Democracy: Separation of Powers, Rule of Law, Representation, and Bureaucracy

THE CHURCH IS LESS CONCERNED about form than substance when it comes assessing any kind of government, including democracy. However, there are some natural procedural components of democracy and some which through history have been found to be valuable. In the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church mentions some of these institutions.

One important principle is the division of powers in a State. As John Paul II states in his encyclical Centesimus annus, "it is preferable that each power [legislative, executive, judicial] be balanced by other powers and by other spheres of responsibility which keep it within proper bounds." The check and balances caused by the separation of powers promotes the rule of law. (Compendium, No. 408) (quoting Centisimus annus, 46)

The "rule of law" is also an important feature of democratic systems. The notion of the "rule of law" is the notion that "law is sovereign, and not the arbitrary will of individuals." (Compendium, No. 408) (quoting Centisimus annus, 46) Of course, the law here must be based upon reason--as Coke called it, "artificial reason and judgment of law"--yet one not repugnant to the natural moral law. It "rule of law" was famously described by Chief Justice John Marshall who, in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison stated that there ought to be "a government of laws and not men."

But the branches of government are not only limited by checks and balance and the rule of law. They ought also to be answerable to the people in a democracy. In this case, particularly the legislature, the representative body, "must be subjected to effective social control." The principal means by which such "social control" is exercised is through elections. These must be free and meaningful in that they allow "the selection and change of representatives." Thus the representatives are to be held accountable to their constituents for their work.

Legislators are not merely passive agents of their constituents. Nor are they independent agents entirely unresponsive to their constituents. As John F. Kennedy summarized it in his Profiles in Courage, a legislator must "on occasion lead, inform, correct and sometimes even ignore constituent opinion, if [he is] to exercise fully that judgment for which [he was] elected." The Compendium recognizes this tension in the role of the legislator:

Those who govern have the obligation to answer to those governed, but this does not in the least imply that representatives are merely passive agents of the electors. The control exercised by the citizens does not in fact exclude the freedom that elected officials must enjoy in order to fulfill their mandate with respect to the objectives to be pursued.

(Compendium, No. 409)

They therefore have duties to the common good above and beyond their specific constituents:

In their specific areas (drafting laws, governing, setting up systems of checks and balances), elected officials must strive to seek and attain that which will contribute to making civil life proceed well in its overall course.

(Compendium, No. 409)

There is always the danger of special interests. While the concerns of special interests are something that must considered, these must be assessed--not based upon the needs of the special interest as against the common good--but in relation to the common good. As the Compendium puts it, the mandate and objectives to be pursued by legislators "do not depend exclusively on special interests, but in a much greater part on the function of synthesis and mediation that serve the common good, one of the essential and indispensable goals of political authority." (Compendium, No. 409)

The Church reminds politicians that they must engage in their "art of the possible" in a virtuous, moral way. Here there is an insistence of personal morality.

Those with political responsibilities must not forget or underestimate the moral dimension of political representation, which consists in the commitment to share fully in the destiny of the people and to seek solutions to social problems. In this perspective, responsible authority also means authority exercised with those virtues that make it possible to put power into practice as service (patience, modesty, moderation, charity, efforts to share), an authority exercised by persons who are able to accept the common good, and not prestige or the gaining of personal advantages, as the true goal of their work.

(Compendium, No. 410)

This notion of a virtuous legislator of course would exclude any notion of political corruption, something which the Compendium recognizes as being a deformity, a blight on the democratic process:

Among the deformities of the democratic system, political corruption is one of the most serious because it betrays at one and the same time both moral principles and the norms of social justice. It compromises the correct functioning of the State, having a negative influence on the relationship between those who govern and the governed. It causes a growing distrust with respect to public institutions, bringing about a progressive disaffection in the citizens with regard to politics and its representatives, with a resulting weakening of institutions. Corruption radically distorts the role of representative institutions, because they become an arena for political bartering between clients' requests and governmental services. In this way political choices favor the narrow objectives of those who possess the means to influence these choices and are an obstacle to bringing about the common good of all citizens.

(Compendium, No. 411)

Whether we are dealing with the executive, legislative, or judicial branch, any organ of public administration--national, regional, or municipal--must recognize that they are "oriented towards the service of citizens." They are the "steward of the people's resources, which [they] must administer with a view to the common good." (Compendium, No. 412)

One evil which seems to be endemic and which must always be fought against is the problem of excessive bureaucratization. Excessive bureaucratization occurs when "'institutions become complex in their organization and pretend to manage every area at hand.'" (Compendium, No. 412) (quoting Christifidelis laici, 41). Excessive bureaucratization works against the common good and against efficient stewardship of public resources. "In the end," excessively bureaucratic agencies of government "'lose their effectiveness as a result of an impersonal functionalism, an overgrown bureaucracy, unjust private interests, and an all-too-easy and generalized disengagement from a sense of duty.'" (Compendium, No. 412) (quoting Christifidelis laici, 41).

"The role of those working in public administration is not to be conceived as impersonal or bureaucratic, but rather as an act of generous assistance for citizens, undertaken with a spirit of service." (Compendium, No. 412).

Natural Law's Modern Cousin Germain: Rule of Law: What It's Not

THE RULE OF LAW IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE a benefit for life within community. The idea is that within such a thing as a "Rule of Law," the individual has the legitimate opportunity to autonomy in a true sense in that he avoids being made to live his life "for the convenience of others." He is "allowed and assisted to create a subsisting identity across a 'lifetime'." It allows individuals to be "selves," according to Finnis. NLNR, 272. This seems like a rather vague and unsatisfying reason or justification for the Rule of Law. But the general concept that Finnis appears to be advocating is one where the Rule of Law is something that exists when law is maintained as a public thing, a res publica, and not a vehicle for private benefit or private gain. The Rule of Law allows fair and equal social or communal environment where people may share in the common life in a manner which is predictable, which is reasonable, and which promotes peaceful interchange and exchange. There will be a fair reciprocity between men and men, and men and the State. The aim is for all to be given their due, and none less or none more than their due, and so the "Rule of law is thus among the requirements of justice or fairness." NLNR, 273.

The Rule of Law, however, has limited substantive flesh. It is large a creature of procedure. Due procedure, due process, even if procedural provides great advantage and is a great good. But it is instrumental, not fundamental. As a consequence, the "Rule of Law" could, at least notionally though perhaps implausibly, exist within a larger framework of unjust substantive law. A very fine pen or a nice sharp knife can be used by a tyrant as well as a beneficent ruler.

Our Lady of Justice (La Madone de la Justice)
by Bernardo Strozzi (1581-1644) (Louvre)

Although it is speculatively intelligible that a tyrant would subject himself to the "Rule of Law," it is highly unlikely in practical fact. "A tyranny devoted to pernicious ends has no self-sufficient reason to submit itself to the discipline of operating consistently through the demanding processes of law, granted that the rational point of such self-discipline is the very value of reciprocity, fairness, and respect for persons which the tyrant, ex hypothesi, hold in contempt." NLNR, 273. In point of fact, the tyrant would find the "Rule of Law" irksome, limiting, constraining, and not likely something that fits in with his plan. In other words, the "Rule of Law" would work at cross-purposes to the tyrant's larger goals which would contradict the common good and would serve some ideology, some private good if nothing other than his vanity or lust for power, something, in any event, other than the common good. In other words, a tyrant is motivated by either "exploitative" or "ideological" motives, or a combination of both, and these do not readily lend themselves to expression or limitation by the "Rule of Law." At best, the tyrant will adopt the mantle of the "Rule of Law" for tactical and superficial reasons, as part of his "exploitative" or "ideological" regime. Finnis therefore doubts that, in practice, the "Rule of Law" is "simply an efficient instrument which, like a sharp knife, may be good a necessary for morally good purposes but is equally serviceable for evil." NLNR, 274. There is enough substantive flesh on the Rule of Law to make the very Rule of Law counterproductive to any tyranny. It is not merely instrumental so that it is equally available to tyrant and non-tyrant; in Finnis's view, it has a substantive anti-tyrannical end so that a tyrant is not likely to pick it up as part of his grab bag of instruments with which to express his iron rule.

There is, however, a danger to the Rule of Law which Finnis thinks warrants some focus, and it arises in contexts where a people may be accustomed to the Rule of Law so that it becomes an "ideological popularity," and not fully integrated with the larger framework of a "steadily grasp of practical principles." NLNR, 274. In other words, the danger arises when people speak the "Rule of Law" with their lips, but have lost the "Rule of Law" in their hearts and brains. In such situations it is possible that a small cadre of men, "conspirators against the common good," may use constitutional and legal forms to gain power so that there power grasp appear legitimate, has the form of good. "Thus the Rule of Law does not guarantee every aspect of the common good, and sometimes it does not secure even the substance of the common good." NLNR, 274.

Finnis observes that tyrants are unlikely to adopt the Rule of Law because it is "always liable to reduce the efficiency of an evil government, since it systematically restricts the government's freedom of manoeuvre." NLNR, 274. But if the Rule of law restricts a government's freedom of maneuver if the government tyrannical, then mightn't it restrict the government's freedom if the government is not? Can there by such a situation, Finnis asks, where "the genuine Rule of Law and authentic constitutional government are best served by departing, temporarily but perhaps drastically, from the law and the constitution"? It may be that unthinking application of the Rule of Law could, in an extreme situation, be unreasonable and against the common good, particular in the situation where there may be those who would exploit the protections of the Rule of Law for the very purpose of overthrowing it. If so, are there instances where one may transgress the Rule of Law be suppressed for the benefit of the Rule of Law?* The answer would appear to be "yes." In one sense, one departs the realm of human law to go the the law behind all law, the natural law, which provides that any law must have the common good in mind, and that law itself is ordered towards the benefit of the common good, and no law ought to be construed against the common good. Salus populi suprema lex.

In a sense, when push comes to shove, the weakness of the positivist philosophy appears naked in extremis. In an extreme situation, the positivist will have no justification for any act against the written law even if it is to protect that written law. This is so because the justification cannot be found by reference to any written law. In an extreme case, "the answer cannot be determined by any positive rule (written or unwritten) of the 'system'--not even a rule stipulating that the question is illegitimate." NLNR, 276. There are times when one must go outside the "system" to save the "system," namely when staying within the "system" would spell the demise of the very "system" itself. An advocate of the natural law, which conceding the ordinary importance of maintaining the positive law and its binding nature, will recognize that there are instances, be they rare yet they have historically not been non-existent, where the natural law is the final justification for ignoring human law for the sake of human law itself, that is more precisely for the common good of the society governed by it. The positivist may stew in his inability to articulate the justification. The natural law advocate would not. "There is," as Jefferson put it, a law of "higher obligation" to which we have recourse.

_____________________________
*In this United States, this was the question confronting Abraham Lincoln. On April 27, 1861, with an aim to controlling the secessionists in Maryland, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus. The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus gave the military the power to arrest and hold indefinitely anyone without charging them with any specific crime. The U. S. Constitution allowed for such extreme measure in the case of "in Cases of Rebellion," if the "public Safety may require it." U.S. Const., art. I, s. 9. It is a right which Chief Justice Salmon Chase once referred to as "the most important human right in the Constitution." On May 25, 1861, John Merryman, a lieutenant of the Maryland State Militia, was arrested by U.S. Soldiers under orders of the Union General Keim, and was confined to Fort McHenry, and held without charges and without right to legal counsel. In response to a petition brought by Merryman's lawyer, Chief Justice Taney (acting as circuit court judge) issued a writ of habeas corpus which was refused enforcement by the General George Cadwalader, commanding officer of Fort McHenry, who justified himself by the order of President Lincoln suspending the writ. Taney wrote an opinion Ex parte Merryman in which he held Lincoln's act of suspending the writ of habeas corpus unconstitutional since it required Congressional authorization. Lincoln ignored the Chief Justice's opinion, justifying himself before a Special Session before Congress on July 4, 1861: "Are all the laws but one to go unexecuted and the government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?" (Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Vol 5, p. 117) This concept is frequently given voice in the rhetorical statement, "The Constitution is not a suicide pact." Thomas Jefferson enunciated the principle in this fashion: "A strict observance of the written law is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, or saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to the written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the ends to the means" (Letter of Jefferson to John B. Colvin, Sept. 20, 1810).

Natural Law's Modern Cousin Germain: Rule of Law: What it Is

HUMAN INSTITUTIONS ARE SUBJECT TO FAILURE, some of it systemic (e.g., Communism, Somalia, Nazi Germany), some of it occasional (e.g., the occasional rogue judge who is corrupted by bribery, the trial of Alfred Dreyfus). There is not an institution in the world that cannot be, that has not been, sidetracked from its end through the designs or lapses of evil or weak men. Though these institutions are, as a whole or by design, justified by and in accordance with the demands of practical reasonableness, they are captured as it were by persons or groups and so are "deflected to meet the requirements of individual or group bias." NLNR, 265. In this way, they depart from being instruments of the common good and pro tanto lose their justification for being. This is true for the use of punishment attendant to justice. Ultimately, whether one calls these failures injustice, calls them a failure of justice, or even calls them "justice" not in the central case (secundum quid) is not as important as averting these failures. But the failures do not condemn the entire enterprise of justice and the use of coercive power to compel obedience to the interests of the common good or to punish in the event of disobedience against the interests of the common good. In the main, the justification persists the abuses. The question of sanction and its relation to law has been amply debated. Some jurists tie sanction to law. For example, John Austin made sanction a fundamental part of law so as to include the need for sanction as a sine qua non of law. Similarly, the sociologist Max Weber tentatively defined law with focus on the sanction as a material element of law's existence.* But Weber saw that law did not mandate sanction, and so saw that law legitimately function where there was not in practice sanction, but where a sense of duty was what spurred obedience to the law. As Finnis encapsulates Weber's final view on the matter:

For Weber, then, authoritative co-ordination is legal in character when it operates by way not of an attitude of obedience to persons but of a disposition to comply with 'the law', a legally established order of consistent, abstract rules (normally established intentionally) and principles to be applied to and followed in particular cases--wot that those in authority are regarded as 'officials' whose office or authority is defined by those rules, and who are to be obeyed only while they act within their legal powers.

NLNR, 267. As Finnis observes Weber distinguishes law from a whole slew of other human institutions (politics, conventions, manners, etc.) without adverting to the "problem of recalcitrance and hence of any need for coercion or sanctions." NLNR, 267.**

What is it that distinguishes a legal order from, say, "charismatic personal governance of a sovereign administering 'palm-tree justice by ad hoc decrees"? In other words, what constitutes the rule of law versus the rule of men? Finnis identifies a number of requirements that need to be found in the central case of a legal order. The first requirement of a legal order may be labeled the existence of a "legal 'circle'" by which Finnis means the interrelationship between the rules and the institutions that administer or enforce those rules, the institutions themselves being governed by rules. A legal order therefore generally has a "system of rules and institutions so interrelated that rules define, constitute, and regulate the institutions, while institutions create and administer the rules, and settle questions their existence, scope, applicability, and operation." NLNR, 268. The second requirement is that a legal order might be called legal continuity. A rule or an institution in a legal order once validly created "remains valid, in force or in existence, in contemplation of law, until it determines according to its own terms or to some valid act or rule of repeal." The law or institution cannot be a one-time shot, a particular affair. It must have some sort of staying power. The third requirement may be called the enforcement of private pacts. That requirement is that a legal order contain within itself not only the means of creating, administering, and adjudicating those rules, and rules relating to the institution, character, and administration of the institutions whose task is to further those rules, but there must be some means by which private individuals can partake in "juridical acts which, if performed in accordance with rules in form at the time of the performance" are considered to be enforceable independent legal acts. These sorts of acts would include such acts as the making of a contract, the purchase and/or sale of real property, entry into a marriage, the bequest of property by will. The fourth requirement might be called past-presentism. It is the "treating of . . . past acts (whether of enactment, adjudication [etc.] . . . ) as giving, now, sufficient and exclusionary reason for acting in a way then 'provided for'." NLNR, 269. It is this past-presentism that gives law its characteristic as a "stable point of reference unaffected by present and shifting interests and disputes." NLNR, 269. The fifth requirement may be called the assumption of "gaplessness." There is a presumption that the law suffers no gaps, that the law somehow provides for the unusual circumstance so that the law can be clearly applied to the present question or, through the application of due discretion, can be extended to cover and address the question. While in a sense "fictitious," if the legal order did not allow for some "play in the joints" it would be unmanageable. There has to be a rule in each instance that is not just arbitrarily pulled from the air as a stop-gap measure. These requirements then--and the absence of sanction is notable--would be sufficient to designate, in Finnis's view, a legal order from something else (convention, manners, politics). It would apply in a world of sinners just as much as "in a world of saints." NLNR, 269. But in a world of sinners, in a world where fraud and abuse of power are frequent enough so as for all of us to face it sometime during our lives, the legal order has to be supplemented "by the law of wrongs and offences, criminal procedure an punishment." NLNR, 270. In practice, then, sanction or enforcement may be considered a sixth requirement of the legal order, a non-essential but practically necessitated requirement. These requirements of the existence of a legal order, however, do not tell us whether the legal order is working well. If the legal system is working well, Finnis says it is accorded the term "Rule of Law." What indicates a system working well, a system that may receive the accolade of being in accordance with that much vaunted epithet the "Rule of Law"? Finnis provides an answer by identifying eight desiderata of a legal regime that operates as a Rule of Law:

A legal system exemplifies the Rule of Law to the extent . . . that (i) its rules are prospective, not retroactive, and (ii) are not in any other way impossible to comply with; that (iii) its rules are promulgated, (iv) clear, and (v) coherent one with another; that (vi) its rules are sufficiently stable to allow people to be guided by their knowledge of the content of the rules; (vii) the making of decrees and orders applicable to relatively limited situations is guided by rules that are promulgated, clear, stable, and relatively general; and (viii) those people who have authority to make, administer, and apply the rules in an official capacity (a) are accountable for their compliance with rules applicable to their performance and (b) do actually administer the law consistently and in accordance with its tenor.

NLNR, 27-71. Of course, there is a range within which a legal order may be said to operate as a "Rule of Law" or where it may be said to operate outside of it. These requirements are not binary "yes" or "no" answers, and whether there is a "Rule of Law" may be in some cases debatable. Borders may be fuzzy and arguable. In our next blog posting, we will review and complete Finnis's treatment of the Rule of Law with specific focus on why it is considered beneficial to the common good and what limits might apply. __________________________________ *Finnis quotes a part of Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: "An order will be called law if it is externally guaranteed by the probability that coercion (physical or psychological), to bring about conformity or avenge violation, will be applied by a staff of people holding themselves specially ready for that purpose." (quoted in NLNR, 266). ("Eine Ordnung soll heißen . . . Recht, wenn sie äußerlich garantiert ist durch die Chance [des] (physischen oder psychischen) Zwanges durch ein auf Erzwingung der Innehaltung oder Ahndung der Verletzung gerichtetes Handeln eines eigens darauf eingestellten Stabes von Menschen.") **It may be observed that St. Thomas does not find sanction fundamental to law. He does not include it in his definition of the "central case" of law, which he defines as "nothing other than a certain dictate of reason (rationis ordinatio) for the common good, made by him who has the care of the community and promulgated." ST. IaIIae, Q.90, art.4. Sanction is required in law only because of recalcitrance, that is, only because of the disobedience or sinfulness of man.

Archbishop Chullikatt on the "Rule by Law" vs. the "Rule of Law"

ARCHBISHOP FRANCIS A. CHULLIKATT, a native of Bolghatty, India, and the titular Archbishop of Ostra, Apostolic Nuncio in various countries, and Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations, made the following statement regarding the role of natural law on the rule of law. Without the objective norms of the natural moral law, the "rule of law" becomes a counterfeit "rule by law."

Coat of Arms of Archbishop Chullikatt

A Statement by H.E. Archbishop Francis Chullikatt
Apostolic Nuncio, Permanent Observer of the Holy See

65th session of the
United Nations General Assembly

Before the Sixth Committee on item 85:
The rule of law at the national and international levels

New York, 13 October 2010

Archbishop Francis Chullikatt

Madam Chair,

As my delegation addresses the Sixth Committee for the first time during this 65th Session of the General Assembly, I take this opportunity to congratulate you and the bureau on your elections and look forward to a successful conclusion of this Committee' s work.

Madam Chair,

The rule of law is the bedrock for development, peace and security. Why? First of all, the human person is intelligent and second, the world and the issues we confront are intelligible. Therefore, humankind is able to know the essential dignity of every human being. The combination of human intelligence, intelligibility of nature and history and unconditional respect for human dignity should enable those persons entrusted with the making of laws and their enforcement to promulgate just laws that serve and protect the common good of the human family. However, for the rule of law to promote true justice, a better understanding of the nature of law and justice is needed by national and international authorities. Law is not merely the outcome of civil legal deliberations. It must also incorporate the natural moral law, which, in fact, is nothing other than the recognition of all the social consequences of human dignity. Natural law, hence, supplies to law-making and enforcement that which can be derived about what is good and true through the proper and essential application of objective natural human reason. The natural moral law thus introduces a crucial element to the making of public norms. It connects the rule of law with the seeking of truth which, in turn, gives expression to the law inscribed on the human heart.

Today, legislative and judicial bodies too often fail to take into account this crucial basis of their work – the natural moral law – and focus only upon the empirical perception of human circumstances and procedural questions concerning the creation and application of law. Moreover, there is even a failure to acknowledge the need for law to respect universal truths. This positivistic and utilitarian view of law gives rise to the transforming of "private interests or wishes into laws that conflict with the duties deriving from social responsibility." A positivistic and utilitarian view of law results in the "rule by law" rather than true rule of law. As a judicial methodology, it risks undermining the promotion and just application of the rule of law because it disconnects the law from its roots in the natural moral order and leads to the flawed conclusion that what has become legal is therefore just and moral.

At the international level, the promotion of the rule of law also has seen advancements in recent decades in both civil and criminal law. The importance of international trade and development has led to the recognition of the need for States and individuals to have effective and just standards and norms so as to further enhance international development. Likewise, international labor markets and human migration both have received greater attention by the international community so as to promote just and equitable laws which protect the dignity of workers and allow migrants and their communities to enjoy the full protection of the law. Based on sound juridical principles, the work of the International Law Commission, International Labour Organization, UNCTAD, UNCITRAL and the WTO, requires continued commitment and development so as to create a more just international order which fosters understanding between nations. In the same way, finances should be guided by the rule of law. That means that the International Community should keep working on reforming the mandate and rules of the main multilateral financial bodies, such as the IMF, the World Bank Group and the new FSB. Such reorganization should ensure the fair participation of all countries in the world financial governance and should better link the financial institutions to the work of the General Assembly.

Similarly, the international criminal system has seen great progress over the past year. While the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda move closer to completing their work, the International Criminal Court has seen an increase in the number of States ratifying the Rome Statute and the further development of its ability to hold individuals accountable for the worst crimes against humanity. While the ICC has proved a valuable contribution to the international criminal system, continued work to ensure that it promotes the rule of law and greater peace and justice must continue.

While ensuring global and national governance through the rule of law, international leaders and civil authorities must continue to work to remove the perceived conflict between peace and justice and foster a broader vision of justice which takes into account political, social, economic and legal forms of justice. Justice, after all, requires the institution of right relationships among individuals and peoples so that the common good of humanity can be well served.

At the national level, the need for a just rule of law in many corners of the globe continues to go unmet. Efforts to promote the rule of law are hampered by the continued influence of corruption, instability, both social and political and the lack of resources to implement judicial systems. As the Secretary General's report (A/65/318) notes, there is a need to address the capacity and political will of national governments to establish and implement just legal system. Partnerships with civil society organizations which provide education and social services based on sound principles of the rule of law are vital to provide the cultural foundation upon which legal systems can be built.

The increasing codification of international legal standards has led more States to further incorporate such standards and practices into national legislation. This development can be seen particularly in the efforts by States to adhere to the standards established by the international human rights treaties established by the General Assembly. However, my delegation notes with concern the increasing undermining of treaty body systems when their scope is expanded beyond the spirit and goals of the treaties and the intent of the States who have adopted these legal standards. Since they are a part of the legal system, these treaty bodies cannot be excused from adhering to the traditional rules of interpretation of law. Efforts by international treaty bodies improperly to expand the scope of these treaties risks undermining the international treaty system in the realm of human rights. In the worst instances, they have actively promoted an interpretation of these international standards in a way which undermines the fundamental duty of law: to protect life. National legislators endure unwarranted criticism for rightly rejecting this expansion of the various treaties' standards which advance supposed rights that undermine life and the family, innovations that are unsupported by international agreements. Clearly, it is important for such bodies to respect the role of States to negotiate and implement the various human rights standards and to avoid expanding these standards into areas outside their scope and intent.

Madam Chair,

At both the international and national levels the rule of law helps to promote peace and development for all people. Individuals responsible for the development and creation of law have a distinct responsibility to ensure that their efforts contribute to the common good of society by protecting the legitimate interests of every member of society and by elevating consciousness of the responsibilities of all persons. In the final analysis, this is the charge of the rule of law. Thus these individuals must continue to work to ensure that law is truly just and that it fosters the common good through upholding the dignity of the human person, fostering social unity, protecting life, promoting the rehabilitation of offenders, restoring victims both physically and spiritually and increasing trust and understanding between and amongst peoples and nations.

Thank you, Madam Chair.