The Discerning Texan

Stroll through downtown Fallujah or Ramadi? Could happen, not likely. Would be a major, almost unprecedented move for a President of the United States. Madison exposed himself to British fire in the sacking of Washington, 1814, when he left the White House to check on American soldiers.* Slightly different circumstances. Do it, George.

Notably, Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki had to board a flight from Baghdad to Al Anbar to meet with the President. So much for defiant, “we don’t need you” talk from Maliki. It’s clear who was deferring to who, and why. The flight was also notable in that provided a pointed symbol for Mr. Maliki to consider - a Shiite leader who has failed to keep his own Shiite house in order, and who has been cozying up far too closely with US and Iraq enemy Iran, was flying into almost entirely pacified Sunni territory undergoing a construction and redevelopment boom.

Bush and his team met with General David Petraeus and US ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker. The president will speak to about 750 troops for about 10 or 15 minutes said White House spokeswoman Dana Perino, before he continues on to Australia.

Self-appointed Iraq experts Brian DePalma and Mark Cuban were nowhere to be seen.

Related: Bush Circumvents Maliki With Money For Al Anbar Reconstruction

Meanwhile over at Ace of Spades HQ, Drew M. adds:

The countdown to the Democrats crying about playing politics ahead of Petraeus’ report next week is officially underway. As if constantly shilling for America’s defeat for electoral gains isn’t playing politics.

As someone who has soured on Bush in the last year (mainly over immigration amnesty), I have to hand it to the guy. This is quite a gesture, going to the heart of the region that was probably the most dangerous place on Earth not so long ago and is now a true success story for us.

I don't think in American military history there have been too many occasions when so much has rested on the shoulders of just one commander, quite unfairly to be sure. But like it or not, in the political sense of maintaining the war, we are in a Sherman-like make or break decision at Atlanta (taken 143 years ago today), or a Ridgeway moment in Korea, where only a gifted commander like Petraeus can instill the leadership necessary to restore support at home through his success abroad.

In a strange sense, more than ever the ante has been raised, and there is the eerie feeling far more than just Iraq is at stake right now in the next few weeks, but rather the nature of the entire Middle East and the American global role even beyond the region.

So I think it is finally time to give us a pass on the Aruba and Paris Hilton news alerts. We owe that much to the troops in harm's way.

How will this affect the debate on Iraq here in the US? It will show that more of Iraq has been secured in a rather dramatic fashion. A year ago, a presidential visit to Anbar would have been a ludicrous suggestion. His meetings with tribal leaders may have been even more ludicrous regardless of whether they occurred in Anbar or Baghdad. It cuts through the filters of conventional wisdom and media narratives to make a rather bold point about the progress since the start of the surge.

More importantly, how does this affect politics inside Iraq? By meeting with Maliki, Bush can assuage some hurt feelings over calls for Maliki's ouster by Hillary Clinton and Carl Levin. However, his meetings with tribal leaders will demonstrate that the US will be willing to work with a broad range of political leadership, a move that should send a message to Maliki. It will be a recognition of tribal leaders who have chosen political engagement rather than terrorist support, which will strengthen the momentum towards political reform.

It's a smart move in all directions. Bush has once again shown the relevance and the power of the presidency, and he chose the best possible time for this demonstration.

Labels: Defeatocrats, Iraq, President Bush, War strategy, War Successes

Labels: Counterinsurgency, Iraq, War strategy, War Successes

Labels: al-Sadr, America War Support, Iran, Iraq, War strategy, War Successes

Labels: Iraq, Military Technology, War strategy

If this London Times account is accurate, it sounds like good news:

In North Waziristan, the wild border land that America hopes will be Osama Bin Laden’s graveyard, the normally busy roads are almost deserted and the fear is pervasive. Army helicopters sweep the valleys at night hunting for Al-Qaeda militants as troops and gunmen exchange artillery and rocket fire.

America and Britain regard this usually autonomous tribal area - where Bin Laden is long believed to have been hiding - as the logistics centre of Islamic terrorist attacks around the world.

President Pervez Musharraf sees it as the centre of a campaign to “Talibanise” Pakistan. Spurred on by Washington, he has abandoned a truce with Waziristan’s Islamist guerrillas and ordered his army to root them out.

There are believed to be about 8,000 gunmen – a mix of foreign Al-Qaeda volunteers, Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Islamists and local Waziris whose families have for centuries fought off any attempt to impose outside rule on this area. In modern times, even map-makers have been shot to hide the region’s mysteries from the outside world.

Last week soldiers sealed all the roads into Miran Shah, the provincial capital, occupied the hills around it and fired the first artillery salvo in what Musharraf’s many critics have called a war on his own people.

It's always hard to evaluate these reports; we've heard similar things before. But if Musharraf is serious about going after the extremists hiding in Waziristan, it can only be a good thing.

Labels: Al Qaeda, Islamic Fascism, Pakistan, Taliban, The Long War, War strategy

... Nearly six years after the 9/11 attacks, America remains a nation at war. The terrorist network that attacked us that day is determined to strike our country again, and we must do everything in our power to stop them. A key lesson of September the 11th is that the best way to protect America is to go on the offense, to fight the terrorists overseas so we don't have to face them here at home. And that is exactly what our men and women in uniform are doing across the world.

The key theater in this global war is Iraq. Our troops are serving bravely in that country. They're opposing ruthless enemies, and no enemy is more ruthless in Iraq than al Qaeda. They send suicide bombers into crowded markets; they behead innocent captives and they murder American troops. They want to bring down Iraq's democracy so they can use that nation as a terrorist safe haven for attacks against our country. So our troops are standing strong with nearly 12 million Iraqis who voted for a future of peace, and they so for the security of Iraq and the safety of American citizens.

There's a debate in Washington about Iraq, and nothing wrong with a healthy debate. There's also a debate about al Qaeda's role in Iraq. Some say that Iraq is not part of the broader war on terror. They complain when I say that the al Qaeda terrorists we face in Iraq are part of the same enemy that attacked us on September the 11th, 2001. They claim that the organization called al Qaeda in Iraq is an Iraqi phenomenon, that it's independent of Osama bin Laden and that it's not interested in attacking America.

That would be news to Osama bin Laden. He's proclaimed that the "third world war is raging in Iraq." Osama bin Laden says, "The war is for you or for us to win. If we win it, it means your defeat and disgrace forever." I say that there will be a big defeat in Iraq and it will be the defeat of al Qaeda. (Applause.)

Today I will consider the arguments of those who say that al Qaeda and al Qaeda in Iraq are separate entities. I will explain why they are both part of the same terrorist network -- and why they are dangerous to our country.

A good place to start is with some basic facts: Al Qaeda in Iraq was founded by a Jordanian terrorist, not an Iraqi. His name was Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Before 9/11, he ran a terrorist camp in Afghanistan. He was not yet a member of al Qaida, but our intelligence community reports that he had longstanding relations with senior al Qaida leaders, that he had met with Osama bin Laden and his chief deputy, Zawahiri.

In 2001, coalition forces destroyed Zarqawi's Afghan training camp, and he fled the country and he went to Iraq, where he set up operations with terrorist associates long before the arrival of coalition forces. In the violence and instability following Saddam's fall, Zarqawi was able to expand dramatically the size, scope, and lethality of his operation. In 2004, Zarqawi and his terrorist group formally joined al Qaida, pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden, and he promised to "follow his orders in jihad."

Soon after, bin Laden publicly declared that Zarqawi was the "Prince of Al Qaida in Iraq" -- and instructed terrorists in Iraq to "listen to him and obey him." It's hard to argue that al Qaida in Iraq is separate from bin Laden's al Qaida, when the leader of al Qaida in Iraq took an oath of allegiance to Osama bin Laden.

According to our intelligence community, the Zarqawi-bin Laden merger gave al Qaida in Iraq -- quote -- "prestige among potential recruits and financiers." The merger also gave al Qaida's senior leadership -- quote -- "a foothold in Iraq to extend its geographic presence ... to plot external operations ... and to tout the centrality of the jihad in Iraq to solicit direct monetary support elsewhere." The merger between al Qaida and its Iraqi affiliate is an alliance of killers -- and that is why the finest military in the world is on their trail.

Zarqawi was killed by U.S. forces in June 2006. He was replaced by another foreigner -- an Egyptian named Abu Ayyub al-Masri. His ties to the al Qaida senior leadership are deep and longstanding. He has collaborated with Zawahiri for more than two decades. And before 9/11, he spent time with al Qaida in Afghanistan where he taught classes indoctrinating others in al Qaida's radical ideology.

After Abu Ayyub took over al Qaida's Iraqi operations last year, Osama bin Laden sent a terrorist leader named Abd al-Hadi al Iraqi to help him. According to our intelligence community, this man was a senior advisor to bin Laden, who served as his top commander in Afghanistan. Abd al-Hadi never made it to Iraq. He was captured, and was recently transferred to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. The fact that bin Laden risked sending one of his most valued commanders to Iraq shows the importance he places on success of al Qaida's Iraqi operations.

According to our intelligence community, many of al Qaida in Iraq's other senior leaders are also foreign terrorists. They include a Syrian who is al Qaida in Iraq's emir in Baghdad, a Saudi who is al Qaida in Iraq's top spiritual and legal advisor, an Egyptian who fought in Afghanistan in the 1990s and who has met with Osama bin Laden, a Tunisian who we believe plays a key role in managing foreign fighters. Last month in Iraq, we killed a senior al Qaida facilitator named Mehmet Yilmaz, a Turkish national who fought with al Qaida in Afghanistan, and met with September the 11th mastermind Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, and other senior al Qaida leaders.

A few weeks ago, we captured a senior al Qaida in Iraq leader named Mashadani. Now, this terrorist is an Iraqi. In fact, he was the highest ranking Iraqi in the organization. Here's what he said, here's what he told us: The foreign leaders of Al Qaida in Iraq went to extraordinary lengths to promote the fiction that al Qaida in Iraq is an Iraqi-led operation. He says al Qaida even created a figurehead whom they named Omar al-Baghdadi. The purpose was to make Iraqi fighters believe they were following the orders of an Iraqi instead of a foreigner. Yet once in custody, Mashadani revealed that al-Baghdadi is only an actor. He confirmed our intelligence that foreigners are at the top echelons of al Qaida in Iraq -- they are the leaders -- and that foreign leaders make most of the operational decisions, not Iraqis.

Foreign terrorists also account for most of the suicide bombings in Iraq. Our military estimates that between 80 and 90 percent of suicide attacks in Iraq are carried out by foreign-born al Qaida terrorists. It's true that today most of al Qaida in Iraq's rank and file fighters and some of its leadership are Iraqi. But to focus exclusively on this single fact is to ignore the larger truth: Al Qaida in Iraq is a group founded by foreign terrorists, led largely by foreign terrorists, and loyal to a foreign terrorist leader -- Osama bin Laden. They know they're al Qaida. The Iraqi people know they are al Qaida. People across the Muslim world know they are al Qaida. And there's a good reason they are called al Qaida in Iraq: They are al Qaida ... in ... Iraq.

Some also assert that al Qaida in Iraq is a separate organization because al Qaida's central command lacks full operational control over it. This argument reveals a lack of understanding. Here is how al Qaida's global terrorist network actually operates. Al Qaida and its affiliate organizations are a loose network of terrorist groups that are united by a common ideology and shared objectives, and have differing levels of collaboration with the al Qaida senior leadership. In some cases, these groups have formally merged into al Qaida and take what is called a "bayaat" -- a pledge of loyalty to Osama bin Laden. In other cases, organizations are not formally merged with al Qaida, but collaborate closely with al Qaida leaders to plot attacks and advance their shared ideology. In still other cases, there are small cells of terrorists that are not part of al Qaida or any other broader terrorist group, but maintain contact with al Qaida leaders and are inspired by its ideology to conduct attacks.

Our intelligence community assesses that al Qaida in Iraq falls into the first of these categories. They are a full member of the al Qaida terrorist network. The al Qaida leadership provides strategic guidance to their Iraqi operatives. Even so, there have been disagreements -- important disagreements -- between the leaders, Osama bin Laden and their Iraqi counterparts, including Zawahiri's criticism of Zarqawi's relentless attacks on the Shia. But our intelligence community reports that al Qaida's senior leaders generally defer to their Iraqi-based commanders when it comes to internal operations, because distance and security concerns preclude day-to-day command authority.

Our intelligence community concludes that -- quote -- "Al Qaida and its regional node in Iraq are united in their overarching strategy." And they say that al Qaida senior leaders and their operatives in Iraq -- quote -- "see al Qaida in Iraq as part of al Qaida's decentralized chain of command, not as a separate group."

Here's the bottom line: Al Qaida in Iraq is run by foreign leaders loyal to Osama bin Laden. Like bin Laden, they are cold-blooded killers who murder the innocent to achieve al Qaida's political objectives. Yet despite all the evidence, some will tell you that al Qaida in Iraq is not really al Qaida -- and not really a threat to America. Well, that's like watching a man walk into a bank with a mask and a gun, and saying he's probably just there to cash a check.

You might wonder why some in Washington insist on making this distinction about the enemy in Iraq. It's because they know that if they can convince America we're not fighting bin Laden's al Qaida there, they can paint the battle in Iraq as a distraction from the real war on terror. If we're not fighting bin Laden's al Qaida, they can argue that our nation can pull out of Iraq and not undermine our efforts in the war on terror. The problem they have is with the facts. We are fighting bin Laden's al Qaida in Iraq; Iraq is central to the war on terror; and against this enemy, America can accept nothing less than complete victory. (Applause.)

There are others who accept that al Qaida is operating in Iraq, but say its role is overstated. Al Qaida is one of the several Sunni jihadist groups in Iraq. But our intelligence community believes that al Qaida is the most dangerous of these Sunni jihadist groups for several reasons: First, more than any other group, al Qaida is behind most of the spectacular, high-casualty attacks that you see on your TV screens.

Second, these al Qaida attacks are designed to accelerate sectarian violence, by attacking Shia in hopes of sparking reprisal attacks that inspire Sunnis to join al Qaida's cause.

Third, al Qaida is the only jihadist group in Iraq with stated ambitions to make the country a base for attacks outside Iraq. For example, al Qaida in Iraq dispatched terrorists who bombed a wedding reception in Jordan. In another case, they sent operatives to Jordan where they attempted to launch a rocket attack on U.S. Navy ships in the Red Sea.

And most important for the people who wonder if the fight in Iraq is worth it, al Qaida in Iraq shares Osama bin Laden's goal of making Iraq a base for its radical Islamic empire, and using it as a safe haven for attacks on America. That is why our intelligence community reports -- and I quote -- "compared with [other leading Sunni jihadist groups], al Qaida in Iraq stands out for its extremism, unmatched operational strength, foreign leadership, and determination to take the jihad beyond Iraq's borders."

Our top commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, has said that al Qaida is "public enemy number one" in Iraq. Fellow citizens, these people have sworn allegiance to the man who ordered the death of nearly 3,000 people on our soil. Al Qaida is public enemy number one for the Iraqi people; al Qaida is public enemy number one for the American people. And that is why, for the security of our country, we will stay on the hunt, we'll deny them safe haven, and we will defeat them where they have made their stand. (Applause.)

Some note that al Qaida in Iraq did not exist until the U.S. invasion -- and argue that it is a problem of our own making. The argument follows the flawed logic that terrorism is caused by American actions. Iraq is not the reason that the terrorists are at war with us. We were not in Iraq when the terrorists bombed the World Trade Center in 1993. We were not in Iraq when they attacked our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. We were not in Iraq when they attacked the USS Cole in 2000. And we were not in Iraq on September the 11th, 2001.

Our action to remove Saddam Hussein did not start the terrorist violence -- and America withdrawal from Iraq would not end it. The al Qaida terrorists now blowing themselves up in Iraq are dedicated extremists who have made killing the innocent the calling of their lives. They are part of a network that has murdered men, women, and children in London and Madrid; slaughtered fellow Muslims in Istanbul and Casablanca, Riyadh, Jakarta, and elsewhere around the world. If we were not fighting these al Qaida extremists and terrorists in Iraq, they would not be leading productive lives of service and charity. Most would be trying to kill Americans and other civilians elsewhere -- in Afghanistan, or other foreign capitals, or on the streets of our own cities.

Al Qaida is in Iraq -- and they're there for a reason. And surrendering the future of Iraq to al Qaida would be a disaster for our country. We know their intentions. Hear the words of al Qaida's top commander in Iraq when he issued an audio statement in which he said he will not rest until he has attacked our nation's capital. If we were to cede Iraq to men like this, we would leave them free to operate from a safe haven which they could use to launch new attacks on our country. And al Qaida would gain prestige amongst the extremists across the Muslim world as the terrorist network that faced down America and forced us into retreat.

If we were to allow this to happen, sectarian violence in Iraq could increase dramatically, raising the prospect of mass casualties. Fighting could engulf the entire region in chaos, and we would soon face a Middle East dominated by Islamic extremists who would pursue nuclear weapons, and use their control of oil for economic blackmail or to fund new attacks on our nation.

We've already seen how al Qaida used a failed state thousands of miles from our shores to bring death and destruction to the streets of our cities -- and we must not allow them to do so again. So, however difficult the fight is in Iraq, we must win it. And we can win it.

Less than a year ago, Anbar Province was al Qaida's base in Iraq and was written off by many as lost. Since then, U.S. and Iraqi forces have teamed with Sunni sheiks who have turned against al Qaida. Hundreds have been killed or captured. Terrorists have been driven from most of the population centers. Our troops are now working to replicate the success in Anbar in other parts of the country. Our brave men and women are taking risks, and they're showing courage, and we're making progress.

For the security of our citizens, and the peace of the world, we must give General Petraeus and his troops the time and resources they need, so they can defeat al Qaida in Iraq. (Applause.)

Thanks for letting me come by today. I've explained the connection between al Qaida and its Iraqi affiliate. I presented intelligence that clearly establishes this connection. The facts are that al Qaida terrorists killed Americans on 9/11, they're fighting us in Iraq and across the world, and they are plotting to kill Americans here at home again. Those who justify withdrawing our troops from Iraq by denying the threat of al Qaida in Iraq and its ties to Osama bin Laden ignore the clear consequences of such a retreat. If we were to follow their advice, it would be dangerous for the world -- and disastrous for America. We will defeat al Qaida in Iraq.

In this effort, we're counting on the brave men and women represented in this room. Every man and woman who serves at this base and around the world is playing a vital role in this war on terror. With your selfless spirit and devotion to duty, we will confront this mortal threat to our country -- and we're going to prevail.

Labels: Al Qaeda, Democrat Sabotage, Iraq, President Bush, War strategy

Labels: Iraq, War strategy, War Successes

Labels: Iraq, Petreaus, War strategy, War Successes

If US troops leave prematurely, the Iraqi government is likely to collapse, which could trigger violence on a far deadlier scale than Iraq is experiencing now. Iran's malignant influence will intensify, and with it the likelihood of intensified Sunni-Shiite conflict, and even a nuclear arms race, across the Middle East. Anti-American terrorists and fanatics worldwide will be emboldened. Iraq would emerge, in Senator John McCain's words, "as a Wild West for terrorists, similar to Afghanistan before 9/11." Once again -- as in Vietnam, in Lebanon, in Somalia -- the United States would have proven the weaker horse, unwilling to see a fight through to the finish.

Yet none of this seems to trouble the surrender lobby, which either doesn't think about the consequences of abandoning Iraq, or is convinced a US departure will actually make things better. "If everyone knows we're leaving, it will put the fear of God into them," Voinovich declares. Sure it will. Nothing scares Al Qaeda like seeing Americans in retreat.

Three decades ago, similar arguments were made in support of abandoning Southeast Asia to the communists. To President Ford's warning in March 1975 that "the horror and the tragedy that we see on television" would only grow worse if the United States cut off aid to the beleaguered government in Cambodia, then-Representative Christopher Dodd of Connecticut retorted: "The greatest gift our country can give to the Cambodian people is peace, not guns. And the best way to accomplish that goal is by ending military aid now." So Washington ended military aid, and Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge, which proceeded to exterminate nearly 2 million Cambodians in one of the ghastliest genocides of modern times.

On April 13, 1975, four days before the communist reign of terror began, Sydney Schanberg's front-page story in The New York Times was headlined: "Indochina Without Americans: For Most, A Better Life." In retrospect, perhaps such drastic misjudgments can be partly excused on the grounds that Americans didn't really know what horrors Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge were capable of.

But there will be no such excuse for those who insist on pulling out of Iraq. For they know only too well what horrors Al Qaeda and its jihadist allies are capable of. Beheadings. Suicide bombings. Lynchings. Child murder. Chlorine gas attacks. Bali. Madrid. 7/7.

9/11. ...

Read the whole thing here.

Labels: Ignorance of History, Iraq, Islamic Fascism, The Long War, War strategy

Labels: America War Support, Democrat Sabotage, Iraq, Military, War strategy

Labels: Al Qaeda, Islamic Fascism, Musharraf, Palestine, Taliban, War strategy

The airplane is the size of a jet fighter, powered by a turboprop engine, able to fly at 300 mph and reach 50,000 feet. It's outfitted with infrared, laser and radar targeting, and with a ton and a half of guided bombs and missiles.

The Reaper is loaded, but there's no one on board. Its pilot, as it bombs targets in Iraq, will sit at a video console 7,000 miles away in Nevada.

The arrival of these outsized U.S. "hunter-killer" drones, in aviation history's first robot attack squadron, will be a watershed moment even in an Iraq that has seen too many innovative ways to hunt and kill.

Labels: Afghanistan, Iraq, Military Technology, The Long War, War strategy

Labels: Iran, Iraq, Islamic Fascism, The Long War, War strategy

Labels: ACLU, Intelligence, War strategy

Labels: Al Qaeda, Cyberwar, Taliban, War strategy

The government has ordered the local media not to report on the unrest caused by rationing, but the orders are being widely ignored, as newspapers and bloggers report that gas stations are being set afire and that drivers are forced to wait in lines that are several miles long in order to purchase gas. The police chief in Tehran said that 17 gas stations in the capital were damaged (12 set afire) and that rioters broke windows in cars and bank buildings. Two years ago, Mr. Ahmadinejad was elected president after running for office on a populist platform — one based on improving the quality of life by building or subsidizing public improvements (i.e., building new schools, or public parks or making it possible for new factories and jobs to relocate to one or another town). But he has failed to deliver on these promises.

[...]

Right now, President Bush and the rest of the civilized world are in a race against time: Unless the regime falls, it will likely obtain nuclear weapons. The only way to stop that short of war is to use sanctions and other forms of economic pressure to give the regime a final push. According to Mr. Timmerman, the British government is proposing a U.N. Security Council resolution that would bar Iranian ships from landing at foreign ports and transiting international waters, a move that would cut off approximately 40 percent of Iran's daily oil exports in the short run. This is the kind of project the international community must embrace, because if economic pressure does not work, the only alternatives left will be 1) military action, or 2) acquiescing to the unthinkable: allowing the sociopathic mullahs in Tehran to obtain nuclear weapons.

Labels: Iran, Islamic Fascism, War strategy

Labels: Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Iran, Pakistan, War strategy, War Successes

Labels: Associated Press, Cartoons, Iraq, Media Bias, Media War, War strategy

Like many opponents of the Iraq war, Patricia Smith Churchland, Charles B. Strozier, Ole J. Theinhaus, Peter Russert, and David Smith extrapolate its unwinnability from the Bush administration’s alleged failings in waging it. They rehearse liberal boilerplate about how the President “lied” about weapons of mass destruction (ignoring the fact that President Clinton described the threat from Saddam in 1998 in similar terms), about administration incompetence (although this same administration toppled Saddam’s entire regime in less than six weeks and with only 183 casualties), about how Halliburton has made “vast amounts of money” in war profiteering, and so on.

But these familiar plaints, even when not laced with intimations of conspiracy on the part of American government and industry, are immaterial to the central issue. That issue is how to avoid past military mistakes, of which there have been many in Iraq (just as there were in World War II, which we eventually won), and how to find the right strategy for the future. The fact that the Left and the media continue to assert, prematurely, that the war is lost is very much relevant to whether we succeed or not, as I emphasized in my article. The strategy of General David Petraeus represents a different approach to fighting the insurgency in Iraq from that of his predecessors—an approach that holds out much promise, if it is given a chance.

...

In fact, the successes of the Petraeus surge since my article went to press suggest that the war is not nearly over. Sectarian violence in Baghdad is down markedly. Another hopeful sign was the news in late May that local American commanders will be able to negotiate cease-fires in their districts—a huge step in empowering local Iraqi elites to defuse the insurgency. A year ago, the situation in Anbar province seemed hopelessly out of control, but now the Sunni leadership there is turning against the insurgents. If such developments were to spread, the prognosis for Iraq’s future would look far more hopeful.

Reversals for the better are not uncommon in the history of warfare, as I pointed out in my article. The French experienced such a turn in 1956-69 in Algeria, as did the Americans in Vietnam in 1970-72 (under very different circumstances), though both went on to withdraw without achieving victory. ... the decisive factor in both wars was a public that had lost confidence in the military’s leadership, despite its superior position on the battlefield. We are in danger of ending up in the same place today, though with much less reason.

...

The growing consensus, even among opponents of the war like Brent Scowcroft and Anthony Zinni, is that getting out of Iraq is no longer an option. Mr. Smith’s notion that abandoning Iraq will lead to some kind of “national reconciliation” on the model of Vietnam is wrong at both ends of the analogy. In Vietnam, tens of thousands of boat people had to flee for their lives or spend years in Communist reeducation camps. The sectarian violence in Iraq is at a high level even with all our efforts to contain it. If we withdraw, a bloodbath will likely ensue.

Labels: Iraq, War strategy, War Successes

And when it comes from McClatchy newspapers, you know it must be genuine, or they wouldn't print it. A two-thirds drop in the civilian casualty rate in and around Baghdad. Funny, I wouldn't have had that impression from the daily coverage over the last month. They've been focusing on the rise in military casualties, which were always anticipated with the current surge.

Civilian deaths decreasing
By Mike Drummond - McClatchy Newspapers

BAGHDAD -- Iraqi civilian deaths in Baghdad dropped significantly in June, a possible indication that recent American military operations around the country and raids on car-bomb shops in the "belts" ringing the capital are starting to pay off.

But June also marked the end of the bloodiest quarter for U.S. troops since the war began in March 2003.

Unofficial figures compiled by McClatchy Newspapers' show 189 Iraqis, including police and government security forces, were killed in the capital through Friday, a drop of almost two thirds since this year's high in February, when 520 were killed. The average monthly death toll of Iraqis in Baghdad was 410 from December through May.

Labels: Iraq, War strategy, War Successes