A little note on excrements and shop entrance doors

In an article published in the London Review of Books, Slavoj Zizek, Slovenian sociologist, postmodern philosopher, and cultural critic, used a metaphor of a toilet to compare the cultural differences between the German, French and US,

"In a traditional German toilet, the hole into which shit disappears after we flush is right at the front, so that shit is first laid out for us to sniff and inspect for traces of illness. In the typical French toilet, on the contrary, the hole is at the back, i.e. shit is supposed to disappear as quickly as possible. Finally, the American (Anglo-Saxon) toilet presents a synthesis, a mediation between these opposites: the toilet basin is full of water, so that the shit floats in it, visible, but not to be inspected."

Similarly, the direction in which the shop, restaurant etc. entrance door opens (towards the street or towards the inside of the place) is telling of a particular society’s position towards the notion of the public space and public good. Namely, in US shop doors open towards the outside and thus invade the public space, hence one is to conclude, or that America has bigger side-walks so they can allow such luxury, or that this is something to do with fire prevention (mind you one can always break the glass door), or that private property is more important than the public one. In Europe shop windows usually open towards the inside thus reflecting the nature of our social and political system.

Scotland & Kosovo

The Guardian argues how a possible supervised independence for Serbia’s Province of Kosovo might play the role of a precedent in other cases such as Scotland for example. The Guardian writes, “The breakaway British region of Scotland could be among the beneficiaries of this week's expected UN recommendation that Kosovo be granted provisional independence from Serbia, leading in time to full sovereign status. If the plan backed by the US, Britain and Germany is formally accepted by the UN Security Council, it will be taken as an important international legal precedent by would-be separatist movements from Georgia to Moldova to Chechnya, and possibly also the Scottish National party.” For more information read here.

Serbian 2007 Elections: Victory of the Pro-European Forces

On the Serbian parliamentary elections held yesterday 21^st of January 2007 Pro-European political block won the majority of votes. The largest number of citizens voted for the Ex-Milosevic’s ally Serbian Radical Party but this party will not be in a position to form the new government, both because no party seems willing to ally with them (because of the international pressure) as well as they themselves publicly announced would not form a coalition with any of the parties that entered the Parliament, apart from the parties of national minorities and possibly the Socialist Party of Serbia.

The electoral results are the following: Serbian Radical Party won 81 seats, Democratic Party (of the Serbian President Boris Tadic) won 65, Democratic Party of Serbia (of the Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica) won 47, G 17 Plus 19, The Coalition led by the Liberal Democratic Party 15, ex-Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia 16 and the parties of national minorities 7. In other words political parties that were in power during the ancien regime of Milosevic won 97 seats, while the parties that governed Serbia in the post-Milosevic period won 153 seat. In the parliamentary elections of 2003 this ratio was 104 vs. 146, while in the 2000 elections post-Milosevic parties won as much as 176 seats, leaving the parties of the ex-regime on meagre 74.

Bearing in mind the fact that Serbia is undergoing a painful (but arguably a rather successful) transition process, it is rather surprising even that the populist opposition parties did not win even more. As far as the governing coalition of the Prime Minister Kostunica is concerned they suffered a significant blow. Together (DSS, NS, G 17 and SPO) they won 66 seats (SPO 0 since they did not manage to cross the threshold of 5%), while after the 2003 elections they held 110 (They ruled in a position of a minority government thanks to the votes of ex-Milosevic’s party Socialist Party of Serbia). The biggest victor in these elections is the newly founded Liberal Democratic Party that together with its coalition partners managed to enter the Parliament and win 15 seats. This party is largely formed of the ex-members of the Democratic Party and together with the Democratic Party holds the claim over the political legacy of the late Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. Democratic Party, the main-stream reformist, centre-left party of the Serbian President Boris Tadic is also a winner of these elections (the best result ever of this party) although their supporters, who hoped to win more in the elections, are left with a bitter (for them) perspective of having to deal with PM Kostunica’s Democrats for the formation of the new government.

There are several scenarios for the formation of the new government but two are the most likely:

1) The coalition of the DS, DSS-NS Coalition and the G 17 Plus is the most probable outcome, although it remains uncertain who will lead this coalition, the candidate of DS Bozidar Djelic, the current Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica, the leader of G 17 Plus Mladjan Dinkic or a neutral technocrat able to rally the abovementioned parties together. The Coalition grouped around the Liberal Democratic Party is unlikely to take part in the government, both because the Party of the Serbian Prime Minister is unready to cooperate with them and also because they are most likely to benefit from the coalition of DS and DSS in the long run. Some or all parties of the national minorities that managed to enter the Parliament will most probably take part in the new government.

2) All other coalitions are highly unlikely since they are likely to cause serious political damage to both DS and DSS. According to the Serbian Constitution (article 109) if the aforementioned block of parties does not manage to make an agreement on the formation of the new government in three month, Serbia will have the new elections. The entire Pro-European block will not profit from the new elections, both because of the possible negative outcome of the future Kosovo status negotiation as well as because of the dissatisfaction of the voters with their inability to reach an agreement. So the two Democratic parties must reach an agreement, the sooner the better for Serbia and its citizens.

Independence of Kosovo vs. Humanitarian Interventions

In the current issue of the German Law Journal, entirely dedicated to the legal dimension of the future status of the Serbian Province of Kosovo I published an article: Srdjan Cvijic, “Self-determination as a challenge to the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions: The Case of Kosovo”, German Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 2007

This article questions the legality of imposing independence for Kosovo without the consent of Serbia. It does so by firmly linking this question to the debate on the nature and legality of NATO’s 1999 humanitarian intervention in the FRY / Serbia. The UN-mediated process for negotiating the future status of this southern Serbian province, as well as the legal origin of the UN-mandated administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), represent a continuation of the original military and political involvement of NATO and the entire international community initiated six years ago. It is for this reason that no decision on the future status of Kosovo can be reached without bearing in mind the original basis of international involvement in FRY / Serbia. This article will analyse authoritative international jurisprudence that demonstrates how only “a thin red line” divides humanitarian interventions from being legal under international law. It further argues that instances of humanitarian intervention can, over time, acquire legality provided that stringent conditions are respected, the most important of which being that they serve no purpose other than the prevention of grave and immediate threats to human life. Consequently, humanitarian intervention should not serve as a tool for achieving political goals such as greater political autonomy, self-determination, or independence for particular groups within any given country. Infringement of this condition would amount to a revolutionary challenge to international law and threaten the return of the predominance of spheres of influence in international relations and law, taking us back to a past where war was considered the legitimate “continuation of politics by other means”. The imposition of an independence status for Kosovo on Serbia would not only amount to a revolutionary challenge to the established norms of international law, but would also jeopardize the development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

Serbia v. the International Community

To return to a topic that we have discussed on this blog on numerous occasions (see, for example, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here, amongst others), Serbia has sent a fairly clear signal to the international community that it is not prepared to contemplate what many are simply assuming will be the final outcome of the Kosovo status negotiations, an independent Kosovar state, by endorsing nothing less than a new Constitution which declares Kosovo to be part of Serbian territory for eternity; and this only a few short weeks before the Security Council is expected to rule on the issue.

The EU and the US have dismissed the move as "irrelevant" - an incredible suggestion when one considers that it is the territorial integrity, involving long-recognised borders, of an independent state that is concerned. Whatever the outcome, it seems clear that any enforced separation of Kosovo from Serbia will be vigorously (we can only hope peacefully) by the latter; and this turns it into a significant problem for international law, as there seems to be no chance of Serbia simply acquiescing to the Security Council's expected attempt to force the independence option. We will thus, it seems, have a precedent ("exceptional" or otherwise) where the international community will act to divide up an existing (and democratic) state, where no current threat to international peace and security currently exists. A bold move, indeed; but one that could, if handled without huge sensitivity, backfire spectacularly in this historically most volatile region of Europe.