Leaked conversation between then soon-to-be-president al-Sisi and high ranking collaborators about shaking down the Gulf Shaykhs and stashing billions in the Army banks accounts

Borzou Daragahi offers an excellent report on the leaked tapes.

The plotters' ridicule of and obvious disdain for the Gulf "half-states" will not play well in Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Leaked conversations in Arabic (with subtitles)

Insights into the Repressive Character of the Government in Egypt

The response of the Egyptian government to the investigative report "All According to Plan" [حسب الخطة  Arabic link] by Human Rights Watch is extremely revealing and provides insights into the mentality of the al-Sisi regime.  In short, as reported by the flagship al-Ahram, HRW is biased, serves U.S. interests, is in cahoots with the Muslim Brotherhood and had no authority to conduct research in Egypt.  There is a deep-seated suspicion of foreign NGOs in Egypt. I have witnessed it numerous times over the past 35 years.

The latest episode, of course, serves a double purpose, viz., it stifles open discussion of the report and its serious accusations that Field Marshal al-Sisi sits at the helm of a repressive security apparatus that very likely committed crimes against humanity by conducting deliberate mass killings of demonstrators in 2013 following the toppling of Muhammad Mursi as President; and, it serves to warn indigenous rights oriented groups that--unlike HRW officials--they cannot escape reprisal arrests, torture and jail.  You can be sure that while many educated Egyptians with social media access are well aware of the HRW report, but would also confirm that the message to tread very carefully is indelibly received.

The government reaction is addressed by Egyptian Chronicles.

Even in comparison with the worst years of the Mubarak era, this is a very dark chapter in Egypt's modern history.

For official statements in Arabic.

Urban Backlash against Democracy: Battling the Tyranny of the Majority or the Rise of Rural Power?

Robert Bianchi, author of the still rewarding and remarkably topical Unruly Corporatism (OUP, 1989), offers an analysis that is incisive and persuasive.  Through an examination of the election results in 2011 and 2012, he demonstrates that Mohammed Mursi and the Ikhwan's Freedom and Justice Party enjoyed a deep level of support among its sizable but comparatively disadvantaged constituency.  The electoral results correspond to the deep divisions between the Egyptian geographic and economic peripheries and the relatively affluent urban and provincial middle and working classes, not to mention privileged elites who benefited significantly from the pre-revolutionary status quo and strongly supported General Ahmed Shafiq's campaign for the presidency.  The upshot of Bianchi paper is that notwithstanding the propaganda of the al-Sisi regime, one easily surmises that Egypt remains a deeply cleaved society and that the base constituencies of the Ikhwan remain.

The July 3 coup in Egypt: What the law says

Excerpt from the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012:

Coups d'etat

Sec. 7008. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made

available pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the

government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'etat [added emphasis] or decree or, after the date of enactment of this Act, a coup d'etat or decree in which the military plays a decisive role: 

Provided, <> That assistance may be resumed to such government if the President determines and certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that subsequent to the termination of assistance a democratically elected government has taken office: Provided further, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic <> processes: 

Provided further, That

[[Page 125 STAT. 1196]]

funds made available pursuant to the previous provisos shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.

What the White House says:

"I'm being very clear with you ... this is a complex and difficult issue with significant consequences," Carney said during his daily briefing, the first since Egypt's military ousted Morsi nearly a week ago. Calling the action a coup could cut off more than $1.5 billion in annual U.S. foreign aid for Egypt.
But the Obama administration is reluctant to cut off aid. "We think it would not be in the best interests of the United States" to change its aid program at this time, Carney said. Asked if that would mean the administration would be cutting off aid in the near-term, Carney repeated his response: "we think that would not be in our best interests." 

The Egyptian Army is not an instrument of either reform or democracy

The Egyptian Army is not a democratic institution despite its recent pretensions.  One only needs to recall following the ouster of Mubarak for a reminder of how quickly the Army's penchant for autocracy surfaces.  Today's slaughter of scores of apparently innocent civilian protesters underlines the urgency of getting the generals out of the Presidential palace.

Before the situation in Egypt slides further into mayhem, the USG, and not least Obama, needs to grasp that pretending what has happened was not a coup d'état only encourages the generals.  The beginning of an effective policy response is using the word c-o-u-p.  This will oblige the US to suspend military aid and strengthen leverage for moving quickly to a government of national reconciliation.  Now, more than ever, insuring the participation of the MB in such a government is urgent.

The most thuggish institution in Egypt is the police, which has resisted successfully recent attempts at reform.   unless there is an effective establishment of an effective civilian transitional leadership, the police, with the Army's sufferance if not collusion, will return to the business as usual that they know best, namely beating, abusing and arresting anyone who deems to challenge their reign.  

The situation in Egypt threatens to unravel disastrously and compelling US interests demand a firm and unmistakable commitment to inclusive civilian rule in Egypt.  Dawdling only amplifies the long-range risks for the US.

Perceptive OPED by Khaled Abou el-Fadl, "Perils of a People's Coup."

[Also see the concise analysis of Prof. Yoram Meital, a serious student of Egypt, and Sarah Carr's powerful reflection, "On Sheep and Infidels".]

Walter Armbrust, who knows Egypt quite well, offers a thoughtful essay on the strategy of rope-a-dope strategy of the Egyptian generals.

The essay was published in al-Jazeera English.

It is noteworthy that the satellite TV station al-Fara'ayn, which figures importantly in the essay, apparently has been allowed to re-open after being shut on June 30 for criticism of the army commander.  The station has been a platform for Taufiq 'Ukasha, the Mubarak leftover who has been compared to the U.S. conspiracy monger Glenn Beck.  'Ukasha frequently lambasted President Muhammad Mursi for a surfeit of real and imagined failures and motives.

[With the Constitution suspended, the Ministry of Social Affairs has reclaimed it power to ban NGOs and may seek to move against the MB for its use of violence in defending its Cairo Guidance Bureau from being ransacked by demonstrators.

The July 3 Coup

For the opponents of Muhammad Mursi and the Brotherhood this is a moment of euphoria.  But, the moment is unlikely to be followed by significant improvement in economic conditions.  Moreover, there is a high risk of a return to authoritarian rule. While many Egyptians celebrate the coup, it is prudent to be  deeply distrustful of the Egyptian generals and their motives.  They have been the power behind the curtains for decades, and they have consistently acted to protect their sacrosanct budget and privileges.  Their notion of tutelary or guided democracy is a recipe for continued stagnation and repression. 

Mursi was a lousy president; he was not up to the job and he imprudently over-reached.  Yet, much of the bureaucracy, not least the police and the army, willfully thwarted his power and hastened his failure.  When Mursi attempted to engage in dialogue with his opponents in 2012 (pre-empting an Army initiative), the generals let the opposition know that they should not play.

It is very troubling that the generals have not only dumped Mursi, but have now gone after the senior MB leadership, and much of the second tier leadership.  Many will be charged with crimes, apparently.  This may be preliminary to re-criminalizing the MB, which would be reckless. 

A significant percentage of the voting public will support the MB in future elections. This suggests that the only way to preclude their winning future elections may be to return to Mubarak-era policies of preemptive arrests, voter suppression and manufactured electoral results.

Meantime, the anti-Mursi opposition has demonstrated little ability to organize politically versus mobilizing protests.  Indeed, the only group, other than the MB, with a serious nation-wide organization happens to be al-Nour, the Salafist party (which has aligned momentarily with the Army against Mursi).  The social and cultural views of the Salafists make the MB look moderate by comparison.

Of course, the alternative to the coup would have been for millions of Egyptians to continue to suffer under Mursi's inept rule, and to work for a shift in the power balance through parliamentary elections scheduled previously postponed to this autumn.  That is not appealing advice for people who abhor the MB and who are living through very difficult times, but I suggest that it would have been the wiser course if the generals really were intent on preserving the "January 25 Revolution."  

[Please also read the eminently sensible piece by Emile Nakhleh.  He urges a firm policy response by the Obama Adminstration, including a clearly-stated demand that the Egyptian military allow the acting president a free hand to shepherd a process of national reconciliation.]