Peter Abelard and the Natural Law: Problems Raised by Heloise

ABELARD HAD A DISTINCTIVE VIEW ON THE GOLDEN RULE, and this is exhibited in his response to the twentieth problem raised by Heloise in the Problemata Heloissae (Problems Raised by Héloïse). The problem raised by Héloïse in Question 20 relates to the Golden Rule: She wants to know how the Golden Rule, as formulated by Christ in Mathew 7:12, should be applied when there is one who consents to have evil done to him. If there is someone who has no qualms in having evil done to him, will that justify him doing evil to others?

PROBLEMA HELOISSAE XX

Quaerimus et illud, quod in sequentibus adjungit: "Omnia ergo quaecunque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et vos facite illis. Haec est enim lex et prophetae." Si quis enim vult ut in malo sibi quisquam consentiat, nunquid debet illi praebere consensum in re consimili?

What is Abelard's solution? How shall the Golden Rule be applied if someone desires something evil? Does that justify doing evil to others?

A Medieval Disputatio between Four Persons

In response to such a question, Abelard notes that there are two formulations of the Golden Rule, an affirmative formulation, such as we find in Matthew, and a negative formulation, such as we find in the Book of Tobit (4:15). However formulated, the Golden Rule presupposes an evil or good as approved or sanctioned by conscience, quod approbatis in conscientia vestra vobis ab aliis debere fieri. A disordered desire, or an evil desire, one not in accord with the judgment of conscience, is not countenanced by the Golden Rule under either formulation. Conscience will not secure any approval that evil be done, whether to oneself or to others. Rather, conscience defines or assesses the good, and posits it as what ought to be desired. And it is this way that the Golden Rule ought to be understood. Abelard continues by suggestion that this distinction between a disordered urge and conscience is suggested by St. Paul when he says (in Romans 7:19) "I do that which I do not will to do." The will he speaks of is that associated with what would be approved in conscience.

There are two precepts of the natural law concerning the love of one's neighbor: the one referred to in this place and the other we read in in Tobias (4:15). Here he says to his son, "Do to no one what you yourself dislike." What is true of the bad is true also of the good. Just as we do not want bad things to happen to us and so do not inflict them on others, the contrary is also true that, just as we would like others to give us good things, we should be ready to give them in return.

So when it is said, "What you would have others do to you," it means, what you know in your conscience that others should do to you. For nothing in our conscience approves of our consenting to wrongdoing, but only doing those things it considers good and worthy of being done. So, too, the Apostle, in saying (Rom. 7:15): "I do not act as I intend to" understands by the words "I intend to" that which I approve of being done.

Duo legis naturalis praecepta sunt circa dilectionem proximi: unum scilicet, quod hoc loco ponitur; alterum, quod in Tobia legimus, ipso ad filium dicente: " Quod ab alio odis fieri tibi, vide ne alteri tu aliquando facias. " Sicut ergo id malis, ita illud de bonis accipiendum est. Ut videlicet, sicut mala nolumus nobis inferri, sic nec aliis inferamus, et e contrario, bona, quae nobis ab aliis volumus conferri, aliis impendere simus parati.

Quum ergo dicitur: "Quae vultis ut faciant vobis homines," tale est: Quod approbatis in conscientia vestra vobis ab aliis debere fieri. Nullus enim in conscientia approbat, sibi consentiendum esse in malo, sed in his, quae bona aestimat, et fieri digna. Sic et Apostolus quum ait: "Non quod volo, hoc ago:" volo dixit pro fieri approbo.

Abelard continues by expanding on both formulations of the Golden Rule. He first addresses the affirmative formulation by tackling what is meant by "whatever you would have them do to you." Specifically, he attends to issues that arise from diverse stations in people, and the obvious inequality that arises among and between them as a result of their stations in life. Next, he discusses the meaning of the Golden Rule in its negative formulation, specifically, addressing the situation confronting an executioner, who is confronted with the seeming ethical conundrum that he is doing something to another which he undeniably would hate having done to himself.

Abelard recognizes that there is a variety of beliefs entertained by people as to what ought to be done to them, and what their obligations are to others. There is also significant inconsistency in practical application of the Golden Rule arising from different stations, or offices, that a person has. For example, a prince would hardly expect to have to do to his subjects what he would expect his subjects to do to him. Abelard suggests that the Golden Rule, as applied, must take into consideration the inequality of station:

But what is meant by saying "whatever you would have them do to you"? For many people, on account of the dignity or diversity of persons, believe that many things should be done for them that they hardly recognized as their own obligation to do for others. We can see this with respect to prelates and those subject to them, when they require others to do many things for them that they would never feel obliged to do for others. But, in fact, we should understand the matter in this way, that whatever we believe should be done for us by others, we should be prepared to do for them, too, not necessarily each and everyone, but those who are like ourselves, that is, who are worthy to receive these things from us that we are worthy to receive from them.

Sed quid est, quod ait: "Omnia quaecunque vultis?" Multi quippe pro dignitate, vel diversitate personarum, multa sibi debere fieri censent, quae nequaquam aliis se debere recognoscunt: ut in praelatis videmus et subjectis, quum isti multa exigant ab illis, ut sibi fiant, quae nequaquam illis facere debent. Sed profecto sic est accipiendum, ut quaecunque fieri debere nobis ab hominibus credimus, parati essemus et illis facere, non quidem quibuscunque, sed nostri similibus, hoc est, qui haec a nobis suscipere digni essent, sicut nos ab illis.

For Abelard, the problem of station is particularly poignant in respect to the lowest office in the affairs of men, the executioner. The executioner must be excepted from the rule, not as a person, but in the capacity of executioner. One's office, it would seem, would exclude one from the rule. This is because the executioner does not execute his victim in his own name, but in the name of God or the law. The Golden Rule, then applies when one acts on behalf of oneself, and not in the name of law or by power or authority given by God and of which one merely mediates.

In the case of Tobias (4:15): "Do to no one what you yourself dislike," there is posed something of a question, when a person who executes another in the service of justice does not wish to undergo the same experience as the other person. When someone exercises justice on behalf of God, it is God who does the action rather than the person, as we said some time ago. Therefore it can be prescribed that one should not do to another what he would hate to have done to himself, for when someone punishes another justly, it is God or the Law rather than the human agent who performs the act.

Illud quoque Tobiae: "Quod ab alio odis fieri tibi, vide ne alteri tu aliquando facias," nonnihil habet quaestionis, quum is scilicet, qui alium propter justitiam occidit, nunquam ab alio id sustinere velle possit. Sed quia quum quis justitiam propter Deum exercet; Deus potius id quam ille facit, sicut dudum superius diximus, praecipitur ut quod odit fieri sibi, ipse alteri ne faciat: quia quum aliquem recte punit, Deus hoc potius, vel lex, quam homo facit.

Peter Abelard

As might be expected from the parsing, edgy mind of Abelard, "he thought that the golden rule needed qualifying." Marenbom (2007), 274. One wonders, however, if, in his selection of prelates and executioners, Abelard may not have been surreptitiously, implicitly, inter linea criticizing the priestly and ecclesiastical authorities and the practice of capital punishment. Is there a budding anarchist or opponent of capital punishment lurking behind the scholarly show of the peripatetic from Le Pallet?

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English translation of Problema XX of the Problemata Heloissae is from Marty Martin McLaughlin, The Letters of Heloise and Abelard (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2009), 244-45.

John Marenbon, ""The Rise of Scholastic Legal Philosophy," A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics (Fred Miller, Jr., and Carrie-Ann Biondi, eds.) (Springer, 2007) (herein Marenbon (2007).

Peter Abelard and the Natural Law: Know Yourself, Scito Teipsum

ABELARD'S NOTIONS OF THE NATURAL LAW were, as might be expected, intimately tied to his views on moral theology or moral philosophy (ethics). For Abelard, all sin is ultimately, that is, in radice, contempt for God, and this translates to contempt (contemptus) of God's law, which is manifestive of his desire or will. "We show contempt for God, [Abelard] says, by acting or intending to act in a way that we believe is forbidden by God." Marenbon (2007), 273. I Therefore, intention of the actor is an extremely important concept to Abelard, as it is definitive of the actor's contempt. For this reason, in his Theologia Christiana, Abelard states that "the whole quality of deeds should be taken according to the root of intention (radix intentionis)." 369: 696-8 (quoted in Marenbon (1997), 252. Similarly, in his Collationes, (160:3161-3), Abelard states: "Actions are not judged good or bad except according to the root of intention: in themselves, they are all indifferent." Marenbon (1997), 252. For Abelard, it would seem, intentionality, then, is in the mind, and not in the act itself, and in fact, not in the act at all, since all acts are morally indifferent when prescinded from intent. Crowe suggests that this "insistence upon the interiority of moral life" was "Abelard's most considerable contribution to to ethics." Crowe, 114. Indeed, Crowe states that "the leitmotiv of [Abelard's] Ethics or Scito teipsum is that intention or consent, and not external action, makes morality." Crowe, 114 (citing Luscombe, ed., Peter Abelard's Ethics, esp. 4-36).

A Medieval Disputatio between Four Persons

In emphasizing intent to the degree that he did, Abelard appears to have rejected the "defect of justice" theory of St. Anselm of Canterbury (or the similar theory of William of Champeaux), wherein sin is defined as a failure to accord with justice. Under such a "defect of justice" theory, neither the will nor the desire which provides the impetus for the action are sinful; will and desire are good. Rather, sinful is found in the desire or the will's failure to conform to the standard that is required by justice. Marenbon (1997), 253.

According to Marenbon, Abelard also rejected the "stages" theory, such as that proposed by St. Anselm of Laon. In analyzing whether and when something constituted sin, this theory looks at all the stages of a human act--from incipient thought to final action. Thus, analysis of a moral act requires review and assessment of the entire concatenation of moral events from initial thought to final act. In such a view, the initial suggestion (suggestio), leads to the taking of pleasure (delectatio), which may lead to consent (consensus) which increases the pleasure, and may ultimately lead to the final consent required for the act (opus). Marenbom (1997), 254 & nn. 8-11 (quoting Lottin, passim) The first stage (suggestio) was not considered sinful, but perhaps disordered and part of concupiscence. Sin begins to creep in when the suggestio reaches to the area of delectatio. Because delectatio could be disordered and intended, the advocates of the "stages" theory believed that intention alone could result in sin. As an example, indulging in mental pleasure (delectatio) in a sinful act (say committing adultery with another's wife), though the act itself is not intended perhaps even positively rejected, is sufficient to constitute sin. The advocates of the "stages" theory also believed that there were certain acts that, regardless of intention, were sinful. There were some moral absolutes, the violation of which no good intention could excuse. Marenbom (1997), 254.

Peter Abelard

From Abelard's vantage point, sin is the discrepancy or lack of integrity between what a person does and what he believes God's command to be, which raises the issue of contempt. Marenbon (2007), 273. An act in defiance of the what one believes the Other wants, even if that belief is wrong, is contemptuous of the will of the Other. There is a clear danger of subjectivity in this view of moral right and wrong, in that, if this concept is stressed to the exclusion of all other markers of right and wrong, then it is exclusively the actor's belief or perception relative to his act or omission that determines the morality of his act. This would be sheer subjectivism. As John Marenbon explains in his The Philosophy of Peter Abelard:

Moralities of intention are . . . ones where the agent's own evaluation of his moral choice is preferred to any external criterion as the basis for moral judgement. Such moralities are--to use another description which has sometimes been applied to Abelard's ethics--subjective rather than objective. According to such a moral position, I do wrong if and only if I do what I believe I should not do or I do not do what I believe I should do. Abelard's theory of sin (which is formulated in the context of a supreme God) would be subjective, therefore, if (for instance) it held that someone sins if and only if, in performing an action or failing to perform one, he is not doing what he believes he should do for God.

Marenbon (1997, 265. Abelard attempts to avoid the fall into the subjective chasm while emphasizing this morality of intention by recruiting the natural law as the source of objective norms that all men would know and by which they must govern their acts. "As a result of the natural law," Abelard insists, "every mentally capable adult knows the fundamental moral laws that are laid down by God." Marenbon (2007), 273. As a consequence, no one can have the reasonable belief that adultery, murder, theft, perjury, and other such acts that violate the natural law, are commanded by God.

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John Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) (herein Marenbon (1997)

John Marenbon, ""The Rise of Scholastic Legal Philosophy," A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics (Fred Miller, Jr., and Carrie-Ann Biondi, eds.) (Springer, 2007) (herein Marenbon (2007).

Peter Abelard and the Natural Law: Dialogue Between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian

ABELARD WROTE HIS DIALOGUE between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian (also called the Collationes or Comparisons), around 1130 A.D., perhaps while Abbot at the Benedictine monastery of St. Gildas de Rhuys. All three of the characters, including the Philosopher, believe in one God, and they meet up with Abelard in a dream. Abelard is recruited to be more-or-less the judge of their debate. The Dialogue is actual broken up into two dialogues, one between the Philosopher and the Jew, and the second (unfinished) dialogue between the Philosopher and the Christian.

In the first dialogue the Jew and Philosopher expressly discuss the merits of the natural law relative the revealed Mosaic law. During the course of the dialogue, the Philosopher argues that the natural law, which discoverable by reason, is superior to the revealed Mosaic law. A similar dialogue takes place between the Philosopher and the Christian as to the merits between the natural law and the new law of the Gospel. In essence, therefore, the Collationes is a debate about the interaction between the lex naturalis, the lex vetus, and the lex nova, the natural law, the Mosaic law, and the law of the Gospel. For the Philosopher, the natural law is considered to be the science of morals, or ethics. The natural law is preeminent to the Mosaic law, both it terms of time, in dignity, in simplicity, and in mode of discovery. Indeed, it becomes clear that the natural law is the base upon which the Mosaic law and the Evangelical law build, as they contain all that is contained in the natural law, but add additional precepts to the natural law's content. The natural law is discoverable by reason, whereas the Mosaic law and law of the Gospel both, are communicated through revelation.

Peter Abelard

During the course of the Collationes, the Philosopher has this discussion with the Christian:

So far as justice is concerned, it is not just the bounds of natural justice but also those of positive justice that ought not to be crossed. One sort of law is called "natural," the other "positive." Natural law is what the reason naturally innate in all people urges should be put into effect, and therefore remains the same among all people: such as, to worship God, to love one's parents, to punish the wicked, and to do whatever is necessary in the sense that without them no other merits whatever will be sufficient.

To positive justice, however, belongs what is set up by humans so as to preserve usefulness and worth more safely and increase them. It rests either on custom alone or on written authority. An example of positive justice is provided by the sort of punishments given in retribution and the procedures of judges in examining accusations which have been made. Among some, there is trial by combat or hot irons are used, among others an oath that, when we have to live among whoever it may be, we hold the laws they have set up (as I mentioned) just as we hold the natural laws.

The laws which you called divine--the Old Testament and the New Testament--also pass down some commands which are, as it were, natural (you call them "moral commands"), such as to love God and your neighbor, not to commit adultery, not to steal, and some commands which belong, as it were, to positive justice. These commands apply to certain people at a certain time, like circumcision for the Jews and baptism for you and many other commands which you describe as "figural." Moreover, the Roman pontiffs and church councils issue new decrees every day or dispense various indulgences, according to which, you say, what used to be lawful becomes illicit and vice versa--as if God put it in their power to make things good or evil which were not previously be their decrees and indulgences, and their authority could pass judgment on the law of nature.

Oportet autem in his, quae ad iustitiam pertinent, non solum naturalis, verum etiam positivae iustitiae tramitem non excedi. Ius quippe aliud naturale, aliud positiuum dicitur. Naturale quidem ius est, quod opere complendum esse ipsa, quae omnibus naturaliter inest, ratio persuadet et idcirco apud omnes permanet, ut Deum colere,
parentes amare, peruersos punire, et quorumque observantia ita omnibus est necessaria, ut nulla umquam sine illis merita sufficiant.

Positivae autem iustitiae illud est, quod ab hominibus institutum ad utilitatem scilicet vel honestatem tutius muniendam vel amplificandam aut sola consuetudine aut scripti nititur auctoritate, utpote pene vindictarum vel in examinandis acusationibus sententiae iudiciorum, cum apud alios ritus sit duellorum vel igniti; ferri, apud alios autem omnis controversiae finis sit iuratum, et testibus omnis discussio committatur. Unde fit, ut, cum quibuscumque vivendum est nobis, eorum quoque instituta, quae diximus, sicut et naturalia iura teneamus.

Ipse quoque leges, quas divinas dicitis, vetus scilicet ac novum testamentum, quaedam naturalia tradunt praecepta, quae moralia vocatis, ut diligere Deum vel proximum, non adulterari, non furari, non homicidam fieri; quaedam vero quasi positive iustitiae sint, quae quibusdam ex tempore sunt accommodata, ut circumcisio Iudeis et baptismus vobis et pleraque alia, quorum figuralia vocatis praecepta. Romani quoque pontifices vel synodales conventus cotidie nova condunt decreta, vel dispensationes aliquas indulgent, quibus licita prius iam illicita vel e converso fieri autumatis, quasi in eorum potestate Deus posuerit, ut praeceptis suis uel permissionibus bona vel mala esse faciant, quae prius non erant, et legi nostrae possit eorum auctoritas praeiudicare.

Coll. 133-5; 145-7 (Marenbon, trans.)

A Medieval Disputatio between Four Persons

The passage is remarkable for its distinctions and clarity. First, it clearly distinguishes between natural law (or right) and positive law (or right). True, Abelard uses the terms iustitia naturalis and iustitia positiva, and not lex naturalis (or ius naturae or ius naturale) and lex positiva (or ius positivum). So the emphasis is less on law or right, than on righteousness, virtue, or living in accord with the good. This concept was likely borrowed and adapted from the commentary to Plato's Timaeus by the 4th century Christian Calcidius (who translated the first part of Plato's dialogue into Latin from Greek at the request of Bishop Hosius of Córdoba) where it was used as a term to distinguish between human justice broadly vis-à-vis the ordering of the cosmos generally. Marenbon (2007), 275. And while it may not be the first such use of the terms positive law and natural law (these terms are used by Thierry of Chartres and St. Bernard of Chartres in that sense), it certainly represents one of the first such uses of the term in the history of the philosophy of law, and it appears to have influenced later canonists who would use that distinction specifically to distinguish laws promulgated by humans from those strictly natural. Marenbon (2007), 275.

The other distinction that is made by Abelard, and one related to the first, is that between malum prohibitum and malum in se. Though he does not use these terms, it is clear that he recognizes that the positive law can make things once lawful, illicit, and make things once unlawful, licit. Abelard hints even at the possibility of abuse: that the human authority may pass positive law that is not consonant with the natural law, and has the temerity to pass beyond its bounds.

The distinction between positive law and natural law is extended even to God, who is recognized as having the authority to promulgate positive laws of his own--divine law--which may be confirmatory of the natural law, or may require acts in addition to those mandated by the natural law, such as those relating to circumcision for the Jew, and baptism for the Christian.

Peter Abelard and the Natural Law, Introduction

HAVING REVIEWED ST. ANSELM OF LAON AND THE SCHOOL OF LAON and their contribution to the natural law, it would seem reasonable to look at Peter Abelard (1079-1142) and his contributions to the natural law. The natural law was a central feature of Peter Abelard's project to give due emphasis to reason at a time when perhaps reason was not getting its fair share, and so the alliance between faith and reason was being strained. "The idea of law, especially natural law, was central to this project" of Peter Abelard in trying to "give a rationally coherent, ethically centered explanation of the main elements of Christian belief." Marenbon (2007), 271. To begin with, Abelard was convinced that Christian belief was reasonable (which is not, of itself a controversial position), and thus had been anticipated by the best of pagan philosophical reasoning. As part of this vision, Abelard included the practical reason, and thus moral reasoning. Abelard "needed natural law to give a foundation to his ethical theory, which, without it, would have collapsed into unsustainable subjectivism." Marenbon (2007), 271. The controversial aspects raised by Abelard's teaching and innovations were largely the result of improper emphasis and balance on his part, an endemic imprudence and brashness, an injudicious use of language, and his remarkable talent, vastly surpassing his unquestionable intellectual talents, of arousing controversy and attracting enemies.

Bas-Relief of Abelard

Born in the hamlet of Pallet in Brittany, Peter (or Pierre) Abelard was the son of Berengar, the village lord, and his wife, Lucia. You would not have known it from the quiet in the village, but the world was engulfed in the so-called "problem of the universals," and there was an acrimonious debate among the scholars, as the Realist school was on the descendant, and the Nominalist school was on the ascendant. Both of Abelard's parents were of apparently pious disposition, as, after their children reached adulthood, they entered the religious life.

In any event, Peter was the eldest of the children. Groomed for a military career so as to follow in his father's office, he opted instead to devote himself to learning, and had a remarkable aptitude for it, equaled only by his ability to land himself in controversy. Exposed early to the teachings of the monk Roscelin "the Nominalist," the first of that time, Otto of Freisingen states in his chronicles, to institute the "sentiam vocum," primus nostris temporibus sentiam vocum instituit. Mon. Germ. Histor., Script. XX, 376. (The sententiam vocum was one of the anti-Realist's solutions to the problem of the universals, and the precise relationship between genera and species that was bandied about during this debate. What were genera? What were species? Were they a thing (res), or where they mere intellectual constructs, "voices" (voces), as it were? Did only individual humans have real existence, and "humanity" not? Was "humanity" a res, a real thing (hence "Realism") or merely a vox flatus, merely a concept or name (nomen) (hence "Nominalism")? Whether Roscelin was the progenitor of the sententiam vocum or not, it is indisputable that he was a budding anti-Realist, though certainly he did not advance der reine Nominalismus Occams, the pure nominalism, that William of Occam (ca. 1288-ca. 1348) was to advance. But this is not the time or place to discuss Roscelin.) The "problem of universals" aside for the time being, Roscelin headed a school at Locmenach, near Vannes. After spending some time there, Abelard left to study at the Cathedral School in Paris to study dialectic under the Realist William of Champeaux (ca. 1070-1121), the erstwhile pupil of St. Anselm of Laon, the inspiration for the School of St. Victor, and the future bishop of Châlons-sur-Marne. (In marked contrast to Roscelin, William of Champeux was an Über-Realist and anti-Nominalist. In the matter of universals, Abelard was to adopt a mean position between Roscelin and William of Champeaux, but whether that teaching could be characterized as a moderate Realism or a moderate Nominalism is hard to tell.) For a time, Abelard tried to found a rival school, at Paris, then at Melun and later at Corbeil, but he eventually returned to Paris to study rhetoric under William of Champeaux. For a period of time he went to Laon to study Scriptural studies or exegesis under St. Anselm of Laon; however, he soon found himself embroiled in controversy, and was forced to leave the School of Laon. Eventually, after William of Champeaux retired to the monastery of St. Victor for a time, Abelard managed to get a position at the Cathedral School in Paris, where he was nominated canon, and taught both dialectic and rhetoric for a decade between 1108 and 1118, a time, he admits in his Historia Calamitatum, was filled with vanity and pride, not unmixed with imprudence and mortal sin.

Bas-Relief of Héloïse

It was here where he met, and fell in love, and had an improper and highly irregular dalliance with the bright, young Héloïse, niece of canon Fulbert, whom he was supposed to tutor, but instead seduced and impregnated with a child, his son, who would eventually be born and given the name Astrolabius (meaning "Astrolabe," a scientific instrument for measuring the position of stars), a name perhaps rivaled only by Frank Zappa naming his daughter Moon Unit. They were secretly married, but that did not stop canon Fulbert from exercising self-help to stop the relationship. He had Abelard forcibly castrated, and with that operation Abelard became an unwilling eunuch for the kingdom of Heaven. Both the scandal and the mutilation caused by the castration effectively ended Abelard's career at the Cathedral School in Paris. Héloïse retired to Argenteuil where she donned the nun's habit.

No, fly me, fly me, far as pole from pole;
Rise Alps between us! and whole oceans roll!
Ah, come not, write not, think not once of me,
Nor share one pang of all I felt for thee.

(Alexander Pope, "Eloisa to Abelard").

Detail of Abelard and Héloïse by Vignaud

Abelard found refuge in the Abbey of St. Denis, where he took the Benedictine habit, a habit which did not fit him well. He soon found himself at odds with the monks there and was relegated to a priory or cella, a sort of branch of the monastery. He soon shortly found himself embroiled again in controversy, this time because of his quarrels with followers of the School of Laon, who accused him of unorthodox, Sabellian opinions regarding the Trinity. He was summoned to appear before a council at Soissons which was presided over by Kuno, Bishop of Praneste, who acted also as papal legate. Although he was not condemned by the Council, he was ordered to recite the Athanasian Creed, and to burn his book on the Trinity. As a result of the activities of his Abbot, Adam, he was also sentenced to imprisonment in the Abbey of St. Médard. He fled to Troyes where he founded an oratory, named after the Paraclete. After Abbot Adam's death, his successor, Suger, absolved Abelard from his predecessor's censure, and Abelard resumed the life of a Benedictine monk. In 1125, he was elected Abbot of the Abbey of St. Gildas de Rhuys on the coast of Brittany. Héloïse took over the Oratory of the Paraclete at Troyes and became Abbess of that institution. Communication between Abelard and Héloïse continued throughout their life, and that infelicitous love affair, as well as Abelard's struggles against authority, has made Abelard the darling of all Romantics and Rebels, from the medieval Roman of the Rose authored by Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun to the Romantic-styled paintings of Abelard and Héloïse by the Frenchman Jean Vignaud (1775-1826) and the Englishman Edmund Blair Leighton (1853-1922). It is telling that the remains of Abelard and Héloïse escaped the cultural iconoclasm of the French Revolution. In fact, they seemed to have been honored by the spirit of the Jacobin in that in 1817, these citizens of the ancien régime were given a place of honor at the cemetery of Père Lachaise in Paris.

They were effectively revered as romantic saints, mythologized as forerunners of modernity, at odds with the ecclesiastical and monastic structures of their day. They became celebrated more for rejecting the traditions of the past than for any particular intellectual achievement.

Constant J. Mews, Abelard and Heloise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 4.

Abelard and His Student Héloïse by Edmund Blair Leighton

Abelard's tenure as Abbot of St. Gildas was not particularly felicitous. Faced with recalcitrant monks, who viewed him as overly strict, he found himself constantly battling their efforts to be rid of him. Ultimately, around 1136 he returned to Paris where he resumed his career as a teacher, and where he taught, among many others, John of Salisbury.

A Decidedly Byronic Abelard
(Whether before or after castration is difficult to tell)

Once again, Abelard's teachings on the Trinity were called into question. This time, however, his adversary was the redoubtable and influential St. Bernard. Ultimately, the dispute resulted in a council at Sens in 1141, which condemned a number of propositions that were contained in his writings. Abelard appealed to Rome. The sentence of the council of Sens was confirmed by Innocent II. However, here the Venerable Peter of Cluny stepped in (beati pacifici!), and, as a result of his efforts, obtained a mitigation of the sentence against Abelard, reconciled Abelard and St. Bernard, and offered Abelard respite at Cluny. Eventually, Abelard became a member of that monastic community, and taught at that monastery's school. He died in 1142 at Chalôn-sur-Saône, and was buried at the oratory he founded in Troyes. We may perhaps hope that in his death he finally found the peace he mentioned in his hymn O quanta qualia sunt illa Sabbata:

That heavenly city is truly Jerusalem,
Whose peace is forever, whose pleasure's supreme,
Where desire never goes beyond its object
And reward is not despised as short of its goal.

Vere Ierusalem est illa civitas
Cuius pax iugis est, sum iucunditas
Ubi no praevenit rem desiderium
Nec desiderio minus est praemium.

(English translation from James J. Wilhelm, ed., Lyrics of the Middle Ages (1990))

Abelard's opera may be divided into philosophical works and theological works. His philosophical works include the Dialectica, a treatise on logic, the Scito Teipsum or Ethica, a treatise on moral philosophy, and glosses on Porphyry, Boëtius, and the Categories of Aristotle. His theological works include the famous Sic et Non (Yes and No), the condemned Tractatus de Unitate et Trinitate Divina (Treatise on the Divine Unity and Trinity), an updated and enlarged version of that same treatise under the title Theologia Christiana, the Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum, et Christianum, the famous Sententia Petri Abaelardi (Sentences of Peter Abelard) also known as the Epitomi Theologiae Christianae. There are a scattering of exegetical works, hymns, and sequences also attributed to Abelard. In addition, Abelard wrote an autobiographical work entitled Historia calamitarum (History of my Misfortunes), and is famous for his correspondence to Héloïse.

Abelard and Héloïse from a Manuscript of the Roman de la Rose

Ironically, in the area of the natural law, Abelard predicated his thinking on the ideas of the School of Laon, which he otherwise excoriated. Specifically, he adopted its view, which was consistent with received teaching from the Church Fathers, that the old law, the vetus lex, and the new law, lex nova, were distinct. The Bible presented the situation of Abel (as well as others) that lived virtuous lives before the law of Moses, indeed, before Abraham was given the rite of circumcision. How was this to be explained other than by a better understanding of law? The notion of the natural law seemed the ideal vehicle for understanding how this could be. The ultimate justification was found in St. Paul's invocation of this "law of the heart" in Romans 2:14-15. Thus, the natural law was the sort of constant in all law, including both the Mosaic law and the law of the Gospel, and accordingly also governed the Patriarchs who came before the revelation of the old law to Moses at Mount Horeb. "Abelard adopted his basic structure of thinking about law from the School of Laon." Marenbon (2007), 272. However, given the Laudinensian scholars' emphasis on the Scriptures, they did not focus on the pagan evidences of the natural law. "The writers of the School of Laon had not been at all concerned with Greek antiquity in their discussion of natural law." Marenbon (2007), 272. That is, the Laudiensian school did not analyze the natural law from the vantage point of reason. Though he was criticized for it by his contemporaries, Abelard departed from the theologians of the School of Laon by emphasizing the philosophical overlap between the Scriptural notion of the natural law and the philosophical notions. The Abelardian emphasis allowed the natural law to be viewed as something suprahistorical, in that, wrested from the scriptural history, "natural law [was] no longer restricted to a particular chronological period," nor, for that matter, to a particular people. Marenbon (2007), 272. This shift in emphasis by Abelard resulted in a greater appreciation for the natural law in guiding all men and all cultures in all history. In the next series of blog entries, we shall review some of the more important Abelardian works that discuss his concept of the natural law. We will first look at his Collationes (Comparisons or Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian), a work celebrated for the clear distinction between natural law and positive law, perhaps the first, most clear distinction of the kind in legal thought. Following that, we will look at his Scito Teipsum (Know Yourself), a work sometimes entitled Ethica (Ethics). Abelard's moral teachings, which influence his view of law, are significant for their emphasis on intention of the actor in analyzing the morality of acts, or at least the actor's culpability. We shall also review Abelard's unusual take on the Golden Rule in reviewing his Problemata Heloissae, as well as his Commentary on Romans. In discussing all these matters, we will rely very heavily on the excellent guidance of John Marenbon, whose many works on Peter Abelard are superlative.