Possible Disaster in Baghdad
by Olds88
Tue Feb 13, 2007 at 10:44:29 AM PST
The title of this diary may sound vastly understated, even sarcastic. It isn't meant that way. It is meant as an alarm.
The current escalation in Baghdad might not be just more of the same, might not just be worse, it might be a military disaster. From what I have learned, it seems the elements of a large-scale defeat for US forces could be drawing into place in the city. The result could be hundreds of casualties on top of a failed mission.
Below are my observations drawn from current news reports and study of previous operations in Iraq. If my fears are borne out, the current Baghdad security plan leaves our troops vulnerable to almost every weapon at the insurgents' disposal.
- Olds88's diary :: ::
"People (in America) think it's bad, but that we control the city. That's not the way it is. They control it, and they let us drive around. It's hostile territory." --1st Lt. Dan Quinn, platoon leader, 1st Infantry Division in eastern Baghdad
THE PLAN SO FAR...
Few specifics about the plan have been released except for the AEI's original map which simply showed Army Brigade Combat Teams sprinkled across the districts of Baghdad. It wasn't clear if the troops would be garrisoned on bases in brigade strength (3,500-4,000 soldiers), battalions (800-1,000), or smaller units. If early operations are any indication, the troop deployments will be modeled on a single house in northeastern Baghdad.The Adhamiya neighborhood of Baghdad is the last Sunni enclave on the east side of the Tigris. Despite being only a short car bomb drive from Sadr City, it has stayed Sunni largely because of the presence of US troops. Since August of 2006, an Army company has lived in a house in the neighborhood. They patrol the streets, getting attacked daily from inside the neighborhood by Sunnis or from outside by raiding Shiites. They are a unit of 120 soldiers and they are a long way from friendly forces. When I read about this situation, the first word that popped into my head was, "Alamo." I would never consider using such a cynical term out loud but, hell, that's what the soldiers on the ground are calling it. Its real name is a much more reassuring fort Apache:
[MICHAEL HOLMES, CNN INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENT]: We're with Charlie Company, 126th Infantry, based at forward operating base Apache. Although it's not really a base, it's actually a house. A hundred and twenty men in the middle of probably the city's most dangerous area.
HENDRIX: Some guys call it the Alamo, you know. It's just a house in the middle of Adhamiya. Nobody else around. No other units.
HOLMES: They are fired on regularly by insurgents, both Sunni and Shia. The house shows the scars.
A couple of months ago, insurgents attacked her. Charlie Company killed 38 of them. Around here, something as simple as leaving a house after speaking with the owners requires smoke grenades for cover.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We unfortunately, you know, learn some hard lessons.
HOLMES: Since arriving here in August, Charlie Company has never left, never stopped patrolling, 24/7. They've lost five men, two dozen wounded, and earned a fistful of medals for bravery.
(on camera): Is there a day here where something doesn't happen?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No. No.
Surge author and tin soldier abuser Fred Kagan has bitched that soldiers need to get out of their vehicles and make contact with the residents to quell violence. Since early reports suggest there could be a critical vehicle shortage, that part of the plan seems assured. The situation described above is what they may look forward to.
LITTLE HOUSE ON THE BATTLEFIELD
Another house was recently set up in the ethnically-cleansed Shiite neighborhood of Shaab just northeast of Adhamiya. You may remember the fighting in Shaab and adjacent Ur around February 6th. A Stryker Brigade was clearing an area of insurgents in order to establish a house for a company from the 82nd Airborne. Those soldiers of the 82nd will have a challenging task of winning hearts and minds if this resident's account of the clearing operation is accurate:A resident of Ur said about 10 U.S. Stryker armored vehicles had snaked through her neighborhood but became stuck on a narrow street. Unable to turn around, she said, the first Stryker rammed down the walls of a school and drove through it, followed by the rest of the convoy.
Is it just me? Does that paragraph depict a crystal-clear, multi-dimensional problem of interfacing troops with a high-density civilian population? In the event of an emergency, it is likely that these Strykers will be coming to the aid of troops under attack. Situations like the one above are going to kill civilians and vehicle occupants alike as insurgents attempt to turn tight alleyways into incinerators.
Getting back to the houses: they are officially known as JSSs, Joint Security Stations-- buildings where US and Iraqi troops will work and live together... at least until they don't. US officers won't have authority over the Iraqis-- who will take orders from a separate chain of command. Given the infiltration of Iraq's Security Forces, having them within the walls could be incredibly dangerous. A cynic might see them as an early warning system-- the day they disappear is probably the same day the Mahdi Army is planning to attack. Of course, when they do disappear, they will be taking knowledge of the building's layout, weak points, schedules, ammunition storage, supply levels, etc.
In short, this "Surge" plan will expose US soldiers to every weapon the Shiite and Sunni militias have: snipers, mortars, IEDs, car bombs, but most importantly: supply route interruption.
SUPPLY ROUTES
Research for this diary keeps circling back to the events of April 2004. That month is most vividly remembered for the image of four mercenaries killed and suspended from a bridge and the subsequent siege of Falluja. But it was also the month Sadr's Mahdi Army joined the fighting and took over large areas of the South. During the first half of April, his militia took over Karbala, Kufa, Najaf, and Kut,. The result was one of the deadliest months of the war. What was far less reported was the simultaneous and extremely effective attack on supply routes:The south-north highway, over which all the deliveries out of the main supply hub crossed, was marked with more than 300 bridges. The bulk of these bridges are low, culvert-style structures. Insurgents cut as many as they could in any way possible. They punctured oil pipelines under bridges and set them aflame to inspire a collapse. They detonated explosives to punch ragged holes in the roadway. In one instance, insurgents dissembled a tall bridge spanning a river. They also targeted likely alternative routes. “They effectively shut us down,” he said. “When they took out the bridges ... we lost about seven days. In conjunction, they increased the op tempo in the north, especially in the Fallujah area ... I didn’t sleep for eight days.”
DoD map of attacks on April 7, 2004 (Green arrows are Mahdi Army attacks on cities lining supply routes).While US forces were dealing with critical shortages and resorting to air resupply across the country, Iraq's militias were joining forces. Within days of the uprising, Sadr militia and ex-Baathist-- hated enemies-- were working together in sophisticated attacks as reported at the time:
"The dropping of the bridges was very interesting, because it showed a regional or even a national level of organization," Pittard said in an interview. He said insurgents appeared to be sending information southward, communicating about routes being taken by U.S. forces and then getting sufficient amounts of explosives to key bridges ahead of the convoys.
With occupation forces battling Sadr's Shiite militiamen south and east of Baghdad and Sunni Muslim insurgents to the north and west, the timing of the Iraqis' tactical development is nearly as troubling for U.S. forces as its effect. But the explanation for the change is not yet clear, military commanders said.
Here in southern Iraq, which is overwhelmingly Shiite, U.S. officers say the best guess is that former soldiers who served under President Saddam Hussein have decided to lend their expertise and coordinating abilities to the untrained Shiite militiamen.
"It's a combination of Saddam loyalists and Shiite militias," Maj. Gen. John R. Batiste, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, said in a brief interview here at FOB Duke, where he was reviewing combat preparations.
The generally accepted conclusion to this episode was that the US entered a stand off in Falluja while decisively beating concentrations of the Mahdi Army in the south. While those events did occur, the timing suggests other forces were at work beyond the battlefield. Around the middle of the month, it was reported that Sadr was ready to negotiate. Shortly after, attacks on convoys lessened. At the time, Sadr's willingness to deal was depicted as desperation to avoid the destruction of his militia. But just three months later, he was given his own 32-seat faction in the new Iraqi Parliament and the health, agriculture, transport, and education ministries. Negotiations appear to have gone well.
Regardless of the backdoor machinations, US combat support units had a job to do: move supplies. Their immediate response was additional escorts, fast driving, and emergency airlifts for critical items like ammunition. After April, alternate routes were added, trucks were armored, and supply points were decentralized. While these changes might help on the open road, they are not applicable to delivering supplies over the last mile in Baghdad. Resupplying dozens of JSS buildings will mean either many small, lightly defended convoys or fewer, but larger, convoys snaking their way through the crowded streets of Baghdad.
HELICOPTERS
Coordinated attacks on road traffic would leave the forward-deployed companies at the JSS buildings reliant on helicopters for supplies, reinforcements, and evacuations-- medical or otherwise. Helicopters, as widely reported, are facing increased threats themselves. Al Qaeda in Iraq has claimed it has a newer "Strella" type shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles [they may be referring to the Strella-3 (NATO-code SA-14), or Igla-1 (SA-16) or Igla (SA-18) missiles that can attack aircraft from any side, not just from behind like the easily-confused, heat-seeking Strella-2 (SA-7), of which Iraq has many]. Al Qaeda in Iraq is also claiming the weapons are being made available to all groups regardless of affiliation (I presume they mean only other Sunni groups, though). Whether this is true or not, there has obviously been effective coordination against helicopters. Even worse, most of the recent attacks have occurred outside of the cities. A helicopter attempting to land or hover in order to drop supplies to a house in Mansour or Sadr City would be an extremely easy target even to RPGs (remember Black Hawk Down?).By dividing our forces, the plan not only gives the Sunni and Shiites a chance to attack, it gives them a chance to lay siege.
And most frighteningly, it gives Shia and Sunni an strong incentive to work together again.
CAN THEY WORK TOGETHER AGAIN?
Probably. Despite the ongoing civil war, there are individuals and groups with connections across sectarian lines. On the Shiite side, there is Moqtada al Sadr. His organization provided relief supplies to Falluja during the April 2004 siege-- an act that made him a lot of friends among the Sunnis. His relatively nationalistic outlook and his constant call for Americans to leave Iraq roughly lines up with the priorities of non-al Qaeda groups on the Sunni side. That makes Sadr the man who can determine whether Baghdad waits out the American presence, fights, or lays a trap.At this stage, Sadr's wisest strategy would still be to wait. Whether we leave in 6 months or two years, we are leaving. Despite the ravings of Bush, the Baghdad meat grinder is going to run out of cash and bodies soon enough. Once we're gone, Sadr can ethnically cleanse Baghdad before destroying SCIRI. At that point, it is just a matter of having a giant statue cast for Firdos Square.
The US seems intent on drawing Sadr out though. As I first mentioned in this diary, many of his lieutenants have been captured or killed and several officials have been arrested from ministries he controls. There have also been several strikes within Sadr City in the last few weeks. Provoking Sadr like this makes a limited amount of sense: if you can take him on individually and crush him now, smaller groups would likely refrain from doing the same. Also, a weakened Sadr may lose the the confidence of other groups.
But the greatest danger comes from a coordinated Sunni/Shia planned uprising. If they lay in wait until JSS houses are spread across the city, they could inflict severe casualties at those outposts while paralyzing movement on the roads and in the sky. Eventually, Abrams tanks and Strykers could reach the houses-- but only by cutting wide swaths of destruction trough dense neighborhoods (much like the Stryker path through the school, just miles longer). The mission in Baghdad would be over in many senses: practically, militarily, and morally.
CONCLUSION
The events described here may or may not come to pass. Like Fred Kagan, I am no expert. All I know is what I have read about the situation and how the participants have acted in the past. Our troops will be spread out in vulnerable positions. The Sunni/Shia factions has stopped convoys in the past. They are shooting down helicopters now. Most importantly, they have cooperated jointly in combat before. These are seemingly the perfect conditions for disaster. If theses dangers haven't been addressed, that negligence would be criminal.UPDATE: I just want to make clear that I am not predicting a defeat for the entire US Army in Baghdad. A siege of the airport, for instance, is incredibly unlikely. Specifically, I am saying it appears the Joint Security Stations are too small to provide adequate protection for US forces manning them. If the stations are vulnerable, the soldiers will not be able to provide neighborhood security. An attack could result in needless casualties and failure of the operation's goal. The Army would in no way be swept from the city though.
Still, the most likely outcome is that the factions wait until we leave. It's sad that could be considered a good outcome.
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Steve Gilliard, 1964-2007
It is with tremendous sadness that we must convey the news that Steve Gilliard, editor and publisher of The News Blog, passed away June 2, 2007. He was 42.
To those who have come to trust The News Blog and its insightful, brash and unapologetic editorial tone, we have Steve to thank from the bottom of our hearts. Steve helped lead many discussions that mattered to all of us, and he tackled subjects and interest categories where others feared to tread.
Please keep Steve's friends and family in your thoughts and prayers.
Steve meant so much to us.
We will miss him terribly.
photo by lindsay beyerstein
Taylor Marsh: "The New Sunni-Shiite Cold War"
The Redirection, by Seymour Hersh 
He sure gets the scoops, doesn't he? hmmmm.
Thanks to TAYLOR MARSH for this insightful analysis of Hersh's newest article - THANK TAYLOR!
We can only hope it's a cold war. Seymour Hersh lays it out.
Think Iraq, only imagine the religious, tribal and sectarian carnage expanded
throughout the Middle East. Got that picture? Welcome to Mr. Bush's long-term
plan for the Middle East, pitting Sunnis and Shia in the hopes of allying the
former with Israel to contain the latter.
Today on CNN, Seymour Hersh talked about Iran and his new piece just out on
the realities we're currently facing. He talked about a plan wherein Mr. Bush
will decide to strike Iran and get the job done in what is called a "24
hour package." The strike would be decided, launched and completed within
24 hours. They're cocked and loaded and ready to pull the trigger. Shhhh.
Don't tell Congress. As Hersh also said, "I've been writing the same
story for a year. ..." That's true, but this latest story from Hersh
and The New Yorker has a whole different expanse and complexity to
it. After the revolution of 1979 brought a religious government to power, the
United States broke with Iran and cultivated closer relations with the leaders
of Sunni Arab states such as Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. That calculation
became more complex after the September 11th attacks, especially with regard
to the Saudis. Al Qaeda is Sunni, and many of its operatives came from extremist
religious circles inside Saudi Arabia. Before the invasion of Iraq, in 2003,
Administration officials, influenced by neoconservative ideologues, assumed
that a Shiite government there could provide a pro-American balance to Sunni
extremists, since Iraq’s Shiite majority had been oppressed under Saddam
Hussein. They ignored warnings from the intelligence community about the ties
between Iraqi Shiite leaders and Iran, where some had lived in exile for years.
Now, to the distress of the White House, Iran has forged a close relationship
with the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.
The new American policy, in its broad outlines, has been discussed publicly.
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January, Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice said that there is “a new strategic alignment
in the Middle East,” separating “reformers” and “extremists”;
she pointed to the Sunni states as centers of moderation, and said that Iran,
Syria, and Hezbollah were “on the other side of that divide.”
(Syria’s Sunni majority is dominated by the Alawi sect.) Iran and Syria,
she said, “have made their choice and their choice is to destabilize.”
Throughout his piece, which is a must read, Mr. Hersh neglects one important Iraqi actor, which Mash talked about yesterday: al-Hakim. Interesting that this central figure goes silent here. Hersh is no dummy so it's got to be by design rather than omission. I guess "stay tuned" is about all we can take
from it for now.
Now, about our friends the Saudis.
The key players behind the redirection are Vice-President Dick Cheney, the
deputy national-security adviser Elliott Abrams, the departing Ambassador
to Iraq (and nominee for United Nations Ambassador), Zalmay Khalilzad, and
Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi national-security adviser. While Rice
has been deeply involved in shaping the public policy, former and current
officials said that the clandestine side has been guided by Cheney. (Cheney’s
office and the White House declined to comment for this story; the Pentagon
did not respond to specific queries but said, “The United States is
not planning to go to war with Iran.”)
The policy shift has brought Saudi Arabia and Israel into a new strategic
embrace, largely because both countries see Iran as an existential threat.
They have been involved in direct talks, and the Saudis, who believe that
greater stability in Israel and Palestine will give Iran less leverage in
the region, have become more involved in Arab-Israeli negotiations.
The new strategy “is a major shift in American policy—it’s
a sea change,” a U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel
said. The Sunni states “were petrified of a Shiite resurgence, and there
was growing resentment with our gambling on the moderate Shiites in Iraq,”
he said. “We cannot reverse the Shiite gain in Iraq, but we can contain
it.”
(snip)
Martin Indyk, a senior State Department official in the Clinton Administration
who also served as Ambassador to Israel, said that “the Middle East
is heading into a serious Sunni-Shiite Cold War.” Indyk, who is the
director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution,
added that, in his opinion, it was not clear whether the White House was fully
aware of the strategic implications of its new policy. “The White House
is not just doubling the bet in Iraq,” he said. “It’s doubling
the bet across the region. This could get very complicated. Everything is
upside down.”
The issues swirling around Lebanon are what I've been hinting about recently,
especially on radio, because there has been a "fitna" or civil war
brewing since Olmert screwed up his over the top bombing of Lebanon, and did
it so poorly that it not only emboldened Hezbollah, but left the entire region
believing that Israel has a baffoon at the top. Olmert proved that not only
was he incapable of understand military issues, but he didn't have the spine
to back down once his blunder was exposed. This has left Lebanon vulnerable
to all sorts of realities. More from Hersh:
In an interview in Beirut, a senior official in the Siniora government acknowledged that there were Sunni jihadists operating inside Lebanon. “We have a liberal attitude that allows Al Qaeda types to have a presence here,” he said. He related this to concerns that Iran or Syria might decide to turn Lebanon into a “theatre of conflict.”
(skip forward)
Nasrallah accused the Bush Administration of working with Israel to deliberately
instigate fitna, an Arabic word that is used to mean “insurrection and
fragmentation within Islam.” “In my opinion, there is a huge campaign
through the media throughout the world to put each side up against the other,”
he said. “I believe that all this is being run by American and Israeli
intelligence.” (He did not provide any specific evidence for this.)
He said that the U.S. war in Iraq had increased sectarian tensions, but argued
that Hezbollah had tried to prevent them from spreading into Lebanon. (Sunni-Shiite
confrontations increased, along with violence, in the weeks after we talked.)
Americans need to read up. This is getting very confusing for your average citizen, even for those who follow these things. The players are planning on the run to solidify turf, coupling with anything but the usual suspects, as they play with regional dynamite. It's one thing to want to move players around when enjoying a game of Risk, ala Dick Cheney. It's quite another to do it by throwing Israel and the Saudis together while Iraq is on boil.
So here is where we stand today. Iraq is in play, with the Saudis freaked out
about ethnic cleansing and a Shia crescent, while the U.S. ratchets up tensions
with Iran, who is linked in a swath of power from Iran to Lebanon, with Israel
getting more nervous by the day and the Saudis offering up all the cash they've
got to make certain that the Shia power is balanced with Sunni force, actually
dipping their diplomatic toes into a relationship with Israel, all the while
the United States agitates the situation, even though our influence in the region
has plummeted, giving the Shia and the Iranians a leg up. Got that? ...and that's
only the short version.
Now, getting out of Iraq won't begin to solve the challenges Mr. Bush and Dick
Cheney have put into motion. The Sunni-Shiite cold war is on, but it's doubtful
that any of these players will blink.
- posted by Taylor Marsh
Labels: Hersh, Iraq, Shia, sunni
Nikkos: "Why Sy Hersh is Wrong (just this once)"
Labels: Bush Iraq, Hersh, Negroponte, Shia, sunni
Spot The Arab (by their style of doorway)
Thanks to NIKKOS who contributed this great piece on Sy Hersh - THANKS NIKKOS!
Hersh's latest piece in the New Yorker is as terrifying as usual. Among
other things, it posits a shift (the "redirection" of the article's title)
in the Bush administrations' strategy in the Middle East, specifically, an
explicit decision to support Sunnis rather than Shia. If true, this would
represent a stunning reversal in alliances, considering it was the
virulently Sunni Al Qaeda that attacked the U.S. on 9/11 and that the U.S.
is currently fighting a counter-insurgency war against Sunnis in support of
the Shia Maliki government in Iraq. However, for anyone that's been watching
the unfolding disaster which is the Bush administration, these sorts of
vertigo-inducing paradoxes are par for the course.
As usual, it's hard to tell if these are acts of stupidity, strategy or
desperation. The mind reels and grasps for a "logical" explanation, a
narrative which can impose some semblance of order upon the chaos which Bush
and his cronies seem to foment everywhere they traipse. And it is here where
I think Hersh- or more accurately and fairly, his sources- get it wrong.
They get it wrong because they seek to make to make sense out of what the
Bush administration is doing, when there is, literally, no sense to be made
of the situation. Or, to use a favorite phrase of the President, "in other
words," what's going on here is not a rational re-alignment of alliances and
interests in the pursuit of some rational goal- democracy, peace and
stability in the Middle East, for instance. Rather, as has been amply
documented, the Bush administration believes in "constructive chaos" in the
Middle East; that is, the belief that, phoenix-like, a modern Middle East
can emerge only from the flames of destruction. Therefore, conflict is to be
embraced, not feared, for it is only through conflict that the Middle East
can be reborn (though there may be some "pangs," as Condi pointed out).
When viewed in this context, then, Hersh's reporting makes more sense: it's
not that we are switching sides; we're merely making sure both sides are
properly armed and that as a whole, the region is left perpetually
off-balance and unable to respond with any unity to the increasing hegemony
of the United States. The increased tempo of this destabilization may in
fact be part and parcel of an impending military strike against Iran- what
better way to blunt a unified Middle Eastern response than to make sure the
locals are busy fighting each other? Heck, it's just like in the good ol'
days when we armed Saddam on the one hand and clandestinely armed the
Iranians on the other. (Interestingly enough, Iran-Contra is back in the
news, with reports that Negroponte stepped down from DNI in order to go to
State precisely to avoid another Iran-Contra-like debacle which he saw
brewing.)
So, yes, it IS a redirection- but not the kind Sy Hersh's sources envision.
- posted by Nikkos
Ft. Apache
Labels: baghdad, Iraq, Iraqi Army, Shia, sunni
The war at home
Fabrizio Costantini for The New York Times
The Islamic Center of America in Detroit was
vandalized in January.
Iraq’s Shadow Widens Sunni-Shiite Split in U.S.
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR
Published: February 4, 2007
DEARBORN, Mich. — Twice recently, vandals have shattered windows at three mosques and a dozen businesses popular among Shiite Muslims along Warren Avenue, the spine of the Arab community here.
Although the police have arrested no one, most in Dearborn’s Iraqi Shiite community blame the Sunni Muslims.
“The Shiites were very happy that they killed Saddam, but the Sunnis were in tears,” Aqeel Al-Tamimi, 34, an immigrant Iraqi truck driver and a Shiite, said as he ate roasted chicken and flatbread at Al-Akashi restaurant, one of the establishments damaged over the city line in Detroit. “These people look at us like we sold our country to America.”
Escalating tensions between Sunnis and Shiites across the Middle East are rippling through some American Muslim communities, and have been blamed for events including vandalism and student confrontations. Political splits between those for and against the American invasion of Iraq fuel some of the animosity, but it is also a fight among Muslims about who represents Islam.
Long before the vandalism in Dearborn and Detroit, feuds had been simmering on some college campuses. Some Shiite students said they had faced repeated discrimination, like being formally barred by the Sunni-dominated Muslim Student Association from leading prayers. At numerous universities, Shiite students have broken away from the association, which has dozens of chapters nationwide, to form their own groups.
“A microcosm of what is happening in Iraq happened in New Jersey because people couldn’t put aside their differences,” said Sami Elmansoury, a Sunni Muslim and former vice president of the Islamic Society at Rutgers University, where there has been a sharp dispute.
Though the war in Iraq is one crucial cause, some students and experts on sectarianism also attribute the fissure to the significant growth in the Muslim American population over the past few decades.
Yeah, I guess that idea of fighting them over there didn't work so well. They're now fighting each other over here.
All fall apart
VACATED Sunni areas in the Baghdad
neighborhood of Mansour began emptying
out six months ago. Many businesses have
closed down on this once-bustling shopping street.
It Has Unraveled So Quickly
By SABRINA TAVERNISE
Published: January 28, 2007A PAINFUL measure of just how much Iraq has changed in the four years since I started coming here is contained in my cellphone. Many numbers in the address book are for Iraqis who have either fled the country or been killed. One of the first Sunni politicians: gunned down. A Shiite baker: missing. A Sunni family: moved to Syria.
I first came to Iraq in April 2003, at the end of the looting several weeks after the American invasion. In all, I have spent 22 months here, time enough for the place, its people and their ever-evolving tragedy to fix itself firmly in my heart.
Now, as I am leaving Iraq, a new American plan is unfolding in the capital. It feels as if we have come back to the beginning. Boots are on the ground again. Boxy Humvees move in the streets. Baghdad fell in 2003 and we are still trying to pick it back up. But Iraq is a different country now.
The moderates are mostly gone. My phone includes at least a dozen entries for middle-class families who have given up and moved away. They were supposed to build democracy here. Instead they work odd jobs in Syria and Jordan. Even the moderate political leaders have left. I have three numbers for Adnan Pachachi, the distinguished Iraqi statesman; none have Iraqi country codes.
Neighborhoods I used to visit a year ago with my armed guards and my black abaya are off limits. Most were Sunni and had been merely dangerous. Now they are dead. A neighborhood that used to be Baghdad’s Upper East Side has the dilapidated, broken feel of a city just hit by a hurricane.
The Iraqi government and the political process, which seemed to have great promise a year ago, have soured. Deeply damaged from years of abuse under Saddam Hussein, the Shiites who run the government have themselves turned into abusers.
Never having covered a civil war before, I learned about it together with my Iraqi friends. It is a bit like watching a slow-motion train wreck. Broken bodies fly past. Faces freeze in one’s memory in the moments before impact. Passengers grab handles and doorframes that simply tear off or uselessly collapse.
I learned how much violence changes people, and how trust is chipped away, leaving society a thin layer of moth-eaten fabric that tears easily. It has unraveled so quickly. A year ago, my interviews were peppered with phrases like “Iraqis are all brothers.” The subjects would get angry when you asked their sect. Now some of them introduce themselves that way.
I met Raad Jassim, a 38-year-old Shiite refugee, in a largely empty house, recently owned by Sunnis, where he now lives in western Baghdad. He moved there in the fall, after Sunni militants killed his brother and his nephew and confiscated his large chicken farm north of Baghdad. He had lived with Sunnis his whole life, but after what happened, a hatred spread through him like a disease.
“The word Sunni, it hurts me,” he said, sitting on the floor in a bare room, his 7-year-old boy on his lap. “All that I have lost came from this word. I try to avoid mixing with them.”
“A volcano of revenge” has built up inside him, he said. “I want to rip them up with my teeth.”