ACSBlog

  • October 11, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    A federal appeals court provided a setback to Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted’s effort to create more hurdles to voting, by ruling against a part of the state’s rigid provisional ballot rules.

    A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in an unsigned opinion, kept in place an injunction barring election officials from refusing to count ballots cast at the wrong precinct because of poll workers’ errors. SEIU and other groups lodged a lawsuit against the state arguing that an injunction against the law was needed to “prevent the irreparable and unconstitutional disqualification of thousands of lawfully registered voters’ ballots in the upcoming November 2012 general election.” In August, U.S. District Judge Algenon L. Marbley agreed with SEIU’s argument and issued a preliminary injunction against the law.

    Today’s Sixth Circuit action supported the bar against the provisional ballot rule. The appeals court noted that pursuant to Ohio law poll workers carry the burden of ensuring voters are at the correct precinct and that they have correct precinct ballots. The appeals court also took note of the “voluminous evidence” presented by SEIU “that poll workers give voters wrong-precinct ballots for a number of reasons, ranging from misunderstanding counties’ precinct location guides to failing to understand the vote-disqualifying ramifications of handing out wrong-precinct ballots.”

    “The Secretary failed to present evidence to the district court that other factors besides poll-worker error caused wrong-precinct ballots, and the State offers none now,” the Sixth Circuit stated.

    But the provision of the elections law requiring the rejection of right-place/wrong precinct ballots, the court continued “caused by poll-worker error effectively requires voters to have a greater knowledge of their precinct, precinct ballot, and polling place than poll workers. Absent such omniscience, the State will permanently reject their ballots without an opportunity to cure the situation. The mere fact that these voters cast provisional ballots does not justify this additional burden; as the district court explained.”

  • October 11, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Mark Ladov, counsel for the Justice Program of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law.


    All eyes were on Justice Kennedy at this week’s oral argument in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.  As readers of this blog well know, the Supreme Court holds the opportunity to rule on the future of race-conscious inclusive admissions policies — and once again, Justice Kennedy is presumed to be the swing Justice who will decide on the direction of the Court. It is always dangerous to predict rulings based on the Justices’ questions at oral argument, a point driven home by last term’s surprise ending to the Affordable Care Act litigation. And Justice Kennedy, in particular, seemed to keep his cards close in the questions he posed. But the oral argument does suggest that the forthcoming ruling will hinge on one key question: whether the University has persuaded the Court that race-conscious admissions policies remain necessary to achieve a “critical mass” of diversity in its classrooms and campus.

    The concept of “critical mass” comes directly from the Supreme Court’s 2003 ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger, where the Court affirmed the ability of University of Michigan Law School to use a race-conscious but individualized review to ensure a “critical mass” of diversity in its student body. The term did not refer to a specific number, but to an aspiration: that a class filled with sufficient diversity would ensure that no individual felt isolated or was forced to “represent” his or her race; that racial stereotypes would break down within a truly varied student body; and that the university would fully realize the educational benefits of diversity for all students.

    UT provided the Court with plenty of evidence that it has yet to reach this critical mass. The university used survey evidence to show that African American and Latino students continue to feel unrepresented on campus. UT showed that minority enrollment plummeted when the school relied solely on a plan to admit the top ten percent of every high school class; this policy fosters a certain level of diversity, but only because Texas high schools remain so segregated by race and class. The school looked closely at its demographics to see that certain classes and programs remain segregated. UT did not rely on any one single fact or figure, but instead followed Grutter’s instruction to look broadly at whether the benefits of diversity on its campus could still be improved.

  • October 10, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    In 2003 a much different U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of universities to shape their student bodies, in part, by relying on race-conscious admissions policies. Today, a more conservative court examined the constitutionality of the University of Texas at Austin’s admissions policy, which considers race among many other factors.

    The university’s admissions policy is being challenged by a white woman, Abigail Fisher, who says her constitutional rights were subverted by the school’s admissions policy. An array of groups has lodged friend-of-the court briefs both for and against the policy. Conservatives have long hoped to end race-conscious admissions policies arguing they violate the Constitution’s equal protection clause. But in its 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger opinion, the high court led by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor upheld the University of Michigan law school’s race-conscious admissions policy, finding that the school’s compelling interest in creating a vibrant educational experience was not an affront to the equal protection clause. The Grutter majority “recognized that racial and ethnic diversity is a compelling state interest of public colleges and universities,” and that the Court’s precedent supported giving deference to schools’ decisions on their educational missions.

    But that opinion failed to dissuade rightwing pundits, activists and outfits from continuing to claim that it is long past time for universities to stop taking race into account when creating student bodies.

    In an extensive piece for Media Matters, Sergio Muñoz describes the “Myths and Facts” about race-conscious admissions policies.

    For example rightwing or libertarian activists have long argued that a “correct” reading of the Constitution forbids race-conscious policies. Muñoz notes that frequent National Review writer Roger Clegg says that race-conscious “government actions are ‘untenable’ with the Constitution.” But Muñoz, citing an amicus brief filed by the Constitutional Accountability Center, notes that for decades the high court has recognized that such policies are permissible pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. “As our brief explains, not only does the Amendment’s text permit government to enact race-conscious policies to fulfill the Constitution’s promise of equality, but the Framers of the Amendment themselves enacted such measures.”

  • October 9, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    The efforts by Republican controlled statehouses to create more hurdles to voting, such as limiting early voting, creating onerous voter identification requirements, and making it more difficult to conduct voter registration drives, are hardly a recent trend.

    Victoria Bassetti, author of Electoral Dysfunction: A Survival Manual for American Voters, argues in numerous articles that for a country that prides itself on its form of democracy the burdens on voting do not make good public policy nor provide a solid foundation for a healthy democracy. (This month PBS will air an “Electoral Dysfunction” documentary; the book is a companion piece to the documentary.)

    In a piece for The Washington Post, Bassetti says our system of voting is “mystifying” to other countries, largely because of the burdens we place on voting.

    “In the United States, we put the burden on the voter,” she writes. “And in doing so, we keep company with nations such as the Bahamas, Belize and Burundi.”

    While maintaining that very few would label voter registration “anti-democratic,” she notes that “many political and social scientists believe that our country’s practice of putting the registration burden on individuals, coupled with outmoded, paper-intense registration systems, are major causes of the United States’ perennially low voter turnout. One study estimated that voter registration barriers in the United States depress turnout by 5 to 10 percent.”

    In an Oct. 6 column for The New York Times, Bassetti explores how low turnout “produces poor representation, which produces laws people are disinclined to obey and so undermine the process.” She also mentions a rather interesting study regarding how difficult it can be for men to vote, especially if their candidates lose. The study, produced by scientists at Duke and University of Michigan, has something to do with testosterone levels in men and people with normal serotonin levels. (Simply or crudely put, voting can be tough on men because of testosterone reactions and people with weak serotonin systems.)

    Though interesting, Bassetti says such studies are not especially helpful to handling “complex issues facing our democracy.”

    Some of that complexity centers on the bureaucratic mess voting has become in many states.

  • October 9, 2012

    By Jeremy Leaming

    Special interests are ratcheting up their efforts to influence the make-up of state courts, which handle the bulk of the country’s legal actions. These special interests, in large part, are riled over certain rulings of state courts in Iowa, Florida and a string of others, and willing to spend boatloads of money to change those courts. 

    Recently this blog noted the 2010 effort by Christian rightists to unseat Iowa Supreme Court justices for their involvement in a 2009 opinion that invalidated a law barring same-sex marriage. (In Varnum v. Brien, the Iowa higher court said the law violated the state constitution’s equal protection clause.) The effort was led by groups, such as the National Organization for Marriage, the American Family Association and other religious groups bent on demonizing the LGBT community, in part by opposing equality efforts. That effort was successful in removing three of the Iowa State Supreme Court justices, and some of those same groups are gunning for another justice involved in the Varnum majority – Justice David Wiggins. The New York Times blasted the effort to oust Wiggins in a so-called retention vote on Election Day as a “battle over the future of a fair and independent judiciary.” The Times’ editorial went on to state that retention votes were meant to remove judges from the bench because of corruption or incompetence, not because of unpopular rulings.

    In a panel discussion organized by Justice at Stake for this year’s Lavender Law conference, several of the panelists noted that state judges who have issued rulings in favor of marriage equality have often been the target of efforts to yank them from the bench. Lambda Legal’s Eric Lesh said courts nationwide “face real threats from well-funded, special interest groups that seek to politicize our judiciary and undermine the integrity of our justice system.”

    It’s not just state court opinions advancing equality that are triggering threats to state courts.