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Saddam Hussein caught. I wonder if he will now help the Americans find all those atom bombs they buried in the desert last summer - in return for which he will drag out the remainder of his miserable life in a nice war prison with satelite TV while the layers argue over jurisdiction and procedure?
Whatever the case, I bet the resistance with now gather pace. All that has been keeping the lid on things in Iraq was the faint possibility that he might come back. Now he is out of Iraqi politics, all those old men with beards will seem so much more persuasive, and pressure will mount for the Americans to go away.
Call me an old cynic, but this capture may not be quite what was desired....
Before I go, this article in the Spectator by Correlli Barnett is quite sobering reading. Written before the capture of Saddam, it points out that terrorism hasn't exactly slowed down since invading Afghanistan and Iraq.
What is refreshing is his treatment of the fundis as a rational (if not particularly nice) adversary who should be fought as such.
So Saddam has been captured. It's good news for the Iraqis who were persecuted by him and for the Bush family who don't look like such incompetents a second time round. It also is far better than the utter cock up when the Yanks killed Saddam's sons rather than capture them for information. However is it good news for us?
British troops in Iraq are almost all in the south of Iraq around Basra. The majority of the British zone is Shiite. It is also far quieter than the American zone.
Why this is so should be, but isn't, a matter of urgent debate. After all if this situation could be upset then it has the potential to stretch our army to the utmost. When it is addressed at all it is seen to be because our troops are somehow superior to those stupid and insensitive American troops. Now the Yanks do have many stupid and insensitive troops, and compared to our more compact and bijou armed forces it is perhaps not surprising that the stupidity and insensitivity quotients are somewhat higher. The average IQ would decline in ours as well if we had the amount of men under arms that the interventionists imagine that we do.
So is it this intelligence and sensitivity together with our experience in Northern Ireland keeping our sector that much quieter than the Americans? I have my doubts. The American sector is not that much more lively than ours if you take out the Sunni Arab areas. The Kurds and the Shiites in the American zones are just getting on with it. Of course there are some misunderstandings, for example when Kurds want to ethnically cleanse Arabs or when Shiite holy cities get bombed, but we had Fallujah and riots in Basra. The real source of bad things for the Americans has been the Sunni triangle. The very use of the term by the media has been an admission that the real damage on the occupation forces has been imposed almost entirely by a minority of the population. The comfortable official story that the attacks are orchestrated by the largely Sunni Baathists or the entirely Sunni Al Qaeda network is also a recognition of the ethnic imbalance.
Imagine if we had that with the Shia? Would our intelligence and sensitivity manage to keep a lid on things? Perhaps, but I'm not that keen on finding out.
So, what will the capture of Saddam do for the Shia population? Well first off they will be very happy for a couple of weeks. Most observers can agree on that outcome. Most Shia hated Saddam, for good reason. Then, many of the observers believe, they will be grateful to us and keep on co-operating. That's nice. Gratitude is not a well known quality in Middle Eastern politics, in fact it's almost unknown in politics the world over. Although I will be the first to admit that I don't know the intricacies of Arab tribal customs or Shia theology - I simply find it as stupid as the idea that Iraq could be democratic by now, or as stupid as your average neo-conservative public pronouncement on foreign policy.
So let's hope for gratitude but prepare for the Arabs to act like, well, Arabs. What has kept the Shia so relatively co-operative, or at least not fighting to the last cousin as the Sunni do? Perhaps its the fact that they like to be occupied by non-Arabic speaking nominally Christian foreign powers. Or perhaps they, or their leaders, trust us to give them democracy, sovereignty, control over their oil money, the right to bash ten bells out of the Sunnis and other good things. Well do you, dear reader, believe that we will sign up wholeheartedly to the Shia agenda - if we can find out which Shia agenda is the real Shia agenda? Do you think they've forgotten what they regard as our betrayal of the Shia rebellion after the last Gulf War? If you don't think so, why should they?
Perhaps its just not worth the bother. Perhaps we are seen as more ruthless and more desperate and able to pour more armed men in to suppress a rebellion than Saddam was. Perhaps they got fed up after the last rebellion and they think that trusting the authorities, vigorous debate and civil disobedience are now the way to go. Perhaps, but a prudent man wouldn't bank on it.
So what has been there motivation so far? Well let me hazard a guess. Fear. Fear that Saddam may come back like he did last time. Or fear that the Sunnis may come back like they did last time, and every time since the Ottoman Empire first came along. (Parenthetically, do you think that the Shia like hearing all this talk of reconciling the Sunni Arabs with the occupying forces now Saddam has gone? Oh well.) Now arresting Saddam has not removed the fear entirely, after all he could be brought back by the Americans, or his son could come back, or he could escape, or some crazy Western judge could set him free. However this fear, this until now very useful fear, will have been reduced drastically. The man is now in American custody, his supporters have seen him weakened. Even a conspiracist Arab would admit that Saddam is probably (the conditional is deliberate) a spent force. You don't fear a spent force.
That's why I want Saddam kept alive. The very fact that he is alive will give the Shia pause for thought. They know that he would welcome the prospect of returning as a puppet president of Iraq, and although they would be fairly certain that the Americans wouldn't wear it - could they be entirely sure? Of course the fear would be far less than it was last Saturday, but at least we would have some leverage.
But will it be enough fear? I doubt it. Perhaps the Shia will be grateful enough to leave us alone. Perhaps they will see more profit for their agenda of Shia domination of Iraq through co-operating with us. Perhaps they fear their Sunni neighbours enough to prefer us. Perhaps if they do rise, it will be so divided and puny we will not be greatly inconvenienced.
I shall just note that BBC News 24 stated that Saddam was beaten by his stepfather, and from this cruelty, it was just a short step to megalomaniac dictatorship.
Hand him over to the Iraqis since they are willing to put him to death!
Last night, I was attending the Putney Debates where Russell Walters of the Democracy Movement gave a clear and objective talk about the European Constitution (where I shall link to the obligatory Searchlight article warning of the dangers of people like us to the democratic structures of the European Union).
Walters pointed out the centralised and unifying force of the proposed European Constitution, with its dangers to the continued existence of British institutions through powers that allowed further involvement of European law on hitherto domestic policymaking areas such as education, health and social security. Now, a day later, the more immediate threats and possibilities of a ratified Constitution have been postponed for a while.
However, arguments were dominated by a literal reading of the Constitution and the probability of a war if the European Union were to implode under the pressures of absolute economic decline, nationalism and our coming demographic downfall. Whilst the ideological trend towards centralised integration has been consistent, its institutional expression has mutated from Weber's bureaucratic rational state, with power vested in the Commission, towards the institutions of the political elite, the Council of Ministers. With the strengthening of the latter body, the geopolitical struggles that underpin the European Union's policies have become more transparent and more fractious. If the Constitution were to be ratified in some form, its unitary underpinnings would, in the short term, be counterbalanced by the political jockeying of Member States, horsetrading with each other, over political issues. In the longer term, if or when more powers over tax, defence and foreign policy were centralised, this counterbalance could diminish in importance.
Any reading of the European Constitution has to balance what is written with the practical expression of these clauses in institutions and legal practice. The incoherence of the document gives few clues as to whether the immediate trend favoured strong centralisation or indeed promoted the very gridlock it was designed to prevent - a possible outcome. I might add that, at no point, does it adopt the repatriation of powers or more influence for Member States.
We are left with scenarios that debate the dynamic of further integration under the proposed Constitution but agree on the thrust of the ideological programme adopted by D'Estaing and the European Convention.
The final possibility that must be faced is the implosion in violent conflict that accompanies the end of most multinational state structures. Given the history of Europe as the cradle of nationalism, the chances of avoiding a conflict amongst these nations are poor, if the spoils of the state are a source of competition. How fitting that even the possibility of such wars becomes an additional moral resource to oppose the continued existence, in its present form, of the European Union.
The negotiations over the draft of the European Constitution have broken up without agreement. The gap over voting rights, between those who defended their privileges enshrined in the Nice Treaty and the supporters of the new system that increased German influence, could not be bridged.
The initial reaction of European leaders to this development has been to downplay the consequences of the breakdown.
Whilst the current postponement of negotiations is welcome, it is too early to conclude its effect upon long-term trends. The existing structures based upon Nice remain and will be stretched through their accommodation of the new accession countries. Arguments of an inner zone, variable geometry or institutional crisis are speculations that await further events.
This is not the first time in the history of the EU/EEC that countries have failed to agree. So far, this has not led to the withdrawal of a member state or a reversal of the long-term ideological and institutional trend towards integration.
While we probably will be there for ten years, and Iraq probably will be unable to govern itself in that time - this dependence need not detain us in Iraq. The Americans will suffer if they leave Iraq in chaos, but we will not. We are the junior partner - we can leave whenever we like. The Yanks will simply have to fill the vacuum.
Of course the consequential Yankee displeasure may be worse than any withdrawal. However it is the prospect of American displeasure that is the reason for keeping the troops in place. We must not fall under the illusion that Iraq is our show.
The meetings surrounding the draft of the European Constitution have continued. Whilst the 'Big Three' (Britain, France and Germany) agreed upon a provisional form of military headquarters (an acorn or successful sabotage, depending upon your viewpoint), their proposals still require full agreement from every Member State.
The other issue of European defence is the mutual defence pact, suggested by the Italians at the end of November and viewed as anathema by those smaller countries which maintain the myth of neutrality as their foreign policy objective. This has been ditched for the concept of soverien countries assisting each other in the event of armed aggression.
However, Berlusconi was 55% optimistic on Sunday and was in a halfway house on Saturday. Both France and Germany are unwilling to compromise on their demands for voting powers and greater integration, with Chirac describing the critics of the draft constitution as "incoherent".
Jack Straw has repeated the government's position: that a bad Constitution is worse than no Constitution. The anxious moment is this weekend when final negotiations take place and hardline positions give way to compromises in order to achieve that final deal.
On Monday, we could wake up to find the European superstate has arrived or has been definitely postponed.
"There was little time for informed discussion, and even less scope for changes. Large parts of the text passed through without detailed discussions", she writes.
Small details would be strangely absent:
Some members of the secretariat showed particular irritation with my insistence that documents be produced in English. On one occasion a redraft of articles dealing with defence mysteriously arrived just before midnight. They were written in French and the authorship was unclear. Verbal reassurances were given that this was little more than a "linguistically better draft of the earlier English version". The draft was discarded when some of us spotted that references to Nato had mysteriously disappeared".
Yet, for some reason, there is a faint echo of the British Parliament. Another planted article to allow New Labour both possibilities: success or failure.
What would a Brown government look like foreign policy wise? It's a good time to ask this as Blair seems to be (A) amazingly reckless on non-core items of the New Labour agenda such as tuition fees and (B) publicly sickly.
On the second item I am sceptical about how much Blair's actual health has deteriorated. After all he has been incredibly profficient at hiding Leo Blair's avoidance of the single vaccine MMR jab, his use of IVF to conceive Leo Blair and the rather extensive, and free, use of private health resources. If he can keep this stuff secret why are we suddenly hearing so much about stuff that sounds scary but is in fact relatively minor - at least compared to conceiving a child to win seats at the next general election.
After this we leave the realm of facts for that of speculation. Is this a deliberate ploy or just a post-Campbell policy decision to be more honest? Perhaps they think that a Prime Minister's health is more to the point than his children's. Well my theory is that this is deliberate, and it is a ploy. Blair probably intends to keep his promise to resign and let Brown have a fist at being Prime Minister - around about now. However the Great British public may not like the idea of electing Blair and getting Brown. However if Blair had to resign...
So what would Brown be like in foreign policy? In the least important area, our relationship with the third world, he would be worse. He thinks that we should be indulging in transferring our wealth to third world elites in the shape of aid programmes (or he is transferring our wealth). He may also be even keener on implementing pointless environmental treaties (although that's not certain).
In the second most important area, our Special Servitude to America, there will be little difference. Despite the (often skin deep) Atlanto-scepticism of his backers, Brown is as emotionally committed to America as Michael Howard is - and as committed as Blair is to Europe. We are unlikely to give less to, or receive any more from, America. Our boys will still be dying in useless wars.
The most important area is Europe, and Brown will be marginally better. His current, exagerated, Euroscepticism will almost certainly be diluted. For a start he will be out of the traditionally Eurosceptic environs of the Treasury. Secondly, he is not truly as Eurosceptic as he appears to be in contrast to Blair. On the other hand he is no longer committed to Europe in the same way as Blair is. For a start America is no longer as keen on Europe. He also seems to have shown a genuine distaste for the wranglings of Europe, and he is not as capable of self-delusion as his neighbour - he does not think things will improve fast. It will be a marginal improvement, but a marginal improvement is still an improvement.
Sure, the Tories will be better than Brown, but Brown is better than Blair. All those concerned for Britain's independence should be fervently praying for a Brown succession.
Geoff Hoon is meeting Donald Rumsfeld in order to allay US concerns about the fleshing out of the joint defence clauses written into the draft of the European Constitution. As there are 1,000 planners in NATO and 30 in the new planning unit, the ambitions are not yet matched by the embryonic institutional structures being put in place.
On a separate note, the CBI has warned that the proposed Constitution could undermine British industry and security. Energy assets (North Sea oil and gas) could be sequestrated under a European licensing and nationalisation system, sharing these assets to all Member States in a time of crisis.
His [Digby Jones, Director-General of the CBI] deputy, John Cridland, said last night that the energy chapter could allow the EU to take control of energy supplies by giving it the potential right in times of crisis or scarcity to effectively share out reserves.
"It's not that evil people in Brussels want to steal our oil and gas but we should not be signing a treaty with significant uncertainty or ambiguity," he said. The EU could take control of licensing and regulation.
By extension, a crisis in pension provision could lead to the sequestration of private pension assets from countries with a strong asset base.
Alistair Darling made noises. That's another battle lost then.
George Galloway's new way, hoping to unite Islam and the Left, has a predictable message and two agreeable sentiments.
- To withdraw troops from Iraq and to let the people of Iraq decide their own future - Halting the privatisation of essential public services - Defeating the Euro and the proposed European constitution - Protecting and enhancing our environment - The restoration of trade union rights - For equality, tolerance and a multi-cultural society
Initial indications show that the meeting of the EU foreign ministers, negotiating the draft of the European Constitution, achieved institutional agreements that shored up the text. The agreement on defence is detailed below and, in addition, ministers gainedcommon ground on arguments over foreign policy and the structure of the EU Commission.
Due to the removal of sanctions from the Stability and Growth Pact at Franco-German behest, the smaller countries gained their demands of one commissioner apiece, leading to an unwieldy and overpopulated Commission.
The meeting was unable to overcome divisions on overturning the voting powers enshrined in the Nice Treaty with Spain and Poland opposing any dilution of their votes and Germany demanding a greater say as the most populous power in Europe. The Italians suggested postponing the issue for some years without success.
Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of State for Defence, repeated the standard American line that NATO should retain its leadership role within Europe. This was repeated in response to reports during the negotiations over the European Constitution that the "Big Three", the usurpers of Yalta, had concluded their defence agreement.
Blair finally agreed to the Franco-German plan for a military planning unit, outside of NATO, and reportedly consisting of 30 "operational planners". This institution is a strong indication that Blair was willing to concede this battle in return for retaining other powers - no doubt they will be lost later. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard describes this as a
a definitive break with British defence doctrine of the past half century. But British officials hinted that the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, would rewrite the agreement if the US was adamantly opposed.
The response from the United States and NATO was critical, but muted, until they are able to respond to concrete proposals that, as yet, remain under wraps. The details are hazy but indicate that NATO maintains 'first refusal' on participation in any crisis and that the EU has secured the Strasburg option. The military headquarters will be located in SHAPE, or in Cortenburg in Brussels and/or in the military infrastructures of France, Britain or Germany.
To paraphrase Howe, compromising with the British has transformed Franco-German pretensions into an impotent farce. The prospects are that EU defence reforms are essentially neutered under this proposal and the French/Germans will now look to develop military co-operation outside of the auspices of the established European institutions
I must admit that I thought the statements issued by the government on Tuesday were primarily for domestic consumption. However, it is reported today that the redraft of the Constitution, under the Italian Presidency, has removed the national veto from foreign policy and subjected this area to qualified majority voting.
Blair hoped that a clear and simple negotiating stance would deter the more federalist countries in Europe from encroaching upon the "redlines": preserving some freedom of action for Britain and allowing the toytown army to waltz across Iraq under US protection. Already involved in negotiations over the military planning unit with France and Germany and aware that the neutralisation of the Growth and Stability Pact has embittered the smaller countries, Blair has realised that the possibility of a full constitutional text for 2004 is diminishing.
In times of pressured negotiating, the European Union has a fairly successful track record. Most of the Member States do not wish to be considered responsible for the demise of the constitution and they will often make the necessary concessions or compromises to attain the winning post. With reference to Britain, one must ask which of the redlines that Blair has so assiduously publicised will be diluted. The most likely candidate is defence and Hoon's mumblings of downsizing, at the behest of a Brownite Treasury that prefers rancid butter to seized up guns, acts as a portent for the future.
If teh Constitution were to fail, the federalists have already started to make noises about a 'closer union'. The grouping includes France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and possibly the Netehrlands. If they were to develop an integrated model of governance, a European core, this could be advantageous or disadvantageous, depending upon how the institutions of the European Union reacted to this avant-garde. Its existence could either provide a stimulus to those bureaucratic and judicial elements that provide the dynamic for integration and harmonisation within the EU or it might encourage the fissiparous elements to demand the repatriation of powers, the greater use of opt-outs and the practical application of subsidiarity.
By writing this Constitution, the European elites have shown that even the structures, ideology and future of Europe remains a subject of division, argument and possibly failure.
At first, the extraordinary statements emanating from Whitehall seemed to be the latest in a long series of negotiating ploys designed to strengthen Britain's hand in the intergovernmental negotiations over the European Constitution. The defence of the "redlines", placed in The Times and The Daily Telegraph, was designed to shore up perceptions that Blair was not negotiating in Europe on Britain's behalf. It was rather poor spinning from a government that used to pride itself on setting each day's political agenda, since the placement of the statements was obvious and crude.
The primary question was whether these expressions were issued for the domestic political agenda or were they designed to send a message to other countries within Europe. Given the internecine divisions that have dogged the negotiations over the last few weeks, especially as Spain and Poland refuse to give up their voting rights under the Nice Treaty, the possibility of political failure has become a plausible scenario. Blair could be attempting to capitalise on this failure by portraying himself as a dogged defender of Britain's interests, knowing that the chances of further integraton have actually diminished.
The same position was written into Brown's speech, with a similar emphasis on so far and no further to extensions of qualified majority voting, rather than say, further integration:
"We are making clear in these discussions that we are standing up for British interests.
"We have red lines and we are insisting on unanimity for tax, social security and defence."
On the whole, these speeches were for domestic consumption, rather than acting as manifestos for pre-negotiating positions. They were priming the public for the possible failure of negotiations over the European Constitution (rowing the boat back upstream to Nice) and providing an additional patriotic fillip for the beleaguered government whose earlier enthusiasm looks increasingly out of step with political reality.
However, the fact that the government is considering this posssibility must be good news.
President Chirac, Prime Minister Raffarin (enjoying the end of cohabitation) and Prime Minister Blair enjoyed a precentennial summit of the entente cordiale. During their press conference, perceived divisions were replaced by bonhomie and backslapping unity on the issue of European defence.
According to both Britain and France, European defence would complement NATO. Of course in the devil of detail, differences emerge.
Blair was quite clear that European defence would apply to "the limited peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks, but we are actually doing European Defence today in Macedonia and also in Africa."
Chirac had a view of European defence as defence, operationally independent from NATO:
There are operations which need to be carried out by us. It has to be properly prepared, properly led and properly operated. There are national Chiefs of Staff, but we want our defence to be as effective and efficient as possible. We want there to be an organisation, a harmonisation. We do not want overlapping.
Blair still viewed the proposed rapid reaction force as an adjunct to NATO, taking up tasks in areas where NATO was unwilling to deploy its armed forces. Whereas Chirac viewed the new European army as an expression of European unity, contributing to "extra character and extra efficiency".
This press conference showed that both sides had failed in their attempts to bridge the main divide: between the Franco-German desire to create operational armed forces independent of NATO, and the British objective of utilising European forces as a complementary arm of NATO.
Chirac (smiling like a Cheshire cat) was quite clear that a solution would be found through trust:
I have nothing to add. You have raised a number of minor points, which are, of course, important. We will find an agreement on those with our British friends. There is absolutely no doubt about that, for a very simple reason. If we try to work together as partners but do not trust each other then we are likely to fail. When we do trust each other we find a solution. It is as simple as that. We are absolutely determined today to show that there is confidence, and to rid ourselves of mistrust. That is what makes me think that we will find a solution.
One knows that Blair believed him until directed to the light by one of his advisers with a dawning realisation that Chirac may have been indulging the cameras.
Al-Qaeda, to repeat the contributions of many analysts and academics, has become an amorphous beast that is no longer open to strict definition. The original terrorist grouping, with its training facilities and affiliation to the Taliban, has long been dispersed. Now, the term is applied to a large number of terrorist atrocities that are motivated by the ideology of Bin Laden, his cohorts and his trained followers. However, these atrocities are the separate manifestations of groups or franchise operations that achieve success with frightening regularity.
The argument that an upsurge in terrorism has accompanied the aftermath of the conflict in Iraq is sound. However, this upsurge has concentrated on Iraq and has been encouraged by the neighbouring states in order to destabilise the continuing development of the postwar settlement. Disaffected Muslims who adopt the ideology of al-Qaeda provide a strong supply of troops and terrorists for an organised insurgency that has wedded disaffected Sunnis, Ba'athist stalwarts and foreign jihadis into a strong opponent for the Iraqi Provisional Authority.
Al-Qaeda's ideology is based upon fomenting chaos and bloodshed, since these conditions appear to be necessary for the establishment of their khalifah. Their ideological underpinnings have been strengthened by the war in Iraq and the continued western presence in the Middle East. Yet, there may be a case for stating that their support has plateaued and that there is unlikely to be a further radicalisation of existing groups or populations within the Muslim world.
The last two years have seen the creation of a "generation of terrorists". They are buoyed up and renewed by the madressehs that educate their successors but they have not proven adept at extending their political base or converting Muslim states to their particular views (with the possible exception of the Northwest frontier in Pakistan).
Whilst the conditions in Iraq have proved a bloody lesson for Britain and the United States in the capability of Arabs in wedding insurgency and terrorism, this conflict has also, in the longer term, demonstrated the limitations of al-Qaeda's reach.
It has not been lost on the Muslim world that the majority of those killed by al-Qaeda in so many of their brutal suicide bombings have been fellow Muslims.
It is the Muslim states that view Al-Qaeda as the greatest threat to their semi-westernised existence. The terrorists pose a grave threat to any progress made in the Muslim world over the past few years.
The fact that Muslim governments and their citizens increasingly recognise that al-Qaeda�s savage violence endangers their own human rights and their own chances of economic wellbeing and stability just as much as it threatens Western citizens will make them more determined not to give in to this intimidation and to crack down on those responsible for terrorist atrocities and who libel the name of Islam by pretending that they have a religious justification for their crimes.
Authoritarian regimes are beginning to address the social and economic stagnation that provides the fuel for Islamic jihad. However, their culture and their ideological resentment of the West will remain an engine for terrorists in months and years to come. Only by solving the structural impetus of Al-Qaeda can the terrorism be prevented from transmitting its goals and methods to another generation.
This is an old report from the Guardian but it demonstrates the difficulties in reading British foreign policy as it oscillates between the British and European poles.
Energy security is an important issue for governments as medium-term projections demonstrate that dependence upon Middle Eastern oil can only increase. The United States has developed a strong debate upon this issue whereas Europe, with a crisis looming, does not address this serious issue in public.
The United Kingdom is moving towards a strategic partnership with the United States in order to maintain supplies of oil outside the Middle East.
The report to the president and prime minister was written in July by Don Evans, the American commerce secretary, and Spencer Abraham, the American energy secretary. It outlines how the American and British governments have woven together the "separate strands" of their countries' energy and foreign policies in a "frank sharing of strategic analysis and assessments".
The countries have agreed "a set of coordinated actions to help achieve our objectives" across the world.
The big British and American energy companies have been given favoured access to the discussions between the governments, taking part in meetings with officials.
This strategic initiative, known as the US-UK energy dialogue, will focus upon Africa and Central Asia. It is not clear if Britain is aligning itself with the United States because the European Union has not organised an alternative or because Blair has decided long-term strategy will acquire the possibility of greater success in partnership with the United States.