Fixing the Big Donkey

Ok, the Reds season has gone down the tubes, so it's time to revisit our old friend Adam Dunn. During his time in Cincinnati, The Big Donkey was the biggest lightning rod in all of baseball for the simple reason that he personified the divide between traditional scouting and statistical analysis views of the game. Traditional scouting types hated him, statistical analysis fans loved him.

And, one of the first things I posted on this blog was a blurb about the likelihood that Adam Dunn would suffer an early decline. Dunn's game has always been predicated on the old-player skills of power and patience. And, Bill James first postulated that old-player skills were more susceptible to aging than the young-player skills of speed and batting average. The theory being that the loss of a step or the slowing of the bat would cause a player lacking young-player skills to fall off the cliff. For example, which player is better suited to survive a slowing bat and the loss of a step, Adam Dunn or Ichiro? Dunn is at the bottom of the acceptable spectrum in both outfield range and contact rate, while Ichiro is at the top. So, a slowing bat or loss of a step could be devastating for Dunn's production, while easily manageable for Ichiro. Anyway, I bought into that philosophy, which was a big reason why I was opposed to locking Dunn into a multi-year extension that would take him well into his 30s.

Now, that said, this year has been an utter nightmare for Adam Dunn. It's been so bad that it almost defies description. I still buy into the old player skills argument, but it's difficult to imagine the wheels completely and utterly coming off the wagon like this. Is it possible? Sure, in fact the old player argument expects an earlier and faster decline, but I would have thought he would have gone from ultra productive to mediocre to massive struggles. Instead, he skipped the intermediate step and went right to the massive struggles. Regardless, I'm going to take a swing at helping the Donkey out. Once a Red, always a Red.

There are countless possible reasons for Dunn's struggles. The change in leagues and resulting unfamiliarity with the pitchers, the change from playing in the field to being largely a DH, potential injuries, the weight of the contract and the corresponding expectations. It could be one or all of those factors. The more potential variables that exist, the harder it is to pinpoint the specific cause of the struggles.

But, to me, the first thing that I see is a subtle change in his swing mechanics.

Below are two At Bats against one of the toughest pitchers in all of baseball: Justin Verlander. The games are 11 days apart in 2011, but Dunn does the same exact thing in each of them. It looks to me like Dunn has simply fallen into a bad habit in his swing. It's easy to do and occasionally difficult to both identify and fix. But, Dunn utilizes a much more extreme bat waggle/hand position with the ChiSox than he did during his time in Cincinnati and Arizona.

If you watch this video (I suggest pausing it at the 2 second mark and again at the 26 second mark), look at how long it takes Adam Dunn to get his bat up into hitting position. He lays the bat on his shoulder, actually past horizontal and somewhat pointing to the ground. And, he maintains that position for a LONG time. In fact, Justin Verlander gets past the apex of his leg kick before Dunn begins to bring the bat up into a more vertical position. Verlander is probably the hardest throwing starting pitcher in baseball, but Dunn waits until Verlander is unpacking his leg kick and beginning to drive to the plate before bringing his bat up.

If you are slow to get the bat up into hitting position, then you are going to be slow to the ball. And, against MLB pitching, you can't afford to be even a fraction of a second late. In this instance, Dunn makes it work (in part because he gets an 89 mph offspeed pitch), but I really don't think that bat position is a recipe for success.






And, below, here's another At Bat against Verlander, this time almost 2 weeks later, but the same bat waggle and delay in getting into hitting position. This time, Verlander gets the better of him. Stop the video at the 32 second mark and look at how far into the windup Verlander has gotten compared to the bat position of Dunn. How can Verlander be unpacking the leg kick and Dunn still have the bat parallel to the ground??? How can you hit like that??? Being slow to get the bat up into proper hitting position will very likely make him slow to the ball, but it also likely means that he is now moving his hands into hitting position at the very same time he is moving other parts of his body to trigger the swing. At times, it almost seems as if the barrel of the bat is still moving up and in towards the plate when the body begins moving forward to meet the pitch. The simultaneously moving parts to his swing could also help explain his struggles.





Now, let's take a look at a few of Dunn's At Bats while he was with the Reds.

First, here's a battle with one of the best starting pitchers in baseball, C.C. Sabathia. Look at Dunn's bat position against C.C. You can see that he doesn't rest the bat on his shoulder and he never gets past parallel. Also, he brings the bat up to a vertical hitting position before Sabathia begins to unpack his leg kick. So, he's a hair quicker in making his move to bring the bat up into hitting position and he has a shorter distance to travel to get into that position.

(For whatever reason, MLB.com isn't properly embedding the older Reds video clips, but if you click on the black box it'll open up the videos in a new window)






And, finally, here's a look at Dunn against Wandy Rodriguez. If I was Dunn, I'd use this video as an example of what my swing mechanics should be. The bat position is much higher and only occasionally is it horizontal to the ground. And, when Wandy is at the apex of his leg kick, you can see Dunn's bat is in ideal position. In this At Bat, he hasn't rested his hands on his shoulder and is never past parallel or pointing the bat at the ground. To me, this hand position makes him significantly quicker to the ball and puts him in better position to drive the ball.






Maybe Dunn has succumbed to the curse of Old Player Skills and an early career decline. Maybe he was right all these years when he told everyone that he didn't want to play 1b or be a DH, but rather was a leftfielder. Maybe he's just scuffling with the change in leagues.

But, if there was one thing I'd like to see Adam Dunn do over the final month-and-a-half it would be to stop resting the bat on the shoulder and pointing the barrel at the ground. Dunn isn't Rod Carew. He's not a handsy singles hitter who is going to slap and slash singles to all fields. Carew could afford to hit with a horizontal bat wrapped around his body. Dunn is a power hitter and needs to take a big swing to get his money's worth.

It's possible that Dunn has lost a bit of bat speed, but at the very least he hasn't gotten any faster. And, as he gets older, he should be trying to get quicker and use a more direct path to the ball, but instead Dunn has gone the other way. He has dropped his hand position, forcing him to travel farther to get into proper hitting position and meet the ball. Dunn needs to go back to the hitting position he used in the Wandy Rodriguez and CC Sabathia At Bats. Stop holding the bat horizontal to the ground and get it up into hitting position earlier. When a pitcher is running it up there at 95+, you simply can't wait to get your hands into hitting position until after the apex of the leg kick: that's just too late. Get quicker to the ball. Maybe that will get him back on track this year and it will certainly become more important as he ages and loses a bit of bat speed, as he doesn't have all that much margin for error at the plate.

This change might be part or all of what's ailing Adam Dunn. At the very least, if he went back to what worked in Cincinnati and Arizona, then he could cross the new hand position off the list of potential explanations for his struggles. Whatever the reason, the baseball world is just a bit more enjoyable when the Big Donkey is launching the ball into the stratosphere, so let's hope he gets back to doing just that...and soon.

Adam Dunn Traded to the Snakes

After the Griffey trade, Reds fans were waiting for the other shoe to drop. Walt Jocketty didn't make them wait long as he agreed to send Adam Dunn to the Arizona Diamondbacks for three prospects.


THE TRADE

While the trade itself is still incomplete, it seems clear that the Reds will get rhp Micah Owings, rhp Dallas Buck, and c/inf Wilkin Castillo. It has been confirmed that Dallas Buck and Wilken Castillo are two of the players, but Micah Owings has yet to be officially named in the deal. He is currently rehabbing a shoulder injury and injured players cannot be placed on waivers until they are healthy. However, even when he is healthy, he probably wouldn't clear waivers, so the trade probably won't be completed until after the season.

The Reds assigned Dallas Buck to the Sarasota Reds, where he has thrown 8.0 innings with a 2.25 ERA, 0,75 WHIP, 6/3 K/BB ratio, and a 3.50 GB/FB ratio. In 2007, Buck had a GB/FB ratio of 2.28 in 97.2 innings. His heavy groundball tendencies should play well in Great American Ballpark.

The Reds assigned Wilkin Castillo to triple-A Louisville, where he is off to a rough start, hitting a meager .167/.194/.167/.360 in 30 ABs.


SO, HOW DID THE REDS DO?

It's only fitting that there is a wide range of opinions about the trade of the most polarizing figure figure in recent Reds memory.

First, addressing the sentiment that the Reds didn't get enough value in return. After years of exorbitant returns for trading away expensive 2 month rentals, the market has violently snapped back in the other direction. All organizations are putting a renewed emphasis on player development and placing significantly more value on prospects. As a result, players like Adam Dunn are currently worth very little in trade.

For comparison, let's take a look at Mark Teixeira, who is either Dunn's equivalent or superior, depending on your take. It's easy to argue that the Braves got a less desirable package of talent for Teixeira than we received for Dunn. The Braves received Casey Kotchman, who is the definition of league average, and minor league relief prospect Stephen Marek.

While not comparable to Dunn or Teixeira, Eddie Guardado was just traded away for Mark Hamburger, a "prospect" who the Twins signed out of a try out camp. A solid veteran southpaw like Guardado would seem to warrant more than an afterthought like Mark Hamburger.

Clearly, the market has shifted so far (personally, I think too far) that you just don't get impact talent for two months of an expensive veteran. That's not the way it works anymore, as you can't rebuild your farm system by parting with two months of production from one of your players.

That said, I'm really pleased with the additions of Micah Owings and Dallas Buck. Both could be very solid for the Reds, but I think Buck could be the steal of the deal, as I like his upside better than Owings. Buck was projected to be a first rounder out of Oregon State until injury struck. He attempted to rehab his injury, but ultimately underwent Tommy John surgery midway through the 2007 season. In 2008, Buck has thrown 58.2 innings so far and should only get better as he gets farther away from his surgery.


CONCLUSION

Overall, it strikes me as a nice package of talent for Dunn. While Castillo projects as a backup catcher or a very flexible utility player, Owings and Buck have ceilings of #2 starters. While they are more likely to end up as #3 or #4 starters, even that would make them nice additions to the organization.

If a healthy Owings allows us to part with Bronson Arroyo, then we are looking at a ~$25M savings by dealing Dunn. Or, perhaps the addition of Owings/Buck allows us to deal a young pitcher (Bailey, Thompson, etc) to address a hole in the lineup (i.e. Jarrod Saltalamacchia, etc).

From where I sit, the Reds added more value to the organization than they would've have gotten by keeping him. Regardless of whether it is because they have underachieved or just because they lack the talent to compete, this team has stunk for the past decade. While you can argue that Dunn wasn't part of the problem, he certainly hasn't been part of any kind of recognizable solution. And, it's difficult to envision him being part of the solution at the increased cost of $15-17M a season. A player's value to the team goes down as the salary cost increases.

Fact remains, it was time for a change and Dunn's departure will ultimately be offset by other moves. Teams survive the departure of big name players all the time. In fact, they frequently get better. We can get leaner, meaner, and more successful. One player doesn't make or break a franchise. Dunn gave us a lot of good years, but it's time for a new direction.

J.P. Riccardi, Adam Dunn, and a Lack of Team Unity

"He's a great hitter? He's a lifetime .230, .240 hitter that strikes out a ton and all he does it hit home runs"

"You know the guy doesnt have a passion to play the game that much?"

"We've done our homework on guys like Adam Dunn, and there's a reason why we dont want a guy like Adam Dunn"

"We know a little bit more about him than the average fan does."

Those choice comments brought to you by the brain of Toronto Blue Jay GM J.P. Ricciardi. Ultimately, these comments reveal more about the Reds team than they do about Ricciardi or Dunn.

Ricciardi is rapidly proving himself to be a hothead lacking in sound judgment, as evidenced by the lies he told to the media about the true nature of B.J. Ryan's injury, the shoddy treatment of future Hall of Famer Frank Thomas, and now his harsh comments about a player in another organization. Most GMs refrain from commenting on players in other organizations, likely out of fear of a tampering allegation, but while Ricciardi's comment are rather unlikely to have been designed to woo Dunn to the Great White North, it is still very bad form to criticize a player in another organization.

As for Dunn, he handled the situation well, which isn't all that surprising. For all the criticism he takes, Dunn typically comports himself well with the media and seems to have a good head on his shoulders. No, what was truly revealing about this scenario is the lack of team unity in the Reds organization.

One would think that when someone outside the organization attacks a teammate, employee, and friend that someone would step up to protect him. Well, I suppose that did happen, but it didn't come from the right place.

Of all people, Reds team physician Tim Kremchek was the only one to stand up.

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"Timothy Kremchek, the Reds team physician, had an immediate reaction when he heard the criticisms that Blue Jays general manager J.P. Ricciardi leveled at Reds left fielder Adam Dunn.

"I laughed," Kremchek said. "I thought, 'If you only knew.'"

Kremchek, unlike Ricciardi, knows Dunn quite well. The two met in 1998, shortly after the Reds drafted Dunn, in the private box of the team's late owner, Marge Schott.

In addressing the notion that Dunn lacks passion and dislikes baseball, as Ricciardi alleged last week during a radio interview, Kremchek said that just the opposite was true.

"There is no player in this game that I've ever treated who had the things that he had and continued to play," Kremchek said.

Dunn, a former quarterback who received a football scholarship to the University of Texas before turning to baseball full-time, maintains his football mentality with injuries.

In 2005, he played with a broken right hand for a substantial portion of the season. The injury was not revealed until the following January when Jerry Narron, then the Reds' manager, said that Dunn, "broke his hand twice last year and wouldn't let us X-ray it because he wanted to play."

"I could feel the bone moving in his hand," Kremchek said. "It wasn't something that was going to cause permanent damage, but it hurt like hell. When I pushed on it, you could tell."

Kremchek also recalled a night when Dunn, 6-foot-6 and 275 pounds, ran into a wall, required 12 to 15 stitches to repair a gash in his leg and played the next day.

Then there was the time, Kremchek said, when Dunn bowled over a catcher in San Diego, wound up with a swollen, bruised leg and again remained in the lineup, refusing to acknowledge the injury.

Finally, Kremchek talked about Dunn playing with an injured right knee for nearly two seasons before finally undergoing arthroscopic surgery to repair a torn meniscus last Sept. 26.

"Last year, early in the season, he couldn't stop in the outfield," Kremcheck said. "But he didn't come out of games. He never complained. He never told the manager he couldn't play."

Dunn missed the final six games, but only after appearing in 152. He also played in 160 or more games in each of the previous three seasons, as well as 158 in 2002, his first full season. His only career trip to the disabled list was in '03, when he did not play after Aug. 15 due to a sprained ligament in his left thumb.

Kremchek acknowledged that Dunn does not always show passion on the field, at times looking lackluster, like he doesn't care. But he strongly disputes Ricciardi's suggestion that Dunn is some kind of baseball slacker,

"It's not true," Kremchek said. "It isn't. I will tell you that for a fact."

*************************

The question this raises is: Where is the guy in the clubhouse who says that if you attack one of my teammates, you are attacking the entire team?

It's rather appalling that the entire team seemed to take it lying down. Someone should have stood up for Dunn and called out J.P. Ricciardi. There just doesn't seem to be any pride about being a member of this organization. Typically, I'm not one for brash ballplayers, but this team needs a little swagger. It needs an identity. It needs a bit of the "We're the Cincinnati Reds and we're here to kick ass and chew gum....and we're all out of gum" type attitude.

It's too much to ask of him and not realistic, but I would have LOVED to see Jay Bruce step up for Dunn and rip J.P. in the press. He's the heir to the throne and it would be nice to have a homegrown leader in the clubhouse. It would take a very mature rookie to be able to do that, but how much respect would he have earned by doing that? Rookies are supposed to know their place, but he could have grabbed the leadership role for this team and perhaps galvanized the team a bit in doing so.

The biggest problem that I have with the Reds is that year in and year out, the team ALWAYS seem to be less than the sum of the individual parts. Seriously, we are a team of underachievers and maybe this is a small glimpse of why that's the case. Where's the unity? The cohesion? The outrage?

At this point, I'm really not sure that there even IS a team mentality with these players. Frankly, that's why this clubhouse needs a nice house cleaning. Get some players and a manager in here who are proud to be wearing the Reds uniform every day. Players who treat an attack on one as an attack on all. If we can't foster that type of attitude in the players, then we need to bring in a manager who embodies it. Dusty Baker's tooth-pick chewing, back-slapping style just isn't what this team needs. We need a blue-collar, fiery manager who knows how to get the most out his players. A manager who has the respect of his players, but isn't afraid to get right in their faces. A manager who can instill a sense of pride and respect about simply being part of the organization.

Until that time, I don't think this team goes anywhere. Until that time, this is just a bunch of individuals going about their business and collecting huge pay checks. This is storied franchise, but it's time to bring the pride back the Redlegs. Until that time, the Reds will remain an also-ran and second division ball club.

Theory on Replacing Dunn and Griffey

I've actually been chewing on this for quite a while, so I thought I'd get my thoughts down on paper, so to speak. Basically, what I'm trying to do is to figure out just how difficult it would be to replace the production of Adam Dunn. Now, to do so, I'm actually going to try to replace the aggregate production of Dunn and Griffey for 2008. Not surprisingly, I've picked two of my favorites. I'll replace Dunn in left with Matt Murton and Griffey in right with Jayson Werth.

Now, for simplicity sake, I'm going to keep this very theoretical. I'm not saying Werth and Murton are easily obtainable, but rather just trying to determine the feasibility of replacing two offensive minded outfielders who play poor defense with two sterling defensive outfielders who are solid at the plate. You could plug in any number of outfielders (i.e. Ryan Spilborghs and Austin Kearns, etc) in the analysis who fit the profile.

To get an accurate gauge on the total value of a player's contribution to his team, I'd say you have to measure his performance in the currency of the game: Runs. So, I tried to take a look at the runs created on offense and runs saved on defense of all 4 of the aforementioned players.

DEFENSE

It's tough to do, because there are no generally accepted defensive metrics, so there is likely to be disagreement on which one to use. That said, I chose Baseball Prospectus's Rate2, because it is a rate stat that normalizes for playing time, which is necessary given that Murton and Werth haven't played 162 games in a season.

BP defines it as: "A way to look at the fielder's rate of production, equal to 100 plus the number of runs above or below average this fielder is per 100 games. A player with a rate of 110 is 10 runs above average per 100 games, a player with an 87 is 13 runs below average per 100 games, etc."

So, I took the career defensive performance of Dunn (91) and Murton (112) in leftfield and extrapolated it out over 162 games. Based on his career performance, Dunn is 14.6 runs BELOW average in leftfield, while Murton is 19.4 Runs ABOVE average. I did the same for Griffey (94) and Werth (111) in right, where Griffey is 9.7 runs BELOW average, while Werth is 17.8 runs ABOVE average.

Maybe Dunn's improved defensive performance in 2008 is legit, but for now I'll work under the assumption that a larger sample size will bring about a regression to the mean.

In summary, by going from Dunn in left and Griffey in right to Murton in left and Werth in right the Reds improve defensively by roughly 61 runs.

OFFENSE

Again, I'm not sure which would be the most appropriate stat to boil down a player's offensive contribution to Runs. However, it's a bit tricky to compare part time players like Murton/Werth to full-time guys like Griffey/Dunn. Accordingly, I went with Batting Runs Above Average (BRAA), as it is measured on the same basis as Rate2 (i.e. a player's performance above average).

However, I had to extrapolate it out over equivalent levels of playing time for comparison's sake. So, I chose 650 plate appearances.

For Dunn, I went with his 2007 level of performance (.264/.386/.554), as it seems typical of his performance. In 2007, Dunn posted a BRAA of 39. When extrapolated out over 650 PAs, Dunn posts a BRAA of 40.1.

For Murton, I went with his 2006 level of performance (.297/.365/.444), because I think that's a pretty fair approximation of what he would do in 2008. His power numbers may even be better in GABP, but I think that's a fair estimate. Anyway, in 2006 Murton posted a BRAA of 9, which gives a BRAA of 11.5 when extrapolated out over 650 PAs.

For Griffey, I went with his 2007 level of performance, though I suspect that is being a bit generous. In 2007, Griffey had a BRAA of 25 and when extrapolated out over 650 PAs it gives him a BRAA of 26.1.

For Jayson Werth, I blended his 2007 and 2008 levels of performance together. I'm not quite sure what his performance level will be, but I suspect it falls somewhere between 2007 (.298/.404/.459) and 2008 (.262/.337/.497). So, Werth's combined BRAA in 2007 (16) and 2008 (6) is 22. When that is extrapolated out over 650 PAs, Werth posts a BRAA of 30.6.

In summary, over 650 PAs Dunn and Griffey would create 66 BRAA, while Murton and Werth would create 42 BRAA. So, Dunn/Griffey would have a 24.1 run advantage over Murton/Werth on offense.

WARP3

Also, we can look at a cumulative stat like WARP3.

Here is a BP definition of WARP: "Wins Above Replacement Player, level 1. The number of wins this player contributed, above what a replacement level hitter, fielder, and pitcher would have done, with adjustments only for within the season. It should be noted that a team which is at replacement level in all three of batting, pitching, and fielding will be an extraordinarily bad team, on the order of 20-25 wins in a 162-game season."

WARP3 is an updated version of WARP, which includes a few additional factors to increase the accuracy of the stat.

In essence, WARP3 is a rate stat that encompasses offense and defense. So, it should suit our purposes. I went with the WARP3 that's Adjusted for All-Time.

In 2007, Dunn had a WARP3 of 5.8, while Griffey had a 6.4 WARP3. Taken together you get 12.2.

In 2006, Murton had a WARP3 of 6.0. And, Werth had a WARP3 of 4.8 in 2007 and so far has a WARP3 of 3.9 in 2008, so let's say he's at 4.4. Taken together, you'd get 10.4.

So, Dunn/Griffey would provide an advantage of 1.8 Wins Above Replacement Players over Murton/Werth.

Admittedly, I don't know the ins-and-outs of WARP3, so I fail to see why Murton posted the following:

2005: .321/.386/.521 with a WARP3 of 1.7.
2006: .297/.365/.444 with a WARP3 of 6.0.
2007: .281/.352/.438 with a WARP3 of 2.7.

If I had to guess, I'd infer that it largely came down to defense.

In 2005, Murton played a poor leftfield, posting a Rate2 of only 97. So, despite stellar offensive numbers, he was below average defensively.
In 2006, Murton played a stellar leftfield, posting a Rate2 of 114. So, even though he had less impressive offensive numbers, he was stellar defensively.
In 2007, Murton had solid offensive numbers and played an exceptional leftfield (Rate2 of 129), but spent the majority of the time in rightfield (Rate2 of 102), so the defensive impact was lower.

So, I suppose his 2006 season combined solid offense with tremendous defense to give him a very high WARP3.

SUMMARY

From my admittedly rather rough estimates, Dunn/Griffey would provide 24 more offensive runs, but Murton/Werth would save 61 more runs on defense. From these rough estimates, it looks like a 37 run advantage by going with the Murton/Werth tandem.

On a WARP3 basis, it looks like Dunn/Griffey provide an advantage of 1.8 Wins Above Replacement Players over Murton/Werth. Perhaps Murton's WARP3 wouldn't be so high, but I doubt Griffey's would be either.

Going into the analysis, I really didn't know how I was going to tackle it or how it was going to turn out, but I didn't attempt to jigger it in my favor. I know that there is a significant subjective element to it and that it is a rough take (at best), but I did attempt to base the approximated inputs on realistic estimates. And, while I'm sure there is a significant +/- error built into the calculations, I'm not so sure that going from Dunn/Griffey to Murton/Werth wouldn't be a lateral move or at least a fairly minimal downgrade. I suspect that Werth/Murton could do a very solid job of replacing the aggregate production of Dunn/Griffey for a fraction of the cost. Even if Dunn and Griffey would be better in 2009, would they be so much better to justify the additional money and the opportunity costs?

To make a long story short, I can't really conceive of a way to replace Dunn's production with just one player. However, I think you can certainly do it with 2 players. While you could, of course, make the argument to keep Dunn and just replace Griffey, I think we might be better off letting both of them go, which would maximize both our cash savings and compensatory draft picks. From where I sit, it's always better to be both "leaner and meaner" and very strong on the defensive side of the game.

While I certainly don't offer this as indisputable proof that Murton/Werth would be the better tandem, it might speak to the feasibility of replacing Dunn without bringing about the end of the organization as we know it. Their may be problems with the methodology or inputs in this analysis and we could argue all day about the appropriate metrics to be used, but I suspect that the underlying theory is a sound one.

The path to the promised land is paved with great defense and it's time for the Reds to take the first step on that journey.

Adam Dunn's Late Season Fade?

One of the biggest stories of the offseason for the Reds was the news that Adam Dunn had spent the offseason working out and was reporting to camp in the best shape of his career.

This was welcome news to the Reds nation, as Dunn was coming off an appalling finish to the 2006 season. While Dunn receives much unwarranted criticism, it's hard to argue that he consistently fades away late in the season. Dunn's numbers have suffered over recent years, not because his peak level of production had fallen off, but rather because Dunn has been unable to sustain that peak level in the hot summer months.

Dunn's August and September production has consistently fallen off and dragged down his seasonal averages to much lower levels. Dunn didn't really need to take his offensive performance to a new level, but rather become more successful at maintaining that level over the entire season.

It appears that Dunn's offseason conditioning program may be paying off in a big, big way, as his 2nd half performance in 2007 has actually been better than his first half production. Being in better shape seems to have enabled Dunn to avoid the late season fatigue that has characterized his previous seasons. Accordingly, 2007 may be his finest ever, which is due in no small part to Dunn performing better in the 2nd half than he did in the 1st.



The moral of the story seems to be, sometimes, hardwork pays off.

Update: Dunn and New Approach at the Plate

Just thought I'd check on Dunn and see how if he is sticking with his more aggressive approach at the plate.

Year: BA / OBP / SLG / OPS

2004: .266/.388/.569/.957

2005: .247/.387/.540/.927

2006: .234/.365/.490/.855

2007: .263/.371/.564/.935

Year: IsoOBP_AB/HR_BB/PA_#P/PA

2004: .122____12.3__.159__4.24

2005: .140____13.6__.170__4.24

2006: .131____14.0__.164__4.18

2007: .108____12.8__.143__4.30

Year: % of Called Strikes / % of Swinging Strikes

2004: 31% / 19%

2005: 31% / 19%

2006: 29% / 22%

2007: 27% / 24% <---Decreased 1% and No change

Year: % Pitches Swung At / % Time Contact made when Swinging

2004: 39% / 72%

2005: 39% / 73%

2006: 40% / 70%

2007: 43% / 67% <--- Increased 1%/1%

Year: ABs per Strike Out

2004: 2.9

2005: 3.2

2006: 2.9

2007: 2.6 <--- Worse/Decline of 0.2

Year: % of Time Swinging at First Pitch of PA

2004: 28%

2005: 25%

2006: 28%

2007: 34% <---- Increased 4%

Dunn is staying aggressive. In fact, he's even more aggressive. He's swinging more often, at more first pitches, and making a bit more contact. His production is much better, but unfortunately his strikeout rate has gotten worse.

It'll be interesting to see how his production plays out over the season if he stays aggressive.

Dunn and New Approach at the Plate

(written at the end of April)

Well, I think it's time to seriously worry about Adam Dunn. I thought it was wise to trade Dunn this past offseason, because I subscribe to the theory that young players who survive solely on Old Player Skills (Power and Patience) tend to peak and decline earlier than young players who utilize a myriad of skills. Intuitively makes sense, as if you start at the bottom of the acceptable spectrum for speed and defense, then when you lose a step due to age you immediately fall below the acceptable floor for a Major Leaguer player. It's going to be much easier for Jose Reyes to continue to be successful when he loses a step, then it is for Adam Dunn.

I still believe that this is a crucial year for Dunn's career, as if he declines yet again then I think it's obvious that he's on the down slope of his career. He really needs a bounce back season, but at this point I'm not encouraged.

At this point, I think it's possible that Dunn peaked in 2004 and is declining. If he is in decline, then he may have lost a bit of bat speed. And, seeing his production decline, I think he has begun to change his approach in an attempt to offset the slower bat speed.

Year: BA/OBP/SLG/OPS

2004: .266/.388/.569/.957

2005: .247/.387/.540/.927

2006: .234/.365/.490/.855

2007: .269/.360/.474/.834

Both his on base skills and his power have been in decline.

Year: IsoOBP_AB/HR_BB/PA_#P/PA

2004: .122____12.3__.159__4.24

2005: .140____13.6__.170__4.24

2006: .131____14.0__.164__4.18

2007: .091____19.5__.124__4.03

Oddly enough, Dunn's power and patience are decreasing. His IsoOBP (OBP-BA), BB/PA (Walk Per Plate Appearance), and Pitches Seen Per Plate Appearance have all declined since 2004. He's getting less patient at the plate.

Not to mention, Dunn's Homerun per AB rate has increased, which means he is hitting homers with less frequency. Where did the power go??? In 2004, he hit a homer once every 12.3 ABs, but in 2007 he is up to one homer every 19.5 ABs.

Now granted, 2007 has a long way to go, but I'm not overly impressed with what I've seen from Dunn thus far. We've heard a lot about Dunn's new physique and the approach Brook Jacoby helped him develop at the plate. Thus far, I don't think the results are very encouraging. It seems like Dunn is getting more aggressive in an attempt to increase his batting average, but in doing so he's losing the power and patience that make him a special hitter.

There is a great new feature at BaseballReference that provides all the pitch data for each player and Adam Dunn's is fairly interesting. It provides clues to the type of approach that Dunn is using in each At Bat.

If Dunn's bat is slowing down, then I'd expect him to change his approach in certain ways. I'd expect him to be more aggressive and swing more often. If he''s being patient and forcing the pitcher to come into him to give him a pitch he can drive, but then can't pound that pitch then I would expect him to swing more often and expand his strike zone.

Whether it's because of a slowing bat or a new approach, that seems to be what Dunn is doing. Here's a breakdown of Dunn's ABs by pitches.

Year: % of Called Strikes/ % of Swinging Strikes

2004: 31% / 19%

2005: 31% / 19%

2006: 29% / 22%

2007: 28% / 24%

He is taking fewer called strikes (31% --> 28%) and getting more swinging strikes (19% --> 24%). So, despite the complaints about Dunn not swinging often enough, he's actually swinging much more often.

Year: % Pitches Swung At / % Time Contact made when Swinging

2004: 39% / 72%

2005: 39% / 73%

2006: 40% / 70%

2007: 42% / 66%

Dunn is swinging at more pitches (39% --> 42%), but making contact much less frequently (72%-->66%). And, sadly, his new approach isn't helping him reduce his strikeout rate. He is putting himself in fewer good hitting counts, because he is getting more aggressive. He seems to be flailing about in an attempt to make up for his declining production.

Year: Strike Outs per AB

2004: 2.9

2005: 3.2

2006: 2.9

2007: 2.8

He's also swinging at more first pitches than in years past:

Year: % of Time Swinging at First Pitch of PA

2004: 28%

2005: 25%

2006: 28%

2007: 30%

So, again, he's getting more aggressive and moving the conclusion of the At Bat up earlier in the count.

It seems like the "new Adam Dunn" has managed to increase his average, but he is seeing a decline in plate discipline, power, and strikeouts. And, if the strikeouts are increasing, then it seems unlikely that he'll be able to maintain any gains in batting average.

To me, it seems that if Dunn has to start swinging more often because his production is in decline, then it's the beginning of the end. If he can't wait for his pitch and crush it when he gets it, then he's not going to be a very valuable player. To me, it seems like Dunn is at the absolute bottom of the acceptable spectrum for making contact. If his contact rate declines even a little bit, then he may cease to be an effective ballplayer and he lacks any other baseball skills to offset the decrease.

Dunn seems to be trying to force a conclusion earlier in the AB, which could reduce strikeouts, but will also likely decrease his power and walk rate. Whether it's just a new approach or an attempt to make up for a slowing bat, something is changing his approach. And, given his limited skill set, any drastic change in approach at the plate seems ill advised. His strengths are diminishing and his weaknesses aren't improving much.

Dunn may be able to increase his batting average, but if it comes at the cost of his power and patience, then the price is just too high. It's still early in 2007, but he needs to take a big step forward this year, not a step backward.

If he declines again this year, then this may be the beginning of the end for Dunn.

Dunn, Maas, and "Old Player Skills"

After watching Dunn continue to pile up the numbers, despite his low batting average, I thought that I'd give the Dunn bashers something that might actually justify their constant worry.

When I see a player like Adam Dunn, who is very big and not especially agile, I always thought this is a guy who is going to age poorly. People get bigger and less mobile as they age, so I think these types of players are going to be especially susceptible to the effects of aging. Mo Vaughn, Cecil Fielder, and Carlos Delgado are some of the players that I thought would be more susceptible to the effects of aging, as they don’t have much margin for error in the mobility and defense departments. Basically, I’ve always thought that big lumbering guys weren’t good bets to be of value later in their careers.

As such, I've pretty much always thought that Adam Dunn shouldn't be brought back much after the age of 30. At that point, he’ll be very expensive and his game seems unlikely to stand up to the test of time. I’m a huge Dunn backer, but I’m not sure that even I want to see him in GABP at first base or in leftfield at the age of 33.

In that same vein, I recently came across a book which contained a Bill James wrote an article wherein he discussed what he called “Old Player’s Skills” and “Young Player’s Skills”. I found it to be rather interesting, as James breaks down the issue much further, and I couldn’t help but think of a player that we all know and love (well, not all of us ;)).

In essence, James considers power and drawing walks to be “Old Player’s Skills”, as the majority of players tend to improve their power and walks as they age (I don’t necessarily agree much with the improved walk rate, but that’s a discussion for another day ;)). And, he considers speed and batting average to be “Young Player’s Skills”, as batting average and speed decline over time.

Now, here’s the part that directly relates to the Reds. James believes that young players who succeed primarily on the basis of “Old Player’s Skills” will peak EARLIER in their career and age FASTER! I’m sure we can all think of a particular Reds player who fits this mold.

I won’t get into their specific details, but James performed a couple of studies in which the players with “young player’s skills” did indeed have substantially longer careers than those who relied primarily on “old player’s skills”. Not to say that those players who relied on “old player skills” didn’t have good careers, but rather that they peaked earlier and didn’t last as long.

Recently, the writers at Baseball Prospectus recently used James’ theory to explain the remarkable career of Kevin Maas. For those of you who don’t know, Maas was at one time the hottest thing since sliced bread. Maas came up in 1990 at the age of 25, which is a bit old for a prospect, and hit 21 homers in 254 At Bats. Maas exploded onto the scene that summer and was compared to everyone from Will Clark to Roy Hobbs. Maas still holds the MLB record for being the fastest player to reach 10 homeruns, which he managed to do in 77 At Bats. He captured the imagination of much of the baseball world, including me.

Maas was a good prospect before hitting the majors, but he was one who relied on “old player skills”. He had a strong OBP and good power, but a knee injury and poor genetics robbed him of speed and agility, which made him a poor defender. He also never posted a great batting average in the minors, but likely deserved to be called up before the age of 25. After his meteoric rise, it didn’t take long for Maas to struggle and his career flamed out at an early age.

Now, Maas is an extreme example, but I think James may have been on to something with his theory. Now, that’s NOT to say that having a YOUNG player on the team who succeeds by virtue of “old player’s skills” isn’t a good idea, but rather that one should be wary of keeping him on the team for too long.

In other words, giving Dunn a HUGE contract after his current one expires may not be the best idea in the world, as he may well peak earlier and fade away faster than expected. And, having a big dollar contract tied up in a player of that kind could be crippling to this franchise. In James’s view, Dunn’s batting average won’t get better as he ages, but rather it’ll worsen. And, Dunn will become even more lumbering, as he adds on the pounds that come with aging and loses the speed that goes with it.

How much worse can Dunn’s batting average and defense get before it outweighs his walk and power production? At some point, the immense power and walk benefits that Dunn provides will be outweighed by his defensive, mobility, and batting average problems.

It won’t happen this year or next year or even the year after that, but it’ll likely happen SOONER than we think. Hopefully, the front office takes that into account when considering the next contract for Adam Dunn. Enjoy Dunn while it lasts, as he might not be around as long as we should hope.

As usual, just my $.02.