Keep An Eye On This

As much of the content of the traditional media rankles many of us, the editorial decisions should as well. Dozens of potentially game-changing stories go unreported while the Umbrage Brigade on cable talk about what Joe Wilson said about Jimmy Carter or whether Michelle Obama is overstepping her boundaries by talking about health care (I caught that one today). Meanwhile, the biggest financial crisis in 70 years just happened, and even people who consider themselves well-informed don't understand the entire story. The Congress enacted the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (some are calling it the new Pecora Commission, given its similarity to the Depression-era commission of that name led by chief investigator Ferdinand Pecora), headed by former California Treasurer and gubernatorial candidate Phil Angelides, and they held their first public session yesterday. The meeting was introductory in nature, but Tim Fernholz came away with a few thoughts.

• Given the membership [PDF], I worried that the committee would be beset with partisan bickering and/or clashing ideologies, like the Congressional Oversight Panel. The COP, appointed by Congress to provide oversight of the bank rescues, is regularly undermined by dissents from Representative Jeb Hensarling, whose deeply conservative economic views preclude almost any reasonable discussion about regulation and finance. But though some tensions showed, I though the conservative New Pecora commissioners seemed open-minded; former Bush administration economic official Keith Hennessey and McCain economic adviser Douglas Holtz-Eakin made productive comments, though Peter Wallison, a more doctrinaire conservative than either of the other two, seemed to have his mind made up about the financial crisis, essentially blaming Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac right from the outset. He may be the poison pill on this committee.

• Most surprising was Vice-Chairman Bill Thomas, a former Republican Congressman and Committee Chair. Thomas seemed to agree broadly with Chairman Phil Angelides goals of non-partisan fact-finding, and went out of his way to compliment the views of every member of the commission. He even singled out Commissioner Brooksley Born, who strongly advocated regulating derivatives during the Clinton administration, telling her that the crisis would have been much more manageable had her advice been acted on. Later, asked by a reporter if the issue of regulating markets would divide the committee, Thomas stepped forward to say that he thought regulatory reform was inevitable and that making it work correctly was critical. Though it is easy for him to say that now, Thomas' early impressions are much less doctrinaire than had been anticipated.

• One concern: There is no liberal economist on the committee, while there are three conservative economic thinkers in Hennessey, Holtz-Eakin and Wallison. The Democratic appointees have regulatory, legal, political and private business experience, but no specific economic expertise.

• Early in the week, the New Pecora Commission announced the appointment of Thomas Greene as its Executive Director. Greene, a lawyer, has done complex investigatory work both in Washington, D.C. and in California, coordinating anti-trust and securities investigations in a variety of venues. The appointment is critical; recall that the Pecora Commission was named after it's executive director, Ferdinand Pecora, not the members of congress who constituted the actual committee. And more talent is coming: As Greene hung around after the hearing, several different people, including several lawyers, approached him about working for the commission.

The FCIC will hold hearings and issue regular reports between now and December 2010. This needs to be watched. We all have a sense that the banksters turned Wall Street into their private gambling hall and took huge risks, secure in the knowledge that they could get the government to bail them out if things went awry. Currently there have been no prosecutions of the major players in the scandal, no accountability to any degree, and a year later, Wall Street appears to be going back to their same old ways, entirely at our expense. Michael Hirsh believes that this commission offers one last chance to make the record public, and use it as a lever to change the system. He's not optimistic, however. The ideological shadings of the commission and Angelides' wariness of using the subpoena power he's been given worry him (I actually think Angelides can be a lot tougher than Hirsh or anyone gives him credit for). But he offers a glimmer of hope.

Still, Angelides and his team may yet surprise us. It's happened before. The history of "blue ribbon" commissions like this one is rich and storied in Washington; one of them, in 1942, was led by an obscure senator from Missouri who was also seen as a political hack at the time. His name was Harry Truman, and he turned his commission on defense malfeasance into a ticket into the White House and the history books [...]

What we do need, however, is a parade of witnesses who will provide what's been missing so far in this crisis—a prominent outlet for public outrage. In the last nine months, the Obama administration and the grandees in Congress have been designing solutions without much input from the outside, often using experts from Wall Street (especially "Government Sachs"). It's pretty much been a closed system. Even Paul Volcker, considered perhaps the greatest Federal Reserve chairman in history (now that the Alan Greenspan era looks much worse retrospectively), has been all but ignored by the president he is advising. Volcker has been making a series of speeches around the country calling for sensible changes to the structure of Wall Street that the administration and Congress are not yet considering. He wants federally guaranteed bank deposits to be cordoned off from heavy risk-taking and proprietary trading. Volcker wants banks, in other words, to be barred from behaving like hedge funds. "Extensive participation in the impersonal, transaction-oriented capital market does not seem to me an intrinsic part of commercial banking," Volcker told a corporate group Wednesday in Los Angeles. He should be invited to Washington to say the same thing.

I can remember a time when commissions like these, from the Pecora Commission to the Truman Commission to Watergate to Iran-Contra to even the 9-11 Commission, were major public news, followed intensely by the media. You'd think that a similarly designed commission tasked with uncovering the greatest loss of wealth in world history would generated more than a few words on the cable news crawl. But we have to make this important, too. The FCIC may fall into partisan bickering, or it may create some powerful narratives about the criminal enterprise on Wall Street. But none of it will matter if nobody pays any attention.

Imagining The Paul Volcker Treasury Department

Paul Volcker was pretty heavily involved with the Obama transition team, and certainly had the ear of the Administration at some point. I don't know the status of that now. But hopefully they pick up on this article in the Wall Street Journal:

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker on Wednesday said banks should operate in a much less risky fashion, including not making trading bets with their own capital, comments that could provoke intensified debates over the future of financial regulation.

Mr. Volcker, who currently is chairman of the White House's Economic Recovery Advisory Board, suggested banks should be restricted to trading on their client's behalf instead of making bets with their own money through internal units that often act like hedge funds.

"Extensive participation in the impersonal, transaction-oriented capital market does not seem to me an intrinsic part of commercial banking," he said in a speech to the Association for Corporate Growth in Los Angeles [...]

Mr. Volcker said banks should be banned from "sponsoring and capitalizing" hedge funds and private-equity firms, which are largely unregulated. He also said "particularly strict supervision, with strong capital and collateral requirements, should be directed toward limiting proprietary securities and derivatives trading."

He also said collateral and leverage restrictions against the largest nonbank financial institutions "may be needed."

That's because it isn't, it's just become a growth center for banks that can operate like a casino and get the government to bail them out if things go wrong.

Volcker is basically advocating a similar version of the reforms that came out of the Great Depression. Then, banks were separated into commercial and investment entities under the Glass-Steagall Act, and bank holding companies could not own other financial firms. That came out of the Pecora Commission recommendations, which dug up so much of Wall Street's corrupt practices that the necessity of reform could not be refuted.

In a Volcker Treasury Department, instead of Tim Geithner, we would have a chance to make these the starting points for reform, and invigorate the modern-day Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, or Angelides Commission, to dig deep and look into what the financial firms did to nearly destroy the economy. The banksters would be fending off the cries for reform instead of using their lobbying arms to channel them in business-friendly ways.

Now wouldn't that be nice?

...Matt Taibbi says that Volcker was basically beached after the campaign along with a lot of the other more progressively minded economic advisers. It sounds pretty right.

Angelides On Pecora II

Tim Fernholz talks with Phil Angelides, the new chairman of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, a modern-day analogue to the Pecora Commission of the 1930s, charged with finding out the origins of the financial crisis, who we should hold responsible, and how we can ensure it never happens again. There are some interesting tidbits in the interview. First, we can be sure that Angelides has an understanding of the problem.

Why is this commission important?

The magnitude of what's happened in this country is astounding. Millions of people have lost their homes, millions of people have lost their life savings, millions of Americans have seen their pensions disappear. We have seen over a trillion dollars in taxpayer money go to prop up a dying financial system. This is a cataclysm. My view is that there is a real hunger in this country to have a pursuit of the truth, to find out what happened and why it happened, so hopefully, instead of sweeping it under the rug, it will not happen again in our lifetimes. This is an important commission with a critical role of serving the nation's best interests because we are called on to look into something that has been fundamentally important to this country: The very foundations of our financial system have been shaken [...]

Do you believe we already have a broad understanding of what led to this crisis, or do you feel there are a lot of questions still unanswered?

All of us come with our personal views. I'll start by saying that in the early part of this decade, as early as 2002, I was concerned about what was happening the marketplace. I was deeply concerned about executive compensation so I mobilize shareholders across the country to push back on executive compensation. I was concerned about lax enforcement at the SEC. ... I was part of a movement of activist shareholders in an effort to bring some common sense to the market place. In the wake of the Enron and Worldcom, we had some momentum, but the economy recovered and the regulators took their foot off the brakes. We all come in with our own viewpoints, but our job is to look at this fresh.

Next, he's willing to give his Republican colleagues on the committee some input, but he's setting ground rules and he thinks he can get the others on the commission to play ball:

The commission has the ability to subpoena information, but only if at least one of the Republican appointees supports the decision. Are you at all concerned about disagreement within the committee hurting its ability to gather information?

When the Speaker and the Majority Leader asked me to serve as chair, [I knew] this would be a hard and difficult road. I'm starting on the assumption that other commissioners, like myself, are interested in getting to the facts and the root causes. If we have to issue subpoenas, I hope we can do that. Hopefully people [with information] will cooperate, but if not, we were given the tools to get the facts. I would want to start on the basis that no commissioner would want to deprive us of information to make a good judgment on behalf of the American people. The commission is interesting because it really focuses on the inquiry, rather than the policy and political implications. I think that gives us a better chance of coming up with a nonpartisan, bipartisan findings of facts.

And finally, he seems to recognize something that a lot of people don't - the regulators probably had the capacity to stop at least the most egregious criminality happening in the markets, but they didn't use the authority they had. What the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission can offer is, in Angelides' words, "a road map" and "a guidebook" to the next generation of regulators, so they know what to look for and where to go.

Now, Zachary Roth has a long piece about Bill Thomas and the other Republicans on the FCIC, or Pecora II, and how they are partisan enough to resist a real inquiry. The provision that one Republican must vote with Democrats in order to issue subpoenas could allow anyone Republicans don't want testifying to be able to do so; and all of the Republicans appear, to Roth, to be candidates to hang together:

None of the three rank-and-file Republican appointees seem like good candidates to break ranks. Peter Wallison is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, who has been a prominent advocate of the favored conservative notion that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the true culprits in the crisis, and who argued this week in the Washington Post against creating a consumer protection commission for financial products -- an idea seen by many as a cornerstone of any effort to reform the financial regulatory system. Doug Holtz-Eakin, for his part, was John McCain's top economic adviser at the time when the GOP presidential nominee declared the fundamentals of the economy strong. And Keith Hennessey is a former economic adviser to President Bush and a former aide to Sen. Trent Lott.

But it's the identity of the Republican-appointed vice chair -- whose support is required by law for the commission to perform several other key functions, like hiring staff -- that's the really ominous sign. That's Bill Thomas, the Republican former congressman from California, who earlier this decade chaired the House Ways and Means committee.

During his years in Congress, Thomas, who now works for a major DC lobbying firm, acquired a reputation as a smart, highly-skilled and acutely partisan supporter of big business, who once tried to have Democrats forcibly ousted from a capitol meeting room, and was accused of being literally in bed with a corporate lobbyist.

I'd agree that Wallison and probably Hennessey and Thomas are useless, but Holtz-Eakin, a former head of the CBO, has at least displayed flashes of intellectual honesty when he wasn't in charge of a Presidential campaign's economic policies. He has acknowledged the need for higher taxes. He has called for the Bush tax cuts to expire. He's definitely conservative and he sometimes says some boneheaded things, but I don't see him as a hardcore partisan, actually. And if Angelides structures this as a just the facts inquiry, there's at least the promise of a legitimate investigation.