We need more helicopters

"Army bomb expert killed trying to clear the way for vital supplies" is the headline under which Nicholas Cecil, chief political correspondent for The Evening Standard writes today.

Captain Daniel Shepherd died instantly when the makeshift bomb he was trying to defuse exploded in the Nad-e Ali District in Helmand province, southern Afghanistan. A member of his team suffered minor injuries. Capt Shepherd, 28, from 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Regiment, The Royal Logistic Corps, was leading a team trying to clear a route for a convoy to re-supply Nato troops and the local population.

This raises serious questions. There is a whole raft of kit available for this task. Why wasn't it available?

The job starts with the Buffalo (pictured above). It can expose an IED and the claw apparatus can be used to rip away any command wires, if that is the method of triggering employed. The manual disturbance will trigger any motion-sensitive booby trap.

If the bomb is still live, it can be investigated by a remote robot (pictured below). A shotgun fitted to the robot can be used to blast the detonator and thus disable it. Failing that, the robot can be used to place an explosive charge on the device, blowing it up and thereby neutralising it. Damage to roads and other structures can then be dealt with by armoured engineering vehicles.

Only in extreme cases, where there is imminent risk of loss of life without intervention, should an attempt be made by a bomb disposal officer personally to disarm a device. There are no indications that this was the case here.

However, as to the kit, therein lies the tale. Kit such as the Buffalo is not yet in theatre. The US forces have them, the Canadians have them and the French also have them. But, despite a call for them to be provided in 2005 – the MoD did not think they were necessary. They were not ordered, therefore, until last October and will not arrive until next year.


We do have robots – the British were pioneers in this technology. However, they are transported in the unarmoured "Tellar" EOD vehicles, which are themselves highly vulnerable to IEDs. They require an armed escort and route clearance to get them onto site. All too often, they cannot be used.

But our Mastiff EOD vehicles were not ordered until last October and will not arrive until next year – despite the equivalent JERRVs having been used by US forces since 2003.

Then, there is a shortage of armoured engineering equipment. What we have is being sold off at knockdown prices, and the new kit was not ordered until last October. It will not arrive in theatre until next year.

Of course, if we follow the media and political narrative, this incident clearly demonstrates that we need more helicopters. Every casualty is being used to reinforce that argument.

But what it could also demonstrate is that the MoD and the Army seriously under-estimated the IED threat and failed utterly to prepare for it. Such issues, however, will not even begin to be explored by the media. The solution is obvious – we need more helicopters. Everybody knows that.

COMMENT THREAD

The all heat and no light show

Trying – and dismally failing – to cover even a fraction of the torrent of coverage on Afghanistan that has poured from the media over the weekend, I had thought we might see a slackening with the start of the working week – but not a bit of it.

What we are seeing is what might be called the "political phase" as opposition politicians have had time to absorb some of the details of recent events, confer with their colleagues and advisors, and prepare their own lines of attack, crafting points with which to beat the government.

With defence questions this afternoon, the last before the House rises on 21 July, rather predictably we see Liam Fox – silent for so long - leading the charge, accusing Gordon Brown of "the ultimate dereliction of duty" in his handling of the war in Afghanistan.

Those of us with a slightly longer memory will remember that, when our Liam earlier this year had the opportunity to set out his views in detail about the conduct of the campaign in Afghanistan, and what precisely was needed to ensure success, he was strangely silent, as indeed he was through a subsequent defence debate.

Now, making up for lost time, Dr Fox has decided that the prime minister has "catastrophically" under-equipped the armed forces and is now "resorting to spin rather than confronting the life-threatening reality" that the troops face.

The Conservatives' line is to accuse Brown of attempting to cover up the fact that British troops do not have enough helicopters, which has forced them to travel by road and left them vulnerable to the Taleban's IEDs. Twelve of the 15 British soldiers killed in Afghanistan this month, and three-quarters of those killed over the past two years, were killed by IEDs.

Far be it for us to disagree with the premise that more helicopters are needed in theatre, but Dr Fox is on somewhat shaky ground if he is asserting – as he appears to be doing – that the bulk of the recent deaths arose from the lack of helicopters.

Not least, the five killed from the 2nd Rifles were on a routine foot patrol, and while there may have been some measures which could have eliminated the peril to which they succumbed, the use of a helicopter was not one of them. Given that they were patrolling in the vicinity of their forward operating base, on a fixed and predictable "beat", the most obvious safeguard would have been persistent video surveillance, using either UAVs, mast-mounted cameras or even concealed micro-cameras, the like of which have been used to great effect by US forces in maintaining route security.

Of one thing one can be certain, with the elaborate nature of the ambush prepared, it must have taken some time to set up and it is hard to believe that, had the technology been in place, suspicious activity would not have been detected.

It is ironic, in a way, that while CCTV prevails in this country to keep a largely law-abiding population under surveillance – and to detect such heinous crimes as littering – the MoD has not thought fit to employ the same technology to protect against far greater threats.

The irony of this, of course, seems to have passed by Dr Fox, yet nor can he rely on the deaths of Lt-Col Thorneloe and Trp Hammond to support his thesis on helicopter shortages. A helicopter ride might have saved Thorneloe's life, for sure, but in his absence, someone else would have been in the front seat of that Viking and could well have died in his place – the casualty rate might thereby have been unaffected.

Nor indeed do we know that a helicopter would have been appropriate, as the Lt-Col was going into a combat area and pilots are rightly reluctant to fly into contested areas unless in dire emergency, which clearly this was not. And, as we know from the fate of Captain Ben Babington-Browne, killed in a Canadian helicopter last week, flying is not without its hazards. For all we know, a ground vehicle might have been the most appropriate form of transport.

What we do have a better idea of, however is that if money had not been frittered away on such unwanted extravagances as a Ferris wheel and a "wimmins' park" and instead had been diverted on improving the road network and bridges, the heavier protected Mastiffs or Ridgebacks could have been used rather than Vikings.

Again, therefore, helicopter shortages do not seem to be the issue – as indeed it may not have been with the more recent Viking casualty, Corporal Lee Scot. He had been leading his section of Vikings from the front when an explosion struck, yet another soldier blown apart in that dangerously vulnerable vehicle.

Defence secretary Ainsworth then himself points to the fact that two recent casualties were killed by an IED while dismounting from a Mastiff, circumstances which might lead one to wonder whether this was another of those carefully prepared Taleban ambushes, but again an incident where a helicopter could hardly have saved the day.

Thus, while a more general case can certainly be made for more helicopters, the bandwagon harnessed by Dr Fox is not going in that direction – which suggests that when he raises the issue in defence questions tomorrow – as undoubtedly he will, given an opportunity – he will be slapped down. That will not matter, of course – the propaganda point will have been made and will get the requisite headlines.

Where Ainsworth would be vulnerable - but is unlikely to be challenged by Dr Fox, however – is on his assertion that "extra equipment could not eliminate risk". This is true enough in that nothing can eliminate risk, but there is certainly equipment that could reduce it, whether it is bridging gear, video surveillance cameras, more UAVs or, as we saw with Private Robbie Laws, more and better mine/IED clearance equipment.

What comes over from the current Tory thrust, therefore, is an attempt to distil down a complex situation, where theatre needs are equally complex as well as varied – as indeed are the deficiencies - in an attempt to score political points rather than shed light on the problems.

Much the same can be said of the second line of attack, the "boots on the ground" argument, rehearsed over the weekend by commentators too numerous to mention, not least Gen Dannatt, who gets an enthusiastic "puff" from Brigadier Allan Mallinson (ret).

Again, there is a case to be made for more troops in theatre, to consolidate the "take and hold" strategy, the first part of which has been played out over the last two weeks or so, with the deployment of US and British troops in co-ordinated actions. But that is a different thing from asserting that, during the current actions, shortage of troops has in any way affected the casualty rate. And that pre-supposes that we should necessarily buy into the strategy, and not be looking at alternatives.

Also, conveyed in The Times today is a somewhat "inconvenient truth" articulated by an anonymous government spokesman. He says, "We are losing more men because we are taking the fight to the Taleban and more troops are being put in harm's way. But it is just not true to say that fewer would be killed if more were there. The opposite could be true. Many of our men have been killed by roadside bombs. Having more there would not prevent that happening."

There is some truth in that. With an increasingly sophisticated enemy, constantly probing for weak spots and launching opportunistic attacks, more men can equal more "targets" and greater opportunities to inflict casualties. And then, it is indeed the case that more aggressive action, with forays into enemy-held territory, will inevitably increase casualty rates.

Bruce Anderson in The Independent therefore makes good sense when he writes that casualties are inevitable. "Politicians are sometimes naïve enough to think that battles can be won without bloodshed," he adds. But, "Soldiers know better. There is a phrase, regularly used by Wellington, which soldiers will repeat and which always makes civilians quail: 'the butcher's bill'. Soldiers have been there."

Putting that in perspective, Anderson then states that this does not dispense with the need to keep the bill down. He writes:

War imposes moral obligations, especially upon those who send men into action. If they will the end, they must will the means. In Afghanistan, this would not necessitate vastly expensive space-age technology. It would merely require the basic tools of modern warfare, such as armoured vehicles whose armour is worth something, and helicopters. Without them, we are effectively reduced to Second World War methods.

Actually, it does require, in some instances, "space-age technology", some of it very sophisticated and expensive. Other kit though, is more down to earth, such as well-designed mine/blast protected vehicles. But there is no panacea, no "quick fix" which will remove the risk entirely. Helicopters are part of the mix, but there is much a need for light tactical helicopters as there is for more transports, and for a decent section helicopter, which is not currently available to British forces.

Equally, with the "boots on the ground" argument, more troops per se are not necessarily an advantage, unless there is a clear idea of how they are to be employed, to what specific effect, within the context of a clear strategy and with equipment and tactics relevant to the theatre, which will provide "added value" to the campaign.

Issues such as helicopters thus do need to be addressed, but the questions that need to be asked are what types are needed, in what numbers and for what purposes. The equipment arguments then need to be widened out to address the broad range of deficiencies in theatre – and the quality and capabilities of equipment fielded. Numbers – and types – of troops deployed need to be discussed in the context of strategy and the other related issues.

Simply to distil these complex issues down to a small number of political mantras and slogans is neither helpful nor productive. Yet, despite the torrent of coverage that we are seeing, there is no evidence yet that we are progressing to the point where we are getting past the sloganising and into the beef.

Heat, there is in this debate, but very little light.

COMMENT THREAD

A tale of two armies

Primitive British mine/IED clearance methods, compared with their US counterparts, may have been responsible for the death of Private Robbie Laws, 18, of the 2nd Mercian Regiment – to date, one of the youngest soldiers to die in Afghanistan.

On 4 July, Private Laws was attached to a squadron of the Light Dragoons which were operating Scimitar light reconnaissance tanks taking part in operation Panther's Claw. Laws was part of a four-man "dismount" team carried in a Spartan armoured personnel carrier (pictured below right), his and his comrades' task being to carry out mine/IED sweeps on foot, using hand-held detectors, ahead of the armoured vehicles, whenever their commander suspected a possible trap.

Recounted in detail by The Daily Mail, after Laws and his comrades crossed the start line in their Spartan on 4 July, they were soon called into action but, as they dismounted, Taleban fighters opened up with small arms. A Scimitar armed with 30mm Rarden cannon moved up to engage them, setting a pattern for the operation. The advance thus continued in a stop-start fashion as Laws and his comrades painstakingly cleared the route with their detectors.

Come the late afternoon as the light and intense heat began to fade, Laws and his comrades had been resting by the side of the vehicle for an hour or so, then helping to unload another Spartan which had come in from a water resupply run. Small arms fire started coming in and the Light Dragoons started their vehicle engines. Laws and the three other dismounts piled into their Spartan, which began to move.

Some 200 yards on, the squadron commander ordered two men to dismount to carry out a sweep ahead. Laws with one other completed the task and remounted. As the Spartan started to move off, there was a "massive bang" and the cabin filled with smoke. The vehicle had been hit by a Taleban RPG. Laws was killed instantly, another soldier was very seriously injured and one other was slightly injured.

It is of course the case that the Spartan could have been targeted at any time during the operation by a Taleban PRG, with fatal consequences. But the main defence of this lightly armoured vehicle is its speed and manoeuvrability over a wide range of terrain. Its constant stop-start progress, and pauses to allow manual sweeping, thus made it a predictable and highly vulnerable target while it was stationary.

Compare and contrast, however, the experience of the US Marines further south, confronted by multiple IEDs impeding their progress. In terms of delays, their clearance team was no less impeded. But, unlike the British using lightly armoured personnel carriers with infantry using hand-held detectors, working on foot, the Marines were properly equipped.

Their 10-vehicle clearance team included a vehicle equipped with a mine roller, pushed ahead to detonate pressure-pad actuated mines and IEDS, a Husky mine detection vehicle (pictured below) and a number of MRAPs, all manned by specialist combat engineers.


After 72 "tough hours" on the road, the first IED destroyed an anti-mine roller being pushed by the convoy's lead vehicle. The explosion sent the roller's pieces flying into the air, and flipped the 17-ton onto its side, nearly toppling it into a canal that ran beside the dirt road. The crew, however, escaped unharmed.

After an overnight wait, a recovery team with specialist lifting equipment was despatched along the same route, only to hit an IED that had appeared to have been planted overnight specifically to strike them.

The explosion wrecked their vehicle but fortunately, it was another MRAP and the crew escaped unharmed. Then, and only then with the scene secure, did the Marines used hand-held mine-sweepers to check the road between the two blasts and then destroyed burnt damaged equipment to stop it falling into Taleban hands.

The convoy finally got back on the road by the evening but within an hour it was hit by a third IED that destroyed the Husky. The crewman survived. In between that point and the first of the blasts, the team had covered only a couple of miles of road and had discovered and dismantled seven further IEDs.

Said the convoy commander, Lieutenant Dan Jernigan, "Vehicles are being blown apart but the Marines inside are being kept safe. Not to sound cavalier, but it is better we take the blast than Humvees or someone else such as villagers." He was surprised that there had been no Taleban ambushes targeting his convoy when it had been stranded, but the vehicles were well armed and armoured – unlike the Spartan – and able to protect themselves.

The clearance process here was being applied to a supply route, but exactly the same process could have been applied to the route taken by the Light Dragoons. Typically then, the route is kept under observation after clearing – by UAVs or even infantry stationed along the route. As a final safeguard, an MRAP precedes the tactical convoy – a process known as "route proving" – to take the blast from any device that has been missed, or where emplacers have managed to evade observation and plant another bomb.

With a route almost guaranteed free from emplaced explosives, light tactical vehicles can then exploit their mobility and speed, without being tied to the stop-start routine that dogged the Light Dragoons, making their vehicles such vulnerable targets.

With such procedures in place, even the lightly armoured Vikings could be used with impunity, their routes through danger areas cleared, allowing them to exploit their off-road performance once they safely reach open country.

Ironically, the clearance and proving procedures – and the equipment to carry them out – were pioneered by the British – and used with great success in Bosnia in the early 90s, being copied by US forces and applied to both Iraq and now Afghanistan. Since Bosnia, however, the specialist equipment acquired by the British has been sold or otherwise disposed of. The need for such now again belatedly recognised, more equipment was ordered last October under the "Talisman" project, but deliveries are not scheduled to commence until next year – although the vital Husky is not being procured.

That is the measure of the shortfall in the British operation, but this is not a shortage of finance – clearly, as the equipment is now on order. More likely, it reflects the failure of the British Army to recognise and pre-empt the threat of mines and IEDs, with tragic consequences which stretch back into the Iraqi campaign, where troops in Basra and elsewhere faced similar threats and were similarly ill-equipped.

In this day and age, while there is still a valid and extensive role for the hand-held detector, there is no excuse for the excessive reliance on dismounted teams to do a job which could often be done more safely with armour and machines. That they are not available is yet another of those scandals, for which there should be a reckoning.

COMMENT THREAD

"Not designed for combat"

Currently running in Exeter is the inquest on the death of Pte Jack Sadler, which we covered last year, with the inquest proceedings attracting an interim report from The Daily Telegraph.

Jack, a TA volunteer in Honourable Artillery Company, was a Wimik gunner, attached to the Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) serving 52 Brigade in Afghanistan during Operation Herrick 7.

On 4 December 2007, the BRF, comprising a group of Wimiks, was scouting a route for an artillery convoy of made up of two Pinzgauers each pulling a 105mm light gun, plus DROPS trucks carrying the ammunition. They were on their way to a firing point close to Musa Qala to take part in the operation to recover the town.

Making pitifully slow progress over the rough ground, they had been observed by what they feared might have been Taleban "dickers" as they had skirted a village en route before then reaching a "problematic" steep-sided wadi which they had to cross, following a route they had taken the day before – the only one which the trucks could negotiate.

Because of the heavy trucks the Force was escorting, there were only a very limited number of points at which the wadi could be crossed. While scouting the route across, Jack's Wimik hit a mine, with him sustaining fatal injuries.

No mine clearance had been carried out as the convoy was static while the reconnaissance was carried out. It was a "sitting target" and an attack was feared if it remained in one place too long, so the pressure was on to get the convoy moving again. But, on the rocky ground, the Group commander did not suspect any danger. There were no "Combat Indicators" suggesting trouble and no one in the group "sensed" any danger.

Had there been enough helicopters, the two guns and their supplies of ammunition could easily have been transported by air – as underslung loads. This would be an easy job for a Chinook. But, with a major operation in the offing, there was no spare capacity and, therefore, the battery had to travel by road, with fatal results.

That then puts the focus on the Wimik, deployed in an area where the threat of mines and IEDs was ever-present. And, it emerges from the inquest that a report submitted to the coroner described it as "not designed to be used in a combat situation because of its lack of ballistic and munitions protection".

Needless to say, the Ministry of Defeat is represented at the inquest, with Col Charles Clee holding the line. He was quick to stress that Wimik has since been replaced with newer models fitted with better protection against mines and roadside bombs.

Clee, who is deputy head of urgent operational requirements at the MoD also stated that Wimiks were "valuable to commanders because of their flexibility." Their light weight meant they could operate on local roads. He also trotted out the familiar line that, it was up to commanders on the ground to choose which types of military vehicles to use for different tasks.

Indeed there was a choice ... Wimik, Wimik or Wimik. As for it being able to operate on local roads, as a convoy escort, the BRF was being tied to a predictable route which could only be negotiated by heavy trucks. It, not the convoy, was the "sitting target".

With the Viking in the news, and the past publicity on the Snatch Land Rover, the vulnerability of the Wimik has, by and large, passed under the media radar. Yet more have been killed in Wimiks in Afghanistan than any other vehicle, at least 15 as opposed to ten in the Snatch and Jackal and eight in the Viking.

The hearing continues tomorrow so it remains to be seen what the coroner will make of this, but there is not any great confidence that local coroners can see through the dissemination poured out by the MoD. The precedents are not good.

COMMENT THREAD

The wrong debate

See also: Time to get this sorted

With its unerring instinct for getting it wrong, the BBC – in the persona of its defence correspondent Caroline Wyatt – is framing the debate over the use of the Viking and the deaths of Lt-Col Thorneloe and Tpr Joshua Hammond as one of "armour versus mobility", suggesting that there is "a fine balance."

To be fair, she is not the only one to get it wrong. This is the way much of the British military thinks, thus channelling the argument into a sterile comparison between the merits of the heavy but well-protected Mastiff and the lighter, more mobile vehicles such as the Viking and the Jackal.

As the military would have it - enunciated by Amyas Godfrey to the BBC and also to The Guardian - the choice of which armoured vehicle to use in any campaign is a question of balancing risks and benefits.

"It is all about getting the balance right between the need for armour and the need to be light and flexible, with the ability to go off-road," says Godfrey. "Mobility is a form of protection in itself, and with heavier armour, you sacrifice mobility for greater protection."

At that entirely superficial level, there is some merit in Godfrey's assertions. Roads are a natural target for terrorists and, as that picture above shows, one particular weak point is the culvert bomb, which is fiendishly dangerous and requires a great deal of manpower and other resource to thwart. The ability to transit an area avoiding the roads – and such devices – is therefore an obvious advantage.

However, one almost gets tired of the repetition here, having yet again to draw the distinction between design and weight. Godfrey, in common with so many of his ilk, equates protection with "heavier armour".

Such are the constraints on their own thinking that they seem incapable of understanding that mine/IED protection is not primarily a function of weight of armour but of design – the principles of which we elaborated recently. It is this complete failure of the military establishment to understand these fundamentals which lies at the heart of this sterile debate.

To that extent, as we have so often observed, mobility and protection are not mutually exclusive. It is only the sterile thinking of the British military which makes it so. It would be perfectly feasible – by design - to produce a tracked vehicle with the mobility of the Viking, yet with the inherent protection of a Mastiff. This should not add significantly to the weight or, more particularly, hamper mobility.

Those proponents of the Viking, who argue that its mobility has saved more lives than its lack of protection have lost, are therefore arguing from a false premise. Mobility and protection are not mutually exclusive – it is possible to have both.

There are, however, other issues to address, where the whole argument on off-road mobility falls apart. One of those is the "pinch" or "choke" point problem, which we have also discussed. No matter how good a vehicle's off-road performance might be, there are natural features in any terrain which restrict and funnel movement into predictable areas, and it is there that ambushes are so often mounted.

Even in wide open spaces, there are constraints. As Tom Coughlan writes in The Times of the Viking, "in the heavily irrigated fields along the Helmand river, room for manoeuvre is more limited, and churning up farmers' fields with its tracks will not help to win the support of the local populace."

This then leads to a paradox, where designers optimise for off-road performance and then, to deal with the occasional but deadly ambush, add armour to their vehicles. They end up – as they did with the Vector – compromising performance without significantly improving protection. The outcome is an off-road vehicle with less performance than a custom-design protected vehicle, from which stems the mantra that you cannot keep increasing weight.

Locked into this trap – yet under pressure to reduce casualties - they have nowhere to go but to develop bigger and stronger vehicles in order to carry more armour. This is precisely the line adopted with the Viking, where it is to be replaced by the Warthog – a vehicle with heavier armour but sharing the same design flaws.

However, Major-General Julian Thompson, who commanded 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines in the Falklands conflict in 1982, makes a different point. He tells The Times - undoubtedly based on his experience in Aden and then Northern Ireland: "The question is not whether one vehicle or another is sufficiently armoured, it's about the lack of helicopters. We need more helicopters in Afghanistan to ferry troops in high-risk areas."


This is a good point. The ultimate mine protected vehicle is the helicopter. Unfortunately, as we pointed out earlier, the option of relying on helicopters is not available to the coalition forces, and not entirely because there is a shortage.

Unlike Northern Ireland, where the security forces were the main target of the terrorists, in Afghanistan the population in general is being attacked, particularly on the roads, which are needed to move large quantities of supplies. They are used heavily by Afghan security forces and civilians.

To abandon those roads to an enemy which is indiscriminately slaughtering civilians as well as the security forces is also to abandon any attempt at winning "hearts and minds". The military must maintain a strong presence on the roads and, therefore, will always be exposed to a risk that cannot be mitigated by the greater use of helicopters.

Nevertheless, there are limitations to the amount of protection that can be afforded, even in the best designed vehicle. To make that point - or something akin to it - Caroline Wyatt calls in aid the spokesman for Task Force Helmand, Lt-Col Nick Richardson.

He insists the Viking remains an excellent vehicle, telling us that, "Armour is the last resort in terms of defeating the threat. It is much better to be able to avoid the threat than to have to rely on the armour defeating the threat when it is initiated. He then states: "It doesn't matter how much armour you have - it can always be overcome if you make the charge big enough."

The "bigger bomb" threat is overstated, an issue we have promised to address in a separate post, and neither should "armour" (more properly, protection) be considered the last resort.

In their Bush War between 1962 and 1980, the Rhodesian Army found that it was impossible to ensure that the thousands of miles of unpaved roads were kept clear of mines and IEDs. Therefore, vehicle protection was treated as a routine precaution. (See this study by Franz J Gayl - 147 pages, pdf).


That notwithstanding, protection is by no means the only precaution. Route clearance – using basic devices such as mine rollers (pictured above) plus more sophisticated technical aids, and even sniffer dogs - route proving, surveillance, routine patrolling to deter activity, intelligence, interdiction of supplies and disrupting the bomb-makers are all part of the armoury which must be deployed to defeat the joint threat of the mine and the IED.

To distil the argument down to one of "armour versus mobility", therefore, is as facile as arguing that either armour or mobility is the answer. But there is no more facile an argument than to assert that "armour" – i.e., protection – must be sacrificed to mobility. That is the wrong debate.

COMMENT THREAD

Road rage

Covered only briefly by the British media was an incident on Wednesday when three Danish soldiers were killed by an IED in Afghanistan.

As the 700-strong Danish contingent in the country is under British command, and operates closely with British forces, these could so easily have been British soldiers, in which case there would have been a great deal more attention given to this small tragedy.

Here, what is remarkable is that there are uncanny parallels between this incident and one which occurred on 25 February of this year. Then, three soldiers from the 1st Btn The Rifles were also killed by an IED. They were riding a Wimik near Gereshk, engaged on "routine escort duties" along the notorious Highway 1 when they were hit by a culvert bomb estimated at 250Kg.

As to the current incident, the Danish troops were reported to have been riding in a "lightly armoured jeep" – most probably a Mercedes G270 CDI (pictured) – which is a direct equivalent of a Wimik. They too were engaged on routine escort duties near Gereshk along the same Highway 1, and were also hit by a culvert bomb, this time estimated at 350Kg.

Highway 1 is the main artery in Afghanistan. It runs from the eastern Pakistani border through Kabul and Kandahar, onwards to Herat in the west, passing Camp Bastion, the main coalition base in Helmand province, and thence on to the Iranian border.

Unsurprisingly, given its strategic importance, it is a key target. And, as one of the few paved roads in the country, is difficult to mine. Therefore, the Taleban – as did the Iraqi militias and the IRA before them - have resorted to the tactic of using culvert bombs, taking advantage of culverts which number into the thousands in some provinces, spread out over hundreds of miles of road.

And, according to Time magazine, not only has the frequency of such attacks increased, the power of the bombs employed has gone "way up." Twenty-pound charges have been replaced by oil drums packed with hundreds of pounds of explosives, set off by trip wires and pressure plates, that are capable of destroying up-armored humvees.

In Northern Ireland – where the IRA used on occasions 1000lb bombs - to deal with such formidable weapons, the British Army were forced to abandon the roads altogether, resorting to helicopters and foot patrols, a decision which was taken shortly after a Saracen APC (pictured) was destroyed by a culvert bomb near Crossmaglen on 9 October 1975.


Unfortunately, the option of relying entirely on helicopters is not available to the coalition forces, and not entirely because there are insufficient helicopters. The roads – and in particular Highway 1 – are needed to move large quantities of supplies and are used heavily by Afghan security forces and civilians. To abandon those roads to an enemy which is indiscriminately slaughtering civilians as well as the security forces is also to abandon any attempt at winning "hearts and minds".

On the other hand, foot patrols and direct intervention is proving extremely hazardous. At the beginning of this week, a Canadian combat engineer died while trying to defuse an IED in a culvert beneath a roadway about 12 miles southwest of Kandahar City. Also killed in the blast was an Afghan policeman. An interpreter was injured and evacuated by helicopter.

Once again therefore, technology is having to provide the answers, one application of which is the mine protected vehicle. Despite the increased size of bombs, many still believe they are saving lives although no one pretends they are the complete answer.

Danish defence Chief of Staff Tim Sloth Jørgensen believes that more losses from IEDs are "unavoidable". "We're never going to find them all," he says. "There is no safe way to do so, and the enemy is always coming up with new tactics."

Others, offering arguments redolent of those we heard during the Snatch debate, defend the decision to transport troops in lightly armoured vehicles. Despite the incident in February, they cite the relatively safe conditions along Highway 1. They also point out that if soldiers began travelling in armoured personnel carriers, the Taleban would begin planting larger bombs.

This argument for "safety" is not shared by Time magazine, recording that the section of Highway 1 between Kabul and Kandahar is littered with "brutal evidence" of the Taliban's IED offensive.

The road is a showcase US-funded project, meant to connect two of the country's most vital commercial centres, but it is now an automotive graveyard, littered with burned-out carcasses of vehicles and disrupted by crumbled bridges.

One infamous stretch is lined with the wreckage of 40 transport trucks, the remains of a 90-minute enemy ambush dubbed the "jingle-truck massacre." (Afghans hang chains and coins from their truck bumpers, which create a jingling sound.) "Every few miles, craters of varying size pock the pavement, interspersed with suspicious patches of dirt that compel patrol convoys to make off-road detours or dismount to investigate before proceeding."

The problem, however, is not new. Similar conditions were experienced in Iraq and there US forces developed engineering solutions to reduce the risks. This included a programme of clearing road verges, compacting the road shoulders, replacing manhole covers to drainage systems and fixing grates on the ends of culverts.

Route clearance was also practised in Iraq, using equipment such as the Buffalo - although these will not be delivered to the British zone until next year at the earliest.


Other equipment which has been used are mast and aerostat-mounted surveillance cameras, which allow for the continuous observation of vulnerable sections of road which cannot be achieved with UAVs. This principle has been extended with the use of mast-mounted observation cameras and other sensors on vehicles (pictured above).

As much as anything, this is an engineers' war - a game of three-dimensional chess where technical expertise and innovation is as important as firepower. When it comes to "boots on the ground", therefore, more infantry are not necessarily the answer. We need more combat engineers.

COMMENT THREAD

On the fingers of your hands

Following the attempted take-over of Lashkar Gah by the Taleban on 11 October 2008, 3 Commando Brigade, which had only taken over on 8 October, were effectively confronted with a baptism of fire, almost in the nature of a mini "Tet Offensive" experienced by US forces in Vietnam.

It cannot then be suggested that, even in the limited area of Lashkar Gah district, that the security situation settled down and was largely without incident. Setting aside the major operations undertaken by 3 Commando Brigade, such as Operation Sond Chara in December, which was mounted as a direct result of the October incursion into Lashkar Gah, the record shows steady, continuous background enemy activity in the district.

As before, the most complete record is the US Air Force daily airpower summary. Because the rules of engagement allow airpower to be called in only when there is observed enemy activity, this provides a useful metric, by which enemy action can be measured.

From that, we can see there was little respite. On 24 October, for instance, only days after the incursion had been defeated, a US Air Force F-16A Fighting Falcon was called in to drop a GBU-12 onto enemy positions in a building that was using RPGs against coalition forces near Lashkar Gah. That day, incidentally, 50 close air support missions were flown by US and coalition aircraft.

The next day, 25 October and the day after, the 26 October, saw typical low-level activity with coalition aircraft performing shows of force to deter enemy activities. No munitions were expended but the process demonstrates that there was enemy activity on those days, what might reasonably be described as "security incidents".

The 29 October saw a more serious incident, described as occurring in an area to the south of Lashkar Gah. ISAF soldiers killed a Taliban commander by the name of Mullah Ziauddin. He had been linked with other senior Taleban members and was said to have controlled forces responsible for attacks on ISAF and Afghan security forces. Another suspected Taliban commander, Mullah Mashar, was captured in the same area.

On 4 November, it was back to a show of force, this time comducted by a US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet, followed by a coalition aircraft on 7 November, both "in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah." The 9 November also saw a show of force, this time from a US Navy F/A-18A Hornet.

Six days later, on 15 November, there was something altogether more serious. US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt IIs were called in to fire cannon rounds and a B-1B Lancer dropped a GBU-38 onto Taleban hiding in a compound trying to shoot down an aircraft. A coalition aircraft also performed a show of force to deter enemy activities near the compound where the anti-aircraft fire was seen. This alone, had it succeeded, could have had devastating effects.

It was nearly two weeks later, on 27 November before air activity was again recorded, this time a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet. It conducted a show of force to deter enemy fighters and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. The next day, 28 November saw an A-10 and a coalition aircraft conducting shows of force to deter enemy activities near Lashkar Gah.

Much of the activity at this time fell into this category, indicative of background level enemy action. Thus on 30 November we saw US Navy F/A-18A Hornets and F/A-18Es conducting shows of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy conducting IED search operations in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah.

The 1 December, however, had a US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet and a coalition aircraft firing cannon rounds onto the Taleban holding positions along a river, in order to clear the path for a coalition forces convoy travelling along that route. In addition, F/A-18Fs conducted a show of force to deter enemy fighters and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy in the same area.

Then, on 5 December, a US Air Force MQ-1B Predator used Hellfire missiles against the Taleban who were firing RPGs at coalition forces from the western edge of a tree line in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. In addition, coalition aircraft performed shows of force to deter further enemy activities in the same area.

On 6 December, a US Air Force B-1B Lancer dropped guided bomb unit-38s onto the Taleban who were firing RPGs at coalition forces from inside a compound in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah.

On 9 December F/A-18A Hornets conducted shows of force to deter a group of suspicious people gathering near a coalition checkpoint, on 10 December, a F/A-18C Hornet and a coalition aircraft conducted shows of force and, on 11 December a coalition aircraft conducted a show of force. Then, on 12 December, an A-10 and a coalition aircraft performed shows of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition forces convoy that was disabled near Lashkar Gah.

The 17 December saw a US Air Force B-1B Lancer dropped a GBU -38 onto Taleban who were firing RPGs at coalition forces from a nearby enemy compound in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. A US Navy F/A-18C Hornet conducted a show of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition forces patrol that had taken fire in the same area.

A day later, on 18 December, US Navy F/A-18C Hornets performed shows of force to deter enemy activities and provide armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy in the area. On 29 December, coalition aircraft conducted shows of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition ground forces convoy receiving RPG and small arms fire in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah.

With that, there was something of a break and the New Year seems to have started relatively slowly. Not until 6 January were shows of force needed, but these required an A-10 and a US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet. The slow start continued, but with more aggression on 15 January when several US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets destroyed Taleban bunkers and firing positions using GBU-38s. The strikes were conducted after coalition ground forces began receiving fire from those locations in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah.

With the tempo hotting up, on 18 January a coalition aircraft routed a group of Taleban personnel gathered near Lashkar Gah with a show of force. The jet also scouted a roadway in advance of a coalition convoy movement to ensure it was clear of enemy personnel or improvised explosive devices.

The 27 January saw a US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle (pictured) performed a show of force, expending flares, in order to discourage enemy attack on coalition soldiers.

Two days later, on 29 January saw some serious action near Lashkar Gah when a US Air Force B-1B Lancer and coalition aircraft dropped GBU-38s and Paveway munitions to counter enemy fire on coalition units. The aircraft tracked the enemy shooters through several firing positions in civilian settlements, providing shows of force along the way to cover friendly ground forces' manoeuvres. The aircraft finally released weapons once the enemy was positively identified and in a position where the blasts would no longer endanger civilians.

The next day, 30 January, has US Navy F/A-18A and -C Hornets, plus F/A-18F Super Hornets out in force, initiating shows of force near Lashkar Gah to prevent enemy forces from interfering with coalition troop movements in those areas.

The 2 February had a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet executing a show of force over a settlement near Lashkar Gah. Enemy forces had been targeting coalition soldiers there with RPG and automatic fire, but dispersed following the manoeuvre.

The next day, 3 February again saw serious action in the Lashkar Gah area. A US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet and a coalition aircraft used several kinds of precision munitions and rockets to target enemy gunmen barricaded in buildings. The aircraft used strike tactics that avoided damage to nearby buildings and even caused only minimal damage to the occupied structures. The airstrikes supported coalition units fighting building to building against the Taleban.

On 4 February , it was a coalition aircraft that flew a show of force, this time over a group of armed individuals suspected to be Taleban. The aircraft also performed tactical reconnaissance along a heavily travelled highway, discovering signs of improvised explosive devices.

Three days the elapsed when, on 7 February a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet performed a show of force to deter enemy actions near Lashkar Gah. In total, 68 close air support missions were flown that day.

The following day, 8 February, had near Lashkar Gah, a coalition aircraft employing a GBU-12 and a strafing pass, striking enemy snipers concealed in a building. The snipers had been firing at coalition soldiers when the aircraft's weapons halted their attack. A total of 74 close air support missions were flown that day.

The 12 February had a coalition aircraft fly a show of force in the area of Lashkar Gah in order to discourage enemy forces from launching indirect fire attacks from a position they had used in the past.

The 13 February saw a US Air Force F-15E strafing a Taleban position concealed in a tree line near Lashkar Gah. Enemy gunmen had been firing at coalition soldiers with assault weapons and rocket propelled grenades.

Then, for the third day running, "air" was in action, on 14 February, when a US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle and a Navy Hornet teamed up near Lashkar Gah to engage and destroy anti-Afghan fighting positions that had opened fire on a coalition ground unit with a disabled vehicle. Using a combination of GBU -38s and strafing attacks, the aircraft destroyed or warded off the enemy force. The Hornet performed a show of force following the engagement to deter further enemy activity.

After a day's break, on 16 February, during a coalition convoy operation a US Navy F/A-18C flew overhead and conducted a show of force along the convoy's travel route. On 18 February, in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah, a Navy Super Hornet engaged an enemy firing position using a GBU-12. The air strike occurred in response to a call for air support after Taleban forces opened fire on a coalition patrol.

The 20 February had A-10s and a coalition aircraft flying shows of force over Lashkar Gah as deterrence against enemy action while coalition units performed their missions and, on 21 February, a US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet conducted a strafing pass against enemy forces dug in behind a line of trees along a road near Lashkar Gah.

The Super Hornet had been flying overwatch for a coalition convoy when enemy gunfire erupted from the roadside. While the jet's cannons quickly ended the direct threat to the convoy, the aircraft followed up with a show of force and expended flares to deter a possible enemy counterattack.

The 22 February had a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet providing overwatch near Lashkar Gah, then using a GBU-12 to target an enemy indirect fire position launching attacks on coalition units. The strike successfully ended the attacks.

On 25 February, near Lashkar Gah, a coalition aircraft then flew a show of force to allow a coalition convoy to withdraw from an engagement there. Enemy troops in concealed bunkers had ambushed the coalition convoy with an improvised explosive device and automatic weapons, but broke off fighting as soon as aircraft arrived. The coalition jet then performed tactical reconnaissance overhead as coalition attack helicopters targeted the enemy from close up.

The next day, on 26 February , a coalition aircraft used a precision guided munition to destroy a Taleban compound near Lashkar Gah. The jet released weapons after coalition troops began taking fire from enemy fighting positions within. This was followed the next day, 27 February, by a US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper which engaged a group of enemy personnel with a Hellfire missile near Lashkar Gah. The UAV launched its strike in response to an enemy attack on coalition forces.

On 2 March, a US Navy F/A-18C Hornet and F/A-18F Super Hornet flew overwatch in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. They performed shows of force and expended flares when the convoy they were protecting received small arms and RPG fire. The attack stopped abruptly upon the appearance of the jets. The convoy reached its destination without further incident.

Two days later, on 4 March, US Navy F/A-18C Hornets and Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles provided air support to a coalition raid on an enemy narcotics production compound near Lashkar Gah. When personnel inside the narcotics compound started shooting with machine guns and RPGs, the Hornets executed shows of force to suppress their fire as coalition soldiers pulled back. Once ground forces had reached a safe distance from the facility, the Strike Eagles destroyed the narcotics compound with a series of GBU-38 strikes.

A day after that, on 5 March, near Lashkar Gah, a coalition aircraft performed a show of force and expended flares to deter enemy activity over a local settlement. The aircraft was providing aerial overwatch for a coalition unit in the area.

On 6 March, aircraft flew shows of force to suppress enemy activity and on 7 March multiple US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets provided their firepower to a battle near Lashkar Gah. Using 20mm auto-cannon strafes and a GBU-38, the aircraft knocked out several hostile fighting positions and an enemy facility.

The following day, on 8 March, US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles flying aerial overwatch near Lashkar Gah strafed a group of enemy personnel who had set up an improvised explosive device along a roadway. The individuals were hiding in a tree line, apparently waiting for an approaching coalition convoy, but were detected before they could carry out an attack.

The 9 March had US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets dropping GBU-12s on an enemy firing position and an enemy compound near Lashkar Gah. Both strikes took place in response to enemy forces firing at coalition personnel with small arms.

On 13 March, a coalition aircraft responded to a dawn attack against a friendly patrol base near Lashkar Gah, releasing a GBU -12 on one of several Taleban positions firing into the base. The air strike combined with howitzer fire from coalition field artillery served to stop the enemy gunfire and relieve the base.

Then, on 14 March, the RAF was in action with a GR-9 Harrier performing route clearance, searching for IEDs over supply routes and highways in Helmand province. The aircraft also performed a show of force in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah to deter enemy action.

The 15 March saw F-15Es and a coalition aircraft performing shows of force to deter attacks near Lashkar Gah, after coalition ground forces detected signs of enemy presence. In total that day, 74 close air support missions were flown.

On 16 March, a flight of Strike Eagles flew shows of force near Lashkar Gah, deterring enemy forces as a convoy traversed the area. The jets also performed a route scan ahead of the convoy and provided armed overwatch.

The next day, 17 March, US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets flew a show of force, expending flares, and then engaged using a GBU-12 near Lashkar Gah in response to enemy automatic weapons and mortar fire against a coalition convoy. The action targeted Taleban around an enemy supply compound. Coalition ground observers helped the strike land on target, passing coordinates for a direct hit using the precision munition.

On 20 March, a US Air Force MQ-1B Predator fired a Hellfire missile on an enemy compound near Lashkar Gah. Coalition ground forces were receiving enemy fire from within the compound.

And on 22 March a US Air Force B-1B Lancer used GBU-31 and -38 munitions to completely level a Taleban compound where enemy forces were holed up and firing away with machine guns and RPGs. The strike relieved a coalition ground unit a few hundred yards away, allowing them to continue on their mission.

Coalition ground controllers called in Navy F/A-18C Hornets and F/A-18E Super Hornets to hit a building where an enemy mortar team was hiding and firing rounds. The aircraft strafed and then dropped a GBU-38 and a GBU-12 on the building, destroying the mortar position.

F-15Es bombed and strafed an enemy force confronting coalition troops near Lashkar Gah. The aircraft targeted several groups of enemy fighters, including rifle, heavy machine gun, and RPG teams. The jets tracked and hit enemy personnel again as they unsuccessfully tried to escape into the mountains.

Two days later, on 24 March, a Super Hornet executed a show of force and expended flares near Lashkar Gah to prevent a pending Taleban attack after enemy gunmen had been spotted outside a coalition forward base. The aircraft's appearance provided a deterrent and prevented hostilities from developing further.

That day, in the district, an operation started. Afghan and coalition forces arrived at a compound militants had occupied for the night. The force immediately was engaged by Taleban from inside the compound. Several Taleban fled, while the force continued to receive small-arms fire from inside a building. The force cleared the building, killing three enemy.

One Taleban was barricaded in one of the buildings, using women and children as shields. The force used precision small-arms fire to kill the militant with no harm to the women or children.

The force pursued the Taleban who had fled the compound on foot. One was killed when he manoeuvred on the force. Four others engaged the force with a PKM machine gun and were killed. Two others armed with AK-47 assault rifles were killed after posing a serious threat to a nearby compound. One suspect was captured unharmed and detained.

It took four days before 28 March "air" was used again, this time with aircraft performing shows of force. The next day, 29 March had another RAF GR-9 Harrier in action, flying shows of force and expending flares to support a coalition ground patrol which was receiving RPG and small arms fire. The aircraft's manoeuvres kept the enemy pinned down while friendly forces overran the enemy position.

On 29 March, a local man on a bicycle was shot by ISAF forces after he failed to respond to warning signals while approaching a convoy. He was not in possession of any explosives.

The 2 April saw an Air Force F-15E executing a show of force expending flares in order to help a coalition unit break away from enemy gunfire. When the enemy's shooting continued after the fly-over, the F-15E strafed the hostile forces with its guns. An F/A-18E also flew a show of force, suppressing enemy fire from another enemy position.

On 3 April, a coalition aircraft and an A-10 executed shows of force near Lashkar Gah and Nangalam to prevent enemy activity in those locations. The aircraft supported coalition ground forces carrying out security and reconstruction efforts.

The 6 April had coalition and Air Force aircraft performing shows of force in Lashkar Gah to deter enemy actions. That day, 76 close air support missions were flown. The next day, 78 missions were flown, with 7 April a Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet flying a show of force over a group who appeared to be setting up an improvised explosive device. The manoeuvre prevented the individuals from succeeding while avoiding risk to nearby civilians.

The 8 April had a suicide bomber killing at least five people in an attack on an anti-drugs patrol. Police and civilians, at least one of them a child, were among those killed in the attack in Lashkar Gah. Nearly 20 others were hurt. The patrol was travelling north of Lashkar Gah in a convoy of six vehicles when it was attacked by a suicide bomber on foot. The attacker detonated explosives strapped to his body as he approached the convoy. One vehicle was completely destroyed, and four others were damaged.

On 9 April, in the mountains near Lashkar Gah, a Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet strafed enemy personnel shooting from a tree line. The enemy gunmen had opened fire on a coalition mounted patrol, prompting the aircraft to intervene. A second Super Hornet performed a show of force and expended flares to deter enemy reinforcements from moving into the fight.

On 10 April, the last day of 3 Commando Brigade deployment, a UK Royal Air Force GR-9 Harrier flew a show of force during an Explosive Ordinance Disposal operation near Lashkar Gah. The flyover deterred Taleban activity so that bomb squad technicians could remove an explosive threat without enemy interference. Nearby, a ground patrol called in a Coalition aircraft to fly several shows of force while the patrol was under attack.

Also, on that day, 15 insurgents were killed after opening fire on a U.S.-Afghan patrol. The coalition troops had returned fire, killing all 15 attackers with small-arms, heavy weapons and aviation weapon support.

Thus, by the conclusion of the 3 Commando Brigade deployment, in just one of the major population centres, of five – where there were supposed to have been no more "security incidents" than on the fingers of your hands - there were at least 69 which fitted that description, ranging from suspicious groups gathering, to attempted bomb laying, a major suicide bombing and full-blow gunfights, with aircraft strafing and bombing – plus an attempted take-over of the town by the Taleban.

During the Brigade's deployment, 32 men were killed. The Commanding Officer, Brigadier Messenger, said that is "something that will stay with me for the rest of my life."

COMMENT THREAD

A profound abuse

Details coming in of the deaths of three soldiers from 1Bn The Rifles point to the continued misuse of resources and equipment in the Army, leading once more to unnecessary deaths.

According to The Daily Telegraph, the three were killed while riding in an open-topped Wimik Land Rover, when they were hit by an IED just east of the town of Gereshk in Helmand province.

What is particularly relevant here is that the vehicle was being used as part of the escort for a supply convoy, making it highly vulnerable to attack, while negating any of the claimed advantages for this type of vehicle.

The essence of a Land Rover Wimik is that it is a lightweight, highly manoeuvrable gun-platform. The emphasis is on mobility, therefore, rather than armoured protection, the theory being that the vehicle is not tied to roads or any specific routes. The crew can choose unpredictable routes, and avoid potential ambush points, by which means the mobility afforded is judged to offer as much or greater protection than conferred by armour.

Even that theory is arguable. On the one hand, the Taleban have become adept at ambushing vehicles when they are travelling to and from operations, when they are tied to fixed routes and lose the advantages of off-road mobility. Then, crucially, it makes a false distinction between mobility and protection, as if they were mutually incompatible, which they are not.

Where a vehicle is involved in escort duty, however, even the theoretical advantages disappear. Supply convoys in that region are often laboriously slow, with typical average speeds of 5mph. Their routes are predictable and their slow progress gives the Taleban plenty of opportunities to get ahead and prepare ambushes.

While it is possible – and standard practice – to carry out explosives searches at "pinch points", these are carried out by the British Army with dismounted troops using hand-held mine detectors (pictured left) and dog teams. They are laborious and slow, with checks often having to be cut short or omitted to avoid delaying the convoys – where hold-ups in vulnerable positions carry their own risks of ambush.

Under such circumstances, Wimiks and the like should never be used as escorts. Even within the frame of reference dictated by the Army, they are patrol vehicles and light gun platforms. They were never designed for convoy duties and are not safe for that purpose.

Nor should any convoy be required to travel through hostile territory without route clearance and proving. Dismounted techniques, being too slow – and dangerous for the clearance teams, who are themselves prone to ambush - purpose-built vehicles are essential.

Such use was, of course, pioneered by the British and, as we have often observed on this blog, copied by US forces and the Canadians, where such route clearance is routinely carried out in Afghanistan. Now, belatedly - having sold off its own vehicles ans sat on its hands for six years - the MoD is at last buying replacement vehicles, the so-called "Talisman" package. Unfortunately, this is not due to start coming on-stream until next year.

Belatedly, also, the MoD has just issued a "contract notice" inviting expressions of interest from manufacturers prepared to supply "up to 400 Light Protected Patrol Vehicles (LPPV)".

The LPPV, we are told, will be a wheeled vehicle with an estimated gross vehicle weight of around 6 to 7 tons, capable of carrying up to 6 crew (2+4), integrated with a range of communication and electronic equipment providing protected mobility. This, we are also told, will replace in-service light legacy platforms based on the Land Rover based SNATCH vehicle. Additionally, the platform may be used as the basis for the replacement to Land Rover WMIK.

Interestingly – tragically – the tiny Irish Army has already resolved this issue, having at the end of last month ordered 27 mine-resistant patrol vehicles (LPPVs by any other name).

These are the BAE Sytems/OMC RG-32Ms (pictured right), the smaller version of the RG-31. This is a vehicle the MoD tested in 2002/3 and rejected in favour of the less-protected Iveco Panther, which is still not in service.

However, the Irish, slow though they might be, do have an advantage. They do not have to contend with the MoD. This is the MoD's second attempt at buying an LPPV, the first being the ill-fated Pinzgauer Vector (pictured below left). And it is worth noting that, in June 2006, when the Army ordered its first batch of 80 Vectors, at a cost of £35 million, the intention – or so it was claimed – had been "to counter the threat posed by suicide bombers."

We were then told that it had been adapted for use in "high-risk" environments and would thus "protect troops from automatic fire, landmines and fragmentation bombs."

At the time, it was reported that senior officers believed the greatest threat to British troops would come from suicide bombers and insurgents "armed with the same improvised explosive devices that have been used against lightly-armoured vehicles in Iraq." Nothing has changed.

Nevertheless, as early as June 2008, less than a year after the vehicles had been deployed, there were hints of a problem. This came in a published list of "expected out-of-service dates" for a range of vehicles. The Vector was given a date of 2015.

In an Army that routinely keeps vehicles for 30 years or more, a mere seven-year service life was unprecedented. Then, by the end of the year, the Army had conceded that the vehicle was not up to the job, having proved inadequate, and unable to cope with the threat from roadside bombs - the very purpose for which it had been bought.

In December 2008, however, we had General Sir Kevin O'Donoghue, without so much as a blush, airily telling the Commons defence select committee, "You produce a solution for the requirement of the time; the requirement changes as the threat changes, as the security architecture changes and you need to produce something else." It hadn't changed - they got it wrong.

Now, more than three years after the Pinzgauer contract was first mooted, we see a "contract notice" inviting expressions of interest for a vehicle which will probably end up being something like the RG-32M or another vehicle that has been available for many years.

So, while the Army gets it wrong again and again - pouring money down the drain in the process - men have to die, again and again. And the MPs, who are supposed to monitor such things, have asked what?

COMMENT THREAD

"Same old failings"

The starting point of this piece is the assertion that we will never get sensible military procurement until or unless MPs and the media start to take the subject seriously.

Only then, do we assume that they will make the effort to understand the issues and put the pieces together. And, if they do so, they will be able to target their criticisms accurately and fairly. But they must also come up with clear ideas of what should be done. There is no point whatsoever relying on the MoD – or the military. Time and time again, it has become demonstrably clear that they have very little idea of what they are doing.

The illustration of this broader thesis comes with today's media coverage of the annual National Audit Office (NAO) report on MoD project management, which has featured, amongst other things, the problems in bringing "Terrier" battlefield engineer vehicle into service – a project slated at £300 million, each vehicle costing £5 million.

The focus on this machine in the report has prompted three media articles dedicated specifically to the subject of the Terrier.

In no particular order, there is a piece by Chris Irvine, in The Daily Telegraph, another in the same paper (online both) by Thomas Harding and a piece in The Daily Mail by Matthew Hickley. Then, in each case there is comment by an MP, Edward Leigh, the Conservative chairman of the Public Accounts Committee.

To understand the scale of the problem, we first have to look at each article individually. Then we need to look at the bigger picture, Leigh's response to the newspapers and the role of the NAO.

Taking Hickley's Mail piece first, the headline (which would not have been written by the author) proclaims: "Army forced to buy JCBs and paint them in camouflage colours to clear warzones." The message, however, accurately reflects the copy, which tells us:

Plans for new armoured bulldozers to help British troops to clear obstacles in warzones have been hit by such long delays that the Army has had to buy JCB diggers instead and paint them in camouflage colours.

This assertion is then reinforced by the picture (above), which shows a line of ordinary, commercial JCBs.

Taking that one point (we will return to the others) – that the Army is, in effect, using ordinary JCB diggers, with a new paint job - this is a cheap shot, and wholly wrong. The vehicles being bought are the state-of-the-art JCB High Mobility Engineer Excavator (HMEE) - pictured below, right.

They were purpose-designed, initially for the US Army and are custom-built military machines. Furthermore, the version to be fielded is armoured, which adds to the differences – although we have reservations about this, as these machines are not mine protected. Nevertheless, they bear no more relation to the civilian machine than does an Army truck to a Tesco delivery vehicle.

Moving on to Chris Irvine's Telegraph piece, he also writes in similar terms that "The Army had to buy JCB diggers and paint them to camouflage them after plans for new armoured bulldozers to clear warzones were met by long delays."

The issue we need to address here is the inference that the Army bought the HMEE because of the delays in procuring the "new armoured bulldozers" – the Terriers (picture, below left) to which the NAO report refers.

Once again the assertion is wrong. Although ostensibly based on the NAO report, that is not what the NAO actually says. The passage is here:

2.17 Terrier will replace the Combat Engineer Tractor that was withdrawn from service in March 2008 because of concerns about the safe integration and operation of the Bowman communications system, reliability and obsolescence problems. The delays to Terrier will extend this capability gap; but users have been willing to accept that the vehicles will not be available to support operations until 2012 rather than risk a lower level of reliability. The Department does not believe that the delays will have an operational impact in the short term because of Urgent Operational Requirement action to purchase alternative engineering vehicles for current operations, including the JCB High Mobility Engineer Excavators.

The most relevant sentence here is the last, where the MoD argues that the delays in the Terrier procurement will not affect operations because, inter alia the HMEE has been bought. From this, it is a long way to go to assume that the HMEE was bought because of the delays in the Terrier programme. And, in fact, that was not the case,

Those that have followed this issue will know that the HMEE is to be purchased as part of the £96 million Talisman package, devised as a "specialist route clearance system", which "will provide a new high-tech way of dealing with the IED (Improvised Explosive Device) threat."

In this role, the HMEE brings to the table capabilities which the Terrier cannot supply. Specifically, the HMEE is a development of the JCB Fastrac, a machine which is optimised for (relatively) high-speed road use. It is thus capable of travelling long distances at convoy speed, keeping up with other vehicles without the need for specialist transportation. It can also operate freely on a wide variety of roads.

Strangely enough, when the concept was first announced in 2005, it was much lauded, not least by Sean Rayment in The Sunday Telegraph as the US Army's "latest secret weapon in the war against terror". How times change. But it is a pity that Telegraph writers do not read the Sunday version of their own newspaper.

The contrast with the Terrier, to anyone who thinks about it, is obvious. A tracked vehicle, if it is to travel any distance, has to be transported on a low loader. Furthermore, it is not by any means ideal for working on metalled roads – tracks tending to tear up the tarmac. It may have a limited role in Afghanistan, its design use being to carry out engineering works in the "indirect fire zone". But it is not an equivalent to the HMEE (and vice versa).

At best, the two machine types have overlapping capabilities, which is probably what the MoD was getting at when it argued that there would be no "operational impact" from the delay in the Terrier. Most of the jobs the Terrier would have been called upon to do, the HMEE can also do. But the HMEE can perform tasks for which the Terrier would be wholly inappropriate.

With that, we now come to the next point, majored on by Thomas Harding, his article headed: "Mine clearing vehicle that could save lives of British troops delayed for two years." Unfortunately, he has been misled both by the MoD and the NAO, which position the Terrier as a "mine clearance vehicle", which is actually only a secondary role.

Harding thus writes: "The armoured vehicle can clear minefields and make routes safe for following armour and is likely to have proved a significant asset in Afghanistan where dozens of soldiers have been killed by roadside bombs." He then goes on to say, "As a result of the hold-up the MoD has been forced to buy 10 off-the-shelf Buffalo route clearance vehicles as part of an urgent £96 million project."

The juxtaposition of these two issues is not altogether a happy one. In the mine clearance role, the Terrier is mainly what is known as a "breach" vehicle. Usually, to clear mines, it tows a bit of kit called Viper minefield breaching system (now replaced by the Python) which it uses literally to blast a way through a known minefield, paving the way for armour.

In insurgency warfare, the mine is used as an ambush weapon and, therefore, a different approach is used, needing equipment to investigate suspect locations, to determine whether there is an explosive package hidden there. Once one is detected, it is then identified and dealt with.

Thus, the distinction is between "breach" and "clearance". The Terrier is used for the first, the Buffalo for the second - as one of a suite of vehicles, providing part of the detection capability. There is no comparison. The Terrier can be used for the one (as an ancillary function) but cannot perform the role of the Buffalo. There can be no question, therefore, of being "forced" to buy Buffaloes because of delays in the Terrier programme. The two are completely different animals, used for different jobs.

However, as between the Terrier and the HMEE, there can be an overlap. Both vehicles can be fitted with mine clearance rollers (pictured right). But this kit is also currently fitted to Mastiffs and can be fitted to virtually any other armoured vehicle (in Oman, rollers were fitted to Saracens), so one hardly needs a £5 million, specialist engineering vehicle for the purpose, especially as the Terrier is not mine protected. Futhermore, this equipment - unlike the Husky detector gear - will only deal with pressure-plate activated devices, and not those triggered by command wire or other remote actuation mechanisms.

This brings us to the problem of the "bigger picture". The limitation of the NAO is that it looks at individual projects, mainly from a cost perspective. It does not look at projects in context (how they relate as part of a system, with other equipment), nor does it consider whether they are necessary or whether an alternative would be more appropriate. It simply looks at the situation "as is".

The trouble is that no one else is looking at the bigger picture either. Perhaps the Defence Select Committee should be doing this, but it does not. And neither does the media. As we see with this story, it dissects the information served up to it on a plate and goes no further. But, if you examine the "system" as a whole, a different and altogether more disturbing picture emerges.

Looking specifically at the HMEE, the question has to be asked, what is it for? An excavator, with or without armour, cannot be used to look for mines or other explosives. That is the job of the Husky (see left) in combination with the Buffalo. You would not expect an excavator to dig up a mine or explosive device once found. For a start, the HMEE armour (and design) is not up to that, which would make it far too dangerous. Explosive devices, invariably, are hand-cleared or blown up in situ. The only role one can think of, for which the HMEE is particularly suited is filling in the craters after a device has been blown up.

The question that devolves is why, in the £96 million Talisman project, the Army is buying HMEEs - 13 of them at a cost of £6.2 million – when it is not buying Huskies, an essential component of any route clearance operation? Another question is why the Army is spending £6.2 million on buying HMEEs at all, when it has already has a fleet of 25 armoured mine clearance vehicles, which it is now trying to sell off, unused, at the knockdown price of less than £4.5 million.

If the NAO is interested in value for money – which is its purpose in life – then it needs to look a bit closer at the Talisman project. Tucked into that, as Ann Winterton discovered, are some additional Mastiffs. Their role will be to function as armoured bomb disposal vehicles.

Only last year though, the MoD replaced its entire overseas fleet of bomb disposal vehicles, spending £7.5 million on 18 Swiss-built Bucher Duro vehicles, called the "Tellar" (pictured right). As we pointed out at the time, these unarmoured vehicles are totally unfit for purpose and now, surreptitiously – disguised by another project – these are being replaced.

Thus, we find ourselves in a position where, after the waste of nearly £20 million, we are going to end up with route clearance teams which still lack the essential Huskies to make them truly effective. But the NAO has no comment about that, and the media – entirely heedless of what is going on – is chasing after hares, making false points about JCBs, missing the real story.

That leaves Edward Leigh, who comments on the NAO findings. He complains of the "same old failings", which threaten to leave British troops poorly prepared for frontline action. He condemns what he calls "a lack of realism" and then declares: "This is about more than money. This kit will sooner or later be operated, perhaps in anger, by our men and women in the forces."

That latter sentiment is one with which we would agree. But, instead of offering any more detailed critical evaluation or himself looking at the bigger picture, Leigh is mouthing sound bites in response to an agenda dictated by the NAO. We are indeed – to use his words – dealing with the "same old failings", but there are far more failings than those identified by the NAO. As an MP, and chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, it is his job to root them out.

Instead, from our parliamentary representatives, we also get the "same old failings", which means that money will continue to be wasted and "our men and women in the forces" still won't get the right kit.

They – and we, the taxpayers – deserve something better.

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