Ben Muse

This blog supports Ben Muse's classes in the Master of Public Administration program at the University of Alaska, Southeast. These classes are Economics for Public Managers and Economics of Public Policy. This blog is for past, present, or prospective students in the classes.

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3/31/2004
 
"Time is money"

Craig Newmark links to evidence that people who make more speed more. Many of the speeders interviewed report that "time is money."

 
Bad law in Virginia

Kevin Brancato (Truck and Barter) posts on Virginia's anti-"price gouging" law. Apparently the law reads (in part),
    "During any time of disaster, it shall be unlawful for any supplier to sell, lease, or license, or to offer to sell, lease, or license, any necessary goods and services at an unconscionable price within the area for which the state of emergency is declared. Actual sales at the increased price shall not be required for the increase to be considered unconscionable."
Apparently inspired by the aftermath of Hurricane Isabel, this would limit price increases following a natural disaster to those justified on the basis of cost increases. Brancato also links to a column on the same topic by Walter Williams. Williams points to the possibility that price controls imposed under this law will impede recovery efforts in a stricken community.

I posted on post-Isabel price-gouging last September (linking to some other useful resources): "The pros and cons of price gouging".

 
Offshore outsourcing has little effect on U.S. jobs?

Kash, at Angry Bear summarizes, and links to, an Institute for International Economics report that finds little offshore outsourcing impact on the U.S. job market: "In general, the report does not turn up any evidence the offshore outsourcing is responsible for significant job losses in any particular industry or occupation."



 
Unfounded fear of competition

Tyler Cowen reports on how and why French auction firms survived the relaxation of barriers to international competition, and the entry of Christie's and Southeby's into the market.

 
The "small state" advantage in Congress

Brian Knight reports on the existence, sources, and efficiency implications of the small state advantage in Congress in a new National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working paper. From the abstract:
    "While representation in the U.S. House is based upon state population, each state has an equal number (two) of U.S. Senators. Thus, relative to the state delegations in the U.S. House, small population states are provided disproportionate bargaining power in the U.S. Senate.

    This paper provides new evidence on the role of this small state bargaining power in the distribution of federal funds using data on projects earmarked in appropriations bills between 1995 and 2003.

    Relative to earmarks secured in House appropriations bills, Senate earmarks exhibit a small state advantage that is both economically and statistically significant. The paper also examines two theoretically-motivated channels through which this small state advantage operates: increased proposal power through appropriations committee representation and the lower cost of securing votes due to smaller federal tax shares. Taken together, these two channels explain over 80 percent of the measured small state bias. Finally, a welfare analysis demonstrates the inefficiency of the measured small state bias."
See "Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power, and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the U.S. Senate" (NBER Working paper w10385).



3/28/2004
 
International trade and externalities

Michael Margolis and Jason Shogren point out ("How Trade Politics Affect Invasive Species Control", Resources for the Future discussion paper 04-07) that international trade itself may be a source of negative externalities. Unpleasant invasive species (think zebra muscles in the Great Lakes) may come in the cargo, or in ship ballast water; the movement of cargo may create pollution externalities; trade activity may provide opportunities for the movement of contraband or terrorists. From the abstract:
    "Trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species including diseases and agricultural pests. Most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally, which constitute a market failure rooted in international trade. Unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero, the external costs may justify a tariff..."
The problem is that in a world with interest groups, and interest group contributions to politicians, "The invasive-species tariff is set higher than it would be if government were independent of rent-seeking contributors." "The informational needs required to distinguish disguised protectionism from legitimate public-goods protection are formidable."

3/27/2004
 
While Suharto was stealing all his money, Indonesia was growing lickety-split

I posted Transparency International's list of top kleptocrats below. Suharto of Indonesia leads the list, allegedly stealing something between $15 and $35 billion. But I also note that Indonesia grew quite a bit under his regime. Indonesia was one of four ASEAN countries that doubled real income per person between 1980 and 1995. (Michael Sarel, Growth and Productivity in ASEAN countries, IMF working paper, 1997).

I'm not familiar with the details of the Indonesia economy during this period, but I wonder if Suharto is an example of one of Mancur Olson's predatory, rent maximizing, 'warlords' ("Creating the wealth of nations") adopting policies that increase the wealth of the nation, in order to increase his take. It's more lucrative to steal from the rich than from the poor.

 
Tyler Cowen buckles on his armor and sallies forth to UNESCO

Cowen appears to be heading over to France for a meeting on cultural diversity.

 
Core Kerry economic team

Louis Uchitelle reports on the key members of Kerry's economic team in tomorrow's New York Times:A Kerry Team, a Clinton Touch.
    "THEY are a motley team, the four members of John Kerry's war room for economic policy.

    Remember Roger C. Altman, the high-ranking Treasury official in the early Clinton years, forced out for being too loyal to his boss in the Whitewater investigation? He is one of them. Gene Sperling, a White House insider in all eight Clinton years, is another. Then there are two less-known 30-somethings: Jason Furman, a Harvard-trained economist... and Sarah Bianchi, who was Al Gore's policy adviser in 2000 and is now Mr. Kerry's. Both got their start in the Clinton White House, as young aides barely out of college...

    ...Even so, the fixes that Mr. Kerry and his core economic advisers are beginning to offer are clearly rooted in Clinton economics, which is resolutely centrist. Fiscal responsibility and deficit reduction, hallmarks of the Clinton years, are bedrock orthodoxy in the Kerry camp, too.

    So is faith in the private sector's powers to generate prosperity. Job creation will come from corporate America, not government, once the right incentives and subsidies are in place, the war room says. In fact, the Clinton-era god of deficit reduction and private-sector supremacy is also worshiped in the Kerry camp...."


3/26/2004
 
Late 20th Century Kleptocrats

Transparency International reports on the top ten kleptocrats of the late 20th Century:
    1. Mohamed Suharto President of Indonesia from 1967-98: US$ 15 to 35 billion
    2. Ferdinand Marcos President of the Philippines from 1972-86 US$ 5 to 10 billion
    3. Mobutu Sese Seko President of Zaire from 1965-97 US$ 5 billion
    4. Sani Abacha President of Nigeria from 1993-98 US$ 2 to 5 billion
    5. Slobodan Milosevic President of Serbia/Yugoslavia from 1989-2000 US$ 1 billion
    6. Jean-Claude Duvalier President of Haiti from 1971-86 US$300 to 800 million
    7. Alberto Fujimori President of Peru from 1990-2000 US$ 600 million
    8. Pavlo Lazarenko Prime Minister of Ukraine from 1996-97 US$ 114 to 200 million
    9. Arnoldo Alemán President of Nicaragua from 1997-2002 US$ 100 million
    10. Joseph Estrada President of the Philippines from 1998-2001 US$ 78 to 80 million"
The list is part of the press release prepared to draw attention to Transparency International's new Global Corruption Report 2004 Brendan I. Koerner explains how Suharto reached the top of his field in Slate: "How Did Suharto Steal $35 Billion? Cronyism 101."

 
Publicly financed stadiums: no net gain

Russell Roberts (at Marginal Revolution) reports on research showing that publicly financed sports stadiums don't tend to produce net economic benefits for the communities that attract them.

3/24/2004
 
Medicare and Social Security Reports released

The trustees of the Social Security and Medicare programs issued their annual reports yesterday. Robert Pear of the New York Times says these show that the fiscal status of the Medicare program has gotten worse over the past year, but that there has been little change in the status of the Social Security program:
    "Medicare's financial condition has significantly deteriorated, partly because of exploding health costs and partly because of the new Medicare law, the government reported on Tuesday.

    In its annual report to Congress, the Medicare board of trustees said the program's hospital insurance trust fund could run out of money before the end of the next decade.

    The trustees have made such projections in the past, but this one was much bleaker than the outlook reported just last year.

    By contrast, the financial outlook for Social Security, though shaky in the long run, changed little from last year..."
The actual reports are here. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) discusses the social security report here.

3/23/2004
 
High gas prices explained

By Lynne Kiesling, here: "Why Are Gas Prices High and Rising?".

 
Pollination and public policy

Andrew David Chamberlain's post, "Of honey bees and apple orchards" surveys the role of honey bees in the history of economic thought with links to papers on pollination markets and the U.S. honey program.

I recommend a stop by Chamberlain's blog, The Idea Shop. It's well written, with lots of original content and enticing links. These posts are little jewels; as compositions, they'll repay study by other bloggers.

 
What can you tell about a state by the assets it exempts from bankruptcy proceedings?

Scheherazade reads the character of a state in the assets it exempts from bankruptcy proceedings.

 
What are we good at?

Will the U.S. be able to compete in a world without trade barriers? Marc Andreessen, developer of the web browsers Mosaic and Netscape, surveys our strengths for John Robb.

I learned about this from Alex Tabarrok at Marginal Revolution who also provides a link to a USA Today column on Andreessen's views.

3/22/2004
 
Being rich isn't what it once was

The share of U.S. wealth in the hands of the top 1% of U.S. persons fell a lot in the twentieth century. Take a look at the trend, as estimated in a new working paper by Wojciech Kopczuk and Emmanuel Saez ("Top Wealth Shares in the United States, 1916-2000: Evidence from Estate Tax Returns")



Figure 2 in Kopczuk and Saez.

The share ranges between 35% and 40% from 1916 to the start of the depression, then falls through the depression years and the world war. After the war, it never rises above 25%, and even appears to fall somewhat during the 1970s. It is stable at about 21-22% during the boom of the 1990s.

What caused these shifts? Kopczuk and Saez have some ideas:
  • The shift from the "high" wealth share before the depression to the "low" level from the world war on may be associated with (a) the collapse of stock values during the depression and (b) the increase in corporate income taxes during WWII. (p 11)

  • The failure of the wealth share to bounce back after the world war may be due to (a) the persistence of progressive income and estate taxes after the world war, (b) the emergence of strong anti-trust policies in the New Deal and their persistence after the war, and (c) post-war "democratization" of higher education contributing "to the emergence of a large middle and upper middle class in America which was able to accumulate wealth and hence perhaps reduce the share of total wealth accruing to the groups in the top percentile." (pgs 18-19)

  • A week or so ago I posted on an analysis of twentieth century income trends in top income groups prepared by Piketty and Saez. The figure I posted showed upward trends in the income shares received by the top 10% and 1% of U.S. income earners in recent years. The figure above shows that this increase in income didn't translate (up to 2000) in an increase in the wealth share for the top 1% of the population. Kopczuk and Saez speculate that (a) there was not enough time during the boom for people to accumulate enough wealth, (b) savings rates for people with high incomes may be lower now than they once were, (c) a larger proportion of high earners may be up there for only a short period of time. (pgs. 16-17)

This time series isn't available from government data sets. Kopczuk and Saez had to estimate this using information from estate tax records and data sets on mortality rates. The paper provides the details and a discussion of potential biases.