Islamism . . . or Tribalism?

Richard Landes

(Image from Center for Millennial Studies )

Richard Landes -- son of David Landes, who wrote The Unbound Prometheus, a classic on the rise of technology and capitalism -- has posted a blog entry, "Salzman on Tribal Islam: Insights of an Anthropologist" (4/7/2008) at Augean Stables commenting on a long article by Stanley Kurtz, "I and My Brother Against My Cousin," The Weekly Standard (4/14/2008, Volume 013, Issue 29), in which Kurtz asks, "Is Islam the best way to understand the war on terror?" and suggests that "Tribalism may offer a clearer view of our enemies' motivations."

The Salzman in question is Philip Carl Salzman, who has written a book -- titled Culture and Conflict in the Middle East (Humanity Books, 2008) -- that applies the anthropology of tribes to an understanding of the Middle East. This is a neglected aspect of the reality that we face in our encounter with friends and foes in, for example, Afghanistan and Iraq -- as I've begun to perceive through the success that the US Military has had in destroying Al Qaeda in Iraq through allying itself with the tribes that had come to detest Al Qaeda, as in the Anbar Province of western Iraq, for example.

I won't attempt to summarize the entire article, but you can read it at Augean Stables for the benefit of comments interspersed by Landes -- a very bright fellow whom I got to know on a listserve about First-Century Judaism a couple of years ago (though he'd likely not recall me).

The post offers some rather hard-hitting views. Here's Kurtz applying Salzman's anthropological findings:

Arab tribesmen are preoccupied with maintaining deterrence and prepared to use force preemptively, if necessary -- rather like über neocons. The ironic but very real parallel is a function of the de facto stateless anarchy in which Arab Bedouin live -- and the de facto global anarchy that hawkish conservatives rightly believe to be the underlying reality of the international system. Saddam Hussein's interest in being taken to possess WMDs, whether or not he actually had them, makes sense in light of the link between deterrence and reputation. The emboldening effects of America's pre-9/11 retreats in Somalia, Lebanon, and elsewhere show the reverse of the medal. Although this is a familiar litany, I'd argue that the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the rage against the Muhammad cartoons, the killing of Theo van Gogh, and a host of related acts of intimidation ought to be placed under the heading of pro-active deterrence as well.

Landes comments:

And the Western response as an invitation to further aggression. What's interesting is how the demopathic spokesmen for this side scream hysterically at "unprovoked" or "excessive" response by the Israelis or the Americans, and how well that plays before a Western audience driven by both PCP and resentment of those in the West who do fight back.

Interestingly, however, Kurtz sees tribalism, despite its honor-shame culture, as more flexible than Islam:

While tribalism is in one sense culturally pervasive in the Middle East, tribal practices are less swathed in sacredness than explicitly Koranic symbols and commandments -- and are therefore more susceptible to criticism and debate. Even jihad and suicide bombing can be interpreted through a tribal lens.

Landes, by contrast, sees more positive value in an Islam that has shed its honor-shame aspect:

Indeed, in my reading, all demotic monotheism is against honor-shame, including demotic Islam. Monotheism in the grip of honor-shame, as much of political Islam, is imperialist. But Islam, like Christianity and Judaism, has a profound core of respect for the individual soul and the willing acceptance of the yoke of heaven (i.e., ethical restraints), rather than the denominational imposition of their interpretation of that yoke -- that coincides spectacularly with the fundamental democratic notion that the social contract will only work, and democratic elections will only succeed as a means to choose leaders, if the polity has a critical mass of honest, self-regulating, morally autonomous adults. Then you have the key ingredients in civil society -- voluntarism, commitment to respect for the "other," ability to restrain one's own desires.

I wonder if this is true. Does Islam have "a profound core of respect for the individual soul and the willing acceptance of the yoke of heaven," or is it fundamentally theocratic and therefore at odds with democracy?

Either way, all three guys -- Landes, Kurtz, and Salzman -- are highly intelligent scholars worth engaging with. Read the entire, rather long post at Augean Stables.

Barack Obama: In to Africa...

Kenya

(Image from Wikipedia)

To understand Barack Obama today, you have to know what he came to understand through his trip to Kenya. His earlier views on Third World, or even African solidarity took a few knocks.

Wanting to see more of Kenya, he decides to take a safari trip to the Great Rift Valley, so he and his half-sister Auma go to a travel agency in Nairobi. The agency is run by 'Asians' -- the British term for "South Indians" -- as are most small businesses in Nairobi, according to Barack.

These 'Asians' are not especially popular, as Obama comes to find out -- along with some other disappointing revelations. As he and Auma ride a van to the safari spot, he recalls that as they were purchasing their tickets at the travel agency, Auma had tensed up:

"You see how arrogant they are?" she had whispered as we watched a young Indian woman order her black clerks to and fro. "They call themselves Kenyans, but they want nothing to do with us. As soon as they make their money, they send it off to London or Bombay."

Her attitude touched a nerve. "How can you blame Asians for sending their money out of the country," I had asked her, "after what happened in Uganda?" I had gone on to tell her about the close Indian and Pakistani friends I had back in the States, friends who had supported black causes, friends who had lent me money when I was tight and had taken me into their homes when I'd had no place to stay. Auma had been unmoved.

"Ah, Barack," she had said. "Sometimes you're so naive."

I looked at Auma now, her face turned toward the window. What had I expected my little lecture to accomplish? My simple formulas for Third World solidarity had little application in Kenya. Here, persons of Indian extraction were like the Chinese in Indonesia, the Koreans in the South Side of Chicago, outsiders who knew how to trade and kept to themselves, working the margins of a racial caste system, more visible and so more vulnerable to resentment. It was nobody's fault necessarily. It was just a matter of history, an unfortunate fact of life.

Anyway, the divisions in Kenya didn't stop there: there were always finer lines to draw. Between the country's forty black tribes, for example. They, too, were a fact of life. You didn't notice the tribalism so much among Auma's friends, younger university-educated Kenyans who'd been schooled in the idea of nation and race; tribe was an issue with them only when they were considering a mate, or when they got older and saw it help or hinder careers. But they were the exceptions. Most Kenyans still worked with older maps of identity, more ancient loyalties. Even [Aunt] Jane or [Aunt] Zeituni could say things that surprised me. "The Luo are intelligent but lazy," they would say. Or "The Kikuyu are money-grubbing but industrious." Or "The Kalenjins -- well, you can see what's happened to the country since they took over."

Hearing my aunts traffic in such stereotypes, I would try to explain to them the error of their ways. "It's thinking like that that holds us back," I would say. "We're all part of one tribe. The black tribe. The human tribe. Look at what tribalism has done to places like Nigeria or Liberia."

And Jane woud say, "Ah, those West Africans are all crazy anyway. You know they used to be cannibals, don't you?"

And Zeituni would say, "You sound just like your father, Barry. He also had such ideas about people."

Meaning he, too, was naive; he, too, liked to argue with history. Look what happened to him.... (pages 347-348)

What had happened to the elder Obama was that as a Luo in a time of Kalenjin dominance, tribalism had lost him his political position, his status, his wealth, his power, leaving his family to bicker over the small inheritance bequeathed to them.

In looking at all of this, Obama suffered some rather poignant impressions of Africa. He doesn't attempt to paper the problems over, perhaps in part because of what on old friend of his father, the historian Dr. Rukia Odero, told him when he and Auma visited her in her Nairobi home:

"Truth is usually the best corrective." (page 434)

For the moment, I'll leave it at that...