Showing posts with label U.S.Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label U.S.Policy. Show all posts

Monday, November 17, 2014

Can Iraq Be Saved?


Retired Colonel Joseph Núñez spent five years in Iraq. What makes him relatively unique is that much of his time was spent in Iraq's provinces, so he has been, so to speak, in the weeds. His talk is sponsored by the Institute for Iraqi Studies (@IISBU) at the Pardee School, 121 Bay State Road, First Floor, on November 19th at 4 p.M. I have known the speaker for a long time, beginning with three years as colleagues on the West Point faculty. This shoud be a fascinating talk.

Wednesday, June 04, 2014

Apartheid Israel Feeling the Chill from Washington

U.S. decision to deal with the PA government raises hackles in Israel.  Good.

The notion that Israel-coddling produces diplomatic flexibility has been disproved repeatedly, not least by former diplomat and diplomatic strike-out king Dennis Ross (and here).  Ross bent over backwards in a recent NYT Op-Ed to find ways that Israel might do just a teeny bit of withdrawals from the West Bank to eliminate the threat that the PA would seek redress for Israel's illegal colonization of the West Bank with the International Criminal Court.

Here are two worthy contributions, both antidotes to coddle school:  The first by Alain Gresh, is aptly titled "What's mine is mine; what's yours is negotiable."  The second is by Emile Nakhleh, who argues that the two-state option is dead.

[Added: This joint statement in April 2014 by five respected and wise men and woman remains relevant, notwithstanding the failure of John Kerry's effort to broker an Israel-Palestine deal.]

[Added: Israel flaunts international opprobrium and announces 1,460 more housing units in illegal settlements.]

Tuesday, July 09, 2013

The July 3 coup in Egypt: What the law says

Excerpt from the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012:
Coups d'etat
Sec. 7008. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
available pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the
government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'etat [added emphasis] or decree or, after the date of enactment of this Act, a coup d'etat or decree in which the military plays a decisive role: 
Provided, <> That assistance may be resumed to such government if the President determines and certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that subsequent to the termination of assistance a democratically elected government has taken office: Provided further, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic <> processes: 
Provided further, That
[[Page 125 STAT. 1196]]
funds made available pursuant to the previous provisos shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.
What the White House says:
"I'm being very clear with you ... this is a complex and difficult issue with significant consequences," Carney said during his daily briefing, the first since Egypt's military ousted Morsi nearly a week ago. Calling the action a coup could cut off more than $1.5 billion in annual U.S. foreign aid for Egypt.
But the Obama administration is reluctant to cut off aid. "We think it would not be in the best interests of the United States" to change its aid program at this time, Carney said. Asked if that would mean the administration would be cutting off aid in the near-term, Carney repeated his response: "we think that would not be in our best interests." 

Monday, July 08, 2013

The Egyptian Army is not an instrument of either reform or democracy

The Egyptian Army is not a democratic institution despite its recent pretensions.  One only needs to recall following the ouster of Mubarak for a reminder of how quickly the Army's penchant for autocracy surfaces.  Today's slaughter of scores of apparently innocent civilian protesters underlines the urgency of getting the generals out of the Presidential palace.

Before the situation in Egypt slides further into mayhem, the USG, and not least Obama, needs to grasp that pretending what has happened was not a coup d'état only encourages the generals.  The beginning of an effective policy response is using the word c-o-u-p.  This will oblige the US to suspend military aid and strengthen leverage for moving quickly to a government of national reconciliation.  Now, more than ever, insuring the participation of the MB in such a government is urgent.

The most thuggish institution in Egypt is the police, which has resisted successfully recent attempts at reform.   unless there is an effective establishment of an effective civilian transitional leadership, the police, with the Army's sufferance if not collusion, will return to the business as usual that they know best, namely beating, abusing and arresting anyone who deems to challenge their reign.  

The situation in Egypt threatens to unravel disastrously and compelling US interests demand a firm and unmistakable commitment to inclusive civilian rule in Egypt.  Dawdling only amplifies the long-range risks for the US.

Perceptive OPED by Khaled Abou el-Fadl, "Perils of a People's Coup."

[Also see the concise analysis of Prof. Yoram Meital, a serious student of Egypt, and Sarah Carr's powerful reflection, "On Sheep and Infidels".]

Monday, March 11, 2013

Obama’s Moment to Make the Case for Middle East Peace


Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace*

If it were easy to do, an American president would have long ago shepherded Israelis and Palestinians into the negotiated two-state peace agreement that both peoples and their neighbors so clearly need — a peace that would greatly enhance U.S. interests.
There are many reasons why it will be hard for President Obama to achieve, in his second term, the Israeli-Palestinian peace accord that has eluded him and his predecessors for so long. The rise of radical one-state nationalists and ideologically driven settlers in Israeli politics, the debilitating split in the Palestinian camp between Hamas and Fatah, the power struggles and sectarian enmities roiling the region — these are all factors adding to the difficulty of forging the two-state peace agreement that alone can end the agony of occupation for Palestinians and bring Israel a sounder more durable form of security.

Saturday, November 03, 2012

U.S. Needs Muslim Allies (esp. to deal with Afghanistan): Sensible piece by my colleague Husain Haqqani


Excerpts from "Why the U.S. Needs Muslim Allies" in WaPo, Nov. 1, 2012:
"Using drones to find and kill al-Qaeda leaders already known to U.S. intelligence will not end the war, either. Eventually, the United States will have to find Muslim allies who help limit the influence of ideas or organizations that turn some young Muslims into terrorists. Washington has made few efforts toward that end, depending on friendly autocrats or whoever manages to get elected instead of working to strengthen modernizing democrats who share Western values. Governments in the Muslim world would also have to deny terrorist groups the havens they enjoy now and shut down the organized recruitment and training of future terrorists.
"Taliban leader Mohammad Omar is frequently reported to have said, “Americans have the watches, but we have the time.” By announcing the deadline for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the Obama administration has effectively told al-Qaeda and the Taliban how long they have to wait for the Americans to depart.... 
"Time is needed to raise an effective Afghan national army able to secure the country....
"Consider also that the impending U.S. withdrawal provides little incentive for Pakistan’s military to revisit its ambitions in Afghanistan. Although the Taliban increasingly threaten Pakistan, the Pakistani military and intelligence services continue to make distinctions among groups of Taliban and jihadis and considers some of them strategic allies. Pakistan is still clinging to hopes of greater influence over Afghanistan with the help of various Taliban factions after the withdrawal."

Friday, March 16, 2012

You really should watch this segment by John Oliver. His powerful humor lands body blows on proponents of cutting off funding to UNESCO

As you will remember, in October 2011 UNESCO voted 107-14 with 52 abstentions to admit Palestine to membership.  This triggered a legally-required U.S. cutoff of funding for the organization, and thereby curtailed or ended a number of worthwhile projects around the world.  As noted here in an earlier post, the U.S. action was defended by a variety of Israel advocates.





The second part is here.







Thursday, March 15, 2012

Sensible appraisal of Obama's Iran policy by Nicholas Burns


"The most confounding aspect of our public debate is that we are considering war with a dangerous adversary about whom we know very little. No senior American official has even met Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. There has been virtually no contact between the two governments in 30 years. As undersecretary of state working on Iran policy during President Bush’s second term, I and my colleagues were not permitted to talk to Iranian officials. It went against an elementary lesson I learned as a diplomat - no matter how distasteful, we must talk to governments we don’t like if we want to outsmart them and avoid war. For that very reason, an earlier and much wiser Israeli leader, Yitzhak Rabin, warned memorably, “You don’t make peace with friends. You make it with very unsavory enemies.’’
......... 
"Obama’s critics would do well to recall two hard facts. First, diplomacy takes time. If Iran doesn’t capitulate within a few weeks, predictable voices will call for war instead. We have time to negotiate before Iran gets perilously close to a nuclear weapons capability. Obama should take that time to figure out if Iran is serious. That is how diplomacy works on an issue as complicated and potentially deadly as this."

Thursday, January 12, 2012

Sara Roy: "it is worth putting Hamas to the test."

One factor that prompted Yitzhak Rabin to make a deal with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat was the looming rise of Hamas in the early 1990s.  That was two decades ago, but Israeli leaders still become apoplectic at the notion of dealing with Hamas.  The prospect of a Palestinian unity government elicits a variety of threats from Israel, including cutting off water and electricity to Gaza, as Sara Roy notes in her incisive op-ed.  Of course, given the coming rise of Islamically-oriented governments in Tunisia and particularly in Egypt, ostracizing Hamas is no longer a relatively easy matter.  Given the Netanyahu government's territorial agenda, and its mockery of the idea of viable and independent Palestinian state, the isolation of Hamas is integral to its policy.  None the less, it is time for U.S. policymakers to re-examine their assumptions about Hamas, and Roy's essay provides some points to ponder.

Compare Roy's piece to the latest advice from Dennis Ross who believes that Israel and the PA should get back on the bike and keep pedaling.  His comment invites images of a stationary tandem exercise bike, not one that might actually cross a finish line.  Among other things, Ross argues that Israel should reduce its activities in area "A", which is to say those parts of the West Bank where the PA is supposed to exercise civil and security authority under the Oslo agreements.  (It is curious that Ross fails to note that President G.W. Bush, for whom he worked, demanded, in 2002, that Israel pull its forces back from area "A", only to be stiff-armed by Ariel Sharon).  Read the Ross piece for a sample of the sort of well-practiced advice that plays right into the hands of Israel's hardline government.  Just keep on pedaling....

Important reportage on Benyamin Netanyahu's divisive political game in the U.S.

The author is the journalist Max Blumenthal.

"The Bibi Connection"
Excerpt:
"Netanyahu’s shadow campaign is intended to be a factor in defeating Obama and electing a Republican in his place. He opposed Obama’s early demand to freeze settlements on the West Bank as a precondition for reviving the peace process, a process since the Oslo Accord that Netanyahu has attempted to stall or sabotage, despite his signing of the Wye Agreement under pressure from President Clinton. Since his adamant stand against the settlement freeze, Netanyahu has undermined every effort to engage the peace process. He appears dead set on consolidating Greater Israel, or what many Israelis call “Judea and Samaria,” and has signaled a strong desire to attack Iran."

Sunday, November 27, 2011

Nakhleh and Norton on the Egyptian election

"Both the security forces and senior US officials are apprehensive that this week’s elections will bring the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood to power, and there is little doubt that the Brotherhood is poised to win a plurality of seats this week and in run-offs scheduled for December and January. But rather than trying to dilute the election results through military diktat, the United States should insist that the security forces honor the results and hand over power.
"Misplaced fears about the implications of an Islamist sweep are often heard in Washington, where some media pundits have asked whether the Arab Spring is devolving into an Islamist Winter. But Tunisia’s election provides an instructive model on an alternative to that scenario. The election fostered a coalescence of Islamist and secular politicians. The victory of the Tunisian al-Nahda party, which won a 40-percent plurality, may be a harbinger for the coming of Arab political normalcy and the delegitimization of “Arab exceptionalism.’’ Al-Nahda’s leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, has begun reaching out to secular groups to form a coalition government, a move that would not have happened before the demise of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya."
[Because of the Thanksgiving holiday, this piece went to press five days ago.]


On November 25, 2011, a White House statement suggested impatience with the Egyptian generals' and emphasized the goal of "the full transfer of power to a civilian government."  Compare this statement to the President's phone conversation with Field Marshal Tantawi on October 24, 2011.

Friday, September 23, 2011

Another fielding error by Dennis Ross

Writing in the Boston Globe, Juliette Krayem argues that a "blunder" by Dennis Ross and David Hale helped convince Mahmoud 'Abbas and his advisors to proceed with their UN initiative.  In a letter handed to the PA leader he was urged to take into account the massive increase in Israeli settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
"According to Abbas’s advisers, a letter given to the Palestinian leader was the final straw. The letter has not been publicly disclosed by either party, but Arab media and commentators have zeroed in on a single reported sentence. In pushing for direct negotiations with Israel as an alternative to seeking UN recognition, the letter argued that the Palestinians need to consider Israel’s rightful security needs, as well as “demographic changes’’ that have occurred since the war in 1967."
Perhaps Krayem is writing sardonically when she describe the phrasing as a surprising blunder.  After all, one of the Dennis Ross' talents has been to channel the Israeli narrative.  He is aptly described in a Times interview as an "ardent supporter of Israel" and his penchant for coddling Israel is hardly a secret.
"It’s a surprising blunder for a man with Ross’s decades of experience in trying to close the deal on the peace process."
Krayem concludes with a call for "demographic change" in the U.S. diplomatic team.  
"But whatever the outcome of the wrangling at the United Nations, the whole contretemps has served to weaken the United States in the Arab world. That is why Americans deserve to hear from their own envoys, Ross and Hale, about why their meeting with Abbas went so badly awry, so that everyone can judge what happened and make the necessary “demographic’’ changes to produce a new generation of American envoys."

Thursday, September 22, 2011

Head of the main pro-Israel think-tank in Washington generously approves Obama's UN speech.

"Instead, with no discussion of Israeli settlement activity, building in Jerusalem, or the difficulties of Palestinian movement through checkpoints, Obama limited himself to one side of the story. In essence, the punishment meted out to Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas for rejecting Washington's request to shelve his UN gambit was that Obama came to New York as Israel's ally, not as an impartial mediator of peace diplomacy."

Is there a credible alternative for the Palestinians?

Obama at AIPAC, May 2011:

"Just as the context has changed in the Middle East, so too has it been changing in the international community over the last several years. There is a reason why the Palestinians are pursuing their interests at the United Nations. They recognize that there is an impatience with the peace process – or the absence of one. Not just in the Arab World, but in Latin America, in Europe, and in Asia. That impatience is growing, and is already manifesting itself in capitols around the world.

"These are the facts. I firmly believe, and repeated on Thursday, that peace cannot be imposed on the parties to the conflict. No vote at the United Nations will ever create an independent Palestinian state. And the United States will stand up against efforts to single Israel out at the UN or in any international forum. Because Israel’s legitimacy is not a matter for debate.

"Moreover, we know that peace demands a partner – which is why I said that Israel cannot be expected to negotiate with Palestinians who do not recognize its right to exist, and we will hold the Palestinians accountable for their actions and their rhetoric.

"But the march to isolate Israel internationally – and the impulse of the Palestinians to abandon negotiations – will continue to gain momentum in the absence of a credible peace process and alternative. For us to have leverage with the Palestinians, with the Arab States, and with the international community, the basis for negotiations has to hold out the prospect of success."

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

Veto?


The so-called "peace process" had ground to a halt.  The White House was diverted by other issues, for instance the sputtering U.S. economy, Libya, Afghanistan to name a few. The principal US officials still involved processing peace, not least the affable but ineffectual Dennis Ross, were occasionally trying to bunt their way to first base, but they typically struck out.

Now the Palestinian initiative at the UN has jarred the US into action, but what is the Obama White House doing other than corroborating its diplomatic isolation with Israel?  The prospect of the US casting a veto to thwart a step that will likely increase pressure on Israel to negotiate responsibly is a stunning paradox, especially at the time when Israel is led by a government that has demonstrated little, if any commitment to a feasible two-state solution.  The US is using its sharp diplomatic elbows to deter support for the Palestine initiative, but there is no evidence that the US is doing much poking in Israel.

Of course, there is an attempt to deter Mahmoud Abbas with a statement by the Quartet, but that statement, at least as presently drafted, it is deeply flawed and it is unlikely to win Palestinian assent.  

US and Israeli interests are not identical, and it is worrying that that simple reality is contentious in Washington.  Given the wider US interests in the Middle East, especially considering the momentous political upheavals in the Middle East, it will be very damaging for the U.S. to cast a veto, which is why Obama and Co. are trying to kill the issue before it gets to the UNSC. What the US should be working to attain is a context in which the issue of Palestinian membership in the UN is met by a US abstention rather than a veto.  

Tuesday, July 19, 2011

Joseph Collins has been observing Afghanistan for 30 years.

Download his new primer for free.  Collins, who was a colleague on the Social Sciences faculty at West Point, is balanced, informed and lucid.