Trickle Up Power and Pour Down Participation

ONE OF THE CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHURCH'S social doctrine is the principle of subsidiarity, and with it, like the caboose behind the train, comes the necessary implication of subsidiarity: participation.

The principle of subsidiarity is a foundational principle of social philosophy that has two prongs. First, it holds that political, economic, and other social matters ought to be handled by the smallest, lowest, or least centralized competent authority able to handle them. This preserves the vast and healthy network of relations in civil society, from the family on upwards. Second, it includes the concept that any higher authority, if and when it justifiably intervenes, should have at most a subsidiary, helping function (subsidium), performing only those tasks which cannot be performed adequately at a lower level, and only for such time as the lower level is unable adequately to handle them.* Any such necessary intervention "must not continue any longer than is absolutely necessary, since justification for such intervention is found only in the exceptional nature of the situation." (Compendium, No. 188)

The principle of subsidiarity means we ought to have a bias or presumption against centralization, and a bias or presumption in favor of de-centralization. "The principle of subsidiarity is opposed," therefore, "to certain forms of centralization, bureaucratization, and welfare assistance and to the unjustified and excessive presence of the State in public mechanisms." (Compendium, No. 187)

The principle of subsidiarity is not limited to government and political questions only. It covers all all civil society, and includes, for example, the economic realm. The principle of subsidiarity will therefore distrust concentrations of economic power in bureaucratic, powerful, often impersonal corporations. It abhors monopolies. It would rather see such economic resources and economic power distributed as low down as possible. Distributist in spirit,*** it prefers the mom-and-pop store over a Wal-Mart. It prefers a family farm over an big agribusiness. To a subsidiarist, small is beautiful in the world of economics as E. F. Schumacher put it in the title of his famous book on economics.

In short, power ought at best to "trickle up," and, conversely, participation ought to "pour down." Anyone who believes in the principle of subsidiarity will entertain a healthy horror grapheocratiae,** a horror of bureaucracy, an antipathy to big government and big business. He will see the serious injustice to persons and society involved by the arrogation of powers by an overweening, intermeddling state or corporate culture. He will view the intervention of the State as one of last resort. He will understand the great truth behind Ronald Regan's joke: "The nine most terrifying words in the English language are, 'I'm from the government and I'm here to help.'"

The principle of subsidiarity stems directly from the dignity of the human person. It recognizes the truth that "every person, family, and intermediate group has something original to offer to the community," and that potential ought not be stymied by higher ups, since it tends to suppress or even destroy the "spirit of freedom and initiative." (Compendium, No. 187) "It is impossible," the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church therefore tells us, "to promote the dignity of the person without showing concern for the family, groups, associations, local territorial realities; in short, for that aggregate of economic, social, cultural, sport-oriented, recreational, professional, and political expressions to which people spontaneously give life and which make it possible for them to achieve effective social growth." (Compendium, No. 185)

"Subsidiarity, understood in the positive sense as economic, institutional, or juridical assistance offered to lesser social entities, entails a corresponding series of negative implications that require the State to refrain from anything that would de facto restrict the existential space of the smaller essential cells of society. Their initiative, freedom, and responsibility must not be supplanted." (Compendium, No. 186)

The principal of subsidiarity is a bulwark against abuse of power. It "protects people from abuses by higher-level social authority and calls on these same authorities to help individuals and intermediate groups to fulfill their duties." (Compendium, No. 187)

Concretely, the principle of subsidiarity, when put into effect, will result in the following:

1. "respect and effective promotion of the human person and family"
2. "ever greater appreciation of associations and intermediate organizations in their fundamental choices and in those that cannot be delegated to or exercised by others."
3. "the encouragement of private initiate so that ever social entity remains at the service of the common good, each with its own distinctive characteristics"
   
4. "the presence of pluralism in society and due representation of its vital components"
5. "safeguarding the rights of minorities"
6. "bringing about bureaucratic and administrative decentralization"
7. "striking a balance between the public and private spheres, with the resulting recognition of the social function of the private sphere"
8. "appropriate methods for making citizens more responsible in actively 'being a part' of the political and social reality of their country."
   

(Compendium, No. 187)

The flip-side of the principle of subsidiarity is participation. Participation is defined as "a series of activities by means of which the citizen, either as an individual or in association with others, whether directly or through representation, contributes to the cultural, economic, political, and social life of the civil community to which he belongs." (Compendium, No. 189) Participation is to be encouraged and fostered so that people exercise responsibility, participate in all areas of social life, and contribute to the common good.

Bureaucracy, monopoly, privilege, red-tape, excessive regulation are all enemies of participation. Cultural, legal, bureaucratic, attitudinal, and social obstacles to active participation of persons is something that ought to be removed through education or other means.

Though participation is important in any society, it plays a particularly significant role and enjoys a notable vibrant color in democratic societies since by definition,"every democracy must be participative." Participation is, as the Compendium puts it, "one of the pillars of all democratic orders and one of the major guarantees of the permanence of the democratic system." (Compendium, No. 190)

On the other hand, totalitarian or dictatorial regimes de jure deny the public the right to participate in public life outside the confines, supervision, or control of the State since they view a free people as a threat to their power. Somewhere between democracy and totalitarianism is that form of government we see entirely too often in the modern world: one that stifles participation through the heavy bureaucratic machinery and regulations which can sap the citizenry of its creativity and result in de facto or practical denial of the right to participation.
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*The word "subsidarity" in fact comes from the Latin term subsidium, when means help, aid, or assistance.
**Grapheocratia is modern Latin for bureaucracy. See Walter Redmond's Glossarium Anglico-Latinum (s.v. "burocracy" [sic])
***Distributism is an economic philosophy that was formulated and promoted by such Catholic thinkers as G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc as an effort to apply the principles of Catholic social teaching articulated by the Catholic Church, in particular in Pope Leo XIII's social encyclical Rerum Novarum and Pope Pius XI's social encyclical Quadragesimo Anno. Distributism advocates that the ownership of the means of production ought to be distributed as widely as possible among the population, and that it ought not be centralized either under the control of the state (which yields State Socialism) nor under the control of a few large businesses or wealthy men (e.g., laissez-faire capitalism). Distributism, however, is for free markets and private property. It wishes as many as possible to participate in the economic life and the means of production. Perhaps the best summary of distributism can be found in Chesterton's quip: "Too much capitalism does not mean too many capitalists, but too few capitalists." G. K. Chesterton, The Superstition of Divorce (New York: John Lane Company, 1920), 47.

De Testimonio Quatuor Testibus: Terribiliter Magnificasti Me

“I WILL WORSHIP YOU, for I am fearfully, wonderfully made,” says the Psalmist to his God. (139 (138):14). And the Psalmist thus introduces us to the third of Budziszewski's witnesses to the existence of the self-evident, undeniable principles of the natural moral law. It is the awareness that "every part of us has meaning," from our bodies, to our emotions, to our mind, to our life in common in the family and in civil society; both spirit and flesh and communion speak to us of our own design and purpose. We cannot ignore the obvious teleologies of our bodies, or our broader nature, whether they relate to us as individuals or us as a species. It is in the teleologies of man as a species that Budziszewski focuses upon in identifying the quality of man's moral design.

It is almost a commonplace to observe that man is made to live in common. Man is a political animal as Aristotle noted long ago, and one who is satisfied in living alone is either a beast or a god, but certainly not man. "It is not good for man to be alone" is a truth that covers the conjugal communion which is but one of many societies that man is called to form by nature. In looking at this tendency in man to live in common, Budziszewski identifies four social qualities of man at the level of the species: (1) interdependence; (2) complementarity; (3) spontaneous order; and (4) subsidiarity. Budziszewski (2003), 87-94.

The interdependency of man is manifest. Man needs to rely on his fellow creatures, and even such apostles of individualism as the "ugly as sin, long-nosed, queer-mouthed" Henry David Thoreau had to have a Bronson Alcott from whom to borrow an axe so as to build his cabin at Walden Pond. He also had something less than five pounds of money, which is worth less than the paper the notes were printed on unless there were others with which to engage in commerce. Such interdependence involves more than just the body. It also involves the intellect. How, for example, could Thoreau find any value in his considerable writing skills if he had not had the social interaction which gave him his English to begin with? Even our very existence is dependent upon others: without Cynthia Dunbar and John Thoreau, his parents, it is highly unlikely Thoreau would have seen the light of day. It is thus obvious that man depends upon his fellows for his procreation, for his nurture and education, for his culture, for his material and intellectual needs, for his language, for his identity, his morals, even his religion. And this dependence upon man upon his neighbor does not even address the dependence of man upon God.

We are not all made the same, and though we are interdependent, that interdependence is one of complementarity. We are not interdependent as if we were a bunch of identical worker bees. Most notable is the biological, physical, and psychological complementarity between man and woman which shows itself in the conjugal union and leads to familial life and the nurture and procreation of the human species. But this sort of complementarity is also part of the daily activities and functions of men. Our individual talents, abilities, training, education allow us to complement those of others.

By the term spontaneous order, Budziszewski means that man as a species spontaneously, that is without guidance or extrinsic imposition, quickly form Burkean "little platoons," which is to say we form "a rich array of associations such as families, neighborhoods, villages, businesses, vocational groups, religious societies, schools," and so forth. This includes the political community, although the political community is secondary in the sense that it is not necessarily a relationship of individuals in partnership with a state, but it is a relationship of man already in his primary associations with a state, and so the political community is a "secondary association--and association of associations, a partnership of partnerships." Budziszewski, 91. It seems, however, that as one moves up the hierarchy of associations from the conjugal communion and family to the nation state, there is a "diminishing spontaneity," a reduction in "connaturality," "greater need for contrivance," a lesser reliance upon pure natural impulse toward one based upon convention. To be sure, the institutions of higher order ought not be unnatural, they should "function like a second nature, not fighting first nature, but filling the outline that first nature provides." It is in this feature that Budziszewski finds the fourth quality of man living together as a species: the principle of subsidiarity:

The higher rungs ought to protect and cooperate with the spontaneous lower rungs--but just because they are less spontaneous, they may not. The risk implies a rule. Higher rungs should be permitted to supply only those aspects of the common good which the lower rungs cannot This, finally is the principle of subsidiarity, which applies across the entire span of civil society . . . . The principle of subsidiarity reaffirms to social design of the species, corrects both its individualist denial and its collectivist perversion, and champions the rights and dignity of all those in-between associations which, if only allowed, will take root and flourish, filling the valley between State and Self with fruit and color.

Budziszewski (2003), 93, 94.

Natural Law's Modern Cousin Germain: The Common Good and Friendship

MAN IS A SOCIAL ANIMAL, a ζῷον πολιτικόν or homo politicus. It follows that the requirements of practical reasonableness will take this reality into consideration. Practical reasonableness is not solely focused on self-constitution, self-realization, self-fulfillment to the point of self-centeredness or selfishness. Practical reasonableness recognizes that there must be a balance between self-regard and regard for others. (This part of the natural law is entrenched in Scripture: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." (Luke 6:31) or "Love your neighbor as yourself" (Leviticus 19:18; Mark 12:31 )).

Indeed, regard for others sometimes leads to significant self-sacrifice, even the sacrifice of oneself. Greater love no man has than to give his life for his friends. (John 15:13) We hold those who give their lives for others--e.g., the firemen, policemen, caregivers, and even the priest at 9/11 who gave their lives helping others, St. Maximilian Kolbe at Auschwitz who trade his life for the life of a married man, the soldier receiving the Medal of Honor posthumously in defending his fellows and his country--in such high honor surely not irrationally?

Finnis finds humans always aggregated in communities. He looks at communities as the product of relationships between human beings, and identifies four irreducible "orders" of such communities or sets of unifying relationships: a physical or biological order (relationships in the physical realm), an intellectual order (relationships of common thinking), a cultural order (community of shared language, technology, techniques, etc.), and a voluntary or psychological order (relationships of corroboration, co-ordination, cooperation arising from common action or a common pursuit or interest). It is this last order with which Finnis is most concerned and with which the requirements of practical reasonableness have most to do.

"Friendship" by Picasso

This relationships of corroboration, co-ordination, and cooperation give rise to common enterprises and therefore bring forth the concepts of common good. This order of community may be further subdivided (using largely Aristotelian insights) into communities that relate to utility ("business" communities), communities that relate to pleasure ("play" communities). Also to be distinguished are those communities that go beyond mere utility or pleasure, those that deal with amity, with friendship. In these kinds of relationships, the good of the other is, at least in part, defining of the relationship or community. In this sort of relationship of corroboration, "there is a community . . . not only in that there is a common interest in the condition [of that corroboration], and common pursuit of the means, whereby each will get what he wants for himself [as there is in those relationships of utility and/or pleasure], but also in that what A wants for himself he wants (at least in part) under the description 'that-which-B-wants-for-himself', and vice versa." NLNR, 141. One is clearly outside the ideas of self-fulfillment, self-constitution, self-realization--that self-fulfillment, self-constitution, self-realization includes the self-fulfillment, self-constitution, self-realization of another or of others. A father is miserable if he cannot provide for the needs of his wife and his children. His self-fulfillment comes, in great part, from the self-fulfillment of those under his care. More generically, a friend regards the good of his friend as part of his well-being. He relishes in the successes of his friend, and grieves at his friend's suffering.

So we leave the area of relationships of utility and of pleasure into the area of relationships of friendship (with the concept of friendship broadly understood). The notion of friendship is essential to the classical understanding of natural law which is not the individualistic self-regarding state of nature envisioned by Hobbes or Rousseau.

[C]ertainly there is no possibility of understanding the classical tradition of 'natural law' theorizing . . . without first appropriating the analysis of friendship in its full sense.

NLNR, 141. The "dialectic" of the core of friendship is a requirement of practical reasonableness because it participates in the basic value, the self-evident value of friendship: A has B's interest and not his own in view; reciprocally, B has A's interest and not his own in view; such "reciprocity of love does not come to rest at either pole." NLNR, 142-43.

Thus self-love (the desire to participate fully, oneself, in the basic aspects of human flourishing) requires that one go beyond self-love (self-interest, self-preference, the imperfect rationality of egoism . . . ). This requirement is not only in its content a component of the requirement of practical reasonableness; in its form, too, it is a parallel or analogue, for the requirement in both cases is that one's inclinations to self-preference be subject to a critique in thought and a subordination in deed.

NLNR, 143.

Friendship, then, is a sort of governor or a sort of counter to self-interest, and, in an almost paradoxical way, it is one's self interest which requires one to disregard one's self-interest as a fundamental sine qua non for participating in the good of friendship. If we focus on self-interest to the exclusion of friendship, we harm our self-interest. Our self-interest, then, requires us to have due regard for others. Friendship allows us to step outside ourselves.

Strict friendship is "the most communal though not the most extended or elaborated form of human community." NLNR, 143. There are friendships, attenuating in character, that extend and elaborate further out, rippling out of friendship in the strict sense and family to one's greater community, including one's neighborhood, city, state, country, nation, and even the global community.* But even in its greatest expanse, some sense, however attenuated, of the common good exists. That is why, when we see the plight of the Japanese after the tragic earthquake we have the felt need to provide them with help though we are "friends" with them in only the most weak of ways. There is a certain "friendship" that we have with the entirety of the human race.

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*However, "communism in friendship," one that seeks "the widest sharing in friendship" to the detriment of intermediate familial and other communities, frequently seen in Utopian schemes, such as those suggested by Plato in his Republic are to be disdained as a travesty of friendship. It is fatal to real friendship which must be other-regarding and personal, since it requires commitment to the other and an ability to give of one's self or one's own to the other. NLNR, 144-46. If one does not have something of one's own to give, it follows that there can be no friendship. The more an individual has (and the less the state or the commonality has), the more he can give in friendship. Friendship cannot exist if one is nothing more "than a cog in big wheels turned by others." NLNR, 147. Subsidiarity must exist in friendship as in the allocation of other aspects of community (power, decisions to allocate resources, etc.).