Farage: I've Made A Terrible Terrible Mistake

Under the scrutiny of the media, and potentially more crucially the harsh spotlight of the internet, Nigel Farage has had to embarrassingly backtrack on his allegations that attempts on his life were made.

The Ukip leader said he should never have spoken out about the wheel falling off his car, after questions were raised about the so-called assassination attempt

Such accusations clearly should never be made without substantial evidence. It appears that Farage has "shot from the hip" as he always has been inclined to do. It's a trait he has played on within the concept of being "honest" in contrast to other politicians. It's a strategy that worked when speaking to the converted and outside mass media scrutiny.

However with a higher profile and the intense spotlight of the forthcoming referendum it's difficult to conclude that his comments could be anything other than damaging for Brexit if he's associated with the leavers.

Farage's comments also leaves UKIP's de facto mouthpiece Breitbart in a difficult position:

 Rightly it criticised the hypocritical media when it comes to mistakes:

If Breitbart London had made a faux pas as large as the Guardian, the Independent, LBC, and the Huffington Post – we’d be laughed out of every shitty, Westminster drinks reception for weeks on end.

But then whoops:

I confess, UKIP leader Nigel Farage told me about this specific concern [assassination] over his car in November of last year. Off the record, not for reporting. “Fine,” I sighed. After the, “Oh my God, are you okay, mate?” obviously.

Farage has now admitted such claims are a "terrible terrible mistake". If true then Raheem Kassam is not the first, nor will be last, to be dropped in it by Farage where loyalty is an unusual concept. I wonder if Breitbart will follow its own advice.

That such a story made the rounds does though neatly illustrate the decline in standards in the UK media. The Mail on Sunday published the claims without critical content; a claim which was reproduced by the mainstream media at the time with no critical analysis. It took the internet to take the claims apart.

Ironically for a man who understood the need to bypass the legacy media when trying to establish UKIP as a credible political party in the late '90s - he used public meetings as a means of negating the hostility of the media - the internet has passed him by.

Of additional concern is news that Farage, having made a "terrible mistake", has now gone public regarding advocating a "public protest" on new alcohol guidelines - this from a man who spends a lot of time in the pub.

This then is all about Farage and not Brexit. It's becoming clear that the sooner he is distanced from the leave movement the better.

EU Referendum: Blogging Matters

Recently we have made some minor housekeeping adjustments to the blog, and there are some more changes to make. Added to the side column is a contact form where I'm happy to take questions or offer advice to any reader who wishes to start out as being a blogger as part of the campaign to remove ourselves from the EU.

We have made changes to the blogroll where I'm more than happy to included any blogs I've inadvertently missed out. Just let me know via the comments or by the contact form. Some videos which are no longer relevant to a referendum campaign have also been removed.

With the thus far disappointing nature of both the Vote Leave Ltd and Leave.eu efforts, both of whom are attempting to "own" the referendum with sometimes crass and puerile stunts. A referendum has to be won by the people, not "owned" by a leader.

It therefore looks like UK exit from the EU will have to increasingly rely on those who use the internet outside Westminster. Here then independent blogging can be but one tool in this fight. Using this medium we can build communities and use blogging to brief in plain sight.

While not having the prestige of the legacy media and sometimes not the numbers it can seem that blogging has a limited effect in terms of publicity. But as bloggers we can make a huge difference. With this we are reminded of the "CiggyBusters" campaign in 2010 for example where Medway Council took fright after complaints by an internet campaign not least by the now defunct blogger Corrugated Soundbite.

We also see how effective a bloggers' campaign was against Open Europe which prompted Open Europe's Mats Persson to write a deceitful article in the pro-EU Daily Telegraph in response. In addition we see how the video campaign 10:10, No Pressure by Franny Armstrong fell apart quickly when faced with bloggers and the power of the internet.

Here we're minded to think of Rochester Castle which is pictured above. One of the interesting features of Rochester castle which can be seen in the picture is one of the towers is round while others (the other three) are square.

The reason is the consequence of the 1215 siege by King John during the Baron wars. The round south east tower was initially square like the others. During the siege the south east tower was undermined destroying the foundations of the tower which was supported by wooden props.

These props were then burnt with pig fat causing the tunnel to collapse and subsequently the tower. When the tower was rebuilt castle defensive technology had moved on resulting in it being built round rather than square.

In this sense blogging is a means of undermining the castle of lies, with a relatively small but very effective team.We can take down the castle walls by tunneling underneath.

Guess Me Weight

Following on from our previous post we see an interesting example of Ofcom's wide brief, with a "guess your weight" competition held in central London yesterday. Protesters took rather unusual measures to highlight their objections to an amendment made to the 2003 Communications Act.

This amendment meant that any paid-for pornography bought online will now be regulated by the same guidelines set out by the British Board of Film Censors (BBFC) as DVDs sold by sex shops, which involves a number of sexual activities, produced by UK film makers, being banned for online broadcast.

As the Telegraph notes:

The new rules were brought in after the Department for Culture, Media and Sport decided that the laws relating to DVDs and online paid-for video porn were inconsistent.

DVDs are regulated by the BBFC, while online porn is regulated by the Authority for Television On Demand (ATVOD) and Ofcom. With the rise of VOD, the DCMS concluded under 18s would be able to access R18 content.

Providers of what is known as On Demand Programme Services ("ODPS") are required by law to notify ATVOD before the service begins, and to advise ATVOD if the service closes or undergoes significant changes.

Despite calling itself an "independent co-regulator" it comes as no surprise to learn that the Authority for Television On Demand (ATVOD) is another example of the complex mixture of Ofcom approved and EU financed regulatory structures:

On 18 March 2010, Ofcom delegated certain of its functions and powers in relation to the regulation of On Demand Programme Services to ATVOD by means of a formal designation. The designation included provision for a review of the arrangements after two years. Accordingly, on 22 March 2012 Ofcom launched such a review and on 15 August 2012 issued a statement confirming the Designation with amendments to give ATVOD greater operational freedom.

And while service providers must pay a fee to ATVOD in relation to each On Demand Programme Service, the fees which are charged by ATVOD are the subject of a public consultation each year and are approved by Ofcom.

We see yet another cosy alliance between those which sit on, and have previously sat on, boards across the great number of Ofcom approved regulators.

For example we see that Ruth Evans is the independent ATVOD Chair, and has previously sat on the Deputy Chair of the Office for Communications Consumer Panel for five years and on the Board Director of PhonePay Plus, which regulates premium rate services in the UK.

The Deputy Chair, Nigel Walmsley, was until recently a Council Member of the Advertising Standards Authority, and the Chairman of the Broadcasters Audience Research Board (BARB), and Pete Johnson, the Chief Executive Officer was previously Head of Policy and Business Development at the British Board of Film Classification.

Independent Board Member Robin Foster's profile describes him as having:

... previous experience as a strategy partner at Ofcom, helping to establish Ofcom and playing a key role in Ofcom’s first major strategic reviews of public service broadcasting, telecommunications and spectrum.

Then ODPS have to consider the universal guidelines on child internet safety issued by the UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS).

Ofcom is not ATVOD's only focus as it notes itself:

Under the terms of its designation as the appropriate regulatory authority for editorial content in On - Demand Programme Services (“ODPS”), one of ATVOD‟s designated functions is to ensure that Service Providers promote, where practicable and by appropriate means, production of and access to European works (within the meaning given in Article 1 (n) of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive („the Directive‟) (section 368C(3) of the Act) 

Thus those protesting might be interested to know that Westminster is largely impotent in this case. The dominating factor, which unsurprisingly the Telegraph fails report, is laid bare in the Statutory Instrument in the Explanatory Notes (page 3):

The Audiovisual Media Services Regulations 2009(a) and 2010(b) implement Directive 2007/65EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services(c) (“the AVMS Directive”).

And EU Directive 2010/13/EU (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) states:

It is necessary, in order to avoid distortions of competition, improve legal certainty, help complete the internal market and facilitate the emergence of a single information area, that at least a basic tier of coordinated rules apply to all audiovisual media services, both television broadcasting (i.e. linear audiovisual media services) and on-demand audiovisual media services (i.e. non-linear audiovisual media services).

Confirming once again the UK's submissive role as a European Union member state.

Oftel, Ofcom And BT

With this piece we seek to explore the nature of the regulatory structure of telecommunications within the UK as illustrated in the above diagram. The intention is an attempt at simplicity which is to look at national, EU and international regulation in turn.

However problems emerge in the sense that such dividing lines don't truly exist - the EU for example is a fundamental part of the UK government, as is international governance. This becomes especially so with telecommunications. An example is that the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) has a direct relationship with the UK regulatory body The Office of Communications (Ofcom) as do indeed EU bodies such as COCOM.

So while we wish to deal with each in turn as an attempt to illustrate clearly the very complex world of telecommunications, we appreciate that there is a very fine line to be drawn between attempting simplicity and being inaccurate. With this in mind the above picture showing the EU as a separate 'cloud' and the following piece should be viewed with EU and international governance in mind, and as a consequence much overlap will occur over the next few pieces.

Yet even on just a domestic basis regulation is continually being updated, the above diagram was relevant until April 2014. The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, merged the ineffectual Office of Fair Trade and Competition Commission (established in 1999) to create the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) meaning the diagram now looks more like this below:

Further domestic complexity was brought to the fore by the Scottish independence vote; that despite political and legislative devolution to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, there aren't any formal mechanisms which involve the devolved legislatures with representation in telecoms governance and oversight.

Governance at a global, EU, ministerial and and regulator levels exclude representation from the UK's four nations. For example in the Scotland Act 1998 which established a devolved Scottish Parliament, telecoms was kept as a "reserved" matter - a constitutional term meaning that it was to be decided by the UK Parliament as per Section C10:

1.     Telecommunications and wireless telegraphy.
2.     Internet services.
3.     Electronic encryption.

With Scotland rejecting independence recently, telecoms regulation remains a democratic challenge within the UK. Ofcom appointed the Advisory Committee for Scotland (ACS) to advise Ofcom "about the interests and opinions, in relation to communications matters, of persons living in Scotland." However as only an advisory committee it sits to one side, unelected and unaccountable. The same lack of 'devolution adjustment' also applies to Wales and Northern Ireland. This could be consider unsatisfactory when telecoms across the UK have different needs with regard to rural location, broadband and 2G, 3G 4G mobile phone access.

Thus not unsurprisingly, with this in mind, the demand for an independent Scotland to have a say in telecommunications regulation was made in its White Paper, Scotland’s Future – Your Guide to an Independent Scotland (page 276):

The government of an independent Scotland will have the powers to properly prioritise the needs of rural Scotland in relation to telecommunications...

Scotland's dissatisfaction with regard to a lack of representation laid bare on page 311 (my emphasis):

We have also felt the impact of other decisions in communications policy that did not take account of Scotland’s circumstances. When 3G mobile licences were auctioned in 2000, an initial coverage target of 80 per cent of the UK population was set. This was increased to 90 per cent of the UK population in December 2010. Despite the efforts of the Scottish Government, a distinct Scottish target was not set. Currently, 3G coverage in Scotland is the lowest of the four UK nations, reaching only 96 per cent on the most optimistic estimates. 

Furthermore, there is a disparity between urban and rural Scotland. Coverage in rural Scotland drops to as low as 92 per cent, demonstrating that there will always be poorer coverage in rural areas unless these areas are given priority in allocating licences.

A contrast could be considered between the lack of telecoms representation by Scotland within Ofcom and with Ofcom's broadcasting responsibility - where the BBC, with its Audience Council Scotland, has a representative member for Scotland on the BBC Trust which is currently Bill Matthews.

To explain Ofcom's lack of coherence we can see that one of the notably observations taken from the above graph as indicated by the arrows is that in terms of its relationships with other interested regulatory bodies Ofcom has a prominent central role to play in UK communications regulation. But it is a role that is always inconsistent.

The lack of consistency has been a consequence of a lively mix of ever evolving nature of technology, of the growth of "regulator watching" and of the ever integration of the EU and international considerations.

Domestically the implementation of privatisation of previously nationalised industries under Margaret Thatcher led to a growth of "regulator watching" with often mixed success for the customer, and this was particularly apparent in telecoms.

Ofcom's predecessor was the telecoms regulator Oftel. Oftel was established under the 1984 Telecoms Act  which had privatised the telecoms market, known as the "Abolition of British Telecommunications’ exclusive privilege". It was the first major privatisation by the then Conservative government.

Oftel was often accused, particularly towards the end of its regulatory life, of being very sympathetic to BT and with good reason. BT's relationship with the regulator Oftel was one of "coercive-diplomacy" rather than a telecoms company being more subservient to an assertive telecoms regulator.

The relative impotency of Oftel largely stemmed from BT remaining intact instead of being broken up; a decision which reflected the government's view on maximising proceeds from shares and future tax revenues on what was the world's biggest telecommunication company. But by remaining effectively as a monopolist telecoms company BT had every incentive to exclude competition by refusing interconnection between networks or threatening competition by fixing interconnection charges as high as possible.

So what followed was "coercive diplomacy" between the powerful monopolistic BT and its less powerful regulator. This somewhat uneven conflict was particularly encouraged by modifications to BT's operating licenses. BT was entitled to reject licence modifications proposed by Oftel under Section 12A of the 1984 Telecoms Act.

Thus despite privatisation, many difficulties were experienced by other companies attempting to enter a market wholly dominated by BT, particularly with its inherent well established infrastructure. A problem acknowledged by Oftel itself in its 1st report of 1984:

BT is competing in a large number of spheres of activity in the telecommunications industry from a position of significant strength, resulting from such factors as its established reputation and its established customer base supported by a selling organisation of extensive scope. Understandably many organisations have been apprehensive about the possibility of effect competition in this situation.

Problematic regulation and promotion of competition could also be seen when Mercury (Cable and Wireless) obtained its licence in 1985.

According to condition 13.1 of BT’s licence at the time, any competitor which had been licensed had to enter into a connection agreement with BT to run a connectable system and therefore needed connection to BT’s network. BT's reluctance to succeeded a measure of market share became apparent in 1985 when Mercury and BT had failed to agree terms for a connection contract.

So Mercury applied to the Director General of Telecommunications (DGT) to make a ruling under the conditions 13.5 and 13.6 of the BT licence. However while the outcome eventually favoured Mercury, who had incurred significant financial costs, the difficulties of overcoming BT's market place dominance meant that UK privatisation of telecommunications remained little more than a duopoly until the early '90s.

BT's dominance as underpinned by Section 12A meant it could bypass Oftel by threatening to force the issue to go for consideration by the then Mergers and Monopolies Commission (MMC) - a body which was eventually replaced by the Competition Commission in 1999, (given further powers under the Enterprise Act 2002) and then itself replace by the CMA.

By going to the MMC then open up the possibility of third party challenges to the cosy and convenient alliance of both BT and Oftel. Thus at the time Section 12A gave both strong incentives to negotiate terms to avoid uncertainties outside the charmed world of telecommunications that a third party may induce. The threat of a big stick in the guise of MMC gave each party a mechanism which could be used to bear down pressure on the other.

As a result Oftel was to suffer from "regulatory capture" by BT, eventually becoming as a regulator unfit for purpose. A successor was needed to further open up the telecoms market to competition. That came in the form of Ofcom whose prominence as the major regulator was established by The Communications Act 2003 (TCA)

Yet it was less Oftel's failings as a regulator that led to its demise but more a need to implement a number of EU directives into UK law which resulted in the Communications Act - EU Directives which unsurprisingly sought to further harmonise communications regulation across the European Union under the guise of modernisation but naturally implied a further step towards EU integration. Such EU Directives included; Directive 2002/19/EC, Directive 2002/21/EC, and Directive 2002/22/EC.

Using these EU Directives the then Labour government established Ofcom which inherited the duties of five separate other former regulators - the Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC) the Independent Television Commission (ITC), Oftel, the Radio Authority and the Radio Communications Agency.

Out of the TCA Ofcom became a "super regulator" and it comes as no surprise given Ofcom's inheritance that it was criticised for having "a too wide a brief". Not for the first time this was less a reflection of EU law and more the habitual enthusiasm of UK governments to gold plate EU law. Thus we have to query whether the initial establishment of Ofcom needed such a wide brief to comply with EU law or whether it was the political nature of the then Labour government which had unwelcome habit of reliance on big state solutions.

However it was not only the wide ranging powers that posed Ofcom problems but the inconsistency of those powers. Despite inheriting the briefs of the ITC, BSC and the Radio Authority it became clear that Ofcom was to have limitations in certain areas for domestic political reasons.

During the Parliamentary debate in 2002 on the Telecommunications Bill, Labour MP, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Tessa Jowell argued in support of the Bill that:

Finally, part 5 gives Ofcom tough competition powers to act concurrently with the Office of Fair Trading. Ofcom will be able to use general competition powers, but we are also retaining, very importantly, sector-specific competition rules for broadcasting—a vital part of protecting markets that do not deliver key policy objectives purely by leaving them to competition alone. Ofcom will have flexibility to use sector-specific powers, but it will not use them where it would be more appropriate for it to use general competition powers.

Reading carefully Tessa Jowell's statement indicates very clearly that the BBC was not to be fully within the remit of Ofcom a single independent regulator for the UK's broadcast media. From the outset its creation is fatally flawed as long as the biggest and most powerful broadcaster is not fully under the supervision of the independent regulator for the UK communications industries.

Other issues which became apparent with the TCA 2003, as is typical of the UK's relationship with the EU, was that it took advantage of EU legislation as an excuse to go further with lawmaking and introduce other controversial parts. An example being, Section 127 of the Act 2003 which makes it:

...an offence to make improper use of a public electronic communications network such as grossly offensive, indecent, obscene, menacing or annoying phone calls and emails.

This was used notoriously used against Paul Chambers who joked on Twitter that he would "blow Doncaster airport sky high", a charge which he was subsequently cleared by the Supreme Court in London.

With Ofcom we can see that a consequence of a national regulatory body emboldened by new powers is that they purse paths different from government national bodies unhindered. In the UK this was reflected by Ofcom's decision in 2003 having been established by the TCA 2003, in response to the telecommunications market developing rapidly, to conduct what it called a ‘root-and-branch’ strategic review of the regulatory regime.

Unlike its predecessor Ofcom, determined to breakup BT's monopoly further, concluded in 2005 a major strategic review of the fixed telecommunications sector by using its separate powers under the Enterprise Act 2002 - itself a result of EU Directives. The objective of the review was to determine whether the sector was suffering from competition problems of such a persistent nature that they could not easily be remedied using Ofcom's specific market review powers under the TCA.

The outcome of the strategic review meant that BT offered a host of undertakings to Ofcom by which it agreed to set up a separate network access division called Openreach (a so-called "BT group business") and also to offer its wholesale products on an equivalent basis to both external customers (Cable and Wireless, Carphone Warehouse etc) and its own downstream divisions. The undertakings have brought about a fundamental shift in the way in which BT had conduct business with all its customers, meaning all were now on a more equal footing in terms of wholesale access.

Thus despite the EU inspiration behind TCA and the Enterprise Act, from a regulatory perspective, the establishment of Openreach and its relationship to external customers is currently unique to the UK and is being actively studied by regulators in other European countries who experience similar competition problems arising from the presence of a large incumbent telecommunications operator.

The term "super-regulator" though does not mean Ofcom is the only regulator when it involves telecommunications, there are at least sixteen others and the list below demonstrates with great clarity the criticism that Ofcom has a brief which is too wide, and a reflection of the diversity of telecoms: it has its tentacles everywhere:

1)   Advertising Standards Authority (ASA)
2)   Telephony Preference Service (TPS)
3)   Ombudsman Services
4)   Communications and Internet Services Adjudication Scheme
(CISAS)
5)   PhonepayPlus
6)   Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)
7)   UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS)
8)   UK Safer Internet Centre
9)   Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP)
10) NICC - UK home of network interoperability standards
11) Go On UK - "empowering everyone in the UK to reach their digital potential"
12) NGN UK - dormant now part of OTA
13) Office of the Telecommunications Adjudicator (OTA)
14) Gambling Commission
15) Information Commissioner's Office
16) British Board of Film Classification (BBFC)

Not surprisingly with sixteen different organisations we have a complex mixture of Ofcom approved and EU financed regulatory structures. An example of the myriad structure can be found with the Internet Watch Foundation which came to media attention when it censored a Wikipedia page over an entry regarding an album cover by the German band The Scorpions. Here we see a registered charity, which works very closely with Ofcom (although Ofcom has no powers to regulate the internet) and receives EU funding. Susie Hargreaves the Chief Executive has also joined the BBFC’s Consultative Council.

Further evidence of the diversity and Ofcom's overreaching remit comes via the Advertising Standards Agency which describes a system as being one of "co-regulation of broadcast advertising" - it is self-regulation within a co-regulatory framework. It is underpinned by an enabling statutory instrument, The Contracting Out (Functions Relating to Broadcast Advertising) and Specification of Relevant Functions Order 2004 and a formal Deed between Ofcom and the ASA (Broadcast), BCAP and Basbof.

Interestingly Ruth Sawtell who is on ASA Council is also a non-executive director of PhonepayPlus, the regulator of premium rate telephone services.

In addition to the hydra nature of Ofcom, and its regulatory offspring, telecommunications are also responsibilities imbued within various government ministries and the agencies for which they are responsible, requiring within government itself a need for coordination as the table below illustrates (click to enlarge):

Thus it's apparent that even on a domestic basis telecoms regulation is diverse, overlapping and often incoherent. In the next piece we will move our focus away from domestic regulatory structures and turn our sights on the EU's role in UK telecommunications regulation.

Brexit And Telephones (2)

Following on from our previous post on Telecoms, we intend to address more fully the complexities of European and international political and regulatory networks of telecommunications which present significant challenges when considering Brexit. We begin here though as background with the impact of the rise of the mobile phone before we move in further pieces which look at national, EU and international regulation in detail.

As would be expected due to its inherent nature regarding communication, telecoms is a truly globalised industry which is reflected by the fact that many of its well known companies are multi-national businesses. For example the biggest and most valuable telecoms giant is US-based AT&T which provides mobile and fixed-line telephone service and broadband cable whose overall revenues grew to more than $127 billion in 2012. UK based Vodafone is the world’s second largest mobile phone operator on revenue and subscribers, behind only China Mobile.

Yet the rapid advancements in the last 30 years in technology have not only been reflected in the diversity of services provided by telecoms companies but also that the market is now populated extensively by what are traditionally non-telecoms specific enterprises.

We can appreciate the rapid advancements most acutely when we consider that in the time it took fixed lines, since the invention of the phone some 140 years ago, to progress from analogue, to digital circuit switching and then to packet switching technology courtesy of VoIP, it has only taken mobile phones around 30 years to achieve the same progression path.

When the traditional telephone was first challenged properly by the mobile phone in the early 1980’s operating on a cellular network– it was essentially by a two way radio which operated on two different analogue frequencies in order to receive and transmit conversations at the same time. It was an advancement on Push-to-Talk technology.

The rapid rise of early mobile phone efforts and vigorous competition though meant incompatibility of technology between carriers and also capacity problems. Other problems were that some services in the UK services such as Rabbit, Phonepoint and Mercury Callpoint could only make outgoing calls near a designated base station.

Even in the United States by the mid 1990s, there existed competing and incompatible second-generation digital wireless — channel access technologies such as CDMA (code division multiple access), TDMA (Time division multiple access) and iDEN, ensuring that phones would not work from one system to another.

The situation in Europe in the early 1980s was initially even worse. The first European mobile cellular systems were introduced in Scandinavian countries in 1981 and 1982. Following on shortly were the likes of Spain, Austria, the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and France. These systems were all analogue, now known in hindsight with the technological advancements as first generation (1G), however the problem was that there were eight of them which were all different and incompatible. Thus mobile communication was generally restricted to one country only.

This led to the intervention by the Telecommunications Commission of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunication Administrations (CEPT), a voluntary association of European countries where policy makers and regulators from 48 countries across Europe collaborate to harmonise telecommunication, radio spectrum, and postal regulations. The CEPT established a study group called the Groupe Speciale Mobile (GSM) to develop the specifications for a European-wide second-generation digital cellular system in the 900 MHz band.

The requirements were that it was to be fully digital, incorporating the best technology of the time. There would be no backward compatibility with existing systems and they desired that their new wireless standard would be similar to landline requirements for ISDN, hoping to make a wireless counterpart to it.

Here conflicts emerged between the national self interest of countries, of mobile phone companies and the need for standardisation.

The GSM group wanted to select the most appropriate technology by assessing a number of demonstration systems by interested parties. Eight systems were submitted which were between broadly TDMA technology and those incorporating CDMA technology. TDMA and CDMA were split along Scandinavian countries (Nokia, Ericsson and Elab) and the Germany/France axis respectively - whose systems were heavily subsidised by the French and German governments. The split reflected differing demographic characteristics between the countries.

TDMA with its fewer time slots thus its relatively moderate traffic capacity was less cost intensive and meaning it was easier and quicker to rollout across rural communities. Conversely the systems of Franco/German origin were generally designed with high traffic capacities in mind. This was a cost effective solution in more urban and dense areas with high traffic-density requirements but is more expensive for rural areas where many time slots are not needed.

Yet at least if not more as important as technology were; political issues, property rights issues and vested interests. Obviously the stakes were enormous for suppliers and states. One of the two shortlisted by SEL/Alcatel was considered to be “too proprietary” and held the patents on its CDMA-based proposal. There was reluctance by some countries to approve the other shortlisted option (TDMA) submitted by Ericsson due to it being based in a country that at the time was not a member of EEC. Other disputes included the use of encryption in GSM (A5/1), with eventual agreement that it should be optional – countries such as France do not allow it to be activated.

Interestingly, although the EEC privately supported narrowband TDMA solution, it wasn't in a position to act to facilitate a breakthrough, as 84/549/EEC: Council Recommendation of 12 November 1984 confirms the EU only had the power to recommend:

that the Governments of the Member States ensure that:
- the telecommunications administrations:

1. consult each other, preferably in the framework of CEPT, before they introduce any new service, notably between Member States, with a view to establishing common guidelines so that the necessary innovation takes place under conditions compatible with harmonization;

It was not until the Treaty of Maastricht (Article 129 D) that, for the first time, the EU was given a competence in the field of telecommunications. Instead it was diplomatic efforts by individual countries, notably by the UK, that lead to a breakthrough which came via the Bonn Declaration in 1987. This confirmed that a decision had been reached to use TDMA technology:

Europe must have a single standard supported throughout the CEPT- This should be based on the narrowband TDMA concept defined by CEPT at its Madeira meeting in Feb 1987.

The ministers also called for the agreement between network operators to be formalised by a Memorandum of Understanding (called the GSM MoU) which they did, not long after:

The signatories shall support the open (non proprietary) definition of at least the following interfaces in the form of CEPT recommendations:

Mobile/BaseStation (air interface) based on the narrowband TDMA concept defined by CEPT at its Madeira meeting in Feb 1987 enhanced in the areas of modulation and coding to provide the greatest flexibility in receiving equipment implementation as agreed by CEPT GSM at its Brussels meeting 9-12 June 1987

Base Station/MobiIe services Switching Centre

Mobile services Switching Centre,/Mobile services Switching Centre/Location Register

In 1987 the then EEC adopted, via Council Directive 87/372/EEC, frequency allocations proposed by the CEPT covering the 25 MHz bands of 890 - 915 MHz for uplink - mobile to base station, and 935–960 MHz for downlink - base station to mobile to apply to the Single Market.

(Interestingly the rights to the GSM trademark and logo were held by France Telecom)

The first GSM systems were up and running by 1991 with Vodafone launching the UK's first GSM commercial service in the same year. Having been deployed throughout Europe, GSM allowed smooth roaming from country to country.

GSM has since become the most popular worldwide technology regarding the standardisation of mobile phone calls:

More than 6 billion people worldwide use the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) family of technologies. GSM is the most widely used wireless technology in the world, available in more than 219 countries and territories worldwide, with a market share of more than 90 percent.

What made GSM so successful, was not that it was a far superior technology - indeed the first GSM handsets in 1992 were not much better than the old analogue ones - but instead that it established a complete telecommunications network in one package. Other worldwide standards bodies only produced a specification for the radio piece of the mobile network. Automatic roaming and handover of calls between base stations required dedicated exchanges for numbering and switching management and this is what GSM provided. It turned out to be a very successful illustration of European co-operation, ironically, with little involvement of the EEC/EU.

Born out of the 'GSM MoU' in 1987, and powered by the success of GSM, was the emergence of the GSM Association (GSMA) which represents the interests of mobile operators. Thus GSMA has "evolved to become one of the most powerful trade associations in the world, lobbying governments on everything from tax policy to pricing strategy":

Spanning more than 220 countries, the GSMA unites nearly 800 of the world’s mobile operators with 250 companies in the broader mobile ecosystem, including handset and device makers, software companies, equipment providers and internet companies, as well as organisations in industry sectors such as financial services, healthcare, media, transport and utilities.

In 1988, created by CEPT the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) was established. ETSI is an independent, not-for-profit, standardisation organisation in the telecommunications industry and, although not an EU organisation, it is officially recognised by the EU. Crucially ETSI allows direct participation in its technical committees from non-EU companies that have commercial interests in Europe which means it has a global outlook and influence - for example it was a founding member of the Global Standards Collaboration.

GSM thus was a big success, and probably due to this success 'Europe' began to become complacent - an unwise position to take as technology marches on relentlessly. While GSM second generation (2G) cellular systems were used principally for the purpose of transmitting voice calls - there was a growing use for the transmission of data. GSM acknowledged this with the flexibility of using Signalling System No. 7 which was essential to support new data services and SMS (text messages). Within a decade one billion text messages were being sent in a month. The development of third generation (3G) meant that term 'mobile broadband' reflected the growing demand for phones to emulate domestic PC broadband speeds.

While GSM was ultimately a triumph of European co-operation without the intervention of the then EEC, it was inevitable that the EU would use telecommunications as another excuse for further political integration which it retrospectively added to the Maastricht Treaty. Not unsurprisingly since becoming an EU competence the progression of telecoms innovation and co-operation within Europe has not been much short of stagnation.

We can see this acutely with the emergence of LTE (Long-Term Evolution) commonly known as 4G. Whereas European countries took the initiative in the '80s with GSM now other non-EU countries are doing so with 4G. Rather ironically the GSMA writes in its assessment - Mobile Wireless Performance in the EU & the US:

There is broad agreement that the EU mobile wireless market is underperforming relative to other advanced economies, including the U.S. We find that the EU is lagging well behind the U.S. in deployment of next generation wireless infrastructures and the advanced services they make possible, and that EU consumers are worse off as a result.

EU regulatory policies have resulted in a fragmented market structure which prevents carriers from capturing beneficial economies of scale and scope and retards the growth of the mobile wireless ecosystem. We recommend reforming and harmonizing spectrum policies, permitting efficient levels of consolidation, and promoting innovation by fostering dynamic competition.

It then notes that:

Growth in investment in the U.S. is translating into faster data connection speeds: U.S. speeds are now 75 percent faster than the EU average, and the gap is expected to grow.

The U.S. is deploying ITE at a much faster pace than the EU; by YE 2013, 19 percent of U.S. connections will be on lTE networks compared to less than two percent in the EU.

LTE 4G data networks will have the potential to make different streams needed for mobile voice and data services obsolete. Traditional cellular networks require a separate stream to carry voice traffic and data network. With LTE, rather like VoIP on landlines, voice traffic can be carried by IP technology, known as Voice over LTE (VoLTE). The final convergence for mobile phones is following the path trod before it by traditional land lines where the technology of VoIP has begun to establish itself.

Thus with the potential abolition of circuit switching technology within mobile phones this process to just being a mini computer will be complete. What for some time was effectively a phone with just some relatively simple software during the ‘90s where phones could text and allow users to play simple games like snakes as epitomised by the utter domination of Nokia, has become instead, with the development of smartphones, a small computer with telephony attached almost as an optional extra.

This convergence regarding mobile phones means we see telecommunications becoming an important component of the broader IT industry as companies such as Google with Samsung and Microsoft with Nokia enter the telecoms market.

In many ways the complexity of telecoms and indeed international regulation is demonstrated most clearly by the smartphone – the complexities of modern international regulation laid bare by a device small enough to fit in a pocket.  A modern smartphone contains many technologies which are regulated in different ways, by way of an example modern phones tend to have the following features for example:

Bluetooth: Regulated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE): "Before launching a Bluetooth classified product it must be ensured that the product is in compliance with the international RF, EMC, Safety and Health standards set by the regulatory authorities of the various regions."

WiFi: Products are certified by the WiFi Alliance, which is a global non-profit industry association stating "The members of our collaboration forum come from across the Wi-Fi ecosystem and share a vision of seamless connectivity. Since 2000, the Wi-Fi CERTIFIED™ seal of approval designates products with proven interoperability, industry-standard security protections, and the latest technology.

GPS: Civil signal designs are owned by the US as confirmed by this statement in 2013 "The governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America today announced that they had reached a common understanding of intellectual property rights related to the Global Positioning System (GPS) and will work together to address broader global navigation satellite systems’ intellectual property issues.

Radio: FM radio is available on modern phones via plugging in a headset and receiving analogue signals, frequencies agreed under the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

NFC/RFID: Near Field Communication - technology in smartphones which allows contactless electronic payments. It is based on the international ISO/IEC 18092 standard.

Camera: Photographs made with a camera phone can fall outside the jurisdiction of the EU: "A photographer who requested Wikimedia to remove one of his images used online without his permission has had his wishes dismissed, with the US organisation behind Wikipedia claiming that because a monkey pressed the shutter button it should own the copyright".

Ringtones: Companies who offer ringtone services to sell to the UK public pay royalties to PRS for performance rights.

Music: Related to the above the issue of copyright and competing international trademark rights became an issue as illustrated by the Beatles (Apple Corp) verses Apple computer case.

What this illustrates neatly is that the telecommunications field is so vast, and changing so rapidly, it is difficult to cover all aspects of it. But its globalised complexity requires global involvement.

In the next few blog pieces we will concentrate on national, European and international telecommunication regulation in turn.

Brexit: Questions To Answer

We were aware that Richard North’s Flexcit submission probably wasn’t going to win. Reservations were evident from the start. Conclusions were drawn that the nature and arguments of the submission were at odds with the economic bias of the IEA. That we knew and anticipated.

But what we, (and nearly all the contestations who entered – just short of 150), expected was for it to be a fair competition. It’s not unreasonable to expect that everyone should have had a chance.

With the publication of the final six shortlisted (another rule change that was unexpectedly announced half way through the competition) it’s becoming clear that being fair the IEA prize most certainly was not. All of the final six papers breach the original competition rules, in some cases strongly. In addition Richard points out in a very revealing analytic piece there are also some other far more serious concerns.

There are in essence three widely publically acknowledged ways of leaving the EU, the pros and cons of which were addressed in the FleXit plan as per the competition requirements.

The first way of leaving are variations on the “Norway Option” (EFTA/EEA), the second is the Swiss bilateral agreements and the third is what I consider the “Life on Mars” option; we are all involved in a car crash, enter a coma and wake up in the early '70s. This is also known as the “just repeal the ECA and the WTO will just rescue us” option.

As Richard notes, the final six which were shortlisted all considered a completely different (but crucially the same) option – "EFTA only". The final six argue to pursue the Swiss arrangement via EFTA membership:

It should be noted that EFTA membership is not required to pursue the so-called "Swiss option", as the Association played no role in the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU. This we know from René Schwok, writing in an official EFTA anniversary book. In other words, the "Swiss option" doesn't need EFTA membership.

In fact, the advantage of the bilateral route for Switzerland is that it allowed her to make her own agreements without being bound by the EFTA framework. Thus, the only advantage the UK would gain from the “EFTA-only” option would be the ability to tap into EFTA's existing trade deals. But if that was the sole motivation, it is unlikely that the UK would be accepted as a returning member.

It is an argument that is so rare, if not unique, that there are very few academic papers on it (if at all) and an argument that largely cannot be found expressed on the internet in any form whatsoever - until the conclusion of the Brexit prize (very likely because it's completely unworkable).

In the age of the internet, we would expect academic papers to rely heavily on it in terms of research. Indeed there are a number of passages in the final six – including the winning entry that are very familiar to this blogger. But that is to be expected. Any information posted on here is for free use.

What is unexpected to say the least is that all six have come up with the same argument which is not freely available on the internet nor indeed widely argued within eurosceptic circles - and hasn’t been as long as many of us have campaigned against EU membership.

One such paper showing such “original thought” is fair enough, two could be a coincidence. More than that and we’re suspicious. That six have entered, then have been shortlisted and they're the only ones…well we don’t need to make clear the statistic improbabilities of that.

We also note that Roger Bootle, one of the original judges, stepped down after complaints that he expressed himself in a way that was unfit to be a judge during an ongoing competition. Interestingly it is also understood that the judges only managed to see and evaluate the final six papers - they were vetted in advance. Odd then that the only reference to an "EFTA only" solution aka "EFTA + bilaterals" was made by Roger Bootle published while the IEA competition was ongoing.

For those whom wish EU exit, the IEA has serious questions to answer about the conduct of its competition and whether it invited participants to enter papers on a false premise. Thus I currently have an ongoing complaint with them requesting that they publish all of the original 17 shortlisted so we can come to our own conclusions.

I was born into the then EEC (the UK joined 18 months earlier) so I don't have direct experience of the lies that took us in - I can only observe it from a generation apart. However what is clear is that the lies continue; history is repeating itself.  For eurosceptics who genuinely want EU exit our furrow as a result is being ploughed a little lonelier.

If the IEA competition was a banana we wonder whether it would comply with Commission Regulation (EC) No 2257/94

Brexit: The Winning Entry?

Iain Mansfield will be a happy man this morning having won the Brexit prize and walked away with a sizable cheque. His winning submission can be found here.

We invite readers, before they continue to read the rest of this post, to first study both the winning entry and compare it with the one submitted by Richard North, with help from his blog readers, which didn’t even make the final six shortlist, and come to their own conclusions.

We do so to negate the charge of “sour grapes” which of course is an easy accusation to make. We also like to make it clear that there's no particular personal ill will towards Mr Mansfield – that he’s entered a competition and won is hardly his fault.

That said as the winning contestant of what should be considered an academic paper with “prestige” he should put himself in position to defend the arguments he makes. By deleting his blog this morning and also being hamstrung by being a member of the Civil Service he is compromised by failing to be able do so. As a consequence the paper cannot further the cause of UK exit.

Largely though our deep concerns are directed at the IEA and the potential severe damage this competition will do to the eurosceptic movement.

It’s worth noting that the competition wasn’t the idea of the IEA, it was instead the brain child of Lord Pearson, ex UKIP leader of course, and he raised the necessary funds. Pearson took the view that the IEA was a suitable organisation to run the competition.

What’s becoming apparent though is the competition wasn’t run with entirely honest intentions by the IEA, they have used the opportunity of Pearson’s 'naivety' - of not seeking a remit - to hijack it to impose their own free market ideology. That the IEA have attempted to hijack the prize is not just the opinion of Richard North but also some of the other contestants as well, who are equally unhappy.

It's also interesting to note that Mr Mansfield not only walks away with the main prize but also wins the prize for being "the best entry from an individual aged 30 or under”. How convenient.

Such concerns are reinforced by the continuing changes in the rules during the competition. Not only did the IEA arbitrarily impose upon contestants a further shortlist of six – which immediately announced that any submission failures were at least 7th best not 4th best - a decision which wasn’t stated from the start, but they then made public their clear expectations as demonstrated by the video above, contrary to the original competition requirements.

After the competition had closed the judges revealed that they wanted a "free trade" solution, something that was never specified throughout the competition. As an example below is the full guidance sent via email sent on 25th November 2013 where a free trade only solution was not specifically required:

Dear all,

The Brexit judges met again last week and discussed the development of the short-listed papers into full submissions. They asked me to send entrants on the short list some further guidance, which has been integrated into the original further guidance, in order to help you meet the objectives of the competition.

1.      The full paper should not concern itself with reasons as to why the UK might exit the EU or the advantages or disadvantages of such a step, nor should it spend time looking at how such a situation might arise. The starting point is that the decision to leave has already been taken and the paper should explore and set out a programme of policy steps to be followed by a UK government in that event.

2.      While, obviously, you need to consider the precise mechanism and procedure for exit, this should not be the main or primary focus of the final submission. Rather the full submission should look at the areas of government policy and overall political economy that would be affected by a UK exit and suggest a coherent and structured set of policy responses. The most obvious one is trade policy but there are many others, notably regulation in general (including financial regulation, environmental regulation, labour market regulation, immigration, and so on), foreign and fiscal policies and wider questions of economic policy.

3.     Wherever possible you should seek to provide costed and quantitative estimates and arguments. For example (and this only as an example, not a suggestion) there could be an analysis of trade flows over the last thirty years with estimates of where the greatest potential advantages from bilateral trade deals might lie; what trade policy options would confront the UK - from unilateral free trade through to joining particular free trade areas or remaining in the EEA; where the fastest benefits of lower trade barriers might be achieved and what impediments might stand in the way.

4.    However, when it comes to some of the more difficult issues, there will not be a hard and fast answer. Nevertheless, entrants should try to provide estimates and make judgments and these must be backed up with argument and evidence.

5.    Though the exit process should not be the primary focus of the papers, the successful entrant should include a clear sense of the practical steps that would need to be taken and the likely timetable in relation to them.

6.    As the context for point 2, above, there should be a clear picture of the various choices and options facing the UK upon exit with a discussion of the pros and cons and there should be a discussion of the pros and cons of various special arrangements which the UK might make with the EU after BREXIT.

7.    The entry should outline what the worst case for the UK might be after BREXIT and discuss ways of avoiding this and/or mitigating it if it transpires (for example, would the worst case be the EU refusing to negotiate any trade arrangements and refusing to make any agreements relating to the operation of UK companies throughout the EU and then imposing trade barriers and how might the UK respond?).

8.    Use of several tables and charts should be expected.

The fact that none of the EEA solutions - or variations of - did not make the unexpected announced six adds weight to our suspicions. If contestants had been informed from the start of the "free-trade" desires of the IEA, then EEA solutions would not have been put forward by entrants on the basis that they had no chance.

Those who have now read both papers linked above may feel a sense of being completely underwhelmed by the winning entry. The winning paper contains wishful thinking, superficiality, and is completely lightweight. It simply does not address the complexities of leaving. It also contains basic errors such as this on page 12:

The Single Market is far more than a customs union or a comprehensive free trade agreement. The treaty that instigated the Single Market was not the Treaty of Rome, but the Single European Act of 1987 [sic], which concerned much more in depth matters of economic integration.

I have to remind my readers that paragraph was part of a winning entry. Unbelievable. One wonders whether Dr David Starkey is keen, as a constitutional historian of note, to be associated with a paper that quite clearly falls below the accepted standard of an academic paper.

Another example is point 8 in the email above; “Use of several tables and charts should be expected."

Point 8 caused no end of consternation for us. Richard’s submission put forward the case rightly - a point acknowledged by more than one judge on the panel - that exit from the EU was a political argument not an economic one. Given that the IEA is obviously an economic think-tank we concluded that they were looking for a paper festooned with economic graphs.

Typical examples are this paper from Ruth Lea and this from Nexit. With this in mind and after long hours of cogitation and discussion we managed to include in Flexcit many original tables and charts that were relevant to our submission which also tried to confirm with possible expectations of an economic argument. Even so we still had concerns that the lack of economic graphs was a potentially obvious weakness, in the sense of Richard’s submission being looked upon kindly by economically biased judges.

But as it turns out we needn’t have bothered or been worried. Clearly by the winning submission this was never an issue. By way of example this is an original graph from the Flexcit submission (click to enlarge throughout):

And another regarding the Article 50 process:

In contrast this is one from the winning submission, picked at random on page 57:

or this on page 56:

The graphs used in the winning submission have obviously been copied and pasted; they are unoriginal and they are blurred - in the paper - to the exent they are unreadable. And this submission won? Even by comparision with the papers (linked to above) from Ruth Lea, Roger Bootle and again this from Ruth Lea all associated with the IEA this is a very poorly drafted paper.

And that is without noting it came up short in the word count - 10,000 to 20,000 words was the requirement - the winner came in at fewer than 9,500 words. As Richard notes, Mansfield's arguments are also incoherent:

Mansfield, however, rejects the idea of joining the EEA, although he does suggest we join EFTA. As an aside, does he explore the views of EFTA members, as to whether they would accept the UK? He doesn't, but we did.

I actually went to Norway, and to Iceland. The Norwegians and Icelanders both, wanted us in EFTA and the EEA, because we could help them renegotiate the deal. Would they want us in EFTA without the EEA? I very much doubt it – but this is something Mansfield doesn't even explore. And the judges let him get away with it.

Howsoever, what Mansfield advocates is a pick'n mix bilateral agreement, adopting a position "somewhere between that of Turkey's and Switzerland's membership of EFTA". This is not only politically unattainable in the timescale, it is incoherent.

Turkey's relationship with the EU is of membership of a Customs Union. Switzerland has bilateral free trade deals with the EU. The relationship with the Swiss deals and EFTA is complex. Some are via EFTA, some are outside. But the one thing absolutely certain is that there is no position at all between Turkey and Switzerland. Mansfield is comparing chalk and cheese.

And, having talked so some of the other competitors last night, I know that we were not the only entrants to point out the impossibility of attaining an ab initio bilateral deal within the two years.

The big danger now is that the eurosceptic movement will be hampered by this paper which now has "prestige" and is seen as best way forward. Europhiles will take great delight in taking it apart - it will be seen as the best eurosceptics can offer. It’s going to be akin to shooting fish in a barrel. Huge damage has been done.

I'll end this post with the now ironic words of one of the judges:

“In the past most politicians have focused on the economic rather than the political implications of the European Union. The debate about Europe‘s future is a battle of ideas and ideologies. The European Union has always been a deeply political project."

The IEA is simply another London based institution that will not understand how or why the EU exists. It's lost any credibility it had left whatsoever.

Brexit: Not Shortlisted

"The European Union is, and always has been, a political project, even though this has not been something that has been as openly acknowledged as it should have been in Britain" Labour MP and IEA judge Gisela Stuart

Today we learnt the names of the final six to go forward to the IEA Brexit prize. Unfortunately the entry by Richard North was not selected; it can be read or downloaded from here.

In many ways it was not a surprise. We had doubts from the start that a submission which aims to negate the economic arguments in order to win a referendum against FUD would be in direct contrast to the economic bias of the IEA.

Despite that a number of the judges acknowledged publically that the EU is a political project not an economic one, a feeling persists the IEA in general and indeed this country still cannot get to grips with the true nature of what the European Union is. This is reflected in the obvious concentration of economic interests in the final six.

What compounds the disappointment though is that after many months of hard work the news was received by a rather terse email from a press person:

The words "good and intriguing" are rather patronising to say the least. "Intriguing" is clearly a euphemism for not what we were looking for. After months of hard work by Richard researching a very complex and important subject and producing an original thesis of "Flexcit" contestants deserve much better than a patronising, bland and standard email.

Despite that it's encouraging that we now have a very detailed, layered and practical document on how the UK can exit the EU, that in itself is progress.

Finally I would like to thank Richard for his enormously hard efforts since October, much of it unseen, in producing a very valuable and useful piece of work. One that needs to be re-read a few times to fully appreciate its scope.

A Man Without A Plan

“A goal without a plan is just a wish.”

Antoine de Saint-Exupéry

Whether Scotland later this year agrees to go it alone or to remain part of the UK is of course a matter for them. What is interesting though about the campaign is how it it reveals with great clarity the problems with winning a referendum on removing a country from a union - changing the status quo. There are lessons in abundance that can be learned from the Scottish experience when considering the removal of the UK from another (albeit different type of) union - that of the EU.

The arguments of whether the Scottish people should run their own affairs democratically has been deliberately reduced down to mainly economic arguments by the Unionists; the Westminster village has closed ranks by taking advantage of the SNP's lack of preparation with regard to currency and undermining the independence case by opposing a currency union.

The three main Westminster parties are to declare that whoever forms the next UK government will not enter a currency union with an independent Scotland.

And FUD regarding Scottish exit has been in full flow:

Finance experts, academics and business leaders have raised fears that independence would destroy the economy, hit investment and force companies to migrate to England.

Words like "disaster" and "destroy" sound very familiar and is a foretaste of what we can expect come an EU referendum. Removing a country from a union needs an effective exit plan - in short a man with a plan - to negate the inherent fear factor. But as I've noted here and here, such a coherent strategy has been sorely lacking with the SNP and it is very likely to cost Salmond, and those supporting Scottish independence, the referendum.

As recent polling shows the independence vote is trailing significantly:

• Support for independence is 29%
  
• Support for remaining in the Union is 42%
• Don't knows 29%

Support for remaining part of the UK leads by a big margin, add into that the "status quo effect" inherent in any referendum and the fear factor on the "don't knows" and the campaign for Scottish independence looks doomed. Paddy Power's current odds are 2/11 against independence and 10/3 for. It would take a brave man to bet on Scottish independence.

With the referendum getting ever closer we can expect a ramping up of the same scare-mongering tactics. One such example is the Spectator this week where Alistair Daring exposes the weak links in Salmond's case:

Alex Salmond is now a man without a plan. He is offering Scots a future of uncertainty and instability. Threats of a debt default leaving Scotland and Scots with a bad credit rating. No idea which currency we would be transitioning to.

By contrast if Scots want to know the benefit of remaining in the UK, they need only reach into their pockets and pull out a pound coin. We have one of the most trusted, secure currencies in the world. We have the financial back up of being part of one of the biggest economies in the world. The pound means more jobs, smaller mortgage repayments, cheaper credit card bills and lower prices in the supermarket. Why would we gamble that for an unknown currency?

And so on...

Of course this isn’t the first part of their White Paper that has fallen apart. A few days ago Scotland’s accountants were damning in their assessment that there was no plan for paying pensions. The SNP’s own expert group admitted there was no plan for paying benefits. This is too big a decision to make without having a real plan.

Salmond has been criticised for the lack of preparation as 62% of Scots in a poll last year think the SNP's case is "not very convincing":

According to the survey for the pro-union Better Together group, 62 per cent of people said the SNP case was either “not very convincing” or “not convincing at all”. Twenty-four per cent of the doubters voted SNP in the last Holyrood election.

Thus as the SNP demonstrate having a referendum and being ill-prepared, leaves any independence campaign woefully exposed.

Be careful what you wish for...

Brexit: And In It Goes

Nearly four months after being shortlisted for the Brexit prize by the IEA - covering the actual process of withdrawing from the EU and the post-exit position of the UK globally - Richard North's submission has now gone in today in anticipation of tonight's midnight deadline.

With 17 papers shortlisted in the prize they will hopefully provide a quality and genuine debate on the best way to exit the anti-democratic monstrosity that we are members of - a debate that has been severely lacking in other, sometimes surprising, quarters.

With the submissions still anonymous and now under judges' consideration I'm reluctant to give away too many details publically (having read it) which may give an indication who wrote it and thus maybe affect the outcome.

Just to be shortlisted was an achievement in itself but given the massive prodigious, mostly unseen, efforts by Richard over the last months the submission should walk away with the prize on merit alone. It could have very easily been over 100,000 words - given the complexity of EU exit - way above the 20,000 word limit.

Despite the merits of Richard’s paper, the outcome of the prize is too difficult to call. Especially given that exit from the EU is primarily a political problem, and process, not an economic one – a point that encouragingly some of the judges appreciate. Yet to produce a paper that argues that the economic consequences must be neutral potentially goes against the economic bias of IEA as a whole, especially given the economic arguments of NExit endorsed by judge Roger Bootle.

The paradox is the IEA remit was on the basis that the referendum had already been won, but the “Norway option” is there largely to help win the referendum in the first place by negating the fear of exit on economic grounds.

Yet the Norway (EEA) and the Swiss current arrangements are essentially a fudge. The EEA has among other problems a veto - a 'temporary' solution that tried to reassure the Norwegians on the merits of entering the Single Market while really trying to "bounce" them into full membership of the EU.

The Swiss agreements have similar intent but with the recent referendum on immigration, the Swiss model of bilateral agreements is set to unravel - especially given the guillotine clause which exists between the EU and Switzerland. Both Switzerland and the EU consider the arrangement very unsatisfactory.

What then is clear is if the UK exit and adopt the Norway model, it can be only temporary. Yet the UK's exit will be of such magnitude, with the addition of regaining our position at the "top table" of international organisations (without the EU to represent us), the UK can as a result play an important role in re-ordering the European post-war settlement. Britain would have the ability to take an active role in shaping the European landscape. We need not resort ourselves to a passive role.

Thus the submission offers a very positive outlook for the UK's role in the world. One hopes it wins.