Open Europe Berlin interviews Prof. Bernd Lucke, leader of Germany's anti-euro party AfD

Our German-based partner organisation Open Europe Berlin has published on its blog an exclusive interview with Professor Bernd Lucke - founder and leader of Germany's new anti-euro party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). We have translated some of the most interesting bits.

On the topic of design flaws in the European Monetary Union (EMU)...

Bernd Lucke (BL): The root of all evil is, in my assessment, the fact that the European Treaties did not provide, and do not provide until today, for the possibility to withdraw from the eurozone...Since leaving [the euro] as a last resort was excluded from the outset, the possibility of exerting political pressure on member states was also limited.

[…]

Despite non-sustainable economic development in some countries, the financial markets obviously did not pick up on the large differences [between eurozone countries], which affected the risk of credit default. In turn, the low interest rates 'funded' these developments.  Actually, the alarm bells should have been ringing in view of the different developments in country-specific inflation rates, unit labour costs and trade balances. Also, the housing bubbles in Ireland or Spain should have been recognised and counteracted upon by politicians. However, warning systems were not available. It was revealed how ill-conceived the introduction of the euro was, under all aspects.

On the role of the ECB in the crisis...

BL: The ECB is not directly to blame because it was simply a part of the poorly constructed euro system...In the time before the crisis, the ECB could have been blamed at most for not pointing out the dangers associated with different inflation rates in the euro countries...Just a note: an independent central bank is good. But a central bank – like the ECB – that is no longer subject to state or democratic control and has switched to self-preservation mode is extremely dangerous.

On using tools such as the ESM and OMT to stabilise the eurozone...

BL: The ESM is ultimately a giant institutionalised eurobond, and therefore a form of debt mutualisation...What we want as AfD is...the return to the Maastricht criteria, and in particular the re-introduction and strict compliance with the no-bailout clause. No country shall be liable for the debts of other countries...Countries should and would go bankrupt, which would reduce the partly unbearable debt levels.

On how AfD sees a eurozone break-up...

BL: As an ‘immediate measure’, we demand the consequent compliance with the [existing] rules of the European Treaties as well as adding a euro-exit clause to the rules. If necessary, we want to force this right to exit by blocking future ESM loans with a German veto. Without further assistance loans, the crisis countries would decide that it is in their own interests to exit the monetary union. This should happen in an orderly and gradual [manner]. On the legal side, the European treaties need to be changed. We have parliaments and governments for that. And Germany has enough weight to push this through.

The Four Presidents Report?

Or was it the Van Rompuy report...looking at the report on moving "Towards a genuine economic and monetary union" released earlier today its hard to judge how closely involved the other Presidents were, notably ECB President Mario Draghi and Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso.

So to recap, this was meant to be a report reflecting the views of the EU's four Presidents (in addition to the three already mentioned, also Jean-Claude Juncker, the outgoing head of the Eurogroup).

First, we've spotted a couple of areas of confusion between what European Council President Herman van Rompuy and Draghi have been saying.

The report suggests that,

"The ECB has confirmed that it will establish organisational arrangements guaranteeing a clear separation of its supervisory functions from monetary policy." 

However in his monthly press conference today, when pushed on the ECB's view on the single supervisor Draghi stressed that the ECB is a "passive actor" in all of this and was not involved in designing the legal structure of the new supervisor. Clearly these two views are directly at odds, which fails to fill us with confidence that the new tasks of the ECB will be combined with its current ones in a legally sound and practical way. A concern which has previously been voiced by ourselves and many others.

Draghi was also at pains to stress that the link between sovereigns and banks can only be broken when the banking union is complete, i.e. with a common resolution mechanism. The report argues that the set up of the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) will play an important role in "contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks". Not necessarily directly at odds, but it again peaks concerns that the Council plans for banking union over-estimate the impact of the SSM.

Additionally, as the FT's Brussels Blog notes, Van Rompuy also disagrees with European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso on the issue of debt mutualisation, with the latter favouring eurobonds.

We at least can't blame Draghi for struggling to find the time to help write the report while also running a giant institution. But if the supposed authors can't agree on the logistics it doesn't bode well for next weeks EU summit...

Catalonia's bailout request is a test of Rajoy's mettle

In today's City AM we look at what Catalonia's decision to request a bailout from the Spanish government means for Spain, its Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, and the eurozone. Here it is:

Catalonia's decision to seek a bailout from the Spanish government was just a matter of time. With over €5.7bn (£4.5bn) of debt maturing before the end of the year, Spain’s wealthiest – but also most heavily indebted – region had very little chance of paying its bills without some form of external assistance. The request is going to be a huge test of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s mettle.

Despite asking for a loan of over €5bn – that is, almost one third of the money the Spanish government has earmarked to help all 17 of the Comunidades Autónomas – the Catalan government has so far shown no signs of graciousness towards the central government.

In fact, a Catalan government spokesman provocatively told the press that Catalonia will not even say “thank you” to the Spanish government for its help. The logic being that the money the region is going to borrow was Catalan taxpayers’ money in the first place – previously confiscated in order to pay for transfers to the rest of Spain. Most importantly, Catalonia has said it will reject any “political conditions” and has no intention to make further cuts to meet the deficit target imposed by the central government for this year.

The upcoming negotiations over the details of the bailout will therefore turn into a key credibility test for Rajoy, on two fronts. Domestically, his government simply cannot afford to display any weakness throughout the talks with the Catalan leaders. If Rajoy rolls over for Catalonia, other regions will feel encouraged to claim their share of cash from the central government, with little or no strings attached.

This will raise questions over whether the €18bn in the bailout fund set up by the Spanish government to help cash-strapped regions is going to be enough. At this stage, half of the money in the pot has already been committed, with only three of the 17 regions deciding to tap the fund, so far. 

At the European level, the Spanish government desperately needs to prove that it is capable of reining in the regions’ spending. As European Council president Herman Van Rompuy recalled during his visit to Madrid earlier this week, internal problems resulting from the way the Spanish state is organised are not Brussels’s, but Madrid’s. In other words, domestic inter-regional Spanish politics will not be considered a valid justification for Spain missing its EU-mandated deficit targets once again. 

With the markets broadly expecting Spain to ask the Eurozone’s temporary bailout fund, the European Financial Stability Facility, to start buying Spanish bonds in a bid to reduce its unsustainable borrowing costs, the Spanish government needs to make sure that it comes out of the negotiations with Catalonia in a position of strength.

If, on the other hand, Rajoy is shown to be unable to exert control in his own backyard, his negotiating position in Brussels will surely be weakened – and his Eurozone counterparts will be increasingly reluctant to take his promises of reform and fiscal consolidation seriously.

Spanish fears stoked by genuine concerns over banks and regional government spending

We've got a piece over in City AM today looking at the reasons behind the increased financial market jitters over the state of the Spanish economy. Despite the usual EU protestations that Spanish fundamentals are sound, there are definite areas of concern present in the Spanish economy - not least, as always, the banking sector. That's not to say a bailout is assured but simply that more needs to be done to ensure the stability of the Spanish economy and convince the markets that Spain is on the path to a full recovery.

See below for the full piece and see here for our full briefing on Spain:

WITH a sense of inevitability the spotlight has landed on Spain. Though the headlines proclaimed that the Eurozone crisis has returned with a vengeance, the truth is it never left. Spain is not Greece, but, many of the market fears surrounding the economy are still both well-founded and expected. There are three major causes of concern: the exposure of Spanish banks, regional governments’ fiscal profligacy and a risk that structural reforms won’t reap benefits soon enough.

The vulnerable banking sector remains the likely trigger for any future downturn in Spain. One in five of the loans by Spanish banks to the bust real estate and construction sectors is seen as “doubtful”, i.e. at serious risk of never being repaid. Against some €136bn (£112bn) in potentially toxic loans, Spanish banks hold only €50bn in loss provisions. And things are likely to get worse. House prices have declined quickly over the past six months and may fall by another 35 per cent, if there is to be the same level of adjustment as seen in Ireland.

This is troubling, firstly, because Spain cannot afford to bail out its banks. And, secondly, because Spanish banks have been the main recent buyers of Spanish sovereign debt. If these banks don’t have the cash to buy Spanish debt, then who will? This massively increases the prospect of a self-fulfilling bond run on Spain and the chances of an ill-fated Spanish bailout.

Not to be outdone, the regions look to be harbingering plenty of problems of their own. The regions have seen the amount of unpaid debt on their books rise by €10bn (38 per cent) since the start of the crisis. The total in unpaid bills now tops €36bn. Yet again, this cost is likely to be transferred to the central government, which can ill afford it, and risks the country missing its deficit target, further fuelling market jitters. The regions are also expected to contribute 44 per cent of the planned deficit reduction this year. But with the budget still hot off the press, the largest and wealthiest regions are already rejecting Madrid’s ordered spending cuts.

The good news is that the new Partido Popular government is pushing through some much needed structural reforms. Unfortunately, it will take time for the benefits to be felt, and in the short term they are likely to increase already skyhigh unemployment while doing little to boost lagging demand.

Spain remains a serious and diverse economy, with relatively good administration and infrastructure – talk of a full bailout programme is premature. The most likely outcome is some sort of aid for the banking sector – probably with the help of the European stability mechanism. As much as we hate seeing risk being transferred to taxpayers, it might be better for Spain to swallow this bitter pill now and ask for aid for its banks, than risk it dragging the whole economy – and the euro – over the edge.

Eurozone bailouts in the dock

Whenever there's a new, big EU-related initative, say a Treaty or a new bailout fund, you know that one thing will follow: a legal challenge at the German Constitutional Court - the Bundesverfassungsgericht, or BVerfG. And when the heavyweight Court rules, Europe holds its breath (see here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here for example). The Court's rulings on the Maastricht Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty and, most recently, the eurozone bailouts have very much set out the parameters for further EU integration.

While taking the German Constitution, or Basic Law (Grundgesetz) extremely seriously, the BVerfG usually opts for the 'here but no further' approach, and have never fully overturned an EU measure, though it did have some strong things to say about the Lisbon Treaty, while also striking down the German law that implemented the EU's Data Retention Directive. Likewise, the Court has made the introduction of Eurobonds, should it ever come to that, far more complicated (see here for background).

As the Bundestag gears up to ratify both the euro's permanent bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism, and the German driven 'fiscal treaty' on budgetary discipline within the eurozone, get set for another series of launches. Interestingly, today, we learn from Der Spiegel that none other than former German justice minister Herta Däubler-Gmelin - from the Social Democrats - has said she will bring a legal challenge to the Court against both the ESM and the 'fiscal treaty' on behalf of the 'More Democracy' campaign group, on the basis that the budgetary sovereignty of the Bundestag is being threatened. She claims that the EU plans "cross a red line", and that:

"I'm all for Europe, but not for a Europe that is determined only by the governing elites… It can not be that Europe takes away the rights of national parliaments, without strengthening the European Parliament and the participation rights of citizens accordingly. Europe must be democratic."

We hear you Herta.

Less surprisingly, Germany's far-left party, Die Linke, and CSU MP Peter Gauweiler (a regular litigator) are planning legal challenges as well.

Some people seem to have this strange idea that even in a crisis, the rule of law should be upheld (yes, we are being sarcastic).

The second Greek bailout: bad for Greece, bad for eurozone taxpayers

Ahead of today’s EU summit, Open Europe has published a new briefing arguing that the second Greek bailout is bad for Greece and bad for eurozone taxpayers. The briefing notes that of the total amount (€282.2bn) that is entailed in the various measures now on the table to save Greece – through the bailouts and the ECB – only €159.5bn, or 57% will actually go to Greece itself. The rest will go to banks and other bondholders. Furthermore, immediately following the restructuring, Greece’s debt to GDP will still be 161%, a reduction of only 2% compared to where it is now. On top of this Greece has to undertake extensive budget cuts amounting to 20% of GDP in total – a level which no other country has even attempted in recent history.

By 2015, once the first and second Greek bailouts have been completed, as much as 85% will be owned by taxpayer-backed institutions (EU/IMF/ECB).This means that in the event of a likely default, a huge chunk of the losses will fall on European taxpayers, potentially leading to significant political fallout in countries such as Finland, the Netherlands and Germany. The briefing concludes that, given the sizeable debt relief needed in Greece, a fuller coercive restructuring would have been a simpler and more effective option from the start and should still be pursued.

To read the full briefing click here.

What is cheap ECB liquidity actually solving?

The ECB held its second three year long term refinancing operation (LTRO) this morning. Overall 800 banks requested €529bn in funding. The market and wider reaction has been mixed – the amount was well within expectations although the number of banks was much higher (up from 523 last time). The larger number of banks is widely being seen as positive since it suggest smaller banks took part this time - and they are more likely to lend directly to businesses - while on average banks asked for less liquidity.

The more important figure though, is how much of this is new liquidity. Of the previous €489bn LTRO only around €200bn was new lending, since banks rolled over their previous loans from shorter ECB lending operations. In this instance (since many loans have been rolled over) the new injection of liquidity is likely to be much higher. We expect that the new liquidity totalled between €300bn and €400bn.

Short term loans issued by the ECB earlier this week totalled €134bn, while €150bn of short/medium term lending is also due to expire this week - both can be seen to give an indication of the amount of lending which will be rolled over. Much of the new lending will have come from the loosened collateral requirements (€200bn or so) as well as the decreased ‘stigma’ associated with banks which borrow from the LTRO.

We’re yet to see a full list of who borrowed what (and probably won’t for some time) but there are some details (we’ll update as more come through):

Intesa Sanpaolo (IT) - €24bn
Lloyds (UK) - €11.4bn
Allied Irish (IR) - Unknown
Banco Popolare (ES) - €3.5bn
KBC (BE) - €5bn
Unicredit (IT) - <€12.5bn (not that this helps pin down the figure much)
BBVA - Similar to first LTRO (around €11bn)

Italian banks are reported to have tapped the LTRO for around €100bn in total, while banks such as ING (NL) and ABN Amro (NL) have stated that they did not tap the operation at all. Clearly 'stigma' is not an issue in Italy but alive and well in the Netherlands, presenting an interesting microcosm of the problems facing these countries.

One point we’d note is that the first LTRO was not tapped heavily by banks from the bailed out countries. There is no evidence that banks from Portugal or Greece took any ‘new’ lending from the first LTRO while Irish banks only took an additional €5bn (% of their current borrowing from the ECB and Irish central bank). This could be for one of two reasons: the banks are more or less blocked from taking on massive amounts of extra liquidity since they should be leveraging and meeting stringent capital requirements under the bailout programmes. Or, the banks in these countries had run short of collateral to post with the ECB in exchange for loans. It will be interesting to see if this problem held true in the second LTRO, given the loosened collateral requirements – early indications with the Portuguese borrowing costs jumping suggest it will.

This shows how the LTRO will not solve any of the eurozone problems. In fact it may not even help sentiment or lending in the worst hit countries. The Italian and Spanish banks look likely to increase their purchases of their domestic government debt, further intertwining eurozone states with their banking sectors. The question now is, how many more LTROs will there be?

Given the lack of a credible solution to the problems in Greece and Portugal we fear more may be on the horizon.

Ps. For you German speakers, it's well worth reading this piece from Die Welt's Holger Zschäpitz on why the LTRO is turning the ECB into a lender of first instance rather than one of last resort

The second Greek bailout: Ten unanswered questions

We put out a briefing note today outlining the ten questions and issues that still need to be resolved in the coming weeks in order for Greece to avoid a full and disorderly default on March 20.

The briefing argues that, realistically, only a few of these issues are likely to be fully resolved before the deadline meaning that Greece’s future in the euro will come down to one question: whether Germany and other Triple A countries will deem this to be enough political cover to approve the second Greek bailout package.

In particular, the briefing argues that recent analyses of Greece’s woes have underplayed the importance of the problems posed by the large amount of funding which needs to be released to ensure the voluntary Greek restructuring can work – almost €94bn – as well as the massive time constraints presented by issues such as getting parliamentary approval for the bailout deal in Germany and Finland. While the eurozone also continues to ignore or side-line questions over the whether a 120% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2020 would be sustainable and if, given the recent riots, Greece has come close to the social and political level of austerity which it can credibly enforce.

The briefing concludes that, ultimately, there’s no way Greece can actually ever fully meet the conditions laid down by the EU and IMF – particularly if they keep piling on new demands. The scale of the cuts goes far beyond any fiscal consolidation – successful or failed – that any country has gone through in living memory. The question is instead one of how long the eurozone’s charade of unrealistic conditions in return for more bailout cash can continue. Specifically, will Germany and other Triple-A countries accept half-baked solutions to the big unanswered questions that still haunt the efforts to save Greece?

To read the full briefing click here.

Germany still doesn’t understand Greece

Despite being locked together in economic turmoil for almost two years, the reports which emerged over this weekend further suggest that Germany still does not understand the depth of some of the problems facing Greece (and that they cannot be tackled by a one dimensional policy).

We are of course referring to the leaked German proposal calling for Greece to cede budget sovereignty to the EU. Naturally, this is an impossible claim and was roundly rejected by Greece and the Commission, while German officials have spent the weekend trying to douse the flames behind the scenes.

It is not clear whether or not this was ever a serious proposal on the part of the German government, although stern talk from the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble and the Economy Minister Philipp Roesler suggested that the sentiment behind the proposal was real enough. We will not dwell on the obvious and well documented political and democratic questions which this raises – it is clearly a step too far which could and would not ever be accepted by the EU in the current framework. There has been talk of a Eurozone finance ministry at some point in the future, but this stands apart from asking a single country to undemocratically cede control of taxation and spending to the EU- meaning the proposal was destined to sink as soon as it hit the water.

This substantial issue aside, the sentiment behind the proposal reveals a continuing misunderstanding of the Greek problem from the German government. Despite all the talk of “growth and jobs” in recent days, it is clear the emphasis is on austerity above all else. It also raises serious questions about Germany’s belief that Greek debt could ever be sustainable under Greek control – which should be a concern for German citizens since they are about to finance the largest share of another €130bn bailout.

Fundamentally though, as a recent OECD report noted, the problems within Greece run a lot deeper than just the ability to agree on the ‘right’ policies. For all its shortcomings, the Greece has instituted a multitude of deficit and debt reduction plans over the past year. However, the real issue comes with the implementation of these reforms, as the OECD comments:

“Ministries take decisions but these are often not reflected in concrete results. A succession of reforms launched in recent years (including reforms of the administration) did not bring the expected results, due to poor implementation.”

So, the problems do not necessarily lie with the politicians or the top level civil servants (or at least they do not stop there) meaning that shifting top level control to the EU would make very little practical difference.

These problems cannot be tackled overnight or by simply imposing more austerity. Germany has continually refused or failed to understand the nature of the problems facing Greece despite much of the public posturing. With the outcome of the Greek restructuring negotiations still far from clear, a change in tact is needed - although it could well already be too late.

A new year, the same old problems...

Ahead of the first (full) EU summit of the new year, we've put together our thoughts on what progress to expect.

As per usual there are lots of topics to be discussed but we don’t expect too many concrete decisions. We’d expect a final draft of the euro fiscal pact to be completed, some progress on ESM - the eurozone's permanent bailout fund - and a commitment to "growth and jobs" (as opposed to recession and unemployment..?). Huge questions over Greece and size of bailout funds will probably remain. Below we outline the key issues to watch out for (take 2):

Fiscal pact: This should be last round of discussions on the new European treaty. The aim has always been to have the final draft completed by end of January. However, there are still a few issues which need to be resolved.

The key interaction is between how the rules will apply to those non-eurozone which sign the pact and how much influence they will have (i.e. how many meetings they get to attend and what decisions they will have an impact on). Sweden, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic will make their decision on whether to sign based on how this plays out. The final agreement won’t be finalised as the Czechs and Irish will still have to decide whether to hold a referendum on the treaty. Expect it all to be tied up at the March summit.

Our bet is on the Poles, Danes and Swedes signing up if they're guaranteed some sort of place at the table and if the rules of pact actually don't apply to them - creating a rather bizarre situation.

The UK and the use of EU institutions: We suspect that Cameron will reluctantly accept the formulation in the fourth draft of the fiscal compact which gives the ECJ the right to slap fines on member states for not implementing the pact's spending ceilings. Technically, this marks an overlap between the fiscal compact and the EU treaties - something which Cameron has argued against in the past.

ESM treaty: Behind the scenes negotiations have been on-going, so the draft should be fairly far along. The biggest sticking point was the use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to make decisions within the ESM, which Finland objected to. There now looks to be a compromise. The Finnish Constitutional Committee announced today that it approves of the new wording in the ESM treaty, whereby QMV is used to disburse loans but for any change in the size of the ESM a unanimous decision is needed. The Grand Committee (representing the Finnish Parliament) will rule on Monday and is expected to support this position. This is pretty big.

Additionally, there should also be a discussion on the size of the ESM and whether the ESM and EFSF can run in parallel. It's hard to read Germany on this issue. There have been indications that Germany may be willing to let ESM and EFSF run together, but it would want the fiscal pact and Greece sorted before it is considered. It's likely the topic will be broached but final decision will be delayed until March.

Greek restructuring: EU leaders are unlikely to have a deal ready to present at the meeting so it may be more of a general discussion. Even if a deal is achieved, which reconciles the differences between Greece and its bondholders over the level of interest paid on the new bonds, there is still the huge question of holdouts and ECB. Expect these issues to be covered along with talk of increasing the size of the second Greek bailout and losses for public sector - but don't expect any big movements (at least not publicly).

Growth and jobs agenda: EU leaders have been pushing this 'new' agenda recently. After coming in for massive criticism for their undying commitment to austerity, they are keen to focus on boosting competitiveness, promoting growth, creating jobs and the like. Despite that, as of yet a coherent policy agenda to achieve this has not been formulated - most of the time there is just a broad commitment to ‘structural reforms’.

We expect much of the same from this meeting - leaders (David Cameron in particular) will play up the renewed focus on growth rather than just austerity but it remains unclear how much difference the EU can make on this front. Ultimately, national governments need to push ahead with long term changes to the structure of their economies (labour market reforms, increased education and training, investment in R&D, increased competition etc.) This will take time, money and political will, all of which the eurozone is short of at the moment.

More IMF contributions? conditionality is king

The rumours were finally confirmed today as the IMF released a statement announcing its plans to increase its funding base by up to $500bn. There’s been a lot of talk in the British media in recent weeks about the potential increased UK contributions to the IMF, and not much of it positive. The coverage has painted any additional UK contributions as tantamount to a eurozone bailout – this is a tempting narrative but ultimately it may be too simplistic. When it comes to the IMF there are a few subtleties which need to be considered, as we outline below.

Firstly, no-one has lost money lending to the IMF…ever. It is always the most senior creditor, meaning it will be the first to be paid back. Therefore the potential risk of this lending is minimal, no matter where it goes. Moreover, as Cameron has pointed out, the contributions do not impact the UK’s debt or deficit, so it is not really a question of giving up other priorities to fund the IMF.

Additionally it seems as if the money will be paid into the IMF general reserve fund and not a specific eurozone fund. It is also likely that other members will contribute, so this moves the point away from being simply about the UK and the eurozone and becomes more about the UK's participation in the global economy. Being a member of the IMF is an important part of the UK’s global role and its foreign policy approach. Unilaterally declining to contribute funds and possibly removing the UK from the IMF would have an impact far beyond the UK’s role in the eurozone crisis.

Furthermore, given the failures of the EU in the eurozone crisis, shifting the balance of power towards the IMF would be no bad thing (in the right circumstances, of course). The IMF has conclusively argued for a large write down of debt in Greece (as we also have) and has the expertise and experience to deal with the challenges of restructuring struggling economies.

That said there are a few conditions which the Government should consider:

- The funds must go into a general fund not a eurozone specific one and must be matched proportionately by all other members of the IMF.
- Larger IMF contributions to the eurozone must be matched by a greater say in the crisis resolution. Generally, it should be made clear by the IMF and its members that the current approach is not working – the focus needs to switch to debt restructuring combined with increased competitiveness and growth.
- The funds must not be seen to impact on Cameron’s decision to veto the recent European treaty. Although IMF funding was mentioned, this is a separate issue since it is coming from a direct IMF request not the EU.

So, it comes down to this: The UK should not hand out further contributions to the IMF without conditions. With these conditions met, the result would not be the same as simply handing more money directly to the eurozone. Alas, in the end, even an extra $500bn at the IMF’s disposal may not make a huge difference the outcome of the crisis.

Greece-ing the wheels…?

It would be a gross understatement to say that negotiations on the Greek voluntary restructuring/write-down/bond swap have been dragging on a bit. The initial idea was first proposed and adopted last July and has been the topic of almost permanent negotiations ever since. Recent reports have suggested that a deal is ‘close’, with Greek officials expecting it to be tied up by the end of the month.

However, given the headlines over the last couple of days, we’re not sure how close ‘close’ really is. We’re referring specifically to all the talk of a retroactive introduction of collective action clauses (CACs).

Excuse the jargon, but this essentially means that the Greek government is considering passing a law which will introduce a clause into outstanding Greek bonds which stipulates that if a certain percentage of the bondholders (usually 75%) agree to a restructuring deal, the remaining holdouts will, by law, also be forced to accept the deal. Seems like a strange move if a deal is just around the corner, doesn’t it?

The aim seems to be that by introducing the CACs the Greek government can ensure a high participation rate in the restructuring, increasing the chances of Greece returning to debt sustainability. This sounds like a reasonable idea on the surface but it raises a huge number of questions given the previous negotiations:

- Invoking CACs would surely constitute a credit event, meaning the restructuring would no longer be ‘voluntary’, leading to the pay-out of credit default swaps. We’ve long been advocates of a forced restructuring in Greece, but this is something which the EU and Greece have been trying to avoid since these negotiations began – it seems a strange turn of events to say the least.

- It has been suggested by some officials that the CACs will be put in place but not invoked, simply used as a negotiating tool or threat. This seems rather long winded (and feeds the idea that a deal is not imminent) but we’re fairly sure announcing it in advance is a poor negotiating tactic, even by EU standards.

However, by our reckoning, the most important issue it raises is over the bonds held by the ECB. As we have noted before, the ECB is now the largest single holder of Greek debt, having purchased a reported €45bn in Greek debt under its Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Up until now the ECB has been able to stay out of the restructuring discussions since they have been conducted on an ad hoc basis (the ECB has continually asserted that it will be holding these bonds to maturity).

Legally, though, the ECB is not a senior creditor and has the same standing as all other bondholders. If the CACs were introduced and invoked they would surely impact the ECB bonds as well. We have previously estimated that such write-downs could cost the ECB €12bn - €18bn, while Barclays recently put the figure as high as €20bn. Not the end of the world for the ECB, but it would be a huge blow to its overall approach to the eurozone crisis (particularly in terms of German support). Furthermore, resisting these losses could be more detrimental to the eurozone since it would essentially mark the ECB as a senior creditor, creating huge distortions in bond markets as investors become wary of the increased prospect of being the first ones to take losses.

So, the discussion surrounding CACs definitely brings a new element to the Greek restructuring issue. It’s very suggestion runs contrary to the claims, which all eurozone leaders have been making, that a deal is close. However, if it is a signal that Greece has realised that a voluntary restructuring may not be workable or be enough to make Greek debt sustainable then it could be a welcome turn of events towards a hard restructuring. As we have argued numerous times before, a Greek default is now unavoidable and will only become more expensive the longer it is put off - i.e. the sooner this is accepted and dealt with the better.

Get ready for another rollercoaster ride

As we noted last week, 2012 is going to be another incredibly messy year for the euro (hardly an earth-shattering prediction).

Everyone agrees that the next few months are going to be a crucial phase in the eurozone crisis. If a long term solution isn't found it is likely that one never will be and the window of opportunity for saving the eurozone in its current form may close for good (if it hasn't already). We've been here before of course (remember 'six weeks to save the euro'), but there needs to be, at least, some sort of settlement over Greece, to avoid a hard, uncontrolled default in the first half of 2012. Below are the key dates to watch, focusing on meetings and bond auctions - expect this list to increase substantially given the almost weekly meetings between eurozone leaders these days. It's going to be a busy first quarter for euro leaders - summits of various kinds are in bold:

--Monday, Jan. 9: Meeting between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Berlin
--Tuesday, Jan. 10: Ireland's troika of lenders expected to start latest review of country's bailout program.
--Thursday, Jan. 12: ECB interest rate statement and press conference. Spanish (€3.5bn) bond auction.
--Friday, Jan. 13: Italian bond auction (€6bn).
--Monday, Jan. 16: Troika of international inspectors expected to return to Greece to resume talks on new bailout deal.
--Thursday, Jan. 19: Spanish (€3.5bn) and French (€8bn) bond auction.
--Friday, Jan. 20: Troika talks in Greece expected to end. Ireland's troika of lenders releases its latest quarterly review of the country's bailout.
--Sunday, Jan. 22: Finnish Presidential elections
--Monday, Jan. 23: Euro-zone finance ministers meeting. --Tuesday, Jan. 24: European Union finance ministers meeting.
--Thursday, Jan. 26: Italian bond auction (€4.5bn).
--Monday, Jan. 30: EU leaders summit. Italian (€7bn) and Belgian bond auctions (€4bn).
--Tuesday, Jan. 31: Greece aims to conclude talks detailing new EUR130 billion loan deal, debt-exchange program with private-sector creditors by this date.

--Thursday, Feb. 9: ECB interest rate statement and press conference.
--Wednesday, Feb. 15: eurozone Q4 2011 GDP estimate released.
--Friday, Feb. 17: EUR1.6 billion Greek T-bills maturing.
--Tuesday, Feb. 28: ECB three-month and three-year long-term refinancing operation. Italian bond auction.
--Wednesday, Feb. 29 to Thursday Mar. 1: Italy sees €46.5bn in debt maturing.

--Thursday, Mar. 1: EU leaders meet in Brussels for a two day summit.
--Thursday, Mar. 8: ECB holds monthly meeting
--Saturday, Mar. 10: Slovakia holds parliamentary election
--Monday, Mar. 12: eurozone finance ministers meet in Brussels --Tuesday, Mar. 13: EU finance ministers meet in Brussels
--Tuesday, Mar. 20: Potential Greek default? Greece sees €14.4bn in government debt mature, needs to have next tranche of bailout funds and second bailout in place to be able to cover this cost.
--Friday, Mar. 30: eurozone finance ministers meet in Copenhagen --Saturday, Mar. 31: EU finance ministers meet in Copenhagen; Deadline for new Spanish government to present 2012 budget to Spanish parliament

--Sunday, Apr. 22: French Presidential election

Will the euro crack in 2012? It'll be turbulent but probably not...

In a blog post for the Telegraph, we ask this simple and yet brutally complicated question. This is what we argue:

In truth, as the crisis is overwhelmingly about erratic domestic politics, it’s absolutely impossible to predict when the euro will bite the dust. What’s clear is that in the absence of some sort of fiscal union (likely to be collective borrowing amongst euro states in return for German-style budget rules), the single currency is doomed in the long-term. In the short term, however, there is still scope for plenty of muddling through – which is to say that there’s a strong chance that the euro survives 2012. So what is the likely good (an expression used loosely here) and bad news for the eurozone moving in 2012? And what would, to complete the phrase, an “ugly” scenario look like?

The “good”

The ECB stepping up: Arguably the biggest threat to the survival of the eurozone in 2012 is a deep freeze in the banking system. That is, banks get so incredibly nervous that they completely stop lending money to each other, leaving some banks bust. Governments would find it very hard to refinance themselves and credit to the wider economy would be choked off.

Now, for those who think short-term (which is most people), the good news is that the ECB has stepped in to offer ridiculously cheap loans to any bank in the eurozone that asks for it (under a new euro acronym known as the LTRO), giving them the cash and confidence to continue lending this year – at least in theory. There is a catch of course: as with all other ECB intervention, the LTRO serves to transfer more risks from private creditors to European taxpayers (as the ECB is ultimately taxpayer-backed) and there are little signs of a plan to wean banks’ off their growing reliance on public money. How all 523 banks that have taken loans so far will be able to rollover nearly €500bn in funds, all due for repayment in 2015 – when the ECB wants its money back – is a question few are asking at the moment.

There’s bailout cash left: Though not nearly enough to act as proper lender of last resort, there’s bailout money left in the pot for the eurozone to play with this year. Following a second Greek bailout, the temporary and permanent euro bailout funds (the EFSF and the ESM), set to run in parallel in 2012, have a combined lending capacity of between €500bn and €750bn with potentially another €170bn of IMF money to add. In addition, the ECB can still buy a limited amount of government bonds, albeit reluctantly. Compare this to the roughly €800bn that eurozone governments need to raise between them (including countries that are safe) this year, and it might just about add up – for 2012, that is.

The bad

Recession inevitable: No matter what happens, it will be an incredibly painful year for the eurozone, with recession plaguing several countries, exacerbated by a slowdown in the rest of the world. Low growth and poor competitiveness remain the euro's greatest curse.

The Greek factor: Without the next tranche of EU bailout cash, Greece will default in March, and is almost certain to default sooner or later anyway. Greece is currently in negotiations with private creditors over a ‘voluntary’ restructuring of its €360bn debt mountain – it remains uncertain whether it can remain inside the eurozone absent a deal, which would mean a ‘forced’ restructuring. However, both the Greek electorate and the political elite remain committed to the euro and I doubt eurozone leaders will have the nerve to force Greece out this year. But anything can happen should, say, the present Greek technocratic government fall (it's worth reading Paul Mason's take on it).

A French downgrade: Due to the large exposure of the country’s banks, France could well be downgraded at least one notch. Among other things, this would hit the creditworthiness of the euro bailout funds, meaning higher borrowing costs for those countries that tap them and even more reliance on German taxpayers’ cash.

Risk of unexpected bank collapse: Despite ECB liquidity, the sudden collapse of a large eurozone bank is an ever present risk. The radical increase in banks’ use of ECB cash (via the LTRO and other programmes) is an alarming sign that one or several banks are in serious trouble.

Europe stands alone: No one seems willing to come to Europe’s rescue, with international lenders from Beijing to Washington frustrated by the EU’s dithering.

The ugly

Though the risk is still small, there’s a possible perfect ‘storm scenario’ for the euro in 2012. As events are so incredibly intertwined, it’s impossible to tell which would come first. But the scary thing is that just one or two of the below factors may be enough to start a chain of events which would lead to the disorderly break-up of the eurozone:

• Widespread downgrades, including of the eurozone’s remaining Triple A countries, by credit rating agencies. Serious questions would be raised over the viability of the eurozone’s bailout funds as they rely on an ever thinner list of Triple A eurozone states, leaving the euro with little more than a paper tiger as a backstop.

• Spanish banks could hit the iceberg as households fail to pay their mortgages and the level of non-performing loans pile up. If it gets bad enough, the Spanish government wouldn't afford to recapitalise these banks on its own and must seek a potentially huge bailout from the EU/IMF.

• In addition to those in Spain, one or more banks in Italy or France could sink due to large exposure to weaker euro states - following a hard Greek default for example. As in Spain, there are doubts as to whether these governments could afford to bail out their banks without outside help.

In parallel to these economic concerns, the political tensions between what’s required to keep the euro together versus what citizens are willing to swallow could reach breaking point. A new French government might try to renegotiate the euro’s new budget and fiscal rules, causing uncertainty and delays, while Angela Merkel’s opposition to bailouts and ECB intervention could increase as national elections loom large in early 2013. Meanwhile, the push by unelected governments in Greece and Italy for ever more austerity, could trigger a fresh wave of political unrest. Though still unlikely, the Monti government in Italy could lose its support in Parliament, leading to fresh elections, more uncertainty and spiralling borrowing costs for Italy. The country remains too big to be bailed out.

Ultimately, it is how these political tensions are played out in various countries that is likely to determine the eurozone’s fate. My best bet is still on the euro surviving this year – we haven’t yet reached rock bottom. But make no mistake, this will be another incredibly messy year for the euro and the choice between what’s right for democracy in Europe and what’s right for the euro cannot be avoided forever.

The ECB’s bazooka?

This morning saw the first allotment of the new unlimited three year ECB loans - the much hyped mechanism that some hope will solve the eurozone crisis by actually providing cash to struggling eurozone banks with which they can then use to buy Portuguese, Italian, Irish, Greek and Spanish debt, giving these countries some breathing space.

Banks demand for these new loans shattered almost all expectations, coming in at €489bn (from 523 banks), compared to an average estimate of around €300bn beforehand. In the run up to the operation there had been much debate over whether this was a ‘back-door’ bailout by the ECB or its version of ‘Quantitative Easing’. Christian Noyer Governor of the Banque de France even termed it the ECB’s bazooka (for our recent briefing on this see here).

With all this in mind one would expect a euphoric reaction from financial markets – unfortunately that doesn’t seem to have been the case. There was naturally some initial boost, but stock markets have settled quickly with some European markets even down slightly, while peripheral bond yields have continued their upward rise.

There are a few key reasons why this might be the case:

- The actual boost in liquidity is only €210bn, since the rest is moved from some of the ECB’s other shorter lending operations, so any knock on effects it does have are likely to be limited.

- Banks face a huge task to reach the 9% capital requirements laid out by the European Banking Authority (EBA), even with this extra liquidity banks are still going to be tempted to undertake significant deleveraging (reducing lending) to meet these requirements.

- Banks face huge amounts of debt which needs to be rolled over or paid off, this is far from covered by this extra liquidity.

- It is unlikely that much of this money will be funnelled back into sovereign debt (thankfully) since banks still face huge scrutiny over their exposures to the eurozone crisis, while any such investments would have to be hedged (the risk would have to be accounted for) - both of which decrease the value of such investments.

- Some of this money may filter through to boost lending by banks to the wider economy, but given some of the constraints above this is far from certain.

- Reports suggest the ECB has already begun purchasing Italian and Spanish debt to keep yields down this afternoon, a role which many expected banks to be playing once they were flush with all this new liquidity.

So, still plenty of concerns and questions for financial markets to ponder despite the big uptake in this morning’s lending operation.

Even if all of this money were used to purchase sovereign debt by banks it would not help solve the crisis. Not just because it would load under capitalised banks with risky sovereign debt (hinged on huge political uncertainty) but also because it only represents a short term liquidity boost. Sure, it might help Italy and Spain rollover a few billion in debt a bit more cheaply, but it does nothing to tackle the underlying problems of the crisis (lack of competitiveness and growth to name but two) nor does it help the already insolvent bailed out states.

In the end, the pressure is still on for eurozone leaders to find a comprehensive intergovernmental solution, they must take the lead, the ECB and the banks cannot.

The Battle for the heart and soul of the ECB

Open Europe has today published a briefing arguing that the ECB is unlikely to buy the hundreds of billions worth of government bonds required for it to properly backstop the eurozone, following an underwhelming agreement between EU leaders at the summit of 8 and 9 December.

However, Open Europe notes that, contrary to popular opinion, the ECB is already heavily intervening in markets. Through its government bond buying and liquidity provision to banks, we estimate that the ECB’s exposure to weaker eurozone economies has now reached €705bn, up from €444bn in early summer – an increase of over 50% in only six months, raising fresh questions about its credibility, independence and possible losses it may face in the case of future sovereign defaults.

The briefing also notes that other suggested options for boosting demand for sovereign debt – such as the newly announced three year long term refinancing operation (LTRO), due on Thursday – while helping to stem the short-term funding crisis, would also come with the risk of incentivising a weak banking sector to stock up on risky government debt. The ECB would also struggle to conduct ‘Quantitative Easing’ (QE) in the same vein as the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England as any QE would have to be spread proportionately around the eurozone, meaning that Germany would be subject to greater effects of any QE than Italy.

Open Europe concludes that there may come a day when the ECB has no choice but to intervene on a massive scale. However, if so, that will likely be a stop gap on the path to a new, slimmed-down eurozone, and probably following the default of at least one eurozone member.

Key points:

- As things stand the ECB should not, will not and cannot provide the unlimited financial backstop to the eurozone that financial markets seem to be clamouring for. The measures taken at the EU summit on 8 and 9 December are unlikely to supply adequate cover for the ECB to buy the hundreds of billions worth of Spanish and Italian government debt needed to fulfil this role.

- The ECB has taken on large amounts of low quality collateral in return for providing loans to banks, and has seen a massive surge in the number of asset-backed securities it has taken on to its balance-sheet. Though not all of these assets are bad or ‘toxic’, they are extremely difficult to value. At the same time, the number of banks which are becoming reliant on the ECB is alarming and hopes that the functioning of the European financial markets will ever return to normal are diminishing – creating a long-term threat to Europe’s economy.

- Through its government bond buying and liquidity provision to banks, the ECB’s exposure to the PIIGS has now reached €705bn, up from €444bn in early summer. This is an increase of over 50% in only six months and shows how, contrary to popular belief, the ECB is already intervening quite heavily in the markets. It also highlights how the eurozone crisis continues to transfer risks away from private creditors to taxpayer-backed institutions. It remains unclear how the ECB would cover losses in the event of a sovereign default.

- The ECB is likely to continue to keep interest rates low and continue to provide cheap credit to banks despite inflation fears in Germany. Currently, given the global slowdown, the different monetary policy needs of eurozone countries are small enough to paper over. However, this will not be the case for long and as German growth picks up the huge flaws in the one-size-fits-all monetary policy will again be horribly exposed.

- Moving forward, the ECB could offer a liquidity boost to Europe’s economy but little more. The term ‘lender of last resort’ is often misused or misunderstood – the ECB cannot fully backstop sovereign states or return them to solvency. At best it could ease the pressure on illiquid states, but even this depends on the legal constraints on the ECB’s defined role and being seen to give in to political demands that would hurt the ECB’s credibility and independence.

- Even if it can be achieved practically, Quantitative Easing (QE) by the ECB is unlikely to work. Even a €500bn bout of QE – as some have called for – would see only €90bn flow towards Italy, due to the need to spread QE evenly across the eurozone. This would not make a significant dent in Italy’s €1.9 trillion of sovereign debt.

- Alternative options such as the ECB lending to the IMF or lending to banks for them to stock up on sovereign debt, are preferable to direct ECB financing of states, since the IMF and banks can apply some conditions and maintain market pressure for reform, but create hazards and complications of their own without offering many additional benefits.

- Instead of arguing about the role of the ECB, EU leaders should focus on pushing ahead with debt restructurings in the eurozone, despite the ECB’s objections, and formulate a plan for how to mitigate the ensuing losses both on the ECB’s balance sheet and in the private sector. Ultimately, money would be far better used for these ends rather than flooding the eurozone with liquidity and recycling debt – both of which have failed so far.

- The time may come when greater ECB intervention in the sovereign debt markets is unavoidable, but at this point it would be a mechanism to help ease the transition to a new eurozone structure, probably with fewer members and a more clearly defined role for the ECB.

To read full briefing, click here.

FrAAAnce misses the point...

For all those who think that French President Nicolas Sarkozy will be sitting in the Élysée plotting some form of retaliation against Cameron, it has quickly become clear that he has much bigger things to worry about.

Rumours have once again been flying around that France’s triple-A rating is under threat and could be facing an imminent downgrade. These have become all the more serious by the numerous French government ministers that have publicly played down the gravity of any downgrade.

On Monday Sarkozy said that a downgrade would be “one more difficulty, but not insurmountable.” On Tuesday Valerie Percresse, French Budget Minister, made similar remarks saying, "The fundamentals of the [French] economy are good, and investors don't doubt France will pay back its debts," thereby playing down the impact of any downgrade. Finally, yesterday French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said, “[A downgrade] wouldn't be good news, but it wouldn't be a cataclysm either. The United States lost their triple-A and still manage to borrow on the markets in good conditions.”

This public onslaught by the government on the cost of France losing its triple-A rating is widely being seen as a way of softening up the public and the markets for what’s coming. Ultimately, the impact of a downgrade on France will depend on numerous factors, not least: whether other countries are also downgraded, whether it is a one or two notch downgrade and the level of upcoming public and private financing which France faces immediately after the decision.

Our concern though is not about the impact on France. In fact the French government seem to be missing the bigger picture – the impact it will have on the eurozone bailout funds. The eurozone is already running short on money, at least in terms of providing a financial firewall to stop the crisis. As we noted in our ‘No Way Out' report a downgrade would not be good:

Since the EFSF’s Triple-A rating relies on Triple-A countries, a French downgrade would also mean a downgrade for the EFSF itself. For such a downgrade to be avoided, the remaining Triple-A countries would need to substantially increase their share of the guarantees, transferring even more of the burden on the already reluctant German taxpayer – while also threatening Germany’s own rating. In all likelihood, under the increased EFSF scenario, a downgrade of France would trigger a downward spiral of ratings cuts due to the extra EFSF liabilities which would make the entire fund completely unworkable.

So a French downgrade would be bad for the EFSF, the eurozone’s temporary bailout fund, while numerous downgrades could spell the end of its ability to borrow, and therefore lend, at low cost. It could also spell trouble for the ESM, the eurozone’s permanent bailout fund, which, despite some paid in capital, also largely relies on guarantees from its members.

In any case, the French government may be softening up its population for a downgrade, but who’s going to soften up markets for the realisation that the eurozone bailout funds could be rendered close to useless (more useless?)….

Update 15/12/11 12:20pm:

Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, today launched an attack on the rating agencies (and the UK), suggesting that they are not basing their decisions on economic fundamentals and if they were the UK would/should be downgraded before France.

Noyer raises some valid concerns about the level of the UK's debt, deficit, inflation and the dwindling credit availability - but he, like his colleagues mentioned above, misses the key point. The UK has full control over its own monetary policy and can balance it with its fiscal approach in any way desired. France however faces: a central bank whose thinking runs completely contrary to the government's desires, an overvalued currency, increasing fiscal constraints due to its exposure to the eurozone crisis and a looming election (along with potential political divisions over the eurozone crisis). All in all, the UK may economically be in just as bad a position as France, but the UK has the tools to deal with its problems, the French government is, on the contrary, massively constrained.

Draghi's Den

It’s been a whirlwind entrance for Mario Draghi as ECB President and today’s meeting of the Governing Council was seemingly no exception. The key decisions which came out of the meeting were much what we expected, although with a few twists, while more importantly Draghi tackled some of the interesting problems facing Europe fairly bluntly (for a central banker anyway).

Key decisions

1) 0.25% interest rate cut: Essentially needed to be done since markets had come to expect it and the prospects of a eurozone recession next year are looming large. Probably highlights previous rate rises as a mistake, at least in retrospect, has been shown up by eurozone leaders failure to tackle the crisis. The failure of a single monetary policy looks to have been papered over while eurozone contraction sets in, but when/if Germany starts growing quickly again (relative to the rest of the eurozone) Draghi will have some much tougher decisions.

2) Long term liquidity to banks (3yr loans): Widely reported that banks would struggle to secure long term financing without such a move (have €230bn in debt maturing in Q1 2012). Not ideal given the ever increasing dependence from the banking sector on the ECB, but should be seen as a one off. Hopefully will increase lending in the broader economy but this is not assured, especially since unlimited short term liquidity has failed to do so.

3) Easing collateral rules: Greater acceptance of asset backed securities (ABS) – sounds ominous. Not ideal but does come with clear criteria and conditions. There have been indications that banks are running short of viable collateral. Without such a move, this could cause deleveraging or force banks to shift to Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) which accepts even worse collateral and is more secretive. This could, however, potentially propagate the movement of poor quality assets onto the ECB’s balance sheet.

Interesting comments by Draghi

- “The ECB is not a member of the IMF”: Draghi went to some lengths to stress that the plan for eurozone national central banks (NCBs) to lend to the IMF so that the IMF could lend “exclusively” to struggling eurozone countries would not be possible. One point which has been raised is that IMF money is fungible, so the NCBs could contribute to the IMF general reserve account which could then lend to eurozone members. In any case, Draghi made it clear he’s not keen on ECB or NCBs lending to the IMF and may try to stop any proposal, even if it isn’t de jure illegal.

- “We shouldn’t circumvent the spirit of the treaty”: Draghi said this countless times. He reiterated his opposition to increasing bond purchases. He also seemed to suggest he would reject similar ideas of ECB lending to states even if they could be justified as de jure legal if they were de facto illegal and broke the principles of the treaty.

- ‘Other elements will follow’ fiscal compact comment was misinterpreted: Interestingly, Draghi highlighted his surprise that his comments last week had been taken as an indication of increased bond buying, stating that he did not mean that in anyway. He suggested that he was merely highlighting the sequence of events, in that fiscal consolidation needs to come first and can then be followed by a backstop but only through the EFSF or the ESM, the eurozone bailout funds.

So, a strong expansion of monetary policy to help the banking sector a promote growth and stability. We may not be onside with all of his measures, since they may raise long term questions over what gets put onto the ECB’s balance sheet, but they are clearly within the realms of monetary policy. Using these mechanisms is always preferable to the ECB wading into the murky world of fiscal policy.

Despite this boost, markets are likely to be unnerved by his comments during the Q&A session. Draghi essentially ruled out any ECB or NCB lending to the IMF or at least suggested he would oppose the process. He also put pay to this ‘quid pro quo’ theory that the ECB will step in and increase its bond purchases if eurozone leaders agree some fiscal integration or discipline. We have to commend Draghi for his firmness on these issues, although we still fear he could wilt in the face of the increasing clamour from eurozone leaders and their reliable inability to find any solution. But at least for now it puts the ball firmly back into EU leaders’ court ahead of tomorrow’s summit.