Do all theodicies fail?

I'll comment on part of a thread by atheist Jeff Lowder:

@SecularOutpost

Likewise, when atheists argue that facts about evil, pain, suffering, imperfection are evidence against God's existence, it's a complete nonstarter to talk about how God is logically compatible with those facts. 

i) That depends. Mere logical compatibility might be a makeshift explanation. That's not sufficient. If, however, logical compatibility means evil, pain, and suffering are not surprising given the overall tenets of Christian theism, then that's a legitimate explanation. If that fails to satisfy the evidential argument from evil, the failure is not in the explanation but in the way the evidential argument is formulated. 

ii) It's unclear what Jeff means by "imperfections". For instance, it's not a design flaw that I don't have fireproof fingers. If I accidentally burn my fingers, that's not an imperfection. Fingers need to be sensitive to perform many functions. Fireproof fingers would be numb. 

For parallel reasons, all known theodicies for the arguments from evil fail. They provide a possible explanation for which we have no independent reason to believe is true and/or the explanation is not probable on the assumption theism is true.

i) That's ambiguous. We often resort to explanations that are reasonable even though we lack independent evidence that they are true. Why is someone late for work? Maybe they had a flat tire, accident, or family emergency. We don't require corroboration for that conjecture to make it a legitimate conjecture. We know that those kinds of things happen. We know he's a responsible employee. 

ii) It's often rational to provide a possible explanation when we have no independent evidence that it's true, because it's not necessarily about having direct evidence for the explanation, but indirect evidence given the character of the agent, as a competent and benevolent agent who has good reasons for what he does.

iii) On the assumption that Christianity is true, it's not merely probable but inevitable that some of God's actions will be inscrutable given the complexities of historical causation. Normally it's wrong to inflict pain on a young child. The child doesn't understand why the doctor is performing a painful procedure. He doesn't understand why his dad is standing by, allowing that to happen. 

(Aside: I also forgot to mention another requirement: the theodicy or atheodicy has to make the fact to be explained probable. Many theodicies and atheodicies also fail this requirement.) 

Probable in relation to whom or what frame of reference? An atheist? 

Once again, an explanation needn't be probable to be legitimate. To recur to my previous example, an employee may be late for work because they had a flat tire, accident, or family emergency. Since I don't know for a fact why they are late for work, I can't say which explanation is probably the correct explanation. And it may be an explanation I didn't consider. 

But we could put this in reverse: it's improbable that he decided to play hooky, given his track-record as a responsible employee. 

For example, the pain a terminally ill patient feels in the hours or days before death does not aid in survival or reproduction. Now, if theism is true, then God must have a morally sufficient reason for allowing all pain, including pain which does not aid in survival or reproduction. 

i) Because the human nervous system is fairly coarse-grained. It wasn't designed to be that discriminating. But that cuts both ways. It wasn't designed for us to enjoy chocolate gelato. That doesn't aid in survival or reproduction. But why is that the only justification? 

ii) Because Jeff is locked into attacking generic theism, he overlooks distinctive assumptions, resources, and explanations provided by Christian theism. He acts like all pain must be a design flaw, as created. But in Christian theology, the natural world always contained dangers and potential sources of pain. The difference is that in an unfallen world, humans might expect special providential protection from certain kinds of harms. 

The basic idea of UPD is that God exists, and God may have a morally sufficient reason for allowing pain, suffering, imperfection, or evil, and that reason is unknown to (or unknowable by) humans. 

That reply is good as far it goes, but it doesn't go far enough to defeat the atheistic arguments from pain, suffering, imperfection, and evil. Yes, God may have unknown reasons for allowing such things, but he might also have unknown reasons for preventing such things. 

There is no antecedent reason why God-permitting reasons are more likely than God-preventing reasons, and so both of those reasons cancel out. What we're left with is what we do know. 

i) Those aren't mutually exclusive explanations. It's not a choice between God permitting every evil and God preventing every evil. Some evils are necessary sources of second-order goods, but too much evil swamps the good. There is no general principle that God-permitting reasons are more likely that God-preventing reasons, or vice versa. God-permitting reasons ought to be more likely that God-preventing reasons. That assessment involves striking a balance between competing goods that humans lack the information and intelligence to appreciate.  

ii) In addition, the preemption of evil is invisible. A nonevent leaves no trace evidence. So we can't do a comparative assessment of how often God permits evil in relation to how often God prevents evil. We only have one side of the comparison.

iii) However, both divine permission and divine prevention of evil have a disruptive impact on the future. So these represent alternate world histories. A world where God prevents more evil will have a different history than a world in which God permits more evil. 

iv) That, however, doesn't mean a world with less evil is a world with more good. Some evils are necessary evils insofar as some evils provide the necessary conditions for certain kinds of goods. 

Is atheism the religion of the godless?

@SecularOutpost

I’ve never understood the motivation of some / many / most Christians to define religion in a way that makes some / many / most atheists religious. (I agree that an atheist can be religious, FTR.) Especially when combined with the idea that Christianity is not a religion.

https://twitter.com/SecularOutpost/status/1244367119061401601

The reason is the way in which atheism so often becomes the functional equivalent of religion. In practice it's not just nonbelief in a God or gods. They feel they need to fill the void with substitutes that take the place of God and play the explanatory role of God. A cause or ideal to live for and center their lives on. 

Just like we might say football is Joe's religion or becoming a senior partner in the law firm is Jerry's religion. And all-consuming passion that mimics religious devotion. 

BTW, Jeff Lowder is an apostate, so his question reveals the fact that he never really understood atheism or religion. 

"Death is what gives life meaning"

@SecularOutpost

Death is what gives life meaning.

The fact that life can be lost is what makes life meaningful.

It’s the risk of loss of one’s own life that gives the other things meaning.

https://twitter.com/SecularOutpost/status/1236376219597168640

1. You can file this under: if you want a shallow answer to an existential question, ask an atheist.  

Atheists face a dilemma of their own making. How do they play the losing hand they dealt themselves? Some of them are more forthright about the consequences. By contrast, Jeff's strategy is to make a virtue of necessity.  

Does God have a purpose in life?

On a theistic view, there is no objective purpose of *God’s* life: there is no ‘Super-God’ to give God purpose in God’s life. Poor God has to choose His own purpose in life. @RFupdates is simply pushing the problem back a step. https://t.co/kTrneRRGVM

— Secular Outpost (@SecularOutpost) October 27, 2019

@SecularOutpost

 On a theistic view, there is no objective purpose of God’s life: there is no ‘Super-God’ to give God purpose in God’s life. Poor God has to choose His own purpose in life. @RFupdates is simply pushing the problem back a step.

This is Jeff Lowder's attempt to be clever and turn tables on the argument. But his arguments aren't improving with age. It's such a confused, and simplistic riposte. 

1. On the face of it, Jeff is laboring to mount an argument from analogy. Either the principle holds true in both cases or not at all. But what could that mean?

2. Human beings are contingent, needy creatures. Physically dependent on their environment. For instance, we can only survive and thrive within a very narrow temperature range.

In addition, we're social creatures with emotional needs. Including the need to touch and be touched by other human beings. 

Human beings are not self-contained units whose needs are internally supplied and satisfied. In the nature of the case we require things outside ourselves to provide for our emotional needs and personal fulfillment. 

3. How is that supposed to be comparable to God? A self-contained being who is complete in himself? An being who needs nothing outside himself to supplement himself? A timeless agent who has no unrealized potential. No longings. No impediments. 

4. To say humans need to have a purpose in life doesn't imply that God needs to have a purpose in life, as if God needs something to give his life direction or satisfaction from one day to the next. In classical theism, God isn't that kind of being. 

5. In addition, while the debate is typically framed in terms of what makes life "meaningful," there's more than one concept in play:

There's the question of what, if anything, makes an individual life important. That's distinct from personal fulfillment. Your life can be important even if you're unfulfilled or dissatisfied. 

Is life worthwhile? That's ambiguous. In one respect life is potentially worthwhile, but some people treat the gift of life as worthless because they have nothing adequate to live for. 

6. Is immortality a necessary condition for life to be important? 

7. What makes life fulfilling? What ought to make life fulfilling? If I lose everything I care about, is that fulfilling?

And if what I care about is merely the way my brain was wired by a mechanical process without wisdom or benevolence, is that meaningful? Or is that hollow and arbitrary? 

What makes anything good? Is it just an illusion we project onto an indifferent reality? 

Who's harming homosexuals?

It's hard to think of anything which has done as much harm to homosexuals as religion. #LGBT #atheism #religion

— Secular Outpost (@SecularOutpost) August 26, 2019

Actually, that's easy. By far the greatest harm to homosexuals is the harm they inflict on themselves and each other by a medically and psychologically self-destructive lifestyle. The homosexual lifestyle is suicidal to the homosexual and homicidal to his boyfriends. 

Village atheist of the month award

Wanna know a key difference between religion & science? If we burned every science book in existence, we could experiment & test our way back to the same conclusions. If we burnt every ,Bible, Quran, etc., that information would be lost forever, & you’ll have to invent new gods.

— 𝔸𝕞𝕒𝕕𝕖𝕦𝕤 𝔸𝕝𝕞𝕚𝕘𝕙𝕥𝕪 (@TheophilusPrime) July 12, 2019

The only reason I'm commenting on something this dumb is because Jeff Lowder thought it was worth retweeting. Now Lowder is actually one of the more intellectual atheists, so that shows you how low the bar is.

i) To begin with, this is at best a difference between history & science, not religion & science. So is the invidious comparison a knock against historical knowledge?

ii) Scientists do use historical notices about past sightings of comets, conjunctions, meteors, extinct animals, natural disasters, supernovae, &c. It's a false dichotomy to pit historical knowledge against science. By the same token, it's a false dichotomy to pit religion against science in that regard.

iii) Christianity isn't just based on ancient documents. Throughout church history, Christians claim to experience miracles, angelic apparitions, special providences, answered prayer, &c. Although not every report is credible, the evidence can't be discounted in advance.

iv) If, hypothetically, every Bible was destroyed, then hypothetically, God could miraculously recreate the Bible. So at best, the tweet only works on the assumption that Christianity is false. It creates no presumption that Christianity is false. Unless you already know Christianity is false, the tweet is fallacious, and if you already know Christianity is false, the tweet is superfluous.

Dumb atheist alert

Tonight I stood on guard outside a local mosque for 90 minutes. These are my friends and neighbors. I disagree with Islam as I do with any other religion but I will fight until my last breath for anyone’s right to worship peacefully.

— Dean Murphy (@DeanModified) March 16, 2019

This was retweeted by Jeff Lowder at the Secular Outpost, so he evidently thinks there's something admirable about the gesture of his fellow atheist, Dean Murphy. Maybe this is intended to polish the public image of atheists.

i) Is there any statistical reason to think western mosques in general are danger zones? Are attacks on western mosques prevalent? 

ii) In what sense was he guarding the mosque? Was he packing heat? If he was unarmed, how would an unarmed guard be any match for a well-armed sniper? So isn't this a vacuous feel-good gesture? It doesn't actually protect any Muslims in the mosque. It's just a theatrical stunt. 

iii) Since Muslims are supposed to pray 5 times a day, does Murphy and his fellow infidels plan to guard western mosques 5 times a day, 7 days a week, for the foreseeable future?

iv) Mosques are sometimes used as cover for jihadists to plan terrorist attacks. It's not just about worship. 

v) If devout Muslim immigrants come to power in the west, they will persecute atheists like Murphy. He's a patsy for his sworn enemies.  

Confused comparisons

Any Southern Baptist congregation members care to comment on this? pic.twitter.com/M3Ia4iNWYU

— Dean Murphy (@DeanModified) February 10, 2019

Normally I wouldn't comment on anything this stupid. Atheists say so many dumb things that there's not enough time to comment on even a fraction of their thoughtless output. However, this was retweeted by Jeff Lowder at The Secular Outpost, so he evidently thinks there's something insightful about the comparison. And that reveals something about the level at which the average atheist thinks.

i) I guess the implication of the juxtaposed images is that lay Southern Baptists are hypocritical because they protest homosexual marriage but they don't protest child molestation by priests. Really? How much thought did atheist Dean Murphy put into that comparison?

ii) To begin with, SBC clergy are overwhelmingly straight, so there's no parallel with the RCC.

iii) Likewise, it's not as if SBC laymen have any direct influence over the selection process or behavior of the Catholic priesthood.

iv) The Supreme Court is directly germane to homosexual marriage because 5 justices invented an imaginary Constitutional right for homosexuals to marry each other.

How is that comparable to child molestation by Catholic priests? What is the role of the Supreme Court in that situation?

vi) On the other side is a pic of French demonstrators protesting against homosexual marriage, with a scene of the same street empty.

On the one hand, church attendance in France is about 5%. On the other hand, France has a 10% Muslim population. So what's the imagined connection between Christianity and protesting homosexual marriage in France?

Secular neutrality

On Twitter, Jeff Lowder attempted to respond to my post (unless his tweets are sheer coincidence):

Did you know that “I (the speaker) exist” and “It’s hot on the surface of the sun” are both consistent with nihilism? No one worries about that, so why do some apologists think it’s a big deal that atheism is consistent with nihilism?

For the glaringly obvious reason that logical consistency with the surface temperature of the sun has no bearing on whether human life is important or worthwhile–which is hardly analogous to the logical consistency of atheism with nihilism. 

To take a comparison, suppose I'm a churchgoing member of the Khmer Rouge. Suppose I defend my behavior by saying Christianity is neutral on the Khmer Rouge. It's theologically consistent for a Christian to support or oppose the Khmer Rouge. 

Or suppose I'm a churchgoing Stalinist. I helped Stalin plan the forced famines. Suppose I defend my behavior by saying Christianity is neutral on Stalinism, It's theologically consistent for a Christian to support or oppose policies that starve millions of men, women, and children. 

Would that be "uninteresting"? To the contrary, it would be extremely discrediting. 

While atheism is consistent with nihilism, that fact is uninteresting because an atheist can consistently hold other beliefs which entail that nihilism is false. (Again, atheism doesn’t entail nihilism.)

Aside from the fact that Jeff is begging the question (since it's arguable that atheism does entail nihilism), his response illustrates his persistent blindspot. Is it really uninteresting to say a consistent atheist can be or not be a moral and existential nihilist? 

Suppose we said Buddhism is neutral on nihilism, so that a consistent Buddhist may rape little girls and torture elderly women while other Buddhists may, with equal consistency, disapprove of that behavior. Buddhism is indifferent about raping little girls and torturing elderly women. 

Would that be an uninteresting fact about Buddhism? Or would that be a revealing and disreputable fact about Buddhism?

Sadism and atheism

It never ceases to amaze me many apologists confuse consistency with entailment: they will use words like “nihilism is consistent with atheism” when what they mean is “atheism entails nihilism.” The problem, however, is that the former is uninteresting while the latter is false.

— Secular Outpost (@SecularOutpost) January 31, 2019

i) Jeff doesn't bother to study what his own side is saying. This isn't just a Christian interpretation of atheism, but what many atheist thinkers admit. That's something I've documented in detail.

ii) In addition, I've presented arguments for how atheism entails moral and existential nihilism.

iii) Perhaps Jeff is using "atheism" in the artificial sense of nonbelief in the divine. 

iv) But suppose for discussion purposes that we agree with Jeff. Is it "uninteresting" that atheism is consistent with nihilism? If someone tells me to my face that as an atheist, his viewpoint is consistent with raping little girls or torturing elderly women for fun, that's a very revealing statement. 

Atheists complain that many Americans don't trust atheists. But if atheism is consistent with nihilism, what better reason not to trust an atheist. Would you feel safe sleeping in the same room with someone whose viewpoint is consistent with vivisecting human beings?

"Misgendering"

On Twitter, atheist Jeff Lowder directed the following comments at Christians:

Sincere question for conservative Christians: what is the Biblical case against allowing transgendered persons from transitioning to the gender identity they identify with? What reason(s) do you have which would not also prohibit the correction of birth defects?

I can see how Genesis provides support for a (the?) gender binary, but I don't understand the Biblical basis for condemnation of individuals who wish to transition to the gender they most closely identify with.

It also assumes that pronouns have to be a reference to anatomical sex rather than gender identity. 

Besides, does anyone really think it makes sense to refer to a trans person like Laverne Cox (pictured below) using male pronouns? pic.twitter.com/uVDw90MEW2

i) Even from the standpoint of Protestant epistemology, the case against transgenderism isn't confined to Scripture. God gave us a mind, a world, and five senses. So we can supplement biblical arguments with extrabiblical arguments. 

ii) Does Jeff mean morally prohibitive or legally prohibitive? For instance, some Christians might say it shouldn't be illegal for consenting adults to "transition", but that ought to disqualify them from church membership, church office, military service, &c. 

iii) Conversely, there should be conscience clauses for physicians who disapprove. 

iv) "Transitioning" shouldn't be mandated coverage in healthcare plans, although people can pay extra for extra coverage if they so desire. To make it mandatory compels other  people to subsidize your perversion.

v) It should be illegal for minors to "transition". 

vi) If someone actually suffers from gender dysphoria, hormone therapy, plastic surgery, and/or sex-change operations won't fix that condition, which is psychotic rather than physical. Indeed, "transitioning" aggravates the problem, to judge by suicide rates for those who've "transitioned". So it's not analogous to corrective surgery. 

vii) The distinction between gender identity and "anatomical sex" begs the question. Whether we should grant that dichotomy is the very issue in dispute. 

viii) Unless Jeff is hopelessly uninformed, he ought to realize that this isn't just about letting transgender people "transition", but about radical accommodations. Unisex public bathrooms and locker rooms. "Transgender women" (i.e. biological men) sharing shelters for battered women. Dissenters fined, fired, or imprisoned. Students punished if they "misgender" a classmate. 

ix) Sorry, but the correct term for "Laverne" Cox is "freak". It's demeaning to real women to call a biological man a woman. 

x) Trangender ideology is incoherent:

https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2018/02/20971/

The invisible security guard

Imagine you are a woman who is told your apartment [is] protected by an invisible security guard. An intruder breaks into your apartment and rapes you. The guard is nowhere to be found. You ask the landlord, "Where as your security guard? Either he doesn't exist or is weak or evil or incompetent."

One of your neighbors studies 'invisible scrutiny guard apologetics'. He overhears your conversation. He says, "But if a-guardism is true, there is no security guard. You can't consistently argue against the guard's existence without presupposing his existence."

If you understood why his answer to you completely misses the point, you'll understand why it misses the point for theists to claim that the atheistic argument from evil presupposes theism".

https://twitter.com/SecularOutpost/status/999507572947173376

i) This is a hobbyhorse of Jeff Lowder. His point is that an atheist can deploy the argument from evil even if the atheist denies moral realism. In that case, the argument from evil will take the form of an internal critique. Showing that theism or Christianity in particular is inconsistent on its own grounds.

ii) That's technically true, but there's the question of why a moral nihilist cares about the problem of evil. If there are no epistemic duties, why is it important to disprove Christianity?

iii) In addition, an atheist who deploys the argument from evil assumes a burden of proof. Since he's raising the objection, he shoulders a burden of proof to make an argument. Moreover, he needs to take standard Christian theodicies into consideration, and show how those are wanting. It's up to him to make the first move. It's not incumbent on the Christian to recycle standard Christian theodicies. Since those are already on the table, an atheist needs to build that into his initial formulation.

In fairness, that doesn't mean a Christian apologist has no corresponding burden of proof. But an atheist can't shift the burden of proof onto the Christian by simply exclaiming, "How can an omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent God permit evil!" Atheists are often lazy in that regard.

iv) The parallel is ill-conceived. If you posit that the apartment is protected by an invisible security guard, then that's his sole job, so if the tenant is attacked, then on the face of it "either he doesn't exist or is weak or evil or incompetent." But the comparison breaks down since protecting humans from harm is not God's only job. Unlike the security guard, God may have a number of priorities. So the analogy is vitiated by disanalogies.

v) And even on its own terms, maybe the security guard was sick that day. Maybe his car broke down. Maybe the landlord failed to get a temporary substitute. Or maybe the security guard had a family crisis which took precedence over his day job. Invisibility doesn't make him omniscient, omnipotent, or omnipresent. So that's a very poor example to illustrate the point.

With or without God

So much of #apologetics about the alleged ‘absurdity’ or ‘meaninglessness’ of life without God is nothing more than philosophically elaborate ways of saying ‘I don’t like the idea of life without God.’ #atheism

— Secular Outpost (@SecularOutpost) March 11, 2018

Although this is an example of armchair psychoanalysis, it doesn't refute what I wrote. Now, if I'm wrong, I want to be corrected. Where are the examples of meaning of life apologetics which amount to more than a subjective "I don't like the idea of life without God"? https://t.co/Cx26Y5bJmU

— Secular Outpost (@SecularOutpost) March 22, 2018

Of course, some atheists "don't like the idea of life [with] God". Take Alduous Huxley in Ends and Means:

I had motives for not wanting the world to have a meaning; and consequently assumed that it had none, and was able without any difficulty to find satisfying reasons for this assumption. The philosopher who finds no meaning in the world is not concerned exclusively with a problem in pure metaphysics. He is also concerned to prove that there is no valid reason why he personally should not do as he wants to do. For myself, as no doubt for most of my friends, the philosophy of meaninglessness was essentially an instrument of liberation from a certain system of morality. We objected to the morality because it interfered with our sexual freedom. The supporters of this system claimed that it embodied the meaning - the Christian meaning, they insisted - of the world. There was one admirably simple method of confuting these people and justifying ourselves in our erotic revolt: we would deny that the world had any meaning whatever.

Hyperactive detection device

Humans evolved a Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device (HADD). Most humans seem to be hardwired to believe that agents explain various facts; this tendency seems to include all sorts of invisible agents, including God, gods, ghosts, and so forth. The advance of science has systematically reduced the need to invoke invisible agents, by providing naturalistic explanations for things previously explained by invisible agents.

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/search/active+detection/#GKPrMIWtIPf2VmUJ.99

Why does the the relatively new discipline of cognitive science of religion support the claim that we have a Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD), which causes human beings to naturally form beliefs about invisible agents? Considering HADD’s poor track record of producing true beliefs about invisible agents in general, why should we trust it when it produces a belief about one invisible agent, the God of theism?

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2017/05/15/repost-25-questions-theists/#JeP40MZ9BmIsCxI0.99

i) Jeff states this as if it's a fact, which Christians (or theists) must explain. However, this is just a postulate of evolutionary psychology. Have cognitive scientists isolated and identified a HADD mechanism in the brain? Where in the brain can this device be found? What's the physical structure of this device? 

ii) If they can't locate HADD in the brain, then aren't they guilty of inferring an indetectable cause? But in that event, the HADD postulate is in itself a prime example of hypersensitive agency detection. So the postulate is self-refuting. 

iii) Does HADD have a poor track record? Has scientific progress systematically reduced the need to invoke invisible agents? 

Let's consider some examples of HADD. Forensic scientists who infer a murderer from circumstantial evidence. Inferring that invisible pathogens (bacteria, viruses) cause disease. Inferring that rats carrying fleas carrying bacteria are the cause of Bubonic plague. Inferring that some infections are caused by waterborne pathogens (e.g. cholera, salmonella). Or airborne diseases (e.g. TB). Or radiation poisoning.  

Inferring that some snakes are dangerous due to the chemical composition of venom. Or box jellyfish. Or death by nerve agents (e.g. sarin).  

Inferring that visible objects are composed of invisible molecules, atoms, subatomic particles and energy fields. Inferring that objects fall to earth due to the invisible force of gravity. 

What about inferring that a landscape was produced by invisible past events like erosion and volcanic action? 

What about a farmer who infers that a weasel killed his chickens at night, or wolves killed his sheep at night, based on footprints and bloody remains? 

Jeff might object that some of these factors aren't "agents" in the technical sense of personal agents, but the general principle is the same. Inferring an invisible cause for a visible effect. Is the hypothetical HADD postulate confined to personal agents, or is that just a special case of the general human tendency to trace many outcomes back to invisible factors? Invisible in time, place, or scale? 

If Jeff and other like-minded atheists try to confine the principle to personal agency, that's special pleading. An ad hoc restriction on a general principle to artificially target supernatural explanations while exempting naturalistic alternatives. Jeff has a bad habit of compartmentalizing issues.  

iv) Even assuming that we're hardwired to detect invisible agency, why would that be the case unless it conferred a survival advantage? Wouldn't that be truth-conducive? Isn't that how Darwinians attempt to deflect Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism? 

Sonny Corleone

Recently, Timothy McGrew produced a recommended reading list on Christian apologetics:

http://www.apologetics315.com/2012/09/tim-mcgrews-recommended-apologetics.html

Atheist Jeff Lowder objected: 

I want to make a distinction between genuine inquiry, on the one hand, and partisan advocacy, on the other. Consider a central (but far from the only) topic in the philosophy of religion: the existence or nonexistence of God. Consider, for a moment, what it would mean to engage in genuine inquiry regarding God’s existence. If the word “inquiry” means anything at all, surely it means more than “read stuff which confirms the point of view you already hold.” It should include, at a minimum, reading opposing viewpoints, not with the goal of preparing pithy one-liners for debates, but with the goal of actually trying to learn something or consider new ways of looking at old topics. For professional philosophers, I would imagine that inquiry would also include trying to “steel man” your opposition, i.e., trying to strengthen the arguments for your opponent’s position. It might even include publishing arguments for a position you do not hold and even reject.

In contrast, partisan advocacy is, well, exactly what it sounds like it is. Much like an attorney hired to vigorously defend her client in court, a partisan advocate isn’t interested in genuine inquiry. To the extent a partisan advocate reads the “other side” at all, she does so in the same way presidential candidates try to find out the “truth” about their opponent under the guise of “opposition research.” So, for example, if a partisan advocate were to create a reading list about God’s existence, they would compile a list of recommended resources which either exclusively or overwhelmingly promoted a certain point of view and without even a hint that a balanced inquiry should be taken.

As suggested by the subtitle of this post, if we apply the genuine inquiry vs. partisan advocacy distinction to religion, I think we get the distinction between (an ideal) philosophy of religion vs. apologetics.

Read more at http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2017/08/07/genuine-inquiry-vs-partisan-advocacy-philosophy-religion-vs-apologetics/#I16M50ckua1OmH2D.99

Several issues:

i) Jeff seems to think any such list ought to give both sides of the argument. Certainly there are situations in which that's advisable. No doubt if Dr. McGrew were teaching a college course on philosophy of religion, he'd give both sides of the argument. Have required reading from both sides. 

However, it's unreasonable to think that's a general epistemic obligation. The point of reading both sides of an argument is to take sides. To render an informed judgment. Having arrived at a particular conclusion, it's perfectly appropriate to take your conclusion for granted when making recommendations. Indeed, the point of asking someone like Dr. McGrew for advice is that he can be trusted to do the initial sifting and sorting. 

ii) McGrew's list is obviously for popular consumption. The books are pitched at the level of the layman rather than the professional philosopher. Yes, it's ideal to read the best proponents and opponents of a given position, but you need to take the aptitude of the target audience into account. 

iii) Good books on Christian apologetics do give both sides of the argument. They present the opposing position in order to critique it. It's not as if the treatment is one-sided.

Perhaps Jeff would object that the treatment is biased. It's true that it's often preferable to learn the opposing position direct from the source, rather than filtered through a hostile source. But my immediate point is that it's someone misleading for Jeff to insinuate that if you only read Christian apologetics, you're only exposed to arguments for Christianity and arguments against atheism. A good book on Christian apologetics will also interact with arguments for atheism and arguments against Christianity. 

iv) There is, though, a deeper issue. In terms of inquiry, given limited resources and time-management constraints, where should we invest our time? How do we prioritize? How do we narrow the search parameters? 

One approach is risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis. Take vaccination. That's a precautionary measure. Should I be vaccinated just in case there's an epidemic? The answer depends on counterbalancing the potential harm, benefit, severity, and probability. How dangerous is the pathogen? How likely is an outbreak? Am I in the high risk group for anaphylaxis? Sometimes we do something hazardous because the alternative is even more hazardous. Sometimes what is reckless in one situation is prudent in another. 

Now, the crucial point is that we engage in this deliberation when we don't know the specifics. I don't know if there will be an outbreak. I don't know if I'm in the high risk group for anaphylaxis. But if I wait to find out, it may be too late. I can't afford to learn the hard way. There's too much to lose. If, on the other hand, I have a genetic marker that puts me in the high-risk group for anaphylaxis, then it's more prudent to take my chances with an epidemic.

At this stage of the inquiry, I do the risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis to preemptively eliminate certain options. I don't give those options any further consideration. I don't suspend judgment until I get to the bottom of things, because the whole point is to take precautionary measures in the event of a worse-case scenario. 

v) Apply that to atheism. It isn't necessary for the inquiry to determine whether atheism is true or false. Rather, inquiry would rationally terminate at a preliminary stage. Suppose, if atheism is true, you have everything to lose and nothing to gain. Conversely, if Christianity is true, you have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The purpose of the inquiry is to determine if that's the case. At this stage of the inquiry, the objective is not to determine which position is true or false, but to access the respective consequences of their hypothetical truth or falsity. Moral and existential consequences. Depending on the results, there may be no obligation to pursue our inquiry any further. We stop at the preliminary stage because we ruled out that hypothetical option for reasons that don't even impinge on the truth or falsity of the alternatives. And that can be justifiable. It isn't always essential or obligatory to take intellectual inquiry beyond that preliminary elimination stage. 

vi) Take Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism. That's controversial. The purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether his argument is a success or failure. If his argue fails, then we expand the inquiry to investigate other arguments for or against naturalism. But if his argument succeeds, then that's a logical place to end the inquiry. If naturalism subverts the reliability of reason, isn't that a sufficient defeater? There are many different ways to kill somebody, but once he's dead, it's redundant to employ additional methods. That's literally overkill. How much lead do you need to pump into Sonny Corleone to get the job done? 

"Some Thoughts on the Lowder-Turek Debate"

Prof. James Anderson offers his thoughts on the recent debate between Jeffrey Jay Lowder and Frank Turek.