Showing posts with label EU. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EU. Show all posts

Tuesday, 29 March 2022

TRIPS Waiver Compromise on COVID-19 Vaccines and Treatments Announcement Coming Soon?

The AIPLA and other IP organizations have issued a joint statement on a tentative TRIPS waiver compromise. On March 15, 2022, Adam Hodge, USTR spokesperson stated, in part:

Since last May, USTR has worked hard to facilitate an outcome on intellectual property that can achieve consensus across the 164 Members of the World Trade Organization to help end the pandemic. USTR joined informal discussions led by the WTO Secretariat with South Africa, India, and the European Union (EU) to try to break the deadlock.

The difficult and protracted process has resulted in a compromise outcome that offers the most promising path toward achieving a concrete and meaningful outcome. While no agreement on text has been reached and we are in the process of consulting on the outcome, the U.S. will continue to engage with WTO Members as part of the Biden-Harris Administration’s comprehensive effort to get as many safe and effective vaccines to as many people as fast as possible.

I wonder how Russia's invasion of Ukraine impacted the consensus building.  The Joint Statement provides:

JOINT STATEMENT ON TENTATIVE TRIPS WAIVER COMPROMISE

Written March 28, 2022

On March 24, AIPLA, along with the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO), Licensing Executives Society International (LESI), Licensing Executives Society USA & Canada, and the New York Intellectual Property Law Association (NYIPLA) issued a joint statement on the tentative TRIPs Waiver Compromise.  Our organizations are concerned by reports that the European Union, India, South Africa, and the United States have reached a tentative compromise on a proposed TRIPS waiver of intellectual property (IP) rights. We strongly support equitable, widespread and successful distribution of vaccines necessary to meet the challenges of COVID-19. However, the proposal currently being reported incorrectly portrays IP as a barrier to production and supply of COVID-19 vaccines. Our organizations know of no evidence to support that IP is such a barrier. In fact, the World Health Organization has stated: “[w]ith global vaccine production now at nearly 1.5 billion doses per month, there is enough supply to achieve our targets, provided they are distributed equitably. This is not a supply problem; it’s an allocation problem.”1 Solving the allocation problem is best accomplished by focusing on improvements to supply chain and distribution issues, rather than by concentrating on the red herring of intellectual property as an alleged barrier. Intellectual property has been critical to the development of technology that has enabled a global COVID-19 response and it continues to fuel efforts to more effectively distribute vaccines and advance other needed technology. We should not undermine our ability to respond to this and future pandemics.

Footnote 1:  See https://www.who.int/campaigns/vaccine-equity (accessed on 18 March 2022).


Monday, 19 July 2021

Rewards for Information on Cyberattacks Paying Off Already?

On July 15, 2021, the U.S. State Department announced that up to $10 million rewards would be provided to informants with information concerning cyberattacks sponsored by or on behalf of foreign governments.  Details of the program can be found here and here.   Notably, today, the White House has announced that the United States and its allies have determined that the Chinese government has utilized contract criminal hackers in cybersecurity hacking involving zero day vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Exchange Server.  The Biden Administration notes generally that:

[United States Department of Justice] imposing costs and announcing criminal charges against four MSS [PRC Ministry of State Security] hackers.

The US Department of Justice is announcing criminal charges against four MSS hackers addressing activities concerning a multiyear campaign targeting foreign governments and entities in key sectors, including maritime, aviation, defense, education, and healthcare in a least a dozen countries. DOJ documents outline how MSS hackers pursued the theft of Ebola virus vaccine research and demonstrate that the PRC’s theft of intellectual property, trade secrets, and confidential business information extends to critical public health information. Much of the MSS activity alleged in the Department of Justice’s charges stands in stark contrast to the PRC’s bilateral and multilateral commitments to refrain from engaging in cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial advantage.

The Biden Administration notes that it “working around the clock” to address cybersecurity issues.  Here are some of the measures the Administration is taking:

  • The Administration has funded five cybersecurity modernization efforts across the Federal government to modernize network defenses to meet the threat. These include state-of-the-art endpoint security, improving logging practices, moving to a secure cloud environment, upgrading security operations centers, and deploying multi-factor authentication and encryption technologies.
  • The Administration is implementing President Biden’s Executive Order to improve the nation’s cybersecurity and protect Federal government networks. The E.O. contains aggressive but achievable implementation milestones, and to date we have met every milestone on time including:

      • The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) convened a workshop with almost 1000 participants from industry, academia, and government to obtain input on best practices for building secure software.
      • NIST issued guidelines for the minimum standards that should be used by vendors to test the security of their software. This shows how we are leveraging federal procurement to improve the security of software not only used by the federal government but also used by companies, state and local governments, and individuals. 
      • The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) published minimum elements for a Software Bill of Materials, as a first step to improve transparency of software used by the American public.  
      • The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) established a framework to govern how Federal civilian agencies can securely use cloud services.
  • We continue to work closely with the private sector to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure. The Administration announced an Industrial Control System Cybersecurity Initiative in April and launched the Electricity Subsector Action Plan as a pilot. Under this pilot, we have already seen over 145 of 255 priority electricity entities that service over 76 million American customers adopt ICS cybersecurity monitoring technologies to date, and that number keeps growing. The Electricity Subsector pilot will be followed by similar pilots for pipelines, water, and chemical.
  • The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued Security Directive 1 to require critical pipeline owners and operators to adhere to cybersecurity standards. Under this directive, those owners and operators are required to report confirmed and potential cybersecurity incidents to CISA and to designate a Cybersecurity Coordinator, to be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The directive also requires critical pipeline owners and operators to review their current practices as well as to identify any gaps and related remediation measures to address cyber-related risks and report the results to TSA and CISA within 30 days. In days to come, TSA will issue Security Directive 2 to further support the pipeline industry in enhancing its cybersecurity and that strengthen the public-private partnership so critical to the cybersecurity of our homeland.

By exposing the PRC’s malicious activity, we are continuing the Administration’s efforts to inform and empower system owners and operators to act. We call on private sector companies to follow the Federal government’s lead and take ambitious measures to augment and align cybersecurity investments with the goal of minimizing future incidents.

Thursday, 18 June 2020

Free Colloquium -- "Technological Progress, COVID-19 and the Future of Globalization"

VIT University Law School in Chennai, India is hosting a Zoom colloquium titled, “Technological Progress, COVID-19 and the Future of Globalization” on June 22 at 6:30 pm Indian Standard Time (6:00 am PST (California); 3:00 pm GMT+2 (Belgium) 9:00 pm GMT+8 (China)). The colloquium participants will offer their preliminary thoughts concerning issues ranging from intellectual property access to vaccine development and manufacturing to investment and the World Trade Organization.  Given the nature of the colloquium, we will not cover all potential issues.  However, a follow-up conference exploring these and additional issues in depth is tentatively scheduled for the Winter of 2020 or Spring of 2021 in Chennai. 

The participants in the Zoom colloquium include: Dean Gandhi Manimuthu (VIT Law); Mark Lemley (Stanford Law); Jim Chen (Michigan State Law); Martin Husovec (Tilburg University); Kirsten Schmalenbach (Univ. of Salzburg Law); Stephan Kirste (Univ. of Salzburg Law); Henrik Andersen (CBS Law); Liu Lina (Xi’an Jiaotong University); Prabash Ranjan (South Asian University); James Nedumpara (Indian Institute of Foreign Trade); Ana Rutchsman (St. Louis Law); Patrick Warto (Univ. of Salzburg Law); and Mike Mireles (Univ. of the Pacific, McGeorge Law).   If you are interested in participating via Zoom, please contact Mike Mireles at msmireles@gmail.com.  There are limited spots available.  Thank you!

Tuesday, 18 February 2020

The Regulation of Technology Companies and Data: Is IP the Answer?


In a Brookings Institute Report titled “How to Regulate Big Tech,” Anwar Aridi, World Bank, and Urška Petrovčič, VP Criterion Economics and Fellow at the Hudson Institute, review the differences between U.S. and EU competition law and the purported impact of those distinctions on EU policy development concerning technology companies and data usage.  Notably, they frame the question for EU policy makers as whether to ease the EU’s regulatory scrutiny over technology companies to develop national champions or to continue existing regulatory scrutiny to develop an even-handed approach (another idea is to ratchet up scrutiny or develop new regulations).  They seem to favor the even-handed approach.  The framing of the issue is an interesting one.  Clearly, China has taken a very different approach that was relatively protectionist in nature.  And, what has happened?  China has fought off U.S. company dominance in their market—many may argue unfairly—and has some powerful and innovative technology companies: Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent. (affectionately or maybe not so affectionately known as BAT in China).  Moreover, China has a platform that is rivaling U.S. platforms in the U.S. market, particularly amongst youth—Tik Tok.  The development of powerful non-U.S. based platforms may be what ultimately leads to increased regulation of all platforms in the United States, including more antitrust enforcement.  However, I question whether incorporating additional values into antitrust analysis, such as national security, will be a good idea. National security as a value in antitrust analysis may be very difficult to cabin-in.  Indeed, there are also other laws available to police national security.  


Dr. Kai-Fu Lee, in his book, “China, Silicon Valley and the New World Order,” makes the case that the battle over artificial intelligence systems and data will be won by China over the United States—the advantage is China’s ambitious and win-at-all costs entrepreneurs that have had to operate in a Chinese system where the weak perish quickly and the Chinese are willing to part with their data.  Is there a way to check behavior that antitrust regulators are having difficulty with keeping up with in the fast-moving technology environment?  Perhaps the answer is private enforcement of intellectual property laws—with those laws structured to protect new entrants, and small and medium-sized companies to deter efficient infringement by large, entrenched companies.  That’s perhaps still too slow.  New state laws to protect privacy interests may be helpful as well—Facebook recently settled a case concerning violation of a state bioinformatic law for around $550 million. 

Tuesday, 27 February 2018

U.S. Antitrust Division Chief Makan Delrahim: Making Patents Great Again?


Makan Delrahim, the leader of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice of the Trump Administration, has made several interesting comments concerning patents and the antitrust interface.  In a recent post on the Patently Obvious Blog, Professor Dennis Crouch discusses some debate concerning Mr. Delrahim’s positions as to when patent holders may create antitrust issues: “[Delrahim] explained that the DOJ’s historic approach has been a “one-sided focus on the hold-up issue” in ways that create a “serious threat to the innovative process.””  Professor Crouch includes links to documents concerning Delrahim’s positions as well as some responses. 

A few days ago, Mr. Delrahim spoke to the College of Europe in Brussels.  His speech is titled: Good Times, Bad Times, Trust Will Take Us Far: Competition Enforcement and the Relationship Between Washington and Brussels.”  Most of the speech concerns the successes of cooperation between the DG Competition and the US DOJ Antitrust Division.  However, he does note some divergence in approach concerning intellectual property:

In the intellectual property area, we each have licensing guidelines; DG Competition’s guidelines were revised in 2014; ours just last year.  Both sets of guidelines highlight the benefits of robust IP protection, the importance of innovation incentives, and the risk that certain hardcore conduct poses to competition.

Intellectual property rights and innovation are topics I have cared about for a long time.  Intellectual property rights are enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, and I believe that strong protection of these rights drives innovation incentives, which in turn drive a successful economy.

A deep-seated concern for protecting incentives to innovate underlies many of the changes in U.S. antitrust law over the past several decades, and it is no coincidence that we have enjoyed a period of staggering innovation over that time.  But in an ever-evolving marketplace, success is not a static outcome.  We must continue to think critically about how best to calibrate our enforcement decisions to promote competition and innovation.

As you may know from what I have said publicly, a particular concern of mine is how we use antitrust enforcement in the context of standard setting.  In particular, I worry that we have strayed too far in the direction of accommodating the concerns of technology licensees who participate in standard setting bodies, very likely at the risk of undermining incentives for the creation of new and innovative technologies.  We continue to better our understanding of this important field.

The dueling interests of innovators and implementers always are in tension, but the tension is best resolved through free market competition and bargaining.  And that bargaining process works best when standard setting bodies respect the intellectual property rights of technology innovators, including the very important right to exclude.  To the extent a patent holder violates its commitments to a standard setting organization, remedies under contract law, rather than antitrust remedies, are more appropriate to address licensees’ concerns.

I am aware that there may be some distance between my position and that of some of my European counterparts.  If that is the case, however, we can look to our long history of effective and productive collaboration for guidance about how to proceed.  I will make every effort to work with our counterparts at DG Competition to narrow any gap between Brussels and Washington in this area.  We must maintain our close dialogue on the cutting-edge issues—innovation, intellectual property rights, and digital markets—that will occupy much of our time in the future. Innovators and consumers in both of our unions deserve nothing less.        

Mr. Delrahim also discussed the purpose of antitrust or competition law, and digital markets:

We also continue to work to narrow the differences between us on policy and substance.  Mr. Kolasky’s speech identified a “sharp divergence” between the EU approach and “the central tenet of US antitrust policy – that the antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors.”  But since those remarks, European Commissioners have again and again affirmed their commitment to the consumer welfare standard.  Starting with then-Commissioner Mario Monti and continuing with Commissioners Neelie Kroes, Joaquin Almunia, and on to Commissioner Margrethe Vestager today, Commissioners have expressed their commitment to the same consumer welfare standard that guides U.S. competition enforcement.  As Commissioner Vestager has stated, “we don’t always do things the same way.  But I think our goals are very similar: We want to protect competition and consumers.”

This is not to say that we have overcome all of the differences between us.  We still do have differences, but we talk about them regularly and respectfully, so that we can understand what motivates them.  

For example, we have not yet closed the gap in the area of unilateral conduct. European competition law still imposes a “special duty” on dominant market players, while we in the U.S. do not believe any such duty exists.

With respect to unilateral conduct, we have particular concerns in digital markets.  We continue to advocate for an evidence-based approach based on existing theories, which are sufficiently flexible to apply to new forms of doing business in the digital economy.  Where there is no demonstrable harm to competition and consumers, we are reluctant to impose special duties on digital platforms, out of our concern that special duties might stifle the very innovation that has created dynamic competition for the benefit of consumers. 

But the benefit of our close relationship with DG Competition is that we can and do talk about these differences, making progress along the way.  For example, in the ICN’s Unilateral Conduct Working Group, we spent significant time working together to develop an Analytical Framework for Unilateral Conduct.  Even though we have different views on how dominant players should be treated, we nevertheless reached agreement on a fairly significant policy document.

Will Mr. Delrahim Make Patents Great Again? 

Tuesday, 5 December 2017

Tide turns in US and EU agencies’ policies on SEP licensing

The new US Department of Justice antitrust leader says antitrust enforcers are too accommodating to IP implementers when in dispute with standard-essential patent owners. Instead, patent owners should be allowed to decide how they want to exercise their property rights: “under the antitrust laws, a unilateral refusal to license a valid patent should be per se legal” – he also reminds us “the right to exclude is one of the most fundamental bargaining rights the patent owner possesses.”

New European Commission guidelines on SEP licensing respect patent owners’ rights to benefit from “fair and adequate return” from “value added of patented technology” contributions and “rewards are needed to continue to invest in R&D and standardisation activities.” Standardised technology “should be available to any potential user of the standard” and “with smooth and wide dissemination of standardised technologies,” but the guidelines do not oblige SEP owners to license to anyone who asks for a license.

This is important news: the new head of the US DoJ antitrust division is reinforcing a trend that shifts the balance between IP rights and antitrust restrictions.[1] But significant harm has already also been done internationally with contagion from prospective or actual policy positions that were previously more hostile or equivocal on IP owners’ rights.  For example, some Asian antitrust agencies have welcomed, for reasons of industrial or protectionist policy, previous attempts in the ‘West’ to weaken rights of SEP owners. Actions have included seeking to reduce royalty returns, imposing chip-based licensing and reducing the availability of injunctions. Getting the Asian authorities also to reverse their positions in IP policy, for example, on antitrust enforcement, is a daunting task.

US U-turns

In a major reversal to the stance of Renate Hesse, the former head of the DoJ’s Antitrust Division, her successor Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Makan Delrahim really hit the nail on the head in his speech at the USC Gould School of Law's Center for Transnational Law and Business Conference in Los Angeles on 10th November 2017 by warning that:
“enforcers have strayed too far in the direction of accommodating the concerns of technology implementers who participate in standard setting bodies, and perhaps risk undermining incentives for IP creators, who are entitled to an appropriate reward for developing break-through technologies.”

He explained that:
“[t]oo often lost in the debate over the hold-up problem is recognition of a more serious risk: the hold-out problem.  Standard setting typically occurs against the backdrop of negotiations between innovators, who develop technologies through private investment and own IP rights, and implementers, who hope to market and use the technology through a license and pay the IP holder a royalty.  The hold-out problem arises when implementers threaten to under-invest in the implementation of a standard, or threaten not to take a license at all, until their royalty demands are met.”

Delrahim went on to opine:
“I view the collective hold-out problem as a more serious impediment to innovation.  Here is why: most importantly, the hold-up and hold-out problems are not symmetric.  What do I mean by that?  It is important to recognize that innovators make an investment before they know whether that investment will ever pay off.  If the implementers hold out, the innovator has no recourse, even if the innovation is successful.  In contrast, the implementer has some buffer against the risk of hold-up because at least some of its investments occur after royalty rates for new technology could have been determined.  Because this asymmetry exists, under-investment by the innovator should be of greater concern than under-investment by the implementer.”

In conclusion, he said:
“Every incremental shift in bargaining leverage toward implementers of new technologies acting in concert can undermine incentives to innovate.  I therefore view policy proposals with a one-sided focus on the hold-up issue with great skepticism because they can pose a serious threat to the innovative process.”

I agree, as I have argued repeatedly. For example, in my August 2016 IP Finance posting entitled "Patent holdup" allegations encourage SEP free-riders, I wrote:
“Whereas alleged “patent holdup” supposedly results in excessive royalties, “patent holdout” is undermining licensors attempts even to achieve FRAND terms or to complete any licensing at all in many cases. Licensors are therefore losing their ability to make a fair return on their investments in SEP technologies. This discourages ongoing investments in standard-essential technologies, participation in SDOs and contribution to the standards.

Free-riders who are not paying for the IP they use are gaining an unfair advantage over other implementers who are paying FRAND royalties as well as stealing property rights from technology developers. There is significant evidence of some infringers flourishing while avoiding paying patent licensing fees on their manufactures and product sales for many years. They can, for example, typically challenge FRAND offers in lengthy litigation before paying any royalties. In some jurisdictions, even the royalties ultimately awarded can be derisorily low. In particular, various Asian OEMs accounting for a substantial proportion of global smartphone sales remain significantly unlicensed for at least some of the many SEPs they implement in the devices they manufacture or sell.”

European Commission also seeks fairer balance in its approach to SEPs

The EC has been pondering SEP licensing policy issues for at least a few years, including an extensive consultation process with workshop discussions. I pitched in a couple of times, myself, here and here. On November 29, 2017, the European Commission issued a Communication to the European Parliament Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents.” Thankfully this strikes a rather better balance, as all the above indicates is required, than some proposals that more resemble the one-sided “clarifications” endorsed by the DoJ’s business review of IEEE’s 2015 patent policy “update,” as discussed below. The guidelines in the EC Communication significantly represent EU policy but they are non-binding.

The EC Communication addresses four areas: transparency on SEP exposure; principles for FRAND licensing terms for SEPs; enforcement of SEP rights (e.g. including injunctions); and open source.

Significantly, with respect to FRAND licensing, the EC is not seeking to prescribe how or where in the value chain SEPs should or can be licensed. In other words, licensors will not be obliged to license at the chip level, whether that might be regarded as a “smallest salable patent-practising unit” or not. The requirement is that standardised technology “should be available to any potential user of the standard” and that there is “smooth and wide dissemination of standardised technologies,” not that any implementer can insist on being licensed.

The guidance that allows “fair and adequate return” from “value added of patented technology” contributions is also consistent with standards developing organisation patent policies such as ETSI’s.  It therefore recognises the need for SEP holders to be incentivised to continue to invest in R&D and their standardisation efforts.

Unsurprisingly, the Communication significantly relies on Huawei vs. ZTE jurisprudence, notably with respect to the fundamental importance of availability for injunctive relief. The Communication also recognises the problem of patent holdout. For example:
“With respect to the security to be provided by the SEP user as protection against an injunction, the amount should be fixed at a level that discourages patent hold-out strategies. Similar considerations could apply when assessing the magnitude of damages.”

Of course, there is an important distinction between the EC as a policy-maker versus the DoJ as an antitrust enforcement agency saying antitrust agencies should back off from imposing or guiding SDO policy. The EC guidance correctly notes that the Communication “does not bind the Commission as regards the application of EU rules on competition.” Such rules are relevant and their application is fact-specific. The Communication clearly establishes that European policy should strive to create fair balance between different interests (and with industry-led solutions), rather than prescribing action and imposing SEP policy through EU antitrust enforcement.    

Policy guidance passé

In marked contrast to all the above, by 2012, the previous head of the DoJ’s Antitrust Division publicly beckoned SDOs to weaken patent owners’ rights with her disregard for considerations of patent holdout. In a 2012 speech entitled Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch she suggested that SDOs include terms in patent policies that make injunctions harder to obtain, restrict cross-licensing and “explore setting guidelines for what constitutes a F/RAND rate.” She also encouraged SDOs to overcome any concerns they might have about antitrust actions against their revised patent policies by “seek[ing] ex ante review through [DoJ’s] business review procedures.” This was presumably to reassure any SDOs that might adopt her proposals would not find adverse antitrust actions being formulated against them subsequently.

A couple of years later, IEEE-SA (responsible for the 802.11 WiFi standard among many others) changed its patent policy in line with some of these proposals; which was duly blessed by DoJ with a Business Review Letter.

The new patent policy, ratified in 2015, was touted as “clarification” and an ”update,” but it actually sets out various wholly new terms that are restrictive and harmful to patent owners. In the face of significant resistance by IEEE members who were technology contributors, and via a highly controversial and secretive process, the new patent policy significantly restricted flexibility in the RAND commitment with the following conditions, the first three of which significantly correspond with the three among Hesse’s six proposals I identify above:
  • SEP holders must waive their rights to seek any injunctions until they have successfullylitigated claims against unlicensed implementers to conclusion in a court of appeals;
  • Reciprocal cross-licensing cannot be required, except for patents reading on the same standard;
  • Royalty charges “should” be calculated based on the “smallest saleable” implementation of any portion of the standard and comport with a reasonable aggregate royalty burden of the relevant standard; and
  •  Only licenses for which SEP holders have relinquished the right to seek, enforce, or even threaten, an injunction can qualify as “comparable licenses” for determining RAND royalties.
The policy “update” also obliged patent holders to be bound by the IEEE RAND commitment to license their patent to any “Compliant Implementation,” meaning that a patent holder making such a commitment cannot opt to license its patents for using the IEEE standards at only certain levels of production.

As indicated by the title of my September 2017 report on the effects of IEEE’s new patent policy, [d]evelopment of innovative new standards [is] jeopardised by [the] IEEE patent policy. Instead of creating greater clarity or transparency of licensing terms (as ‘predicted’ in the IEEE BRL), the patent policy change has actually caused confusion and uncertainty to implementers about licensing terms because nearly half of the major contributors to IEEE standards have been unwilling to pledge their IP under this new and one-sided IEEE patent policy that guts technology value. Up to nearly three quarters of ‘Letters of Assurance’ (LOA) submitted to IEEE by all companies contributing essential technology (i.e. for the 802.11 WiFi standard), are now negative LOAs, which means that the patents identified on those forms are not subject to RAND terms as defined under any patent policy. The unhappy experience of IEEE patent policy change cautions antitrust agencies to be wary of getting involved in IP policies.

Despite the DoJ being an antitrust agency, endorsing the collusive agreement among predominantly licensees to prescribe how and where SEPs are licensed always appeared to me like approving price fixing by a buyers’ cartel. This blow to patent owners’ pricing is exacerbated by the previous total disregard for the plight of licensors subject to patent holdout. Renate Hesse once told me that nobody had alleged collusive price fixing, and that holdout is not an antitrust issue. However, her successor points out that a two-sided approach is required on the issue of patent holdup versus patent holdout, and this is what he had to say about “clarifying” how rates are determined:
“SSO rules purporting to clarify the meaning of “reasonable and non-discriminatory” that skew the bargain in the direction of implementers warrant a close look to determine whether they are the product of collusive behavior within the SSO.”

This two-sided approach is supported by the Europe Court in Huawei v ZTE which established obligations on both parties, non-conformity to which could result in either the possibility of an injunction being granted or the raising of an antitrust defence to defeat a request for an injunction.


Curing and reversing the contagion

The detrimental effect of the patent policy change and supporting BRL is possibly even more severe outside of IEEE standards in some jurisdictions. The 2015 IEEE patent policy change, endorsed by a BRL from the previous DoJ antitrust head, is dangerously serving as a template for antitrust enforcers worldwide – not only with respect to IEEE standards, but also for other standards such as 3GPP’s mobile communications standards. This is like pushing at an open door in nations where antitrust enforcement is being used as an instrument of industrial or protectionist policy to support manufacturing-oriented companies who would like to pay less for the IP they are reliant upon that is developed in other nations, significantly including the US and Europe.

Contributing technology to standardisation efforts and making a FRAND commitment is voluntary. If antitrust agencies construe IEEE’s patent policy as only a “clarification,” and therefore impose it on holders of SEPs to various SDO’s standards the effects could be severe. They might bind patent holders to new conditions that they were never willing and never agreed to accept— for IEEE standards and for other standards. The latter would include standards such as 3GPP’s where some technology developers’ business models, development of standards and their success are much more dependent on payment of royalties than with IEEE standards. 3GPP standards account for much more in total royalties than IEEE standards. Delrahim rightly states that “[w]e should not transform commitments to license on FRAND terms into a compulsory licensing scheme.”

Antitrust agencies including NDRC (China), KFTC (Korea) and TFTC (Taiwan), as well as many other organisations and individuals have been swayed by or receptive to policy positions of US and European government agencies that were against or ambivalent about upholding patent rights in interoperability technology standards including those of many SDOs including IEEE, 3GPP (including regional partners such as ETSI).

Except for IEEE, SDOs have reaffirmed longstanding IP policies that uphold the rights of patent owners. For example, major European SDOs CEN and CENELEC state that SDOs should not provide guidance on, or impose compliance with, FRAND pricing, valuation, and rate-setting methodologies, and they “firmly believe that pricing should be determined by patent holders and implementers outside of SSOs in the context of bilateral negotiations.” 

Notwithstanding strong signs of a reversal of policy at US DoJ antitrust from its leadership, the moderate and balanced position recently announced in the EU supported by strong statements by the European Court, and the overwhelmingly consistent pro-IP position of the SDOs themselves, it remains to be seen if other antitrust authorities can also be persuaded not to pursue policies that undermine the fundamental rights of patent holders and the incentives they have to invest in innovative new technologies that, through contributions to SDOs, can be readily accessed and exploited by all.  

As China and some emerging nations are increasingly becoming SEP innovators as well as implementers, perhaps self-interest might ultimately make these nations recognise that upholding IP rights is in their interests, even in the short term, as licensors themselves, as well as it being in everybody’s long-term interests to maximise development and dissemination of innovative new technologies.




[1] The new trend was already being set by other actions including: (i) dissenting statements of US FTC Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen in the matters of (a) Robert Bosch, (b) Motorola Mobility and Google and (c) Qualcomm; (ii) the CJEU’s judgement in Huawei v ZTE establishing obligations applying to both sides of an SEP-licensing agreement. The European court also stated that the FRAND commitment ‘cannot negate the substance of the rights guaranteed to the proprietors by Art. 17(2) of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.’

Monday, 9 November 2015

More FTAs for the EU -- and here's a chance to have your say

IP Finance has learned that the European Commission is planning to launch free trade agreement negotiations with Australia, New Zealand, Tunisia, Morocco and India in the near future.  In this context the UK Government is conducting its own business survey about existing barriers to trade in these countries [these might include not only the operation of intellectual property rights but issues such as the ability to remit royalties and the manner of their taxation]. Says the UK Intellectual Property Office
"We are very keen to hear from you about challenges you face in these markets. Your responses will help us identify issues thatcould be addressed through trade negotiations, including those related to intellectual property at question 14.  We would encourage you to complete it by Friday 27 November".
Here's the web link to the survey (which is where you will find, inter alia, question 14). 

Tuesday, 21 December 2010

EU Commission on FRAND

Connoisseurs of European Union legislation will be delighted with the latest Commission tome which is imaginatively entitled "Guidelines on the Applicability of Art 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements". This magnificent 94-page opus replaces the 2001 version of the guidelines and will no doubt be welcome Christmas reading to aficionados of EU competition law. The work is dedicated to providing guidelines on "horizontal cooperation agreements", which are defined as being those between agreements entered between actual and potential competitors. The EU appreciates that such horizontal agreements can lead to substantial economic benefits, in particular if the participants in the agreements combine complementary activities, skills or assets. The guidelines are intended to provide indications of safe harbors in which such agreements are or would be valid and would not lead to problems in competition law.#alttext#

Readers of the IP Finance blog may well find the discussion on FRAND commitments in standardization agreements to be highly relevant, since the EU has given some insights into its thinking on how a FRAND definition might operate. The guidelines note that FRAND commitments are designed to ensure that technology protected by intellectual property rights (IPR) are accessible to users on Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory terms (hence the FRAND acronym). FRAND commitments can prevent IPR holders from making implementation of a standard difficult by refusing to license or requesting unfair or unreasonable fees.

The Guidelines notes that the assessment of fees should be based on the economic value of the IPR - which seems highly reasonable and certainly not revolutionary - and several methods are available to make this assessment. The cost-based methods are not well-adapted. The Guidelines states that this is because of the difficulty in assessing costs attributable to the development of the patents or group of patents. In this author's view, the major downside with the cost-based method is the fact that any figures about historic costs obtained bear little or no relevance to the commercial implementation of the IPR.

The Guidelines suggest that one way of assessing FRAND terms would be to compare the licensing fees charged by the IPR holder for the relevant patents in a competitive environment before the industry has been locked into the standard with those charged after the industry has been locked in. This, of course, makes the assumption that the relevant data is available. It's also possible that the relevant patents have, prior to the adoption of the standard, not been licensed. Indeed in some sectors, many IPRs have been developed and filed with the aim of being incorporated into the standard - and those rights may well be dropped if they are not incorporated.

#alttext#Finally the Guidelines suggest that an independent expert assessment be obtained about the centrality and essentiality to the standard of the relevant IPR portfolio. This is the author's knowledge, the most common way of assessing FRAND terms at present. An examination is made about the portfolio in question and its relation to other relevant IPR portfolios. It still fails to address the question of the level of fees. And for this the Guidelines suggest two alternatives: public disclosures made by IPR holders in the context of the standard setting process and/or comparison with the rates levied in other comparable standards. Both methods are currently used in practice and it is good to see the EU Commission giving its "badge of approval" even if it does wand that "nothing in these Guidelines prejudices the possibility for parties to resolve their disputes about the level of FRAND royalty rates by having recourse to the ... courts".

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Wednesday, 16 April 2008

Management of IP in knowledge transfer activities

IP Finance is grateful to guest blogger Professor Ruth Soetendorp for the following piece:

"The European Commission's recent Recommendation on the Management of IP in knowledge transfer activities combines a Code of Practice for universities and other public research organisations a set of practices for public authorities, universities and research organisations to facilitate IP management. It recognises the role IP management plays in achieving the goals of the Lisbon Strategy: circulation of use of ideas in a dynamic knowledge society and enhancing competitiveness and welfare, through converting knowledge into socio-economic benefits. Proper IP management should lead to the growth of 'an entrepreneurial culture and development of associated skills.

While not binding on Member States, a recommendation carries political weight (Wikipedia describes recommendations as instruments of indirect action aiming at preparation of legislation in Member States).

So what's recommended? Institutions should establish and publicise policies and procedures for IP management, raise the IP awareness and skills of students, sort out ownership issues to facilitate crossborder collaborations and knowledge transfer. Member States should designate a national contact point to coordinate KT between research organisations and the private sector, and should ensure widest possible implementation of the Code of Practice, ensuring equitable and fair treatment of all participants in international research projects, particularly re ownership of and access to IPR.

It covers IP policy (and publication/dissemination policy), clear rules for staff and students, incentives, IP portfolios, setting up patent/IP pools, awareness and training to promote IP identification, protection and exploitation. The recommendation (Annex II) also identifies practices to facilitate the implementation of the Code. Member States are expected to inform the Commission by 15 July 2010 and every two years thereafter of measures taken on the basis of this Recommendations, as well as their impact.

The Recommendation is a welcome endorsement of IP education for students, together with enhanced institutional IP management awareness and competence".