Friday, January 10, 2025

The Top Ten TTAB Decisions of 2024 (Part II)

The TTABlogger has once again gone out on a limb to chose the ten (10) TTAB decisions that he considers to be the most important and/or interesting from the previous calendar year (2024). This is the second of two posts; the first five (5) selections are posted here. Additional commentary on each case may be found at the linked TTABlog post.

Laverne John Andrusiek v. Cosmic Crusaders LLC and Lewis J. Davidson, 2024 USPQ2d 21 (TTAB 2024) [redesignated as precedential January 3, 2024] (Opinion by Judge Frances Wolfson) [TTABlogged here]. The Board granted a petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark CAPTAIN CANNABIS for comic books, on the ground of likelihood of confusion with Petitioner Andrusiek’s identical mark, for which he claimed prior use for comic books. Andrusiek’s “actual” trademark use on comic books did not begin until 2017, but from 2006 he used the term as the name of a character, which the Board accepted as use analogous to trademark use. The question, then, was whether Andrusiek made technical trademark use (or “actual use,” as the Board put it) of the CAPTAIN CANNABIS mark within a reasonable time after his analogous use. Andrusiek submitted evidence of such technical trademark use from 2016 and 2017, including displays of comic book covers on Amazon.com, on YouTube, and in other media. The Board found that “Petitioner’s actual trademark use in 2017 was within a commercially reasonable period of time following his analogous use in 2013-14 so as to create a ‘continuing association of the mark’ with Petitioner’s goods.” Viewing the evidence as a whole, “as if each piece of evidence were part of a puzzle,” the Board found that “when fitted together,” the puzzle pieces established prior use by Andrusiek.]

In re Samsung Display Co., Ltd., 2024 USPQ2d 1279 (TTAB 2024) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert H. Coggins) [TTABlogged here]. The Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark UPC for, inter alia, display panels as components of computers and smart phones, finding confusion likely with the identical mark registered for charging cables and power connectors. Applicant Samsung argued that, to show relatedness of the goods, “something more” is required than the mere fact that some third-party manufacturers sell both types of goods. The Board was not impressed. The Board found that “the goods are related because they are each incorporated and used in the same finished electronic products.” As to Samsung’s “something more” argument, the Board pointed out that the two cases relied on by Samsung – Coors Brewing and St. Helena Hospital – involved the relatedness of goods and services, thus “limiting the requirement for ‘something more’ to circumstances where goods are used in the rendering of services and the relatedness of the goods and services is not evident, well known, or generally recognized.” Coors Brewing involved beer and restaurant services, while St. Helena Hospital concerned hospital-based lifestyle programs and printed materials dealing with fitness. Although some purchasers of the involved goods here may be sophisticated, others are not – such as hobbyists and gamers who build or repair their own electronic devices – and there was no evidence that these ordinary consumers would exercise more than ordinary care.

State Permits, Inc. v. Fieldvine, Inc., 2024 USPQ2d 1458 (TTAB 2024) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington) [TTABlogged here]. In a “somewhat unusual” Section 2(d) cancellation proceeding targeting a Supplemental Register registration and involving “dueling claims of acquired distinctiveness,” the Board granted a petition for cancellation of Fieldvine, Inc.’s registration for the mark PERMITS.COM for construction permit services. Although Petitioner State Permits, Inc. could not prove acquired distinctiveness for its mark PERMIT.COM, it did prove first use for identical services, and that was enough. Unlike in a challenge to a registration on the Principal Register, where the challenger must prove prior proprietary rights in its mark, if the challenged registration resides on the Supplemental Register and covers a descriptive term that lacks acquired distinctiveness, a prior user of a confusingly similar term may succeed in cancelling that registration even without establishing acquired distinctiveness for its own mark. As the CAFC observed in Books on Tape, it would be an "anomalous result" if, "in view of our finding of a likelihood of confusion, Respondent is permitted to keep its Supplemental Register registration for PERMITS.COM, in the absence of a showing of acquired distinctiveness and in the face of Petitioner’s prior use of PERMIT.COM.”

Alfred Sarmento v. Maria Manuela Pinho DE Carvalho, 2024 USPQ2d 1683 (TTAB 2024) [precedential]. [TTABlogged here]. In this opposition to registration of the mark VICE REI for “Wine; Spirits; Liqueurs; Anise liqueur,” the Board denied opposer’s motion for partial summary judgment grounded on non-ownership of the mark on which applicant’s international registration was based. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) had cancelled the international registration after the Portuguese Trademark Office ruled that the applicant did not own the mark. Nevertheless, the Board gave its blessing to the transformation of the United States request for extension of protection into a national application with a Section 1(b) intent-to-use basis. The Board observed that applicant properly followed the procedures for transformation under Section 70(c) of the Trademark Act, and it then held that Sarmento’s contention that the mark was improperly transformed “cannot form the basis of an inter partes challenge to the registrability of the mark.” “Processing a request for transformation is a ministerial act, and there is no substantive examination of the document(s) or the permissibility of the circumstances that prompted the request for transformation.” Furthermore, opposer’s non-ownership claim was meritless because the challenged application is based on intent-to-use, and there is no statutory requirement that a Section 1(b) applicant be the owner of the mark at the time of filing.

Iron Balls International Ltd. v. Bull Creek Brewing, LLC, 2024 USPQ2d 1004 (TTAB 2024) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge David K. Heasley). [TTABlogged here].Attempting to side-step a Section 2(d) refusal of the mark shown below, for “gin,” Iron Balls petitioned to restrict Respondent Bull Creek’s registration for the mark IRON BALLS for “beer” to “micro-brewed craft beer.” The Board found that the proposed restriction would not avoid a likelihood of confusion, and so it denied the petition. Under Section 18 of the Trademark Act, “[a] party seeking to restrict a registrant’s broadly worded identification of goods under Section 18 must plead and prove ‘(1) that the registrant is not using its mark on goods or services that would be excluded by the limitation, and (2) that the limitation would result in the avoidance of a finding of a likelihood of confusion.’” As to the first requirement, the Board found it significant that Bull Creek represented itself as a “craft brewery” and displayed the “Independent Craft Brewer Seal” on its labels, and so it concluded that relevant purchasers would see respondent as a “brewer with a limited, small batch output” and would consider it to be a “craft microbrewery” and its goods “micro-brewed craft beer.” However, as to the second requirement, “even if Respondent’s goods could be characterized as ‘micro-brewed craft beer,’ and even if its identification of goods were so restricted, the restriction would not avoid a likelihood of confusion.”

Read comments and post your comment here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Thursday, January 09, 2025

The Top Ten TTAB Decisions of 2024 (Part I)

The TTABlogger has once again gone out on a limb to chose the ten (10) TTAB (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) decisions that he considers to be the most important and/or interesting from the previous calendar year (2024). This is the first of two (2) posts; the first five (5) selections are set out below. Additional commentary on each case may be found at the linked TTABlog post. The cases are not necessarily listed in order of importance (whatever that means).

Look Cycle International v. Kunshan Qiyue Outdoor Sports Goods Co., Ltd., 2024 USPQ2d 1424 (TTAB 2024) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Karen S. Kuhlke). [TTABlogged here]. Findings of fraud are few and far between, but here the Board ruled that, in the underlying application for the mark BLOOKE for bicycles, parts, and accessories, respondent’s false statements regarding use of the mark were made either with the intention to deceive the USPTO or with reckless disregard for the truth, and therefore constituted fraud. Respondent’s specimen of use included purported invoices from three transactions but the addresses for the three purchasers were non-existent. It also produced documents during discovery supposedly disclosing an event held prior to April 2021 in the United States but shown to be referencing a 2023 event in Shanghai China. The Board found that the evidence demonstrated “knowing intentional deception,” but “even if the evidence were not sufficient to reveal such intention directly, at a minimum, the facts of this case demonstrate reckless disregard for the truth from which we infer the requisite intent.”

DoorDash, Inc. v. Greenerside Holdings, LLC, 2024 USPQ2d 935 (TTAB 2024) [precedential]. [TTABlogged here]. Trademark bullies breathed a sigh of relief when, in this opposition to registration of the mark shown below for delivery of medical cannabis via car service, the Board rejected Applicant Greenerside’s affirmative defense of unclean hands. Opposer DoorDash alleged likelihood of confusion with eight registered DOORDASH marks for various goods and services, including food delivery. Greenerside asserted that DoorDash has misused its trademarks in a “longstanding and habitual practice of trademark bullying” by opposing a “significant number of applications” on “dubious, weak or exaggerated” grounds. The Board granted DoorDash’s motion to strike that defense. “The Trademark Act does not refer to ‘trademark bullying’ explicitly or even implicitly.” The Board has previously considered assertions of “unclean hands” based on “overzealous enforcement” but found that this defense does not apply to a registrant “seek[ing] to protect its rights in its registered marks, and preclud[ing] the registration of what it believes to be a confusingly similar mark.” Here, the Board found that DoorDash was “merely exercising its right to protect its marks.”

In re Gail Weiss, 2024 USPQ2d 1376 (TTAB 2024) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Peter W. Cataldo). [TTABlogged here]. The Board upheld a refusal to register the mark GABBY’S TABLE for “Computerized on-line retail store services in the field of food, cooking utensils, cookware, culinary arts cookbooks, magazines and videos, and lifestyle books, magazines and videos” because the specimen of use showed that Applicant Weiss (an online influencer) “provides referrals of products for sale by third parties on their websites” and not the services recited in the application. Weiss’s specimen comprised a webpage displaying a list of items that “Gabby’s Table Recommends” for purchase. A picture of each item is displayed, along with a product description and a “buy now” button that re-directs the consumer to a third-party website where the item may be purchased (e.g., Amazon). The recommended items cannot be purchased directly via Weiss’s website: “Applicant’s specimen does not display, for instance, a virtual ‘shopping cart’ pricing, shipping information, or any other indicia of online retail store services.” Weiss provided no evidence that “consumers clicking the ‘BUY NOW’ buttons on her website, upon being re-directed to a product description on a third-party vendor website where they may then purchase the product from that vendor, will perceive that Applicant herself is providing online retail store services.”

Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. The Franklin Investment Corp. DBA Franklin Industries, 2024 USPQ2d 2025 (TTAB 2024) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cheryl S. Goodman). [TTABlogged here]. Inter partes proceedings involving two color marks are as rare as a traffic cop in Boston. The Board denied this petition for cancellation of a supplemental registration for the color mark (red-white-and-blue) shown on the left below, finding confusion unlikely with the registered color mark (red top) shown on the right, both for metal fence posts. In a 69-page decision, the Board found the first DuPont factor — the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks — to be dispositive. The Board pointed out that the issue must be decided “primarily on the basis of visual similarity, which has been described as a ‘subjective eyeball test.’” The Board deemed the marks dissimilar: “[t]he commercial impression of Petitioner’s Red Top Fence Post Mark, is a ‘red top,’ and the color red.” On the other hand, consumers would perceive respondent’s Red, White, and Blue Fence Post Mark as referring to “the national colors of the United States of America, or the flag of the United States of America.”

Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. v. Ava Labs, Inc. , 2024 USPQ2d 1299 (TTAB 2024) [precedential]. [TTABlogged here]. In this opposition to registration of the mark BLIZZARD for various business services, Applicant Ava Labs, Inc., counterclaimed to cancel two pleaded registrations owned by Opposer Blizzard Entertainment for online retail store and mail order services. Ava asserted that the registered marks BLIZZARD and BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT had never been used or had been abandoned because the offering of one’s own goods does not constitute a service done primarily for the benefit of others and therefore does not qualify as service mark use. The Board disagreed. The question was “whether, as a matter of law, online retail store or mail order activities featuring only a party’s own goods are ‘services’ as contemplated in the Trademark Act.” The Board observed that “it has long been recognized that gathering various products together, making a place available for purchasers to select goods, and providing any other necessary means for consummating purchases constitute the performance of a service.” Furthermore, the Board has implicitly recognized that retail store activities featuring one’s own goods are services, acknowledging that “if a retail store also uses the name of the store on the goods themselves, the same mark can serve both a trademark and service mark function.” The Board concluded that Blizzard’s activities under the marks constitute use of the marks that satisfies the requirement of the Trademark Act.

Read comments and post your comment here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.

Wednesday, January 08, 2025

The TTAB Issued 30 Precedential Opinions in 2024

The Board issued 30 precedential opinions in calendar year 2024, a total slightly lower than in recent years. A number of trademark practitioners believe that the TTAB should be issuing more precedential decisions. The Board has made available a form for nominating a Board decision as precedential. (link here). [Good luck with that.]


Section 2(a) - False Suggestion of a Connection:
Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion: Section 2(e)(1) - Mere Descriptiveness: Section 2(f) - Acquired Distinctivenss:
Failure-to-Function/Specimen of Use: Fraud: Use/Nonuse:
Discovery/Evidence/Procedure:
Pan-American Convention:

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Tuesday, January 07, 2025

CAFC Affirms TTAB: Pink Color De Jure Functional for Hip Joint Implants

The CAFC upheld the TTAB's decision [TTABlogged here] granting petitions for cancellation of two registrations on the Supplemental Register for the color pink applied to the entire surface of hip joint implants, on the ground of Section 2(e)(5) functionality. CeramTec GmbH v. CoorsTek Bioceramics LLC, Appeal No. 2023-1502 (Fed. Cir., January 3, 2025) [precedential].



Appellant CeramTec raised two principal arguments on appeal: (1) that the Board’s finding of functionality was infected by legal error and unsupported by substantial evidence, and (2) that the Board erred by categorically precluding the defense of unclean hands in cancellation proceedings involving functionality.

Functionality: The CAFC concluded that the Board correctly applied the Morton-Norwich factors in finding the color pink to be de jure functional for ceramic hip implant components. It observed that CeramTec's expired '816 patent, as well others of its patents, disclose the utilitarian advantages of adding Cr3+ ions to ZTA ceramic hip replacement component materials in order to increase levels of hardness. Ceramtek conceded that the addition of chromia causes a ZTA ceramic to become pink, and (2) that CeramTec practices at least one claim of its ’816 patent. Under the first Morton-Norwich factor, the Board correctly applied the Supreme Court's directive in TrafFix that "utility patents can be 'strong evidence' that the features therein claimed are functional, thus precluding trademark protection."

The Board's finding under the second Morton-Norwich factor was unchallenged: that CeramTec's advertising touted the utilitarian advantages of adding chromium oxide to ZTA ceramic compounds; this evidence also “constitute[s] strong evidence of functionality.” As to the third factor—the availability of functionally equivalent designs—the Board correctly deemed it to be neutral due to the lack of evidence of actual or potential alternative designs. The fourth factor—whether the designs result in a comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacture—was also correctly deemed neutral due to conflicting evidence.

Because substantial evidence supported the Board’s factual findings, the CAFC affirmed the Board’s conclusion that CeramTec’s proposed trademarks are functional under Section 2(e)(5).

Unclean Hands: The CAFC agreed with CeramTec that the Board was incorrect in stating that the defense of unclean hands is unavailable in Board functionality proceedings. CeramTec had contended that CoorsTek should be precluded from asserting that the proposed trademarks are functional because CoorsTek had long maintained that chromia provides no material benefits for ZTA ceramics.

The CAFC pointed out that Rule 2.114(b)(2) expressly provides that the defendant in a cancellation proceeding may "includ[e] the affirmative defense[] of unclean hands." However, any error by the Board in its broad pronouncement was harmless "because the Board adequately considered whether the unclean hands defense was available in this case, as illustrated by its statement that it was 'exercis[ing its] discretion' in view of the 'strong public policy interest in' cancelling ineligible marks."(citing Loglan Inst., Inc. v. Logical Language Grp., Inc., 962 F.2d 1038, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The Board did not err in declining to apply [equitable] defenses [in a cancellation proceeding], as the public interest . . . to rid the register of [an ineligible mark] transcends them.”)).

Conclusion: And so, the CAFC affirmed the Board's decision.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Although the court repeatedly speaks of "cancelling" CeramTec's marks, it is the registrations that are cancelled, not the marks. Maybe one could say the marks were "invalidated." Note also the court's use of "trademark" as a verb. All lawyers should know better.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Monday, January 06, 2025

Precedential No. 1: TTAB Upholds USPTO Objections to Over-Inclusive Drawings for Watch Configuration Marks

The Board affirmed the USPTO's refusals to register the product configuration marks shown below, for "watches, wristwatches," on the ground that the drawings were unacceptable for two reasons: (1) they include functional elements, and (2) they include elements that have not acquired distinctiveness. In other words, certain of the elements shown in solid lines should have been depicted in dotted or broken lines because they lack trademark significance. In re Audemars Piguet Holding SA, Serial Nos. 90045780 and 90045814 (January 2, 2025) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

Applicant Audemars Piguet described the marks as consisting of 12 specific elements as to the first design, but only nine of the 12 as to the second design. The Board noted that "[n]either refusal is based on lack of acquired distinctiveness of the entire designs or on the functionality of the entire designs." Instead, they are based on the applicant’s refusal to comply with Examining Attorney Taryn Smith's requirement that the drawings be revised.

Applicant argued that requiring the application drawing "to depict less than the entirety of a design in dotted lines is legally unsupportable." The Board disagreed. Rule 2.52(b)(4), for example, specifically provides for use of dotted or broken lines in a drawing to depict any matter that is not claimed as part of a mark. In Water Gremlin, the CCPA affirmed a drawing requirement that the functional elements of a proposed mark be shown in dotted lines (combination of a design of a compartmented container with a handle with the words SINKER SELECTOR depicted upon a transparent lid).

The USPTO may register only marks that satisfy the statutory criteria, not marks that partially do and partially don’t satisfy them. And one criterion for registration on the Principal Register is that the proposed mark is distinctive. Drawing requirements plainly advance that obligation by providing a means to exclude unregistrable matter from a mark or design that combines matter that is registrable with matter that is not.

The functionality-based drawing requirement: The Examining Attorney maintained that all of the elements except the octagonal bezel with eight hexagonal screwheads and the pattern covering the back of the watch face are functional. The Board agreed only as to the circular watch face element: "[w]here . . . the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates widespread use of a design feature an applicant claims is a part of its trade dress, that feature is functional." As to the other elements, although each may have a function, the Office's proof of de jure functionality fell short.

In short, as to these other features, the evidence fails to show that the particular shape or design in the applications before us works better because of their configuration. E.g., In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (that a design element performs a function does not mean that the element is legally functional unless the degree of utility is such that the public needs to be able to use that element to compete effectively); see also In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 502 (CCPA 1961) (“A feature dictated solely by ‘functional’ (utilitarian) considerations may not be protected as a trademark; but mere possession of a function (utility) is not sufficient reason to deny protection.”).

The acquired distinctiveness-based drawing requirement: Applicant did not provide sales figures but pointed to its extensive advertising and promotional efforts. However, the advertisements depicted many different combinations of elements, and there was no "look for" advertising that directed consumers to the specific elements claimed in the drawings here. Importantly, most of the watches also displayed one of Applicant’s word marks (e.g., AUDEMARS PIGUET and/or AP) on the watch faces, which "detracts from the potential for Applicant’s advertising to educate consumers to look to the design elements alone to identify source."

The common thread among the watches depicted in these ads appears to be the octagonal bezel and eight evenly-spaced screwheads within the bezel. Indeed, Applicant’s website has expressly touted that “[t]he octagonal bezel with its 8 hexagonal screws have become the collection’s trademark.”

The Board concluded that applicant proved acquired distinctiveness only as to the octagonal-shaped bezel and the eight hexagonal screw heads. It found the other claimed elements to be nondistinctive and incapable of indicating source, necessitating the drawing requirement that they appear in dotted lines.

Conclusion: The Board pointed out that the applications may not be re-opened to allow amendment of the drawings. See Trademark Rule 2.142(g), 37 C.F.R. 2.141(g) (permitting re-opening of an application after a decision on appeal only as to disclaimers under Section 6, 15 U.S.C. § 1056). [FOB Pam Chestek points out in her comment that such an amendment to the original drawing would be an material alteration of the mark and thus not allowed].

The Board therefore affirmed the Board affirmed the refusals to register.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment:  So, applicant should have shown only the 8-sided bezel and 8-sided screw heads in solid lines. The other solid lines must be 86'd.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Friday, January 03, 2025

TTABlog Quarterly Index: October - December 2024

E-mail subscriptions to the TTABlog are available. Just enter your e-mail address in the box on the right to receive a daily update via Feedblitz. Please report any broken or inoperative links, as well as any errors and omissions, to the TTABlogger at jwelch at wolfgreenfield.com.

Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion:
Section 2(e)(1) - Mere Descriptiveness:
Section 2(f) - Acquired Distinctiveness:
Abandonment: Failure to Function/Specimen of Use:
Fraud: Genericness:
Discovery/Evidence/Procedure: Pan-American Convention: Recommended Reading: Other:

Text © John L. Welch 2024.

Thursday, January 02, 2025

Precedential No. 30: Illustration of Block Puzzle Merely Descriptive of Computer Game Software, Says TTAB

In this doubly rare case - a Section 2(e)(1) opposition involving an illustration of the goods - the Board found the proposed mark shown below to be merely descriptive of computer game software. "[C]onsumers who know that Applicant’s product is a block puzzle game will understand the mark to immediately convey information about it; that is, that the product is a downloadable and/or mobile computer block puzzle game as described in Applicant’s identification of goods." Hangzhou Mengku Technology Co., Ltd and Fuzhou Mengku Technology Co., Ltd v. Shanghai Zhenglang Technology Co., Ltd, Opposition No. 91272143 (December 30, 2024] [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Lawrence T. Stanley, Jr.). [oral argument held on September 19, 2024].

Applicant’s proposed mark is the "app icon" that is displayed alongside the app title, developer, and other information in online search results, including in the Google Play App Store, and on the app listing page in the Google Play App Store. The opposers develop and publish mobile games for download on the Google Play App Store, including a mobile game featuring block puzzles, and so they were entitled to a statutory cause of action [f/k/a standing] under Section 2(e)(1).

Noting the old saw that "a photograph can be worth a thousand words," the Board pointed out that "a pictorial representation, such as an illustration or photograph, may be considered just as descriptive as a word if it immediately conveys information as to the content, subject matter, feature, or characteristic of the goods or services." See, for example, In re Eight Ball, Inc., 217 USPQ 1183, 1184 (TTAB 1983) (pictorial representation of a cue stick and eight ball found merely descriptive of billiard parlor services).

To be considered merely descriptive, the illustration or representation need not be completely accurate, realistic or true-to-life. “[t]he ultimate guideline … is whether the design forthwith conveys an immediate idea of a feature of the goods and lacks any additional fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive matter.” The Board noted that applicant’s identification of goods is "unrestricted as to the type of downloadable or mobile computer game, and necessarily includes computer games of all sorts, including block puzzle games."

The Board found that the proposed mark "conveys an immediate idea of a feature of the goods, namely that Applicant’s product is a block puzzle game, as described in the identification of goods." Moreover, the mark "lacks any additional fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive matter."

Applicant’s design elements are either taken directly from the game (i.e., pale block game pieces against a dark background with faint lines forming a grid of rows and columns behind the game pieces, a brown border surrounding the gameplay area, and transparent blocks forming the identical shape below where the floating block appears), or are common elements used by third parties in a crowded field of block puzzle app icons (i.e., a glow of various colors around the active game piece and symmetrical placement of blocks). The minor changes in tint of the game pieces and the background of the gameplay area, the curved border instead of a square border, the symmetrical placement of blocks, and the choice to make the glow blue in Applicant’s proposed mark are “hardly sufficient to render the design distinctively stylized or fanciful.”

And so, the Board sustained the opposition.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: The Board's use of the language "block puzzle game as described in Applicant’s identification of goods" is misleading, since the idenfication does not expressly list "block puzzle games." Better to say "as encompassed within" rather than "as described in," I think.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Tuesday, December 31, 2024

TTAB Posts January 2025 Hearing Schedule

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) has scheduled five oral hearings for the month of January 2025. As indicated below, the first four will be held virtually and the fifth will be in-person at the USPTO's Madison East Building in Alexandria, Virginia. Briefs and other papers for each case may be found at TTABVUE via the links provided.

January 8, 2025 - 10 AM [Virtual]: In re Panini America, Inc., Serial No. 88960239 [Section 2(d) opposition to registration of ELEMENTS for "sports trading cards" in view of the registered mark ELEMENTALS for “art prints; printed comic magazines; printed comic strips; printed comic books; printed comics; decals; drawings; giclee prints; printed graphic novels; graphic prints; graphic prints and representations; printed illustrations; lithographic prints; lithographs; paintings; printed posters; stickers; collectible printed trading cards; graphic art prints"].

January 14, 2025 - 1 PM [Virtual]: Kiss Nail Products, Inc. v. Thank Nature LLC, Opposition No. 91257144 [Opposition to registration of the mark ECOKISS for "Body butter; Cosmetics; Facial scrubs; Facial washes; Hair conditioner; Hair shampoo; Moisturizing creams; Bar soap; Cosmetic mud masks; Facial moisturizers; all of the foregoing made with natural and/or environmentally friendly ingredients," on the ground of likelihood of confusion with the registered mark KISS and various KISS-formative marks, for cosmetics, skincare, and other beauty and personal care products].

January 16, 2025 - 1 PM [Virtual]: Beth Barden v. Knead Hospitality + Design, LLC, Opposition No. 91279889 and Cancellation No. 92078440 [Petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark LIL' SUCCOTASH and opposition to registration of SUCCOTASH PRIME on the ground of likelihood of confusion with plaintiff's alleged common law rights in the mark SUCCOTASH, all for restaurant services].

January 23, 2025 - 2 PM [Virtual]: Chris Galati v. Herer Media & Publishing, Inc., Oppositions Nos. 91264518, 91264520, 91265414, and 91271537 [Consolidated opposition to registration of the mark JACK HERER for pipes for smoking, t-shirts, and online and retail store services featuring a variety of consumer articles, on numerous grounds, including nonownership, fraud, likelihood of confusion, likelihood of dilution, mere descriptiveness, deceptive misdescriptiveness, and lack of bona fide intent].

January 28, 2025 - 10 AM [In-Person]: O&M Halyard, Inc. v. Guidepoint Global, LLC, Cancellation Nos. 92077680 and 92078922 [Petitions for cancellation of registrations for the marks QSIGHT and GUIDEPOINT QSIGHT for business consulting and business informational services, on the ground of likelihood of confusion with the registered QSIGHT and QSIGHT-formative marks for clinical inventory management software and services, and counterclaim for cancellation of four of the pleaded registrations on the ground on nonownership].


Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment:  Any predictions? 

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.

Monday, December 30, 2024

Precedential No. 29: USPTO Has Inherent Authority to Correct its Error by Cancelling Inadvertently Issued Registration

The Board ironed out a wrinkle in this rather straightforward affirmance of a Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusal of NURSECON (in standard character form) for "Arranging and conducting special events for social entertainment purposes." The Board rejected the applicant's argument that the USPTO exceeded its authority when it cancelled the registration for this mark and restored the application to pending status. "[T]he cancellation of the registration number as inadvertently issued was an appropriate exercise of the USPTO's inherent authority to correct its errors." In re Nursecon, LLC, Serial No. 88052194 (December 26, 2024) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mary Beth Myles).

After the applicant’s Statement of Use was accepted and the application was published for opposition, but before the registration issued, Examining Attorney Ingrid Eulin added a note to the application file stating:

It has come to the examining attorney’s attention that a refusal of registration must issue. Due to processing limitations, the USPTO is unable [to] stop the registration from issuing. Therefore, on the registration date, the registration will be cancelled as inadvertently issued and the application restored to pendency in order for a refusal to be issued.

After the registration issued, the Office cancelled it and restored the application to pending status. The applicant argued "that the USPTO exceeded its authority by unilaterally cancelling an issued registration to re-open examination of the Application" and further that the proposed mark is not merely descriptive. Ultimately, the Section 2(e)(1) refusal was made final, and this appeal ensued.

The applicant argued that the USPTO’s jurisdiction over a trademark application ends with the issuance of the registration and that, absent some change in fact or law or some other exigent circumstances, the USPTO lacks the authority to cancel a previously issued registration. The Board was unmoved.

The USPTO has a duty to issue valid registrations in compliance with the Trademark Act and “to examine all trademark applications for compliance with each and every eligibility requirement.” In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 600 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The USPTO, like all administrative agencies, possesses inherent authority to reconsider its decisions. *** The USPTO also has “broad authority to correct [its] errors.” The Last Best Beef, LLC v. Dudas, 506 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that the USPTO acted within its inherent authority to correct its own unlawful action by canceling the issuance of two registrations).

Although the TMEP states that an examining attorney must correct a "clear error," that statement is merely an "administrative guideline." And even though the Examining Attorney here did not explicitly state that there was a "clear error" in failing to issue a descriptiveness refusal, "the determination that a refusal should have issued under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) was nevertheless a finding of clear error."

[T]he USPTO possesses inherent authority to correct its errors, recognized by courts .... That authority does not derive from the TMEP. Rather, the TMEP provides guidance for procedure. See Foreword to TMEP.

Turning to the substantive issue, the Examining Attorney maintained that the proposed mark is merely descriptive because NURSE describes the target consumers of Applicant’s services, CON is a shortened version of “conference” or “convention,” and the combination of the two words does not alter the descriptive meaning of the proposed mark. The Board agreed, finding that NURSECON "describes a significant feature of Applicant’s recited services, namely, that they may be and are provided at nursing conferences." Furthermore, conferences and conventions themselves may constitute "special events for social entertainment purposes."

The applicant asserted that it coined the term NURSECON, but the Board pointed out once again that "the fact that Applicant may be the first or only user of a term does not render the term distinctive if, as here, it has been shown to be merely descriptive of the [services] in the application."

The Board had no doubt that NURSECON is merely descriptive of the applicant's services, and so it affirmed the refusal to register.

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TTABlogger comment: The TMEP is not the law! One of my favorite rants.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.

Friday, December 27, 2024

TTABlog Test: Three Recent Section 2(d) Appeals - How Did They Turn Out?

A TTAB judge once said to me that one can predict the outcome of a Section 2(d) appeal about 95% of the time just by looking at the marks and the goods/services. Of course, if you just said "affirmed" you'd be right about 90% of the time. Anyway, here are three Board decisions issued on Christmas Adam. No hints this time. How do you think they came out? [Answer in first comment].


In re Blue Dragon Fly, Inc., Serial No. 90825428 (December 19, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert H. Coggins). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark shown below, for, "Bath cream; Body cream; Body lotion; Hair lotion; Hand cream; Hand lotions; Skin cream; Skin lotion" and for "Shirts; T-shirts; Tee shirts" in view of the registered mark BLUE DRAGONFLY ACRES for "Body butter; Bath soaps in liquid, solid or gel form."

In re Dictador Holding Limited, Serial No. 97349113 (December 23, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin) [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark DICTADOR ARTHOUSE SPIRITS for "Alcoholic beverages, except beer and wine" [SPIRITS disclaimed] in view of the registered mark ART HOUSE for "wine."]

In re Monogram Health, Inc., Serial No. 97412872 (December 23, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Michael B. Adlin). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark shown below left, for "medical services in the field of nephrology" in view of the registered mark shown below right, for "medical services, namely, medication monitoring and drug detection services to evaluate patient treatment plans and improve clinical outcomes and patient safety."]

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TTABlogger comment: See any WYHA?s? BTW: What's the difference between T-shirts and Tee shirts? The latter are for golfers only.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.