First, a few quick items:
1) The Kosher Cooking Carnival is here; thanks for the great billing, Isramom!
And while we’re on the topic of cooking, the wonderful Rebbetzin came across a great-looking Rosh HaShanah recipe, “Roasted Chicken, Apples and Leeks,” here at Real Simple.
2) You already know I love my ScienceDaily emails; here are two more reasons, from the “No Kidding!” department:
Fake Popup Warnings Fool Internet Users Even After Repeated Mistakes
and
Facebook Profiles Can Be Used To Detect Narcissism.
Thank you for making this possible with your tax dollars, and your contributions to your university’s endowment fund.
3) Oh, and one more weird one, from a Real Simple article on Apple-Picking:
Pack an old-fashioned bag-and-thermos lunch, but swap the typical PB & J for something more interesting, like Roasted Sweet Potato and Apple Soup and Cucumber and Goat Cheese Sandwiches.
Um… I guess you and I have different definitions of “Real Simple.”
But back to the topic of this post:
I had a dream last night, in which I was leining the pasuk, כי חלק ה' עמו יעקב חבל נחלתו, but the word נחלתו was missing. I hunted for it, and eventually found it written in the wrong place, a line before the spot in which it belonged. (Translation: The sentence was supposed to be, For Gd’s nation is His portion; Jacob is the portion of Gd’s inheritance. The word missing was of Gd’s inheritance. It’s Devarim 32:9.)
It’s not that unusual for me to experience a stress dream about having a Torah-reading problem. I am the shul’s regular baal keriah, I lein all the time, so this is the equivalent of a public speaker dreaming about getting up to speak and finding he can’t read his notes, or a chef dreaming about not being able to locate the salt.
The dream was also missing a key realistic element, which makes me more likely to dismiss it: That sentence comes from the shirah of Haazinu, which is written in the Torah in poetic columns, but in my dream it was in the Torah’s normal paragraph format. Even in the middle of the night I would remember that detail; Haazinu is one of my favorite segments in the Torah, with its beautiful poetry.
Still, the dream disturbs me.
What could it mean? Some possibilities:
It’s a reminder to speak about Israel, our נחלה/inheritance, more often.
It’s a reminder to speak about Jewish unity, which makes us a single portion of Gd.
It’s a warning of guilt for me; our status as Gd’s inheritance relies on the merit and covenant of our ancestors, and I am not living up to that merit and covenant.
I don’t know. I’m not about to declare a תענית חלום (taanit chalom, a fast undertaken to atone for one’s sins, triggered by a frightening dream) for myself, but I wonder what was going inside my head last night.
Lion of Zion, if you want to shed light on the leining issue, go ahead. Therapydoc, you're welcome to weigh in on the dream.
Showing posts with label Judaism: Dreams. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judaism: Dreams. Show all posts
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
Thursday, September 11, 2008
Daf: Gittin 51-54 – Psychology of Borrowers, Tzedakah, Dream Prophecy and Parenting
Getting closer to catching up on my Daf Yomi notes. Bored by this? No problem; jump down to read about how Israel, with Large Hadron Collider, creates Black Hole to destroy Palestinians.
Gittin 51a
See Tosafot וכי; I find this read simpler than that of Rashi.
Gittin 51b
Our gemara here makes a psychological assumption which, I think, requires explanation. The gemara says that a borrower who could not pay back his debt might deny part of the debt in an attempt to stall full payment, but he would not have the chutzpah to deny the debt entirely, in front of his benefactor. Therefore, if a defendant denies a debt entirely, we trust him.
In our day, this seems strange – of course people would lie! But I think that’s partly a function of the change in lending habits. Today, individuals rarely lend significant sums of money; institutions are the lenders, with their mortgages. But in the days of the gemara, as I have explained elsewhere, interest-free loans were the chief engine of tzedakah from one individual to another.
Therefore, the borrower, knowing he has received hefty tzedakah from the plaintiff, would not have the hubris to deny the tzedakah outright and in entirety.
Gittin 52a
The gemara here says that court-appointed guardians cannot perform mitzvot for his charges using their funds, if the sums that would be spent would not be known and fixed (קצבה). Mezuzot are considered to have a known, fixed value. Tzedakah, on the other hand, does not.
One might argue that tzedakah has a fixed value, 10% of income, but that would not be correct. We have two separate mitzvot of tzedakah. One is the requirement to give to needy people who are standing before us, and there is no limit on that giving. The practice of giving 10% is a separate custom of allocating 10% of our income to tzedakah, and going to find needy people to whom we will be able to distribute it.
The gemara here says that dreams “לא מעלין ולא מורידין,” have no practical import. This would seem to clash with the idea that dreams have some element of prophecy, a view held by many sages!
Of course, the most famous passage of gemara on this theme, in the 9th chapter of Berachot, offers both views. Ibn Ezra, though, among others, argued that the majority view is that dreams do have great prophetic significance!
R’ Yehudah haChasid (Sefer Chasidim 444) argued that dreams are considered prophetically significant. He explained our gemara to mean that if one sees in a dream that he should do something wrong, then he should say that dreams are insignificant. This fits our gemara, in which the dreamer (Rabbi Meir) felt the dream was giving him inappropriate counsel.
Gittin 52b
The gemara says that although we ordinarily require a thirty-day waiting period for evaluation and bids before selling minor orphans’ property on their behalf, this is not the case where the money is needed for burial. Tosafot ולקבורה asks that this is obvious, since we don’t delay burial! He explains that the gemara is saying we would sell off the property immediately even to pay debts incurred in the process of burial.
Gittin 54a
The gemara here debates whether we fine people for accidental violation of the law, in order to keep them from violating it intentionally. There is a concern that if we do not penalize accidental violation, people will be careless.
This same debate comes up in the field of parenting, too; do we punish children for accidents, in an attempt to make them be more careful? Does that method work?
Gittin 54b
Abayye says that we believe a person who says that he disqualified my korban or contaminated my produce with טומאה, if he could just as easily do it right now, anyway. The idea seems to be that since, if we didn’t believe him, he could go ahead and do it right now, we might as well believe him about the past.
This seems a bit odd to me; after all, his testimony about the past was that happened by accident in the past. Would we really think he would do this intentionally, violating biblical law?! (There is, as I recall, a Tosafot in Bava Metzia on a similar idea in a מיגו argument.)
The gemara here talks about repairing a Sefer Torah in which all of the Names of HaShem were written with improper intent. It talks about tracing over the Names with proper intent, but doesn’t mention the other solution: cutting out the parchment in each spot, and replacing it. Presumably the reason it doesn’t mention this approach is because the same problem that applies to tracing – the fact that it will make the Torah scroll look odd – would apply to this solution, too.
Gittin 51a
See Tosafot וכי; I find this read simpler than that of Rashi.
Gittin 51b
Our gemara here makes a psychological assumption which, I think, requires explanation. The gemara says that a borrower who could not pay back his debt might deny part of the debt in an attempt to stall full payment, but he would not have the chutzpah to deny the debt entirely, in front of his benefactor. Therefore, if a defendant denies a debt entirely, we trust him.
In our day, this seems strange – of course people would lie! But I think that’s partly a function of the change in lending habits. Today, individuals rarely lend significant sums of money; institutions are the lenders, with their mortgages. But in the days of the gemara, as I have explained elsewhere, interest-free loans were the chief engine of tzedakah from one individual to another.
Therefore, the borrower, knowing he has received hefty tzedakah from the plaintiff, would not have the hubris to deny the tzedakah outright and in entirety.
Gittin 52a
The gemara here says that court-appointed guardians cannot perform mitzvot for his charges using their funds, if the sums that would be spent would not be known and fixed (קצבה). Mezuzot are considered to have a known, fixed value. Tzedakah, on the other hand, does not.
One might argue that tzedakah has a fixed value, 10% of income, but that would not be correct. We have two separate mitzvot of tzedakah. One is the requirement to give to needy people who are standing before us, and there is no limit on that giving. The practice of giving 10% is a separate custom of allocating 10% of our income to tzedakah, and going to find needy people to whom we will be able to distribute it.
The gemara here says that dreams “לא מעלין ולא מורידין,” have no practical import. This would seem to clash with the idea that dreams have some element of prophecy, a view held by many sages!
Of course, the most famous passage of gemara on this theme, in the 9th chapter of Berachot, offers both views. Ibn Ezra, though, among others, argued that the majority view is that dreams do have great prophetic significance!
R’ Yehudah haChasid (Sefer Chasidim 444) argued that dreams are considered prophetically significant. He explained our gemara to mean that if one sees in a dream that he should do something wrong, then he should say that dreams are insignificant. This fits our gemara, in which the dreamer (Rabbi Meir) felt the dream was giving him inappropriate counsel.
Gittin 52b
The gemara says that although we ordinarily require a thirty-day waiting period for evaluation and bids before selling minor orphans’ property on their behalf, this is not the case where the money is needed for burial. Tosafot ולקבורה asks that this is obvious, since we don’t delay burial! He explains that the gemara is saying we would sell off the property immediately even to pay debts incurred in the process of burial.
Gittin 54a
The gemara here debates whether we fine people for accidental violation of the law, in order to keep them from violating it intentionally. There is a concern that if we do not penalize accidental violation, people will be careless.
This same debate comes up in the field of parenting, too; do we punish children for accidents, in an attempt to make them be more careful? Does that method work?
Gittin 54b
Abayye says that we believe a person who says that he disqualified my korban or contaminated my produce with טומאה, if he could just as easily do it right now, anyway. The idea seems to be that since, if we didn’t believe him, he could go ahead and do it right now, we might as well believe him about the past.
This seems a bit odd to me; after all, his testimony about the past was that happened by accident in the past. Would we really think he would do this intentionally, violating biblical law?! (There is, as I recall, a Tosafot in Bava Metzia on a similar idea in a מיגו argument.)
The gemara here talks about repairing a Sefer Torah in which all of the Names of HaShem were written with improper intent. It talks about tracing over the Names with proper intent, but doesn’t mention the other solution: cutting out the parchment in each spot, and replacing it. Presumably the reason it doesn’t mention this approach is because the same problem that applies to tracing – the fact that it will make the Torah scroll look odd – would apply to this solution, too.
Friday, July 4, 2008
Daf: Sotah 38-41 - Torah Reading, Hakhel, Flattery and more
Lots of very interesting material in these pages of gemara; as always, please read with a gemara in front of you.
38b (in addition to the notes on 38b from the last Daf segment here)
The gemara mentions that financial need is considered an אונס situation, a condition which forces one into conduct that is not halachically ideal, but is acceptable due to duress.
For similar ideas, see the mishnah on Beitzah 35b, as well as Shitah Mekubetzet there on the difference between that case and the one on Shabbat 126b of clearing a storage area on Shabbat to make room for learning Torah. See also Berachot 30a on davening earlier than appropriate before a business trip, and Moed Katan 14a on searching for your own lost property rather than preparing for Yom Tov.
The gemara says that we aren’t concerned about tall people constituting a physical interruption when standing between shorter people and the kohanim. Rashi (end of the page) explains that this is because it would be impractical to worry about this (אין לדבר סוף). It is odd to see impracticality as a halachic consideration; we do invoke אין לדבר סוף in the beginning of Yoma, but as a practical consideration, not a halachic consideration!
39a
See the Maharitz Chayes on how the gemara knows that the kohanim have a mitzvah to bless the nation with love, specifically.
The verb אדבריה is usually associated with setting up a student as a speaker before a sage. See Maharitz Chayes on this.
39b
The classic long “Amen” sung by the baal keriah before beginning an aliyah has a liturgical purpose: It warns everyone to stop talking before the reading begins, per our gemara here. See Mishneh Berurah 141:17.
The gemara here does not explain why the person who reads the Haftorah must also read from the Torah. Ulla, in Megilah 23a, explains that it’s for the sake of the honor of the Torah.
The gemara talks about waiting to start the Haftorah until the Torah is all wrapped up. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 147:7) explains that this is in order to allow the גולל (wrapper of the Torah) to complete his task and listen to the Haftorah. However, the Mishneh Berurah (147:22) notes that no such concern applies regarding the יהי רצון recited on Mondays and Thursdays.
40a
Tosafot כל seems to believe that dreams have real power, such that one is in real danger if he has a bad dream. This seems to run counter to Berachot 55-57, where the great majority of sages weigh in saying that dreams are largely a function of psychology! Perhaps Tosafot is referring to psychological danger - but note that Ibn Ezra to Bereishit 40:8 says we rule, as a matter of law, with the view that dreams are considered potent.
The Maharsha explains that R’ Abba’s humility is greater than that of R’ Avahu because R’ Avahu endures public embarrassment rather than private.
On people’s preference for aggada: Shabbat 115a and 116b says one should not read Tanach on Shabbat, because it draws the heart away from the Beit Medrash. The same draw is noted for non-law-oriented aggada passages of learning in our gemara, and in Rashi Shmot 13:5.
Rav Pappa here merges existent versions of liturgy to create one text for all to read; he does similar things with the berachah for seeing a rainbow (Berachot 59a) and the berachah at the end of megilah reading on Purim (Megilah 21b). (R’ Akiva Eiger notes some further places on the page, but I didn’t look them up to see whether those are Rav Pappa or not, and I don’t remember off-hand.)
40b
See Tosafot וכל כך and ומנין.
Rashi קומו וברכו’s explanation of the inclusion of מן העולם ועד העולם in berachot is odd; see Rashi on Berachot 54a and Rashash there on which berachot contained that text.
41a
Rashi here justifies bringing Sifrei Torah to the Beis haMikdash on Yom Kippur by (1) taking the view that one may transport items on Yom Kippur, or that (2) Yerushalayim was considered encloseable by an Eruv. The latter view is problematic, in light of the gemara (Pesachim 66a) about the debate on how the Jws could get Korban Pesach knives to the Beis haMikdash when erev Pesach was Shabbat. (unless they were coming from outside Yerushalayim?)
Note that although we always say the King leads Hakhel, and our mishnah says it here, this isn’t necessarily so. The Torah does not specify a King, and they didn’t have an halachic king until Shaul.
Regarding the “You are our brother” line addressed to King Agrippas, see Rashi here, Rashi on 41b and Tosafot on 41b אותו היום.
Rashi on the mishnah ושמע seems to have an order of the Hakhel reading that varies from that of our mishnah?
The tithes were considered important enough to be included in the reading for Hakhel. Similarly, see Yevamot 47a that this is one of the issues of which we must inform a potential convert, apparently because the consequences of failure to tithe properly are dire for the nation as a whole.
41b
The gemara here goes on at length regarding the evils of flattery. There are two kinds of flattery: False praise, and Praise of wicked behavior. Here we are talking about the latter variety, which is particularly pernicious as it undermines society. See mishnah Shviit 4:3 and Gittin 62a, and Magen Avraham 347:4, among other sources on praising and flattering people who are acting improperly. As Tosafot says here: Better to keep your mouth closed.
On the other hand, the former is an issue of lying in general; see Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel’s famous debate about how to praise a bride, in Ketuvot 16b-17a.
Rashi here מאתחלתא דמועד has one view on why Hakhel could not be on the first day of Yom Tov; see, though, the opposition of Tosafot כתב, printed on 41a.
38b (in addition to the notes on 38b from the last Daf segment here)
The gemara mentions that financial need is considered an אונס situation, a condition which forces one into conduct that is not halachically ideal, but is acceptable due to duress.
For similar ideas, see the mishnah on Beitzah 35b, as well as Shitah Mekubetzet there on the difference between that case and the one on Shabbat 126b of clearing a storage area on Shabbat to make room for learning Torah. See also Berachot 30a on davening earlier than appropriate before a business trip, and Moed Katan 14a on searching for your own lost property rather than preparing for Yom Tov.
The gemara says that we aren’t concerned about tall people constituting a physical interruption when standing between shorter people and the kohanim. Rashi (end of the page) explains that this is because it would be impractical to worry about this (אין לדבר סוף). It is odd to see impracticality as a halachic consideration; we do invoke אין לדבר סוף in the beginning of Yoma, but as a practical consideration, not a halachic consideration!
39a
See the Maharitz Chayes on how the gemara knows that the kohanim have a mitzvah to bless the nation with love, specifically.
The verb אדבריה is usually associated with setting up a student as a speaker before a sage. See Maharitz Chayes on this.
39b
The classic long “Amen” sung by the baal keriah before beginning an aliyah has a liturgical purpose: It warns everyone to stop talking before the reading begins, per our gemara here. See Mishneh Berurah 141:17.
The gemara here does not explain why the person who reads the Haftorah must also read from the Torah. Ulla, in Megilah 23a, explains that it’s for the sake of the honor of the Torah.
The gemara talks about waiting to start the Haftorah until the Torah is all wrapped up. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 147:7) explains that this is in order to allow the גולל (wrapper of the Torah) to complete his task and listen to the Haftorah. However, the Mishneh Berurah (147:22) notes that no such concern applies regarding the יהי רצון recited on Mondays and Thursdays.
40a
Tosafot כל seems to believe that dreams have real power, such that one is in real danger if he has a bad dream. This seems to run counter to Berachot 55-57, where the great majority of sages weigh in saying that dreams are largely a function of psychology! Perhaps Tosafot is referring to psychological danger - but note that Ibn Ezra to Bereishit 40:8 says we rule, as a matter of law, with the view that dreams are considered potent.
The Maharsha explains that R’ Abba’s humility is greater than that of R’ Avahu because R’ Avahu endures public embarrassment rather than private.
On people’s preference for aggada: Shabbat 115a and 116b says one should not read Tanach on Shabbat, because it draws the heart away from the Beit Medrash. The same draw is noted for non-law-oriented aggada passages of learning in our gemara, and in Rashi Shmot 13:5.
Rav Pappa here merges existent versions of liturgy to create one text for all to read; he does similar things with the berachah for seeing a rainbow (Berachot 59a) and the berachah at the end of megilah reading on Purim (Megilah 21b). (R’ Akiva Eiger notes some further places on the page, but I didn’t look them up to see whether those are Rav Pappa or not, and I don’t remember off-hand.)
40b
See Tosafot וכל כך and ומנין.
Rashi קומו וברכו’s explanation of the inclusion of מן העולם ועד העולם in berachot is odd; see Rashi on Berachot 54a and Rashash there on which berachot contained that text.
41a
Rashi here justifies bringing Sifrei Torah to the Beis haMikdash on Yom Kippur by (1) taking the view that one may transport items on Yom Kippur, or that (2) Yerushalayim was considered encloseable by an Eruv. The latter view is problematic, in light of the gemara (Pesachim 66a) about the debate on how the Jws could get Korban Pesach knives to the Beis haMikdash when erev Pesach was Shabbat. (unless they were coming from outside Yerushalayim?)
Note that although we always say the King leads Hakhel, and our mishnah says it here, this isn’t necessarily so. The Torah does not specify a King, and they didn’t have an halachic king until Shaul.
Regarding the “You are our brother” line addressed to King Agrippas, see Rashi here, Rashi on 41b and Tosafot on 41b אותו היום.
Rashi on the mishnah ושמע seems to have an order of the Hakhel reading that varies from that of our mishnah?
The tithes were considered important enough to be included in the reading for Hakhel. Similarly, see Yevamot 47a that this is one of the issues of which we must inform a potential convert, apparently because the consequences of failure to tithe properly are dire for the nation as a whole.
41b
The gemara here goes on at length regarding the evils of flattery. There are two kinds of flattery: False praise, and Praise of wicked behavior. Here we are talking about the latter variety, which is particularly pernicious as it undermines society. See mishnah Shviit 4:3 and Gittin 62a, and Magen Avraham 347:4, among other sources on praising and flattering people who are acting improperly. As Tosafot says here: Better to keep your mouth closed.
On the other hand, the former is an issue of lying in general; see Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel’s famous debate about how to praise a bride, in Ketuvot 16b-17a.
Rashi here מאתחלתא דמועד has one view on why Hakhel could not be on the first day of Yom Tov; see, though, the opposition of Tosafot כתב, printed on 41a.
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