Indiana Supreme Court Denies Transfer To Hear Charlie White's Appeal

It's just one more confirmation that the rule of law is dead in Indiana. The Indiana Supreme Court on a 4-0 decision signed by Chief Justice Loretta Rush (Justice Massa not participating) denied Charlie White's petition for transfer to review the decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals affirming two of White's erroneous felony vote frauds convictions and a felony theft conviction. The courts adopt special voter residency laws which spring into existence as needed to protect political elites like Evan Bayh, while a lowly guy like Charlie White will face the most arbitrary and capricious interpretation of those same laws as retribution for stepping out of line by the political establishment.

What today's decision means is that you should consider the risk of registering and casting votes in Indiana unless you are among the chosen class. As a person who has worked as an election judge at many elections, I could pick out voters in every election I've worked who could be prosecuted under the same circumstances under which White was prosecuted. If you aren't favored by the ruling political class, don't even think about running for political office. They will do whatever it takes to destroy you to stop you from succeeding. It's just not worth the risk. Prosecutors and judges can twist the laws to mean something they do not say to turn any innocent person into a criminal if they want to destroy you for not conforming to their dictates. I defy anyone to square the decision in Charlie White's case with the application of these same laws to a long line of other prominent Indiana politicians who played far more fast and loose with the state's voter residency laws than White's supposed transgressions. It can't be done with a straight face. If you aren't alarmed by today's decision, you should be.

Flashback: Lawrence County Judge Ordered City Of Mitchell To Pay Salary To Council Member Who Never Lived In City

If you don't believe Charlie White got a raw deal, then let me remind you of the recent case of a Mitchell city council member in Lawrence County who sued city officials who withheld his pay because he did not reside in the council district to which he had been elected in 2007. Everett Ferrel not only never lived in his council district, he wasn't even a resident of the city.

Ferrel mistakenly believed he lived in the city limits and successfully ran and got elected to the council without anyone challenging his residency. As a council member, he earned a salary of $4,900 a year. After the council learned Ferrel didn't live in his district well into his four-year term, the remaining members voted to withhold his salary. Ferrel never resigned, and the city never took formal action to remove him from office. He also wasn't charged with vote fraud for voting and running for office in a municipal election in which he wasn't legally permitted to participate.

Ferrel sued the city for his unpaid salary under Indiana's Wage Payment statute, which entitles an employee to recover up to double the amount of their wage claim as damages, plus their attorney's fees. Judge Andrea McCord ruled in Ferrel's favor and ordered the city to pay the $12,250 of salary the city withheld from him. Judge McCord followed the reasoning of a long line of cases holding an officeholder duly elected and sworn into office holds that office under color of law until legally removed from office.

In Charlie White's case, the Town of Fishers never challenged his residency. Rather, he voluntarily resigned from his town council seat to which he had been duly elected after questions were raised about his residency. Even though he attended all town council meetings and otherwise performed his duties, he returned the salary he earned during a several month period in question. Yet he was still charged and convicted of a felony theft charge. The Court of Appeals' opinion yesterday rejected White's argument that he legally held the office until removed through a formal civil proceeding and, therefore, could not be found guilty of theft. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the town was not required to take formal action to remove him under state law in order to find him guilty of theft. It also upheld his conviction for registering and casting a vote in the 2010 primary election using his ex-wife's home while he was in between homes.

Many readers will also recall the case of former Indianapolis City-County Councilor Patrice Abduallah, who claimed a residence at an uninhabitable, vacant home in the district at which he never resided during the more than three and a half years he served on the council and drew about $15,000 a year in salary. When I called him out on it in a blog post in August 2007, he abruptly resigned from the council. He was never charged with theft and vote fraud like White, and he never returned any of his salary. All of his votes as a council member, including his vote in favor of the 65% increase in the local income tax rate, were deemed valid because he had been duly elected and sworn into office. The Marion Co. Election Board had even discovered the fact that he had listed an address other than one located in his district when he filed for re-election in 2007 but still allowed his name to be placed on the Democratic primary ballot.

The Marion Co. Election Board also opted against recommending criminal charges against Sen. Richard Lugar and his wife, Charlene, after it found the couple had been voting at a precinct in Wayne Township for 35 years in which he had no claim of legal residency after he sold the home he owned there in 1977 and moved his family to Virginia. Lugar was allowed to move his voting residence to an old farmhouse he owned in Decatur Township where he doesn't physically reside. When he lost re-election in 2012, he never returned home to Indianapolis. He kept his home in Virginia but continues to cast absentee ballots using that same farmhouse.

Evan Bayh, an attorney like White, is no better. He voted in multiple elections years after leaving the state of Indiana while he worked full-time for a law firm in Washington, D.C. where he and his wife resided, registered their automobile, obtained a driver's license and paid their taxes. That didn't stop him from running for Secretary of State and getting elected, or running for governor two years later when he was challenged for meeting the state's five-year residency requirement. The Supreme Court enunciated the infamous Bayh residency rule that afforded leniency in its interpretation of the state's residency law to permit him to legally run for governor. It built upon a similar lenient residency interpretation it announced in the case of Judge David Evrard, who was allowed to file and run for judge in Perry County while working full-time as a patent lawyer in Washington, D.C. where he and his wife lived, and his step-children attended school. Evrard had the added twist of marrying a woman he was not legally permitted to marry because she was still married to her first husband.

The Indiana Constitution required Gov. Mitch Daniels to reside in Marion County. He built a luxury home in Hamilton Co. to keep his wife happy where the couple lived during his two terms as governor. Nonetheless, he registered and voted using the governor's residence on North Meridian Street in Indianapolis despite the fact he never resided there. He had the audacity to demand White's resignation from office over questions of his voter residency. The same media which castigated White made light of Daniels' fictional residency. Was Daniels prosecuted for vote fraud? Of course not.

All of you Charlie White haters can hate on him all you want, but there is no mistaking the fact that the laws of this state were unfairly applied to prosecute and persecute him. He faced seven felony charges for his actions. The trial court jury found him not guilty of mortgage fraud, but found him guilty of the six remaining felony counts. He lost the statewide office to which he had been overwhelmingly elected by the state's voters and the salary it paid, along with his reputation. The Court of Appeals agreed that two of the four vote fraud-related charges of which he was convicted constituted double jeopardy. It also agreed to toss a felony perjury charge for allegedly lying on his marriage application about his address. Yet he remains convicted of three felony charges, two for vote fraud and one for theft, more than enough to justify the Indiana Supreme Court to strip him of his law license at least temporarily. If that's equal treatment under the law, I learned nothing in law school.

Indiana Court Of Appeals Splits The Baby: Only Tosses Three Of Charlie White's Six Felony Convictions

I didn't anticipate former Secretary of State Charlie White would find complete justice in this state, and the Indiana Court of Appeals' decision proves me partially correct. An opinion rendered by Judge Nancy Vaidik today only overturns three of the six felony counts White was found guilty of by a Hamilton Co. jury, which resulted in his removal from office. The Court's opinion only vacates the most obvious glaring errors of judgment made at the trial court level that not even this three-judge panel could ignore and save face.

White's felony count of perjury for using his ex-wife's address on his marriage license application was deemed immaterial to support a conviction for perjury. That represented the first time in the state's history a prosecutor charged a person with such an invented crime. The Court also found that two of the vote fraud-related charges on which he was found guilty violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Court vacated both of those convictions.

What is very alarming is that the Court criminalized an act of lawfully casting a vote, which basically tells you that the powers of the state of Indiana can be used to destroy your career for casting a lawful vote in this state, something that has never before happened in the history of the state of Indiana. White's alleged wrong of casting a vote in one precinct instead of another nearby precinct has never been prosecuted as a crime in this state. If it had been, Evan Bayh, Richard Lugar and Mitch Daniels would have all been prosecuted and convicted of felony vote fraud. The charitable residency standard afforded to these men and Judge Evrard did not apply to Charlie White. The Court ignored all of those decisions. It's as if those long line of opinions were never written as the Court made no attempt to distinguish White's case from any of those opinions. All three judges would never have been appointed to the Court of Appeals had our state's Supreme Court not enunciated a charitable residency standard for their beloved Evan Bayh. Moral to this story--don't vote and give them yet another excuse for prosecuting innocent persons they want destroyed.

The Court also for the first time in the state's history ruled that a person can be charged with theft for drawing a salary for an office to which he was legally elected and sworn into office if he later moves out of that district and does not immediately stop drawing his salary. This has occurred dozens of times over the past several decades, and no public official has ever been prosecuted for theft. No civil proceeding required under state law for his removal from office was ever initiated; rather, he voluntarily resigned his office.  This Court said the state could legally prosecute him for drawing a salary as a Fishers town council member for a several month period the jury concluded he had moved outside his district, even though he performed the duties of his office, and never mind the fact that he was elected at-large by all of the town's voters. That runs counter to a long history of cases in this state providing for the removal of a person from office through action of the town council or a civil quo warranto action.

Charlie White is not entitled to any benefit of the doubt like Bayh, Lugar, Daniels et al. The corrupt powers ordered his political career destroyed, and they want his law license taken away from him. The result of today's decision upholds this miscarriage of justice. The decision lends support to the criticism that there is no such thing as equal treatment under the law in this state. The rules are bent to protect the ruling elites, while they are used like a hammer to crush folks the elites have determined must be destroyed. This prosecution and persecution of a duly-elected statewide officeholder is another sad chapter in this state's long and sordid history. Charlie White could always appeal today's decision, but I highly doubt he will get any better results from the Supreme Court.

Court Of Appeals Panel Faces Difficult Choices In Charlie White Case

A three-judge panel of the Indiana Court of Appeals heard the issue-filled appeal of former Secretary of State Charlie White yesterday, and it quickly became obvious the panel led by Judge Nancy Vaidik wanted help in narrowing the issues. Judge Vaidik appealed to White's attorney, Andrea Ciobanu, to boil down the strongest issue she and her fellow panelists, Judge Melissa May and Judge Michael Barnes, should look at most closely in evaluating her client's appeal on a variety of vote-fraud related convictions that resulted in his ouster from office. That proved to be an easier question to ask than to answer.

Ciobanu initially pointed to the residency law jurors were instructed to follow in determining whether White committed vote fraud by registering to vote and casting a single ballot in one election using the address of his ex-wife's home. As she continued her explanation, Vaidik showed frustration. Are you talking about the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence or ineffective counsel? How about all of the above?

There's an old adage that hard cases make bad law, and this might be one of those cases. How did a seemingly simple debate over the voting residence of the newly-elected Secretary of State become such a complicated case, which resulted in his conviction by a Hamilton Co. jury on six of seven felony counts brought against him by a special prosecutor?

The irony is that none of the three Democratic-appointed judges from the Bayh-O'Bannon era would be sitting in judgment of White had the Indiana Supreme Court not ruled three decades ago that then-Secretary of State Evan Bayh had met the state's residency requirement as he launched his bid for governor despite the fact he had been living and working full-time in Washington, D.C. where he filed his tax returns, had a driver's license and registered his automobile.

Unlike White, Bayh faced only a civil lawsuit contesting his residency; he didn't have to fend off criminal charges for the votes he had been casting for years using an old farm house owned by his father in Vigo County. What mattered to the Supreme Court in Bayh's case was his intent. He said he intended to return to Indiana during his temporary absence from the state, and that's all that mattered to the Supreme Court. And that's been the crux of White's argument from day one. He wasn't afforded the benefit of the doubt given to so many who had gone before him.

Unlike Bayh, White had never left the state, Hamilton County or the Town of Fishers where he resided. He was prosecuted because he registered and voted in one Fishers precinct instead of another where prosecutors argued he legally should have been registered to vote. No elected official in the state's history has been criminally prosecuted over his place of residency, although plenty have faced legal challenges to their residency, which have almost universally been decided in favor of the candidate based on his stated intent as opposed to demonstrable evidence of residency.

That's a key point White's attorney made in his appeal, although Judge May was quick to remind her that just because there is no precedent for someone being criminally prosecuted for a particular act that alone doesn't get a defendant off the hook. Judge Vaidik echoed Judge May's observation when she expressed skepticism of White's argument he was being prosecuted as a class of one, arguing it was really just a "selective prosecution" argument that wouldn't carry the day.

White's prosecutors sidestepped a momentous task in proving their case that he did not reside where he claimed to reside by getting the trial court judge to instruct the jurors on a simple, narrow definition of residency: "Where a person has the person's true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment; and to which the person has, whenever absent, the intention of returning." If Evan Bayh's attorneys had been bound to that narrow definition of residency, there would have been no Gov. Bayh.

Like it or not, the legislature enacted a comprehensive scheme of standards that can be applied to determine one's residency for voting purposes, which provides more than just a little wiggle room. It could be based on your place of birth or origin, your intent or conduct, or by operation of law. You can temporarily live somewhere else, including outside the state, under some circumstances. You can have a temporary residence or a non-traditional residence. In short, the legislature has provided a host of nails on which to hang your residency hat, probably because of the overarching constitutional aim of promoting the voter franchise, not discouraging it. None of those standards were included in the jurors' instructions during White's trial.

The prosecutors and trial court judge determined White was not entitled to any of those presumptions of residency; only the narrowly-tailored definition. The Attorney General, which argued otherwise in White's civil election contest, argued a jury in a criminal proceeding would only be confused in their deliberations if offered too many choices. The state provided sufficient evidence to prove White lived at the new home he purchased, not his ex-wife's home, to prove his residency the Attorney General argued. Besides, White offered no evidence to rebut the state's evidence to support a contrary finding even if the jurors had been instructed differently.

Judge Vaidik showed little sympathy to the argument by White's attorney that he was entitled to different jury instructions on the issue of residency. She, instead, focused on the evidence jurors heard and wondered whether there was any reasonable basis for jurors finding White resided at his ex-wife's home, even if temporarily. White's attorney expressed her frustration that a judge could not entertain the possibility that someone can be in between residences like White claimed he was at the time and not have a permanent, fixed residence.

A skeptical Judge Vaidik wondered if White's attorney wasn't asking the court to reweigh the sufficiency's of the evidence the jury heard, which on its face, supported the prosecution's contentions. Yes, but, and that's a big but. As it turned out, all of the stipulated documents White's trial attorney, Carl Brizzi, had obtained the consent of the prosecution to offer at trial, were never presented. Brizzi, a supposedly seasoned prosecutor of the state's largest county, mistakenly believe stipulated exhibits were automatically produced as evidence to the jury without being formally offered at trial. When Brizzi decided at the last moment not to put on a defense because he believed at the time the prosecution failed to prove any of the charges against White, that meant jurors heard no witnesses and received no evidence like White had successfully presented during the election contest case.

White's attorney pointed to his incompetent trial counsel's blunders for the lack of evidence in the trial court, which she supplemented during her client's hearing for post-conviction relief. Judge Vaidik appeared loathe to second-guess the judgment of the PCR judge that Brizzi had failed to provide effective counsel. Judge Barnes and Vaidik leaned on the PCR judge's determination that Brizzi had a legal obligation not to put White's current wife on the stand to testify after he announced for the first time at the PCR hearing she had told him the week of the trial when he sat down to prep her for the first time that White didn't really live at his ex-wife's home where his son resided. Judge Vaidik questioned whether there was sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption created by the state's evidence, even if the evidence he proffered at the PCR evidence had been offered at trial.

White's attorney pointed to the testimony of both White and his wife at the PCR hearing that Brizzi had intentionally taken her comments out of context to rationalize his inexplicable actions after the fact, contending she only said he didn't "live there, live there" in the sense that they weren't contemplating a reconciliation. They maintained he was only living in his ex-wife's basement temporarily until he was formally married since his second wife had minor children living with her. White's attorney pointed to e-mails exchanged the week of the trial wherein Brizzi was proceeding with the strategy of putting on a full defense, which included calling both his ex-wife and current wife as witnesses. The only question had been whether White would take the stand in his own defense, a right White voluntarily waived at trial.

There were some bright points in the argument for White. Judge Vaidik clung to the notion that courts are required to construe criminal statutes strictly, and the trial court had permitted the state to prosecute White on charges of vote fraud for completing a single voter registration form and casting a single ballot. The statute clearly defined the wrong in the plural in both instances for registering and ballot casting Vaidik noted. The Attorney General pointed to decisions in other states supporting the state's argument the statute should be construed in the singular as well as the plural, while conceding state case law wasn't supportive of that interpretation.

An argument not made but which seems plausible is that the legislature required plural instances of voter registration and ballot fraud because its primary concern was to ensure "one man, one vote" and to guard against a voter registering in multiple places and casting multiple ballots, neither of which occurred in White's case. Indeed, nobody contested White's legal right to register and vote in a precinct within Fishers.

Both Judge Vaidik and Judge Barnes expressed skepticism at the state's argument that White could be found guilty of marriage license fraud by listing his ex-wife's home on his application form rather than the new home he purchased. Judge Vaidik doubted White's address in this instance was material for purposes of proving perjury. Vaidik read this statute as only ascertaining whether one of the parties to the marriage resided within the county where the marriage license was being issued. Judge Barnes wondered if it was not uncommon for marriage license applicants to list the address of a parent or someone else, particularly if the couple had been cohabiting prior to making the decision to get legally married.

Similarly, Judge Vaidik doubted the state's argument that the legislature didn't contemplate a civil remedy for removing a person rather than pursuing criminal theft charges against a person who no longer resided within a district to which he was elected, a conviction White faces for receiving a salary as a town council member for a several month period after he had moved outside the district to which he had been elected. White later returned the money, even though he fulfilled all of his duties as a town council member during the time in question. The legislature enacted a specific statute for removal under these circumstances, but the state contended a separate statute declaring a vacancy upon a person moving outside the district is determinative. Even the Attorney General threw a bone to White, conceding that double jeopardy applied to at least two of the charges when questioned by Judge Vaidik, although that issue had not been formally argued by White on appeal.

What should be abundantly clear to the three-judge panel is that it's been presented a hard case to decide because the state prosecuted a case with the acquiescence of a trial court judge under dubious circumstances based on erroneous interpretations of law at worst and over-charging of trivial offenses at a minimum, which was further complicated by his own counsel's tactical blunders that at least bordered on incompetency. While the judges may believe White was playing fast and loose with the residency laws, they must understand that their decision could have a far-reaching impact given the frequency with which residency disputes seem to arise in Indiana politics. Is that a Pandora's box they want to open? At the same time, overturning the convictions requires an admission by the panel that the prosecution, conviction and removal of Charlie White from office was a miscarriage of justice, which I believe it was. That's probably a tough pill for the panel to swallow because of what that says about the criminal justice system in this state.

Attorney General's Position In Charlie White Appeal Poses Greatest Threat To Voter Disenfranchisement

When the Indiana Recount Commission unanimously agreed that Charlie White had legally registered to vote prior to the 2010 election at which he was elected the state's Secretary of State, Attorney General Greg Zoeller's office made compelling arguments to the state's Supreme Court defending the Commission's conclusions that White was legally registered to vote in successfully convincing the high court to overturn Marion Co. Circuit Court Judge Louis Rosenberg's contrary conclusions. Now the Attorney General has done a 180-degree turn and is arguing to the Indiana Court of Appeals that a Hamilton Co. trial court did not err in finding White guilty of multiple felony charges, including vote fraud. In essence, the Attorney General is arguing that the standard for proving vote fraud in a civil proceeding is much higher than the standard it believes Indiana courts should apply in determining a voter's criminal liability for vote fraud.

The entire criminal case against White focused on the prosecution's argument that White had committed perjury and vote fraud by registering to vote and casting a single ballot in one primary election in May, 2010 using the Fishers address of his former wife on Broad Leaf Lane instead of a new condominium he purchased in 2010 on Overview Drive. White had given up an apartment he rented following his divorce from his first wife with the plan of moving into the Overview Drive condominium once he and his second wife were married. White's then-fiancee' moved into the condominium with her children in early 2010 a few months prior to their marriage on Memorial Day weekend. White claimed he did not make the Overview Drive his permanent residence until after the couple was married. White says that he spent many nights sleeping in the finished basement of his ex-wife's house where his son lived and other places while he was busy traveling the state campaigning for the Republican nomination for secretary of state. In September, 2010, White changed his voter registration to the Overview Drive condominium in accordance with Indiana law

The prosecution argued that White committed vote fraud and perjury by claiming the Broad Leaf residence rather than the Overview Drive residence as his residence when he registered and voted using that address in the May, 2010 primary election. During the appeal of the civil case seeking White's removal as Secretary of State, the Attorney General flatly asserted in the brief it filed with the Supreme Court that White was legally registered to vote at the Broad Leaf residence and did not commit vote fraud by casting a ballot using that residence in the May, 2010 primary election. The Attorney General criticized the Marion Circuit Court's conclusions to the contrary as "fail[ing] in its obligation to abide this Court's tripartite command to liberally construe election statutes to effectuate their purpose of securing free and equal elections, uphold the will of the electorate, and prevent disenfranchisement."

In the Recount Commission case, the Attorney General contended that White's residence at Broad Leaf was a legally permissible "nontraditional residence" under Indiana's Election Code. “He was also properly registered at the Broad Leaf house," the Attorney General argued. Continuing, he explained that White "had abandoned all other residences to which he could return." "Broad Leaf was also the home of his immediate family because his son lived there." "Generally, Broad Leaf was a 'nontraditional residence,' which election law defines as not fixed or permanent. He intended to live there until he was married and moved to the Overview Drive Condominium." The Attorney General observed that the question of where White was registered to vote and when he voted using that address are "both technical and formal." To find that White's voter registration and ballot casting using the Broad Leaf residence amounted to fraud was a "an absurd and arguably unconstitutional result" that "the legislature could not have intended."

The Indiana Code defines a person’s residence as “where the person has the person’s true, fixed, and permanent home and principal residence; and to which the person has , whenever absent, the intention of returning.” Additionally, the code provides standards to assist in the determination of the person’s residency. A person’s residence may be established by their origin or birth, intent and conduct to implement the intent, or operation of law. A person does not have residence in more than one precinct. Once a person obtains residency in a precinct, they retain residency there until they abandon the residency by 1) having the intent to abandon the residence, 2) having the intent to abandon the residency, and 3) effectuates that intent by actually establishing a residence in a new precinct. These provisions codify much of this Court’s discussion of residency and domicile in State Election Board v. Bayh . . . 

Other statutory provisions create rebuttable presumptions assisting in determining a person’s residence. . . White had abandoned all other residences to which he could return or intend to return. . .For example, the place where a person’s immediate family resides is the person’s residence. White’s only immediate family was his son, who lived at the Broad Leaf house. The Commission properly found that this qualified White to declare the Broad Leaf house on his voter registration . . . 

The Election Code provides for a person to have a “nontraditional residence” which may be the best description of White’s living arrangements . . . an individual with a nontraditional residence whose residence is within a precinct, but is not fixed or permanent, resides in that precinct  . . .White intended that Broad Leaf house to be his principal residence from the time he abandoned the Pintail Lane  apartment and until he was married and moved into the Overview Drive condominium with his then-fiancee. He had his mail forwarded to the Broad Leaf house, lived in the finished basement, had 24-hour access to the house through a key and a security code. He changed his driver’s license to reflect the Broad Leaf address. Whether a traditional or nontraditional residence, the Commission’s factual determination that the Broad Leaf house was White’s residence from June 1, 2009 to June 1, 2010, is not arbitrary or capricious and the trial court erred in reversing. The Commission’s determination finds support in this Court’s jurisprudence as well. (citations omitted)

At trial, the jury was instructed to rely solely on White's "true, fixed, and permanent home and principal residence; and to which the person has , whenever absent, the intention of returning” as the definition of residence for both his voter registration and ballot casting. In his reply brief in White's appeal of his criminal convictions, the Attorney General concedes the existence of statutory and case law defining the varying legal standards that are to be applied in determining a person's residence as argued by White. Nonetheless, he argued that the narrow instruction the trial court provided to the jury in White's case was "accurate, broadly applicable, and could be understood by the jurors." A more detailed instruction that would have allowed the jurors to consider the varying standards would have only "confused" the jurors he argues, and it was an objection White's attorney, Carl Brizzi, had failed to preserve for appeal the Attorney General argues. The convictions based on the jury instruction on the narrow definition of residence can only be overturned if the appellate court finds that the trial court committed fundamental error because of Brizzi's failure to preserve his objection to the jury instruction.

Similarly, the Attorney General is dismissive of White's claims that jurors were incorrectly instructed on the application of the vote fraud statutes, which make it a crime to fraudulently complete voter registration applications or cast ballots fraudulently. Jurors were instructed that the applicable statutes applied to a single voter registration application or a single ballot despite the fact the statute was written in the plural to apply to "applications" or "ballots." The Attorney General's brief in the Recount Commission case emphasized the fact there was no question that White was entitled to register to vote in Hamilton County and was in fact a registered voter at all applicable times in that country. Yet the Attorney General claims it would be absurd to think the legislature only meant to prosecute people for vote fraud if they completed more than one voter registration application or cast more than one ballot.

The overriding purpose of the voter registration laws is to ensure the constitutional principle of one man, one vote. How can you convict White of two felony counts of vote fraud and two felony counts of perjury for registering in a precinct in the same town within the same county and casting a single ballot in one election when the Attorney General concedes he was a legally registered voter of that town and county entitled to cast a vote on the basis that he should have registered and voted in a different precinct than he was registered and voted? Does that not fly in the face of the Attorney General's previous argument that our election laws are to be "liberally construed" to "prevent disenfranchisement"? Is that the form of vote fraud the legislature intended that persons could be prosecuted for when they enacted those laws? I think not. Lest we forget that the Marion Co. Election Board determined that former Sen. Richard Lugar had illegally registered and cast ballots repeatedly from an address at which he had no legal claim for arguing was his legal residence for 35 years. Was he prosecuted? Absolutely not. In fact, this same Attorney General actually defended Lugar's clearly illegal voter registration as legal.

Other arguments proffered by the Attorney General in his brief are equally as concerning. White was found guilty of felony perjury for listing the Broad Leaf address instead of the Overview Drive address on the marriage license application he completed for the Hamilton Co. Clerk's Office. The Attorney General agrees that White was a resident of Hamilton Co. when he completed the marriage license application but that he made a material misrepresentation on the application by listing the Broad Leaf address as his residence. The Attorney General cites no cases in support of its argument that a person's address on a marriage license application can be the basis for finding a person guilty of perjury but chides White for not providing any cited cases for the proposition that his county of residence was the material information requested, not a more exacting, "true, fixed and permanent" address at which he resided. I venture to guess that many unmarried persons shacking up prior to their marriage use different addresses on their marriage license application, none of whom are ever prosecuted for having done so.

The marriage application also asks for your place of birth. Undocumented aliens are allowed to marry in Indiana despite their illegal status; however, it would not surprise me if some of them misrepresent their place of birth, which the license also requests, due to the misapprehension that their license application will be turned down if they were born outside the country and aren't either a lawful permanent resident or legally visiting the country. The primary purpose of the marriage license application is to establish that applicants are who they represent themselves to be, and that they are legally eligible to marry. Logic would dictate to me that the use of aliases, misrepresentations of dates of birth and one's marital status are the only material misrepresentations that lawmakers contemplated could serve as the basis for a criminal charge arising out of the completion of a marriage license application.

Another felony conviction White is appealing is a theft conviction regarding the fact that he drew a paycheck as a Fishers town council member during a several month period after he had moved out of the district from which he was elected to serve before he resigned from the council. White was elected at-large by all residents of Fishers, although he represented a geographically-defined district. Although White returned the salary he earned during the months he continued to draw after he moved out of his district, the attorney for the Fisher's town council argued that he was under no obligation to return it. White had continued attending meetings and otherwise fulfilling his statutory duties. The town council never exercised its authority under state law to remove him from office, and nobody initiated a quo warranto action seeking a judicial determination that he was not eligible to hold the office to which he had been elected and duly sworn in. White relies on case law that holds that a person holding office under color of law is a de facto elected official entitled to exercise his duties and receive compensation for his services even if later determined to be ineligible to hold office. The acts of a de facto elected official cannot be voided on the basis that a person was later determined to be ineligible to hold office.

This exact scenario has played out on multiple occasions in Indiana and elsewhere. No elected official has ever been charged and convicted of theft in Indiana on this basis prior to White's conviction. The Attorney General is correct in citing a state statute providing that a person is deemed to have vacated his office as a town council member when he ceases to be a resident of the district from which he was elected to serve. The Attorney General argues that White's office was vacant the day he moved out of the district because he forfeited the office under operation of law, and that he committed theft by continuing to draw his salary from that day forward. The Attorney General argues that a resolution of the town council declaring White's seat vacant or quo warranto action are merely alternative and not exclusive remedies that could have been undertaken to remove White from office.

Was Patrice Abduallah prosecuted for theft after he drew his $15,000 a year salary as an Indianapolis City-County Councilor for more than three and a half years before he resigned his office after this blog reported that he didn't reside in his district? Was he prosecuted for completing a voter application and casting a ballot from a home in which he did not reside? No on both counts. A city council member in Mitchell, who didn't even live within the municipal boundaries of the city let alone the district to which he was elected, successfully sued and won back the salary that had been withheld from him on the theory that he was a de facto council member until legally removed from office. I don't recall the Attorney General stepping in to argue otherwise in that case. Taking the Attorney General's argument at face value, Brownsburg town council member Rob Kendall, who has been accused of violating the state constitution's prohibition against holding more than one lucrative office at the same time, could be charged with theft because he continued drawing his town council salary after he accepted appointment to another lucrative office. That's because he would have been deemed to have vacated his town council seat the moment he became ineligible to serve as town council member after he began holding a subsequent lucrative office. It seems to me a civil, not a criminal remedy, has always been the rule in Indiana until White's case.

White's appeal raises a number of other issues that I've not discussed, including ineffective counsel by his attorney, Carl Brizzi, at trial, and prosecutorial misconduct. Despite acknowledging that Brizzi made prejudicial statements suggesting White's guilt during voir dire, failed to raise numerous objections and preserve issues for appeal, mistakenly failed to enter stipulated documents into the record because he was unaware stipulated evidence still had to be formally proffered at trial, and failed to offer any defense, including exculpatory evidence, the Attorney General argues that White was not the victim of ineffective counsel. In the Recount Commission case, the Attorney General argued there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's conclusion that White resided at Broad Leaf, even if as a "nontraditional residence." In the criminal case, the Attorney General argues that there wasn't sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to conclude White had intended to reside at Broad Leaf instead of Overview. Could that be due to the fact that his attorney neglected to offer the evidence that allowed the Commission to reach a different conclusion?

It is beyond me why the powers that be in this state cannot see beyond their hatred of Charlie White to see the long-term legal ramifications of allowing White's convictions to stand. The ACLU of Indiana gets all worked up about a law requiring voters to furnish a photo identification when they appear in person to vote on election day but is silent when those same voter registration laws are strictly applied to criminally prosecute a person who nobody questions was legally eligible to register and cast a vote in the town where he was residing in Indiana. The ACLU of Indiana gets all worked up about a state law that prevents same-sex couples from being allowed to be issued a marriage license legally recognizing their marriage in Indiana but is silent when someone legally entitled to marry in this state is prosecuted for a felony simply because the person listed one address in the same town instead of another address on his marriage application when nobody argues with the fact that the person had resided at both residences within that same county at different times. If White were black, gay, Jewish or Muslim instead of being a white male Christian, do you think the ACLU would have remained silent. I think not. Civil libertarians and fair-minded persons in the rest of Indiana's legal community should be ashamed of themselves for the absence they've taken from the outrageous and politically-driven prosecution of Charlie White.

Judge Limits White's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief To Ineffective Counsel Arguments

Former Indiana Secretary of State Charlie White's long-awaited hearing on post-conviction relief began this morning, but only hours later Hamilton Superior Court Judge Daniel Pfleging ruled that most of the issues White's attorney petitioned the Court to hear would not be heard during the hearing. In a sweeping ruling, Judge Pfleging tossed seven of the eight key issues White's petition raised for post-conviction relief after the prosecution team filed a last-minute summary disposition motion at the outset of today's hearing, limiting the hearing to issues surrounding whether he received ineffective counsel from his trial lawyer, former Marion Co. Prosecutor Carl Brizzi. As a result of today's ruling, Judge Pfleging will not be second-guessing any decisions made at trial by Judge Steve Nation, the trial court judge who presided over the trial at which White was found guilty on sex of seven felony charges leveled against him.

White's attorney had subpoenaed a number of witnesses to testify at today's hearing that the defense had originally planned to call during White's trial but who instead were sent home after Brizzi told them their testimony would not be needed because he had decided to rest his case without putting on a defense, a move that left court watchers shaking their heads in disbelief. Judge Pfleging took breaks in between arguments by attorneys for both sides to review the trial court's lengthy transcript before issuing his ruling before the court broke for lunch today. Judge Pfleging concluded that the issues raised in White's petition did not involve new evidence or facts but rather attempted to re-litigate legal issues argued before and during the trial that had already been ruled upon and were ripe for appeal.

White, who recently filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Brizzi, had also subpoenaed Brizzi to testify at today's hearing, but his malpractice defense attorney, Dina Cox, filed a last-minute motion to quash the subpoena in an effort to delay Brizzi's testimony to allow her more time to prepare. Judge Pfleging granted her motion, delaying any testimony from Brizzi until at least October. Cox's attorney was on hand to strategize with the prosecution team led by special prosecutors Dan Sigler and John Dowd, along with Dan Sigler, Jr. In yet another strange twist, Judge Pfleging disclosed that his daughter-in-law works as an attorney at Lewis Wagner, the same law firm where Cox is employed. Lesley Pfleging's practice areas at the firm include insurance defense litigation. White's counsel, Andrea Ciobanu, declined his offer to recuse himself. Judge Nation earlier recused himself from hearing White's petition for post-conviction relief after Ciobanu requested his recusal, citing evidence of bias during the trial court proceedings.

A big part of White's case rests upon the fact that the trial court judge's tendered instructions to the jury on the legal determination of residency for purposes of determining whether White committed vote fraud that were completely contrary to numerous Indiana court decisions, including two well-known residency cases decided by the Indiana Supreme Court, Matter of Evrard and State Election Board v. Bayh, as well as the post-election contest filed against White's election by the Indiana Democratic Party decided by the Indiana Recount Commission in White's favor.

White was also convicted of theft for receiving his salary as a Fishers town council member based on the argument that he did not reside in his district during a several month period that he drew his salary. The Indiana Supreme Court, however, has ruled in prior cases that a public officer duly elected and sworn into office is permitted to hold that office and draw his salary until such time that a quo warranto action is brought against him and a legal determination is made that he is ineligible to hold office, something that never occurred in White's case because he resigned his town council office. White's attorney argued unsuccessfully that the state should have been required to bring a quo warranto action against him when he was still a Fishers Town Council member rather than criminally charge him after his election as secretary of state.

Under one criminal charge, White was found guilty of casting a vote in a single election under a statute that, on its face, pertains only to persons found guilty of casting multiple ballots. He was also found guilty of perjury and lying on his marriage application form by listing the residence of his former wife where he claimed to be residing until his marriage to his second wife. The latter law was enacted by the legislature to discourage same-sex couples from completing marriage license applications and attempting to obtain a marriage license in Indiana in violation of the state's Defense of Marriage Act.

Charlie White Files Malpractice Lawsuit Against Carl Brizzi

Former Indiana Secretary of State Charlie White this week filed in the Marion Superior Court a legal malpractice lawsuit against Carl Brizzi arising out of his representation of him in the criminal case brought against him in Hamilton County where a jury found White guilty on six of seven felony charges brought against him by a special prosecutor after Brizzi declined to put on a defense case during White's trial. The case has been assigned to Judge Patrick McCarty and is the second such lawsuit to be filed against Brizzi in recent months.

In May, former Hancock Co. Coroner Tamara VanGundy, who was forced from office after she voluntarily pleaded guilty to a Class D felony offense for official misconduct arising out of a drunk driving arrest, sued Brizzi after she claimed that he told her she would be to return to her duties and run for re-election as coroner despite her guilty plea despite the existence of a state law to the contrary. VanGundy's case is pending in Marion Circuit Court Judge Louis Rosenberg's court.

White has filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Hamilton County after getting a new judge assigned to his case. Judge Steven Nation, who presided over White's trial, recused himself from the case after White filed a petition seeking his removal from the case. White's hearing for post-conviction relief has been scheduled before Judge Daniel Pfleging for August 15, 2013. White blames his conviction, in part, on Brizzi's decision not to call a number of defense witnesses who were present and prepared to be called. Among those witnesses was an expert witness who would have testified that GPS data from White's cell phone proved that he spent most nights at the home of his ex-wife where he claimed to be residing for voting purposes.

The special prosecutor convinced the jury that White committed vote fraud and other related crimes by claiming his ex-wife's home as his residence for voting purposes. The Indiana Recount Commission unanimously found in White's favor after the Indiana Democratic Party brought a post-election complaint against him following the 2010 general election where White easily defeated their party's candidate for secretary of state in 2010, Vop Osili. The Recount Commission determined that White had legally registered to vote and was eligible to hold office. The trial court which convicted White applied a different voting residency standard than has been applied in numerous voting registration disputes decided by Indiana courts, as well as the Recount Commission hearing his case.

White Direct Appeal Dismissed In Favor Of Post-Conviction Relief

The Indiana Court of Appeals has granted a so-called Davis Petition filed by Charlie White's attorney, which means his direct appeal has been dismissed while his attorney seeks post-conviction relief starting at the trial court level. As the Indiana Law Blog explains:

[T]he COA granted a Davis Petition on Friday, so the appeal has been dismissed for further proceedings in the trial court. Here is the Sept. 7th COA Order. In short, the direct appeal has been dismissed without prejudice so White can file a petition for post-conviction relief. Once the trial court rules on the PCR petition, then White can appeal the issues arising from, relating to the PCR and the issues he would have raised in his direct appeal.
 

An AP story inaccurately reports that White is only appealing three of his six felony convictions. As I understand it, the reason White's appellate attorney is seeking post-conviction relief instead of a direct appeal is to broaden the scope of issues that may be heard on appeal if the trial court does not grant White the relief he seeks, such as exculpatory evidence that was heard by the state Recount Commission that heard White's eligibility challenge decided in his favor by the state's Supreme Court. None of that evidence was heard by the trial court jury because White's trial attorney chose not to put on a defense. Judge Steven Nation refused to allow the Recount Commission's findings in White's favor entered as evidence at trial. An expert hired by White's attorney also publicly complained that he was not allowed by White's attorney to offer cell phone GPS evidence that he was prepared to testify definitively proved that White was sleeping at his ex-wife's home at nights, not at the condominium he had purchased as argued by the prosecution to prove that he committed vote fraud. The brief filed by White's attorney was filed prior to the granting of the Davis Petition in order to satisfy the deadline for submitting a brief for direct appeal in the event his Davis Petition had been denied and does not necessarily represent the issues that will ultimately be heard on appeal.

UPDATE: Here is a more blunt explanation for the post-conviction relief approach rather than a direct appeal:

Former Indiana Secretary of State Charlie White will have a chance to argue that his lawyer’s incompetence led to his conviction on six felony charges.

The Indiana Court of Appeals has allowed White to delay his appeal until he returns to the trial court to try to convince a judge that his attorney, former Marion County Prosecutor Carl Brizzi, provided such poor service that it hurt White’s case. The main issue, according to court documents, is that Brizzi refused to present a defense on White’s behalf.

If White is successful, the judge could overturn his convictions and order a new trial.

But even if White doesn’t get a new trial, he will be able to take the stand to discuss the case during a post-conviction relief hearing. He also could question Brizzi and witnesses in the case, said Joel Schumm, a law professor at the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law in Indianapolis.
 

Also, the AP has corrected its earlier story.

If Charlie White Had Only Been A Resident Of Lawrence County

Former Secretary of State Charlie White was charged and convicted of theft for drawing a salary as a Fishers Town council member for a several month period that a Hamilton County court determined that he had not been residing within the boundaries of his town council district despite the fact that White repaid all of the money, in addition to taxes he paid on the salary he returned to the Town of Fishers. A similar case out of Mitchell in Lawrence County yielded an entirely different result.

A Mitchell city council member, Everett Ferrel, was deemed not to be residing within the boundaries of the city of Mitchell despite his election to the council in 2007 so the city refused to pay him his council member's salary during most of the four-year term to which he was elected. Mitchell council members are paid an annual salary of $4,900. After Ferrel disputed the refusal of the city to pay him his council salary, the city hired a special counsel to file a declaratory judgment in the Lawrence Circuit Court to determine whether the city was obligated to pay Ferrel his salary. Because the city never took formal action to remove Ferrel from the council, Judge Andrea McCord determined that the city had to pay him all of the unpaid wages it had withheld from him, which amounted to $12,250, despite the fact that it was undisputed that Ferrel did not live within the city's boundaries.

Under Indiana's Wage Payment Statute, an employer is actually liable not only for the amount of any wages legally due to the employee, but it is also liable for double the amount of unpaid wages as damages, plus the attorney's fees incurred by the employee in seeking to recover his unpaid wage claim. Apparently the parties conducted a mediation at which Ferrel agreed to accept only the $12,250 owed to him and no damages.

So here you have two council members in different counties within the state of Indiana subject to the very same laws. Charlie White agrees to resign from his council seat and repay the wages he was paid for a several month period when he was no longer living within his district. He is still charged by a special prosecutor with felony theft. Hamilton Co. Superior Court Judge Steve Nation denied White's attorney's motion to dismiss the theft charge against him, and the jury found him guilty. In Lawrence County, a council member demands his full salary even though it is determined that he doesn't reside within the city limits. He refuses to resign from the council, and Lawrence Co. Circuit Court Judge Andrea McCord rules that he was entitled to his full salary despite not living within the city because the city did not take formal steps to remove him from the office to which he was elected. More importantly, Ferrel was under no pressure to resign from the council since the Lawrence Co. Prosecutor wouldn't file criminal charges against Ferrel like the special prosecutors did in White's case. It's all further fodder for the view that Charlie White got screwed up in Hamilton County big time no matter how you personally feel about him. White's only hope is that the Indiana Court of Appeals hearing his appeal agrees with that view.

Madison Co. Clerk Says McIntosh Residence Not Unusual

The chief elections officer and county clerk of Madison County, Darlene Likens, says Fifth District congressional candidate David McIntosh's voting residence at an Anderson home where he doesn't live is not unusual. “It’s not unusual for federal candidates to try and cover the bases," Likens told the Anderson Herald Bulletin. "They have a residence where they come home so they can run again.” Likens' analysis apparently doesn't consider the fact that McIntosh hasn't been a federal candidate since he gave up his former 6th District House seat in 2000 to run for governor. Likens, a Republican, is backing McIntosh in the crowded Fifth District race to replace retiring U.S. Rep. Dan Burton. Likens told the newspaper that she was unsure whether the county elections board of which she is a member would meet to hear a complaint challenging McIntosh's voting residency before the state's May 8th primary election.

In the story titled, "Residency issues continue to dog congressional candidate David McIntosh," reporter Stephen Dick notes that McIntosh has lived in Arlington, Virginia since 2005 when he sold his Muncie home and moved his family there to work for as a lobbyist for a Washington, D.C. law firm, Mayer Brown & Platt. “It looked to me as if McIntosh already lived in Virginia; his kids go to private school and his wife is active in the Episcopal church,” Greg Wright, the citizen activist who filed the complaint told Dick. McIntosh has acknowledged that he obtained a Virginia driver's license after being stopped for a traffic offense by a Virginia police officer and told he needed a Virginia driver's license, which can only be issued to persons who declare themselves residents of that state. Unlike McIntosh, his wife Ruthie votes in Virginia. Wright's complaint included a letter dated July 14, 2011 from Citizens United's David Bossie urging McIntosh to run for Congress in Virginia's Eighth District where he lives. Wright's complaint notes that McIntosh also owns a Florida vacation home and has the tax bills for that home mailed to his Virginia address.

When McIntosh first sold his home in Muncie, he registered and voted at a home in Pendleton, Indiana owned by Randall Wilson, who serves with McIntosh on the board of Xtreme Alternative Defense Systems, a federal defense contractor based in Anderson. McIntosh later changed his voter registration to an Anderson home owned by Pete Bitar, the CEO of Xtreme. Federal lobbying registration records show that McIntosh lobbies for the Anderson defense contractor.

Critics of McIntosh point out that former Secretary of State Charlie White was indicted and convicted on several vote fraud charges earlier this year and forced to resign from office for registering and casting a vote at one election in Hamilton County using his former wife's home while he was in between homes prior to his marriage to his second wife. White is appealing his criminal convictions. The state's Supreme Court has already ruled that Democrats waited too late to file a complaint challenging White's eligibility on the basis that he was not legally registered to vote in the proper precinct.

McIntosh obtained an advisory opinion from Madison Co. Prosecutor Rodney Cummings stating that McIntosh's voting registration in Anderson was legal despite the fact that he and his family did not physically reside at the home where he was registered to vote. Cummings based his opinion on the Evan Bayh case, which was decided by the Supreme Court, but that case decided whether Bayh was a resident of Indiana for purposes of being a candidate for governor Indiana, as opposed to being a legal resident eligible to vote in a particular precinct. A more exacting legal standard applies to a person's voting registration.

What the McIntosh residency issue points up is that depending on who you are has a lot to do with how your case is legally handled. White faced the worst possible outcome under circumstances under which tens of thousands of voters cast votes every election in Indiana when they are in between residences. Former Sen. Richard Lugar was forced to re-register at his family's farm in Marion County after the Marion Co. Elections Board determined that he had been illegally registered and casting votes using a residence he had sold 35 years ago, but he faces no criminal charges for his violation of election laws. Both the Madison county clerk and county prosecutor support McIntosh and clearly have no intention of enforcing the law to his detriment under circumstances that undeniably raise a far worse violation of the voter registration laws than White's case involved. White may have had a point when he told a Fox News show following his conviction that Indiana was a state of men, not of laws, that unfairly applied the state's voter registration laws. The media has also been noticeably more restrained in its coverage of Lugar's and McIntosh's voter residency problems compared to the vitriol they displayed in their coverage of White's residency woes.

Indiana Supreme Court Reverses Judge Louis Rosenberg, Deems White Was Eligible To Hold Office As Secretary Of State

The Indiana Supreme Court has just issued its unanimous opinion in the Charlie White eligibility case reversing the decision of Marion Co. Circuit Court Judge Louis Rosenberg overturning the Recount Commission's determination that Charlie White was eligible to hold office as Secretary of State. The opinion written by retiring Chief Justice Randall Shepard can be accessed here. The Court ruled that the Democratic Party waited too long by waiting until after the election to challenge White's voter residency status consistent with its recent decision in Burke v. Bennett. By ruling as it did, the Supreme Court sidestepped the issue of whether White was legally registered to vote, an issue that it will likely revisit when/if it hears a criminal appeal of White's Hamilton County criminal convictions for vote fraud-related crimes. Interestingly, Justice Dickson in a concurring opinion agrees with my constitutional analysis that the state constitution does not impose as a qualification for being secretary of state that a person be a registered voter of the state. He would deem the state statute requiring a secretary of state candidate to be a registered voter as a condition to his candidacy unconstitutional. As a consequence of today's decision, Gov. Mitch Daniels will get to name White's permanent successor to that office to serve out the remainder of his term unless the court later overturns White's criminal convictions for vote fraud-related charges on appeal. More analysis to come.

Attorney General Reverses Decision Of Daniels' DCS Seeking To Block Release Of Public Records

In a rare move, the Indiana Attorney General took issue with an appeal filed by the state's Department of Child Services concerning the release of public records and intervened, resulting in the dismissal of the case. Last week, a probate court judge in St. Joseph County approved the release of recorded calls made by an anonymous person to a hotline reporting on the abuse of a young boy, who months later died at the hands of his father's physical abuse. DCS sought emergency relief from the Indiana Court of Appeals, which issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the South Bend Tribune from releasing the records about an hour after the newspaper published a story online detailing the phone calls. The newspaper pulled the online story and awaited further action at a hearing scheduled before the Indiana Court of Appeals tomorrow. Instead, Attorney General Greg Zoeller's office intervened as the state's chief legal counsel and asked the court to dismiss the case, which the court agreed to do. The Tribune reports on this development:

The Attorney General’s office took over the case Monday from DCS and immediately filed a motion for dismissal, determining the agency’s effort to prevent publication was inconsistent with the First Amendment.

"In the interest of openness and transparency, the publication of public records should not be halted," Attorney General Greg Zoeller said in a statement.

After the dismissal, the Tribune published the story on its website. It also appears in today’s Tribune. The article concerns a 20-minute phone call made to the abuse hotline about 10-year-old Tramelle Sturgis, who was tortured and beaten in his home in November.

"We're grateful to our attorneys and pleased that the attorney general decided to intervene," said Tribune Executive Editor Tim Harmon. "Mr. Zoeller, at least, understands the very serious constitutional issues that are at stake when the courts are asked to muzzle the press."

Interestingly, after the Attorney General intervened and got the case dismissed, DCS now claims its objective was not to impose prior restraint on the press. John Ryan, DCS's Chief of Staff, tells the Tribune its only objective was to prevent the Tribune from revealing the identity of the anonymous caller who reported the abuse. Zoeller told the Tribune his office is reviewing its long-standing practice of allowing DCS to represent itself in light of its actions in this case.

Hats off to Zoeller for standing up to DCS and the Daniels administration on this important issue. The Attorney General's actions here are instructive on how he may proceed with the criminal appeal in the Charlie White case. Some legal commentators have suggested that Zoeller has a conflict in defending the state's prosecution of White on appeal at the same time he is urging on behalf of the State's Recount Commission that the Supreme Court reverse Marion Co. Circuit Court Judge Louis Rosenberg's order reversing the Commission's decision in favor of White's eligibility to hold the office of Secretary of State. If Zoeller believes White's prosecutors misapplied Indiana's election law to indict and convict him on charges of registering and voting in the wrong precinct, he has every right to take a position supporting the overturning of those convictions. He is not legally obligated to defend what he determines to be a legal wrong just as he did with the DCS case today.

Cell Phone Records Would Have Cleared White If Offered

Could have, should have, would have. Two private investigators are questioning why Charlie White's attorney, Carl Brizzi, didn't call an expert to explain his cell phone records, which they tell WISH-TV's Karen Hensel proved White was living at his ex-wife's home and not at the Overview condominium he had purchased to live with his second wife following their marriage where prosecutors convinced a jury he was really living. Here's some of what Hensel reported:

He has two experienced private investigators questioning why cell phone records were never used as evidence. They said they hold the evidence to prove White never should have been convicted on the six felony counts in his voter fraud trial.

Tim Wilcox of International Investigators LLC has been an investigator for 42 years. Wilcox believes White did not get a fair trial.

"The jury was not given the evidence that could change their minds,” he said. “His attorney decided not to present the key witnesses, and we had the key witness."

That key witness, Wilcox said, is Ryan Harmon, a former Indiana State Police officer who once worked on the public corruption section as a detective and retired after being investigated in connection with a hit-and-run accident. He is now a private investigator.

"Their State Police investigator had no knowledge in cell phone tower triangulation," Wilcox said, noting that Harmon does.

Harmon explained why cell records could have changed opinions on White’s residency: "The cell records are not just a day and time. We have longitude and latitude of the towers. We have different azimuth laid out." . . .

The case against White centers around this: He used his ex-wife's address, where he used to live, instead of a condo he shared with his then-fiance, on his voter registration form. Prosecutors said it's because he didn't want to give up his Fishers Town Council salary after moving out of the district he was elected to represent. White and the two private investigators said it's because he was never actually living in the condo.

That's where the cell phone records come in. Nearly two years of phone calls - 30,000 records. Harmon conducted a specific technique called triangulation to analyze them.

"During a six-month period, I looked at every night where the last call was made and the first call in the morning," Harmon said, because the last call made was most likely where White stayed all night.

"48 percent of the time over a six-month period, this phone was on tower 74,” Harmon said. “Tower 74 is the tower in question where the condo is located."

Harmon then looked at the stats just during the work week, assuming White stayed at the condo to see the then-fiance on weekends. Cell records show the percentage of time he spent there dropped dramatically during the week.

"12 percent of the time in a six-month time, Monday through Friday, on that tower. Back it down to a Sunday-Thursday work week, and it is 9 percent,” Harmon said. “It doesn’t fit. He was not living at the condo. He was visiting the condo."

Harmon said the cell phone records show White only stayed there nine nights in more than three months.

"Let's look at the date when the felonious acts took place on May 4, 2010, when Mr. White committed this felony by voting,” Harmon said. “96 days leading up to May 4, there was only nine nights in 96 days one could logically conclude he stayed at the condominium. Out of 96 days. To me, that is beyond a reasonable doubt."

Then, when White got remarried, 16 days after voting, on May 20, Harmon said: "The records tripled on tower 74. He is living at the condo now. He is married."

It just sickens me that Brizzi didn't call Harmon as a witness. A source tells me that Brizzi didn't want to call Harmon because the prosecutors planned to discredit him because of his firing by the Indiana State Police. Harmon was charged with two felonies and two misdemeanors after he plowed into a row of motorcyles parked on South Meridian Street and drove off without stopping while driving his department-issued Jeep Cherokee a couple of years ago after he left the Cadillac Ranch bar near Union Station. Ironically, Brizzi was the Marion County Prosecutor who charged Harmon in 2010. Regardless, his testimony would have been quite valuable assuming he qualified as an expert to testify on these matters. From what I heard, the government's witness didn't know how to properly interpret the cell phone tower evidence and gave some very unreliable information to the jurors. Even worse, I'm told the evidence offered by the government did not include the entire period under question; only a small time frame where it tended to support their contention he was living at the condo, a deceptive practice known as cherry picking. I thought there was some rule of evidence about completeness when offering such evidence, but I digress. I question the reliability to even offer this evidence in the first place, but observers say that Judge Nation pretty much allowed the prosecutors to offer any evidence they wanted to prove White's guilt over Brizzi's objections.

White told Hensel that he and Brizzi felt that the prosecutors had failed to meet their burden of proof so there was no need to put on a defense, but what they forget is that every damn one of those jurors were convinced of his guilt before the trial started regardless of what they claimed during voir dire because that's all they heard the media report for an entire year. If the law had been properly applied, the prosecutors would have never brought the indictments against him. Once the prosecutors showed their willingness to recreate well-stated law with their imaginative interpretations in an effort to destroy White, it was the duty of Judge Steven Nation to step up and dismiss the charges on Brizzi's motion that clearly explained why the charges were incompatible with Indiana law. Only Judge Nation knows why he chose to ignore Brizzi's well-argued statement of the law and side with the over zealous prosecutors.

Hensel also tried to find out how much the special prosecutors, John Dowd and Dan Sigler, charged taxpayers for prosecuting White. She was told their final bill has not yet been submitted. Sigler engaged in good old fashioned nepotism by adding his son, Dan, Jr., to the special prosecution  team to provide an opportunity to further drive up prosecution expenses to the state, and to provide a good billing opportunity for his son. Brizzi handled White's defense alone.

Vop Osili Shouldn't Be Measuring The Drapes Just Yet

After watching the live streaming over the Internet of the oral arguments in the Charlie White eligibility case before the Indiana Supreme Court this morning, I think it might be a bit premature for Democrat Vop Osili to start measuring the drapes for his new office in the State House. Despite winning only 38% of the vote, Osili, with the help of Democratic Marion Co. Circuit Court Judge Louis Rosenberg, is trying to hijack the will of Indiana voters and hand the Secretary of State's office to Osili based on the specious claim that White was ineligible to run for the office because he wasn't "legally" registered to vote.

Every Supreme Court justice who questioned attorneys for both sides in this case seemed to be really struggling with the idea that White, who has always been a resident of the state and registered to vote in Hamilton County, could somehow be deemed ineligible to run for the office because he allegedly wasn't registered to vote in the proper precinct. Justice Dickson even asked the question I alone have raised since neither of the parties discussed this issue in their briefs. The Indiana Constitution imposes no residency requirement on secretary of state candidates like it imposes on the governor, let alone a requirement that a candidate be registered to vote. How can the legislature add a qualification that is not required by the state's constitution? Osili's attorney did her best to argue that the additional requirements imposed by the legislature were reasonable, but Justice Sullivan wondered about other requirements, such as being a licensed attorney. As a general rule of constitutional interpretation, when specific eligibility requirements are provided for in the constitution, the legislature is not free to impose additional eligibility requirements not specifically required by the constitution.

Justice David, the newest member of the court, seemed bothered that the interpretation of the law by Judge Rosenberg and defended by the Democrats would result in the disenfranchisement of many otherwise eligible voters. Justice David referred to the problem of a "residence of nowhere." White's attorney, David Brooks, very effectively argued to the justices that Judge Rosenberg's interpretation of the law essentially left White without a residence at which he could legally be registered to vote. Brooks pointed to Indiana case law that makes it perfectly clear that a person's future intent to have a residence different than their current residence, as White so intended, does not make a person's current intended residence invalid. None of the justices seem to buy the Democrats' argument that the law could be interpreted to mean more than requiring a candidate for the office of secretary of state to be registered. Whether the person was registered at the time in the correct precinct seemed an irrelevant question to be asking if I was reading the justices' minds correctly.

Justice Dickson also seemed concerned that a state statute providing that a person who received the second most votes in a general election would assume the office once a vacancy is created as completely at odds with a provision of the state's constitution allowing the governor to fill a vacancy in a state office until a successor is elected and qualified. Osili's attorney, Karen Celestino-Horseman, argued that the Constitution only allowed the governor to fill the vacancy temporarily; however, clearly Osili was never elected, even if White is deemed to not be qualified. Attorneys for neither side were prepared to discuss the question first raised about the statute allowing the second highest vote-getter to take office at the opening of today's hearing by Justice Sullivan, but I think the constitutional provision can only be read to mean that the governor appoints White's successor, since White had already been deemed the winner of the election and sworn into office.

That leads to the next question with which the justices wrestled: Did the Elections Commission even have authority to hear the challenge to White's election since it was not raised in a timely fashion? The Election Commission generally only has authority to hear disputes raised and decided more than 60 days before the election because of the need to print ballots and begin absentee voting for the election. The Democrats conceded that their challenge could not be brought before the election because they didn't raise the issue by the statutory deadline. Yet the Democrats believe they should be allowed to overturn the election post-election based on an eligibility challenge it should have raised prior to the election. The attorney for the Attorney General, Steven Creason, made a very strong argument that the Commission lacked authority to hear the post-election challenge. He pointed out that all of the relevant evidence the Democrats used to challenge White was known at the time he was nominated for the office in June, 2010, long before the deadline for filing a challenge with the Commission. That argument seemed to resonate with the justices.

Horseman, not surprisingly, repeatedly raised the issue of White's criminal convictions in Hamilton County on the very vote fraud issues at issue in the eligibility appeal before the court. She argued that the court should take judicial notice of those convictions and use the evidence of that guilty verdict against White in this case. Justice Sullivan was quick to point out to her that the criminal case was likely to be heard by the Supreme Court, which "may or may not" agree to uphold those convictions. It would be preposterous for the court to rely on the ruling of that criminal case, which as I've pointed out was chocked full of errors, and that a good appellate lawyer should be able to get most, if not, all of those convictions overturned on appeal.

I would not be surprised if the Supreme Court hands down a preliminary ruling with a full opinion to follow as early as late today given the gravity in settling for now who holds the right to serve as secretary of state. If the court rules affirms Judge Rosenberg's ruling, it could allow Osili to take office. If it reverses Rosenberg's ruling and affirms the Recount Commission's decision in favor of White's eligibility, then Gov. Daniels will be able to appoint a permanent replacement. White, for now, has forfeited the office by virtue of the Hamilton County felony convictions. The justices wondered how Gov. Daniels had authority to name Jerry Bonnet only as an interim secretary of state. The Attorney General's attorney, Creasor, suggested the decision was made by agreement between Bonnet and Gov. Daniels that he would hold the office only temporarily until the case before the court today is decided. He could not cite a specific law giving Gov. Daniels authority to name a temporary replacement.

Johnson County Law Enforcement Officers Accused Of Vote Fraud In Wake Of Charlie White Conviction

I warned people that you could expect more felony charges being trumped up against people for exercising their right to vote in the wake of the specious charging and conviction of former Secretary of State Charlie White on felony vote charges for doing something no differently than voters in this state do at every election. A Johnson Co. Prosecutor facing his own investigation of his strange personal conduct involving accusations that he stalked a female employee of the Johnson Co. Sheriff's department is now asking a special prosecutor to investigate whether four employees of that same Sheriff's department and a Franklin police detective committed vote fraud by casting votes in the wrong precinct. The Star reports:

A special prosecutor will investigate allegations of voting irregularities involving five Johnson County law enforcement officers.

Saying he wants to avoid the appearance of a conflict, Johnson County Prosecutor Brad Cooper filed a request Feb. 15 asking a judge to name a special prosecutor to investigate whether four Sheriff's Department employees and a Franklin police officer voted in the wrong precincts in the May 2010 primary . . .

According to documents filed in the Johnson County clerk's office, which oversees elections, the allegations involve four Sheriff's Department employees: Chief Deputy Randy Werden, Deputy David Emery, crime lab investigator Melissa Carter and Communications Director Bryan Wolfe. None of the four responded to messages from The Indianapolis Star . . .

Franklin Police Detective Scott Carter also is alleged to have voted in the wrong precinct.

In a telephone interview, Carter said he and then-wife Melissa Carter had moved to another home in Franklin, which was in the same voting district, and explained the situation to poll workers on Election Day 2010.

"I went to the precinct to vote and I was told to vote at the old precinct," Carter said. "I'm a law enforcement officer and I wasn't aware there were stipulations involving this.

"If I was an average person," he said, "I'd be afraid to vote just because they're going to be afraid they're going to do something wrong."

The circumstance described by Carter allows him to vote one last time at his old precinct after he moves as long as he lives in the same congressional district. If he had not updated his voter registration to his new address yet, he would be told by election officials to return to his old precinct to vote where election officials should also have him to fill out a change of address form so that he is registered in the proper precinct at the next election. This happens in virtually every precinct in this state every election day. Carter is absolutely correct. Average joes should be scared to death to vote in this state based on the legal standards adopted in the Charlie White case. Over zealous prosecutors could literally prosecute thousands of Hoosier voters every election using the standards applied to White.

According to the Star report, a person who doesn't even live in Johnson County, Ethan Allen Bailey, delivered the complaint and supporting documents to the Johnson County Clerk's office. It would be interesting to find out if Bailey has any connection to the Johnson Co. Prosecutor. Melissa Carter, one of those accused of committing vote fraud, is the same woman that Prosecutor Brad Cooper was accused of stalking.

How Can Attorney General Greg Zoeller Ethically Defend The Case Of Charlie White's Prosecutors On Appeal?

Ousted Secretary of State Charlie White is looking to the future as he should. The juggling act of the special prosecutors in that Hamilton County courtroom will now get a sharper lens focused on it by appellate judges who take an oath to uphold the state's constitution and laws as White exercises his right to appeal his criminal convictions. The duty falls to the state's Attorney General to defend state prosecutions before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. There's one big problem here. Greg Zoeller has already filed a brief with the Indiana Supreme Court stating that Charlie White was legally registered to vote at his ex-wife's home. If White was legally registered to vote at his ex-wife's home, he could not have committed at least five of the six felonies of which he was convicted. In his brief, Zoeller's office says:

White was registered in Indiana and was constitutionally and statutorily entitled to vote.

He was also properly registered to vote at the Broad Leaf home. He had properly abandoned all other residences to which he could return. Broad Leaf was also the home of his immediate family because his son lived there. Generally, Broad Leaf was a "non-traditional residence," which election law defines as not fixed or permanent. He intended to live there until he was married and moved to the Overview condominium.

In the sentencing hearing yesterday, Judge Steven Nation said that the trial court found that White had "intentionally defrauded the public by using his ex-wife's home to vote and continuing to take his Fishers Town Council salary after he had moved out of the district." How can Zoeller's office argue on appeal in the Recount Commission case that White was "properly registered to vote" at his ex-wife's house and defend White's criminal convictions based on him being illegally registered to vote at his ex-wife's house? The answer, in short, is that he can't under the rules of professional conduct. If Zoeller believes what his office wrote in that brief in the Recount Commission case, he has a legal obligation to argue on White's behalf in the criminal appeal that these special prosecutors and Judge Nation got the law wrong. Not just a little wrong, but badly wrong. The theft issue over drawing his Fishers Town Council salary for a few month period is a separate matter, but a proper application of Indiana law on that issue should also be resolved in White's favor as well because he stole nothing from Fishers. Judge Nation did not ask White to pay restitution because Fishers' officials communicated to Judge Nation that the town had not been a victim and White owed them nothing.

No Jail Time For Charlie White

Hamilton Co. Superior Court Judge Steven Nation sentenced former Secretary of State Charlie White to one year of home detention for the six felony convictions a jury returned against him earlier this month on vote fraud-related charged and fined him $1,000. He ordered no restitution because, well, there was nothing to repay taxpayers. This was never a case about public corruption or violating the public trust. This has been a total witch hunt from day one to turn legal acts into crimes in an effort to toss an innocent man from office. Billionaire immigrant George Soros is laughing his ass off at the success his self-financed campaign to disrupt America's democratic institutions by targeting state elections officials and to promote the misapplication of state election laws is having in Indiana, savoring the day when the United States of America lands on the ash heap of history. Look over here at nothing while we steal your elections blind state by state.

The two special prosecutors looked peeved when they spoke to reporters after the sentencing hearing that White received no jail time. It's not enough that they succeeded in causing White to lose his office for doing what voters and candidates do every day in every election in this state without consequence, consistent with our own Supreme Court's long-standing decisions allowing for a liberal determination of a person's residence for purposes of voting. White also faces disbarment because of the felony convictions and personal bankruptcy. I have confidence that the Indiana Supreme Court will eventually correct the miscarriage of justice that occurred in that Hamilton County courtroom. Charlie White is not a criminal. The problem is that by the time higher courts have settled that issue it won't matter anymore. White will be left asking where he goes to get his reputation back.

One last time, folks. No vote fraud took place here. No theft took place here. No perjury took place here. The judgment of this court is an unprecedented application of the law that should scare the hell out of every person who holds a citizen's fundamental right to liberty and political participation sacred. The only thing I've taken away from this case is how easy it is for our criminal justice system to be crooked and warped by people who have an agenda other than taking care that the laws are faithfully executed and prosecuted on the same terms to all citizens. Get on the wrong side of the wrong people and you will pay the price. I will await real justice in this case from our state's Supreme Court. If the court follows its long-standing precedents, it will find that White was legally registered to vote and should never have even faced jeopardy of office, let alone multiple felony charges. We shall see.

Brizzi Talks About The Charlie White Trial

Former Marion Co. Prosecutor Carl Brizzi sat down for an interview with Current In Carmel to discuss the conviction of his client, Charlie White, on six felony counts. On the issue of appealing the convictions, Brizzi leaves no room for doubt that White will appeal the convictions.

We’re definitely going to appeal. We think there were very appealable issues in this trial, so I don’t think it’s speculation to be saying he’s pursuing an appeal.” . . .

What people have to bear in mind is, he was literally charged with four different felonies for casting one vote. I’m not really sure if that’s been reported. I mean … four felonies for one vote seems a bit extreme.”

Asked if he was second-guessing his decision not to put on a defense, Brizzi responded:

“What do you want me to do? You can’t go back and second-guess any of the decisions made during the trial. No one except for me, Charlie and the people closest to him know what that evidence is and the potential for it to not be favorable. I lived this case for months and months and months and months, and we made the decisions we made. We’re never going to be able to explain to anyone with any satisfaction why those decisions were made.”

 Asked if he expected White to be sentenced to jail time for his convictions, which carry a maximum sentence of 18 years (for voting in one election at his ex-wife's home):

“Can he potentially face jail time? Yes, absolutely. Do I expect it? I don’t expect or not expect anything at this point. I certainly don’t take anything for granted.”

He's right about that. Hamilton County is one strange and foreign land when it comes to the criminal justice system. We've seen law enforcement ignore overwhelming evidence that a serial killer was living in the community. We've seen male on male sexual assaults in the schools being dismissed as boys engaged in horse play. We've seen parents mistakenly accused of murdering their babies. We've seen a man put away for attempting to murder a state legislator when the police knew damn good and well that's not what took place, notwithstanding the teary-eyed tale told by the legislator. And we've seen adults serve intoxicating alcohol to minors resulting in death without consequences. You're taking big chances when you get caught on the wrong side in Hamilton County.

AP Reporter Misinforms Readers About Residency Issues

It is simply unbelievable the lack of integrity held by so many mainstream news media reporters in their coverage of political and legal issues in this country today. The deliberate misrepresentation of issues and laws to suit one's ends has become acceptable journalism. The AP's Charles Wilson's story on the issue Charlie White has made about other prominent politicians' abuse of the voter registration laws is the latest example of a journalist's personal agenda getting in the way of fair and balanced reporting of the issue at hand. White has pointed out issues regarding the residencies of Sen. Richard Lugar, Gov. Evan Bayh and former U.S. Senator Evan Bayh to illustrate the fact that each of these men could not hold up to scrutiny if the laws were applied as strictly to them as they were to him. The situations of Lugar and Bayh are totally distinct, but you wouldn't know that reading Wilson's elementary-level discussion of the issues.

The crux of White's argument regarding Bayh and Lugar is that they live in the Washington, D.C., metro area but vote in Indiana. Lugar doesn't own a home in Indiana — he sold his Marion County home in 1977. His residency has prompted Hoosiers for Conservative Senate, which is backing Lugar challenger Richard Mourdock, to ask the Indiana Election Commission to rule Lugar's candidacy invalid.

White maintains that is essentially the same thing he was convicted of doing.

But the Indiana Constitution provides that "no person shall be deemed to have lost his residence in the state by reason of his absence either on business of this state or of the United States."

In 1982, then-Indiana Attorney General Linley Pearson cited that law in a legal opinion upholding Lugar's state residency despite the sale of his home.

"If such a person was entitled to vote in this state prior to departing for service in Congress, whatever residence that person possessed for voting purposes prior to such departure remains his or her residence," Pearson wrote. "There is no requirement that a person maintain a house, apartment, or any fixed physical location."

Attorney General Greg Zoeller issued a statement last week saying that his office concurred with the 1982 opinion.

William Kubik, a professor of political science at Hanover College, said White's argument that senators who vote in their home state while serving in Washington commit voter fraud is "completely specious."

"White's argument would mean that active duty military personnel would be ineligible for absentee ballots in Indiana," Kubik said.

The Marion County prosecutor in October turned down White's request for an independent investigation of his vote fraud allegations against Bayh, saying White provided no evidence showing that Bayh and his wife have given up their Indianapolis residence despite continuing to live in Washington since Bayh's Senate term ended last year.

Notice that Wilson, like other reporters, relies on the opinions of political science professors who are neither lawyers nor apparently persons knowledgeable of the U.S. Constitution, which alone sets the eligibility requirements for serving in the Senate. It doesn't matter what the Indiana Constitution says; a senator must be an inhabitant when he is elected. Sen. Lugar has continuously presented himself to the voters of this state since his first election in 1976 as an inhabitant of the state despite the fact that he gave up a residence here in 1977 when he sold his home. Lugar admits he stays in hotels during the few days he spends in the state each year. To call White's argument that Lugar is no longer an inhabitant of the state as "completely specious," is a non-sequitur.

It is also not a given that Lugar is even permitted to cast votes from an address at which he no longer has an interest as his registered voting address because of the state constitutional provision referred to in Wilson's story. That law is intended to prevent people in service to the federal government from losing their claim to residency within the state because they primarily reside elsewhere as a result of their official duties. Because senators and representatives must be inhabitants of their states, they still must maintain some form of residence within their states, even if it is not their primary residence. Lugar is the only member of Indiana's congressional delegation who does not have a home or apartment to rely upon in the state to claim he is an inhabitant and to use as a physical address for voting purposes. As I've noted before, the U.S. Constitution does not even require senators and representatives to be registered voters of their states. Nonetheless, if they choose to register to vote in their states, they need to meet the lenient standard defined in numerous court decisions for meeting residency requirements for voting registration requirements. I predict our state's Supreme Court will reiterate the long-established law on residency when it reverses Marion Circuit Court Judge Louis Rosenberg's decision late last year ordering White removed from office.

Bayh's case is totally different from Lugar's case. Bayh no longer is in service to the state of Indiana since he left the Senate in January, 2011 so he cannot avail himself of the state's constitutional provision allowing him to reside primarily in Washington but registering and casting votes from a condominium in Indiana at which he never resides. Just ask the neighbors in the condominium community where he claims a homestead exemption if you doubt me. They have no idea Bayh is their neighbor because he doesn't stay there when he visits Indiana. Like Lugar, he stays in hotels when he visits the state. Marion Co. Prosecutor Terry Curry didn't even bother to investigate the charges White made that Bayh and his wife were committing vote fraud by voting from that address; he simply dismissed them out of hand without conducting any inquiry.

The facts are somewhat different for Gov. Daniels. Under the Indiana Constitution, the state's governor is required to reside at the state's capitol in Indianapolis. Daniels admits he primarily resides at his home in Carmel, but as White points out, he is claiming the governor's residence as his voting address and casting votes from there.

Daniels spokeswoman Jane Jankowski said the governor's office was confident that he was following the law. She told The Associated Press that Daniels "stays at the residence occasionally and conducts meetings and other events there."

White's point is that he was ordered removed from office and convicted of vote fraud for using his ex-wife's home as his voting address for a few month period while he was in between marriages and permanent homes. The evidence before the Recount Commission showed White stayed at his ex-wife's home several nights a week where his son over whom he exercised parenting time resided, received mail there and used it as his address for obtaining a driver's license. White's ties to his ex-wife's home were arguably greater than Daniels' claim to reside at the governor's residence. Yet one has been forced from office and convicted of felonies, while the other remains in office and the public reassured is abiding by state laws.

I realize it's quite inconvenient for mainstream media reporters to get into the meat of these issues involving Bayh, Lugar and Daniels. It doesn't fit their meme that White did something horribly wrong that is so much different than what other prominent politicians have done forever and are still doing. They dislike White and have no qualms about couching their stories in terms that always make him out to be a bad person, while claiming their favored politicians are being unfairly criticized when the tables are turned on them. White is the real victim here. The public, too, is a victim because it has been repeatedly denied accurate information and dispassionate judgment by those reporting on these issues.