Showing posts with label Trade Dress. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Trade Dress. Show all posts

Saturday, February 11, 2012

Trade Dress Protection does not Prevent a Competitor from Copying your Product

[Post by Mark Borghese]

When a competitor makes an identical copy of your product, but sells the copy-cat product under a different brand name, do you have any recourse? What if your product and the competitor's product are so close they look as if they came from the same mold? Is that enough to sue?

Unless you have a utility patent, or some of the copied portions are artistic or ornamental, the answer is almost always no.

In the United States, utility patents are the only way to protect functional elements of a product. Over the years, litigants have made many attempts to protect product engineering with something other than a utility patent with very little success. Often, when a competitor duplicates a product there is no patent claim (because a patent was never granted), no trademark claim (because the product is sold under a different brand), and no copyright claim (because nothing artistic was copied). Often the only possible intellectual property claim left is "trade dress" which refers to the visual appearance of a product or its packaging that signals to consumers the product's source. But not just any visual appearances are entitled to trade dress protection. Only non-functional visual appearances count. This means something artistic or arbitrary in a product's design or packaging.

In Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Construction ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. 2012), one of the Plaintiffs, Tractel, Inc., manufactures and sells the Tirak traction hoist pictured below.



These type of traction hoists typically raise and lower swing stage scaffolding platforms on large buildings like this one sold by Tractel.



During a tradeshow in Las Vegas, Tractel saw a Chinese competitor, Jiangsu Shenxi Construction Machinery Co. ("Jiangsu") exhibiting a competing product that looked strikingly similar to Tractel's product.


Tractel sued the Chinese competitor in the District of Nevada alleging trade dress infringement. When discovery closed, both parties moved for summary judgment. The presiding district judge, James C. Mahan, ruled in favor of the Defendants. Judge Mahan found there was no trade dress infringement as all of the claimed "trade dress" served a functional purpose.

Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which upheld Judge Mahan’s ruling. The Ninth Circuit held:

Tractel's hoist is . . . a utilitarian machine with no indication that the visual appearance of its rectangular exterior design is anything more than the result of a simple amalgamation of functional component parts. Absent are any indicia of arbitrary or fanciful design. "To uphold a finding of infringement here . . . would suggest that the general appearance of almost any unpatented product rarely if ever could be copied faithfully. That is not the law." Leatherman, 199 F.3d at 1011. The form of Tractel's hoist follows its function, making the hoist a classic example of "de jure" functionality. We affirm the district court’s determination that Tractel did not present evidence sufficient to create a triable issue as to the nonfunctionality of its claimed trade dress.

Tractel attempted to argue that the overall exterior appearance of its product was non-functional due to its "cubist" and "modern" look and feel. The Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments. In fact, the court found Plaintiff's arguments to be nothing more than semantic trickery.

It is not enough to say that the design portrays a "cubist" feel—so does a square table supported by four legs. The fins may be attractive but they serve a functional purpose. And the cube-shaped gear box is simply housing. Except for conclusory, self-serving statements, Tractel provides no other evidence of fanciful design or arbitrariness; instead, here, "the whole is nothing other than the assemblage of functional parts, and where even the arrangement and combination of the parts is designed to result in superior performance, it is semantic trickery to say that there is still some sort of separate 'overall appearance' which is non-functional."

What Tractel really lacked in this litigation was evidence that any of its customers viewed the design of Tractel’s hoists as non-function or a source identifier. The Ninth-Circuit noted that one of Tractel’s customers testified that everything about the hoist design is functional.

[T]he entire design is predicated on function from what I've seen, and again as with most hoist manufacturers, every element on there is critical to the design otherwise they wouldn’t waste the money or the weight which again comes back to the weight is the key component. So in my opinion every element on there is important to the function.
The Ninth Circuit found that Tractel's other witnesses were just as unpersuasive.

From its own witnesses, Tractel at best offered either unsupported or conclusory claims about the design. Fatal to its claim was the testimony of its own witnesses who honestly laid out the functional nature of the design. Lacking was any evidence, like engineering notebooks or testimony from the designers, about design or aesthetics. Even more devastating was the testimony of third-party witnesses called by Tractel who laid bare the claim of nonfunctionality. For example, they testified that the fins play an important function of dissipating heat and are not for aesthetics. Likewise, the shape of the hoist is practical because it fits in confined construction sites and it is "more efficient and more compact" than some of the other hoists on the market.
Trade dress protection claims -- especially unregistered trade dress protection claims -- are notoriously difficult to prove. And, as the Ninth Circuit held here, impossible to prove without evidence that the design elements are non-functional.

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About the author
Mark Borghese is a Las Vegas entertainment law attorney with the law firm of Borghese Legal, Ltd.

Thursday, December 9, 2010

Home Depot Seeking to Stop Other “Depots” (But Not For the Reason You Think)



Last Friday, the companies behind the nationwide hardware store chain The Home Depot (and the chains’ intellectual property assets) – Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. and Homer TLC, Inc. (together “Home Depot”) – filed two lawsuits last week (one in California and one in Florida) against companies operating under names which incorporate the terms The and Depot.

In the case filed in California, Home Depot sued Nimasara Industries, Inc. which purportedly does business under the name The Box Depot. See Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. and Homer TLC, Inc. v. Nimasara Industries, Inc. d/b/a The Box Depot, Case No. 10-cv-09300 (C.D. Cal. December 3, 2010) (complaint here). In the case filed in Florida, Home Depot sued a company doing business as The Beer Depot. See Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. and Homer TLC, Inc. v. The Beer Depot, Case No. 10-cv-24299 (S.D. Fla. December 3, 2010) (complaint here).

At first glance, these appear like cases where Home Depot is attempting to protect its “Depot” brand from being diluted from third party use of the same “depot” moniker in connection with some other product or service (reminds me of the slew of non-toy related businesses that adopted the “R Us” business moniker after Toys R Us made it so famous in connection with toy stores).

Of course, if this was the case, a quick look at the list of trademarks currently registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that follow the same “The ____ Depot” pattern is quite extensive and raises questions about Home Depot’s ability to claim that names which incorporate the terms “The” and “Depot” are likely to be associated with Home Depot when a term other than “Home” is used in between.

Most notably, Nimasara Industries, the company sued by Home Depot, is the assignee of a trademark registration for THE BOX DEPOT (registered in 2003). In addition, here are several other registered marks for various goods/services:
However, upon closer review of the details of each complaint, it becomes clearer that that the real basis of Home Depot’s trademark infringement claims is not so much about the terms “THE” and “DEPOT” per se, but rather the use of such words in a stylized lettering that resembles the blocked stenciled-style lettering used by Home Depot in its logo and/or the use of such words in connection with an orange color scheme that Home Depot claims infringes on its trade dress rights.

Home Depot describes these trade dress rights in one of its complaints as a “distinctive orange color scheme . . . used in and on its stores and in connection with the use of THE HOME DEPOT and THE HOME DEPOT & Design marks. This distinctive Orange Trade Dress includes the use of orange signage, stripes, lettering, and labels throughout its stores and on its building exteriors, as well as in its promotional materials.” Indeed, Home Depot even has a trademark registration for the “color orange” in connection with many goods and services described specifically as “The mark consists of the color orange used as a background for advertising, promotional materials, signage, and labels.”

In the Beer Depot complaint, the crux of the dispute appears to be that Beer Depot is displaying the name THE BEER DEPOT “in blocked stenciled-style lettering utilizing an orange color scheme, the natural effect of which is to make Defendant's usage of 'The Beer Depot' name and trade dress as close as possible to Homer TLC's famous Marks and imitate Homer TLC's Orange Trade Dress, evidencing an intent to trade on Homer TLC's goodwill by creating consumer confusion.” While I was unable to find the Google advertising referenced in the complaints (and chose not to download the exhibits), there was one photograph (link here) taken by Derick Glancy and posted on his Flickr page that shows what likely concerns Home Depot. Beer Depot has never responded to Home Depot’s cease and desist letters.

In the Box Depot complaint, once again, Home Depot’s complaint appears to be the use of a logo similar to Home Depot’s logo and the use of other “orange trade dress.” Specifically, Home Depot claims that Box Depot is operating “its business in a building with an orange stripe around the upper exterior perimeter. Defendant's name, both on Defendant's building and in Defendant's ‘The Box Depot’ logo, is displayed in blocked stenciled-style lettering utilizing an orange color scheme. The natural effect of these elements in combination is to make Defendant's usage of its ‘The Box Depot’ name, mark and dress as close as possible to Homer TLC's famous Marks and imitate Homer TLC's Orange Trade Dress, evidencing an intent to trade on Homer TLC's goodwill by creating consumer confusion.” The PDF of the complaint does contain the exhibits showing the alleged infringement, but as they are in black and white (and not very clear scans), one cannot really tell about the use of orange coloring although the use of blocked stenciled-style lettering is apparent – and it is a style that Box Depot had not previously adopted in its registered logo (pictured below). Indeed, the very fact that Home Depot is not seeking to cancel Nimasara’s current registration in its complaint shows that Home Depot is more concerned about Nimasara’s use of “The” and “Depot” in connection with an orange color scheme, rather than the words themselves.

[Hmm...did you ever have one of those blog posts that you get started on, spend way too much time on, and then you aren't sure how exactly to wrap it up eloquently? Did I mention The Homo Depot?!]

Saturday, October 31, 2009

Weekly Wrapup of Nevada District Court Trademark Lawsuits

It was a busy week for trademark related lawsuit filings in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada (and not a single one of them filed by me).

Price Products, LLC v. Juvenile Solutions, Inc., Case No. 09-cv-02067 (D. Nev. October 27, 2009) (Complaint).
The owner of the DRIPSTIK ice cream/frozen treat holder (pictured above) sues for trademark and trade dress infringement over a knockoff product sold under the name FUN STIK by former Canadian distributor Petite Creations through Petite’s American distributor, Juvenile Solutions. Price Products discovered the products being marketed by Juvenile Solutions at an exhibitor’s booth at the ABC Kids Expo held on September 13-16, 2009, at the Las Vegas Convention Center (which is the only reason why an Idaho LLC is apparently suing a California corporation in Nevada district court).





M Holdings, LLC et al v. Hu Mei Lei, Case No. 09-cv-02071 (D. Nev. October 27, 2009) (Complaint) (Las Vegas Sun Article).
Las Vegas’ newest hotel and casino, The M Resort, files cybersquatting action against Chinese resident Hu Mei Lei over the website wwwmresort.com registered September 5, 2009, and purportedly featuring “provocative images of women” initially and changed thereafter to a typical pay-per-click landing page with links to discount hotel websites.


Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Ryska et al, Case No. 09-cv-02093 (D. Nev. October 29, 2009) (Complaint) (Las Vegas Sun Article).
Rolex sues Las Vegas residents Angelika Ryska and Robert Mayer for counterfeiting over their sale of “replica” Rolex® watches through their website moreaffordable4u.com.


Mellow Beverage Co., LLC v. Nounna et. al, Case No. 09-cv-02090 (D. Nev. October 29, 2009) (Complaint) (Las Vegas Sun Article).
A company which sells a “relaxation and sleep aid” beverage under the unregistered trademark MELLOW (pending trademark applications here and here) filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against Shannon N. Nounna and Beverage Concepts, Inc. over a similar type of relaxation beverage using the name MELLOW (pictured below) (pending trademark application here) that Beverage Concepts is apparently launching soon.


CityCenter Land, LLC v. Papillon Airways, Inc. et al, Case No. 09-cv-02088 (D. Nev. October 29, 2009) (Complaint) (Las Vegas Sun Article).
The owner of the massive CityCenter project in Las Vegas is seeking a declaratory judgment that its proposed use of the name PAPILLON (pending trademark applications here and here) for one of CityCenter’s high-end retail stores located at CityCenter’s 500,000 square foot retail complex called “Crystals at CityCenter” does not infringe on the trademark rights of Papillon Airways, Inc. and Monarch Enterprises, Inc. which use the PAPILLON mark in connection with helicopter and bus tour services.

On September 3, 2009, Papillon Airways’ counsel sent a cease and desist letter to CityCenter, citing Paillion Airways’ trademark registration for PAPILLON for various goods and services (e.g., bumper stickers, clothing, helicopter and bus tour services) and claiming that CityCenter’s use of PAPILLON (logo version pictured above) is likely to lead consumers to believe there is an affiliation with Papillon Airways’ goods and services. CityCenter’s response is that Papillon Airways misrepresents the scope of its rights to the PAPILLON mark, which is always used in connection with “Grand Canyon Helicopters” (as pictured below), and thus the second claim for relief for misrepresentation.


Aloha Medicinals, Inc. v. Birkdale Medicinals, Inc., et al, Case No. 09-cv-00639 (D. Nev. October 29, 2009) (Complaint).
A convoluted lawsuit involving claims by Aloha Medicinals, a manufacturer of dietary supplements for people and pets, against former authorized distributor Birkdale Medicinals and one of its officers, Anthony “Tom” Peters, arising from Birkdale Medicinals’ apparent relabeling of Aloha Medicinals’ products to make it appear as if the products were Birkdale Medicinals’ own branded products. There are also claims relating to use of Aloha Medicinals’ copyrighted website, clinical and technical data for Aloha Medicinals’ products (used by Defendants as data for their products), using Aloha Medicinals’ unregistered trademarks as metatags and Google Adwords, and intentional misrepresentation regarding broken promises over special packaging provided by Aloha Medicinals to Birkdale Medicinals.

Friday, May 22, 2009

Cartier files (and later withdraws) trademark lawsuit against Apple over “Fake Watch” iPhone App

Trademark litigation watchers are well aware of Cartier's aggressive protection of its “TANK” line of watches (created by Louis Cartier in 1917, who was supposedly inspired by the Renault tanks that Cartier saw during World War I). I previously wrote (link here) about one such lawsuit Cartier filed against Donna Karen.

So it probably came as no surprise when news came out today (reports here and here) that Cartier had filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against Apple Inc. alleging that an iPhone app named Fake Watch infringed Cartier's trademark and trade dress rights associated with Cartier's Tank watches.  [Update: the complaint can be viewed here (HT: Marty Schwimmer)]

The Fake Watch app (made by a company named Digitopolis Co. and available for downloading on Apple's online iTunes store) displays the time using an image of "look-alike famous wristwatches" (one of which apparently looks like Cartier’s TANK watch).


Cartier claimed that Apple’s "use of Cartier's Tank mark and Cartier's trade dress and proprietary designs is likely to cause consumers to believe that Cartier's and defendant's goods originate from the same source."

But by the end of the day, reports surfaced that Apple had removed the app from iTunes and Cartier’s lawyer issued a statement that Cartier would be withdrawing the lawsuit (WSJ report here).

If only all trademark disputes could be settled this quickly.

[Update: Ron Coleman presents his thoughts about what is really going on behind the scenes with respect to this filed and later withdrawn complaint by Cartier.]

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

“Smiley” Cookie Owner Brings More Frowns With Another Trademark Infringement Lawsuit

I previously blogged (link here) about the trademark infringement lawsuit brought by Eat N' Park Hospitality Group (“Eat 'N Park”) against The Clever Cookie Corp. over the latter company’s sale of cookies that Eat 'N Park claimed were “confusingly similar” to its federally registered smiley face design for cookies (pictured above). This lawsuit – filed in 2007 and technically dismissed for want of prosecution only to be refiled by Eat 'N Park again on June 26, 2008 (see Eat ‘N Park Hospitality Group, Inc. et al. v The Clever Cookie Corp., Case No.08-cv-00886 (W.D. Penn)) – remains pending.

Well, Eat 'N Park is at it again. On February 26, 2009, the company filed a similar trademark infringement lawsuit against a New Jersey-based online company named Forget-Me-Knot Gifts (“FMK”) over its sale of “Smiley Face” cookies. See Eat ‘N Park Hospitality Group, Inc. et al. v Forget-Me-Knot Gifts, Case No. 09-cv-00255 (W.D. Penn.). A copy of the complaint can be found here.

Based on what could be found on their website, FMK appears to sell smiley face cookies as part of their business of selling gift baskets and cookie bouquets.


Forget-Me-Knot Gifts'
Get Well Basket and Cookie Bouquet

FMK may have already decided that it does not want to fight the lawsuit – the links where its smiley face cookies appear all indicate that “SORRY, THIS GIFT IS CURRENTLY NOT AVAILABLE. We are redesigning this gift...please check back for new version.”

And while it’s sad that a company like Eat ‘N Park can stop a small business like FMK from using a universally recognized design like the smiley face on a cookie (and the company isn’t even Franklin Loufrani of SmileyWorld fame), who can blame them for not wanting to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars just to defend its right to use the design – with very little chance of recovering any attorney’s fees even if FMK were to prevail.

But let’s see Eat ‘N Park go up against the victor of Loufrani v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Opposition No. 91152145 (TTAB Filed July 23, 2002). [Interesting Sidenote: When I typed “SmileyWorld” into the GOOGLE brand search engine, Eat ‘N Park’s website came up as a sponsored link. Looks like Eat ‘N Park has purchased Mr. Loufrani’s mark as a Google adword. I guess Eat ‘N Park has no problem trading off the goodwill that has been built up by the self-proclaimed king of all Smileys.]

Thursday, February 19, 2009

Article Spotlights VitaminWater Trade Dress Enforcement


Law.com posted an article (link here) regarding the trade dress enforcement efforts undertaken by Energy Brands, Inc. (d/b/a Glacéau), the company behind the fruit-flavored “enhanced” water VitaminWater which was purchased by Coca-Cola in 2007 for $4.1 billion. The article describes the efforts by the company’s legal team in aggressively going after competitors that try to imitate VitaminWater's bell-shaped water bottles with their two-toned labels (pictured above).

Glacéau is currently seeking to register its VitaminWater bottle with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). Glacéau received a registration for the bottle label. However, Glacéau’s application to register the actual bottle design (filed June 24, 2008) has been preliminarily refused by the PTO on the basis that the product packaging is functional and thus incapable of serving as a source identifier and furthermore on the basis that the packaging is not inherently distinctive. The PTO is currently only willing to register the wording and design on the label (which Glacéau already has).

With Coca-Cola’s trademark legal team supporting it, I would expect a significant response to the PTO’s action by Glacéau arguing that its bottle design is not functional and that product packaging is inherently distinctive (or alternatively, Glacéau can prove acquired distinctiveness based on its strong marketing efforts to date – after all, if Coca-Cola was willing to pay $4.1 billion for the company, it must have been doing something right).

Anyone care to make any predictions on whether Glacéau will prevail? One thing I could not have ever predicted – consumers would pay good money for flavored sugar water. Isn't this just bottled Kool-Aid?

Monday, February 9, 2009

Archway Cookies Sues Voortman Cookies for Trade Dress Infringement

The Charlotte Observer had a story today on a trade dress infringement lawsuit filed last week by Charlotte, North Carolina based cookie company, Lance Mfg LLC, and Archway Bakeries, LLC –– the owner of the Archway Cookies brand and purchased by Lance out of bankruptcy in December –– against Ontario, Canada-based Voortman Cookies Ltd. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. See Lance Mfg LLC et al v. Voortman Cookies Limited, Case No. 09-cv-00044 (W.D.N.C. Filed February 6, 2009).

Since 2005, Archway has used a red-and-gold plastic packaging for its best selling oatmeal and oatmeal-raisin cookies. Apparently in the last few weeks, Voortman began selling its oatmeal and oatmeal-raisin cookies in a very similar red-and-gold packaging. Archway alleges that the infringing packaging is designed to “exploit the uncertainty among both consumers and the retail trade resulting from the Archway bankruptcy” in order to confuse consumers into believing that Voortman is the new owner of the Archway brand.

Here are pictures of the two brands:

Given the obvious similarities, the primary issue will probably be whether Archway’s product packaging is distinctive enough in the marketplace to serve as a source identifier (i.e. whether Archway’s packaging is protectable trade dress)? While product packaging can be inherently distinctive (see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000)), because Archway’s trade dress does not appear to have been registered with the PTO, it will first have to demonstrate that its product packaging is inherently distinctive (so unusual and memorable that it is likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product) or, alternatively, that it has acquired a secondary meaning such that consumers have come to associate the packaging exclusively with Archway.

It's not clear how much advertising dollars Archway has spent in the relatively short period of time (since 2005) in which it has been marketing its cookies using this product packaging. However, evidence that another party has intentionally copied a particular trade dress will often times be considered strong evidence by the court that the trade dress has acquired a secondary meaning.

You be the judge.

Saturday, January 10, 2009

Trader Joe’s Sues New York Grocery Chain Over Trader John’s

Earlier this week (link here), I wrote about the Larry Flynt’s nephews being sued because they distributed an adult movie under the company name Flynt Media Corporation. Their logic was that they have every right to use the name “Flynt” as a business name because its their name.

Yesterday, the news was about John Catsimatidis, the CEO of Gristede’s Foods Inc., the owner of the Gristede’s supermarket chain in New York City. The popularity of Gristede’s in New York has apparently been languishing with the number of stores declining from 78 stores in 2000 to 35 stores in 2008.

Catsimatidis, a billionaire and potential mayoral candidate for New York City, decided to change the look of one particular store on 14th Street in Manhattan as an “experiment.” His idea for the name of this rebranded store came from the fact that his name is John and he is a trader, ergo call it “Trader John’s.” No one should have a problem with that, right?

Trader John's on 14th Street
(Photo Credit: The Shophound)

Well, no one except the Trader Joe’s Company Corporation – the California company that owns the chain of 326 Trader Joe’s grocery stores throughout the United with estimated current annual revenue of around $7.2 billion – including a store on 14th Street in Manhattan which is apparently so popular that shoppers often have to stand in line just to get inside and shop, and which also, coincidentally, is just three blocks away from the “Trader John’s” location. Trader Joe’s holds numerous registrations for the mark TRADER JOE’S including one for “specialty grocery store services.”

Trader Joe's on 14th Street

And did I mention that Catsimatidis also came up with the “unique” idea of decorating his store with “wood paneling, wagon wheels, and baskets.” No one has a grocery store that looks quite like that, right?

Not surprisingly, Trader Joe’s filed suit to stop Gristede’s from opening the “Trader John’s” store – set to open sometime next week – after previous cease and desist letters were apparently ignored. Bloomberg, Forbes, and the NY Post all had news reports on the lawsuit.

While I have not seen the complaint, Trader Joe’s is apparently claiming both trademark infringement, trade dress infringement, as well as trademark dilution (dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment) of its famous grocery name (among other likely state and common laws trademark related causes of action). The tarnishment argument is apparently supported in part by numerous online postings commenting on the shoddy conditions found by such consumers at Gristede’s stores. The trade dress argument attacks Catsimatidis creation of a store which mimics the look and feel of a Trader Joe’s store, which Trader Joe’s will undoubtedly maintain has acquired a secondary meaning as identifying their grocery stores. [While I’m not so sure I agree that the type of interior used by Trader Joe’s has acquired a particular distinctiveness as identifying Trader Joe’s exclusively, when the trade dress is combined with a similar sounding mark, it is certainly supportive of a likelihood of confusion as well as strong evidence of an attempt by Catsimatidis to infringe upon the Trader Joe’s – not only naming your store with a similar mark, but then giving it a similar look].

One wonders how a man who was able to become a billionaire can honestly say with a straight face that he has the right to rename his stores “Trader John’s” just because his name is John and he is a trader. And is there anybody out there that doesn’t think that he chose this particular name in order to take advantage of the goodwill built up in the “Trader Joe’s” name?

What’s next – his use of the name “Trader John’s” does not infringe the “Trader Joe’s” registered trademark for “specialty grocery stores” because he plans for his grocery stores to be very average, ordinary grocery stores that will be not be selling any “specialty” goods?

Monday, December 1, 2008

Chippendales Fight Over the Inherent Distinctiveness of Famed “Cuffs & Collars” Uniform


Ron Coleman’s Likelihood of Confusion® beat me to the trademark blog punch with his analysis (link here) of the ex parte appeal filed by Chippendales USA, LLC -- the owner of the intellectual property behind the famed Chippendales dancers -- appealing the USPTO’s final refusal to register its “unique” apparel configuration (pictured below) as a trademark for "adult entertainment services, namely exotic dancing for women in the nature of live performances" on the basis that the trade dress is not inherently distinctive. See In re Chippendales USA, LLC, Serial No. 78666598 (the hearing of which is scheduled for Thursday, as reported by The TTABlog®).


What’s interesting about this pending application being appealed is that Chippendales actually already has one trademark registration on this particular trade dress – U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2,694,613 (for adult entertainment services, namely exotic dancing for women). That application was filed back in November 2000. After the PTO initially refused registration on the basis that the trade dress was not inherently distinctive, Chippendales amended the application to state Section 2(f) acquired distinctiveness as its basis for registration on the Principal Register (along with 400 pages of evidence). The PTO had no problem recognizing that the Chippendales trade dress had acquired distinctiveness.

Then in 2003 (about five months after the above application had registered), Chippendales filed a second application to register the same trade dress – only this time, Chippendales did not want to enter a Section 2(f) claim of acquired distinctiveness. One basis for the PTO’s refusal to register was that the application would result in a duplicate registration; however, Chippendales’ attorney explained that “the objective of this application is to have the Cuffs and Collar mark deemed inherently distinctive and registered on the Principal Register with no Section 2(f) claim.” This particular application was subsequently abandoned (for reasons not entirely clear although it may have had something to do with an untimely appeal) in favor of a third application filed in 2005 (the application which is subject to the aforementioned hearing).

As Coleman states,
TMEP 1301.02(c) provides for registration of a “three-dimensional costume design . . . for entertainment services.” In other words, clothes worn as a costume, not as “apparel” per se, are clearly amenable to protection as a trademark. The question appears to be whether a “configuration” of apparel such as that in the illustration constitutes a “costume” — i.e., whether the concept of using a costume to portray a particular character (Mickey Mouse, the San Diego Chicken) can be extended to a situation where, here, there is a concept, but not an identifiable, personal persona meant to be evoked.
The PTO agrees that the Chippendales “costume” is product packaging (as opposed to a product design), and thus, under Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215, 54 USPQ2d 1065, 1069 (2000), may be inherently distinctive and registrable on the Principal Register without a showing of acquired distinctiveness. However, the PTO just doesn’t seem to believe that this particular product packaging is distinctive. The PTO focused on the factors set forth in Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344, 196 USPQ 289, 291 (C.C.P.A. 1977) for determining the inherent distinctiveness of configuration marks comprising product packaging:
  1. Whether the applied-for mark is a “common” basic shape or design;
  2. Whether the applied-for mark is unique or unusual in the field in which it is used;
  3. Whether the applied-for mark is a mere refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods; and
  4. Whether the applied-for mark is capable of creating a commercial impression distinct from the accompanying words.

Regarding the first factor, the PTO found that there is nothing unique or distinctive about a male dancer wearing cuffs and a bow tie and collar and that it is considered to be one of various ways for strippers and male entertainers to dress. As for the second factor, “The collar and cuffs are but one style of accouterments that are worn during the performance of a dance number or show. . . . This is practically an integral element of live acts, exotic dancing and strip tease performances in the world of entertainment and burlesque.” Regarding the third factor, the PTO noted that “Exotic dancers and striptease performers, particularly in the early days of burlesque, often began their routines in formal evening attire. . . . Though this particular form of dress may have been innovative, it was not source recognizing at the outset.” The fourth factor was inapplicable because no word mark was involved.

The test suggested by Chippendales as an alternative to the Seabrook test with respect to costume source indication is: 1) Is the costume used in a channel of trade where consumers are conditioned through their past experience to presume a source identification function? and 2) Is the costume immediately associated with an iconic larger than life character where the costume acts as an intrinsic symbol for the character?

Because the Chippendales "Cuffs & Collars" outfit has become so famous in connection with Chippendales, one can overlook the issue behind inherent distinctiveness -- namely, was the trade dress inherently distinctive when it was first adopted. The PTO maintains that despite the "iconic" status that Chippendales' trade dress may have presently reached, it did not have such status when the services first took place using the trade dress.

Tuesday, November 4, 2008

Sprinkles Cupcake Denied Motion for Default Judgment Against Famous Cupcakes


I previously wrote (link here) about the trademark infringement lawsuit filed by California cupcake maker Sprinkles Cupcakes against rival cupcake maker Famous Cupcakes over Sprinkles’ registered "nested circle design" for "bakery goods."


The news reports out yesterday (link here) report that U.S. District Judge Percy Anderson denied Sprinkles’ Motion for Default Judgment in its lawsuit to stop Famous Cupcakes from using its “toppers” in the center of its cupcakes (see picture below). The court supposedly cited “problems with Sprinkles' court filing.” Sprinkles’ attorneys have said they will refile their Motion after making the required corrections.

Anybody know what was wrong with Sprinkles’ Motion?

[Ed. Note: This post was subsequently edited to correct an error in the type of Motion that was filed with the court, as clarified by Bobby Ghajar in the comments.]

Thursday, October 30, 2008

Hershey Wins TRO Against Furniture Company Based On Trade Dress Dilution


Hat Tip to Marty Schwimmer for posting the complaint filed by Hershey Company (“Hershey”) against Art Van Furniture (“Art Van”), a Michigan furniture company over its use of the above picture on its furniture trucks as well as the somewhat surprising decision by the court to grant a temporary restraining order on the basis of dilution. See Hershey Company et al v. Art Van Furniture, Inc., Case No. 08-cv-14463 (E.D. Mich. Filed October 21, 2008). Reports on the actions of the parties leading up to the lawsuit have been published by the AP and The Detroit New.

Most of the court’s decision is spent analyzing, and ultimately rejecting (ed.—rightly so), a likelihood of success on the merits for Hershey’s trademark/trade dress infringement claims given the balance of the likelihood of confusion factors favoring Art Van.

However, the court then, with a relatively brief analysis of Hershey’s trademark dilution claim, concludes that Hershey has established a likelihood of success on the merits for a claim of trademark dilution by blurring.
Granted, Hershey had the advantage in meeting the primary elements necessary to show dilution under 15 U.S.C. §1125(c) – specifically a famous and distinctive trademark in the nature of the Hershey’s candy bar trade dress, use of the Art Van ad by Art Van after Hershey’s trade dress became famous, and a similarity between the Art Van ad and Hershey’s trade dress that gives rise to an association between Hershey’s trade dress (Comment: Based on the pictures above, I’m not so sure I would agree with the court's finding that Art’s candy bar would give rise to an association with Hershey’s candy bar).

As for whether such association is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark, when you start to analyze the six factors set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) that courts consider in deciding if a junior mark is likely to dilute a famous mark through blurring (degree of similarity, degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark, exclusive use of famous mark, degree of recognition, intent to create an association with the famous mark, and any actual association), they tend to favor Hershey’s as well (comment--although again, I’m not sure I agree with the degree of similarity in this case).

But what I found curiously odd was the court’s short shrift of Art Van’s parody defense. Naturally, as support for its argument that its use was protected by parody, Art Van cited to the last year’s “Chewy Vuitton” decision in Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th Cir. 2007), which rejected a dilution cause of action by Louis Vuitton against the makers of “Chewy Vuitton” dog toys.

The following is the sum total of the court’s distinguishing of the instant case and the Louis Vuitton decision (emphasis added):
The [Louis Vuitton] court dismissed the plaintiff’s infringement and dilution claims; there was no mistaking the intentional, yet irreverent nature of the defendant’s miniature handbags. Id. at 260-61.
“It is a matter of common sense that the strength of a famous mark allows consumers immediately to perceive the target of the parody, while simultaneously allowing them to recognize the changes to the mark that make the parody funny or biting.” Id. at 261. Defendant’s “couch bar” may be funny, but it is not biting; its resemblance to Plaintiff’s famous trade dress is too muted to poke fun, yet too transparent to evoke a generic candy bar.
An important theme running through Louis Vuitton is that, while a parody may be nearly identical to the original in some respects, in others it is so different that no one could possibly mistake it for the real thing. Id. Defendant’s design is neither similar nor different enough to convey a satirical message.
So there is no mistaking that a dog toy that sells under the name “Chewy Vuitton” and made to look like (and yet obviously not be) a mini “Louis Vuitton” purse is so intentionally irreverent that it constitutes a parody – yet a sign on a furniture truck showing a brown couch emerging from a candy bar wrapper that looks somewhat like a Hershey candy bar wrapper is not irreverent? Surprisingly, the key appears to be "somewhat like a Hershey candy bar."

Basically, the court is saying that Art Van’s ad, while capturing an image that consumers would associate with Hershey’s trade dress, is not so strong enough that Art Van can claim it to be a parody of Hershey’s trade dress. The court uses the word “biting” although I’m not so sure I would call a “Chewy Vuitton” dog toy a “biting” parody (although I’m sure there are numerous dogs out there that find such toys quite “biting”).

While I’m not so sure I agree with the court’s decision that Art Van’s ad is not “biting” enough (i.e., neither similar nor different enough to convey a satirical message), the lesson learned is that if you are going to parody a famous mark, you had better make sure that you go all out to not only make an obvious association with the famous mark, but also to make an obvious disassociation with the famous mark.

Apparently, if you attempt to parody a Hershey bar, but it’s not clear enough that you are parodying an actual Hershey bar, then such ad, while apparently sufficient for dilution purposes with respect to such Hershey bar, is insufficient for parody purposes.

One wonders if the court would have decided the parody issue differently had the lettering more closely resembled the Hershey candy bar lettering (or even used a word like “Couchey’s” inpace of “Hershey's” and then “Fine Furniture” instead of “Milk Chocolate”) and had the color of the candy bar looked more like the famous dark brown color of a Hershey bar? What is the point where Art Van’s ad would have been intentionally irreverent enough to constitute a parody?

Monday, June 30, 2008

On remand, Johnson & Johnson wins injunction against Heartland Sweeteners in Splenda® trade dress infringement lawsuit

Rebecca Tushnet’s 43(B)log writes about the latest development in the ongoing trade dress dispute between McNeil Nutritionals, LLC (“McNeil”), the Johnson & Johnson division that makes Splenda® artificial sweetener (a brand of the artificial sweetener, sucralose), and Heartland Sweeteners LLC (“Heartland”), which produces and distributes store-brand sucralose in a similar looking yellow packaging for big-chain supermarkets.

After the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed-in-part the district court’s prior decision in favor of Heartland (see prior blog post on the Third Circuit's decision here), the district court, on remand, conducted the necessary additional evaluation to determine if injunctive relief was appropriate for the packaging which the Third Circuit found the likelihood of confusion factors favored McNeil Nutritionals, specifically, packaging used by Heartland for sucralose sold at Royal Ahold NV’s Giant Supermarket. See McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners LLC, Case No. 06-cv-05336 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2008).
The court, upon remand and applying the remaining factors of the four factor test for issuing injunctive relief, determined that an injunction should issue with respect to approximately $340,000 of Heartland’s remaining inventory of the infringing box (Heartland notably redesigned its product packaging to be different than McNeil’s Splenda packaging).

Tuesday, April 29, 2008

Juicy Couture sues Victoria’s Secret for trademark and trade dress infringement

I previously wrote (link here) about the efforts by Juicy Couture Inc. (“Juicy Couture”), the owner of the mark JUICY (most often seen on the back side of skintight terrycloth sweatpant-wearing females) to stop the owner of the Juicy Campus website from selling clothing emblazoned with the name “Juicy Campus.” The news today (here, here, and here) was about another lawsuit filed by Juicy Couture, but this time against a much more formidable foe – Victoria’s Secret (“VS”). See Juicy Couture Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Management Inc. et al., Case No. 08-cv-3985 (S.D.N.Y April 28, 2008).

According to published media reports (I have not reviewed a copy of the filed complaint), Juicy Couture is apparently upset over VS’s Pink line of clothing products alleging that they are confusingly similar to Juicy Couture’s own popular clothing lines (“Pink has applied slogans across the seat of pants which famously originated with Juicy Couture and identifies its brand.”).


Juicy and Pink
[ed.- anyone else detect a common theme here?]


Juicy Couture also objects to certain candy-shaped product packaging introduced by VS last October (click here for one account of these new products). Juicy Couture apparently is objecting to VS’s “Panty Pops” (ladies underwear packaged like lollipops), “Panty Candy” (a line of thongs packaged like bon-bons) and “Camy and Panty Cone” (a holiday gift set with tank top and matching underwear wrapped in an ice-cream box).

“Panty Pops"


“Panty Candy”


“Camy and Panty Cone”

Juicy Couture argues that VS’s candy-shaped packaging is confusingly similar to Juicy Couture's own Sweet Shoppe line of packaging resembling lollipops, bon-bons and ice cream cones and thus constitutes trade dress infringement ("In copying Juicy Couture's distinctive and unique trade dress, defendants crossed the line from design imitation to trade dress infringement. Because of the source-identifying function of Juicy Couture's packaging and the striking similarities, the defendant's packaging is likely to deceive consumers as to the origin of the products contained within.") I was unable to any pictures of Juicy Couture's “distinctive and unique” Sweet Shoppe packaging online – all I could find with respect to Sweet Shoppe was a charm bracelet.


Juicy Couture's Sweet Shoppe Charm Bracelet

Juicy Couture appears to be trying to corner the market on terrycloth shorts and sweatpants with slogans across the seat of the pants. As for Juicy Couture’s trade dress claims, while I could not find any pictures of Juicy Couture’s product packaging online (which does make you wonder how unique, distinctive, and recognizable it could be), I doubt that Juicy Couture’s product packaging is so distinctive that it has come to be recognized as a unique source identifier for Juicy Couture – instead of merely novelty product packaging appealing to a female audience.

Monday, April 28, 2008

What are the differences between a trademark, service mark, certification mark, collective mark, trade dress, and trade name?

I am asked the questions often enough that their answers are worthy of a blog post.

Trademark
A “trademark” is any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, used by a party to identify and distinguish its goods from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods (even if that source is unknown). See §45 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1127).

Service Mark
A “service mark” is the same as a “trademark” except that it is used by a party to identify and distinguish the services of that party from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services (even if that source is unknown). See §45 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1127). The law specifically states that titles, character names, and other distinctive features of radio or television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor.

In short, the two basic functions of a trademark or service mark is 1) identifying the source and origin of particular goods or services and 2) distinguishing for the consuming public the goods or services of one party from the goods or services of others.

Certification Mark
A “certification mark” is any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, used by a person other than the mark owner which certifies:
  1. Regional or other geographic origin of such person’s goods or services (e.g., CERTIFIED MAINE LOBSTER and JERSEY FRESH FROM THE GARDEN STATE);

  2. Material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy or other characteristics of such person’s goods or services (e.g., the UL logo certifying that certain electrical equipment meets the safety standards of Underwriters Laboratories Inc.; NSF certifying that certain food equipment meets the public health standards established by NSF International); or

  3. That the work or labor on such person’s goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization or by a person who meets certain standards and tests of competency set by the owner (e.g., UFCW UNION MADE certifying that the goods were produced by members of the United Food & Commercial Workers International Union and AFL-CIO).

See §45 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1127); see also prior blog post here on certification marks.

Collective Mark
A “collective mark” is a mark used by members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization. See §45 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1127). There are two basic types of collective marks:

  1. A collective trademark or service mark, which is a mark adopted by a collective group for use by its members who use the mark to identify their goods or services and to distinguish such members’ good or services from the goods or services of nonmembers (e.g., THE FTD BELOVED BOUQUET and AII AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INSPECTORS); and

  2. A collective membership mark, which only serves to indicate membership in the collective group (e.g., the logo used by members of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association).

While collective trademarks and service marks are classified in the international class as the underlying good or services which the collective mark identifies, a collective membership mark has its own international class (IC 200) (see 37 C.F.R. §6.4).

One important distinction with respect to a “collective mark” compared to a trademark/service mark is that it only serves to indicate membership in the collective group – the collective group itself does not actually use the collective trademark or service mark to identify or distinguish any goods or services although it can advertise and promote the goods sold or services rendered by its members using the collective mark.

Trade Dress
“Trade dress” refers to the design or packaging of a product or service which serves to identify the source or origin of the product or service – the arrangement of identifying characteristics or decorations connected with a product or service (through its packaging, design, or otherwise) that make the source of the product or service distinguishable from others making the same products or offering the same services and which promotes the sale of such product or service. Trade dress involves the total image or overall appearance of a product or service, and includes, but is not limited to, such features as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, and even particular sales techniques. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Int'l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1993).

In order for trade dress to be protected as a trademark or service mark, it must be a) nonfunctional and b) distinctive enough in the marketplace to serve as a source identifier (i.e. either because it is inherently distinctive, which is often the case for “product packaging,” or because the trade dress has acquired a secondary meaning, which is often necessary to show for “product designs”).

A product feature is considered functional, and thus cannot serve as a trademark, if the product feature is essential to the use or purpose of the product or if the product feature affects the cost or quality of the product (i.e., exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant, non-reputation-related disadvantage). See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995); Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850, n.10 (1982).

The basis behind the functionality doctrine was explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Qualitex as follows:

The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature. It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time, 35 U.S.C. §§154, 173, after which competitors are free to use the innovation. If a product’s functional features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over such features could be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity).

Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164-65.

Some of the factors used by courts to determine functionality are: (1) whether there exists a utility patent directed to the design, (2) whether the owner touts the utilitarian advantages of the design in advertisements, (3) whether there are alternative and competitive designs, and (4) whether the design is cheaper and simpler to manufacture than alternative and competitive designs. See In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 213 USPQ 9 (CCPA 1982). If trade dress is found to be functional, it will not be protected as a trademark or service mark regardless of the extent to which the public may attribute such trade dress to a single source and regardless of any public confusion over competing parties’ goods or services.

You will sometimes hear the labels de facto functional and de jure functional. De facto functionality refers to a product design that may be functional but which is not necessary for its function (e.g., the design of the Coca-Cola bottle is functional, in that it serves as a container for Coca-Cola soda beverages; however, the particular design is not necessary for the bottle to serve as a container). This is the type of functional design that can be protected as a trade dress. De jure functionality, on the other hand, refers to a product design that, because of the particular design, provides the owner with a competitive advantage. This type of functional design cannot be protected as a trademark because such protection would allow a owner to control in perpetuity a “useful” product feature thereby inhibiting competition.

Trade Name
Unlike a trademark or a service mark, which serves to identify and distinguish the source and origin of goods and services, a trade name is any word, name, symbol, or other designation, or any combination thereof, which serves to identify a particular business, vocation, or enterprise and which distinguishes such business, vocation, or enterprise from the business, vocation, or enterprise of another. See §45 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1127); see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, §12 (1995). While trade names will typically include such entity designations such as “Inc.,” “Corp.,” “Company,” or “LLC,” a trade name can include the name under which the company is “doing business as” (d/b/a). In addition, a trade name does not function as a trademark or a service mark, and will not be protected as such, unless it somehow attaches to goods or services in such a way that purchasers and prospective customers would recognize the business identified by the trade name as the source and origin of such goods or services.

House Mark
A “house mark” is a mark that is used by a business in conjunction with a line of products to identify the business as the source of such products. A house mark is closely related to a trade name because often times a trade name will serve as a company’s house mark in conjunction with a trademark or service mark used to identify a specific product or service. For example, Toyota Corp. uses the Toyota trade name as a house mark in identifying its line of automobiles including TOYOTA SIENNA, TOYOTA COROLLA, TOYOTA CAMRY, and TOYOTA PRIUS. While house marks are often the same as the business’ trade name, a house mark can also be a separate trademark or service mark, such as the name CRAFTSMAN, which Sears uses in conjunction with a line of hardware tools.

Family of Marks
Finally, you will occasionally hear about a company that has a family of marks. A family of marks is a group of trademarks or service marks that have some kind of common element which allows consumers to recognize the source and origin of the goods or services identified as such. The classic example of a family of marks is McDonald Corp.’s use of the “Mc” prefix attached to some other word to identify one of its products or services including MCRIB, MCMUFFIN, MCFLURRY, etc. (For a recent blog post on McDonalds’ efforts to protect its family of marks, check out this post (here) on Michael Atkins’ Seattle Trademark Lawyer blog).


Monday, April 21, 2008

Energy Drink Maker Wins Preliminary Injunction Against Rival Based on Trade Dress Infringement

On April 14, 2008, a Michigan federal district court judge granted the motion for preliminary injunction brought by Innovation Ventures, LLC d/b/a Living Essentials (“Living”) against rival energy drink maker N2G Distributing, Inc. and Alpha Performance Labs (together “N2G”) based on trade dress infringement by N2G of Living’s distinctive product packaging while rejecting Living’s claims for trademark infringement. See Innovation Ventures, LLC (d/b/a Living Essentials) v. N2G Distributing, Inc. et al., Case No. 08-CV-10983 (S.D. Mich. April 14, 2008).



Living is the maker of a 2 fl. oz. bottled energy drink called “5 Hour Energy” (pictured above). On June 14, 2004, Living filed an intent-to-use application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to register the mark 5 HOUR ENERGY (for homeopathic supplements, pharmaceutical preparations, nutritional supplements and dietary supplements that relieve or prevent fatigue) on the Principal Register. The PTO rejected registration of Living’s mark on the grounds that it was merely descriptive under Trademark Act §2(e)(1) (15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1)) (the mark describes a specific characteristic of the goods, namely, providing the user with energy for up to 5 hours). Rather than attempt to argue acquired distinctiveness, Living apparently amended its application to register the mark on the Supplemental Register, rather than the Principal Register (this after it had already filed an Amendment to Allege Use that it began using the mark as early as June 2005).

N2G makes and distributes a line of energy drinks called “Nitro2Go” (normally sold in 8.4 or 16 fl. oz. cans). In August 2007, N2G introduced a product called “Nitro2Go Instant Energy” in 2 fl. oz. bottles (announcement here).

Living discovered N2G’s product at a trade show in early March 2008 after some trade show attendees apparently expressed belief to Living's representatives that Living was also the maker of the “Instant Energy” product. On March 7, 2008, Living filed its lawsuit against N2G alleging federal trademark infringement and counterfeiting, false designation of origin and trade dress infringement, and common law trademark infringement. On March 13, 2008, Living filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction against N2G.

The court granted Living’s motion for preliminary injunction, but it did so based on trade dress infringement, not trademark infringement.

The court, in analyzing Living’s likelihood of success on the merits (the first of the four factors the court must balance in deciding to grant a preliminary injunction), focused first on Living’s trademark infringement claim. Living argued a likelihood of confusion between its “5 Hour Energy” mark and N2G’s “6 Hour Energy Shot.” The court noted, however, that registration on the Supplemental Register does not provide the same benefits as registration on the Principal Register, and that essentially the registration provides no additional rights beyond what Living has under the common law. As such, the court first had to determine whether Living’s mark was distinctive or had acquired a secondary meaning.

Living tried to argue that its sales and advertising figures as well as its 90% share of the two-ounce energy drink market (27 times greater than the next closest competitor) supported its argument that its “5 Hour Energy” mark had acquired a secondary meaning. However, the court found that Living had not carried its “heavy burden” at this point in demonstrating that the primary significance of Living’s highly descriptive mark to the public would be as a source identifier of the product rather than an identifier of the product itself. N2G also provided evidence of other two-ounce energy drink products from different manufacturers with such phrases as “7 Hour Energy Boost,” “6 Hour Energy!,” “Extreme Energy Six Hour Shot,” and “6 Hour Power,” which goes against Living’s argument that its “5 Hour Energy” has a strong secondary meaning that particularly identifies the source of the product. As such, the court found that Living had not demonstrated a “strong likelihood of success” on its trademark infringement claim to support its motion for preliminary injunction.

With respect to Living’s trade dress infringement claim, the court first noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s distinction between trade dress cases involving product packaging (which can be inherently distinctive and thus no secondary meaning analysis is necessary) and product designs (which cannot be inherently distinctive). See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214-15, 120 S. Ct. 1339, 146 L. Ed. 2d 182 (2000). In addition, the court noted that to the extent that a product's overall trade dress is arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive, it is still considered inherently distinctive despite its incorporation of generic or descriptive elements. See Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Imps. & Distribs., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1993).

Living asserted that the following elements made up its distinctive trade dress packing for its “5 Hour Energy” drink: (1) a terrain climber at sunrise design; (2) color scheme (red, orange, yellow, and shades of blue); (3) the size, color, and font of the product name; and (4) the shape of the bottle (a short neck and a main container with broad shoulders).

While N2G tried to argue that each of the individual elements of Living’s trade dress were either descriptive or generic, the court concluded that, although Living’s “5 Hour Energy” drink product packaging may have some generic and descriptive elements, the “overall product packaging image - the color scheme, fonts, and most significantly the graphical depiction of the landscape and figure –” constitutes an arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive trade dress thatis inherently distincitve and thus can be protected from infringement without a showing of secondary meaning.

Finding that Living’s “5 Hour Energy” drink product packaging constituted protectable trade dress, the court proceeded to determine whether the N2G’s trade dress is confusingly similar.

While the court recited the likelihood of confusion factors used by the Sixth Circuit (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 646 (6th Cir. 2002), the court decided to forgo doing a factor-by-factor analysis and instead focused on the fact that the Sixth Circuit recognizes a presumption of likelihood of confusion in cases where evidence points to “intentional copying” (where the intent of the copier is to piggy-back on the reputation of the product copied). See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1242-43 (6th Cir. 1991).

N2G attempted to focus on several different aspects of its product packaging as evidence that it did not copy Living’s trade dress; however, the court found Living’s evidence of intentional copying compelling enough – at least at this preliminary stage – to support a determination that the trade dresses of the two products are confusingly similar. The court specifically noted that N2G’s packaging contains the exact same color scheme, the same black-type italicized font for the logo, the depiction of a silhouetted athletic figure ascending a silhouetted mountain, and even copied Living’s “caution” warnings word-for-word.

As for the other three factors the court must balance in deciding whether the grant a preliminary injunction, the court found irreparable harm based on the general presumption that irreparable harm arises when there is a likelihood of confusion (N2G apparently made no arguments against application of the presumption). The court accepted Living’s argument that the harm to its reputation and goodwill outweighed the harm to N2G in having to recall its product and redesign its packaging. Finally, the court held that the public interest in preventing confusion and deception in the marketplace and protecting Living’s interest in its trade dress weighed in favor of Living.

With that, the court granted Living’s motion for a preliminary injunction.


Vegas™Esq. Comments:
The court’s opinion is a little confusing with respect to N2G’s infringing trade dress. The opinion specifically points out in the beginning that N2G began distributing a product called “Nitro2Go Instant Energy” in two-ounce bottles in August 2007 (pictured above) suggesting that this is the infringing product (and one can see the similarities). However, throughout the remainder of the opinion, the infringing product is referred to as N2G’s “6 Hour Energy Shot,” including specific references to a hiker image and “6 Hour Energy Shot” logo on N2G’s bottle – neither of which appear in the above picture (I only see a surfer and bicyclist).

So it’s not clear if the court’s decision is based on the bottle pictured above or if N2G had some other kind of product packaging that more closely resembled Living’s product packaging. If the former, then I’m not so sure I would agree with the court’s decision with respect to intentional copying and likelihood of confusion; however, if the latter, then the court’s determination as such may be justified.