War is hell

War is ugly. Physically, psychologially, emotionally, socially, morally, etc.

If we must wage war, let us wage war in such a way as to break the enemy's will to ever fight again. Show no mercy. Utterly shame and decimate the enemy if necessary. As long as people have sinful hearts full of pride, lust, greed, etc., people will be moved by their pride, lust, greed, etc. to wage war. Thus to defeat them and best ensure no future war with them one may need to completely humble and shame their proud hearts. I believe this is more or less the argument scholars like Victor Davis Hanson and Donald Kagan have made in books like The Western Way of War, The Father of Us All, and On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace.

That is, think not Germany after WWI. But think Germany after WWII. After WWI, Germany was defeated but unbowed. The German government surrendered even though German troops were still physically occupying territory on the Western front and even though Germany had won on the Eastern front against Russia. So Germany sought to avenge their defeat at an opportune time. But after WWII, Germany was defeated and bowed to their knees. They knew they had lost. Soviet armies crushed Germany from the east and Anglo-American armies from the west. Germany lay in ruins.

This seems to be the best way to ensure a lasting peace. And, as a friend points out, this can potentially save more lives in the long run.

I suspect this is one reason why God commanded the Israelites to show the Canaanites no mercy if they insist on war. If it's going to be war, then let it be all-out or total war such that the enemy will absolutely know he is defeated, have his will to fight broken and shattered to pieces, and never seek to fight again.

I realize this sounds harsh. But we live in a fallen world. These are the sorts of harsh realities we're often forced to face. These are the difficult choices we're often forced make.

Sledgehammer

Eugene Sledge was a Marine in the Pacific Theater during WWII. If I recall, he was in his late teens when he enlisted. His nickname was "Sledgehammer."

He wrote a book titled With the Old Breed in part about the horrors of war which he saw with his own eyes.

Sledge also featured as a character in the HBO miniseries The Pacific produced by Steven Spielberg and Tom Hanks.

Indeed Sledge saw terrible brutalities in the war. He felt an ever present fear. He knew firsthand the filth and stench of dead bodies strewn everywhere. The hatred and loathing in one's innermost being for some of the enemy's atrocities.

For instance, Sledge describes a moment when he came across the mutilated bodies of three fellow Marines. One of the dead Marines had had his genitals cut off and shoved into his mouth by Japanese soldiers. It sickened him.

He witnessed many other grotesque events while fighting in the Pacific. He entered the war as a young teenager hoping to have the experience of a lifetime, which he did; but he also came back home mature beyond his years. In many respects, he came back a shattered man, a man with a heavy, pained heart, who had witnessed his friends die before him and much worse. It was as if someone had struck Sledge's heart with a sledgehammer, rending it into pieces.

Although he went on to obtain a PhD in biology, marry a beautiful bride, and raise happy children and grandchildren, these memories never left him. They were forever seared into his mind. Indelible, terrible nightmares.

Later in life, in fact if I recall it was toward the end of his life, and at the encouragement of his wife and other loved ones, he decided to write out about his experiences. Mainly for his friends and family as well as to unburden himself. So he did.

The Marines weren't allowed to keep a diary back then for fear if they were killed in action and their bodies searched, a diary might reveal military secrets to the enemy. However, they were each given a Bible. He had written some notes in his Bible during the war. So he used these notes and his memory to write With the Old Breed.

He didn't expect it to be published let alone to sell so many copies. But it did. Today it's considered a military classic. The book is recommended and sometimes required reading at our military academies and at other universities and institutes.

Sledge ends his book in this way:

Until the millennium arrives and countries cease trying to enslave others, it will be necessary to accept one’s responsibilities and be willing to make sacrifices for one's country - as my comrades did. As the troops used to say, if the country is good enough to live in, it’s good enough to fight for. With privilege goes responsibility.

Best commanders of World War II

Here is Max Hastings' judgment of the Second World War's commanders from his book Inferno:

The Germans and Russians proved more successful than the Western Allies in fulfilling the requirement identified by Howard: to empower commanders who fought rather than managed. For American, British, Canadian, Polish and French troops at the sharp end, the 1944–45 northwest Europe campaign seldom seemed less than horrific. But the casualty figures, on both sides a fraction of those in the east, emphasise its relative moderation once the fighting in Normandy was over. With the exception of a few such enthusiasts as Patton, Allied commanders understood that they were mandated to win the war at the lowest possible human cost, and thus that caution was a virtue, even in victory. By pursuing such a policy, they fulfilled the will both of their societies and their citizen soldiers.

The rival claims to greatness of individual commanders are impervious to objective ranking. Circumstances decisively influenced outcomes: no general could perform better than the institutional strength or weakness of his forces allowed. Thus, it is possible that Patton – for instance – might have shown himself a great general, had he led forces with the Wehrmacht’s skills or the Red Army’s tolerance of casualties. As it was, especially in pursuit he displayed an inspiration and energy rare among Allied generals; but in hard fighting, his army fared no better than those of his peers. Eisenhower will never be celebrated as a strategist or tactician, but achieved greatness by his diplomatic management of the Anglo-American alliance in the field. Lucien Truscott, who finished the war commanding the US Fifth Army in Italy, was arguably the ablest American officer of his rank, though much less celebrated than some of his peers. MacArthur was distinguished by the splendour of his self-image as a warlord, which it suited his nation to indulge, rather than by gifts as a battlefield commander. While he directed the 1944 phase of the New Guinea campaign with some flair, he floundered in the Philippines; superior resources, especially air support, were the deciding factors in his victories. MacArthur was a narrowly affordable luxury rather than an asset to his country’s strategic purposes. The outstanding personality of the Japanese war was Nimitz, who directed the US Navy’s Pacific campaign with cool confidence and judgement, often displaying brilliance, especially in the exploitation of intelligence. Spruance showed himself the ablest fleet commander at sea.

On the British side Cunningham, Somerville and Horton were outstanding naval officers, Sir Arthur Tedder the best of the airmen. Slim, who led Fourteenth Army in Burma, was probably the most gifted British general of the war, and certainly the most attractive command personality; his 1945 crossing of the Irrawaddy and outflanking of the Japanese at Meiktila were notable achievements. But Slim would have struggled to extract any better results from Britain’s desert army in 1941–42 than did Wavell or Auchinleck, because of its collective shortcomings. Montgomery was a highly competent professional; it is unlikely that any other Allied commander could have surpassed his direction of the 1944 Normandy campaign, where attrition was inescapable, but he diminished his reputation by epic boorishness in conducting the vital relationship with the Americans. ‘Monty’ deserves a significant part of the credit for the success of the invasion of France, but never achieved a masterstroke which would place him among history’s great captains.

The Soviet Union’s best generals displayed a confidence in handling large forces unmatched elsewhere on the Allied side. In the first half of the war, they suffered interference by Stalin almost as damaging to Russia’s prospects of survival as was that of Hitler to Germany’s cause. But from late 1942 onwards, Stalin became much more receptive to his marshals’ judgements, and the Soviet war effort correspondingly more successful. Chuikov deserves full credit for the defence of Stalingrad; Zhukov, Konev, Vasilevsky and Rokossovsky were commanders of the highest gifts, though their achievements would have been impossible without their nation’s tolerance of sacrifice. Soviet victories were purchased at a human cost no democracy would have accepted, no Western general allowed to indulge. The raw aggression of Soviet commanders in 1943–45 contrasts with the caution of most American and British leaders, a reflection of their respective societies. The Red Army never showed itself superior man for man to its German opponents: until the end, the Wehrmacht inflicted disproportionate losses. Russian commanders produced their finest performances in the summer 1944 Operation Bagration, when 166 divisions attacked on a front of 620 miles. The storm of Berlin, by contrast, was conducted with a brutish clumsiness which diminished the reputation of Zhukov.

Among the Germans, von Rundstedt displayed the highest professionalism from 1939 to the end. In the desert, Rommel displayed similar gifts to those of Patton, but like the American paid insufficient attention to the critical influence of logistics. The Allies esteemed Rommel more highly than did many German officers, partly because British and American self-respect was massaged by attributing their setbacks to his supposed genius. Manstein, a superb professional, was the architect of great victories in Russia in 1941–42, and probably Germany’s best general of the war, but failure at Kursk emphasised his limitations: hubristically, he accepted responsibility for launching a vast offensive which could not hope to succeed against superior Russian strength, dispositions – and generalship. Kesselring’s 1943–45 defence of Italy places him in the front rank of commanders. Guderian was the personification of the Wehrmacht’s skill in exploiting armour. Several of Germany’s generals, Model among them, merit more admiration for the manner in which they sustained defensive campaigns in the years of retreat, with inferior forces and negligible air support, than for victories in the period when the Wehrmacht was stronger than its foes. Hitler’s strategic interventions prevented any German commander from claiming absolute credit for victories, or accepting absolute responsibility for defeats. The institutional achievement of the German army and its staff seems greater than that of any individual general. The overriding historical reality is that they lost the war.

Yamashita, who directed the 1942 seizure of Malaya and the 1944–45 defence of the Philippines, was Japan’s ablest ground-force commander. Otherwise, the energy and courage of Japanese soldiers and junior officers were more impressive than the strategic grasp of their leaders. These were hamstrung throughout by huge failures of intelligence, which transcended mere technical inadequacy, reflecting a deeper cultural incapacity to consider what might be happening on the other side of the hill. The defence of successive Pacific islands reflected professional competence among some garrison commanders who lacked scope and resources to exploit any higher gifts. Afloat, though luck played an important part in the Battle of the Coral Sea and at Midway, Japan’s admirals displayed astonishing timidity, and were repeatedly outguessed and outfought by their American opponents. Yamamoto merits some respect for his direction of Japan’s initial 1941–42 offensives, but must bear a heavy responsibility for much that went wrong afterwards. Only his death in April 1943 spared him from presiding over the national march to oblivion he had always recognised as inevitable.

The enemy of my enemy is my friend

During World War II, many Arabs supported the Nazis (against the Jews) and several prominent leaders escaped to Berlin to spend time with Hitler and the other Nazis (e.g. the Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini).

Let's say Hitler had better supported Rommel's Afrika Korps such that Rommel was able to win the war in North Africa. Let's say the Nazis then invaded and conquered the Mideast.*

I take it the Nazis would have started to exterminate the Jews in the Mideast. I take it the Arabs would've supported the Nazis since they would've shared a common hatred for the Jews.

But after the Jews were dead, what would be next? Arabs are non-Aryans. As such, wouldn't Hitler and the Nazis have considered the Arabs inferior? If so, then, at best, the Arabs would've been treated as second class citizens if the Nazis had won in the Mideast. So why such support among Arabs for the Nazis then and (it frequently appears) now? The enemy of my enemy is my friend?

By the way, if the Nazis had treated the Arabs as second class citizens, it would've been ironic given most Arabs are Muslim and sharia law sanctions the treatment of non-Muslims as second class citizens.

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* As I understand it, this was a viable option at the time. It's arguable Hitler could have won the entire war if he had invaded the Mideast in lieu of invading Russia or at least prior to invading Russia.

For one thing, the British received something like 80% of their total oil supply from their Mideast colonies. If the Germans took over these lands, then they would've cut off the vast majority of the British oil supply and effectively caused the British military to grind to a halt.

For another thing, it almost certainly wouldn't have taken the 4 million German soldiers it took Hitler to invade Russia. Hitler could have arguably conquered North Africa and the Mideast with a quarter of that amount if not less. Not only would he have committed far less troops which could've been used elsewhere and for other purposes, but he arguably would've sustained a lot less losses in a North Africa/Mideast campaign than what he lost on the Eastern Front against Russia. Four out every five German soldiers killed in the whole of the Second World War were killed by the Russians. The German military was bled dry by the Russians.

Hitler could've then invaded Russia from the Mideast. If successful, which he arguably would've have been, Hitler would've achieved two key objectives: cutting Russia off from oil for use by the Soviet military and given the Nazi Wehrmacht access to Stalin's vast and rich oil fields in the Caucasus. In fact, this was a large reason why Hitler pushed so much to win the Battle of Stalingrad, which he eventually lost.

By the way, it's staggering to think the Germans lost approximately 850,000 soldiers in a single battle, the Battle of Stalingrad, and the Russians over 1.1 million, whereas the US and the UK lost approximately 900,000 combined in the entire Second World War. Of course, this shouldn't be taken to imply the US and UK did far less "work" in winning WWII than the Russians did, like so many World War II historians appear to think these days. For instance, Russia never had to supply the US or UK like the US and UK supplied Russia throughout the war. Russia never fought a multiple front war like the UK and particularly the US did. In fact, the US did the bulk of the fighting which contributed to the Japanese loss. And it probably speaks well of the strategic and tactical savvy of the US and UK in contrast to Russia and/or poorly of the strategic and tactical savvy of the Russians in contrast to the US and UK.

(Although arguably the best Allied general of the entire war was not Patton or Monty or Eisenhower, but William Slim in Burma and India. It's arguable the fighting in Burma kept the Japanese from conquering China. However the Pacific War was more renowned for its naval engagements and Chester Nimitz probably takes the cake as the best admiral among all forces. It's arguable Nimitz's plan to bypass the Philippines and take Taiwan was better from a strategic perspective than MacArthur's plan to invade the Philippines. For better or for worse, we went with MacArthur's plan. Georgy Zhukov was arguably the best general out of all the generals in World War II. Ahead of Patton, Monty, Rommel, Guderian, von Manstein. But Zhukov was ruthless and brutal too.)

Of course, Hitler invaded Russia in 1941 because he placed Nazi ideology ahead of military strategy. He considered Germans a superior Aryan race (e.g. he made ridiculous comments like German soldiers were far more physically durable than Russians and therefore didn't need to wear heavy winter clothing for the Russian winter which in many places where the Germans fought would've lower than -100 degrees Fahrenheit with wind chill factor). He hated the Jews most of all but only hated the Slavs and Bolsheviks slightly less. He wanted lebensraum or living space for his Aryan race. I should add, from what I've read, Hitler considered the British "Aryan cousins" and so felt war with them was unfortunate. He would've preferred the UK sit out of the war. Of course, this doesn't exonerate Hitler in the slightest. But if true I think it would explain at least in part Hitler's appallingly bad grasp of military strategy (e.g. the miracle of Dunkirk). His racist ideology helped bring him to power, but it also contributed to his downfall.

Preaching as a dying man to dying men

The post "Christmas and the faith and courage to live - or die" by Carl Trueman is worth reading.

In addition Trueman's post brings to mind this portion from C.S. Lewis' "Learning in War-time":

War threatens us with death and pain. No man - and specially no Christian who remembers Gethsemane - need try to attain a stoic indifference about these things: but we can guard against the illusions of the imagination.

We think of the streets of Warsaw and contrast the deaths there suffered with an abstraction called Life. But there is no question of death or life for any of us; only a question of this death or of that - of a machine gun bullet now or a cancer forty years later.

What does war do to death? It certainly does not make it more frequent; 100 percent of us die, and the percentage cannot be increased.

It puts several deaths earlier; but I hardly suppose that that is what we fear. Certainly when the moment comes, it will make little difference how many years we have behind us.

Does it increase our chance of a painful death? I doubt it. As far as I can find out, what we call natural death is usually preceded by suffering; and a battlefield is one of the very few places where one has a reasonable prospect of dying with no pain at all.

Does it decrease our chances of dying at peace with God? I cannot believe it. If active service does not persuade a man to prepare for death, what conceivable concatenation of circumstance would?

Yet war does do something to death. It forces us to remember it. The only reason why the cancer at sixty or the paralysis at seventy-five do not bother us is that we forget them. War makes death real to us: and that would have been regarded as one of its blessings by most of the great Christians of the past. They thought it good for us to be always aware of our mortality. I am inclined to think they were right.

All the animal life in us, all schemes of happiness that centered in this world, were always doomed to a final frustration. In ordinary times only a wise man can realize it. Now the stupidest of us know.

We see unmistakable the sort of universe in which we have all along been living, and must come to terms with it.