NYT: Jamie Raskin--How to Force Justices Alito and Thomas to Recuse Themselves in the Jan. 6 Cases

Congressman Jamie Raskin, in a guest opinion for The New York Times, demonstrates how to force Justices Alito and Thomas to recuse themselves from the Jan. 6 cases.

"The constitutional and statutory standards apply to Supreme Court justices. The Constitution, and the federal laws under it, is the “supreme law of the land,” and the recusal statute explicitly treats Supreme Court justices like other judges: “Any justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The only justices in the federal judiciary are the ones on the Supreme Court." 

To read the full essay CLICK HERE

Trump demands SCOTUS justices step aside

President Donald Trump launched a new attack on the judicial system, targeting the nation’s high court by demanding that two liberal Supreme Court justices recuse themselves from any case involving him or his administration, reported The Huffington Post.

Trump claimed associate justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg couldn’t be fair to him: 

Trump has a history of attacking prosecutors and judges. Earlier this month, he slammed U.S. District Judge Amy Berman Jackson, who presided over the case against longtime Trump ally Roger Stone. Jackson also handled a case that concluded last year against former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort. 

Trump earlier tried to insult U.S. District Judge Gonzalo Curiel, who was born in Indiana, by describing him as a “Mexican.” He also called U.S. District Judge Jon S. Tigar a “disgrace” and an “Obama judge” for ruling against his administration in an immigration case.

Trump’s latest attack seems to be in response to a dissent Sotomayor wrote last week in which she accused the Supreme Court’s conservative wing of being biased toward the administration, saying they’ve been “all too quick to grant the Government’s ‘reflexiv[e]’ requests.” She warned that such actions could “erode the fair and balanced decisionmaking process that this Court must strive to protect.” 

To read more CLICK HERE

GateHouse: Weinstein lawyers try to remove judge for admonishing client

Matthew T. Mangino

GateHouse Media

January 10, 2020

This past week, each morning a feeble looking Harvey Weinstein hobbled into the State Supreme Court building in Manhattan, New York for the start of his much anticipated sexual assault trial.

Celebrity trial aficionados know the routine - aging defendant, in rumpled suit, arm-in-arm with counsel, looking lost and bewildered. Remember the inexplicably “blind” comedian convicted of sexual assault?

Weinstein stands accused in criminal court of the alleged sexual assault of two women. He has been accused of assaulting as many as 70 other women who, by law, cannot pursue criminal charges due to the passage of time.

Harvey Weinstein appears as though he can’t walk without the aid of a walker, which, by the way, has its metal legs inserted into yellow tennis balls.

Monica Hesse, a Washington Post style-columnist, asked “Can you for one second imagine him (Weinstein) showing up with neon tennis balls?” referring to the Golden Globe Awards ceremony, ironically held the night before his trial began.

The trial is merely at the jury selection stage and already the sparks are flying.

The nearly immobile Weinstein apparently still has good dexterity in his hands. On the second day of jury selection, Judge James Burke admonished Weinstein for using his phone in the courtroom - actually two phones. Judge Burke told Weinstein, “Is this really the way you want to end up in jail for the rest of your life, by texting and violating a court order?”

Weinstein had been noncompliant with court’s order not to use cellphones in the courtroom and with court personnel who asked him to put away his phones on at least three occasions.

Social media was abuzz, was this judge biased against Weinstein? Did the judge want to put this feeble 78-year-old man in prison for life for using a cellphone?

Attorneys for Weinstein showed up the next day in court with a request for Judge Burke to hand the case over to another judge. According to the USA Today, the request for recusal alleged that Burke’s scolding reflects “animus” toward the defendant, and has “created a situation in which the Court’s ‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned,’ in violation of New York State’s Rules of Judicial Conduct.”

In New York, the sole statutory authority for judicial recusal is Section 14 of the Judiciary Law. Section 14 provides that a judge who has a financial interest in a case or is a relative of one the parities must recuse herself from presiding over the case - scolding a defendant for violating court rules is not on the list.

The courts in New York have ruled, “Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a Trial Judge is the sole arbiter of recusal. This discretionary decision is within the personal conscience of the court.”

Judge Burke refused to step aside.

There is a long standing doctrine in the law known as the “duty to sit.” The duty to sit encourages judges to hear and decide cases unless there is a compelling reason for recusal.

The duty to sit also discourages litigants from forum shopping - defense attorneys using recusal to find a more favorable judge. The doctrine also makes it difficult for judges to simply recuse themselves from controversial cases. Jeffrey T. Fiut, writing in the University of Buffalo Law Review, explained ”(T)he judge has a responsibility to hear and decide cases, one that should not be shirked for political or personal reasons.”

“There’s nothing prejudicial or inflammatory (about) scolding a defendant,” said Judge Burke. “If using strong or even hyperbolic language succeeds after stern admonishments have failed, then the court has accomplished its goals.”

Weinstein’s feeling are hurt - someone told him “no.” There will be many more distractions as this case moves forward, but the ultimate goal will not change - justice for the accused and justice for the victims.
Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg, Garbett, Kelly & George P.C. His book “The Executioner’s Toll, 2010″ was released by McFarland Publishing. You can reach him at www.mattmangino.com and follow him on Twitter at @MatthewTMangino.

To visit the column CLICK HERE

PLW: U.S. Supreme Court Tackles Series of Criminal Controversies

Matthew T. Mangino

The Pennsylvania Law Weekly

July 15, 2016

The momentum for criminal justice reform, which was so promising in Congress early in the year, has fizzled out.

The Sentencing and Reform Act was to update federal mandatory minimum sentences, among other things.

Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, told RealClearPolitics.com, "I don't see how it gets done before" July 15, referencing the day the senators depart from Washington and won't return until after Labor Day. "It's a real big disappointment to me." After Labor Day there is little chance that anything will get done with the election looming.

As a result, this year any criminal justice "reform" comes the old-fashioned way—through the U.S. Supreme Court. This spring, the court released a flurry of criminal justice decisions, somewhat obscured by titillating decisions on abortion, immigration and affirmative action.

The high court did delve into a couple of jury-related questions, a couple Fourth Amendment cases, sentencing and a corruption decision.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the court's treatment of criminal justice issues, but an examination of a handful of decisions that might be enlightening.

In Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. (2016), decided on May 23, the court reversed a capital murder conviction, finding that the Georgia prosecutors' "two peremptory strikes on the basis of race are two more than the Constitution allows."

Timothy Foster was 18 years old when he was arrested for the murder of a 79-year-old widow and former elementary school teacher. Foster is African-American, while the victim was white. Turned in by his girlfriend, Foster admitted to the crime. But there were questions about his limited-intellectual capacity and whether he had an accomplice.

When the case went to trial all of the black members of the jury pool were removed. Foster's trial came only a year after the court's landmark decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson was intended to eliminate racial bias in jury selection.

The 1986 ruling set up a three-step process for testing complaints about race-based use of peremptory strikes.

First, the accused has to show membership in a specific racial group. Second, prosecutors need to offer nonracial reasons for removing the juror. Third, the judge must decide whether, taking everything into consideration, the defense proved a racial bias.

During jury selection in Foster's case, one black juror was dismissed for cause, and prosecutors eliminated the other four with peremptory challenges, offering a variety of nonracial reasons accepted by the presiding judge.

In 2006, nearly 20 years after his conviction, Foster's lawyers obtained the prosecution team's jury selection notes under the Georgia Open Records Act. The name of each potential black juror was highlighted on four different copies of the jury list and the word "black" was circled next to the race question on questionnaires for the black prospective jurors. Three of the prospective black jurors were identified in notes as "B#1," "B#2," and "B#3."

The high court granted Foster a new trial.

In Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), decided May 31, another capital case, the state put the defendant's future dangerousness at issue and acknowledged that his only alternative sentence to death was life imprisonment without parole. The Arizona high court concluded that the defendant had no right to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed.

In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994), a capital defendant's future dangerousness was at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury was life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The court ruled that the due process clause entitles the defendant to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel.

A Pennsylvania case was prominently among the high court's decisions this spring. In Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. ___ (2016), decided June 9, the court held that due process required that Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice Ronald Castille recuse himself from the capital defendant's post-conviction challenge where Castille had been the district attorney who gave his official approval to seek the death penalty in the case.

The court stated: "Under the due process clause there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant's case." It went on to hold that the justice's authorization to seek the death penalty against the defendant constituted significant, personal involvement in a critical trial decision.

In Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___ (2016), decided June 20, the defendant was stopped along the street without reasonable suspicion. The defendant complied and the officer relayed the defendant's information to a police dispatcher, who reported that the defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. The officer then arrested the defendant pursuant to the warrant. When a search incident to arrest revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, the defendant was charged and convicted.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that the evidence was inadmissible.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The court began by noting that it has recognized several exceptions to the exclusionary rule, three of which involve the causal relationship between the unconstitutional act and the discovery of evidence. "Evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained."

The court also took up an alcohol-testing incident to an arrest for driving under the influence. In Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___ (2016), decided June 23, the court held that while a warrantless breath test of a motorist lawfully arrested for drunk driving is permissible as a search incident to arrest, a warrantless blood draw is not. The court concluded: "Because breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, we conclude that a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving."

The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the political corruption conviction of former Virginia Gov. Robert F. McDonnell.

McDonnell received more than $175,000 in loans and gifts—including a Rolex watch, vacations and partial payment of his daughter's wedding reception from a Richmond businessman.

The gifts did not violate Virginia law, but federal prosecutors alleged that in exchange for the gifts, McDonnell engaged in official acts to arrange meetings for the businessman and hosted a reception at the governor's mansion for a new product launch.

Although Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. tried to distance himself from the conduct of McDonnell, his concern was clear—the term "official acts" could cover almost any action a public official takes.

In McDonnell v. United States, 578 U.S. __ (2016), decided June 27, Roberts wrote, "Conscientious public officials arrange meetings for constituents, contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in events all the time." He continued, "The basic compact underlying representative government assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act appropriately on their concerns—whether it is the union official worried about a plant closing or the homeowners who wonder why it took five days to restore power to their neighborhood after a storm."

In Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. __ (2016), decided May 19, the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee does not apply to the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution. The defendant argued that the 14-month gap between conviction and sentencing violated his speedy trial right. For inordinate delay in sentencing, although the speedy trial clause does not govern, a defendant may have other recourse, including, in appropriate circumstances, tailored relief under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments.

Finally, for those foolish enough to think that reform could somehow be spurred by the U.S. Supreme Court there is Taylor v. United States, 578 U.S. __ (2016), decided June 20. Instead of limiting the federal government's reach in local criminal matters, the court expanded the reach.

As summarized by Scotusblog.com, Taylor holds that, "Because the Hobbs Act criminalizes robberies and attempted robberies that affect any commerce 'over which the U.S. has jurisdiction,' the prosecution in a Hobbs Act robbery case satisfies the act's commerce element if it shows that the defendant robbed or attempted to rob a drug dealer of drugs or drug proceeds."

So much for reform, prosecutors will be further clogging federal prisons with local thugs who prey on local drug dealers. 

Special to the Law Weekly Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg Garbett Kelly & George. His book "The Executioner's Toll," 2010, was released by McFarland Publishing.

PLW: U.S. Justices Take a Look at Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Matthew T. Mangino

The Pennsylvania Law Weekly

March 22, 2016

A few weeks ago, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in Williams v. Pennsylvania, No. 15-5040. Attorneys for Terrance Williams argued that former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice Ronald Castille should have recused himself from a 2014 case involving Williams.

Castille was the district attorney of Philadelphia in 1986 when Williams was sentenced to death. Nearly 29 years later, Castille—then on the state Supreme Court—joined in a unanimous decision reversing a trial judge's decision to reverse Williams' death sentence.

Shawn Nolan, who handles death-penalty appeals in the Federal Community Defender Office in Philadelphia, told The Associated Press before the argument, "It's just not right."

For his part, Castille said, "In Pennsylvania, we leave it up to the judge's personal conscience ... I've always been confident that I can be fair and impartial."

Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court affirmed Williams' conviction and sentence, and he filed three petitions under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, all of which were denied and affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Williams also petitioned for federal habeas relief, which was denied.

On his fourth try for post-conviction relief, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Judge M. Teresa Sarmina, said prosecutors in Castille's office had failed to turn over evidence of the abuse to Williams' lawyer, and she vacated the death sentence five days before Williams was scheduled to be executed.

Williams moved to have Castille recuse himself from this case. He refused and ultimately joined the opinion that reversed Sarmina's decision. Castille, in an opinion laced with withering criticism, suggested Sarmina's court had become "unmoored from its lawful duty" and accused Williams' lawyers of sidestepping procedural rules and "pursuing an obstructionist anti-death penalty agenda."

The Philadelphia District Attorney's Office argued that Castille played only a fleeting part in Williams' prosecution, limited to signing off on the decision to seek the death penalty.

"His signature on that [capital case] memo, in January 1986, was his first, last, and only contact with this case," prosecutors said during oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court.

A majority of U.S. Supreme Court justices voiced concern that Castille participated in the case. Justice Sonia Sotomayor said, "The judge here actually signed his name to the review of the facts and the decision to seek the death penalty."

Justice Elena Kagan indicated Castille should have recused himself because he personally signed off on seeking the death penalty.

"He made the most important decision that could be made in this case," Kagan said.

By deciding to judge the conduct of his own office in a case in which he was personally involved, Castille created a judicial conflict so obvious and so extreme that it violated the due process clause's guarantee of an impartial justice system, wrote Brianne J. Gorod, chief counsel of the Constitutional Accountability Center, on the American Constitution Society website.

"Chief Justice Castille's conduct deeply undermined the integrity of the judicial proceedings and trampled any notion of due process for Mr. Williams," wrote Lawrence J. Fox in an amicus brief filed by the Ethics Bureau at Yale Law School.

Nearly seven years have passed since the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on whether a judge should have recused himself.

The last time the court took up the issue of judicial was in 2009. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, 556 U.S. 868 (2009), West Virginia Justice Brent Benjamin was asked, and refused, to recuse himself in a case in which one of the parties had contributed $3 million to his election campaign. He voted with the majority, in favor of his contributor, reversing a jury verdict.

In analyzing a question of recusal, the court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is "likely" to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional "potential for bias." This unconstitutionally high risk of bias exists where "'experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'"

Applied to the facts of Caperton, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or imminent."

The death penalty, like campaign contributions, can have an impact on the impartiality of the court. Data analyzed last month by Reuters found a strong correlation between the results in death-penalty cases and the way each state chooses its justices.

In states like Pennsylvania where high court judges are directly elected, justices rejected the death sentence in 11 percent of appeals compared to a 26 percent reversal rate in states where justices are appointed, Reuters reported.

Castille has always been a proponent of the death penalty. When he was running for a seat on the state Supreme Court, although prohibited from taking a position on specific issues, he would say, according to The New York Times, "I can certainly say I sent 45 people to death row as district attorney of Philadelphia," adding that voters "sort of get the hint."

In a scathing decision in September 2014, only months before the Williams decision, Castille took the Federal Community Defenders Office to task. "Death-penalty opponents, such as the Federal Community Defenders Office, can then redirect their efforts to the political arena, where they belong," Castille said. "This court has a responsibility for the entire Pennsylvania judicial system, to ensure the delivery of swift, fair, and evenhanded justice in all cases."

Castille wasn't shy about lambasting Williams either as the argument before the high court approached. Castille said, "He [Williams] was actually a male prostitute ... He was prostituting himself for money. This guy he killed was not the most upstanding individual, but he still took the guy's life."

As court observers wait on the high court's decision, it is worth noting that Gov. Tom Wolf has vowed to grant a reprieve to every death-row inmate scheduled for execution in Pennsylvania.

Williams was the first to benefit by Wolf's pledge. Even without the governor's intervention executions are unlikely in Pennsylvania. The state has not carried out an involuntary execution in more than a half century. There has been three executions in Pennsylvania since 1978 and all three men volunteered to be executed.

A decision is expected this summer by the U.S. Supreme Court. •

To visit the PLW CLICK HERE

GateHouse: Supreme Court scrutinizes judicial recusal

Matthew T. Mangino

GateHouse Media

March 4, 2016

On Feb. 29, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in Williams v. Pennsylvania. The Williams case could set new standards for judicial recusals in courtrooms across the country. Convicted murderer Terrance Williams is challenging his death sentence because the district attorney whose office prosecuted his case, Ronald Castille, was chief justice when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned his right to a new sentence hearing.
The issue has become so controversial, a group of former judges wrote a brief on behalf of Williams trying to persuade the U.S. Supreme Court that Castille crossed the line, wrote Tony Mauro of the National Law Journal.
Jeffrey Green, counsel of record on the judge’s brief, said the “distinguished former judges” behind the brief were adamant that “Appellate judges do not operate in silos, and the effect of a biased judge’s participation cannot be reduced to a ‘no harm, no foul’ determination based on vote distribution.” The Williams decision — by the Castille court — was unanimous.
Williams asked Castille to disqualify himself from hearing his appeal. Castille refused, telling the Philadelphia Inquirer before the U.S. Supreme Court argument, “In Pennsylvania, we leave it up to the judge’s personal conscience ... I’ve always been confident that I can be fair and impartial.”
The Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges who “served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated personally and substantially” in a case, to disqualify themselves. According to the National Law Journal, the code also requires disqualification in proceedings in which a judge “served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy” or in which the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
Pennsylvania lawyer Lawrence Fox of Drinker Biddle & Reath told the The Legal Intelligencer in another judicial ethics case in Pennsylvania, “I believe avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as important as avoiding impropriety itself ... [w]e want the public to have confidence in the decisions of the courts.”
The Philadelphia DA’s office argued that Castille played only a fleeting part in Williams’ prosecution, limited to signing off on the decision to seek the death penalty. “His signature on that (capital case) memo, in January 1986, was his first, last and only contact with this case,” prosecutors said during oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court.
A majority of U.S. Supreme Court justices voiced concern that Castille participated in the case. Justice Sonia Sotomayor said, “The judge here actually signed his name to the review of the facts and the decision to seek the death penalty.”
Justice Anthony Kennedy asked Stuart B. Lev, of the Philadelphia Public Defender’s office, “Well, what is the rule, then, that you’re formulating … [r]ecusal is required when, and fill in the blank?” Lev replied, “When the prosecutor has direct personal involvement in a substantial decision in the case, and the issue before the court reflects upon that decision.”
Justice Elena Kagan indicated Castille should have recused himself because he personally signed off on seeking the death penalty. “He made the most important decision that could be made in this case,” Kagan said.
Brianne J. Gorod, chief counsel of the Constitutional Accountability Center wrote, “By deciding to judge the conduct of his own office in a case in which he was personally involved, Castille created a judicial conflict so obvious and so extreme that it violated the Due Process Clause’s guarantee of an impartial justice system.”
Chief Justice John Roberts, suggested to the Philadelphia DA’s office, “I mean, if the individual who should have been recused occupied a dominant role in the discussion and was successful in persuading colleagues and all that — and of course, that’s the sort of evidence you certainly can’t have access to.”
A decision is expected this summer from the high court.

Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg, Garbett, Kelly & George P.C. His book “The Executioner’s Toll, 2010” was released by McFarland Publishing. You can reach him at www.mattmangino.com and follow him on Twitter @MatthewTMangino.

To visit the column CLICK HERE

Ohio Supreme Court Removes Judge from Alleged Serial Killer's Trial

The Ohio Supreme Court has removed Judge Shirley Strickland Saffold from presiding over the case of Cleveland serial killer suspect Anthony Sowell. Attorneys for Sowell accused Judge Saffold of bias as a result of postings about Sowell and one of the defense lawyers on the Cleveland Plain Dealer website.

On April 13th I wrote on this site:

As difficult as it is to believe "commentgate" is becoming more sensational than the actual trial of a serial killer. Anthony Sowell a 50-year-old Clevelander, is accused of killing 11 women whose bodies were found at his home last fall.
The Plain Dealer reported in March that more than 80 comments had been made on Cleveland.com -- an online affiliate of the newspaper -- by someone using an account set up with an e-mail address used by Judge Shirley Strickland Saffold.

According to CNN, a petition to the Ohio Supreme Court filed by Sowell's attorneys alleged that Saffold had "improper," ex parte conversations with the former judge on the case, Timothy McGinty, and a newspaper reporter from The Cleveland Plain Dealer. They also said that e-mails from the judge's personal and office accounts allegedly were sources of information for a March 26 Plain Dealer article and that the judge has a financial interest in the case because she and her daughter have sued the newspaper over the apparent use of her e-mails as sourcing for that article.

Safford responded by insisting she harbors no bias in the case and denying she had any improper conversations about it with others. She also said her civil suit against the newspaper has nothing to do with the case against the defendant.

Acting Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Paul E. Pfeifer disqualified Saffold within days of the petition. Justice Pfeiffer found, "When the case becomes about the judge rather than the facts of the case and the law, it is time for the judge to step aside." Judge Saffold had refused two prior requests to recuse herself.

CNN reported that, "Although Judge Saffold denied that she was the source of these online comments, she has admitted that the comments originated from the online account shared by her and members of her family and that the comments were posted by her daughter," Pfeifer said in his ruling.

He said the "unfortunate postings" impede Saffold's ability to resolve legal issues in the case that would appear to be objective and fair. Pfeifer wrote further, "disqualification is appropriate where the public's confidence in the integrity of the judicial system is at stake."

Sowell's case has been reassigned to Judge Dick Ambrose a former linebacker for the Cleveland Browns.

To read more: http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/04/23/ohio.bodies/?hpt=Sbin

Judge's Comments Land Her in Hot Water

Those "anonymous" comments made on newspaper websites may not be as anonymous as once thought. The Cleveland Plain Dealer recently disclosed the identity of a judge who's e-mail account was used to post comments on the newspapers website. Apparently, some of the comments referred to a high profile case the judge was hearing as well as reference to one of the attorneys handling the high profile case.

As difficult as it is to believe "commentgate" is becoming more sensational than the actual trial of a serial killer. Anthony Sowell a 50-year-old Clevelander, is accused of killing 11 women whose bodies were found at his home last fall.

The Plain Dealer reported in March that more than 80 comments had been made on Cleveland.com -- an online affiliate of the newspaper -- by someone using an account set up with an e-mail address used by Judge Shirley Strickland Saffold.

Some of the online comments related to the high-profile Sowell case the judge was handling, and one comment was critical of Rufus Sims, one of Sowell's attorneys.

Sims has asked the judge to recuse herself from Sowell's case. Prosecutors have asked Sims to remove himself from Sowell's defense. Judge Saffold has sued the Plain Dealer. The defense has subpoenaed the editors of the Plain Dealer to testify against Saffold.

Does anyone in Cleveland remember the 11 dead women and the man accused of taking their lives? A hearing has be scheduled for next week, not to deal with pre-trial motions in the murder trial, but to hear the request for Judge Saffold to remove herself from the case.

To read more: http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2010/04/plain_dealer_editor_and_report.html