More of the same expected from the ECB despite eurozone economic malaise

The ECB holds its monthly meeting tomorrow. Below we look at the main topics of discussion, with the ECB weighing some important decisions.

Could the ECB cut its main interest rate again?

• Possibly. It is certainly considering it. As with last month, growth and inflation have remained subdued, providing further incentive and scope for the ECB to cut rates.
• There has not been a significant downturn on either front however, meaning many do not expect further action.

The ECB is considering a negative deposit rate
Most reports suggest the ECB Governing Council is split on this issue. At the least this means it is unlikely to push ahead with it. We also believe the problems and complications outweigh the benefits. There has been much written about this but below we summarise the key points.

Logic: banks are now charged for holding large excess reserves (deposits) with the ECB, this will hopefully encourage them to make loans on the interbank market and make more loans to the real economy rather than holding the money at the ECB.

In favour:

• Banks and investors look for higher returns and begin lending cross borders again. This aids financial integration and could help tackle other issues such as the large Target 2 imbalances.
• Increases the amount of times money is circulated through the economy (the velocity of money) as lenders try to avoid getting stuck with excess cash. This could in theory help boost inflation and growth.

Against:

• Contrary to prevailing logic it could actually cause a drop in liquidity. As excess reserves become more expensive banks begin repaying loans they have taken from the ECB. All the while they are deleveraging (may even speed it up), causing less money to flow to the real economy.
• Rates could actually rise for a number of reasons. Larger number of weaker banks forced onto the interbank market. Banks may simply look to pass on increased costs to consumers.
• If banks do not pass on costs or deal with them, then profits will be hit – in many cases they are already worryingly low.
• Could increase the flood of money to safe assets, particularly from the core eurozone countries. The return on these would become even more negative, increasing their costliness and driving divergence with the rest of the eurozone.
• The large money market fund industry, which plays an important role for liquidity in bond markets, could struggle to stay afloat since it relies on small positive returns on safe short terms assets (see above points).
• The euro is likely to weaken, this combined with the other effects could cause a large outflow of cash to other parts of the world, exacerbating problems.

What about all the talk of boosting lending to small businesses?
This focuses around the creation of a new market for securitised loans to small businesses. The logic being: banks make these loans, package them together into securities and then sell them on to other banks and investors. There is a clear demand for quality assets which provide a decent return meaning there could be demand for such securities.

However, the ECB has backed away from grand plans on this issue. As we pointed out previously it was always very hesitant about purchasing such securities itself, with the Bundesbank in particular opposed to such action.

More of the same seems likely
With things ticking over the ECB is likely to hold off on any further drastic action at its meeting tomorrow. It will continue to emphasise that monetary policy will remain loose for some time (the concept of forward guidance which it began to adopt last month to some extent). It may also put more flesh on the bones of schemes to work with the European Investment Bank (EIB) to boost lending to small businesses. Some easing of the collateral rules as we predicted last month is also a definite possibility.

As we’ve said before, the ECB continues to look constrained. It does of course have a few more tools, however, they are in many cases quite extreme and have potential side effects. These are best suited to very extreme scenarios (euro break-up) rather than the wider malaise and long term endemic crisis which the eurozone now faces, particularly given that often (as we are now seeing with banking union) any ECB action sparks complacency and inaction on the part of politicians.

ECB increasingly likely to cut rates but running short of tools to help the eurozone economy

The ECB looks set to cut its main interest rate by 0.25% to 0.5% on Thursday (while keeping the deposit rate at 0% due to concerns about distortionary effects of negative rates).

Why is the ECB considering cutting rates?

• The obvious answer is that the crisis is clearly dragging on and the eurozone economy is struggling. But, that has been true for some time, so why now?
• Economic activity has been particularly bad (see right hand graph below), while forecasts have been continuously downgraded.
• In particular, annual inflation has dropped well below the ECB’s target of 2%, while unemployment has continued to rise (left hand graph below, click to enlarge).

Will it have any impact?

• Not really. On the margin it will help reduce costs for those banks which borrow heavily from the ECB and consumers with variable rate loans and mortgages – but the impact will be very limited.

• The usual mechanism through which a rate cut is transmitted to the market is broken. See for example the overnight lending in the eurozone. It remains at a very low levels. That said, rates are also at record lows. Why is this? Well, most likely because only the strongest banks are borrowing on these markets. For this reason the cut will not filter through to where it’s most needed since lending rates are already completely detached from it and focus more on the risks of the banks involved.

• As has been well documented, rates in the south and the north are also significantly different, particularly in terms of lending to businesses. Clearly, these have also diverged from the current ECB rates which are already incredibly low. Cutting further is unlikely to impact this.

What other tools does the ECB have?

Communication: ECB indicates willingness to keep monetary policy loose and step in to aid markets if needed. This has been used effectively by the Fed.
Probability: High, especially in coordination with rate cut.
Effectiveness: Minimal boost since it is already being pursued to some extent, more to reassure markets.

Easing collateral rules: ECB widens the range of assets which it accepts as collateral in exchange for its loans. May also decrease the 'haircut' applied to the value of the loans (thereby increasing their worth as collateral). This is likely to be targeted on SME loans and securities made up of SME loans.
Probability: High, if not this month then in June, particularly if economic data continues to be poor. Effectiveness: Limited, could help bank funding but unlikely to boost SME lending significantly. More risk taken onto ECB balance sheet, likely to widen divisions with Bundesbank. Has been done previously and had little impact.

Outright purchases of SME loans and securities: ECB purchases securities of bundled SME loans, similar to the purchases it made under the Covered Bond Purchase Programme and the Securities Markets Programme.
Probability: Very low. Draghi has previously suggested he sees it more as the job of institutions such as the EIB to help SMEs. Furthermore, the level of SME ABS is limited since they rely heavily on bank loans for funding (another reason why the ECB believes a rate cut could help, at least in theory).
Effectiveness: Limited, especially given that the market for such products is not huge. It would also increase the risk taken directly onto the ECB balance sheet (more so than easing collateral) and would provoke an outcry in Germany for overstepping the acceptable level of central bank intervention. Furthermore, such direct purchases are much harder to unwind than loan related policies which expire naturally, selling off these assets will be tough.

A version of the UK 'Funding for Lending' scheme: not really an option for the ECB at this time, contrary to popular belief. The various national regulations and structures aside it is practically impossible since the ECB already applies full allotment (unlimited lending).
Probability: Very low.
Effectiveness: Potentially counterproductive as the ECB would need to end its programme of full allotment in order to then make liquidity dependent on the amount of loans made by banks.

These are to name but a few options being reviewed currently. Other options such as working with the European Investment Bank to promote SME lending would need political assistance, while options such as 'Quantative Easing' aren't viable for the ECB, as we discussed here.

So for all the talk of the rate cut, it will likely have a very minimal impact. The ECB could look to combine it with other policies but the painful reality is that, when it comes to boost lending to the real economy, the ECB has very few options. Constraints from the Bundesbank and concerns over the progression to banking union mean the ECB will likely continue to put the onus on governments to make reforms to boos the economy.

Merkel and Letta shadowbox on 'growth' vs 'austerity'

New Italian PM Enrico Letta paid his first official visit to Germany yesterday, only hours after delivering his inaugural address to the Italian parliament. Much has been made of his strong 'pro-European' yet 'anti austerity' stance - so how would this go down with Die Kanzlerin? Here are some quotes from yesterday's press conference:

On 'growth' versus 'austerity'

Letta: "We have done our bit [on budget consolidation]…Europe has to implement growth policies."

Merkel: "We have to free ourselves from this misconception that growth and budget consolidation are opposed. Solid public finances are a precondition for growth. And growth is not only the state giving money, but it's creating conditions for small and medium enterprises to feel at home, to be able to invest and open up jobs. And for that we need structural reforms, good schools and universities, investments in research."

On national responsibility vs 'European Solidarity'

Letta: "In the past five years of crisis we did not find sufficient solutions because there was not enough Europe. This is my objective - and also that of Germany, because both our countries have a federalist vocation... If we reached these objectives [banking union, a fiscal and economic union and a political union] we could solve our domestic problems much easier."

Merkel: "We want to ensure Europe emerges from this crisis stronger than it went into it. As part of that every country must do its part."

On meeting EU targets

Letta: "How and where we will find the resources is a domestic matter. I don’t owe explanations to anyone. I’m not here to justify domestic choices... We have no intention of telling German citizens what they have to do, and we know German citizens have no intention of telling us what we have to do.”

Merkel: "Every country must complete its own tasks... [Italy] has already made significant progress on this path."

Overall, the tone of the press conference and meeting was fairly amicable and concilliatory. That said, there are clearly a number of potential flashpoints. For all the pro-European rhetoric, for Letta 'more Europe' clearly involves more financial help for Italy, be it via a bank resolution fund or debt-pooling and not more EU scrutiny of national tax and spending decisions which is the German approach - note Merkel specifically referred to the fiscal treaty as an "element of consolidation" and the ESM as "an element of solidarity".

As we've pointed out previously, Italy still faces a number of challenges - finding a way of balancing the books without money from the planned property tax (the cancellation of which was demanded by Berlusconi) and also re-starting the structural reform agenda which stalled under Monti following a promising start. Failure to achieve progress on these fronts will inevitably trigger tension with Germany.

A sign of things to come could be this comment from (German-born) Josefa Idem, Italy's new minister for Sports and Equal Opportunities who told ZDF that she "understands that the people most directly affected by the crisis and who draw a direct link with the austerity measures bear an aversion towards Mrs. Merkel."

Is the academic premise for austerity in the eurozone crumbling? Not quite…

A mini-storm has been whipped up in the economic community overnight after a paper was published highlighting some flaws in the widely cited Reinhart & Rogoff paper ‘Growth in a time of debt’.

A quick recap for those of you not familiar with the paper. It essentially argues that high debt levels are associated with low economic growth. It bases its analysis on data from 44 countries over the past 200 years. It also notes that this relationship gets stronger once debt exceeds 90% of GDP. The paper has been widely cited in defence of and in support for ‘austerity’ – by politicians in both the US and Europe (notably Olli Rehn in respect to the eurozone crisis).

The new research released challenged Reinhart & Rogoff’s (R&R) findings, on the basis of an excel error (oops), data omissions and incorrectly weighting of data. There has been plenty written about which side is correct – you can see a summary of criticisms here and R&R’s responses here and here.

The question that interests us is not necessarily the intricacies of this academic back and forth. To be honest, it is obvious that there is no clear single threshold above which debt begins to impact growth in all countries and that often specific historical experiences in certain countries may not mean much for policies in different times and places (see this Ed Hugh post for a good summary). This is particularly true given some of the unique constraints of the eurozone crisis.

But given that some people are seeing this as a damning indictment of the backing for ‘austerity’, will this have any impact on the approach to the eurozone crisis?

In a word, no. Here are a few reasons why:

• R&R research aside it is clear to everyone that Greece, Portugal and Ireland were insolvent, it was market pressure that pushed them into a bailout. Reducing the debt level is a vital part of their reform, while it also serve to counter the significant moral hazard that comes with a bailout.
• Similar constraints apply in Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Slovenia. With elevated borrowing costs they cannot expand fiscal policy without coming up against greater market pressure and pushing their average interest costs well above their growth rates (especially in the short run).
• Therefore, arguing for the end of austerity in these countries is actually arguing for fiscal transfers from the rest of the eurozone, since they do not have much, if any, room to expand spending. This is ultimately where the debate is at, it is not about austerity or spending, it is about whether the stronger countries are willing to provide the transfers – be it through banking union or fiscal union – to keep the eurozone together in the longer run and create the architecture necessary so that it can withstand future shocks. If they are not then they have to face the prospect of breaking up or decreasing the size of the eurozone.
• The constraints which apply also extend much further than just public debt. As we have seen in Spain, Ireland and Cyprus (and are seeing in Slovenia) the levels of private sector and banking sector debt are equally important. The macro picture is much more complex than just the level of public debt and economic growth. The problems in the crisis are a mix of fiscal, banking and structural.
• Austerity is more than just cutting spending. It has become a catch-all term for some very necessary reforms to improve competitiveness and productivity in the eurozone. Even if spending could be increased, these reforms would be needed, although admittedly the fallout (increased unemployment in many cases and massive political backlash) might be more bearable – but as noted above, this isn’t really possible in many of the worst cases.
• The logic behind the current approach is also strongly driven by Germany’s own economic experience in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which proved very effective in turning the country around. The main issue here is not whether the approach itself is correct or not (since it clearly did work there), but the scope in which it is applied. It is clear that you cannot have 17 Germanys with economies driven by exports in a single currency bloc where the countries predominantly trade with each other (it might help in the short term but its not clear it is a sustainable long term economic model for the bloc).

So what academics (and policymakers) really should debate is whether fiscal transfers are possible and/or desirable.  Proving or disproving R&R is neither here nor there when it comes to dealing with the eurozone crisis.

Where will Cypriot growth come from?

This is now emerging as the key question for Cyprus following the severe mishandling of its bailout. The financial services sector, along with real estate and related businesses, which accounted for around 30% of Gross Value Added in the economy is now essentially gone as a source of growth.

Cyprus’ main trading partners, Greece in particular, remain mired in recession. Its two largest banks – key employers – will be restructured and unemployment will undoubtedly rise. Meanwhile, the government will be cutting spending and raising taxes, laying off public sector workers and embarking on some strict labour and product market reforms – as part of the standard Troika bailout package. Many of these reforms are needed but as we have seen across Europe, when combined with other impacts mentioned above, a downward spiral can be created.

The key hope for growth remains tourism. However, with the euro remaining strong and the prospect for political and social unrest in Cyprus still high, it is difficult to see a huge boost in this area. It will continue to truck along but is unlikely to fill the gap left by other areas of the economy shrinking. As we have discussed before, the prospect of growth from large gas revenues remains a pipe dream for now.

With all of this in mind we have put together a comparison of some of the previous growth estimates, along with the implicit ones included in the latest troika report and some of OE’s initial (optimistic) projections (click to enlarge).

All of this remains uncertain, depending on when capital controls are removed and how investors respond but it does not make pretty reading. All previous hopes for the economy are off the table and expectations need to be severely adjusted. The Troika's estimates are very optimistic, particularly in terms of returning to rapid growth in 2015 and 2016. Furthermore, if the growth estimates included in the bailout prove to be overly optimistic it means Cyprus will, just as Greece did, require further financial assistance.

No backing down: Germany comes out swinging over claims it is the neighbourhood bully

Given all the Germany-bashing over the last week, in the wake of the Cyprus bailout deal (some of it completely ridiculous), it's easy to forget that the Germans themselves are remarkably united over the agreement. In fact, the feeling is that Germany, collectively, just got a fair bit more assertive over its eurozone policy.

On Friday, before a new agreement was finally reached and with Cyprus’ euro membership on the line, German Chancellor Angela Merkel – reportedly in an angry mood - told MPs from her coalition parties that it was wrong for Cyprus to "test" Europe and that while she preferred to see to see Cyprus stay in the single currency but was prepared for an exit.

And with respect to anti-German sentiments, speaking to ZDF this morning, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble bluntly stated that:

“It is always the case, also in the classroom: When you sometimes have better results, the others, who have difficulties, can be a bit jealous.” 

German Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (FDP) called on EU leaders to show more solidarity with Germany, claiming that:

"I wish that that the individuals at the highest levels of the EU including the President of the Commission and the President of the Council also display solidarity with us and defend the Germans against unjust accusations".

Meanwhile the opposition SPD and Greens have said they will both vote to approve the deal. It is not just German politicians who are being increasingly assertive. In our daily monitoring of the German press, we've sensed a hardening of tone and rhetoric throughout the crisis, not least in response to the overtly anti-German tone of many of the anti-austerity protests in the south. Referring specifically to the Nazi-themed nature of the protests, Ulrich Clauß argues in Die Welt that:

“In terms of the endemic prevalence of corruption in government and administration and in close to all parties in their respective parliamentary spectrums, these countries rank alongside third-world dictatorships. On the whole we are talking about countries in which ‘good governance’ seems to be an alien concept… in terms of political culture, there is an extreme divide between North and South in Europe.”

Writing in FAZ, Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger argues that:

“The Cypriots like to see themselves as the victims. It is not however their European partners who are responsible for the mess they are in… In the crisis countries many blame their plight less on corrupt elites and bad policies but on the alleged lack of solidarity in the North for which read: neo-hegemonic Germany.”

Last week, following the Cypriot parliament’s rejection of the original bailout agreement, Bild columnist Hugo Müller-Vogg argued in a piece entitled “We’re the scapegoats” that:

“Politicians there have acted extremely irresponsibly. Now they are extremely brazen in their demands from those who have solidly managed their economies. Moreover, they insult those who are supposed to help them. Without German guarantees there would be no bailout fund. But of all things we Germans are being hit in the crisis countries not only criticism but even open hatred… If it was not an issue of Europe’s future, there would only be one appropriate response: deal with your own mess”.

Writing in Die Welt, Director of the Hamburg Institute of International Economics Thomas Straubhaar describes the Cypriot bailout deal as a “turning-point” in the eurozone crisis, arguing that:

“Up until now, the bankrupt countries have been able to use fear of a domino effect to extort Europe. That is now over because the strong eurozone countries have the better hand – and they should not be afraid to play it”.

The implications of a Germany more prepared to assert its viewpoint has huge implications for the future of the eurozone and the EU as a whole. Remember who holds the cheque book...