Listen to IRONMAN

There is an editorial in the New York Times today regarding Al Qaeda and 9-11 attacks. Will Congress ever take an interest in getting to the bottom of just what really went wrong?

The Deafness Before the Storm
By Kurt Eichenwald, New York Times, September 10, 2012

An excerpt from the editorial:

The direct warnings to Mr. Bush about the possibility of a Qaeda attack began in the spring of 2001. By May 1, the Central Intelligence Agency told the White House of a report that “a group presently in the United States” was planning a terrorist operation. Weeks later, on June 22, the daily brief reported that Qaeda strikes could be “imminent,” although intelligence suggested the time frame was flexible.

But some in the administration considered the warning to be just bluster. An intelligence official and a member of the Bush administration both told me in interviews that the neoconservative leaders who had recently assumed power at the Pentagon were warning the White House that the C.I.A. had been fooled; according to this theory, Bin Laden was merely pretending to be planning an attack to distract the administration from Saddam Hussein, whom the neoconservatives saw as a greater threat. Intelligence officials, these sources said, protested that the idea of Bin Laden, an Islamic fundamentalist, conspiring with Mr. Hussein, an Iraqi secularist, was ridiculous, but the neoconservatives’ suspicions were nevertheless carrying the day.

There was another briefing on July 10. Followed by an assessment by the FBI that prohibited then Attorney General, John Ashcroft, from flying on commercial airlines. And then came the now infamous August 6 briefing, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S." As time goes on, more and more information continues to trickle out - history will not be kind to those who ignored the warnings.

The unit that Kirk von Ackermann was once a member of, DO5 or the Asymmetric Threat Division, was shut down by mid-2001. DO5 was actively engaged in conducting analysis of bin Laden long before it was acceptable to do so.

Which brings us to von Ackermann's former colleague, IRONMAN, the unnamed intelligence officer who has worked tirelessly to get someone to pay attention. IRONMAN filed a formal complaint charging that the Joint Forces intelligence Command had not disclosed all original material relating to the 9/11
Commissioninvestigation by House and Senate Intelligence Committees. A review was conducted. Part of that review included questionnaires and interviews. One such response:

Appendix B. (U) Scanned JFIC Response:

2. Did your agency have information prior to Sept 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorist cells were operating within the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the Joint inquiry.

ANSWER: No, but prior to Sept 11, 2001, neither JFIC nor JFCOM tracked terrorist activity in the United States. The United States was not part of JFCOM's AOR.

From IRONMAN's complaint published at Truthout:

(U) Contrary to JFIC's formal report to the JCS staff, JFIC had a direct and assigned purview on international terrorism against the U.S., to include the operations of al-Qa'ida and the 9/11 attackers. JFIC was directly responsible to both Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and its subordinate, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) for all-source intelligence anaiysis of international terrorism against the U.S. To ensure the quality of such analysis, JFlC's commanding officer [redacted] established the Asymmetric Threat Branch (DO5), charged with reporting on asymmetric threats, especially terrorism. [redacted] was subsequently promoted to JFCOM J2. As a RADM and PACOM J2, she established another Asymmetric Threat branch at PACOM.)

(U) The Asymmetric Threat Branch in JFIC was a forerunner of current all-source fusion centers. Unlike other analytical offices in the intelligence community, DO5 members had a wide mix of skilis in all six intelligence disciplines - HUMINT, OSINT, COMINT, ELINT, IMINT, and MASINT. Consequently, DO5 was abie to develop and use all-source, original analysis in a manner probably then unprecedented within the intelligence community. DO5 began preparing a wide range of original analysis on asymmetric warfare, especially terrorism, from mid-1998 until mid-2001.

And on it goes.

EXCLUSIVE: New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, Truthout, June 13, 2011
Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response

More info and links at the JFIC tag below.

DO5 Puzzle

It's bugging me.

What does "DO5" stand for?

(U) JFIC's Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5)

(U) In 1999, the JFIC created the Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5) to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Director of Operations recruited JFIC personnel from the command based upon their counterintelligence and counterterrorism expertise. The DO5 provided current intelligence briefings and produced the Worldwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the USJFCOM Intelligence staff. The DO5 also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). The JTF-CS assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance. The DO5 supported the JTF-CS exercises by establishing fictional terrorist organizations that would mimic real world terrorist groups. In the summer of 2001, the DO5 was realigned under the Intelligence Watch Center.

JFIC [...] stated that DO5's emphasis was on force protection for the USJFCOM components.

Deep Operations, Division of Intelligence Operations, Directorate of Operations, Dude Overboard...

Excerpts above from:

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

Capt Stephen Santez USN

Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN presenting Captain Kirk von Ackermann, USAF a Joint Service Commendation Medal from the JFIC on April 26, 2000

Within the last year, the name of a highly classified intelligence program of which Kirk von Ackermann was once a member was revealed with the release of documents under an FOIA request by a former intelligence officer known only as IRONMAN.

DO5 or the Asymmetric Threat Branch of the Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) was actively tracking Al Qaida until late 2000-early 2001 when it was inexplicably shut down by commanding officers. Kirk von Ackermann is said to have carried the weight of the prescience of his predictions - his hands tied by more senior officers - for the years to come.

That's not to say his work went unrecognized. As a result of his service with DO5, Kirk von Ackermann received at least one commendation, formally presented by Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN. What event or service to the nation prompted the commendation is unknown. Kirk von Ackermann's wife Megan once wrote:

I heard things about 'briefings' and gradually recognized that the briefings were often to quite senior officers. I know there were commendations and awards, but details were obscured.

With the ever increasing role of social networking in and around our modern lives, it should come as no surprise that there is a LinkedIn page for Steve Santez, the same CAPT Santez pictured above. Included on Santez LinkedIn page is a short description of his work experience as the Director of Operations at the Joint Forces Intelligence Command from 1999-2002. It's worth noting that Director of Operations = J3.

Screen capture of LinkedIn page for Steve Santez

Steve Santez
Senior Intelligence Training Development Integrator at BAE Systems
Norfolk, Virginia Area
Defense and Space
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/steve-santez/47/a25/6a9

"…Expert in all-source intelligence with specific emphasis on asymmetric threat analysis, human intelligence, intelligence training development and delivery, and concept development and experimentation leading to results…"

Director of Operations
Joint Forces Intelligence Center
August 1999 – February 2002 (2 years 7 months) Norfolk, Virginia

Drove all intelligence analysis, production and training for the US Joint Forces Command Joint Forces Intelligence Center. Led over 100 military and civilian personnel across all mission areas of analysis, targeting, collections, watch center fusion, and asymmetric threat analysis. Led initial analysis during the Russian submarine KURSK sinking. Director of Operations during disestablishment of the US Atlantic Command and establishment of the US Joint Forces Command. Created the first asymmetric threat division at JFIC in support of Joint Task Force Civil Support and led analysis of Al Qaeda pre 9/11. Agent for change; worked with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to migrate Joint Personnel Recovery Intelligence Production to the Joint Forces Intelligence Center.

The language in Steve Santez bio more or less mirrors the same language found in the IRONMAN FOIA, Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry which accompanies an article at TruthOut by Jeffrey Kaye.

(U) Contrary to JFIC's formal report to the JCS staff, JFIC had a direct and assigned purview on international terrorism against the U.S., to include the operations of al-Qa'ida and the 9/11 attackers. JFIC was directly responsible to both Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and its subordinate, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) for all-source intelligence anaiysis of international terrorism against the U.S. To ensure the quality of such analysis, JFlC's commanding officer [redacted] established the Asymmetric Threat Branch (DO5), charged with reporting on asymmetric threats, especially terrorism. [redacted] was subsequently promoted to JFCOM J2. As a RADM and PACOM J2, she established another Asymmetric Threat branch at PACOM.)

(U) The Asymmetric Threat Branch in JFIC was a forerunner of current all-source fusion centers. Unlike other analytical offices in the intelligence community, DO5 members had a wide mix of skilis in all six intelligence disciplines - HUMINT, OSINT, COMINT, ELINT, IMINT, and MASINT. Consequently, DO5 was abie to develop and use all-source, original analysis in a manner probably then unprecedented within the intelligence community. DO5 began preparing a wide range of original analysis on asymmetric warfare, especially terrorism, from mid-1998 until mid-2001.

For those unfamiliar with the significance of IRONMAN's Formal Complaint, this section should clarify matters:

(U) Reports on the most likely targets for domestic and international terrorists, both within the U.S. and abroad, as well as adjunct targets during a traditional war. The most sensitive of these reports were those identifying targets within the U.S., developing scenarios, analysis of commonalities for use in planning responses and recommendations for preventative action. This U.S. tasking was given by JTF-CS.

(S/NF) The reports were first prepared in the summer of 2000, in support of JTF-CS, and were briefed to the JFCOM J2, JTF-CS J2, and senior JFCOM staff, including the DCINC and J3. The JTF-CS Commander may have also attended the briefings. The first version of the briefing was entitled "The WMD Threat to the U.S.", (information cut off date 16 July 2000). The briefing slides emphasized that New York City was the most difficult consequence management problem, and recommended using NYC as the model for planning /exercises. The oral briefing itself was much more sensitive, indicating that the World Trade Centers # 1 and # 2 were the most likely buildings to be attacked in the U.S., followed closely by the Pentagon. The briefer indicated that the worst case scenario would be one tower collapsed onto the other. The possibility of striking the buildings with a plane may have been discussed then - it was certainly discussed in the red cell analysis leading up to the briefing. The acting Deputy of DO5, [redacted] proposed in the red cell analysis that the building could be struck by a jetliner. Discussion followed on contacting World Trade Center security and engineering/architectural staff, but the idea was not further explored because of a command climate discouraging contact with the civilian community. However, at the end of the briefing, the JFCOM J3 directed that the national military terrorism exercise for FY 02 be based on a New York worse-case scenario. He indicated he would've preferred to have done so in FY 01, but the military was already financially committed to another use (a cruise ship) in FY01.

Please keep in mind that all of this work was happening well before September 11, 2001.

The lives that could have and should have been protected...

(U) [...] In addition, I and the deputy of that team, [redacted] especially carried the burden of knowledge of how close DoD came to bin Ladin and perhaps being able to reduce the number of lives lost on 9/11. I do not want that burden any longer. [redacted] and I discussed this issue the last time we spoke. He remains the longest missing man in Iraq in this war, and I want, one day, to be able to explain to his children what their father foresaw.

The longest missing man in Iraq is Kirk von Ackermann.

Related Reading

DO5 in the News
September 9, 2011

Rear Admiral Rosanne LeVitre, USN
July 21, 2011

Counter Terrorism and JFIC
May 6, 2011

Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann
October 8, 2006

Joint Service Commendation Medal
January 23, 2006

References

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden

By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

Allegation of Misleading Congress PDF
To: Hon. Claude M. Kicklighter
DoD Inspector General
From: Edward Maguire
Director of National Intelligence
November 27, 2007

Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

Abbreviations - used above

COMINT - Communications Intelligence
DO5 - Asymmetric Threat Division
DOD - Department of Defense
ELINT - Electronic Intelligence
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
HUMINT- Intelligence
IMINT- Imagery Intelligence
J2 - Director for Intelligence
J3 - Director of Operations
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM - Joint Forces Command
JFIC - Joint Forces Intelligence Command
JIC - Joint Intelligence Center
JTF-CS - Joint Task Force- Civil Support
MASINT- Measurement and Signature Intelligence
OSINT- Open Source Intelligence
PACOM - Pacific Command
RADM - Rear Admiral
US - United States of America
USAF - United States Air Force
USN - United States Navy

DO5 in the News

Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold have a new article on the former military intelligence unit, DO5, and its work tracking Osama bin Laden over at Truthout. Kirk von Ackermann, the longest missing American in Iraq, while serving in the US Air Force, was a member of DO5. DO5 also known as the Asymmetric Threat Division, was created by the Director of Intelligence of Joint Forces Command.

New Documents Suggest DoD Watchdog Covered Up Intelligence Unit's Work Tracking 9/11 Terrorists
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold
Truthout, September 9, 2011

Declassified powerpoint slides obtained by FOIA accompany the article. I'm a bit curious if anyone has filed an FOIA for the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) mentioned on Slide #2. (I like paper trails....)

Also worth your attention, there's an interview with author Jeffrey Kaye on theReal News.com discussing his research.



So. Still blogging. Anniversary of Kirk von Ackermann's disappearance is coming up - number 8. And still no answers.

Addendum:

Additional commentary and discussion with Jeffrey Kaye over at the Dissenter at FireDogLake.

IG Report Cover-up: Top Military Officials Hid Evidence of Pre-9/11 Al Qaeda Intelligence
By Jeffrey Kaye, September 10, 2011

In particular, Kaye's commentary is worth reading carefully. He notes, "...The falsification was meant in particular to hide the work of the 9-person unit within JFIC, known as the Asymmetrical Threats Division, or DO5 in military lingo."

The following 6 individuals were at some point associated with the Asymmetric Threat Division during the tenure of Captain Kirk von Ackermann between November 1999 into 2000 (exact end date unknown).

Commander Rear Admiral Rose LeVitre, USN
Director Captain Janice M. Dundas USN
Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN
Division Head Major Oliver Wright III, US Army
Deputy Division Head John Rodriguez NCIS
Captain Kirk von Ackermann USAF

JFIC Project

Trying to put together a table of who's who at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and it's subordinate, Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) during the critical 1999 to 2001 time frame. It's in table format and can be found here:

USJFCOM

Most of the information in the chart has been gleaned from online biographies of retired military personnel who have entered the private sector. Some of the names and dates are from the Inspector General report. Kirk von Ackermann first reported to JFIC for Information Operations in November 1999. He was quickly attached to the asymmetric threat group, DO5.

I'll update the chart as more information becomes available.

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010

Rear Admiral Rosanne LeVitre, USN

In his May 8, 2006, Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General [1], an unidentified intelligence officer known only as IRON MAN wrote:

(U) Contrary to JFIC's formal report to the JCS staff, JFIC had a direct and assigned purview on international terrorism against the U.S., to include the operations of al-Qa'ida and the 9/11 attackers. JFIC was directly responsible to both Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and its subordinate, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) for all-source intelligence analysis of internationai terrorism against the U.S. To ensure the quality of such analysis,  JFlC's commanding officer [redacted] established the Asymmetric Threat Branch (DO5), charged with reporting on asymmetric threats, especially terrorism. [redacted] was subsequently promoted to JFCOM J2. As a RADM and PACOM J2, she established another Asymmetric Threat branch at PACOM.)

It is my belief that the commanding officer described above is Rear Admiral (retired) Rosanne M. LeVitre, US Navy.

Left - Screen capture of the online biography at the website for The Consensus for American Security for Rear Admiral Rosanne M. LeVitre, US Navy (Retired). The biography includes a color photograph and also notes her '...considerable experience in the interagency intelligence arena.'

In fact, the online biography [2] opens with this sentence:

Rear Admiral Rosanne "Rose" LeVitre was the first woman intelligence specialist selected for flag rank in the United States Navy.

According to the biography, Rear Admiral LeVitre was also in the right places doing the right things with the right people at the right time.

After [Gulf War I], she was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Current Operations Directorate (J3). Among her duties was that of JCS representative to a National Security Council. She later served at two joint intelligence centers (JICs), one of which she commanded. After her command tour, she became the Director for Intelligence (J2), U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA.

On selection to flag rank, Rear Admiral (ret) LeVitre assumed the position as Director for Intelligence (J2), U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii. From 2000 to late 2003, she oversaw intelligence operations at a time of increased tensions, from the EP-3 aircraft incident with China, to the Global War on Terrorism, and crises involving India-Pakistan and Korea. She conceived of and oversaw implementation of an expanded information sharing architecture, involving traditional allied partners, non-traditional alliances and non-DOD entities to include the FBI, state and local authorities. [2]

Please re-read that last sentence again.

She conceived of and oversaw implementation of an expanded information sharing architecture, involving traditional allied partners, non-traditional alliances and non-DOD entities to include the FBI, state and local authorities.

Of the Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5), the Defense Inspector General for Intelligence wrote this:

In 1999, the Joint Forces Intelligence Command created the Asymmetric Threat Division to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Asymmetric Threat Division provided current intelligence briefings and produced the Worldwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the Intelligence Director for the United States Joint Forces Command. The Asymmetric Threat Division also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support. The Joint Task Force-Civil Support assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance. [3]

IRON MAN pretty much alludes to the fact that DO5 was ahead of its time:

(U) The Asymmetric Threat Branch in JFIC was a forerunner of current all-source fusion centers. Unlike other analytical offices in the intelligence cornmunity, DO5 members had
a wide mix of skilis in all six intelligence disciplines - HUMINT, OSINT, COMINT, ELINT, IMINT, and MASINT. Consequently, DO5 was able to develop and use all-source, original analysis in a manner probably then unprecedented within the intelligence community. [1]

The Asymmetric Threat Division was Rear Admiral LeVitre's baby, making her truly a visionary in the intelligence community. But according to IRON MAN, shortly after LeVitre left, her replacement shut down DO5.

(U) [redacted] the last JFIC commanding officer under which I served, was adamantly opposed to JFIC conducting any original analysis of al-Qa'ida, and directed such work be stopped in late 2000-early 2001. [1]

And that action - actively shutting down DO5 - puts a very different spin on things.

Someone please tell me that DO5 wasn't shut down because of sexism and that as a direct result, 2,753 people died on 9/11 just because the boys club didn't take girls.

Because if that's the case, that's some seriously [redacted] up [redacted].

ADDENDUM

Flag officer announcements from the archives of the Department of Defense.

Flag Officer Assignments
U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, December 8, 2003

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark announced the following flag officer assignments Dec. 8:

Rear Adm. (lower half) Rosanne M. Levitre is being assigned as director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, FORCEnet, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Arlington, Va. Levitre is currently serving as director for intelligence, J2, U.S. Pacific Command, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Flag Officer Announcements
U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, May 25, 2000

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen announced today that the President has
nominated the following U.S. Navy officers for promotion to rear admiral (lower half):

SPECIAL DUTY OFFICER (INTELLIGENCE)

Levitre, Rosanne M. Director of Intelligence, J2, [NL] U.S. Joint Forces Command AUG 1999 TO DATE Norfolk, Va.

Flag and General Officer Assignments
U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, June 30, 2000

The following are flag and general officer assignments as announced by the Departments of the Navy and Army.

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT
Levitre, Rosanne M.
Rear Admiral
(Lower Half) (Selectee)
Director of Intelligence
J2, U.S. Joint Forces Command
Norfolk, Va.

NEW ASSIGNMENT
Director for Intelligence
J2, U.S. Pacific Command
Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii

References

[1] Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

[2] See: Members » Rear Admiral Rosanne M. LeVitre
The Consensus for American Security

[3] Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

Abbreviations - used above

COMINT - Communications Intelligence
DO5 - Asymmetric Threat Division
DOD - Department of Defense
ELINT - Electronic Intelligence
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
HUMINT- Intelligence
IMINT- Imagery Intelligence
J2 - Director for Intelligence
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM - Joint Forces Command
JFIC - Joint Forces Intelligence Command
JIC - Joint Intelligence Center
JTF-CS - Joint Task Force- Civil Support
MASINT- Measurement and Signature Intelligence
OSINT- Open Source Intelligence
PACOM - Pacific Command
RADM - Rear Admiral
US - United States of America
USN - United States Navy

What did Kirk see?

More thinking out loud.....and nit picking.

In November 1999, Captain Kirk von Ackermann, USAF, arrived to work at Joint Forces Intelligence Command in Virginia, where he was assigned to counter terrorism.

In trying to describe her husband and how his work was slowly consuming his entire life, Megan von Ackermann wrote a very short passage that took place somewhere in the vicinity of Virginia:

Dual Lives
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, September 5, 2006

Like the time [Kirk] glanced over as we passed a local bank, stiffened and muttered something about 'so they use that one...' I think he had recognized someone going into the bank, and now part of him was concerned with working out how to use this unexpected windfall of information.

Assuming what was written is accurate, it means JFIC more or less lied, at least once, in its response to the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence.

Appendix B. (U) Scanned JFIC Response:

2. Did your agency have information prior to Sept 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorist cells were operating within the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the Joint inquiry.

ANSWER: No, but prior to Sept 11, 2001, neither JFIC nor JFCOM tracked terrorist activity in the United States. The United States was not part of JFCOM's AOR.

Then why was a JFIC counter terrorism officer so interested in someone he saw outside of a bank? Why did that officer refer to 'they' - plural - unless the subject observed was connected to or a member of an already known group that - at best - was only 'suspected' of ties to terrorists?

What did Kirk see and who exactly did he pass that information on to? More importantly, what did the recipient do with it?

References

Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF
FOIA response
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

Asymmetric Threat Division - opposition

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

(U) JFIC's Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5)

(U) In 1999, the [Joint Forces Intelligence Command]created the Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5) to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Director of Operations recruited JFIC personnel from the command based upon their counterintelligence and counterterrorism expertise. The DO5 provided current intelligence briefings and produced the Worldwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the USJFCOM Intelligence staff. The DO5 also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). The JTF-CS assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance. The DO5 supported the JTF-CS exercises by establishing fictional terrorist organizations that would mimic real world terrorist groups.

Reviewing Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold's two recent articles over at Truth Out and the related documents. Thinking a bit out loud here and feeling my way around it all.

Anyway, what I am trying to understand is this: why were commanding officers so opposed to the Asymmetric Threat Division's intelligence analysis regarding al Qaeda? Just what the heck was going on over there - was it a Navy thing or was there more to it than that?

Principals

Pieced together from various sources, a very rough list of 'principals' from the 2000-2001 time period. Keep in mind there's some overlap with people coming and going, promotions, etc. Some of the titles might be wrong (my error) and there's a bunch of unknowns. At least it's a starting point.

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. served as Commander In Chief U.S. Joint Forces Command from September 1997 until his retirement September 2000. His replacement was General Kernan.

Lieutenant General Thomas N. Burnette, Jr. served as Deputy Commander In Chief U.S. Joint Forces Command from July 1999 until his retirement September 2000. His replacement was Vice Admiral Mayer.

• General William F. Kernan, US Army - Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command
• Vice Admiral Martin J. Mayer, USN - Deputy Commander in Chief, US JFCOM
• Major General Jack R. Holbein Jr., USAF - Chief of Staff, US JFCOM
• Colonel Daniel P. Bolger, US Army - Director, Strategy and Analysis, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Director of Operations, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Deputy Director of Operations, US JFCOM
• Vice Admiral Robert B. Murrett, USN - Director for Intelligence, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Deputy Director for Intelligence, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Director for Intelligence Operations, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Deputy Director for Intelligence Operations, US JFCOM
• Captain Janice M. Dundas, USN - Commander in Chief, Joint Forces Intelligence Command
• [unknown] - Deputy Commander in Chief,  JFIC
• [unknown] - Director of Operations, JFIC
• [unknown] - Deputy Director of Operations, JFIC
• Major Oliver Wright III, US Army - Division Head, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• John Rodriguez, NCIS - Deputy Division Head, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN - [title unknown], Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• Captain Kirk von Ackermann, USAF - Deputy, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• [unknown] - Operations Officer, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• [unknown] - Counterintelligence Security Officer, US JFCOM
• Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, US Army - Commander, Joint Task Force - Civil Support 
• [unknown] - Deputy Commander, JTF-CS
• [unknown] - Chief of Staff, JTF-CS

Just from a history standpoint, 2000 - 2001 is a fascinating period for the US military and in particular, Joint Forces Command: it's all about transformation. Commander in Chief (CINC), General William F. Kernan, created a new directorate tasking a team, Mayer, Holbein and Bolger, to manage transformation strategy for JFCOM.

The CINC's charter to this team was simple: infuse joint forces with new ideas, and change the way JFCOM will fight. [...]

Rigorous simulation and gaming must be pursued in response to new or emerging technologies and concepts. [1]

Infuse joint forces with new ideas and rigorous simulations....only, not so much.

Oddly enough, Kernan was worried about procuring laser-guided missiles to replenish what was lost during Kosovo, essentially bringing missiles to a knife fight. Meanwhile, a new subordinate organization - the Joint Task Force-Civil Support - was tasked to "serve as the U.S. Joint Forces Command lead for WMD events in the United States"[2]. To prepare, JTF-CS was conducting quarterly training exercises (simulations) based on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives incidents. The Navy - who held the purse strings - wasn't so hot about sponsoring Joint Forces Command. [3]

From Jeffrey Kaye's source materials, IRON MAN on page 2 of his Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General [4] writes:

[The Asymmetric Threat Division] DO5 began preparing a wide range of original analysis on asymmetric warfare, especially terrorism, from mid-1998 until mid-2001. This analysis included: [...]

(U) Reports on the most likely targets for domestic and international terrorists both within the US and abroad, as well as adjunct targets during a traditional war. The most sensitive of these reports were those identifying targets within the US, developing scenarios, analysis of commonalities for use in planning responses and recommendations for preventative action. This US tasking was given by JTF-CS.

JTF-CS was clearly asking DO5 to help prepare realistic scenarios for its training exercises which meshes with what Megan von Ackermann has written [5] about her husband, that Captain Kirk von Ackermann was involved with designing 'readiness exercises'. In a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, the first Commander of Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS) provided some details about JTF-CS. [6]

In addition to planning for real world events, JTF-CS conducts quarterly training exercises that focus on planning and deployment for specific types of CBRNE incidents. To date we have conducted such exercises in each of the 5 areas with which we are concerned: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive events. We have learned to create a base plan for the most dangerous event and prepare branches and sequels for other possible incidents. By doing so, we have reduced our response planning time considerably.

Planning for real world events...against real adversaries, like Al Qaeda. Lawlor casually mentions in his statement that one such exercise was quietly conducted live during the Presidential inauguration of George W. Bush.

The work of the Asymmetric Threat Division - and Captain Kirk von Ackermann - starts coming into focus and becomes much more tangible. These guys aren't sitting around playing video games, they're playing for real. The intelligence is real. The enemy is real. The targets - real. The scenarios - real. The maps - real. The threat - real.

So, why were they getting shut down orders? Who didn't want them trained and ready to fight the bad guys?

Again, from Jeffrey Kaye's source materials, IRON MAN states on page 5 of his Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General [7]:

[U] [redacted] the last JFIC commanding officer under which I served adamantly opposed JFIC conducting any original analysis of al-Qa'ida, and directed work be stopped in late 2000 - early 2001, and enforced that order upon my departure.

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission, Appendix C - a March 25, 2002 letter attached to the FOIA response signed by Major John A. Robinson, USAF, [8] clearly identifies Captain Janice M. Dundas, US Navy, as Commander of the JFIC. Back in March 2000, Dundas signed Captain Kirk von Ackermann's letter of appreciation.

In the section marked, JFIC Response to Congress [9], page 14, the Inspector General states:

(U) The JFIC's Commanding Officer established a command atmosphere which highlighted intelligence oversight and mission focus. The DO5 Operations Officer stated that the JFIC was very cautious over the support that was provided to the JTF-CS based on intelligence oversight guidelines. The Deputy Director of Intelligence stated that JFIC Commanding Officer would repeatedly ask for written certification to justify any tasking to any department or division. He further stated that DO5 had no theater specific mission. The subsequent Deputy Director of Intelligence directed him to stop tracking Usama Bin Laden. The Commanding Officer stated that the tracking of Usama Bin Laden did not fall in JFIC's mission. The Commanding Officer also stated that a couple of folks doing analysis of Afghanistan terrorist training camps was perceived as excess capability when it's not your AOR [Area of Operations] and that the issues were not in JFIC's swim lane.

Someone needs to ask Dundas what she was afraid of - whose toesies were getting stepped on. Was it coming from above her? Did she personally object to Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, Commander of JTF-CS? Petty, yes, but not unheard of.

Vice Admiral Martin J. Mayer, also Navy, was the Deputy Commander in Chief. Prior to serving as DCINC, Mayer was Director for Strategy Requirements and Integration at JFCOM and part of Kernan's 'team' to manage transformation strategy for JFCOM.

IRON MAN notes in his Formal Complaint that "...senior JFCOM staff including the DCINC and J3" were present at the first Asymmetric Threat Division briefing titled, "The WMD Threat to the US."[10] After the briefing, it had been noted that the national military terrorism exercise committment for FY01 involved a cruise ship.

A few months later, Mayer was nominated for appointment to Vice Admiral and Deputy Commander of US Joint Forces on September 15, 2000. Within a month, on October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was the victim of a suicide bombing in Yemen. 17 sailors died that day. By December, CNN was reporting that Al Qaeda was responsible. [11]

In the Afterword to the book Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11, Major General (retired) Larry Arnold 1st Air Force and the Continental US North American Air Defense Command Region wrote:

Just two weeks before September 11, 2001, I had met with Vice Admiral Martin Mayer, the deputy commander in chief of Joint Forces Command located in Norfolk, Virginia. He had informed me that he intended to kill all funding for a plan my command had been working on for two years, that would defend against a cruise missile attack by terrorists. While I convinced Admiral Mayer to continue his funding support, he told me in front of my chief of staff, Colonel Alan Scott; Navy Captain David Stewart, the lead on the project; and my executive officer, Lt. Col. Kelley Duckett, that our concern about Osama bin Laden as a possible threat to America was unfounded and that, to repeat, ‘If everyone would just turn off CNN, there wouldn’t be a threat from Osama bin Laden.’ [12]

Mayer's myopic thinking was far from unique. His Commander in Chief, General Kernan, was interviewed for an article shortly after the Cole bombing [13]:

The way the United States deploys its ships and troops overseas, as well as how they are based at home, will be forever changed because of the attack on the destroyer Cole, according to the man responsible for providing forces to America's combat commanders. [...]

The Cole, a $1 billion Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, was attacked Oct. 12 while it refueled in the southern Arabian port of Aden, Yemen. Seventeen sailors from the Norfolk-based ship died and 42 others were injured.

"I don't think anybody could have predicted somebody would come floating up there on a commercially made skiff that had an embedded shape charge in it, come right up against the side of a ship and blow a 40-by-40-foot hole in it," [Kernan] said. "It's incredible they were able to achieve it."

It's not that big of a jump in the imagination from commercial skiff to commercial jet. Within a year, hijackers on a suicide mission would hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

It's like the commanders just couldn't face up to a very real war. They couldn't - or wouldn't - see the elephant in the room - asymmetric threats from groups like Al Qaeda.

It's all so.....disappointing.

References

New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, Truthout, June 13, 2011

Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF - includes:
FOIA response
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

[1] A Study of Joint Transformation at United States Joint Forces Command
By Colonel Lorraine E. Tyacke, United States Army, April 9, 2002

[2] Management of National Guard, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense
Audit Report No. D-2001-043
See: Coordination With Other Organizations
January 31, 2001

[3] Tyacke, page 8

[4] Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF - includes:
FOIA response
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

[5] Getting to Iraq part two: Counter Terrorism
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, March 24, 2006

[6] Statement of Major General Bruce M. Lawlor PDF
US Army, Commander, Joint Task Force-Civil Support,
US Joint Forces Command
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Status
Update of JTF-CS
May 1, 2001

[7] Unclassified FOIA Response, page 5

[8] Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010

[9] Ibid, page 14

[10]Unclassified FOIA Response, page 3

[11] USS Cole plot began after embassy attacks, investigator says
David Ensor, Chris Plante and Peter Bergen, CNN, December 20, 2000

[12] Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11, By Lynn Spencer, Free Press, June 3, 2008
Afterword, page 285-291, by Major General (retired) Larry Arnold 1st Air Force and the Continental US North American Air Defense Command Region at Tyndall Air Force base near Panama City, FL.

[13] Cole Alters Military's Perception of Security; Joint Forces Chief Assesses Challenges at Overseas Posts, By Jack Dorsey, The Virginian-Pilot (archive $) January 28, 2001

Additional Reading

Military Support of Civil Authorities—
A New Focus for a New Millennium
Major General Bruce M. Lawlor
, Commander, 
Joint Task Force–Civil Support
October 2000 (Updated September 2001)

Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 PDF - By the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (declassified version)
S. REPT. NO. 107- 351 and H. REPT. NO. 107-792
December 20, 2002

9-11 Commission Report
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
July 22, 2004

9/11 Commission - Appendix C - Hearings - witnesses, etc

Notes

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. served as Commander In Chief U.S. Joint Forces Command from September 1997 until his retirement September 2000

Vice Admiral Robert B. Murrett, USN served as the director for Intelligence, US Joint Forces Command, from August 10, 2000 through January 25, 2002

Truthout - Intelligence Withheld From Congress

PS. I just want to take a moment to publicly thank all of the contractors, as well as the military, intelligence, and private military personnel who have graciously shared their knowledge and experience with me over the years. Their information has helped me to better understand the incredibly complex world that men (and women) like Kirk von Ackermann work in. 

While working for Ultra Services of Istanbul Turkey, an American contractor and former intelligence officer, Kirk von Ackermann, disappeared on an isolated road in Iraq on October 9, 2003. He remains the longest missing American in Iraq today.

This blog is loaded with over 7 years of research about the incident as well as the murder of his colleague, Ryan Manelick, who died in December 2003. My own personal belief is that von Ackermann was killed because he was mistaken for John Dawkins who was for all intents and purposes part owner of Ultra Services.

At one point, I discussed the case with one of Kirk von Ackermann's former colleagues and shared my thoughts but for some reason, the scenario I outlined seemed like too much of a stretch. Which is a kind of twisted irony - even in death - Kirk von Ackermann just remains too far outside the socially acceptable, just like the scenarios he once imagined as an intelligence officer.

Truthout

Jeffrey Kaye continues lifting the veil on 9-11 intelligence failures with a new article at Truthout. The end of the article reviews some of what is known in public about Kirk von Ackermann.

I should probably just go on record and reveal that I first learned of the Asymmetric Threat Division - by name - back in 2005. I was under the impression the name of the group was classified and thus never revealed it. I was also once told that Kirk von Ackermann was possibly one of the finest intelligence officers to work for the DoD in the last century. He was said to have had an incredible talent for connecting seemingly unrelated details. I was told his work saved lives - literally.

Insert of the last page of documents from an Unclassified FOIA Response included with the article at Truthout, EXCLUSIVE: New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe by Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, June 13, 2011.

The Unclassified FOIA Response attached to the Truthout article is an absolute must read. The FOIA Response was the result of a 2006 complaint to the DoD Inspector General filed by a former intelligence officer known only as IRONMAN.

EXCLUSIVE: New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, Truthout, June 13, 2011
Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response 

The last page of the FOIA Response - which quotes IRONMAN - holds particular interest for this blog.

(U) [unclassified] My motivation for this complaint is multi-faceted. I do believe that knowledge of the work done by DO5 would add to DoD's understanding of its role in the events leading up to 9/11 and how to avoid future attacks. For this reason, and other more personal reasons, I believe that DO5's analysis, especially the target analysis, should be reviewed and, if possible, declassified. I have been falsely accused of revealing classified information on DO5's work, when I am certain that that information is not and has not been classified since 9/11, and I do want to see myself cleared of that false accusation. In addition, I and the deputy of that team, [redacted] especially carried the burden of knowledge of how close DoD came to bin Laden and perhaps being able to reduce the number of lives lost on 9/11. I do not want that burden any longer. [redacted] [redacted] and I discussed this issue the last time we spoke. He remains the longest missing man in Iraq in this war, and I want, one day, to be able to explain to his children what their father foresaw.

The former deputy of the Asymmetric Threat Division and the longest missing man in Iraq is Kirk von Ackermann. The complicated and contentious history of the company he worked for in Iraq, Ultra Services, was featured in a 2006 article at ePluribus Media.

One Missing, One Dead: An Iraq Contractor in the Fog of War
By Susie Dow, ePluribus Media, May 12, 2006

The US Army CID did the best investigation they could with the information available to them. But they were horribly lead astray by working with the assumption that Kirk von Ackermann disappeared from where his vehicle was found. Von Ackermann's military experience - especially as detailed in the Unclassified FOIA Response - makes clear the events of that day were well outside his norm of behavior.

NSA audio recordings

On October 8, 2003, the day before he disappeared, Kirk von Ackermann called his wife in the United States from Iraq. He left a short message on their home answering machine.

The following day, October 9, just minutes before he 'disappeared', von Ackermann using his satellite phone reportedly called the cell phone of an Iraqi employee and requested help with a bad tire. Several minutes later, a passing patrol reported an abandoned vehicle just several miles down the road from a manned checkpoint. The Iraqi employee arrived approximately 45 minutes later.

It is my belief that an impostor placed that satellite call to the Iraqi employee - who due to limited language skills with English would be unable to tell the difference between two English speaking men's voices.

NSA has audio files of satellite phone calls originating in Iraq during this time period and is in a position to facilitate an analysis to see if in fact the male who placed the call to the Iraqi employee was Kirk von Ackermann. It defies any and all logic that Kirk von Ackermann deliberately drove alone with a bad tire - and without a translator - on a journey of over 165 miles through Iraq, with 7 of those miles on an isolated ridge he had previously identified as the most dangerous part of the journey between Tikrit and Kirkuk.

Perhaps investigators will finally get around to treating the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann as the unsolved murder that it is.

Additional Reading

DoD Whistleblower: Documents Show Intel Withheld from 9/11 Congressional Investigators - author discussion and commentary of the Truthout article
By Jeff Kaye, FireDogLake, June 13, 2011

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden

By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

DoD Inspector General: Intel Agency Ordered to Stop Pre-9/11 Tracking of Bin Laden - author discussion and commentary of the Truthout article

By Jeff Kaye, FireDogLake, May 24, 2011

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF

Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence

Department of Defense

September 23, 2008

Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
Report of the joint inquiry motivated IRON MAN's formal complaint, that JFIC withheld intelligence from congress
S. Rept. 107-351 and H. Rept. 107-792
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Government Printing Office
December 2002

Counter Terrorism and JFIC

By Susie Dow, Missing Man, May 6, 2011

Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann

By Susie Dow, Missing Man, October 8, 2006

And because no one clicks on links anymore....

Getting to Iraq part two: Counter Terrorism

By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, March 24, 2006

After Y2K, Kirk became more and more consumed by the counter-terrorism world. He was read into higher and higher clearances, learned more and more about the largest threats to the US and her allies. Specifically he became deeply aware of Osama Bin Ladin and his organization.

Kirk was involved with designing readiness excercises - scenarios to be used by various units as they tested their skills. He proposed that a small boat filled with explosives be used as a weapon against a large warship - and was told it was an unrealistic idea. This was, of course, well prior to the USS Cole attack.

He also, along with his team, not only suggested that a commercial jet could be used as a terrorist weapon, but predicted the most likely targets that would be chosen. Again, he was ignored, and sometimes laughed at.

Dual Lives
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, September 5, 2006

One afternoon we were driving up the highway outside of Langley. I was reading a magazine - the Smithsonian I think - and I was chatting to Kirk about an article discussing the greatest achievement of modern medicine: the successful campaign against smallpox. Wasn't it amazing, I said, the way the WHO had managed it, wasn't it wonderful that the world was safe now from a disease that had been a deadly threat for thousands of years. Very quietly, his hands stiff on the wheel, he said 'it's not gone.'

Just that. But I knew - I knew that not only did he know that more than one country had kept live samples of the virus, he knew intimately the infection rate, the symptoms, the horrific scarring that those lucky enough to survive would suffer. He knew how it could be weaponized, had thought about delivery systems, had worked through countless scenarios in which various populations were targeted and infected.

And gradually I realized that he was living like that constantly. Everywhere we went, there was part of him looking around and evaluating targets, thinking about blast zones, considering mortality rates, political value, public reaction.

Now tell me that same man, Kirk von Ackermann, chose to deliberately drive alone in an SUV with a bad tire over 165 miles without a translator most of it through Saddam Hussein's tribal area. Didn't happen.....

Truthout - Unasked Questions

It's a strange feeling to come across an article that mentions yourself.

Jeffrey Kaye of Truthout has written a detailed overview of the recent report from the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence of the Department of Defense, Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden. The report stems from a whistleblower complaint that alleged that "...the Joint Forces Intelligence Command had not disclosed all material to the 9/11 Commission." It is very fortunate that Jeffrey Kaye took an active interest in the report as my interest was not so much its findings rather I was much more interested in learning about the work of Capt. Kirk von Ackermann USAF at Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC).

At the end of Kaye's article he quotes a statement I made here on this blog:

Dow noted the [Inspector General] report's conclusion: "The analysis completed by the Joint Forces Intelligence Command, specifically the Asymmetric Threat Division, was not applicable to the questions asked by the 9/11 Commission."

"Which leads me to believe the 9/11 Commission did not ask the correct questions," Dow said.

Question

Now, I fully admit, I have a bias. I see things as they relate to what I have learned of Kirk von Ackermann. So, one 'correct question' that immediately jumps to my mind - a question that the 9/11 Commission apparently did not ask the Asymmetric Threat Division - is this:

Did the Asymmetric Threat Division at any time prepare readiness excercises that involved the use of commercial aircraft as weapons? If yes: a. what were the predicted targets and b. who was that information disseminated to?

Because 'readiness exercises' were one of the things that Kirk von Ackermann was doing while at the Joint Forces Intelligence Command. And yes. Commercial aircraft used as weapons by flying them fully fueled in to buildings - like the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the White House - was one of the scenarios that he predicted.

Cold Case File

For the past 7+ years, I've been researching and writing about the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann as well as the murder of his colleague Ryan Manelick. I remain dis-satisfied with CID findings to date, first and foremost starting with the assumption that Kirk von Ackermann actually disappeared from where his vehicle was found. To arrive at such a conclusion - as tempting as it may be - requires suspending all logic. (See: The Bridge Theory and Missing Contractor: Military Mechanics May Hold the Keys)

I'd just like to see CID re-open the case and look at all of the evidence in chronological order with fresh eyes. Suspect everyone, spare no one from investigation - including the military personnel who first reported finding his abandoned vehicle.

References

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

DoD Inspector General: Intel Agency Ordered to Stop Pre-9/11 Tracking of Bin Laden - author discussion and commentary of the Truthout article
By Jeff Kaye, FireDogLake, May 24, 2011

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
Department of Defense
September 23, 2008

Counter Terrorism and JFIC
By Susie Dow, Missing Man, May 6, 2011

Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann
By Susie Dow, Missing Man, October 8, 2006

Getting to Iraq part two: Counter Terrorism
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, March 24, 2006

After Y2K, Kirk became more and more consumed by the counter-terrorism world. He was read into higher and higher clearances, learned more and more about the largest threats to the US and her allies. Specifically he became deeply aware of Osama Bin Ladin and his organization.

Kirk was involved with designing readiness excercises - scenarios to be used by various units as they tested their skills. He proposed that a small boat filled with explosives be used as a weapon against a large warship - and was told it was an unrealistic idea. This was, of course, well prior to the USS Cole attack.

He also, along with his team, not only suggested that a commercial jet could be used as a terrorist weapon, but predicted the most likely targets that would be chosen. Again, he was ignored, and sometimes laughed at.

Counter Terrorism and JFIC

I stumbled upon a fascinating report today, Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission.

According to Secrecy News Volume 2010 Issue No. 18 of March 9, 2010, the review was only recently declassified. Also see this March 5, 2010 cover letter to the original November 4, 2008 FOIA request from the Department of Defense Inspector General.

Page 9 - Objective

(U) The objective was to determine whether the JFIC [Joint Forces Intelligence Command]  misled Congress by willfully withholding operational information in response to the 9/11 Commission.

The review notes and confirms that JFIC was never identified in the 9/11 Commission Report.

At first glance, it might seem that this review has little relationship to this blog. But there, smack dab in the middle of the review, are members of the Joint Forces Intelligence Command that former USAF Capt. Kirk von Ackermann once associated with.

So with all of the news coverage about the death of Osama bin Laden, I thought now would be a good time to look at what is known about von Ackermann's previous work in counter terrorism while serving in the US Air Force.  While a general overview of anecdotes can be found here: Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann, what I'm after are the specifics - who, what, when.

So let's start with the photos and try to peel this apart.

Capt. Kirk von Ackermann received a Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) Commendation Medal from CAPT Santez on April 26, 2000. Two personnel, the Head and Deputy Head of the Asymmetric Threat Division at JFIC during this same time period (Spring 2000), are identified on page 18 of the review. Additional personnel are also identified within the review, but it's not clear they were with JFIC during the specified time period.

Capt. Kirk von Ackermann also received a Certificate of Appreciation from CAPT J. M. Dundas, US Navy of the JFIC on March 20, 2000. 'CAPT Janice Dundas USN' is identified by name as the commander of the JFIC on page 20 of the review.

Excerpts from the Review of Joint Force Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission are quoted below. I've highlighted additional details of interest. It's not much, but it gives just a little more insight into the world of counter terrorism that Kirk von Ackermann was once working within.

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission
Report No. 2008-INTEL-15
Inspector General United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008

Page 5 - Executive Summary - Background

(U) The Joint Forces Intelligence Command was established in 1999 and was subordinate to the United States Joint Forces Command. The mission of the Joint Forces Intelligence Command was "to provide general and direct intelligence support to United States Joint Forces Command, United States Joint Forces Command staff directorates, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, Service component commands and subordinate joint forces commands tasked with executing United States Forces Command geographic or functional missions." In 1999, the Joint Forces Intelligence Command created the Asymmetric Threat Division to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Asymmetric Threat Division provided current intelligence briefings and produced Worlwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the Intelligence Director for the United States Joint Forces Command. The Asymmetric Threat Division also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support. The Joint Task Force-Civil Support assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance.

According to his wife's blog, Capt. von Ackermann headed up the Y2K task force - which places him at JFIC prior to January 2000 - as well as attended some White House intelligence briefings. She was under the impression he had analyzed the threat of the weaponization of small pox as well as proposed unorthodox methods of attacking United States interests. Small pox - a biological weapon - is an important detail.

Page 6

The analysis completed by the Joint Forces Intelligence Command, specifically the Asymmetric Threat Division, was not applicable to the questions asked by the 9/11 Commission.

Which leads me to believe the 9/11 Commission did not ask the correct questions. Anyway...back to the review.

Appendix B. (U) Scanned JFIC Response:

Page 17 - Request

Please provide a list of the officers within your agency that are principally responsible for counter-terrorism activities on a day-to-day basis and identify the heads and deputy heads of these offices and their dates of service from 1995 to present. (Note: we are not asking for everyone in supervisory chain of such officials). If the individuals occupying these positions are current employees of your agency, please indicate this.

Page 18 - Response

Nov 1999-Summer 2001: Asymmetric Threat Division, Division Head MAJ Oliver Wright III (USA) still at JFIC, Deputy John Rodriguez (NCIS) now at DIA.

Von Ackermann was receiving accolades from the JFIC in the Spring of 2000. His participation on the Y2K task force makes clear he was already serving at JFIC at the very latest by December of 1999.

Appendix C. (U) Scanned USJFCOM Response:

Page 20

Subject: Congressional Inquiry into 11 September 2001 Terrorist Attack (U)

(U) JFIC did not track in-CONUS foreign threat or terrorist information prior to 11 Sep 01, so its answers to Mr. Snider's questions are mostly negative. The answers are attached to this email; they have been reviewed by CAPT Janice Dundas USN, JFIC Commander.

(signed)
Maj. John A. Robinson, USAF

As mentioned, CAPT J. M. Dundas signed a letter on JFIC letterhead dated March 20, 2000, attached to a Certificate of Appreciation issued to Capt. von Ackermann.

Page 30

Appended below are the Joint Force Intelligence Command's replies to the Congressional Inquiry questions tasked by VADM Wilson. JFIC POC is CDR Mike Villareal. JFIC ADJ. DSN 836-7168 JFCOM/J2 POC is Maj. John Robinson. JFCOM/J237, DSN 836-6006

It's unclear if any of the above three men served at JFIC during the same time as Capt. von Ackermann.

Page 31 - Question

What does your agency consider its marching orders both past (since 1985) and present, in terms of its responsibilities in the counter-terrorism arena, ie. what documents establish your requirements and priorities? Please identify these by title and set them aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

Page 32 - Response

b. Fall 1999-Sep 11, 2001: Focus on Asymmetric Threats OCONUS to include terrorism and CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear threats] issues. As Joint Force Provider, emphasis was on force protection for JFCOM Components and support to JTF-CS (Joint Task Force-Civil Support). JFCOM J2 and JTF-CS PIRs set the requirements.

And that's where it becomes crystal clear that Capt. von Ackermann - the counter terrorism officer - was assigned to the Asymmetric Threat Division cited earlier in the review. As 'Asymmetric Threats' included terrorism and biological threats - there's the link to the weaponization of small pox mentioned above.

Some statements from the JFCOM website from the Spring of 2000:

US Joint Forces Command
11: New Name, Future Focus

In October 1999, the name of Atlantic Command changed to United States Joint Forces Command to emphasize the command's role leading transformation of U.S. military forces

Still one of five geographic combatant unified commands, U.S. Joint Forces Command formally took on a more functional role with the new name. It is the only unified command with both a geographic area and functional responsibilities.

Joint Forces Command gained a functional mandate to lead transformation of U.S. military joint warfighting into the 21st Century. The command's geographical responsibility was modified to more closely align with existing NATO Allied Command Atlantic's (ACLANT) area of responsibility -- both a long history of cooperation with European Allies and recent history in Central Europe indicate future military operations will not only be joint, but also combined national efforts.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2020 [Ed note: this document was released May 20, 2000] projects that conflicts of the future will go to the side with the right technology, applied at the right time with the right warrior. Re-designation reflected the command's commitment to experimentation with new warfighting concepts and technologies that answer the call in the Joint Chiefs vision.

Concurrently the command was charged to answer another national call to support terrorist response operations in the continental U.S. Joint Forces Command created the first domestic Joint Task Force, JTF-Civil Support, to provide military assistance to civil authorities, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and FBI, for consequence management of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents in the United States.

A news article from the time period describes the Joint Vision 2020 report mentioned above. Two paragraphs stand out.

Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-spectrum Dominance
By Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, June 2, 2000

Adversaries will probably not challenge U.S. strengths, but seek to attack the United States and its interests through "asymmetric means." They could identify vulnerable areas and devise means to attack them.

"The potential of such asymmetric approaches is perhaps the most serious danger the United States faces in the immediate future - - and this danger includes long-range ballistic missiles and other direct threats to U.S. citizens and territory," the report says. 

Prior to going to Iraq, counter terrorism was the world in which Kirk von Ackermann was immersed. How can anyone honestly think he then forgot all of his training and experience, jumped into an unfamiliar SUV in Iraq, drove 180 miles - much of it on an isolated road - alone - with a bad tire.

Such reasoning defies logic.

References

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
Department of Defense
September 23, 2008

Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann

There were a number of articles recently on the failure of the 9-11 Commission to include details of a July 10, 2001 briefing by George Tenet and Cofer Black to Condoleezza Rice regarding perceived threats of by Al Qaeda against the United States. What follows at the end of this long post is a brief review of some of those articles.

While this may seem out of place here at the Missing Man, I'd like to take this opportunity to remind visitors that Kirk von Ackermann was a former Air Force Captain who was assigned to a counter terrorism team. You'll find no mention of either Kirk von Ackermann or his team in the 9-11 Commission report.

Von Ackermann's family have a blog, Missing In Iraq. While the family admit to knowing little of his work, they have posted several entries that describe his role in protecting the United States from Terrorism that I'd like to call your attention to.

Well before 9-11, Kirk von Ackermann predicted aircraft could be hijacked and used as weapons against the United States. He also predicted potential targets.

Excerpts from Missing In Iraq

Getting to Iraq part two: Counter Terrorism March 24, 2006

After Y2K, Kirk became more and more consumed by the counter-terrorism world. He was read into higher and higher clearances, learned more and more about the largest threats to the US and her allies. Specifically he became deeply aware of Osama Bin Ladin and his organization.

Kirk was involved with designing readiness excercises - scenarios to be used by various units as they tested their skills. He proposed that a small boat filled with explosives be used as a weapon against a large warship - and was told it was an unrealistic idea. This was, of course, well prior to the USS Cole attack.

He also, along with his team, not only suggested that a commercial jet could be used as a terrorist weapon, but predicted the most likely targets that would be chosen. Again, he was ignored, and sometimes laughed at.

Moving and the British Navy July 26, 2006

Kirk had been doing some pretty amazing stuff over the last year or so. He had, I understand, been literally writing the book on info-ops. His theories, concepts and methods were innovative and exciting, and getting a fair amount of notice. Naturally this was all opaque to me. I heard things about 'briefings' and gradually recognized that the briefings were often to quite senior officers. I know there were commendations and awards, but details were obscured.

November, 1999. Welcome to Virginia. August 04, 2006

Within a week Kirk reported to the Naval base for work. He went through the rigmarole of getting a pass and signing in, and walked onto the floor. Ah, they said, the Air Force guy. Right. Well, actually we’ve decided we don’t really want an info ops unit. Instead, you’re going to join the counter terrorism group. We’re putting you in charge of Y2K.

How to Defeat Y2K Without Really Trying August 07, 2006

Anyway, Kirk became the Y2K goat. There was already a counter-terrorism unit so he was sort of cobbled onto that, and had to suddenly come up to speed on the counter-terrorism world in a matter of weeks. His initial focus was supposed to be on the rollover situation. He did his research, looked into the whole thing thoroughly, and when the briefing came around, he was ready.

A New Approach to The Pamper Problem August 22, 2006

They had a pretty major coup within weeks of Kirk's arrival. As always I don't know details. I think it might be the incident that got a little publicity - the one that was to come through Canada. I do remember Kirk saying there were some Mounties somewhere that he really wanted to buy a drink. And I remember the quote from the unit commander when they gave the briefing after it was all over.

New Year, New World August 25, 2006

There was a silent battle going on, one most people still know nothing about. It had nothing to do with computers or millennium viruses. It was the fight for the next millennium, and it was deadly.

A Little (off-white, clunky) Security August 29, 2006

'They're going to put a secure line in the house,' Kirk announced one day. It was well after Y2K, and no naturally I don't know why. I also didn't ask.

Hmmm... a secure line. Like in 'get the president on the line' - the secure line.

Writing Reality August 31, 2006

So in the Spring or Summer of 2000 Kirk wrote up a little scenario that involved a large navy ship. The idea was that a few terrorists would load up a small zodiac - an inflatable boat with a great little engine and no draft - with explosives, then float it up right next to the ship and detonate it.

The navy was not amused. Their ships, their nice, big, powerful ships, were not vulnerable to things like this. Terrorists would never attack a heavily armed and armored vessel - it just didn't make sense. The scenario was disgarded, never seriously looked at.

The USS Cole was bombed on October 12th, 2000. 17 sailors were killed.

dual lives September 05, 2006

One afternoon we were driving up the highway outside of Langley. I was reading a magazine - the Smithsonian I think - and I was chatting to Kirk about an article discussing the greatest achievement of modern medicine: the successful campaign against smallpox. Wasn't it amazing, I said, the way the WHO had managed it, wasn't it wonderful that the world was safe now from a disease that had been a deadly threat for thousands of years. Very quietly, his hands stiff on the wheel, he said 'it's not gone.'

Just that. But I knew - I knew that not only did he know that more than one country had kept live samples of the virus, he knew intimately the infection rate, the symptoms, the horrific scarring that those lucky enough to survive would suffer. He knew how it could be weaponized, had thought about delivery systems, had worked through countless scenarios in which various populations were targeted and infected.

And gradually I realized that he was living like that constantly. Everywhere we went, there was part of him looking around and evaluating targets, thinking about blast zones, considering mortality rates, political value, public reaction.

Torn September 06, 2006

The intelligence world is a strange place, a place where sources and information are impossibly valuable and are fiercely guarded - not just from the enemy without, but from other intelligence branches. CIA, DIA - all of those 'men in black' view eachother with deep suspicion. They do not, to put it mildly, play well with others.

And then there was the entrenched mindset, the very conservative status quo above Kirk. The people at that level had come into the intel world during the cold war, and their focus had never really changed. They were used to a particular kind of enemy - one that was established, codified, predictable; a known quantity with a home to protect. They were extremely good at dealing with this enemy, they knew it cold. But the new world, the world of Bin Laden was not like that, and they were slow to change. So Kirk was endlessly fighting against people who did not want to listen, people who firmly believed they knew everything.

Dies Irae September 27, 2006

He had written it. He had suggested that a terrorist could use a commercial plane, one loaded wtih fuel, as an effective bomb. What if, he had written, what would we do if... and they had laughed. No one would do that. No one had ever done that. It has never happened before.

There are buildings that will be targeted, he said. Bin Laden failed once with the Trade Center - he's going to try again. And there are others, and he listed them. The Pentagon. The White House.

Regrets October 03, 2006

He was approached about going back - not into the military, but as a civilian. There were a couple of offers, and he did seriously think about it. It would mean uprooting again, returning to the East Coast and taking the kids out of school yet again. And it would mean accepting the counter-terrorism world as his world for the rest of his career; there would be no going back from this one.

It was a long, and drawn out decision. We talked endlessly, he called friends for advice, talked to people still in the world, tried to get a feel for what was happening. There was chaos of course. This hit the intel world hard, and people were still trying to sort out the aftermath. Much of it sounded good though - many of the people who were most blind, most hidebound and obstructionist were gone. Change was happening, change that had been needed for years. What sort of useful role Kirk could play, however, wasn't clear. In the end he was afraid that once again he would be drawn into a dark and horrible world and still be unable to make a difference.

There is so much more about Kirk von Ackerman at Missing In Iraq. I hope you'll take the time to read the blog. Please be sure to read the archives.

Recent articles on Al Qaeda Threat in the summer of 2001

Because of the sheer seriousness of the recent articles, I feel the need to include excerpts rather than just providing reference links as I might normally have done. This isn't about politics but rather about the need for the United States to make Counter Terrorism a higher priority. And that means respecting, listening to, and encouraging people like Kirk von Ackermann in the work they do. Even if what they say or think is too far outside of the box to be comfortable to the status quo.

Excerpts

Tenet Recalled Warning Rice By Dan Eggen and Robin Wright, Washington Post, October 3, 2006

According to the transcript, Tenet told Rice there were signs that there could be an al-Qaeda attack in weeks or perhaps months, that there would be multiple, simultaneous attacks causing major human casualties, and that the focus would be U.S. targets, facilities or interests. But the intelligence reporting focused almost entirely on the attacks occurring overseas, Tenet told the commission.

Two Months Before 9/11, an Urgent Warning to Rice Washington Post, October 1, 2006

On July 10, 2001, two months before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, then-CIA Director George J. Tenet met with his counterterrorism chief, J. Cofer Black, at CIA headquarters to review the latest on Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist organization. Black laid out the case, consisting of communications intercepts and other top-secret intelligence showing the increasing likelihood that al-Qaeda would soon attack the United States. It was a mass of fragments and dots that nonetheless made a compelling case, so compelling to Tenet that he decided he and Black should go to the White House immediately.

Tenet called Condoleezza Rice, then national security adviser, from the car and said he needed to see her right away. There was no practical way she could refuse such a request from the CIA director.

For months, Tenet had been pressing Rice to set a clear counterterrorism policy, including specific presidential orders called "findings" that would give the CIA stronger authority to conduct covert action against bin Laden. Perhaps a dramatic appearance -- Black called it an "out of cycle" session, beyond Tenet's regular weekly meeting with Rice -- would get her attention.

As a side note, the threats appear to have been taken seriously enough for John Ashcroft to have stopped flying commercial airlines in July 2001. Ashcroft has denied receiving Tenet's briefing.

Rumsfeld, Ashcroft said to have received warning of attack By Jonathan S. Landay, Warren P. Strobel and John Walcott, McClatchy Newspapers, October 2, 2006

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and former Attorney General John Ashcroft received the same CIA briefing about an imminent al-Qaida strike on an American target that was given to the White House two months before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

The State Department's disclosure Monday that the pair was briefed within a week after then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was told about the threat on July 10, 2001, raised new questions about what the Bush administration did in response, and about why so many officials have claimed they never received or don't remember the warning.

Ashcroft Flying High, CBS, July 26, 2001

In response to inquiries from CBS News over why Ashcroft was traveling exclusively by leased jet aircraft instead of commercial airlines, the Justice Department cited what it called a "threat assessment" by the FBI, and said Ashcroft has been advised to travel only by private jet for the remainder of his term.