. Seel had asked him to conduct an audit of Seel’s trustee sale in an effort to postpone his own home’s sale, which had been scheduled after his servicer denied his loan modification application for the second time. And Darrell had forwarded the results of his examination to Ocwen in a letter outlining several discrepancies in an attempt to delay the sale date.

As a result of that close involvement, Darrell says he personally saw the paperwork indicating both the trustee sale was being cancelled and that the significant principal reduction was being granted as part of Seel’s loan modification. He even went over it with Seel, telling him he hadn’t seen many… if any… like this one.

If you are in Arizona, demand an ethics investigation. This isn’t even subtle. And it won’t be hard to find plenty of industry insiders like Blomberg who will attest that the Ocwen mod isn’t just irregular, it’s unheard of.

Gas Pump Woes

Time for comic relief. Hat tip Tim Coldwell (click to enlarge):

Join Us At FireDogLake’s Book Salon on Saturday to Discuss Treasure Islands by Nicholas Shaxson

Readers may know that Nicholas Shaxson’s Treasure Islands: Uncovering the Damage of Offshore Banking and Tax Havens, has created a big stir in the UK by shedding light on the scale of offshore banking and the numerous types of harm it does. We’ll be hosting a FireDogLake Book Salon tomorrow at 5 PM Eastern 2 PM Pacific.

Not only did I enjoy this book (it manages the difficult feat of being a lively and accessible discussion of banking and taxation), but it is certain to be one of the most important books of the year.

From the FDL overview of the book:

A thrilling ride inside the world of tax havens and corporate masterminds

While the United States experiences recession and economic stagnation and European countries face bankruptcy, experts struggle to make sense of the crisis. Nicholas Shaxson, a former correspondent for the Financial Times and The Economist, argues that tax havens are a central cause of all these disasters.

In this hard hitting investigation he uncovers how offshore tax evasion, which has cost the U.S. 100 billion dollars in lost revenue each year, is just one item on a long rap sheet outlining the damage that offshoring wreaks on our societies. In a riveting journey from Moscow to London to Switzerland to Delaware, Shaxson dives deep into a vast and secret playground where bankers and multinational corporations operate side by side with nefarious tax evaders, organized criminals and the world’s wealthiest citizens. Tax havens are where all these players get to maximize their own rewards and leave the middle class to pick up the bill.

With eye opening revelations, Treasure Islands exposes the culprits and its victims, and shows how:

*Over half of world trade is routed through tax havens

*The rampant practices that precipitated the latest financial crisis can be traced back to Wall Street’s offshoring practices

*For every dollar of aid we send to developing countries, ten dollars leave again by the backdoor

The offshore system sits much closer to home than the pristine tropical islands of the popular imagination. In fact, it all starts on a tiny island called Manhattan. In this fast paced narrative, Treasure Islands at last explains how the system works and how it’s contributing to our ever deepening economic divide.

You can participate in the discussion tomorrow via this link. Hope to see you there!

The Booger Rule of Antitrust in the Debit Card Fight

Although we were big fans of the HuffPo piece yesterday on the DC war over debit card regulation, Adam Levitin was a bit less happy since the article focused on the politics and was thin on why the card fees were burdensome to merchants.

Although a few readers tried arguing the bank position and did not get a terribly enthusiastic reception, Levitin explains the real problem: the actions of the Visa/MasterCard duopoly are pretty clear antitrust violations, but as he pointed out via e-mail, the US pretty much does not do antitrust any more. The Chicago school of economics indoctrination of judges via an orchestrated “law and economics” movement (see ECONNED for an overview) has resulted in judges not seeing competitive problems anywhere. The Department of Justice has lost a slew of recent antitrust cases at the Supreme Court, so they’ve lost the appetite to pursue them.

But (to give an indication of how bad the behavior of the card networks is), the normally supine DoJ has been active in payment cards. It sued Visa and MasterCard over their their “dual exclusivity rule” (allowing merchants to use either one, but barring Amex and Discover) and won. Last year the, DoJ sued and immediately settled with the two big networks on credit card swipe fees.

Levitin explains in a new post what the antitrust issues are:

Merchants think lots of costs (fuel, electricity, etc.) are too high. But what galls merchants about swipe fees is that they have no ability to negotiate over them as they do with other costs of business. For example, Home Depot can’t get lower MasterCard swipe fees by making it the “top shelf,” preferred payment method. And merchants can’t pass along swipe fees to card-using consumers. Payment card network rules say that they have to pass it along to all consumers. These rules are the problem.

It’s as if Visa and MasterCard both operated parking lots that surrounded a WalMart. WalMart can’t really operate unless there’s parking for customers, and it won’t be unreasonable for those customers who park to have to pay for it. Similarly, it wouldn’t be unreasonble if WalMart wanted to offer free parking and to spread the costs to all of its customers.

But that’s not how the MasterCard-Visa parking lot works. Instead of charging those people who choose to park in the lot for doing so or just charging WalMart and letting it do whatever it wants in terms of passing on costs, MasterCard and Visa instead tell WalMart that it is forbidden to charge consumers who use the parking lot more than those who don’t. So WalMart has to charge all of its customers for using the parking lot, even if those customers who walked, took public transit, helicopter or parachute. That’s the antitrust problem–you can pick your friend, you can pick your nose, but you can’t pick your friend’s nose. Same goes for prices. You can pick your prices, you can pick your business counterparties, but you can’t pick their prices. Call this the booger rule of antitrust.

Not surprisingly, US merchants pay substantially higher swipe fees than anywhere else in the developed world. Think that ain’t a tax on the economy Grover Norquist? Or is it OK because that tax is exercised by banks, rather than the government (maybe Norquist recognizes where sovereignty really resides…)?

Aside from finding explanatory value in Wrestlemania III (a taste I must say I do not share, my appetite for trash runs to action movies), Levitin also recommends Dora the Explorer for her animal-themed Swiper.

And while we are in explanation mode, readers were particularly keen about this debit card comment from readerOfTeaLeaves on the economics of debit cards in yesterday’s post:

Allow me to offer a perspective from ‘the eComm layer’, as well as from my acquaintance with several small, locally-owned, hard-working businesses who actually **innovate** and create new products and services (some of whom have sunk a fair chunk of their revenues into trying to develop eComm components to better serve their local communities and customers).

You state that: And it’s not a tax. It’s a fee paid by the merchants in exchange for the cost savings that debit and credit cards represent. The merchant who gives away free bananas in protest of merchant fees (see the article) is an idiot.

I agree this is not a ‘tax’. It is a FEE.

If a merchant accepts cash, they don’t pay a percentage of the transaction based on the amount of the purchase; with most kinds of cc’s (credit cards) and dbts (debit cards) that I’m aware of merchants are extracted a percentage of the transaction. That is a FEE. It is pure, utter extraction.

That transaction doesn’t cost the bank more to process based on whether the amount transacted is $50 or $800 or $3,000. Yet, depending on the amount transacted, the banksters take a ‘cut’, a FEE. They do not innovate, invent, or create to get that FEE — they only get it because they have the power (and legislation) to do so.

Meanwhile, don’t forget that the banks are also charging the customer for that very same transaction: in short, the banks make money off both sides of the transaction. Yet we aren’t hearing about that from the banksters, now are we…?

You lose all credibility with me when you state: Merchant card fees cover both the costs of fraud and convenience. And it is most certainly NOT free for the banks. The infrastructure costs are on the backs of the banks, not the merchants

If you honestly believe this, you are seriously misinformed.

Small retailers (including every restaurant in the nation) pay when there are fraudulent cards. The system **should** notify the retailer at the instant of swipe if the card is fraudulent, but it does not always do this. But it gets worse: if a retailer swipes a card and that data is not encrypted, or the network is not fully secured, then the retailer eats the costs — at least, the retailers that I’ve heard gasping in shock have ended up eating it. One retailer that I know – a small operation – having spent tens of thousands for inventory software and a whole new cc/dbt system, just ended up spending **more** tens of thousands of dollars to purchase all new swipe machines that encrypt **at the instant of swipe**. Did the banks provide those machines for free to the retailer? Not a chance. Did the banks provide any kind of discount to retailers using those new encryption devices? Not a chance.

As for ‘innovating banks’, that’s an oxymoron.

I’ve written eComm code, and I’ve worked in the eComm layer and the very notion that banks innovate is ridiculous. They have done their utmost to control and capture eComm technologies, but that does **not** make them innovators. Nor does it make the credit card companies innovators (!). It makes them what they always were and always will be: agents who cream profits from transactions. They happen to be at the point where the money changes hands, and they take advantage of that fact (in an exploitive fashion, I will add).

What Congress does not appear to understand is that if they side with the banks, they are damaging the vitality of small and medium sized businesses who actually **innovate** — whether it is a local farm that wants to offer an organic produce service, whether it is someone setting up a new merchant site via Amazon’s services, or whether it is a salon chain that wants to offer people the chance to buy a Mother’s Day gift card online. All those people actually **innovate**, provide personal services, and create the economic exchanges that allow for cities to have budgets that pay for schools, roads, cops, etc.

There is no reason — economically — for banks to stick businesses with the costs of fraud over which they have no control, to stick businesses with extractive ‘percentage’ fees of transactions, or to play both sides of every transaction by charging BOTH the payer and the payee.

Links 4/29/11

100,000 Toothpicks and 37 Years Later, Man Completes Incredible Model Of San Francisco SingularityHub (hat tip reader furzy mouse)

Boom and bust flags eco-collapse BBC

Two deficits, two austerities, and quantities matter Steve Waldman

How to Arm a Dictator Nick Turse, TomGram

Easing house prices ‘may prelude big falls’ *Australia version* ABC (hat tip reader Skippy)

Housing falls accelerate MacroBusiness

Japan’s ‘stunning’ stats: Yosano’s new nightmare FT Alphaville (hat tip Richard Smith). I’ve been hearing that Japan has gone into near freefall anecdotally; it’s now becoming official.

Yuan Breaks Through 6.5 Per Dollar for First Time Since 1993 Bloomberg. I bet the Fed and Treasury are quietly very happy with this result, and don’t care re the collateral damage.

The high cost of fracking – and the movement against it Pruning Shears

We had to tell a patient today that she is probably going to die Democratic Underground

Ayn Rand Movie Fails in Free Market (Despite Tea Party Hype) AlterNet (hat tip reader furzy mouse)

It’s all about the rents, part one million and twenty-nine Lambert Strether

Supreme Court rules against consumers. Again. Daily Kos

Protium’s acid reflux FTAlphaville (hat tip Richard Smith). This is exactly the sort of thing we mentioned in ECONNED: the producer class in a big capital markets firm holding management hostage.

Growth data cast doubt over US recovery Financial Times. Yours truly (admittedly in comments rather than a post proper) has been sayin’ this feels like a rerun of early 2008, with a liquidity stoked commodities bubble leading to overdone inflation worries when the deflationary undertow was more powerful. We’ll see soon enough if that view has some merit.

Another Round of Greater Fool Remorse? Michael Panzner

A Frightening Satellite Tour Of America’s Foreclosure Wastelands Clusterstock (hat tip reader furzy mouse

AIG Sues ICP And Moore Capital, Says It Was The Victim Of Fraud Reuters

Dead economist throwdown, yo FT Alphavlle. Good fun.

Life Insurers Skimp on Payouts: States Wall Street Journal (hat tip reader John M)

Michigan Court of Appeals Rules Against MERS ScribD. This is from last week, limited coverage in the blogosphere. Other non-judicial foreclosure states may have similar statutory issues.

The R word Charles Wyplosz, VoxEU

Step away from the CCP Deus Ex Macchiato

The FDIC’s Resolution Problem Simon Johnson. Johnson comes out where we did on the FDIC Lehman counterfactual, and on special resolution authority for big banks in general.

A Foreclosure Problem Congress Couldn’t Ignore Dave Dayen, American Prospect

How Much Longer for the “Royals”? Dylan Ratigan, Huffington Post

Antidote du jour:

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How the Failure to Manage Foreclosed Homes Kills

There’s a sad little story in the “NY/Region” section of the New York Times, which illustrates a not often enough discussed sort of wreckage resulting from the housing mess: that of deaths resulting from foreclosures.

Think I’m exaggerating? There have been cases of suicides, or murder/suicides of people losing their homes. But that can’t necessarily be attributed to foreclosure per se, but of personal financial disaster, with the foreclosure being the literally fatal blow. So while one can attribute their deaths to the financial crisis and therefore to the reckless behavior of major financial firms, it’s hard to pin it on foreclosures per se.

But there are some deaths that can, indisputably, be blamed on foreclosures or more specifically, the negligent management of foreclosed properties. No one should ever die because a bank failed to take proper care of a home it seized. This, just like banks seizing houses that have no mortgages on them, should simply never happen. But it is in fact taking place.

As anyone who lives in a part of the country hard-hit by foreclosures, the banks (more accurately, the servicers) are often derelict in their duties as property managers. When the servicer, acting on behalf of the securitization, takes possession of a home, it becomes responsible for it. It must pay property taxes and comply with local rules. In theory, the servicer should manage the home so as to maximize its value on behalf of the investor. That means securing the property (for instance, taking steps to make sure squatters don’t move in) and maintaining it (mowing the grass, either draining water pipes or providing heat at a minimal level in the winter to preserve the plumbing system).

But the evidence is strong that servicers do a terrible job of property management. Ratty-looking lawns, although annoying to neighbors, are the mildest symptom of neglect. News stories and reader reports tell of foreclosed homes having appliances removed and even stripped of copper.

Any why should they bother? They don’t get paid to realize a good sales price for houses their investors wind up owning. They typically fob the job off onto default service managers, like Lender Processing Services, who in turn hire local companies to manage the properties. But oversight of these firms is weak to non-existant.

The hazards that neglected properties represent are numerous. At least two toddler deaths resulted from them drowning in pools of foreclosed homes. In one, a widely discussed case in Florida, local laws that required the pool have safety barriers and spring-locked barriers were violated. And unmanaged pools represent lesser public health hazards, attracting mosquitoes and vermin.

The New York City deaths are as sad and unnecessary. Domingo Cedano bought a three family home in Bronx with no equity in late 2005. The building had been foreclosed upon but the city records still showed it as being owned by Cedano (it isn’t clear but one would imagine that the onus was on the new owner, the trustee acting on behalf of the securitization trust, to update teh records. But one can see why they might choose not to: to create the impression that Cedano was still responsible for property taxes).

Regardless of the state of the city records, the current owner is responsible for building maintenance. The trustee, Bank of New York, had hired Vericrest Financial to mange the property. They appear to have been missing in action. And the situation devolved:

As of one year ago this month, a state law makes it clear that the lenders are responsible for a property once it has gone into the foreclosure process.

“The legislation required that once a foreclosure takes place, it’s up to the bank or whoever foreclosed on the property to take care of it, maintain it, make sure it’s safe,” said State Senator Jeffrey D. Klein, a Bronx Democrat who sponsored the bill. “If not, the local building department can go in and make the proper repairs.”

That’s not what happened at 2321 Prospect.

In response to complaints about illegal subdivisions and other problems at the building, city inspectors went to the building 10 times, but they were never able to get in and they left notices outside. The city also mailed notices to Mr. Cedano, who was listed as the owner of the property, said Tony Sclafani, a spokesman for the city’s Buildings Department.

A fire tore through the building on Monday. Illegal walls on the third floor blocked access of one unit to the fire escape. A couple and their twelve year old son died in the blaze.

So when the public at large complains of banks letting severely delinquent borrowers stay in homes by holding off on foreclosures, consider: given how neglectful banks are as property managers, they may actually save a life or two by keeping the soon-to-be-dispossed owners in place a tad longer than they might otherwise.

Thomas Palley on How to Fix the Fed

The Roosevelt Institute hosted a conference yesterday on the future of the Federal Reserve, with the speakers including Joe Stiglitz, Jeff Madrick, Matt Yglesias, Joe Gagnon, Dennis Kelleher, Mike Konczal and Matt Stoller. Yours truly broke her Linda Evangelista rule to attend.

The discussion included the contradictions in the central bank’s various roles, its neglect of its duty to promote full employment, and its overly accommodative stance as a regulator, which has been enlarged thanks to Dodd Frank.

You can visit the Roosevelt site to view each of the three panels in full (they include the Q&As, which were very useful), the introductory remarks by Joe Stiglitz, or the presentations by each speaker separately. I encourage you to watch some of the panels, and to entice you, I’ve included videos from two talks I particularly liked below.

Thomas Palley put forward a very straightforward program for making the Fed more accountable:

Thomas Palley, Future of the Fed from Roosevelt Institute on Vimeo.

Another eye-opening presentation was Tim Canova’s discussion of how the Fed operated in World War II, which seems to be virtually expunged from official histories:

Tim Canova, Future of the Fed from Roosevelt Institute on Vimeo.

David Miles: What is the optimal leverage for a bank?

Yves here. Please be sure to read to the end of the post, where Miles discusses what level of equity he thinks banks should carry.

By David Miles, Monetary Policy Committee Member, Bank of England. Cross posted from VoxEU.

The global crisis has called into question how banks are run and how they should be regulated. Highly leveraged banks went under, threatening to drag down the entire financial system with them. Here, David Miles of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, shares his personal views on the optimal leverage for banks. He concludes that it is much lower than is currently the norm.

At the height of the financial crisis, many highly leveraged banks found that their sources of funding disappeared – withdrawn due to fears over the scale of losses. In the fallout from this banking crisis, the economic damage has been enormous. The recession that hit many developed economies in the wake of the financial crisis was exceptionally severe and the scale of government support to banks has been large and it was needed when fiscal deficits were already ballooning.

Setting new capital requirements is now a major policy issue for regulators – and ultimately governments – across the world. The recently agreed Basel III framework will see banks start to use more equity capital to finance their assets than was required under previous sets of rules. This has triggered warnings from some about the cost of requiring banks to use more equity (see, for example, Institute for International Finance 2010 and Pandit 2010).

The argument that balance sheets with very much higher levels of equity funding, and less debt, would mean that banks’ funding costs would be much higher is widely believed. But there are at least two powerful reasons for being sceptical about it.

First, we make a simple historical point.

In the UK and the US banks once made much greater use of equity funding than they do today. But during that period, economic performance was not obviously far worse and spreads between reference rates of interest and the rates charged on bank loans were not obviously higher. This is prima facie evidence that much higher levels of bank capital do not cripple development, or seriously hinder the financing of investment.

Conversely, there is little evidence that investment or the average (or potential) growth rate of the economy picked up as leverage moved sharply higher in recent decades. Figure 1 shows a long-run series for UK bank leverage (total assets relative to equity) and GDP growth. There is no clear link. Between 1880 and 1960 bank leverage was – on average – about half the level of recent decades. Bank leverage has been on an upwards trend for 100 years; the average growth of the economy has shown no obvious trend.

Furthermore, it is not obvious that spreads on bank lending in the UK were significantly higher when banks had higher capital levels.
Figure 1. UK Banks leverage and real GDP growth (10-year moving average)

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Source: UK: Sheppard, D (1971), The growth and role of UK financial institutions 1880-1962, Methuen, London; Billings, M and Capie, F (2007), ‘Capital in British banking’, 1920-1970, Business History, Vol 49(2), pages 139-162; BBA, ONS published accounts and Bank calculations.
Notes: (a) UK data on leverage use total assets over equity and reserves on a time-varying sample of banks, representing the majority of the UK banking system, in terms of assets. Prior to 1970 published accounts understated the true level of banks’ capital because they did not include hidden reserves. The solid line adjusts for this. 2009 observation is from H1. (b) Change in UK accounting standards. (c) International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were adopted for the end-2005 accounts. The end-2004 accounts were also restated on an IFRS basis. The switch from UK GAAP to IFRS reduced the capital ratio of the UK banks in the sample by approximately 1 percentage point in 2004.

The absence of any clear link between the cost of bank loans and the leverage of banks is also evident in the US. Figure 2 shows a measure of the spread charged by US banks on business loans over the yield on Treasury Bills. The chart shows that the significant increase in leverage of the US banking sector over the twentieth century was not accompanied by a decrease in lending spreads, indeed the two series are mildly positively correlated so that as banks used less equity to finance lending the spread between the rate charged on bank loans to companies and a reference rate actually increased. Of course such a crude analysis does not take into account changes in banks asset quality or in the average maturity of loans or changes in the degree of competition.

Nevertheless this evidence provides little support for claims that higher capital requirements imply a significantly higher cost of borrowing for firms.

Figure 2. Leverage and spreads of average business loan rates charged by US commercial banks over 3-month Treasury bills

Screen shot 2011-04-29 at 1.57.01 AM

Source: Homer and Sylla (1991).

The second reason for being sceptical that there is a strong positive link between banks using more equity and having a higher cost of funds is that the most straightforward and logically consistent model of the overall impact of higher equity capital (and less debt) on the total cost of finance of a company implies that the effect is zero.

The Modigliani-Miller theorem implies that as more equity capital is used the volatility of the return on that equity falls, and the safety of the debt rises, so that the required rate of return on both sources of funds falls. It does so in such a way that the weighted average cost of finance is unchanged (Modigliani and Miller 1958).

There are certainly reasons why the Modigliani-Miller theorem is unlikely to hold exactly. But it would be a bad mistake to simply assume that the reduced volatility of the returns on bank equity deriving from lower bank leverage has no effect on its cost at all.

So in calculating cost and benefits of having banks use more equity and less debt it is important to take account of a range of factors including:

The extent to which the required return on debt and equity changes as funding structure changes.

The extent to which changes in the average cost of bank funding brought about by shifts in the mix of funding reflect the tax treatment of debt and equity and the offsetting impact from any extra tax revenue received by government.

The extent to which the chances of banking problems decline as equity buffers rise – which depends greatly upon the distribution of shocks that affect the value of bank assets.

The scale of the economic costs generated by banking sector problems.

Few studies try to take account of all these factors (one notable exception being Admati et al. 2010); yet failure to do so means that conclusions about the appropriate level of bank capital are not likely to be reliable. In a recent paper together with Jing Yang and Gilberto Marcheggiano, we take account of these factors and present estimates of the optimal amount of bank equity capital (Miles et al. 2011).

We conclude that even proportionally large increases in bank capital are likely to result in a small long-run impact on the borrowing costs faced by bank customers. Even if the amount of bank capital doubles our estimates suggest that the average cost of bank funding will increase by only around 10-40 basis points. (A doubling in capital would still mean that banks were financing more than 90% of their assets with debt). But substantially higher capital requirements could create very large benefits by reducing the probability of systemic banking crises – crises which are very costly (as shown by Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). We use data from shocks to incomes from a wide range of countries over a period of almost 200 years to assess the resilience of a banking system to these shocks and how equity capital protects against them. In the light of the estimates of costs and benefits we conclude that the amount of equity funding that is likely to be desirable for banks to use is very much larger than banks have had in recent years and higher than minimum targets agreed under the Basel III framework.

Our estimate of optimal bank capital (by which we mean equity) is that it should be around 20% of risk weighted assets. This is much higher than the 7% level agreed under Basel III. It might sound like 20% is a dangerously high figure. But since risk weighted assets for many banks are between 1/2 and 1/3 of total assets then even with equity at 20% of risk weighted assets debt would be between 90% and 93% of total funding. The notion that this is insufficient debt to capture any benefits from debt discipline seems unlikely.

Were banks, over time, to come to use substantially more equity and correspondingly less debt, they would not have to dramatically alter their stock of assets or cut their lending. The change that is needed is on the funding side of banks’ balance sheets – on their liabilities – and not their assets. The idea that banks must shrink lending to satisfy higher requirements on equity funding is a non-sequitur. But there is a widely used vocabulary on the impact of capital requirements that encourages people to think this will happen. Capital requirements are often described as if extra equity financing means that money is drained from the economy – that more capital means less money for lending.

Consider this from the Wall St. Journal, in a report on the Basel negotiations on new rules over bank capital:

The proposed rules would have driven capital requirements up for all banks, forcing the quality and quantity of these capital cushions to grow …… That would be expensive for banks, because the money sits on banks’ balance sheets and essentially can’t be invested to bring in more profits. (Paletta 2010)

This is pretty much the opposite of the truth. At the risk of stating the obvious, equity is a form of financing; other things equal a bank that raises more equity has more money to lend – not less.

Guest Post: Gallup Poll Shows that More Americans Believe the U.S. is in a Depression than is Growing … Are They Right?

Washington’s Blog


Consumer confidence is, well … in somewhat of a depression.

Reuters reports today:

The April 20-23 Gallup survey of 1,013 U.S. adults found that only 27 percent said the economy is growing. Twenty-nine percent said the economy is in a depression and 26 percent said it is in a recession, with another 16 percent saying it is “slowing down,” Gallup said.

Tyler Durden notes:

That means that more Americans think the country is in a Depression, let alone recession, than growing.

How can so many Americans believe that we’re in a depression, when the stock market and commodity prices have been booming?

As I noted last week:

Instead of directly helping the American people, the government threw trillions at the giant banks (including foreign banks; and see this) . The big banks have – in turn – used a lot of that money to speculate in commodities, including food and other items which are now driving up the price of consumer necessities [as well as stocks]. Instead of using the money to hire Americans, they’re hiring abroad (and getting tax refunds from the government).

But don’t rising stock prices help create wealth?

Not really. As I pointed out in January:

A rising stock market doesn’t help the average American as much as you might assume.

For example, Robert Shiller noted in 2001:

We have examined the wealth effect with a cross-sectional time-series data sets that are more comprehensive than any applied to the wealth effect before and with a number of different econometric specifications. The statistical results are variable depending on econometric specification, and so any conclusion must be tentative. Nevertheless, the evidence of a stock market wealth effect is weak; the common presumption that there is strong evidence for the wealth effect is not supported in our results. However, we do find strong evidence that variations in housing market wealth have important effects upon consumption. This evidence arises consistently using panels of U.S. states and individual countries and is robust to differences in model specification. The housing market appears to be more important than the stock market in influencing consumption in developed countries.

I pointed out in March:

Even Alan Greenspan recently called the recovery “extremely unbalanced,” driven largely by high earners benefiting from recovering stock markets and large corporations.

***

As economics professor and former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich writes today in an outstanding piece:

Some cheerleaders say rising stock prices make consumers feel wealthier and therefore readier to spend. But to the extent most Americans have any assets at all their net worth is mostly in their homes, and those homes are still worth less than they were in 2007. The “wealth effect” is relevant mainly to the richest 10 percent of Americans, most of whose net worth is in stocks and bonds.

I noted in May:

As of 2007, the bottom 50% of the U.S. population owned only one-half of one percent of all stocks, bonds and mutual funds in the U.S. On the other hand, the top 1% owned owned 50.9%.

***

(Of course, the divergence between the wealthiest and the rest has only increased since 2007.)

And last month Professor G. William Domhoff updated his “Who Rules America” study, showing that the richest 10% own 98.5% of all financial securities, and that:

The top 10% have 80% to 90% of stocks, bonds, trust funds, and business equity, and over 75% of non-home real estate. Since financial wealth is what counts as far as the control of income-producing assets, we can say that just 10% of the people own the United States of America.

Indeed, most stocks are held for only a couple of moments – and aren’t held by mom and pop investors.

How Bad?

How bad are things for the little guy?

Well, as I noted in January, the housing slump is worse than during the Great Depression.

As CNN Money points out today:

Wal-Mart’s core shoppers are running out of money much faster than a year ago due to rising gasoline prices, and the retail giant is worried, CEO Mike Duke said Wednesday.

“We’re seeing core consumers under a lot of pressure,” Duke said at an event in New York. “There’s no doubt that rising fuel prices are having an impact.”

Wal-Mart shoppers, many of whom live paycheck to paycheck, typically shop in bulk at the beginning of the month when their paychecks come in.

Lately, they’re “running out of money” at a faster clip, he said.

“Purchases are really dropping off by the end of the month even more than last year,” Duke said. “This end-of-month [purchases] cycle is growing to be a concern.

And – in case you still think that the 29% of Americans who think we’re in a depression are unduly pessimistic – take a look at what I wrote last December:

The following experts have – at some point during the last 2 years – said that the economic crisis could be worse than the Great Depression:

***

States and Cities In Worst Shape Since the Great Depression

States and cities are in dire financial straits, and many may default in 2011.

California is issuing IOUs for only the second time since the Great Depression.

Things haven’t been this bad for state and local governments since the 30s.

Loan Loss Rate Higher than During the Great Depression

In October 2009, I reported:

In May, analyst Mike Mayo predicted that the bank loan loss rate would be higher than during the Great Depression.

In a new report, Moody’s has just confirmed (as summarized by Zero Hedge):

The most recent rate of bank charge offs, which hit $45 billion in the past quarter, and have now reached a total of $116 billion, is at 3.4%, which is substantially higher than the 2.25% hit in 1932, before peaking at at 3.4% rate by 1934.

And see this.

Here’s a chart summarizing the findings:

(click here for full chart).

Indeed, top economists such as Anna Schwartz, James Galbraith, Nouriel Roubini and others have pointed out that while banks faced a liquidity crisis during the Great Depression, today they are wholly insolvent. See this, this, this and this. Insolvency is much more severe than a shortage of liquidity.

Unemployment at or Near Depression Levels

USA Today reports today:

So many Americans have been jobless for so long that the government is changing how it records long-term unemployment.

Citing what it calls “an unprecedented rise” in long-term unemployment, the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), beginning Saturday, will raise from two years to five years the upper limit on how long someone can be listed as having been jobless.

***

The change is a sign that bureau officials “are afraid that a cap of two years may be ‘understating the true average duration’ — but they won’t know by how much until they raise the upper limit,” says Linda Barrington, an economist who directs the Institute for Compensation Studies at Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations.

***

“The BLS doesn’t make such changes lightly,” Barrington says. Stacey Standish, a bureau assistant press officer, says the two-year limit has been used for 33 years.

***

Although “this feels like something we’ve not experienced” since the Great Depression, she says, economists need more information to be sure.

The following chart from Calculated Risk shows that this is not a normal spike in unemployment:

As does this chart from Clusterstock:


As I noted in October:

It is difficult to compare current unemployment with that during the Great Depression. In the Depression, unemployment numbers weren’t tracked very consistently, and the U-3 and U-6 statistics we use today weren’t used back then. And statistical “adjustments” such as the “birth-death model” are being used today that weren’t used in the 1930s.

But let’s discuss the facts we do know.

The Wall Street Journal noted in July 2009:

The average length of unemployment is higher than it’s been since government began tracking the data in 1948.

***

The job losses are also now equal to the net job gains over the previous nine years, making this the only recession since the Great Depression to wipe out all job growth from the previous expansion.

The Christian Science Monitor wrote an article in June entitled, “Length of unemployment reaches Great Depression levels“.

60 Minutes – in a must-watch segment – notes that our current situation tops the Great Depression in one respect: never have we had a recession this deep with a recovery this flat. 60 Minutes points out that unemployment has been at 9.5% or above for 14 months:

Pulitzer Prize-winning historian David M. Kennedy notes in Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (Oxford, 1999) that – during Herbert Hoover’s presidency, more than 13 million Americans lost their jobs. Of those, 62% found themselves out of work for longer than a year; 44% longer than two years; 24% longer than three years; and 11% longer than four years.

Blytic calculates that the current average duration of unemployment is some 32 weeks, the median duration is around 20 weeks, and there are approximately 6 million people unemployed for 27 weeks or longer.

Moreover, employers are discriminating against job applicants who are currently unemployed, which will almost certainly prolong the duration of joblessness.

As I noted in January 2009:

In 1930, there were 123 million Americans.

At the height of the Depression in 1933, 24.9% of the total work force or 11,385,000 people, were unemployed.

Will unemployment reach 25% during this current crisis?

I don’t know. But the number of people unemployed will be higher than during the Depression.

Specifically, there are currently some 300 million Americans, 154.4 million of whom are in the work force.

Unemployment is expected to exceed 10% by many economists, and Obama “has warned that the unemployment rate will explode to at least 10% in 2009″.

10 percent of 154 million is 15 million people out of work – more than during the Great Depression.

Given that the broader U-6 measure of unemployment is currently around 17% (ShadowStats.com puts the figure at 22%, and some put it even higher), the current numbers are that much worse.

But it is important to look at some details.

For example, official Bureau of Labor Statistics numbers put U-6 above 20% in several states:

  • California: 21.9
  • Nevada: 21.5
  • Michigan 21.6
  • Oregon 20.1

In the past year, unemployment has grown the fastest in the mountain West.

And certain races and age groups have gotten hit hard.

According to Congress’ Joint Economic Committee:

By February 2010, the U-6 rate for African Americans rose to 24.9 percent.

34.5% of young African American men were unemployed in October 2009.

As the Center for Immigration Studies noted last December:

Unemployment rates for less-educated and younger workers:

  • As of the third quarter of 2009, the overall unemployment rate for native-born Americans is 9.5 percent; the U-6 measure shows it as 15.9 percent.

  • The unemployment rate for natives with a high school degree or less is 13.1 percent. Their U-6 measure is 21.9 percent.
  • The unemployment rate for natives with less than a high school education is 20.5 percent. Their U-6 measure is 32.4 percent.
  • The unemployment rate for young native-born Americans (18-29) who have only a high school education is 19 percent. Their U-6 measure is 31.2 percent.
  • The unemployment rate for native-born blacks with less than a high school education is 28.8 percent. Their U-6 measure is 42.2 percent.
  • The unemployment rate for young native-born blacks (18-29) with only a high school education is 27.1 percent. Their U-6 measure is 39.8 percent.
  • The unemployment rate for native-born Hispanics with less than a high school education is 23.2 percent. Their U-6 measure is 35.6 percent.
  • The unemployment rate for young native-born Hispanics (18-29) with only a high school degree is 20.9 percent. Their U-6 measure is 33.9 percent.

No wonder Chris Tilly – director of the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment at UCLA – says that African-Americans and high school dropouts are experiencing depression-level unemployment.

And as I have previously noted, unemployment for those who earn $150,000 or more is only 3%, while unemployment for the poor is 31%.

The bottom line is that it is difficult to compare current unemployment with what occurred during the Great Depression. In some ways things seem better now. In other ways, they don’t.

Factors like where you live, race, income and age greatly effect one’s experience of the severity of unemployment in America.

In addition, wages have plummeted for those who are employed. As Pulitzer Prize-winning tax reporter David Cay Johnston notes:


Every 34th wage earner in America in 2008 went all of 2009 without earning a single dollar, new data from the Social Security Administration show. Total wages, median wages, and average wages all declined ….

And see this, this, and this.

Food Stamps Replace Soup Kitchens

1 out of every 7 Americans now rely on food stamps.

While we don’t see soup kitchens, it may only be because so many Americans are receiving food stamps.

Indeed, despite the dramatic photographs we’ve all seen of the 1930s, the 43 million Americans relying on food stamps to get by may actually be much greater than the number who relied on soup kitchens during the Great Depression.

In addition, according to Chaz Valenza (a small business owner in New Jersey who earned his MBA from New York University’s Stern School of Business) millions of Americans are heading to foodbanks for the first time in their lives.

***

The War Isn’t Working

Given the above facts, it would seem that the government hasn’t been doing much. But the scary thing is that the government has done more than during the Great Depression, but the economy is still stuck a pit.

***

The amount spent in emergency bailouts, loans and subsidies during this financial crisis arguably dwarfs the amount which the government spent during the New Deal.

For example, Casey Research wrote in 2008:

Paulson and Bernanke have embarked on the largest bailout program ever conceived …. a program which so far will cost taxpayers $8.5 trillion.

[The updated, exact number can be disputed. But as shown below, the exact number of trillions of dollars is not that important.]

So how does $8.5 trillion dollars compare with the cost of some of the major conflicts and programs initiated by the US government since its inception? To try and grasp the enormity of this figure, let’s look at some other financial commitments undertaken by our government in the past:

As illustrated above, one can see that in today’s dollar, we have already committed to spending levels that surpass the cumulative cost of all of the major wars and government initiatives since the American Revolution.

Recently, the Congressional Research Service estimated the cost of all of the major wars our country has fought in 2008 dollars. The chart above shows that the entire cost of WWII over four to five years was less than half the current pledges made by Paulson and Bernanke in the last three months!

In spite of years of conflict, the Vietnam and the Iraq wars have each cost less than the bailout package that was approved by Congress in two weeks. The Civil War that devastated our country had a total price tag (for both the Union and Confederacy) of $60.4 billion, while the Revolutionary War was fought for a mere $1.8 billion.

In its fifty or so years of existence, NASA has only managed to spend $885 billion – a figure which got us to the moon and beyond.

The New Deal had a price tag of only $500 billion. The Marshall Plan that enabled the reconstruction of Europe following WWII for $13 billion, comes out to approximately $125 billion in 2008 dollars. The cost of fixing the S&L crisis was $235 billion.

CNBC confirms that the New Deal cost about $500 billion (and the S&L crisis cost around $256 billion) in inflation adjusted dollars.

So even though the government’s spending on the “war” on the economic crisis dwarfs the amount spent on the New Deal, our economy is still stuck in the mud.

Why Haven’t Things Gotten Better for the Little Guy?

Government leaders make happy talk about how things are improving, but happy talk cannot fix the economy.

Two fundamental causes of the Great Depression, and of our current economic problems, are fraud and inequality:

There are, of course, other reasons the economy is still stuck in a ditch for most Americans, such as encouraging too much leverage, bailing out the big speculators, failing to break up the mammoth banks, and failing to spend wisely, where it will do some good. See this and this. But fraud and inequality were core causes of the Depression, and our failure to address them will only prolong our misery.

HuffPo Expose on the Biggest, Ugliest Fight in DC: Debit Card Fees

If you want to understand inside the Beltway politics, proceed immediately to a superb article by Zach Carter and Ryan Grim at Huffington Post, “The Swipe Fee War”. It is a meticulously reported piece over the number one fight in the nation’s capital, which contrary to headlines, is not the budget battle but proposed regulations over debit card fees, otherwise known as “interchange” fees. As Felix Salmon, Katie Porter, and Adam Levitin have written, the reason this battle is so hard fought is that it pits two big spending constituencies against each other: banks versus retailers, or as one Senator broke it down further:

The big greedy bastards against the big greedy bastards; the big greedy bastards against the little greedy bastards; and some cases even the other little greedy bastards against the other little greedy bastards

Debit card charges are as close as you get to pure profit in banking once you get the system in place. The service runs over existing charge card equipment and infrastructure on the merchant end, and is integrated into existing bank balance reporting on the consumer end. For retailers, which are often low margin businesses, the various bank payment service charges are a very large cost. And the only serious study done on the impact of card charges (both credit and debit) on consumers concluded that the average household pays $230 a year. This is a significant hidden tax on lower-income households.

The Carter story is full of juicy vignettes: Bernanke lying badly on behalf of banks; WalMart fabricating alarmist Fed statistics; various Congressmen handwringing as to which group they should sell themselves to align with; the repeated flip flops of the mercenary NAACP. If we had sensible anti-trust precedents, this abuse of a oligopoly powers could be handled there, but the successful efforts of law and economics movement to indoctrinate judges have made that a non-starter, leaving the legislature as the best avenue for containing financial services industry rent-seeking. The ugly spectacle of this much time and effort being spent by various pigs at the trough as to how they whack up the economic pie, as opposed to create new products and services, is compelling proof of the need to regulate financial services firms as utilities. If these swipe card rules go through, it would be a welcome small step in that direction.

Links 4/28/11

Huge sperm whale washes up on Sydney beach PhysOrg :-(

Armadillos Can Transmit Leprosy to Humans, Federal Researchers Confirm New York Times (hit tip Crocodile Chuck)

FBI serves Grand Jury subpoena likely relating to WikiLeaks Glenn Greenwald

Tsunami Towns Face ‘Empty Monument’ Risk as Japan Rebuilds Bloomberg

Fatah and Hamas Announce Outline of Deal New York Times

Inflation expectations my butt MacroBusiness

Barclays and the C12 jackpot Guardian (hat tip reader Tim C)

Banks Play Shell Game with Taxpayer Dollars Bernie Sanders (hat tip reader furzy mouse)

Federal Judge Invites Rank Bigotry Into 9th Circuit Courtroom FireDogLake

Obama Denies Vermont Healthcare David Swanson

Sixth Republican Senator Faces Recall in Wisconsin Dave Dayen, FireDogLake (hat tip reader furzy mouse)

BofA Said to Target Individual States in Foreclosure Inquiry Bloomberg (hat tip Lisa Epstein)

Treasury can still spend $60 bln on TARP: report MarketWatch

For the Servicers: Is It Better to Rob Peter or Paul? Bob Lawless, Credit Slips

Antidote du jour:

Screen shot 2011-04-28 at 6.45.25 AM

IRS Likely to Expand Mortgage Industry Coverup by Whitewashing REMIC Violations

As established readers know, we’ve been writing since mid 2010 about the widespread, possibly pervasive, failure of mortgage securitization originators to convey the notes (the borrower IOU) to securitization trusts as stipulated in the deal documents, well before the robo signing scandal broke. This abuse matters because the transaction procedures were designed carefully to satisfy certain legal requirements, among them rules contained in the 1986 Tax Reform Act regarding REMICs, or real estate mortgage investment conduits, which required that the securitization trust receive all its assets by 90 days after closing and that all assets conveyed to the trust have to be “performing”, as in not in default. Failure to comply with the rules is a prohibited act and subject to taxation at a rate of 100%, and additional penalties may apply.

Now, with the Federal government under enormous budget pressure, shouldn’t the authorities be keen to go after tax cheats? The headline of a Reuters article, “IRS weighs tax penalties on mortgage securities,” would suggest so. But don’t get your hopes up. The lesson is don’t jump to conclusions when big finance is involved.

An overview from the article:

Should the IRS find reason to take tough action, the financial impact could be enormous. REMIC investments are held by pension funds, in individual retirement plans such as 401(k)s and by state and local government entities.

As of the end of 2010, investments in REMICs totaled more than $3 trillion, according to data supplied by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.

In a brief statement in response to questions from Reuters, the agency said: “The IRS is aware of questions in the market regarding REMICs and proper ownership of the underlying mortgages as set out in federal tax law, and is actively reviewing certain aspects of this issue.”

This matter was raised early last year by an attorney I know with IRS, to a senior officer, not in enforcement but familiar with REMIC rules. She immediately understood the importance and nature of the violations being alleged and was keen to proceed. Having had no follow up, the attorney rang again, and the IRS officer took the call, this time reluctantly. She indicated she was not supposed to be taking to him. She said the issue had gone to the White House, where word came back that the IRS was not going to be used as a tool of policy.

So demanding that tax law violators pay what they owe is somehow seen as an misuse of government authority? That appears to be the message.

Knowing of this background, in the blogger meeting with Treasury last August, when someone we will euphemistically call as senior official argued that the Treasury had little power over servicers, I objected, and said it depended on whether they construed of their power narrowly or broadly. I pointed out that a Pacer scrape on foreclosure filings would find thousands of violations of REMIC rules that were subject to punitive charges, and that that was an important leverage point to bring the industry to heel. (Yes, this is an example of using tax as a tool of policy, as opposed to merely enforcing the rules……that was by design). He sidestepped the reference to REMIC both in my initial question and follow up.

Steve Waldman, who was also at the session, was as skeptical of the exchange as I was. From a message last August:

Re REMICs: The reaction to your probing was very suspicious.

It’d have been one thing if he’d said they hadn’t looked into the issue. But that wasn’t how he responded. He started talking about how he’d had his staff “look for leverage”, against servicers I think, but found there was nothing there. In other words, he didn’t want to leave the issue open. He wanted to neutralize it.

One possibility is that the truth is face value, but I doubt it. After all, we’d just had staffers describe using the government’s leverage in creative ways to protect taxpayers or serve other public purposes as “extra legal”. Yet here was [the senior official] apparently on a fishing expedition for leverage, no doubt desperate to persuade servicers to facililitate mods to help homeowners. Yeah. Right.

If I’m not misunderstanding you, your core point is that the paperwork on many boomtown mortgages is invalid, and therefore various sorts of transactions, from foreclosures to bundling into REMICs, cannot be legally done, at least not without a lot of expensive research and recertification. In other words, your line of thinking would put a question mark beneath the value of a whole lot of bank assets. That would obviously not be in the national interest according to Treasury. So of course they’ve already looked onto the story and there’s nothing to it.

As Waldman indicates, there is a blindingly obvious reason why the IRS inquiry is a coverup. If the IRS were to find any of the questionable practices to be violations, they’d lead to widespread and large assessments against mortgage investors. That in turn would spawn the mother of all litigations by investors against the originators and trustees. That would blow up the mortgage industrial complex and put us back in a financial crisis. That is the last thing the officialdom wants to happen.

Now in fact there are ways the IRS can make this problem go away. The article quotes Jim Peaslee, who is one of the top experts on REMICS and was i one of the major influences on the original REMIC regulation. Note how he avoids discussing whether there might be violations; his point is the IRS will take a “see no evil” stance:

James Peaslee, a partner at law firm Cleary Gottlieb who is an expert on taxation of securitized investments, said that even if the IRS finds wrongdoing, it might be loath to act because of the wide financial damage the penalties would cause. He notes that the REMIC investors, who he called “innocent parties,” would have to pay rather than the banks that were responsible for any wrongdoing in transferring mortgage ownership.

I had a few above-my-pay grade e-mail discussions with one of Peaslee’s colleagues, another REMIC expert, last year, and the issues are vastly more complex than mere mortals would appreciate. For instance (and this is one of the simple examples), arguably, if the securitization vehicle wasn’t really created with the assets it claimed, so arguably, at least technically speaking, it was disqualified from the outset. However, legal structures and issues don’t map cleanly on to tax issues. We’ve argued that if the notes were not properly conveyed to the trusts (assuming they are New York trusts, which is the governing law in the vast majority of cases) then the trusts will have a big problem with foreclosing, since New York trusts don’t have any discretion and there is no mechanism for getting the notes into the trust other than shortly after it was formed.

But that particular concern isn’t germane from a tax perspective. State law doesn’t determine characterization of an entity for federal tax purposes. So, for example, even if a taxpayer said he a partnership and planned to set up a state law LLC as the partnership vehicle but failed to take all the legal steps, but did have a contract with a partner, and both has acted according to the partnership tax rules and reported income them on their tax returns accordingly, it would most likely still be treated as a partnership in spite of the lack of a state law legal vehicle.

The net result, as the expert indicated, is “that the rules about REMIC (or other securitization) qualification become very bendable” which in turn gives the IRS a great deal of latitude in what it can deem to be acceptable. He felt that was a bad posture to take, since that would give the servicers considerable leeway to manipulate tax liabilities directly.

The Reuters article points out the more obvious concern: foregone revenues by letting tax violations go unpunished:

Adam Levitin, a Georgetown University Law School professor and expert on taxation, said that if the IRS fails to act, “it would be a backdoor bailout of the financial system.”

If the IRS did impose penalties, the REMICs could turn around and sue the banks for causing the problems and not living up to the terms of the agreements establishing each REMIC, thus transferring the costs to the banks. If the IRS finds wrongdoing but fails to act, the IRS would forego “potentially enormous tax revenue that would be passed on to the federal government,” Levitin said. “Given the federal budget deficit that’s not something to sniff at,” he added.

So why is the IRS looking into this issue at all? Wouldn’t one expect them to let sleeping dogs lie? I can think of reasons. First, the issue has gotten enough profile that the IRS (really Treasury) may feel it’s better to go into “put the matter behind us” mode. Second is that it isn’t just the Federal government who would be able to charge taxes against RMBS if they found they had violated the rules, but also states. It’s not hard to imagine that some states have realized that going after the RMBS could be a significant source of badly-needed income. The IRS may thus feel it needs to get in front of this potential source of that investor bugaboo “uncertainty” as well as discourage state action. Mind you, state rules necessarily track the Federal REMIC rules precisely, nor are they required to interpret them the same way, but an IRS “nothing to see here” finding would deter action by all but the most bloodyminded state treasuries).

So we have yet again another example of two tier justice in America. Do you think the IRS would cut you any slack if you had engaged in as many violations of the tax rules as mortgage originators and trusts have? But the point of having a kleptocracy is to avoid inconveniencing the people with money at all costs.

Bill Black: My Class, right or wrong – the Powell Memorandum’s 40th Anniversary

Yves here. Black’s post discusses a turning point that is not as well known as it ought to be. Thanks to reader John M for bring this post to my attention.

By Bill Black, an Associate Professor of Economics and Law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He is a white-collar criminologist, a former senior financial regulator, and the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One. Cross posted from New Economic Perspectives

August 23, 2011 will bring the 40th anniversary of one of the most successful efforts to transform America. Forty years ago the most influential representatives of our largest corporations despaired. They saw themselves on the losing side of history. They did not, however, give in to that despair, but rather sought advice from the man they viewed as their best and brightest about how to reverse their losses. That man advanced a comprehensive, sophisticated strategy, but it was also a strategy that embraced a consistent tactic – attack the critics and valorize corporations!

He issued a clarion call for corporations to mobilize their economic power to further their economic interests by ensuring that corporations dominated every influential and powerful American institution. Lewis Powell’s call was answered by the CEOs who funded the creation of Cato, Heritage, and hundreds of other movement centers.

Confidential Memorandum:
Attack on the American Free Enterprise System

DATE: August 23, 1971
TO: Mr. Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Education Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/sources_document13.html

Lewis Powell was one of America’s top corporate lawyers and President Nixon had already sought to convince him to accept nomination to the Supreme Court before he wrote his memorandum. Powell was famous for his successful efforts on behalf of the Tobacco Institute. The Institute was desperately seeking to prevent the government from alerting consumers to the lethal effects of tobacco and to prevent its customers from holding the tobacco corporations legally responsible for their premature deaths. The Institute played the critical role in covering up the lethality and paying for junk science designed to mislead consumers about the lethal effects of tobacco products. They were literal merchants of death, selling a product that when used as intended was likely to kill the customer.

For the past 45 years,” Attorney General Janet Reno said at a news conference, “the companies that manufacture and sell tobacco have waged an intentional, coordinated campaign of fraud and deceit. As we allege in the complaint, it has been a campaign designed to preserve their enormous profits whatever the cost in human lives, human suffering and medical resources. The consequences have been staggering.

Powell’s confidential memorandum begins by explaining that he wrote it at the request of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Powell’s first substantive sentence is that business is under assault – and anyone who disagrees with him on that point is incompetent. “No thoughtful person can question that the American economic system is under broad attack.”

Powell then explained why business was losing the public debate.

The most disquieting voices joining the chorus of criticism come from perfectly respectable elements of society: from the college campus, the pulpit, the media, the intellectual and literary journals, the arts and sciences, and from politicians. In most of these groups the movement against the system is participated in only by minorities. Yet, these often are the most articulate, the most vocal, the most prolific in their writing and speaking.

Ralph Nader’s Nadir: The Outrage of Calling for Criminal CEOs to be Jailed

Among these articulate voices, the person that Powell most feared was Ralph Nader, who he described as “the single most effective antagonist of American business.” Powell cited a Fortune article to explain why Nader was the great danger.

The passion that rules in him — and he is a passionate man — is aimed at smashing utterly the target of his hatred, which is corporate power. He thinks, and says quite bluntly, that a great many corporate executives belong in prison — for defrauding the consumer with shoddy merchandise, poisoning the food supply with chemical additives, and willfully manufacturing unsafe products that will maim or kill the buyer. He emphasizes that he is not talking just about ‘fly-by-night hucksters’ but the top management of blue chip business.

One can understand why Powell felt so personally threatened by Nader. “Willfully manufacturing unsafe products that will maim or kill the buyer” describes the tobacco industry and Powell was that industry’s most prestigious apologist.

The issue I wish to emphasize, however, is why Powell and Fortune viewed Nader’s statements as evincing “hatred” of the enterprise system. Focus on what Fortune (a virulent opponent of Nader) says that Nader argued. Nader believed that the CEOs leading anti-consumer control frauds should be imprisoned where they (1) defrauded the consumer with shoddy merchandise, (2) poisoned the food supply, or (3) willfully manufactured unsafe products that will maim or kill the buyer. Powell and Fortune view these beliefs as radical, dangerous, and hostile to what Powell refers to in his memorandum as the “enterprise system.”

I submit that Powell and Fortune are not simply incorrect, but as wrong as it is possible to be wrong – and that Powell was blind to reality despite his intellectual brilliance in corporate law. First, is Nader the only one who believes that CEOs who commit control frauds are criminals? Anti-customer control frauds have defrauded, maimed, and killed hundreds of millions of people. In my prior columns I have focused on accounting control frauds because they are the “weapon of choice” in finance. One way of classifying variants of control frauds is by their principal intended victims. Accounting control frauds target creditors and shareholders. Anti-public control frauds target the general public, e.g., tax fraud, the illegal dumping of toxic waste, or illegal trading in endangered plants and animals. Anti-employee control frauds target employees, e.g., by not paying workers wages they are due or exposing them unlawfully to unsafe working conditions.

Anti-customer control frauds target customers. The seller may deceive the customer as to the quality, quantity, or safety of the good or service or the legal authority of the seller to convey the good and/or the promised security interest in the good. Cartels are another variant of anti-customer control fraud. The fraud is that the firms purport to be competitive rivals when they are secretly co-conspirators acting against the customers. Examples of recent anti-customer control frauds that maim and kill include the recurrent counterfeit infant formula scandals (which killed six infants and hospitalized 300,000), various lead toy scandals, counterfeit cough syrup (made with toxic anti-freeze), defective body armor for U.S. soldiers, unsafe water for U.S. troops, unsafe showers for U.S. soldiers (electrocution), counterfeit medicines including anti-malarial drugs, dwellings falsely certified to comply with seismic codes that pancake in earthquakes and kill tens of thousands. Then there are cigarettes, which were actually sold via fraud, are addictive, and lethal if used as intended. This form of fraud, addiction, and lethality was so effectively marketed that it became immune from normal laws and legal restrictions for centuries. Cigarettes have killed millions of customers and others subjected to second hand smoke.

Many anti-customer frauds do not routinely maim and kill. Misrepresenting the quality of a car to a customer can cause him a serious financial loss, but most of the hidden defects will not cause him or others physical injury. (Defects involving the brakes or safety equipment can imperil the customer, passengers, and the general public.) We call a terrible quality car a “lemon” and George Akerlof’s famous article on “lemon’s” markets was published one year before the Powell memorandum. It was this article that led to the award of the Nobel Prize in economics to Akerlof in 2001.

The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Akerlof, George A., The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3. (Aug., 1970), pp. 488-500.

Economists have a Pavlovian response to any mention of Akerlof’s seminal article on lemon’s markets – “asymmetric information.” The committee that awards the prize in economics in honor of Nobel cited Akerlof and his co-awardees’ work in developing the economic implications of asymmetric information. Economists have tended to ignore, however, the context of Akerlof’s famous article. The specific examples of the sale of goods that Akerlof discusses are frauds. More particularly, each is an anti-customer control fraud – a fraud instigated by the person(s) controlling a seemingly legitimate entity where the primary intended victims were the customers. Akerlof did not discuss the variants of anti-customer control fraud that maim or kill – he focused solely on examples of economic injury due to fraudulent misrepresentations by the seller of the quality or quantity of the goods sold. More precisely, two of Akerlof’s examples – the fraudulent sale of defective cars and rice deliberately intermixed with stones – do maim and kill some customers, but Akerlof did not discuss this aspect. (Biting down on a stone can easily shatter a tooth. That causes excruciating pain, but it also exposes an Indian peasant – the fraud victims Akerlof was discussing – to a greatly increased risk of dental infection, which causes an increased risk of severe cardiac illness.) Akerlof had appropriately large ambitions in his article. He sought to provide a “structure … for determining the economic costs of dishonesty” (p. 488). Goods that maim and kill the customer impose the primary economic costs of dishonesty.

So, the first problem with Powell and Fortune’s horror that Nader believed we should prosecute those CEOs who caused the sale of the goods they knew would maim and kill their customers (and others) is that Nader was obviously correct – prosecuting those CEOs should be a top priority – globally. Prosecuting the fraudulent CEOs who “merely” cause their customers financial losses by deceptive sales of defective goods and services should be a significant priority.

Second, Powell and Fortune believe that prosecuting criminal CEOs is terrible for businesses, terrible for CEOs, and terrible for “free enterprise.” They conflate support for prosecuting criminal CEOs with “hatred” for “corporate power” and they conflate “corporate power” with “free enterprise.” Recall that this is their conclusion about Nader:

The passion that rules in him — and he is a passionate man — is aimed at smashing utterly the target of his hatred, which is corporate power.

Powell and Fortune cite Nader’s call for criminal CEOs to be prosecuted as their proof of this conclusion. But why would prosecuting criminal CEOs be bad for “free enterprise?” Powell and Fortune don’t even attempt to explain why this would be true. It is self-evident to them that a world in which criminal CEOs do not enjoy impunity from the law is a world in which “corporate power” will have been ”smash[ed]” and that absent hegemonic “corporate power” “free enterprise” is impossible. Their “logic” and rhetoric are revealing, but absurd. Wanting to prosecute criminal CEOs is not hostile to “free enterprise,” but rather essential to the success and continued existence of “free enterprise.” Akerlof explained why in his 1970 article.

Gresham’s law has made a modified reappearance. For most cars traded will be the “lemons,” and good cars may not be traded at all. The “bad” cars tend to drive out the good (p. 489).

[D]ishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the market. There may be potential buyers of good quality products and there may be potential sellers of such products in the appropriate price range; however, the presence of people who wish to pawn bad wares as good wares tends to drive out the legitimate business. The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence (p. 495).

When cheaters prosper, market mechanisms become perverse and can drive the honest from the marketplace. The market becomes dominated by cheats because they obtain a competitive advantage. The most common reason that firms can cheat with impunity is that their CEOs are cronies of powerful politicians. The defining characteristics of crony capitalism are that the cronies receive subsidies, favors, and immunity from normal rules and laws. The cronies dominate the big corporations and provide reciprocal benefits to controlling politicians. Managerial incompetence and wealth flourishes under crony capitalism. Merit and efficiency suffer, income inequality surges, and class and who one knows become the primary determinants of economic and political success and power. The elites become pervasively corrupt.

Crony capitalism is the antithesis of “free enterprise.” The best way to destroy free enterprise is to allow CEOs to commit control fraud with impunity because that maximizes the perverse Gresham’s dynamic. Only big business had the power to destroy “free enterprise” in America – and Powell’s strategic plan was the best way to destroy free enterprise. As the left had long argued, it was the purported capitalists who would destroy capitalism.

When plunder becomes a way of life for a group of men living together in society, they create for themselves in the course of time a legal system that authorizes it and a moral code that glorifies it. (Frederic Bastiat)

Powell’s memorandum sought to glorify plunder with impunity, but he went beyond Bastiat’s warnings. Powell glorified CEOs who killed and maimed customers.

Third, and Powell is rolling over in his grave as I write this, Nader was one of the leading defenders of “free enterprise” when Powell wrote his memorandum in 1971. That was not Nader’s intent, but it was Nader’s efforts against control fraud that helped stave off for a time Powell’s embrace of a system in which elite frauds go free. That system, crony capitalism, destroys “free enterprise.” The regulators and the prosecutors are the “cops on the beat” who are essential to preventing the cheats from gaining a competitive advantage over honest businesses.

Powell could have, far more logically, characterized Nader’s position as “crusader against criminal CEOs” or “crusader on behalf of honest businesses.” Powell would never have referred to an individual calling for blue collar criminals to be prosecuted as a man determined to destroy liberty. He would have said that such an individual was increasing liberty – for criminals and crimes impair our liberty. President Nixon personally convinced Powell to accept the nomination to the Supreme Court to counter the decisions of the Warren Court, particularly the decisions adding to the constitutional protections of blue collar criminal defendants. Powell, particularly as head of the American Bar Association (ABA), was famous for his campaign against street crime. Powell’s biographer, John Calvin Jeffries, wrote that:

Powell argued that “a root crisis of the crime crisis which grips our country is excessive tolerance by the public generally – a tolerance of substandard, marginal and even immoral and unlawful conduct.” It had reached the point of “moral sickness.”

He worried that the pendulum may have swung too far in favor of the rights of criminals. Even Little Orphan Annie quoted the ABA chief: “There are valid reasons for criminals to believe that crime does pay, and that slow and fumbling justice can be evaded.” Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,(2001: p. 210).

Powell, in his address to the ABA at the end of his term as President, argued that making Americans free from crime should be the nation’s “first priority” (Jeffries & Jeffries, p. 211). (Note the phrase “the rights of criminals” instead of “the rights of those accused.”) Powell conflated criminal CEOs with honest businesses – and was blind to the fact that he did so. Had he shown any logical consistency in how he dealt with criminals, Powell would have praised Nader’s efforts to have criminal CEOs prosecuted. But Powell could not see beyond class and his own experience in aiding CEOs who were “willfully manufacturing unsafe products that will maim or kill the buyer” do so with impunity. Can there be any greater betrayal by a CEO than using deceit to willfully manufacture cigarettes that maimed and killed his customers and those exposed to their customers’ smoke – for the sole purpose of making the CEO wealthy through such sales? Powell did not normally smoke, but according to his biography he posed with fellow members of the board of directors of one of the world’s largest cigarette companies in the firm’s publicity photographs with a cigarette to demonstrate his support for smoking. He showed more than “tolerance” for “immoral and unlawful conduct” – he provided them with aid and comfort. Through his famous memorandum he created a criminogenic environment in which control fraud “does pay” because he helped remove the regulatory cops from their beat and claimed that those who wanted to prosecute criminal CEOs posed such a threat to “free enterprise” that business must show “no hesitation” in marshalling its unmatched economic and political power to “attack” them and ensure that they were “penalized politically.”

Powell: Firms that Fail to Use their full Power v. Foes are Appeasers

Powell derided corporations that gave aid and comfort to the enemy by failing to use their dominant economic power against those who wanted to hold corporations and their senior officials accountable for “defraud[ing],” “poison[ing],” and willfully manufactur[ing] unsafe products that will maim or kill the buyer.”

One of the bewildering paradoxes of our time is the extent to which the enterprise system tolerates, if not participates in, its own destruction.

The campuses from which much of the criticism emanates are supported by (i) tax funds generated largely from American business, and (ii) contributions from capital funds controlled or generated by American business. The boards of trustees of our universities overwhelmingly are composed of men and women who are leaders in the system.

Most of the media, including the national TV systems, are owned and theoretically controlled by corporations which depend upon profits, and the enterprise system to survive.”

Powell: the Business Class are Paragons of Civic Virtue

In Powell’s telling, business interests were the political naïf in politics. Other lobbyists were “special interests” while business was dedicated to the public interest. Special interests made self-interested demands on politicians, business did not.

Business, quite understandably, has been repelled by the multiplicity of non-negotiable “demands” made constantly by self-interest groups of all kinds.

While neither responsible business interests, nor the United States Chamber of Commerce, would engage in the irresponsible tactics of some pressure groups, it is essential that spokesmen for the enterprise system — at all levels and at every opportunity — be far more aggressive than in the past.

Corporations and the Chamber of Commerce did not make demands on legislators and did not act as special interests. Powell was not naïve enough to believe his own propaganda, but he knew that the Chamber of Commerce and its members CEOs would delight in even the most oleaginous praise. A corporate lawyer becomes expert in pandering to power.

Powell: Use Economic Power to “Punish” Foes

Powell’s solution was for corporations to act like real corporations by using their wealth and ownership to take control of the universities and media and use that control to further corporate interests by causing the universities and media to extol the virtue of corporate dominance and by influencing the law to support corporate interests. But his central theme was that business must cease its “appeasement.” CEOs should show:

….no hesitation to attack the Naders … who openly seek destruction of the system. There should not be the slightest hesitation to press vigorously in all political arenas for support of the enterprise system. Nor should there be reluctance to penalize politically those who oppose it.

Powell: Do what we do Best – “Produce and Influence Consumer Decisions”

Powell’s specific prescriptions for how corporations should use their economic power to achieve dominance are filled with hortatory expressions about quality.

Essential ingredients of the entire program must be responsibility and “quality control.” The publications, the articles, the speeches, the media programs, the advertising, the briefs filed in courts, and the appearances before legislative committees — all must meet the most exacting standards of accuracy and professional excellence.

But Powell knew corporations’ real strength – manipulating the public through advertising and marketing.

It is time for American business — which has demonstrated the greatest capacity in all history to produce and to influence consumer decisions — to apply their great talents vigorously to the preservation of the system itself.

American corporations didn’t demonstrate “the greatest capacity in all history to produce and to influence consumer decisions” through advertising that was limited to “the most exacting standards of accuracy.” Remember, Powell’s most important experience was representing the interests of tobacco companies. Tobacco marketing had four dominant motifs – smoking was cool, smoking was adult, smoking made you sexy, and even more dishonest efforts to minimize smoking’s health risks. The advertising, marketing, and lobbying efforts on behalf of smoking were based on deception, and they did succeed in “produc[ing] and influenc[ing] consumer decisions” that were literally suicidal and potentially fatal to their loved ones.

Again, Powell’s apparent naiveté about the propaganda campaign that he was proposing that the Chamber of Commerce unleash was pure sham. He knew that businesses frequently created demand for their products through deception and he knew that if business followed his recommendation to unleash its marketing gurus on attacking those who wanted to prosecute criminal CEOs they would do so with as much regard for accuracy as they found useful for the particular attack. If misleading voters and demonizing opponents through deceptive statements worked better as a means of attack, then Powell knew that marketing specialists would have no more scruples lying about Nader than they had against lying about smoking – but he also knew that the memorandum would eventually become public and that it should be written in as self-serving and self-glorifying a manner as possible. Advertising specialists are a cynical lot, so I’m sure they got a great laugh reading the portion of Powell’s memorandum where he conflates of “the most exacting standards of accuracy” in advertising with “professional excellence” in advertising.

Freedom is the Ability of CEOs to Commit Crimes with Impunity

Powell ended his substantive arguments with the claim that regulating business destroyed freedom.

The threat to the enterprise system is not merely a matter of economics. It also is a threat to individual freedom.

It is this great truth — now so submerged by the rhetoric of the New Left and of many liberals — that must be re-affirmed if this program is to be meaningful.

There seems to be little awareness that the only alternatives to free enterprise are varying degrees of bureaucratic regulation of individual freedom — ranging from that under moderate socialism to the iron heel of the leftist or rightist dictatorship.

We in America already have moved very far indeed toward some aspects of state socialism, as the needs and complexities of a vast urban society require types of regulation and control that were quite unnecessary in earlier times. In some areas, such regulation and control already have seriously impaired the freedom of both business and labor, and indeed of the public generally.

It is a measure of how successful Powell’s strategy was in spreading the ideology of corporate dominance and impunity that some of his statements would now be anathema to business. He concedes in his conclusion that: “most of the essential freedoms remain: private ownership, private profit, labor unions, collective bargaining….” In 1971, even prominent Republicans hostile to unions considered the rights to join a union and engage in collective bargaining to be “essential freedoms.” As a Supreme Court Justice, Powell proved to be a disappointment to President Nixon and movement conservatives because he remained a moderate conservative.

Powell exemplifies the limits of even exceptional intellect and great courtesy. He did not set out to harm the public. He felt he epitomized intellectual consistency, but he was blind to how his class bias on behalf of CEOs made him totally inconsistent in his view of crimes of the street and the suite.

The “areas” in which Powell warned that regulation had already “seriously impaired the freedom of both business and labor” – that language is code for rules restricting discrimination in employment based on race, gender, etc. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the EEOC were anathema to Powell and the CEOs of many members of the Chamber of Commerce. The anti-discrimination laws applied to unions as well as employers. Powell, careful lawyer that he was, knew not to make that nostalgia for bigotry explicit in his memorandum.

Guest Post: Senators Franken and Blumenthal and Representative Johnson Announce Legislation Giving Consumers More Power In Courts vs. Corporations

Washington’s Blog


Congressman Johnson’s office sent me the following announcement in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling that limits the ability of consumers to bring class action suits in many situations, where consumer service contracts provide binding arbitration provisions.

Contact: Ed Shelleby (Sen. Franken): 202-224-1868 | Kate Hansen (Sen. Blumenthal): 202-224 2823 | Andy Phelan (Rep. Johnson): 404-593-9126

April 27, 2011

Sens. Franken, Blumenthal, Rep. Hank Johnson announce legislation giving consumers more power in courts vs. corporations

WASHINGTON, D.C. — After consumers were dealt a blow today when the Supreme Court ruled that companies can ban class action suits in contracts, U.S. Sens. Al Franken (D-Minn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga.) said today they plan to introduce legislation next week that would restore consumers’ rights to seek justice in the courts.

Their bill, called the Arbitration Fairness Act, would eliminate forced arbitration clauses in employment, consumer, and civil rights cases, and would allow consumers and workers to choose arbitration after a dispute occurred.

Many businesses rely on mandatory and binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements that force consumers and employees to settle any dispute with a company providing products or services without the benefit of legal recourse.

“This ruling is another example of the Supreme Court favoring corporations over consumers,” said Sen. Franken. “The Arbitration Fairness Act would help rectify the Court’s most recent wrong by restoring consumer rights. Consumers play an important role in holding corporations accountable, and this legislation will ensure that consumers in Minnesota and nationwide can continue to play this crucial role.”

“Powerful companies who take advantage of ordinary consumers must be held accountable,” said Sen. Blumenthal. “Today’s misguided Supreme Court ruling is a setback for millions of Americans, denying injured consumers access to justice. The Arbitration Fairness Act would reverse this decision and restore the long-held rights of consumers to hold corporations accountable for their misdeeds.”

“Forced arbitration agreements undermine our indelible Constitutional right to trial by jury, benefiting powerful businesses at the expense of American consumers and workers,” said Rep. Johnson. “Americans with few choices in the marketplace may unknowingly cede their rights when they enter contracts to buy a home or a cell phone, place a loved one in a nursing home, or start a new job. We must fight to defend our rights and re-empower consumers.”

In Concepcion v. AT&T, consumers brought a claim against AT&T for false advertising. However, because the value of their case was only $30, their case was consolidated into a class action. AT&T sought to block the lawsuit by pointing to the mandatory arbitration clause in the service contract but lower courts applying state law rightly invalidated the arbitration clause because it banned class actions entirely.

In today’s 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court overturned these lower court decisions which sought to protect consumers. The majority of the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act barred state courts from protecting consumers from these arbitration clauses. The effect of this decision essentially insulates companies from liability when they defraud a large number of customers of a relatively small amount of money.

A longtime advocate for consumers and workers in cases of forced arbitration, in 2009 Sen. Franken passed legislation with bipartisan support that restricts funding to defense contractors who commit employees to mandatory binding arbitration in the case of sexual assault and other civil rights violations. Congressman Johnson, a longtime champion of workers and consumer rights, first introduced the Arbitration Fairness Act in 2007.