The Top Ten TTAB Decisions of 2024 (Part II)
The TTABlogger has once again gone out on a limb to chose the ten (10) TTAB decisions that he considers to be the most important and/or interesting from the previous calendar year (2024). This is the second of two posts; the first five (5) selections are posted here. Additional commentary on each case may be found at the linked TTABlog post.
Laverne John Andrusiek v. Cosmic Crusaders LLC and Lewis J. Davidson, 2024 USPQ2d 21 (TTAB 2024) [redesignated as precedential January 3, 2024] (Opinion by Judge Frances Wolfson) [TTABlogged here]. The Board granted a petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark CAPTAIN CANNABIS for comic books, on the ground of likelihood of confusion with Petitioner Andrusiek’s identical mark, for which he claimed prior use for comic books. Andrusiek’s “actual” trademark use on comic books did not begin until 2017, but from 2006 he used the term as the name of a character, which the Board accepted as use analogous to trademark use. The question, then, was whether Andrusiek made technical trademark use (or “actual use,” as the Board put it) of the CAPTAIN CANNABIS mark within a reasonable time after his analogous use. Andrusiek submitted evidence of such technical trademark use from 2016 and 2017, including displays of comic book covers on Amazon.com, on YouTube, and in other media. The Board found that “Petitioner’s actual trademark use in 2017 was within a commercially reasonable period of time following his analogous use in 2013-14 so as to create a ‘continuing association of the mark’ with Petitioner’s goods.” Viewing the evidence as a whole, “as if each piece of evidence were part of a puzzle,” the Board found that “when fitted together,” the puzzle pieces established prior use by Andrusiek.]
In re Samsung Display Co., Ltd., 2024 USPQ2d 1279 (TTAB 2024) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert H. Coggins) [TTABlogged here]. The Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark UPC for, inter alia, display panels as components of computers and smart phones, finding confusion likely with the identical mark registered for charging cables and power connectors. Applicant Samsung argued that, to show relatedness of the goods, “something more” is required than the mere fact that some third-party manufacturers sell both types of goods. The Board was not impressed. The Board found that “the goods are related because they are each incorporated and used in the same finished electronic products.” As to Samsung’s “something more” argument, the Board pointed out that the two cases relied on by Samsung – Coors Brewing and St. Helena Hospital – involved the relatedness of goods and services, thus “limiting the requirement for ‘something more’ to circumstances where goods are used in the rendering of services and the relatedness of the goods and services is not evident, well known, or generally recognized.” Coors Brewing involved beer and restaurant services, while St. Helena Hospital concerned hospital-based lifestyle programs and printed materials dealing with fitness. Although some purchasers of the involved goods here may be sophisticated, others are not – such as hobbyists and gamers who build or repair their own electronic devices – and there was no evidence that these ordinary consumers would exercise more than ordinary care.
State Permits, Inc. v. Fieldvine, Inc., 2024 USPQ2d 1458 (TTAB 2024) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington) [TTABlogged here]. In a “somewhat unusual” Section 2(d) cancellation proceeding targeting a Supplemental Register registration and involving “dueling claims of acquired distinctiveness,” the Board granted a petition for cancellation of Fieldvine, Inc.’s registration for the mark PERMITS.COM for construction permit services. Although Petitioner State Permits, Inc. could not prove acquired distinctiveness for its mark PERMIT.COM, it did prove first use for identical services, and that was enough. Unlike in a challenge to a registration on the Principal Register, where the challenger must prove prior proprietary rights in its mark, if the challenged registration resides on the Supplemental Register and covers a descriptive term that lacks acquired distinctiveness, a prior user of a confusingly similar term may succeed in cancelling that registration even without establishing acquired distinctiveness for its own mark. As the CAFC observed in Books on Tape, it would be an "anomalous result" if, "in view of our finding of a likelihood of confusion, Respondent is permitted to keep its Supplemental Register registration for PERMITS.COM, in the absence of a showing of acquired distinctiveness and in the face of Petitioner’s prior use of PERMIT.COM.”
Alfred Sarmento v. Maria Manuela Pinho DE Carvalho, 2024 USPQ2d 1683 (TTAB 2024) [precedential]. [TTABlogged here]. In this opposition to registration of the mark VICE REI for “Wine; Spirits; Liqueurs; Anise liqueur,” the Board denied opposer’s motion for partial summary judgment grounded on non-ownership of the mark on which applicant’s international registration was based. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) had cancelled the international registration after the Portuguese Trademark Office ruled that the applicant did not own the mark. Nevertheless, the Board gave its blessing to the transformation of the United States request for extension of protection into a national application with a Section 1(b) intent-to-use basis. The Board observed that applicant properly followed the procedures for transformation under Section 70(c) of the Trademark Act, and it then held that Sarmento’s contention that the mark was improperly transformed “cannot form the basis of an inter partes challenge to the registrability of the mark.” “Processing a request for transformation is a ministerial act, and there is no substantive examination of the document(s) or the permissibility of the circumstances that prompted the request for transformation.” Furthermore, opposer’s non-ownership claim was meritless because the challenged application is based on intent-to-use, and there is no statutory requirement that a Section 1(b) applicant be the owner of the mark at the time of filing.
Iron Balls International Ltd. v. Bull Creek Brewing, LLC, 2024 USPQ2d 1004 (TTAB 2024) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge David K. Heasley). [TTABlogged here].Attempting to side-step a Section 2(d) refusal of the mark shown below, for “gin,” Iron Balls petitioned to restrict Respondent Bull Creek’s registration for the mark IRON BALLS for “beer” to “micro-brewed craft beer.” The Board found that the proposed restriction would not avoid a likelihood of confusion, and so it denied the petition. Under Section 18 of the Trademark Act, “[a] party seeking to restrict a registrant’s broadly worded identification of goods under Section 18 must plead and prove ‘(1) that the registrant is not using its mark on goods or services that would be excluded by the limitation, and (2) that the limitation would result in the avoidance of a finding of a likelihood of confusion.’” As to the first requirement, the Board found it significant that Bull Creek represented itself as a “craft brewery” and displayed the “Independent Craft Brewer Seal” on its labels, and so it concluded that relevant purchasers would see respondent as a “brewer with a limited, small batch output” and would consider it to be a “craft microbrewery” and its goods “micro-brewed craft beer.” However, as to the second requirement, “even if Respondent’s goods could be characterized as ‘micro-brewed craft beer,’ and even if its identification of goods were so restricted, the restriction would not avoid a likelihood of confusion.”
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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.