Government baaaaad

On 14 June 2006, under the by-line of Michael Evans, defence editor, The Times ran a story about the death of Captain James Philippson, the first British soldier to be killed in southern Afghanistan.

In a narrative attributed to "senior military sources", we were told that Philippson had "died while trying to rescue a wounded colleague under enemy fire," the paper then retailing a lengthy derring-do account of his exploits.

The following February, a factual and largely unchallenged account of the events leading to Philippson's death was published as part of a Board of Inquiry report. So different was this account that it became manifestly clear that Evans's original was a work of pure, unmitigated fiction.

To my knowledge, Evans has never published a retraction or correction of his story – the MSM never feels the need to apologise. In fact, an even more lurid account of these fictional events found its way into Sean Rayment's book, "Into the killing zone", albeit lacking source attribution.

A year after the Board of Inquiry report, the events came before assistant coroner Andrew Walker. He chose to ignore the substantive findings of the Board and instead focused on what were tangential issues which had not materially affected the outcome of events – specifically a shortage of equipment and in particular night-vision goggles.

On the basis of his narrow and partial perspective, Walker was thus able to launch into a strident attack on the government, accusing it of causing an "unforgivable and inexcusable breach of trust" with the Armed Forces by sending soldiers into combat with "totally inadequate" equipment.

Outside the court, Tony Philippson, the understandably aggrieved father, was given free rein to declare that it was a disgrace that troops had been sent to fight terrorists without sufficient kit. "I hold the MoD responsible for my son's death but in turn they were starved of cash", he said, accusing the then "parsimonious" chancellor Gordon Brown of not spending money and "risking soldiers' lives".

Never knowingly missing an opportunity to score a cheap political point, shadow defence secretary Liam Fox then weighed in, declaring that the Coroner's findings were "a damning indictment on Labour's treatment of our Armed Forces". "The Government were willing to do the one thing which is unforgivable which is to commit troops to battle without due protection," he said.

So it was that the "Philippson affair" became and has remained a political football, the precise events of the Captain's death buried in a welter of acrimony and accusation, the mythology unchallenged.

What has been challenged, though, is the original finding of the Board of Inquiry which considered that Cpt Philippson had been killed as a result of "poor tactical decision-making, a lack of SOPs (standard operational procedures) and a lack of equipment." In particular, the unit's commanding officer, Major Jonny Bristow came in for some criticism.

We now learn from The Sunday Times that, following assiduous lobbying from Tony Philippson, the Board is to revisit its findings whence it is "anticipated" that it will dismiss the original criticisms that the rescue mission in which Philippson died was an "ill-prepared rush", asserting that soldiers were properly briefed and overall preparation was adequate given the need to deploy the soldiers rapidly.

However, such is the strength of the prevailing narrative (government baaaaad, Army goooood) that, on the basis of these "anticipated" revised findings, current defence secretary Bob Ainsworth is accused of a "cover-up" over the death of Philippson.

The charge rests on an interview just hours after last year's inquest when Ainsworth, then the armed forces minister, confronted with the coroner's comments about inadequate equipment, "attempted to shift the blame onto Bristow", referring to the Board which had also found there were a "lack of standard procedures and tactical errors too".

This, of course, was no more or less an accurate reflection on the Board's views, but now says Philippson senior, the "anticipated" revised findings "will prove Bob Ainsworth was trying to cover-up the real reason for James's death. He was trying to shift blame away from the lack of equipment for which the MoD was responsible and negligent." "James was a friend of Major Bristow and the suggestion that he played a part in my son's death is despicable," he adds.

Whatever sympathy one might have for a bereaved father, it has to be said that this chain of logic is tortuous at best, if not tendentious. But it is nevertheless sufficient to permit The Sunday Times to run as its page-lead the headline: "Bob Ainsworth in 'cover-up' over soldier's death."

Tony Philippson, though – unwittingly or not – is in tune with the media narrative and is thus allowed to say: "Bob Ainsworth is not fit to be secretary of state and lead the armed forces. Blaming a commanding officer for the MoD's failings is outrageous. He should resign his post with immediate effect."

There may, in fact, be many reasons why Bob Ainsworth is not fit to be secretary of state but, in fairness, this is not one of them. Whatever the new board of inquiry might find – and its report is many months away – it can hardly change the basic facts of the narrative account. Any sober assessment of that narrative can only lead to the conclusion that the events which led to the death of Cpt Philippson did not represent the Army's finest hour.

But, as long as the prevailing narrative remains in force, we will not find in the media any suggestion that the military can in any way be at fault, even in the smallest of ways. Government baaaaad, Army goooood is what we are told, and that is what we must believe.

COMMENT THREAD

Helicopter blues

The demand for more support helicopters in Afghanistan cannot be met fully because there are not enough crews to fly them, RAF commanders have acknowledged. Five trained crews were required for each one to ensure safety. So says The Times which cites Air Commodore Simon Falla, deputy commander of the Joint Helicopter Command.

He also reveals another reason why Britain could not send too many more helicopters to Helmand - a shortage of parking space. "There is pressure on real estate. There is this cry for more helicopters but where are you going to park them? They have to be parked somewhere," he says.

Backing up the military inertia is defence secretary Bob Ainsworth, who blandly declares that the military will not be rushed into redeploying Merlin helicopters to Afghanistan, as "we won't jeopardise safety".

The helicopters are on now display at RAF Benson in Oxfordshire, following the return of the last two from Iraq. A flypast took place to celebrate their achievements, with senior RAF and Joint Helicopter Command officers gathered at the base, along with friends and families of personnel from the armed forces.

Meanwhile, the Canadian government has announced a $1.15 billion contract for 15 new CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, which are expected to be delivered between 2013 and 2014.

Pending delivery, Canada's defence minister Peter MacKay has said that Canada would overcome a critical shortage of support helicopters by buying six used machines from the United States as well as leasing six Russian-made aircraft.

Presumably, the Canadian government have already booked the parking slots, and one assumes that pilots will be found to fly them – unless, of course, the Canadian military take lessons from the British military and find ever more inventive reasons why the aircraft cannot be deployed.

COMMENT THREAD

Cutting corners

In March of this year, Ann Winterton asked the defence secretary (then John Hutton) how much it was going to cost to upgrade the Merlin fleet to theatre standard, to allow it to be used in Afghanistan. At that time he replied that the upgrade would cost "in the region of £50 million". This equated to an estimated average of £1.8 million per aircraft.

The same question asked in July, however, elicited a slightly different response. Then, the price for upgrading the 28 Merlin Mk3/3a helicopters had miraculously dropped to "the region of £42 million", equating to an average of £1.5 million per aircraft.

Defence secretary Bob Ainsworth explained this unusual as "due to improved maturity in our cost estimates following work undertaken in the intervening period." However, there may well be a different explanation – in part, at least.

According to Thomas Harding in The Daily Telegraph, in order to get the Merlins out to Afghanistan by the end of the year, Kevlar armour has been omitted from the load compartment – thus producing a saving of £100,000.

The armour, similar to that fitted to a Snatch Land Rover, protects troops from small calibre weapons and fragmentation from RPGs, and has been a requirement in operational helicopters ever since June 2003. Then, a Chinook attempting to land a relief force to aid embattled troops in the Iraqi town of Majar al-Kabir, took heavy gunfire which injured seven, some seriously.

Writes Harding, the lack of armour will severely restrict the operational use of these helicopters. Possibly, they will be restricted to "safe" areas (if there are any) and for the transport of supplies rather than personnel. At over £30 million each for the six ex-Danish Merlins, this would make them the most expensive delivery trucks in the world.

The one consolation (one must always look on the bright side) is that, without the armour, the Merlins will be able to carry considerably more supplies than they otherwise would and, when flying empty, the carbon footprint will be slightly reduced. Al Gore would be proud.

COMMENT THREAD

Not even a whimper

As of Friday, the British military presence in Iraq comes to an end. There will be no flags, no parades, no speeches and not even a formal withdrawal – just an administrative mess.

The warning signs were there in June when plans for Britain's final military mission in Iraq were in disarray, with no formal agreement finalised to maintain in place a Royal Navy detachment and upwards of 400 troops after the 31 July deadline, when the bulk of British forces were required to quit Iraq.

On the back of the ejection of the main force, this was the one diplomatic fig-leaf which enabled the British government to keep a toe-hold in the country and thus continue the pretence that we were still welcome.

However, even that has fallen apart. A "draft accord" which had been approved by Iraqi ministers in June allowed only 100 personnel to remain and that had to be ratified by the Iraqi Parliament. But, according to The Guardian, using an agency report, the Parliament has gone into recess without ratifying the instrument, forcing the remaining British personnel to leave the country by Friday.

Officially, of course, they have not left. They are being stationed over the border in Kuwait, pending the resumption of parliamentary business, whence it is hoped that the British detachment will be allowed to return in late September.

Defence secretary Bob Ainsworth is saying that the government has been "deliberately keeping a low public profile" on the issue - so as not to increase the risk to UK forces, he says. It is nothing to do, he might say if asked, with trying to conceal the humiliating prospect of British personnel having to scuttle over the border to avoid physically being ejected.

An MoD spokesman said US troops would stand in for British troops while they were out of the country, and explains that the "pause" is due to a "procedural delay," leaving the MoD website to laud the heroic work of the removal men, as the last ship sails for England with a batch of Mastiffs (pictured), there to be refurbished and sent to Afghanistan.

The Daily Telegraph tells us that the ratification was opposed by followers of Muqtada al-Sadr who stalled the process. That opposition should have come from that source is hardly surprising. But prime minister Maliki cannot have invested a great deal of political capital in trying to push the agreement through, if Muqtada's men were able to stop it going ahead.

The New York Times notes that the other two small remnants of the coalition, the Romanians and Australians, will also be gone on Friday, if not before, leaving the Americans as the sole members of a multi-national force which has seen contributions from 38 separate states.

My guess is that is how the situation will remain. Come September, the ratification will be quietly parked and the well-rested British personnel in Kuwait will be quietly found a flight home, where there will sneak in anonymously, with nothing more said. And that truly will be the end of what has been one of the more inglorious episodes in British military history in recent times.

And we leave not even with a whimper but ejected by a "procedural delay" which even the British government wanted to keep "low profile". Our presence lasted from 20 March 2003, when British troops crossed into Iraq, to 31 July 2009. And, in two days time, it's over.

COMMENT THREAD

Brown envelopes galore

When it was raised in Parliament yesterday by the redoubtable Ann Winterton - the ONLY MP who raised the embarrassing report of a British-chartered helicopter ferrying military supplies to a British base getting shot down by the Taliban, Miliband and Ainsworth did NOT want to talk about it. The full exchange is here.

Of course, there is every reason why they should not want to be up front. Not only was the prime contractor Skylink subcontracting the work to dodgy Moldovan gun-runners – in breach of the contract requirements – the Moldovans were subcontracting the operating of the aircraft to an equally dodgy Ukrainian outfit, which explains why six of their number were killed.

Moreover, as more details come in, it is now very clear that this was a deliberate Taleban ambush, mounted directly under the noses of the British, aimed at bringing down a Chinook – one of the main strategic aims of the Taleban. The unfortunate Mi-26 happened to wander along, in company with an Mi-8 MTV. Both took fire and the Mi-26 bought it. Bad luck on the Ukrainian crew and bad luck for the Taleban. They wanted an RAF Chinook, and will keep trying until they get one.

As for Skylink, this is an aviation company that has no aircraft. It specialises in supplying aircraft in war zones for the UN and other tranzies like the EU, for NGOs and any shady outfit that happens to be passing with a dodgy cargo it wants moved in a hurry. It buys contracts top dollar, with brown envelopes passing freely. It is so corrupt that even the UN blew it out, until it bought its way back into favour by greasing the right palms.

The company then subs out the work down the chain to dodgy Moldavans, Ukrainians and the rest, mostly operating clapped-out ex-Soviet hardware with safety certificates that owe more to photoshop than they do any certifying authority, their aircraft banned from any and all Western airspace. These outfits work as a group, sharing and swapping assets when they get outed, forming and reforming companies, appearing and disappearing, and cropping up with new names and the same aircraft just as frequently.

These are the people that are working for the MoD, the contract carefully laundered through Nato to give plausible deniability, thus avoiding a Tory and media uproar when it was learned that the MoD was hiring dodgy ex-Soviet choppers to make up for capacity shortfalls.

The trouble was that the original arrangement was that the aircraft should serve the transport hub between Kandahar and Bastion. They were not permitted to fly into FOBs – that is military airspace, from which they were to be excluded.

However, once there, the mission creep set in and, with the desperate shortage of lift, the brief was extended to the aircraft uplifting into the FOBs like Sangin. The Ukrainians, desperate for cash, were squared off with generous bonuses and thus agreed to fly into hot war zones, where even RAF Chinooks will only fly with Apache escorts.

The MoD was happy, being able to release Chinooks and Apaches for operations, Skylink was happy with the extra hours and the bonuses, and the Ukrainians at the sharp end needed the money anyway. And hey! They are expendable.

As long as the contract was piggy-backed off Nato, and thus totally deniable, no one had to be told and everyone kept schtum ... including the Tories. And now, no one wants to talk about it. Says Ainsworth: "I do not want to trespass on to operational details." You bet he doesn't.

As for the Tories, having decided to make "helicopters" their cause celebre, the last thing they want to know is that the Taleban are parking outside the gates of British bases, waiting for an opportunity to down a Chinook. Rather shoots the Fox - to coin a phrase - about more helicopters saving lives.

So goes the conspiracy of silence. The British media ... forget it. E-mails from special advisors? MPs' expenses? Dead safe ... nay problem. If you look too deep here, you don't live.

COMMENT THREAD

"Unsafe" gun runners supplying "Our Boys"

Defence secretary Bob Ainsworth, it seems, has been rather less than frank about the availability of helicopter support for "Our Boys" in Afghanistan – but in a rather unusual way. There was one more helicopter available to deliver supplies than he was admitting.

The downside of this intriguing piece of news, however, might just explain his reticence. The additional machine was leased via Nato, operated by a Moldovan charter company, Pecotox Air, which has been banned from EU airspace for safety reasons and which has been implicated in arms trafficking.

These embarrassing details would not have emerged but for the unfortunate incident yesterday when it was reported the helicopter, a giant Mi-26T, registration ER-MCV (pictured above), was shot down by the Taleban a mile from the British military base in Sangin.

Misleadingly, the AP report (link above) cited the Moldovan operator claiming that the aircraft had been "ferrying humanitarian aid" when the crash took place, a detail quickly corrected by Reuters which had Western forces confirming that the helicopter had been "bringing supplies to a British base at Sangin." According to the Los Angeles Times, it was contracted specifically to supply British forces.

Although The Times, in its report, falls for the "humanitarian aid" story (and misspells the charter company's name), with a moment's reflection the implausibility would be obvious. The aircraft was reported as being leased by Nato, an arrangement which was flagged up in October 2007, as a means of relieving the chronic shortage of helicopter lift in theatre.

One thing we know, Nato is not a humanitarian organisation. It most definitely does not charter helicopters to distribute aid – not least because the NGOs and aid agencies have their own budget for this work and would object to such efforts being associated with the military. However, it is obvious why Pecotox Air would want to mislead, as it would not want it widely known that it was delivering military supplies to British bases.

The fact that "unsafe" gun runners should end up supplying "Our Boys" is a story in itself. For several years, this blog has advocated that the British government should charter civilian helicopters directly, having been made aware of a number of reputable companies who could supply Russian-built helicopters - including the Mi-26 - upgraded with European avionics and flown by security-cleared ex-military crews.

However, such were the objections raised within the MoD - and especially by the RAF, which argued on safety, operational and security grounds against permitting civilian aircraft into military airspace – that, although the government relented briefly, it turned down a long-term arrangement. Instead, it chose to throw its lot in with Nato and charter an aircraft through this source.

By this means, the government was able to distance itself from hostile media and the political fall-out, with the Conservatives strongly against the use of such machines. Going through Nato also by-passed RAF objections.

In taking this option, however, the government lost control over the selection of the contractor, which was managed by Nato in Brussels on a lowest-bidder-wins basis. As a result, British taxpayers ended up paying for a helicopter operated by a company banned from the airspace of EU member states on safety grounds, with a record of gun-running, the machine flown by a Ukrainian crew, possibly of uncertain loyalty.

Whether a better-equipped machine would have evaded the Taleban attack is moot, but one suspects that this machine would not have been equipped with the latest defensive aids (which have proved extraordinarily successful).

How many supplies have been lost – and the cost – has not been disclosed, and probably never will. But at least Bob Ainsworth will no longer have to conceal the identity of his "secret" machine. It now lies a charred wreck, with seven dead as a testament to a very dirty war.

COMMENT THREAD

Of course they need more helicopters ...

Challenged by Liam Fox as to why the defence secretary was not bringing more helicopters into Afghanistan, Ainsworth trotted out the "usual statistics" and then rounded on the shadow secretary, declaring, "I have yet to hear how he thinks we can get more helicopters in ... ".

Yet Ainsworth, in common with his predecessors, is fighting with his hands tied behind his back. He could bring more capacity into theatre within weeks – it could already be there, and could have been for years. But, for he or his predecessors to have done so would have been in the teeth of opposition from the military itself, which has blocked endless attempts to bring more machines into use.

Options on the table have included the leasing of Mi-8 MTVs and Mi-26s (pictured), of purchasing Blackhawks off-the-shelf from the American manufacturers, or buying and refurbishing US Huey-type machines – in use by US Marines and Canadian forces in Afghanistan.

Each time proposals have been made, they have been blocked – sometimes for good reasons, but none of the problems insurmountable. Mainly the blockages have been inter-service rivalry or because the military have been holding out for "better" machines, sometime in the future, as in the Future Lynx.

Maybe in 30 years time, historians will be able to get access to the government records and tell the full story of what has been going on, but the Future Lynx story also involves a strong element of "pork barrel" politics – keeping Augusta Westland in business – the future of the Army Air Corps, of which Dannatt is commandant general, and protecting Navy requirements for a light ASW airframe.

Perhaps a more robust, Churchillian prime minister could have cut through the maze of competing priorities and sectional interests and issued an "action this day" directive. But such is the febrile atmosphere that it would be a very brave – and foolhardy – politician who over-rode his "defence chiefs" and imposed his own choice on the military.

Any of the alternative options would have involved extra risk – over and above that of buying a fully kitted-out helicopter of a type already on the British forces inventory.

The Russian-built helicopters are not as reliable or as safe as the European and American machines, and there are problems integrating the full defensive suites into these airframes. Nevertheless, Mi-8s are in use with special forces in Afghanistan, flown by serving RAF pilots, and the users speak highly of them.

The Huey airframes are old, and have relatively limited capabilities, but they are better than the Lynxes in that they can operate in "hot and high" conditions, albeit with reduced payloads. As for the Blackhawks, they are currently on the US forces inventory, but even then there are problems with integrating the electronics and defence systems with the British fleet.

Thus are ministers handicapped. The British military has acquired a rare ability for finding "reasons" for not doing things it does not want to do, and then deflecting blame onto the politicians when the consequences become apparent, briefing all the while to a media willing to "out" ministers who "put troops at risk". They would just have to wait for one of the "minister's" helicopters to crash, and he would be toast.

The politicians have yet to find a way of dealing with this – a disease which was apparent in 1996 when Douglas Hogg deferred to his "experts" over BSE – which means government has become a process of ministers allowing their "experts" free rein, then acting as their spokesmen and taking the can when things go wrong.

Ainsworth is following in this long tradition and, in time, his successors will do the same. Fox could have put him on the spot, offering alternatives. But he too knows that, to promote them, he would have to take on the military – something he would not do, conscious that he would also be at risk of being denounced.

That in some way explains the current unreality of politics. Ministers and their opposition counterparts are emasculated, and cannot even explain why.

COMMENT THREAD

The all heat and no light show

Trying – and dismally failing – to cover even a fraction of the torrent of coverage on Afghanistan that has poured from the media over the weekend, I had thought we might see a slackening with the start of the working week – but not a bit of it.

What we are seeing is what might be called the "political phase" as opposition politicians have had time to absorb some of the details of recent events, confer with their colleagues and advisors, and prepare their own lines of attack, crafting points with which to beat the government.

With defence questions this afternoon, the last before the House rises on 21 July, rather predictably we see Liam Fox – silent for so long - leading the charge, accusing Gordon Brown of "the ultimate dereliction of duty" in his handling of the war in Afghanistan.

Those of us with a slightly longer memory will remember that, when our Liam earlier this year had the opportunity to set out his views in detail about the conduct of the campaign in Afghanistan, and what precisely was needed to ensure success, he was strangely silent, as indeed he was through a subsequent defence debate.

Now, making up for lost time, Dr Fox has decided that the prime minister has "catastrophically" under-equipped the armed forces and is now "resorting to spin rather than confronting the life-threatening reality" that the troops face.

The Conservatives' line is to accuse Brown of attempting to cover up the fact that British troops do not have enough helicopters, which has forced them to travel by road and left them vulnerable to the Taleban's IEDs. Twelve of the 15 British soldiers killed in Afghanistan this month, and three-quarters of those killed over the past two years, were killed by IEDs.

Far be it for us to disagree with the premise that more helicopters are needed in theatre, but Dr Fox is on somewhat shaky ground if he is asserting – as he appears to be doing – that the bulk of the recent deaths arose from the lack of helicopters.

Not least, the five killed from the 2nd Rifles were on a routine foot patrol, and while there may have been some measures which could have eliminated the peril to which they succumbed, the use of a helicopter was not one of them. Given that they were patrolling in the vicinity of their forward operating base, on a fixed and predictable "beat", the most obvious safeguard would have been persistent video surveillance, using either UAVs, mast-mounted cameras or even concealed micro-cameras, the like of which have been used to great effect by US forces in maintaining route security.

Of one thing one can be certain, with the elaborate nature of the ambush prepared, it must have taken some time to set up and it is hard to believe that, had the technology been in place, suspicious activity would not have been detected.

It is ironic, in a way, that while CCTV prevails in this country to keep a largely law-abiding population under surveillance – and to detect such heinous crimes as littering – the MoD has not thought fit to employ the same technology to protect against far greater threats.

The irony of this, of course, seems to have passed by Dr Fox, yet nor can he rely on the deaths of Lt-Col Thorneloe and Trp Hammond to support his thesis on helicopter shortages. A helicopter ride might have saved Thorneloe's life, for sure, but in his absence, someone else would have been in the front seat of that Viking and could well have died in his place – the casualty rate might thereby have been unaffected.

Nor indeed do we know that a helicopter would have been appropriate, as the Lt-Col was going into a combat area and pilots are rightly reluctant to fly into contested areas unless in dire emergency, which clearly this was not. And, as we know from the fate of Captain Ben Babington-Browne, killed in a Canadian helicopter last week, flying is not without its hazards. For all we know, a ground vehicle might have been the most appropriate form of transport.

What we do have a better idea of, however is that if money had not been frittered away on such unwanted extravagances as a Ferris wheel and a "wimmins' park" and instead had been diverted on improving the road network and bridges, the heavier protected Mastiffs or Ridgebacks could have been used rather than Vikings.

Again, therefore, helicopter shortages do not seem to be the issue – as indeed it may not have been with the more recent Viking casualty, Corporal Lee Scot. He had been leading his section of Vikings from the front when an explosion struck, yet another soldier blown apart in that dangerously vulnerable vehicle.

Defence secretary Ainsworth then himself points to the fact that two recent casualties were killed by an IED while dismounting from a Mastiff, circumstances which might lead one to wonder whether this was another of those carefully prepared Taleban ambushes, but again an incident where a helicopter could hardly have saved the day.

Thus, while a more general case can certainly be made for more helicopters, the bandwagon harnessed by Dr Fox is not going in that direction – which suggests that when he raises the issue in defence questions tomorrow – as undoubtedly he will, given an opportunity – he will be slapped down. That will not matter, of course – the propaganda point will have been made and will get the requisite headlines.

Where Ainsworth would be vulnerable - but is unlikely to be challenged by Dr Fox, however – is on his assertion that "extra equipment could not eliminate risk". This is true enough in that nothing can eliminate risk, but there is certainly equipment that could reduce it, whether it is bridging gear, video surveillance cameras, more UAVs or, as we saw with Private Robbie Laws, more and better mine/IED clearance equipment.

What comes over from the current Tory thrust, therefore, is an attempt to distil down a complex situation, where theatre needs are equally complex as well as varied – as indeed are the deficiencies - in an attempt to score political points rather than shed light on the problems.

Much the same can be said of the second line of attack, the "boots on the ground" argument, rehearsed over the weekend by commentators too numerous to mention, not least Gen Dannatt, who gets an enthusiastic "puff" from Brigadier Allan Mallinson (ret).

Again, there is a case to be made for more troops in theatre, to consolidate the "take and hold" strategy, the first part of which has been played out over the last two weeks or so, with the deployment of US and British troops in co-ordinated actions. But that is a different thing from asserting that, during the current actions, shortage of troops has in any way affected the casualty rate. And that pre-supposes that we should necessarily buy into the strategy, and not be looking at alternatives.

Also, conveyed in The Times today is a somewhat "inconvenient truth" articulated by an anonymous government spokesman. He says, "We are losing more men because we are taking the fight to the Taleban and more troops are being put in harm's way. But it is just not true to say that fewer would be killed if more were there. The opposite could be true. Many of our men have been killed by roadside bombs. Having more there would not prevent that happening."

There is some truth in that. With an increasingly sophisticated enemy, constantly probing for weak spots and launching opportunistic attacks, more men can equal more "targets" and greater opportunities to inflict casualties. And then, it is indeed the case that more aggressive action, with forays into enemy-held territory, will inevitably increase casualty rates.

Bruce Anderson in The Independent therefore makes good sense when he writes that casualties are inevitable. "Politicians are sometimes naïve enough to think that battles can be won without bloodshed," he adds. But, "Soldiers know better. There is a phrase, regularly used by Wellington, which soldiers will repeat and which always makes civilians quail: 'the butcher's bill'. Soldiers have been there."

Putting that in perspective, Anderson then states that this does not dispense with the need to keep the bill down. He writes:

War imposes moral obligations, especially upon those who send men into action. If they will the end, they must will the means. In Afghanistan, this would not necessitate vastly expensive space-age technology. It would merely require the basic tools of modern warfare, such as armoured vehicles whose armour is worth something, and helicopters. Without them, we are effectively reduced to Second World War methods.

Actually, it does require, in some instances, "space-age technology", some of it very sophisticated and expensive. Other kit though, is more down to earth, such as well-designed mine/blast protected vehicles. But there is no panacea, no "quick fix" which will remove the risk entirely. Helicopters are part of the mix, but there is much a need for light tactical helicopters as there is for more transports, and for a decent section helicopter, which is not currently available to British forces.

Equally, with the "boots on the ground" argument, more troops per se are not necessarily an advantage, unless there is a clear idea of how they are to be employed, to what specific effect, within the context of a clear strategy and with equipment and tactics relevant to the theatre, which will provide "added value" to the campaign.

Issues such as helicopters thus do need to be addressed, but the questions that need to be asked are what types are needed, in what numbers and for what purposes. The equipment arguments then need to be widened out to address the broad range of deficiencies in theatre – and the quality and capabilities of equipment fielded. Numbers – and types – of troops deployed need to be discussed in the context of strategy and the other related issues.

Simply to distil these complex issues down to a small number of political mantras and slogans is neither helpful nor productive. Yet, despite the torrent of coverage that we are seeing, there is no evidence yet that we are progressing to the point where we are getting past the sloganising and into the beef.

Heat, there is in this debate, but very little light.

COMMENT THREAD

The situation is serious

One truly wonders whether Bob Ainsworth is aware of the cynicism with which his statement is greeted in informed circles when he blithely tells us that conditions are improving in Afghanistan, based on the "message" he got "in Afghanistan when I visited last week".

One recalls the then newly appointed defence secretary Des Bowne visiting Basra on 18 May 2006, when he declared, "Basra is calm and British forces are working hand in hand with their Iraqi and coalition partners. Suggestions that the city is, in someway, out of control are ridiculous." Two weeks later, Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki announced a state of emergency in Basra, in a bit to contain the escalating violence.

Recalling also Stephen Grey's evidence to the Commons Defence Committee last week, one thus simply speculates how long the "lines-to-take book" was this time. The new defence secretary will have been told what he wanted to hear, and shown that which was convenient to show him, upon which basis he delivers the "upbeat" message that he was always going to deliver anyway – whether he had been to Afghanistan or not.

So taken with Grey's evidence was Jim Greenhalf that he was moved to write his own post on it, observing that much of what was said was worthy of the front page of The Sunday Times.

Anyhow, Ainsworth has delivered his own message to Chatham House today in a keynote speech which was delivered shortly after death of another soldier had been announced, the seventh in a week and the 176th to die since the start of operations in Afghanistan in 2001.

His response to those casualties is charted by The Daily Telegraph which tells us, "More British soldiers will be killed in Afghanistan and there is no end in sight to the campaign, Bob Ainsworth, the Defence Secretary has warned." He adds, "Let us be under no illusion. The situation in Afghanistan is serious - and not yet decided. The way forward is hard and dangerous. More lives will be lost and our resolve will be tested."

So much of the rest of the speech is the usual FCO/MoD extruded verbal material that the only rational thing to do is to glide softly by, although there is some merit in comparing the defence secretary's views with the critique by Matt Waldman, who has some sensible and realistic things to say but, in other ways, is part of the problem.

Of special interest to this blog, however, is Ainsworth's frontal assault on the media criticism of the Viking and other poorly protected vehicles in theatre. "Every effort is being made to increase protection - such as the introduction of Mastiff and Ridgeback troop carriers, the improved armour on Viking and Jackal vehicles, and the more heavily armoured Warthog vehicles coming in 2010," he says, continuing with the "line-to-take" supplied by the military:

With this suite of vehicles military commanders will deploy their assets according to the tactical situation on the ground. But as we develop measures to counter a threat like IEDs, so our enemies adapt - for instance by building higher yield bombs to overcome heavier armour. So let us be clear, sacrificing manoeuvre for heavy armour in every circumstance is not the answer.

We are doing everything we can to counter the IED threat at source. Our forces are finding and diffusing these bombs. But tellingly, they are also concentrating on the networks and the people building them and supplying the technology, the parts and the know-how.

We are getting inside the production process - some in the military call this approach 'getting left of the bang'. When we target the bomb makers and take out the capacity to produce, we cut the threat. Getting left of the bang will save lives - of our troops - and of the Afghans themselves.

This is part of a sustained counter-offensive which has also seen a formal attempt at rebuttal by the Ministry of Defeat, which once again falsely frames the debate as one between protection and mobility, as favoured by the BBC. This is not a ministry that its prepared to learn lessons. Rather it is one that will invest its resources in supporting its existing decisions, however wrong they might be, for want of acknowledging any error whatsoever.

Similarly, Ainsworth is not prepared to admit that which Waldman accuses the government – of miss-spending or wasting aid – not that he could since that involves attacking the FCO and DFID (which we must now learn to call UKAID). Instead, he cites the UK's non-military aid, amounting to £740m since 2001, with a further £500m is planned to 2013. We wonder whether he is aware of the Ferris wheel so generously provided by the British taxpayer, and how that fits in with this general scheme.

What immediately strikes one, however, is the disparity of spending on the military, with over £3 billion in the last three years and £3.5 billion forecast for this current financial year. If the military effort was directed towards civil aid, one might see a wholly different situation in Afghanistan than we see today.

It is rather odd, therefore, that Ainsworth concludes his speech by warning "us" to be under no illusion. "The situation in Afghanistan is serious ... " he repeats. One is tempted to ask: who is this "us", white man? The illusion rests with the secretary of state ... whose policy is not dissimilar to this bridge in the region, which has yet to have the attention of western aid officials. But then, Ferris wheels are so much more useful.

COMMENT THREAD

A leadership crisis

Tucked away at the very end of a piece in The Guardian is a short comment. It notes that the much-touted plans for an extra 2,000 British troops to be deployed to Helmand had been rejected by Gordon Brown, "partly because of Treasury concern about the cost, and partly, say Whitehall officials, because the plans were not convincing."

This is amplified slightly in Defence Management which tells us that it has "emerged" that Prime Minister Gordon Brown rejected plans for a permanent surge of 2,000 troops earlier this year because the proposal was "not convincing" enough. Downing Street, we are told, wanted to see a co-oordinated effort between combat and reconstruction efforts.

Had either or both read Defence of the Realm on 30 April, they would have read something very much to similar effect, where we were the only source stating unequivocally that there would be no permanent uplift in troop numbers in Afghanistan, the precise reason being that the military could not come up with a coherent plan for their employment.

We further amplified these issues later in the month and again in early June, but only now is the mainstream picking up the vibes, which were there more than a month ago but missed by the likes of Michael Smith of The Times, who chose to interpret events though the one-dimensional perspective of "Army versus Treasury.

This focus on cost limits imposed on the "gallant" Army – which, as legend would have it, could win the battle only if it was given enough "boots on the ground" – cropped up again recently, with the accusations from Ed Butler that there had been "tough financial constraints imposed on British troops" in the early days of the Afghani campaign, with the claim that Gordon Brown as Chancellor had demanded that only £1.3 billion could be spent on the operation in three years.

As it happens, actual spending from the Treasury reserve on Afghanistan – in addition to allocations from the Defence budget - was £0.75bn in 2006-07, £1.5bn in 2007-08 and £2.6bn in 2008-09. The forecast for 2009/10 is over 3bn. That puts additional expenditure in three years at close to £4.5 billion which suggests that either Gordon Brown was not as all-powerful as is often suggested, or that the "cap" is a figment of a number of over-heated imaginations.

While the legend, however, plays well to the crowd and can always be guaranteed to provoke foaming at the mouth from the claque and ritual denouncements from opposition politicians, it obscures (and quite deliberately on the part of some) the greater problem in theatre, at the heart of the reluctance to commit huge and growing sums of money in what amounts to giving the MoD a blank cheque.

Something of that was spelt out on the forum, noting that the military had long failed to make a coherent case the cash it has been demanding, and is still unable to do so.

In practical terms, this has been reflected in operations on the ground where, to an extent, the commanding officers of each roulement have had their own ideas about tactics and strategic priorities and have, perhaps been allowed more latitude that perhaps they should. One would not expect key strategic decisions to be made at this level, all of which we surmised, suggests a vacuum of leadership higher up the command chain.

If that is put together with recent events, one can only conclude that we are in a remarkable situation where the military high command has lost the confidence of the government it serves. There is also a feeling that this loss of confidence is reciprocated, and unlikely to be improved by the appointment of Bob Ainsworth to the post of Secretary of State for Defence.

Should this be the case – and the vibes are certainly there – this is an extremely worrying development, and one which perhaps merits more attention than it is getting. Even in this "dumbed-down" age, where soap opera politics prevail, a leadership crisis at the top of the military is of some importance.

COMMENT THREAD

A sense of proportion

"I find it so distressing to hear lavish praise being heaped upon the procurement of vehicles that are potential death-traps and to listen later to expressions of condolence to the families of those who have perished in them."

Thus said Ann Winterton on Thursday (pictured below right), to a near-deserted Commons debating chamber, addressing on the government benches the minister of state for defence, Bob Ainsworth (below left).

Spoken from the heart, with more than a hint of anger, that went entirely unrecorded by the MSM which 24 hours later was to be engulfed in a "day of drama", precipitated by the sudden resignation of James Purnell. Little did we know that, by the end of that day, John Hutton would have resigned and been replaced by Ainsworth as the new secretary of state for defence.

Why Hutton should have resigned so suddenly is not known. He claims "family reasons" but nothing is that simple in politics and, with only eight months in office, he had barely begun to make his mark. For him to leave at what is a crucial moment in the Afghani campaign, however, can hardly help matters. Unsurprisingly, it has been described by Field Marshal Lord Bramall, former CDS, as a " dereliction of duty ".

Back on the Thursday, Ann could hardly have guessed that she was addressing that man soon-to-be-king, when she complained to Ainsworth about the all-important "protected vehicle fleet" in Afghanistan, using General Dannatt's word to describe it as "unbalanced".

There were, she said far too many other vehicles in service (or about to arrive) without the basic mine protection afforded by the "v-shaped hull", those including the Coyote, Viking, Tellar and Warthog - and the Jackal (pictured above, being driven by John Hutton).

It augers ill that Ainsworth, now in the dominant position, did not get the point. The hon Lady, he said, "must accept that we cannot put all our people into the same kind of vehicles. We have to give them a range of different vehicles of different sizes."

There is no way that Ann was arguing thus. Simply that all military vehicles in a part of the world where mine strikes and IED blasts are tragically common should be suitably protected. It is not part of the case that the choice should be restricted to that which are – the point being that better vehicles are required to supplement the range.

Ainsworth, though, ploughed on regardless, heedless of this point, picking up the points Ann had made about the Jackal which, she averred, "highlighted the failed concept of bolting on armour, as proved by the American Humvee vehicle."

Repeating the tired and discredited mantra which he had been fed by his advisors, Ainsworth launched into its defence, declaring: "We have to try to mitigate the effect of using a smaller vehicle and that can be done only to a degree. The main protection of the Jackal is its massive manoeuvrability; it does not have to go down the well-trodden path. If the hon. Lady goes to theatre, she will know that it is a very well thought of vehicle among all ranks."

This invited the obvious retort from Ann: "I would not like to hazard a guess as to how many young men have been killed in it unnecessarily," she told Ainsworth. But the now defence secretary would not leave it there. "The hon. Lady is suggesting that there is some easy alternative that would give our people the capability that they need to do the job and yet remove if not the entire risk, a lot of the risk associated with the Jackal. I do not believe that she is correct."

Ann showed her anger once more. "I hope that the right hon. Gentleman does not think I was born yesterday," she responded. "War is bloody and people get killed in it, but what is desperate is the fact that this country has not supported its soldiers in conflict with the right kind of vehicles, which can be obtained, and has instead made major mistakes in procurement."

While we would not attempt to argue that the recent events have not been important, the "drama" embraced so enthusiastically compares poorly with the real-life struggle that lies out of sight and out of mind, ignored by an indifferent media and uncaring politicians – the real world where men and women are dying needlessly because of mistakes made in London by people who should know better – mistakes to which Ann was seeking to draw attention.

The stark peril facing those men and women is underlined by an article in The Daily Telegraph today, but as no more than a curiosity, detached from the political process.

Written by the paper's stringer, Ben Farmer, he records that troops in Afghanistan "are facing a major increase in the number of roadside bomb attacks as a surge of reinforcements has forced insurgents to shun direct attacks".

This is based on a Nato report that the incidence of IEDs has jumped 80 percent and last year killed 172 international troops. Hundreds more Afghan police, soldiers and civilians have been killed and maimed. Then cited is Gen Richard Blanchette, spokesman for the Nato-led forces, who says: "This is very serious business for us."

He adds that the increase was prompted by insurgents changing tactics and an influx of international troops patrolling on the ground, telling us that, "They are using this as a last measure".

The piece also tells us that armies including the British have been forced to abandon lightly armoured "patrol jeeps" and Snatch Land Rovers, and spend hundreds of millions of pounds on heavier, more cumbersome armoured protection. Yet, it then continues, "despite these efforts, casualties have still dramatically risen", with this year 28 British troops having been killed, 21 by bombs.

Had the paper tied in this piece with last Thursday's debate, the issue would really have come to life, as Ann Winterton told of the wasted money, the poor designs and those procurement mistakes, all explaining why the "efforts" in Afghanistan have not met with complete success.

Perhaps, like this blog, Ann was "too strident" and "too sanctimonious", or perhaps she is simply too detached from the real "drama" of politics. After all, how can the unnecessary deaths of soldiers begin to compare with the "tumultuous" events – as they have been described – of the last 24 hours?

One must, after all, keep a sense of proportion.

COMMENT THREAD

Lost before it started – Part 5

Having looked at the effects of policy on the conduct of the campaign in Iraq, in this fifth part, we look at the Army's response to criticisms, and its broader response to its own failures, reflecting on the nature of the problems which affect the Army high command.

Armchair critics

Faced with criticisms of the Iraqi operation, Gen Dannatt has been quick to round on "armchair critics". He is not the only one. At the height of the Iranian hostages affair in April 2007, there had been much speculation about the apparent willingness of the boarding team to surrender without a shot being fired. Des Browne had sprung to the team's defence, castigating the "armchair pundits". "We ought to be very careful about commenting from the comparative comfort of wherever we are, when we are not out there on operations, about decisions that operational commanders and other people make," he said.

It is perhaps a little unkind to point out that, when it came to armchairs, the MoD was better equipped than most. To complement the £2.3 billion refurbishment of its headquarters in Whitehall, it had purchased over three thousand Herman Miller Aeron chairs, described as "the most comfortable office chairs in the world" - at a list price of over £1,000 each.

An Army incapable of learning

Despite its rejection of "armchair critics", we have an Army which seems incapable of learning for itself. For instance, with troops deployed in Afghanistan, albeit in small numbers before 2006, as had happened in Iraq, routine patrols in the capital Kabul had been carried out in Wolf Land Rovers.

Sure enough, on 28 January 2004, a patrol was attacked by a suicide bomber, killing Pte Jonathan Kitulagoda and destroying the Land Rover. As in Iraq, the Army replaced these vehicles with Snatches. Sure enough, on 4 September 2006, a patrol was attacked by a suicide bomber, killing Pte Craig O'Donnell. Four Afghani civilians were also killed and another soldier was very seriously injured.

Just over a month later, on 19 October, Marine Gary Wright, 45 Commando Royal Marines, was killed in a Snatch as it left the police station in Lashkar Gah, the regional capital of Helmand Province. A suicide bomber had been waiting for his convoy. The Snatch was destroyed, one other Royal Marine was seriously injured and two children bystanders were killed.

In all, up to the end of 2008, at least ten soldiers died in Snatches in Afghanistan, culminating in an infamous incident on 16 June 2008. Then, four soldiers were killed in a Snatch, three from the SAS and one female soldier, Sarah Bryant. Another soldier was badly injured.

The use of the Snatch was roundly condemned as "cavalier at best, criminal at worst," by Major Sebastian Morley, the soldiers' CO. Having tendered his resignation, he claimed that Whitehall officials and military commanders had repeatedly ignored his warnings. Troops would be killed if they continued to allow them to be transported in this vulnerable vehicle, he had protested. He had not been alone. "We highlighted this issue saying people are going to die and now they have died," said a soldier who served with Major Morley, referring to a vehicle which the troops were calling "mobile coffins".

Defence of the Snatch

Far from being contrite, the MoD robustly defended the Snatch. In the immediate aftermath of the June incident, Defence Minister Bob Ainsworth had in the Commons insisted that "commanders on the ground" were telling him they still needed Land Rover-based platforms "... and they will do for the foreseeable future." Weathering aggressive oral questions on 3 November and even a question to the Prime Minister two days later, the MoD maintained its fightback.

This culminated in briefings to MPs and media on 16 December from none other than Lt Gen Nick Houghton, now Chief of Joint Operations. Patronising in tone and simplistic in content, Houghton's dissertation amounted to an admission that, as long as there was a tactical need for a light protected vehicle, the Snatch would have to remain in service. There was no other option. "You may have heard of alternatives," he said, "but at present no acceptable alternative vehicle exists though they are being actively sought."

The Vector – a "coffin on wheels"

What he admitted to journalists after his formal presentation, though, was that there had been an alternative. But it had "proved inadequate, unable to cope with the threat from roadside bombs." This was the Pinzgauer Vector, about which the Army had been so enthusiastic in July 2006. Then, it had prevailed upon Des Browne to buy more - its price for accepting the Mastiff which it had not wanted. A clear record of the Army's intent had been delivered in March 2007 – by Houghton himself. He then told the House of Commons Defence Committee that once the Vector had been deployed fully, "the more vulnerable Snatch would be withdrawn from service in Afghanistan".

There were hints of a problem in June 2008, in a published list of "expected out-of-service dates" for a range of vehicles. The Vector was given a date of 2015. In an Army that routinely kept vehicles for 30 years or more, a mere seven-year service life was unprecedented. Therein lay a tale which raises serious questions about the competence and good faith of those involved in the procurement of Army vehicles.

In June 2006, when the Army had first announced its intention to buy Vectors, this "armchair general" expressed alarm at these "coffins of wheels". This was based on the manufacturer's specifications, which claimed a protection rating against "two NATO L2A2 hand grenades detonating simultaneously only 150mm below the floor pan" – 350g of high explosive. This vehicle was to be deployed into one of the heaviest mined countries in the world, up against Russian anti-tank mines housing 7.5 Kg of high explosive.

More alarmingly, the Vector had a "cab forward" layout, with the driver and the front seat passenger sat over the wheel arches. If a mine detonated under a wheel, either the driver or the passenger would be directly in the so-called "cone of destruction", exposed to the full force of the blast. At least with the Snatch and its "engine forward" layout, there was some distance between the front wheels and the occupants of the cab, allowing, as some did, soldiers to escape the full force of a mine and survive.

Had it deliberately sought out a design to maximise deaths and injuries, the Army, in selecting the Vector, could not have made a better choice. Furthermore, the vehicle was not cheap. Including the support package, each cost £437,000. They were not only "coffins on wheels", they were very expensive coffins. The £258,000 price of a Force Protection Cougar – on which the Mastiff was based – was better value.

Predictably – totally and completely predictably – within months of the Vector being deployed, a fatality was reported. This was on 25 July 2007 when L/Cpl Alex Hawkins and others, "had been taking part in a routine patrol and were returning to their patrol base when the explosion struck their Vector." Two other soldiers were injured. The Vector had to be destroyed to avoid it falling into enemy hands. Channel 4 News noted:

Vector, which is more suitable for rugged terrain than the army’s existing Snatch patrol vehicle, was recently introduced as part of a package of measures designed to increase troops' safety in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first Vectors began arriving in the country in April of this year and are being phased in, set to replace most of the Snatch vehicles by late October.

How many non-fatal incidents occurred we have no means of knowing but reports from serving troops recorded that the "ambulance" section of their flights home were frequently occupied by soldiers who had lost their legs from mine blasts. There is no means of knowing either how many soldiers were killed in Vectors. Conscious of the potential for damaging publicity, the MoD stopped reporting the types of vehicle involved in fatal incidents.

But we do know that, from October 2007 when Snatches were supposed to have been replaced, there had been only one fatal incident involving a Snatch – killing Sarah Bryant and her colleagues – as against three known fatal Vector incidents. There has since been one more, bringing the known total to four.

But there was a final twist to this debacle. There had been yet another Snatch replacement. In April 2008, months before Sarah Bryant and her colleagues had died, the MoD had ordered 24 mine-protected Bushmasters, exclusively for the Special Forces. Had the British emulated the Dutch and called off vehicles directly from Australian Army stock of 400, they could have been on a freight aircraft within weeks and been issued to units in Afghanistan by May. This vehicle could readily have resisted the attack which had killed four people and injured another.

Defence of a failed strategy

While the Snatch was getting the lion's share of attention – greater than in 2005, when so many more soldiers were being killed – and the Bushmaster order having been ignored, troops were being killed and injured in a far more dangerous vehicle, one which had been slated as a replacement for the Snatch. No wonder the Snatch Vixen was rushed in to plug the gap. No wonder Lt Gen Houghton and the MoD had been defensive.

There was though, more to Houghton's defensiveness. The Snatch was more than just a vehicle. It was the embodiment of a mindset. The vehicle filled an operational requirement, reflecting the Army's approach to counter-insurgency. As Houghton explained in his briefing:

In counter insurgency environments, other factors play into the desired capability mix. Most obvious amongst such factors are first the physical accessibility of vehicles in built up areas and narrow streets … Second the physical profile of the vehicle and its affect (sic) on the local people.

Third the ability of a vehicle to allow its occupants to interact with the local population and to allow observation of local atmospherics. And finally I would say the physical effect that a vehicle has in respect of the likelihood of it damaging local infrastructure such as mud walls and weakly constructed roads and culverts and thereby alienating the local population.

The Snatch, therefore, was essential to the Army's "hearts and minds" strategy. But what Houghton did not explain was there were two parts, essentially summed up as "go light – go heavy". The essence was outlined in a joint US/UK study of the British approach to "low intensity operations" in Iraq. This grouped armour into two packages. The Challengers and the Warriors were the "heavies", the Snatch, obviously, the "light". Thus:

Warriors and ultimately Challengers were found to send a very strong statement whereas the use of Snatch vehicles … sent an entirely different message. During difficult periods, having such impressive physical capabilities greatly enhanced the ability to ramp up and down between stances, maintaining British credibility as a serious fighting force.

The strategy, therefore, amounted to sending messages, essentially paternalistic in nature. If the citizens were good, daddy would use Snatches. If they were naughty, daddy would send out the Warriors. If they were very naughty, daddy would get really cross and inflict Challengers on them. If they then behaved themselves, it was back to Snatches as a reward … go light, go heavy – go light, exactly the rhythm to which the Staffords had been exposed in al Amarah in 2005 with such tragic consequences.

The problem, of course, was that the insurgents did not quite see like that. Going "light" meant offering them targets. When the British upped the ante and escorted the Snatches with Warriors, the insurgents learnt how to take out Warriors. When the Challengers appeared, they learnt how to take them out as well. After that, the British had nowhere to go, other than their bases – where they became … targets.

One thing the study also noted was the "instinctive reluctance of junior officers to rely heavily on technology to assist in their tactical decision-making". Was it "based on ill-founded conservatism or on a justified concern with how it may adversely influence their instincts?" it asked. It failed to note that technophobia was not confined to junior officers. However, the point was made – that technology was not always part of the British force mix. More worryingly, it was not part of the intellectual make-up of the Army.

COMMENT THREAD

A narrowness of vision

Having railed, not infrequently, at the hyper-excitement of the groupuscules, as they prattle over the weekly "joust" that has turned Prime Ministers Questions into a bigger joke than it ever was, one is driven to muse on the narrowness of vision that currently defines modern politics.

For many of the so-called political commentators, it is the high-profile events like PMQs and the occasional debate in the House, where a "rebellion" or some such is threatened, that consumes almost their entire attention. Outside that foetidly narrow, almost claustrophobic horizon, nothing else seems to exist.

Subjects like defence, therefore, are relegated to their own specialist "corners". Blogs like this one, for instance, are not considered to be political, and the subjects addressed are largely ignored by the "mainstream" pundits.

The bizarre thing is that there are few subjects more political than defence and, should there be any doubt about that, one just has to look in on defence questions, the subject of one of yesterday's posts.

Yet, the only topic to emerge into the wider domain was the vexed question of "Snatch" Land Rovers and the Conservative Party attempt to extract an apology from Quentin Davies, the defence equipment minister, for his alleged slight of the officer who resigned complaining about "inadequate equipment".

The proceedings themselves were a classic example of what an old parliamentary hand once described as "hunting as a pack", MPs acting in concert, focusing tightly on one point in order to achieve a specific aim.

In the event, the Conservative "pack" achieved its aim – something which sounded sufficiently like an apology for them to claim the headlines. And the way they did it is an interesting illustration of how the parliamentary dynamics work.

Crucially, oral questions to ministers are framed and tabled some time in advance and, under the procedural rules, questioners may not deviate from the subject matter. Where – as was the case here – the matter at hand is of recent origin, it will not be covered directly by a question, which thus requires some inventiveness to enable it to be broached.

The first question on the order paper, in this instance, was one from Lib-Dem MP Malcolm Bruce who asked the defence minister Bob Ainsworth (pictured): "What recent steps he has taken to maintain and enhance morale in the armed forces." That, without requiring too much imagination – otherwise he would have been lost – gave Patrick Mercer his intro, with this supplementary question:

Last year, my old battalion had to patrol in Snatch vehicles, and it has been told that when it goes back again in the spring of next year, it will have to continue patrolling in Snatch vehicles. It refers to them as coffins. Will the Minister comment on the effect that that will have on morale, please?

Next in line was Crispin Blunt, who adopted a similar strategy, himself asking:

What effect does it have on morale when the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies), blames the commanders for their choice of vehicle, saying:

"in retrospect, a commander chose the wrong piece of equipment, the wrong vehicle, for the particular threat that the patrol or whatever it was encountered and we had some casualties as a result"?

For the commanders on the spot, frequently those choices were certainly not available, as has been made clear by my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer). Surely it is simply unsustainable for a Minister to say these things.

These two questions, however, were merely the opening salvoes, preparing the ground for the main assault by Liam Fox, the Tory defence "top gun". He asked:

When a loyal and committed officer resigns and cites a specific reason, he should be treated with the utmost seriousness. When, instead, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies) says that it was:

"such a travesty of reality that it is actually quite difficult to take this at first face value,"

it is not only damaging to morale but, frankly, a disgrace. And, when the Under-Secretary said that there were

"a couple of odd things about this resignation",

what exactly did he mean, and when will he apologise?

This brought a protest from Ainsworth that:

We do take the complaint seriously; we do take the resignation seriously. We do not accept that we are in any way cavalier with our people's safety. We put that at the absolute top of our priorities, and all of us in the ministerial team will continue to do so.

Fox, with one supplementary allowed, returned to the attack:

Still no apology - yet the Under-Secretary's offence went beyond damaging morale and his own arrogant dismissal of a loyal and committed officer. As my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Mr. Blunt) said, the Under-Secretary said:

"there may be occasions when in retrospect, a commander chose the wrong piece of equipment".

Yet is it not increasingly clear that, on the occasion in question, commanders had no choice but to use Snatch Land Rovers? How can it be that after six years and more than £10 billion in spending, we still do not have the armoured vehicles that we require? And, why did the Under-Secretary not take time to discover the facts before opening his mouth and bad-mouthing our commanders?

Ainsworth, as minister, gets the last word in these exchanges. He replied: "My hon. Friend meant no offence. He was trying to explain to people that we need a suite of vehicles in theatre. That was all he was trying to do, and he did not mean to cause any offence to anyone at all."

The "pack" had by no means finished though. The third question, by Linda Gilroy, a Labour MP from Plymouth asked how many Royal Navy personnel were deployed in Afghanistan and, unlikely though it might have been, that gave Tory grandee Douglas Hogg his opportunity:

May I say to the right hon. Gentleman that it is very important that whenever Royal Navy personnel are deployed they are deployed in appropriately armoured vehicles? The Minister for the Armed Forces really should avoid suggesting that serious casualties have been caused by officers on the ground choosing wrong vehicles. That is inaccurate, untrue, deeply offensive to their commanders, and damaging to morale.

He really should not have got away with that one - it was not even framed as a question - but, thus emboldened, Julian Brazier took a flyer on the back of a question by Paul Flynn who had asked about the area of territory in Afghanistan under the control of the Taleban. Asked Brazier:

Does the Minister of State accept that the welcome news that he announced on better armoured vehicles for protecting conventional forces are no substitute for ensuring that all our special forces have proper cross-country vehicles? Will he take the opportunity to offer the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies) the chance to apologise at the Dispatch Box to Major Morley for his remarks at the weekend?

Then, in topical questions – the bit at the end where anything goes, we got Andrew Robathan, a former SAS officer, who stated:

In June, three members of my former regiment were killed in a Snatch Land Rover in Afghanistan. Their squadron commander has now resigned, citing their deaths as one reason for his resignation, but he finds himself blamed for them by a Minister of the Crown. Apart from the very real pain that any commander feels at the death of one of his troops, no special forces would ever choose a Land Rover without proper cross-country capability for operations. These were, however, the only vehicles available. Will the Secretary of State disassociate himself from the remarks of his—very junior—Minister, and apologise not only to Major Morley, but to the families of the dead? The father of one said today …

The verbosity brought a rebuke from the Speaker, and a reply from Quentin Davies himself, bringing this exchange:

The hon. Gentleman obviously does not know that this morning outside the House I expressed my regrets to the father of one of our gallant soldiers who has died, and who apparently said via the media—he did not say this directly to me—that he had been upset by my remarks. I apologised unreservedly to him and expressed my deep regrets. Obviously, any offence caused was entirely inadvertent; I hope the hon. Gentleman recognises that. If I were to have some reason to suppose that operational commanders have been offended by any remarks I have made, I would also apologise very clearly and directly to them. I take it the hon. Gentleman did not hear the broadcast in question, but if he were to do me the courtesy of reading the full transcript —

Mr. Robathan: I have.

Mr. Davies: Well, in that case the hon. Gentleman will have seen that a lot of my argument was designed to explain that it was quite wrong and totally impossible to blame retrospectively, with hindsight, commanding officers for decisions that had been taken and where eventually there had been fatalities, as, unfortunately, happens in warfare. He will have seen from that transcript that some—deservedly—laudatory remarks were made about the quality of our commanding officers and, of course, of our troops as a whole.

Still the "pack" had not finished. Michael Fabricant then intervened, addressing the Speaker: "You, Mr. Speaker, will know that there is a protocol that Ministers never blame civil servants, and there is a similar protocol that Ministry of Defence Ministers never blame commanders in the field. Whatever the weasel words we have just heard, will the Secretary of State …"

The Speaker cut that off – "weasel words" is unparliamentary language – with a warning about using "temperate language". This left Mark Francois, at the tail end of the pack, to deliver something of a rant:

As the ministerial head of the armed forces, the Secretary of State will appreciate the importance of loyalty, as will all his fellow Ministers. On that basis, will he advise those Ministers to use temperate language when referring to our commanders in the field and the great things that they do, as do those who fight for them and for this country?

Wearily, the secretary of state himself, John Hutton, closed the matter:

All Defence Ministers will use temperate language to describe all these matters. [Interruption.] The Under-Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies), has dealt with this matter very clearly. In this place, it is right and proper that we all give praise where praise is due, and nowhere is that more appropriate, right now, than in relation to Iraq and Afghanistan. That is the collective view of Ministers, and I strongly sense that it is the collective view of the House.

No doubt, the Tories felt mightily pleased with their endeavours. They got their headlines and skewered Davies, whom they hate as a renegade Tory, having crossed the floor last year.

But, what did they actually achieve for that expenditure of skill, plotting, organisation and man hours? Briefly, they may have had the Labour defence team on the back foot, but the Tories were playing the man not the ball. They elicited no further information on the decision-making that went into the deployment and retention in theatre of the "Snatch" and nor at any time did they threaten to expose any of the inefficiencies and delays in the system.

In short, the session offered a classic example of parliamentary theatre – all heat and no light. The groupuscules should have been cheering from the sidelines, score-cards at the ready, rejoicing at another victory for their "team".

As it is, they will have to wait until PMQs and the really big hitters. This was only the B-team playing.

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Minister defends "Snatch" (badly)

A report by The Guardian has the government defending the continued use of "Snatch" Land Rovers in Afghanistan.

This is taken from the Defence procurement debate this morning (link to follow) where the "Snatch" came under heavy criticism for its lack of protection against roadside bombs, and armed forces minister Bob Ainsworth defended the vehicle.

The alternative, better protected vehicles like Mastiff could not go to certain places or do certain things. Even the Ridgeback, which will be "will be more capable than Mastiff - smaller and able to go to places that Mastiff cannot - will be considerably larger than a Land Rover-based vehicle." Thus, commanders, he said, needed a range of vehicles for different terrain and operations.

"Whether or not we are going to be able to take away these small platforms without taking away a whole area of capability is something that will need to be thought of very seriously," he added.

The Daily Telegraph, however, also runs a story, but its headline signals a different focus, with: "Fears of more Afghanistan deaths as 'inadequate' vehicle blamed for latest fatalities."

Defence correspondent Thomas Harding tells us that "more soldiers could die unnecessarily in Afghanistan because replacements for their 'totally inadequate' vehicles will not be ready for months", noting that the "Snatch" has been withdrawn from use in Iraq because it offers so little protection against mines.

He goes on to write that campaigners are saying that Cpl Sarah Bryant, 26 (pictured above), of the Intelligence Corps, and special forces soldiers Cpl Sean Robert Reeve, 28, L/cpl Richard Larkin, 39, and Paul Stout, 31 – the four who were killed in this latest outrage - would still be alive if they had been in an armoured vehicle.

Almost one in eight of all fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan – 34 out of 282 – have now been caused by roadside bombs targeting "Snatch" Land Rovers, and of the last 23 deaths in Afghanistan, 18 have been caused by roadside bombs.

Cited is Rose Gentle, a founding member of Military Families Against the War, whose 19-year-old son Gordon died in Iraq. She says: "How many more deaths are we going to have? The public are sick of turning the television on to hear more soldiers have been killed for not having the right equipment."

Sue Smith, whose son Phillip Hewett was killed in a "Snatch" in Iraq, said: "I don't understand why they didn't see this coming. We still haven't learnt from Iraq. "When Phillip died three years ago we knew then that Snatch was no good but we have still continued to use them."

Also cited is Patrick Mercer, who intervened heavily in procurement debate – where he recommended the much wider use of helicopters to transport troops and carry out routine patrols. His view of the "Snatch" was that it was simply "packaging our troops as compact targets". Colonel Tim Collins also comes in, declaring: "It is now either a question that we stop patrolling because we don't have the right vehicles or we take a chance."

The MoD we are then told, has justified the use of "Snatch" in Afghanistan by saying that the threat from roadside bombs there was not as sophisticated as in the Iran-sponsored insurgency in Iraq, but Harding then adds that there are already a number of armoured vehicles being used by other countries that are far superior to the "Snatch".

The Americans and Canadian forces, for instance, are equipped with South African made RG31 mine protection vehicle that can withstand a blast of 14 kilos under a wheel, the equivalent of two large mines.

Finally, of the citations, this blog author says that the: "Snatch was never designed to deal with counter-insurgency where the threat is from mines and bombs. It is totally inadequate for that purpose."

Part of the problem, according to Harding is that the vast majority of the Army's armoured vehicles, including its entire fleet of Bulldog armoured personnel carriers and the Ridgeback is not due in service for some months. But even than, an MoD spokesman counters saying that whilst safety was the "prime concern" in operations, sometimes the "agility and low profile" of 'Snatch' meant it was the most suitable vehicle available.

Here, the anonymous spokesman is being a tad disingenuous, as indeed was Ainsworth, when he told MPs that both the Mastiff and the Ridgeback were too big for some functions. We are back, after all this time, to the “too big for Basra” argument, transferred to a new locale.

When it comes to these two vehicles, these after all were the choice of the MoD – and they alone selected what must be two of the largest MRAP vehicles available. The RG31 – selected by the US and Canadian forces, is a smaller vehicle, and widely used by both for routine patrols. And, for something even smaller, there is the Force Protection Cheetah, a purpose-built protected patrol vehicle – a mere half an inch wider than the HUMVEE.

Ironically, this six-seat vehicle has been considered by the MoD for the protected patrol vehicle programme and rejected. Only after questioning by Ann Winterton (here and here) did it emerge that the capacity was considered insufficient.

Thus, we have a situation where the MoD insists that its existing protected vehicles are too large for some functions. This thus justifies the use of "Snatch" Land Rovers, but then rejects a smaller vehicle on the basis that it is, effectively, er … too small – even though its capacity is greater than the Land Rover.

Somewhere there has to be some logic in this although we have to admit that we are having a little difficulty discovering where.

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