Law, Sit Up Higher: Richard Hooker and the Natural Law, Part 18

SCRIPTURE'S MAIN INTENT IS TO DELIVER THE LAWS OF SUPERNATURAL DUTIES, says Hooker.  In furtherance of his handling of Scripture, he addresses the issue of whether the Scriptures contain all things that are necessary for the way of salvation or not. In terms of making "plain, apparent, and easy to be known" what is needed for salvation, Scripture may be said to contain all such things. It does not follow from this, however, that there is no philosophy, reasoning, or knowledge contained in Scripture. Nor does it follow that the Scriptures address the issue of the "very chiefest" thing to know, which is "what books we are bound to esteem holy, which point is confessed impossible for the scripture itself to teach." I.14.1, 125.

In all kinds of knowledge, Hooker insists, there are presuppositions and all kinds of "bounds and limits." I.14.1, 125. Therefore, a person who desires to learn eloquence must first know how to speak; to be an orator presupposes that there be had a knowledge of grammar and its precepts. "In like sort," Hooker argues, "albeit scripture does profess to contain in it all things which are necessary unto salvation, yet the meaning cannot be simply of all things that are necessary, but all things that are necessary in some certain kind or form." I.14.1, 126. In other words, Hooker suggests that some matters are presupposed by Scripture, just like the teaching eloquence presupposes the faculty of speech. As examples of how one can say that Scripture has all things needed for Salvation in one manner of speaking and in another manner of speaking not, Hooker gives various examples.  For example, Scripture could be said to contain all things necessary for salvation, and which either could not be known at all by natural reason, or could not be known easily by the light of reason. Similarly, Scripture may be said to have all things necessary for salvation, but it presupposes "certain principles whereof it receives us already persuaded," i.e., that we already accept certain matters. I.14.1, 126.

One of the underlying presuppositions in Scripture--of which Scripture is silent--is the sacred authority of scripture, Hooker observes.  We are persuaded by other means that the Scriptures are the "oracles of God," and upon such presupposition the Scriptures "then teach us the rest, and lay before us all the duties which God requires at our hands as necessary unto salvation." I.14.1, 126.

There is also the additional issue of what the Scriptures may be said to contain. Are those matters necessary for salvation contained in Scripture only those set down in plain, express terms? Or do they include or comprehened those things that may be necessarily concluded by reason from Scripture? The first seems untenable, as Hooker suggests that such doctrines as the Trinity, the co-eternity of the Son of God with the Father, and the duty to baptize infants are not expressly found in Scripture in haec verba, in so many words. These are "deduced . . . out of scripture by collection," i.e., by looking at Scripture as a whole. I.14.2, 126. Even in the issue of looking at Scripture as a whole, there is "doubt how far we are to proceed by collection before the full and complete measure of things necessary be made up." I.14.2, 126. That is, when and how is what is in Scripture "by collection" to be determined? This is a serious question in light of human ingenuity:

For let us not think that as long as the world does endure, the wit of man shall be able to sound the bottom of that which may be concluded out of the scripture, especially if things by collection to so far extend, as to draw whatsoever may be at any time out of scripture but probabily and conjecturally surmised.

I.14.2, 126.

Hooker rejects, indeed "boldly denies," the various doctrines that are urged upon the Anglican Church  by her opponents "under the name of reformed discipline" and under the guise of interpretation "by collection." I.14.2, 126-27. With respect to these matters, Hooker demands that they establish their foundation in Scripture by necessity, not just plausibly. The fact that the Scriptures contain those things necessary for salvation, and that God intended those to be in writing, suggests that such essential doctrines can be reasonably or possibly known by men; and this suggests, further, that doctrines be necessarily established in Scriptural text, even if looked at "by collection," or as a whole.

One of those things that Hooker suggests is presupposed by Scripture is the existence of reason. The divine positive law of Scripture does not abrogate the law of reason. Just like St. Paul presupposes the revelation of Christ and the New Testament teachings when he tells his disciple Timothy to abide by the Old Testament Scriptures in 2 Tim. 3:15, so also does the law of Scripture presuppose the law of reason:

And as [Paul's] words concerning the books of ancient scripture do not take place but with the presupposal of the Gospel of Christ embraced: so our own words also when we extol the complete sufficiency of the whole entire body of the Scripture, must in the like sort be understood with this caution, that the benefit of nature's light be not thought as unnecessary, because the necessity of a divine light is magnified.

I.14.4, 129.

There is no question of there being a defect or lack of gap in Scripture.   Hooker rejects this on principle.   Scripture helps perfect the light of reason, and does not relieve us from the use of reason.  Scripture does not lack anything so as to allow us to say that it fails to provide the instruction required for good works, whether these are natural or supernatural, belonging to men qua men, men relative to political society, or men relative to the Church. I.14.5.  It is sufficient, with the natural law it presupposes and does not supplant, for all these things.

It suffices therefore that nature and scripture do serve in such full sort, that they both jointly and not severally either of them be so complete, that unto everlasting felicity we need not the knowledge of any thing more than these two, may easily furnish our minds with on all sides, and therefore they which add traditions as a part of supernatural necessary truth, have not the truth, but are in error.

I.14.5, 129. Again, Hooker makes a point to state that he rejects these traditions, not because they are not in the Scripture (for they speculatively could be revealed by God and therefore binding though they be not written), but because they are neither in Scripture, nor can they be proved by reason to be from God. I.14.5, 129.*

Hooker now addresses the issue of positive law in Scripture, and the mutability or changeability of some of these.  He observes that of the four kinds of law he has spoke about--the law a man imposes upon himself, by a public society upon its members, by all nations upon the several nations, or by the Lord upon all--may be both positive or natural. Hooker rejects the notion that only positive laws are changeable, and that the only species of positive law are those promulgated by men.  There is such a thing as divine positive law, and it is changeable, just like human-derived positive law.  Natural law, however, is always binding.  Positive law is not always binding, as positive law must be expressly and knowingly imposed, that is, promulgated. to be binding  I.15.1, 130.  "And although no laws but positive be mutable, yet all are not mutable which be positive.  Positive laws are either permanent or else changeable, according as the matter itself is concerning which they were first made." I.15.1, 130. 

As examples of positive law in the laws a man imposes upon himself, Hooker gives the example of a vow, or a promise of one man to another.  Before the vow or promise, man is free, and his is not bound by it.  As an example of positive laws arising from the context of a body politic, Hooker gives the examples of civil constitutions pertaining to the commonwealth.  As example of positive laws in the law of nations or ius gentium, Hooker gives the examples of heraldy in war.  As an example of divine positive law, Hooker points to the laws ("judicials") that God gave Israel. I.15.1, 130.

Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie

All laws that concern supernatural duties of man are positive. They touch and concern either man himself, or else related to parts of that supernatural society that is the Church. These supernatural duties, which concern all men, would not be known by men were they not revealed by God, as they are not knowable by nature. These laws "are appointed of God to supply the defect of those natural ways of salvation [available before the Fall], by which we are not now able to attain thereunto." I.15.2, 131.

As a supernatural society, the Church differs from natural societies. In one obvious regard, natural societies involve relations among men, whereas a supernatural society such as the Church involves involve supernatural persons, including God, angels, and holy men. The Church is not only supernatural, it is also a natural society, and so shares in those "original grounds" from which natural societies derive, namely, the natural inclination man has toward social life, and some consent to an order of association. These ought to be governed by law. But the Church is peculiarly a supernatural society, one whose bond is the worship of God.

[T]hat part of the bond of their association which belong to the Church of God must be a law supernatural, which God himself has revealed concerning that kind of worship which his people shall do unto him. The substance of the service of God therefore, so far forth as it has in it anything more than the law of reason does teach, may not be invented of men . . .

I.15.3, 131. Hooker then summarizes thus far his conclusions regarding the divine positive law.  The natural law is unchangeable.  Divine positive law is also unchangeable by man, though God may alter divine positive law for sufficient cause.

Wherefore to end with a general rule concerning all the laws which God has tied men unto: those laws divine that belong whether naturally or supernaturally either to men as men, or political societies, or to men as they are of that political society which is the Church, without any further respect of men and of the Church itself in this world is subject unto, all laws that so belong unto men, they belong forever, yeah, although they be positive laws, unless being positive God himself which made them alter them.

I.15.3, 131-32.  Hooker gives his reason for his general rule that divine positive law is not changeable.

The reason is because the subject or matter of laws in general is thus far forth constant: which matter is that for the ordering whereof laws were instituted, and being instituted are not changeable without cause, neither can they have cause for change, when that which gave them their first institution, remains for ever one and the same.

I.15.3, 132. The unchanging feature of divine positive law is not the quality of positive laws in the area of human societies, including those positive laws of the Church unrelated to relations with God. These laws are as mutable, with change of circumstance, as the the divine positive laws that relate man to God are immutable. Since God is unchanging, and the subject and matter of those laws--man's relationship with God--is the same, there is no cause for changing the divine positive laws.  For this reason, the Gospel is called the eternal Gospel, the Evangelium aeternum, by the Apostle John in Revelations 14:6.  "[T]here can be no reason wherefore the publishing thereof should be taken away, and any other instead of it proclaimed, as long as the world does continue."  I.15.3, 132.  Compare this to the myriad law of rites and ceremonies given the Jew, which, though "delivered with so great solemnity," have been "clean abrogated" by God, "inasmuch as it had but temporary cause of God's ordering it." I.15.3, 132.  The positive laws of God, that is, the divine law, then are provided to us by a wise and just legislator, one that even the pagans recognized is not deceived and does not deceive. Hooker here quotes the dialogue in Plato's Republic (382e)

οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἂν θεὸς ψεύδοιτο.
οὐκ ἔστιν.
πάντῃ ἄρα ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον.
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔν τε ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὔθ᾽ ὕπαρ οὐδ᾽ ὄναρ.

“Then there is no motive for God to deceive.”
“None.”
“From every point of view the divine and the divinity are free from falsehood.”
“By all means.”
“Then God is altogether simple and true in deed and word, and neither changes himself nor deceives others by visions or words or the sending of sign.”

The Scriptures ought to be received with reverence, recognizing their great authority and dignity. Men ought not to "neglect the precious benefit of conference with those Oracles of the true and living God, whereunto there is so free, so plain, and so easy access for all men?" I.15.4, 132. The pagans accorded their scriptures great dignity, and we ought to do no less. Before going into his conclusion of Book I (which we will deal with in our last and final blog entry on Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity), Hooker ends with this peroration.

Wherefore seeing that God has endued us with sense to the end that we might perceive such things as this present life does need, and with reason least that which sense cannot reach unto, being both now and also in regard of a future estate hereafter necessary to be known should lie obscure; finally with the heavenly support of prophetical revelation, which does open those hidden mysteries that reason could never have been able to find out, or to have known the necessity of them unto our everlasting good: use with the precious gifts of God unto his glory and honor that gave them, seeking by all means to know what the will of our God is, what righteous before him, in his sight what holy, perfect, and good, that we may truly and faithfully do it.

I.15.4, 134.


*Again, Hooker seems to presuppose the issue of the canon of Scripture. How is it to be determined what books are canonical, and what books are not? The Scriptures themselves do not, in haec verba or even "by collection," announce the list of books considered to be part of Scripture. Reason, likewise, does not help establish definitively what books, of either the Old or New Testaments, are inspired. Hooker's own rule--that he rejects any oral tradition claimed to the revealed will of God because it is neither in Scripture or impossible to establish by reason--would compel that he reject any definitive list of what books are canonical. The fact is that the books considered scriptural are part of the unwritten Tradition of the Church, and the list of those books that are canonical was defined by the teaching authority of the Church, as early as the Synod of Hippo in 393, and the Councils of Carthage in 397 and 419.  The lists in those councils accord with the council of Rome of 382 headed by Pope Damasus I.  The list of canonical books was essentially fixed by the 4th century, and defined extraordinarily only in the Ecumenical Council of Trent in 1546, when the Protestant Reformers began to question the inclusion of the Deuterocanonical books in the Old Testament, and even some of the New Testament books (e.g., James, Hebrews, Jude, Revelation).  The existence of Tradition and a divinely-guided teaching Church established by Christ, a Church that by binding on earth is able to bind in heaven (Matt. 18:18),  is the basis for knowing the canon, the sine qua non of having a divinely-inspired Bible and knowing that we have it with the certainty of Faith.  Hooker's rejection of Tradition and Magisterium implicitly undermines the authoritative basis of inspired Scripture.  Hooker's rule of faith: that only that is revealed which is in Scripture expressly or necessarily be "collection," or by reason established as revealed by God is incapable of telling us what books are inspired, and which are not.  Are the books of the Maccabees inspired?  If so, on what basis?  If not, on what basis?   Is the Gnostic Gospel of Thomas inspired or not?  If so, on what basis?  If not, on what basis? Neither Scripture expressly or by collection necessarily, or reason, suffices to answer the question.  Only the existence of an authoritative Church founded by Christ, the Word of God, is able to do this. 


Similarly, one may point to Hooker's belief that all revelation ceased with the death of the last Apostle, or, as Hooker puts it: God's "surceasing to speak to the world since the publishing of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and the delivery of the same in writing." I.14.3, 127-28. That public revelation ceased with the death of the last Apostle is received teaching, and part of Tradition and Magisterial teaching. It is, however, nowhere to be found in Scripture, and reason cannot establish it as a teaching of God. So Hooker violates his own presuppositions, and accepts Tradition and the received Catholic teaching when it accords with his own predelictions or conservative temper. While his predelictions regarding the natural law are Catholic per accidens, his "sola scriptura" views are not, and his defense of his position and against the Catholic Church's teaching indubitably improbable.

Portrait of Richard Hooker

Law, Sit Up Higher: Richard Hooker and the Natural Law, Part 17

WELL-FOUNDED IN THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION, Hooker's prior discussions regarding the law of reason or the natural moral law nestle comfortably within the received teaching of united Christendom, even the Catholic Church at the time he penned his work up to the present. In discussing the sufficiency of Scripture, however, Hooker begins to show his Protestant credentials, and it gives us great sorrow that we must part ways with this man who is otherwise so "judicious." Even here, Hooker tries to manage the via media tightrope between "sola scriptura" on the one one hand, and the Catholic teaching that Revelation is contained in Tradition, which is both written Tradition (in Scripture) and oral Tradition (and evidenced, for example, in the liturgical or sacramental practices of the Church, or in the testimony of the Church Fathers, or even in the constant teaching of the Church). Hooker also rejects the role of the ecclesia docens generally, and the Papal Magisterium in particular, in defining doctrinal or moral teaching. Even ignoring how Hooker departs from received teachings, in the light of the modern Anglican Church's wholesale moral capitulation to the Zeitgeist and neo-pagan moral ethos, and its inability to follow even patent aspects of the natural moral law in the area of sexual morality, it is quite apparent that Hooker's formula was errant, and the Catholic Church's was not.  Were Hooker with us today, he would most certainly be aghast at his ecclesial communion's easy acceptance of artificial contraception in Resolution 15 of the Lambeth Conference of 1930.* Equally offensive to the natural moral law and divinely revealed law, the Anglican communion's doctrinal and practical tolerance with respect to homosexual activity, even among its clergy, is hardly less edifying.

Be all that as it may, to return to Hooker, Hooker believes the "principal intent of scripture is to deliver the laws of duties supernatural." I.14.1, 124. In times past, when mankind lived those Methuselan spans of time and had presumably similarly long memories, written revelation was not required. However, as human life-spans shortened, the benefits of written divine law became apparent, and so it was that Moses at first, then later the Prophets, even the Evangelists, inspired by the Holy Spirit, came to write down God's Revelation of which we are the beneficiaries. I.13.1, 122.

For Hooker, the fact that divine law is written (as distinguished from orally revealed) is of no moment to whether it ought to be obeyed. In other words, the motive for obedience of divine law is not that law is written, but that law is revealed by God. I.13.2, 122. Nevertheless, there is great benefit to having the divine laws written.

Hooker insists, as related above, that all divine law is found in written form in Scripture.

When the question therefore is, whether we be now to seek for any revealed law of God otherwise than only in the sacred scripture, whether we do now stand bound in the sight of God to yield to traditions urged by the Church of Rome the same obedience and reverence we do to his written laws, honoring equally and adoring both as Divine: our answer is, no.

I.13.2, 122-23.**

As principal argument against oral tradition, Hooker cites the difficulties of transmital involved in oral, as distinguished from written, reports. "What hazard the truth is in when it passes through the hands of report, how maimed and deformed it becomes; they [the advocates of oral Tradition] are not, they cannot possibly be ignorant." I.13.2, 123. Entirely gone from Hooker's assessment is the role of the ecclesia docens, the teaching Church. Hooker also ignores the problems associated with written report, and that its problems are nothing other than a difference in degree from oral report. He also appears to ignore the problems associated with interpretation of written reports, as written reports do not interpret themselves.   But most significant of all, Hooker avoids the issue of what authority we look towards to establish the canon of Scriptures, and to determine that the books in the canon are divinely revealed. Hooker copiously cited St. Augustine in prior sections, but here he overlooks St. Augustine's pithy saying which clearly places the authority of the Catholic Church as the foundation of knowing what the canon is, and that it is divinely inspired: "But I would not believe in the Gospel, had not the authority of the Catholic Church already moved me." St. Augustine, Contra epistolam Manichaei 5, 6: PL 42, 176. (Ego vero Evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicae Ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas.)  The Church founded by Christ, it must be remembered, pre-existed the first inspired Gospel and the first inspired Apostolic epistle.  Even Homer nods, and even our judicious Hooker suffers lapses of logic and consistency.  The only thing we may grant Hooker is that at least he is not vituperative in his argument against the Catholic position.

Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie

Scripture contains much more than just law: it is "stored with infinity variety of matter in all kinds." I.14.1, 124. It contains matters of doctrine, precepts, prophecies, histories of God's interaction with men, mediations, explanations, some matters general and other particular. Hooker rejects the notion that Scripture contains superfluities, and that everything other than law can be ignored. What is contained in Scripture is no more superfluous than our hands or our eyes.

As therefore a complete man is neither destitute of any part necessary, and has some parts whereof though the want could not deprive him of his essence, yet to have them stands him in singular stead in respect of the special uses for which they serve: in like sort all those writing which contain in them the law of God, all those venerable books of scripture, all those sacred tomes and volumes of holy writ, they are with such absolute perfection framed, that in them there neither wants anything, the lack whereof might deprive us of life; nor anything in such wise abounds, that as being superfluous, unfruitful, and altogether needless, we should think it no loss of danger at all if we did want it.

I.13.3, 124.

NOTES:

*The Lambeth Conference of 1930 issued forth the following Resolution which offends the natural moral law as well as the revealed divine law: "Where there is clearly felt moral obligation to limit or avoid parenthood . . . and where there is a morally sound reason for avoiding complete abstinence, the Conference agrees that other methods [of contraception] may be used . . . ." The Resolution was adopted by the Anglican bishops, with 193 voting for, only 67 against. The Resolution, manifestly offensive to the natural moral law and to universal Christian mores up to that time, issued forth Piux XI's Encyclical Casti Connubii ("On Chaste Marriage") which restated the received doctrine that had essentially been accepted by all Christian bodies before the Anglican Church's errant novel moral stance: "[A]ny use whatsoever of matrimony exercised in such a way that the act is deliberately frustrated in its natural power to generate life," Piux XI stated as teacher of all the faithful, "is an offense against the law of God and of nature, and those who indulge in such are branded with the guilt of a grave sin." [No. 56]

**The Catholic Church's position regarding revelation is conveniently summarized in the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum, Nos. 9-10 (citations omitted): "[9] Hence there exists a close connection and communication between sacred tradition and Sacred Scripture. For both of them, flowing from the same divine wellspring, in a certain way merge into a unity and tend toward the same end. For Sacred Scripture is the word of God inasmuch as it is consigned to writing under the inspiration of the divine Spirit, while sacred tradition takes the word of God entrusted by Christ the Lord and the Holy Spirit to the Apostles, and hands it on to their successors in its full purity, so that led by the light of the Spirit of truth, they may in proclaiming it preserve this word of God faithfully, explain it, and make it more widely known. Consequently it is not from Sacred Scripture alone that the Church draws her certainty about everything which has been revealed. Therefore both sacred tradition and Sacred Scripture are to be accepted and venerated with the same sense of loyalty and reverence.  [10] Sacred tradition and Sacred Scripture form one sacred deposit of the word of God, committed to the Church. Holding fast to this deposit the entire holy people united with their shepherds remain always steadfast in the teaching of the Apostles, in the common life, in the breaking of the bread and in prayers (see Acts 2, 42, Greek text), so that holding to, practicing and professing the heritage of the faith, it becomes on the part of the bishops and faithful a single common effort. But the task of authentically interpreting the word of God, whether written or handed on, has been entrusted exclusively to the living teaching office of the Church, whose authority is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ. This teaching office is not above the word of God, but serves it, teaching only what has been handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it scrupulously and explaining it faithfully in accord with a divine commission and with the help of the Holy Spirit, it draws from this one deposit of faith everything which it presents for belief as divinely revealed."

Portrait of Richard Hooker

Law, Sit Up Higher: Richard Hooker and the Natural Law, Part 16

THERE IS OVERLAP BETWEEN NATURAL LAW AND DIVINE LAW. "The law of God," states Hooker, "though principally delivered for instruction in the one [supernatural duties], yet [is] fraught with precepts of the other [natural duties] also." I.12.1, 119. Hooker can be no more clearer: "The scripture is fraught even with the laws of nature." I.12.1, 119. This overlap between the natural law accessible by reason, and the divine law contained in revelation is what caused the great Canon lawyer Gratian to define the natural right as that which is contained in the Law (i.e., Decalogue or Ten Commandments) and the Gospel: Ius naturale est quod in lege et Evangelio continetur. Both the books of the Law and the Gospels contain, therefore, general duties that are incumbent upon all men, including those incumbent upon them as a matter of natural duty.

It is not fruitless for Scripture to repeat by revelation what would be known by reason, Hooker insists. The natural laws that are contained in Scripture include those which are readily known and those which may not be so readily known. With respect to those which are clearly known through reason, the "Spirit, as it were, borrowing them from the school of nature," uses these readily known precepts to prove requirements that are "less manifest," and so "induce a persuasion" of demands that may be "more hard and dark" without such clarification. Moreover, Scripture sometimes applies these well-known natural precepts in certain situations, and the application of such precepts in specific contexts is profitable to men's instruction. There is obvious advantage when Scripture includes natural law precepts that are not so readily known, since there is advantage "to have them readily set down to our hands." I.12.1, 120. In either event, whether the natural law precepts revealed in Scripture involve precepts readily known or not so readily known, there is comfort to be obtained from the confirmation of those precepts as a result of the "evidence of God's own testimony added unto the natural asset of reason." I.12.1, 120.

Additionally, Hooker states that we are confronted with variegated circumstances in our lives, many of which render it difficult to know the right way to act, and in fact would result in different judgments. In some cases, entire nations and cultures have been "darkened," so that they have failed to detect even "gross iniquity to be sin." As historical examples, Hooker cites the Jewish historian Josephus (Against Apion, Book II.38) who discusses the laws of the Lacedemonians so hostile against other nations and those contemptuous of marriage, the laws of the Eleans and Thebans which failed to condemn sodomy, and indeed provided for it in their laws. He also cites St. Thomas Aquinas's reference to Julius Caesar (IaIIae, q. 94, citing De Bello Gall., vi) who mentions that the German tribes did not consider robbery to be against their laws. Hooker also quotes Psuedo-Augustine's (Ambrosiaster's?) Quaestionis Veteris et Novis Testamenti, where he notes that ignorance and evil customs blinded men, and so it was that idolatry became rampant, fear of God left the earth, fornication became commonplace, and concupiscence was at large. Confronting blinded recipients, it was warranted that the natural law should be made manifest through Scripture.

There is, moreover, a systemic blindness, a self-interest or self-regard, that makes us weak judges in our own cause. We are "prone . . . to fawn upon ourselves." I.12.2, 121. In Freudian terms, we are habitual rationalizers, excuse-makers. An honest examen of conscience is very difficult to achieve. The law contained in Scripture is particularly well-suited to delve into our very abysses, the mountains of our mind, and ferret out and discipline even those errant thoughts, those whisps of wicked wandering wind-thoughts in the intimate parts of our psyche, in whose whorls we pause and take illegitimate pleasure.

Again, being so prone as we are to fawn upon ourselves, and to be ignorant as much as may be of our own deformities, without the feeling sense whereof we are most wretched, even so much the more, because not knowing them we cannot as much as desire to have them taken away: how should our festered sores be cured, but that God has delivered a law as sharp as the two-edged sword, piercing the very closest and most unsearchable corners of the heart which the law of nature can hardly, human laws by no means possible reach unto? Hereby we know even secret concupiscence to be sin, and are made fearful to offend though it be but in a wandering cogitation.

I.12.2, 121.

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There is, finally, the practical realities of differences among men. There are divergent intellectual and moral distributions among men. There are, moreover, few that are suited, by talent or with time, to undertake deep and dispassionate study of the natural law. Which of us could derive through reason the arguments supporting the soul's immortality? Which of us through reason could even "dream of" the resurrection of the flesh? With these questions, Hooker implies that the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the flesh play important roles in determining what is right. Practical and intellectual limits justify the revelation of natural law.

We ought, therefore, be thankful that God has deigned to reveal large parts of the natural law in Scripture. And so Hooker concludes this section of his Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity with a paean of thanksgiving followed by a synoptic coda. First, the praise and thanksgiving:

Whereby it appears how much we are bound to yield unto our Creator, the Father of all mercy, eternal thanks, for that he has delivered his law unto the world, a law wherein so many things are laid open, clear, and manifest; as a light which otherwise would have been buried in darkness, not without the hazard, or rather not with the hazard, but with the certain loss of infinite thousands of souls most undoubtedly now saved.

I.12.2, 121. Hooker then concludes this part of his work with his recapitulation, the sum and substance of all he has been discussing before:

We see therefore that our sovereign good is desired naturally; that God the author of that natural desire had appointed natural means whereby to fulfill it; that man having utterly disabled his nature unto those means has had other revealed from God, and has received from heaven a law to teach him how that which is desired naturally must now supernaturally be attained; finally, we see that because those latter [supernatural means or laws] exclude not the former [natural means or laws] quite and clean as unnecessary; therefore, together with such supernatural duties as could not possibly have been otherwise known to the world, the same law that teaches them, teaches also with them such natural duties as could not by light of nature easily have been known.

I.12.3, 121-22. Having addressed the issue of natural law or the law of reason in Scripture, Hooker then turns his attention to the divine law proper, and the benefits of such divine law being written, the role of Scripture in determining such law, and a brief discourse on the divine law contained in Scripture.

Portrait of Richard Hooker

Law, Sit Up Higher: Richard Hooker and the Natural Law, Part 15

THE PERFECT HAPPINESS THAT MAN SEEKS is ultimately supernaturally fulfilled, though, as we discussed in the last blog entry, Hooker sees in this natural yearning, the natural predispositions or clues of a supernatural answer. What is certain is that nothing man can do, in so far as his nature is concerned, either individually or in community, can seem to assuage this dissatisfaction with the goods of this world. Nothing can shut up the ennui that is so prevalent in man, indeed universally found in him.

This perfection is however within man's grasp, though not exclusively or even principally as a result of his own effort, though his individual effort is not to be neglected as a factor in bringing it about. "This last and highest estate of perfection . . . is received of men in the nature of a reward." I.11.5, 115. The fact that this perfection is in nature of a reward raises the issue of duty, as "[r]ewards do always presuppose such duties performed as are rewardable." I.11.5, 115.

What then is the relationship between man's natural powers, and the supernatural destiny in the form of reward for compliance with duty which betokens perfect happiness? This is what Hooker addresses next, and his answer is decidedly not that of the Protestant Reformers. His vision is decidedly more Catholic than the novel view put forth by the presbyterian Calvinists and the still-inchoate Puritans against whom he directed his great work, his magnum opus.

Our natural means therefore unto blessedness are our works: nor is it possible that nature should ever find any other way to salvation than only this. But examine the works which we do and since the first foundation of the world what one can say. My ways are pure? Seeing that all flesh is guilty of that for which God has threatened eternally to punish, what possibility is there this way to be saved?

I.11.15, 115-16. Man's works alone appear ineffective to admit him into eternal bliss following death, as man cannot overcome the impurity that always attends to them. So man faces a quandary. Either there is no salvation, or salvation comes from another source other than man:

There rests therefore either no way unto salvation, or if any, then surely a way which is supernatural, a way which could never have entered into the heart of man as much as once to conceive or imagine, if God himself had not revealed it extraordinarily.

I.11.15, 116. Since salvation is not a naturally-derived or reason-derived truth, but one revealed by God, it is properly denominated a "mystery or secret way of salvation." I.11.15, 116. Here, Hooker invokes the Catholic bishop of Milan, St. Ambrose, and, even more extensively, the "Christian Cicero" (Lucius Caelius Firmianus) Lactantius (ca. 240-320 A.D.):

Coeli mysterium doceat me Deus qui condidit, non homo qui seipsum ignoravit

Let God himself that made me, let not man that knows not himself, be my instructor concerning the mystical way to heaven.

So Ambrose (Epistle 18, against Symmachus).

[1] Magno et excellenti ingenio viri, cum se doctrinae penitus dedidissent, quicquid laboris poterat impendi (contemptis omnibus et privatis et publicis actionibus) ad inquirendae veritatis studium contulerunt, existimantes multo esse praeclarius humanarum divinarumque rerum investigare ac scire rationem, quam struendis opibus aut cumulandis honoribus inhaerere. . . . [5] Sed neque adepti sunt id quod volebant, et operam simul atque industriam perdiderunt: quia veritas, id est arcanum summi Dei qui fecit omnia, ingenio ac propriis sensibus non potest comprehendi. Alioqui nihil inter Deum hominemque distaret, si consilia et dispositiones illius majestatis aeternae cogitatio assequeretur humana. [6] Quod quia fieri non potuit ut homini per seipsum ratio divina notesceret, non est passus hominem Deus lumen sapientiae requirentem diutius aberrare, ac sine ullo laboris effectu vagari per tenebras inextricabiles. Aperuit oculos ejus aliquando, et notionem veritatis munus suum fecit, ut et humanam sapientiam nullam esse monstraret, et erranti ac vago viam consequenae immortalitatis ostenderet.

Men of great and distinguished talent, when they had entirely devoted themselves to learning, holding in contempt all actions both private and public, applied to the pursuit of investigating the truth whatever labour could be bestowed upon it; thinking it much more excellent to investigate and know the method of human and divine things, than to be entirely occupied with the heaping up of riches or the accumulation of honours. . . . But they did not obtain the object of their wish, and at the same time lost their labour and industry; because the truth, that is the secret of the Most High God, who created all things, cannot be attained by our own ability and perceptions. Otherwise there would be no difference between God and man, if human thought could reach to the counsels and arrangements of that eternal majesty. And because it was impossible that the divine method of procedure should become known to man by his own efforts, God did not suffer man any longer to err in search of the light of wisdom, and to wander through inextricable darkness without any result of his labour, but at length opened his eyes, and made the investigation of the truth His own gift, so that He might show the nothingness of human wisdom, and point out to man wandering in error the way of obtaining immortality.

So Lactantius in his Divine Institutes (I.1)

(Note: the translation of Lactantius is not Hooker's, but is taken from Vol. 7 of the Anti-Nicene Fathers, trans. William Fletcher.)

"Saint Ambrose," Hooker summarizes, "appeals justly from man to God." Lactantius, Hooker continues, shows "that God himself is the teach of the truth, whereby is made known the supernatural way of salvation and law for them to live in that shall be saved." I.11.5, 116, 117. Thus fitted together through the words of Ambrose and Lactantius we find two parts of the mystery, the puzzle as it were, the up and down climax, the κλῖμαξ, the scala, the Jacob's ladder of salvation. Man must seek up to God for answer, and God graciously merciful and mercifully gracious, in an emptying out of Himself, a kenosis (κένωσις), comes down in response.

Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie

Salvation may be described as a "path" or "way," with a beginning and end, with a natural aspect and a supernatural aspect. At the beginning lies the natural law, the law of reason, with which man is imbued as a part of his creation. At the end is judgment and God's justice.

In the natural path of everlasting life the first beginning is that habitability of doing good, which God in the day of man's creation indued him with; from hence obedience unto the will of his creator, absolute righteousness and integrity in all his actions; and last of all the justice of God rewarding the worthiness of his deserts with the crown of eternal glory.

I.11.5, 117.

Before the Fall, mankind's destiny would have been the Light of Glory: "Had Adam continued in his first estate [i.e., before the Fall], this had been the way of life unto him and all his posterity." I.11.5, 117. But Hooker agrees with Duns Scotus that man's pre-lapsarian destiny was not merited through strict merit, but merited only through the superabundant graciousness of the all-giving God:

If we speak of strict justice, God would no way have been bound to requite man's labors in so large and ample a manner as human felicity does import; inasmuch as the dignity of this exceeds so far the other's value. But be it that God of his great liberality had determined in lieu of man's endeavors to bestow the same, by the rule of that justice which beseems him, namely the justice of one that requires nothing mincingly, but all with pressed and heaped and even over-enlarged measure; yet could it never hereupon necessarily be gathered, that such justice should add to the nature of that reward the property of everlasting continuance; in truth, possession of bliss, though should be but for a moment, were an abundant retribution.

Loquendo de stricta justitia, Deus nulli nostrum propter qaecunque merita est debitor perfectionis reddendae tam intensae, propter immoderatum excessum illius perfectionis ultra illa merita. Sed esto quod ex liberalitate sua determinasset meritis conferre actum tam perfectum tanquam praemium, tali quidem justitia qualis decet eum, scilicet supererogantis in praemiis: tamen non sequitur ex hoc necessario, quod per illam justitiam sit reddenda perfectio perennis tanquam praemium, imo abundans fieret retributio in beatitudine unius momenti.

I.11.5, 117-18 (citing John Duns Scotus, lib.4, Sent. dist. 49.6). Be that issue as it may, the path available to man in his "first estate," that is, before the Fall, is simply foreclosed to us, to "all flesh." I.11.6, 118. Whatever reward was proposed by God, required that its prerequisites be fulfilled, and those were not. "[W]e failing in the one, it were in nature an impossibility that the other should be looked for. The light of nature is never able to find out any way of obtaining the reward of bliss, but by performing exactly the duties and works of righteousness." I.11.5, 118.

So how does man get out of the cul-de-sac in which he finds himself following Adam's original sin?

[B]ehold how the wisdom of God has revealed a way mystical and supernatural, a way directing unto the same end of life by a course which grounds itelf upon the guiltiness of sin, and through sin desert of condemnation and death. For in this way the first thing is the tender compassion of God respecting us drowned and swallowed up in mystery; the next is redemption out of the same by the precious death and merit of a mighty Savor, which has witnessed of himself saying, 'I am the way,' the way that leads us from misery unto bliss. This supernatural way had God in himself prepared before all worlds.

I.11.6, 118. This way out is all God's doing, none of it man's. And yet, we are not for that to assume that man plays no part, that he is a passive recipient, of God's generosity. "Not that God does require nothing unto happiness at the hands of men saving only a naked belief (for hope and charity we may not exclude) . . . " I.11.6, 118. And yet, without minimizing the necessity of hope and faith, belief is a sine qua non of the economy of salvation since "without belief all other things are as nothing." I.11.6, 118. Belief, that is Faith, is the "ground of those other virtues," of Hope and Faith.

Faith's principal object is the eternal truth which we find in the treasures of hidden wisdom in Christ. Hope's highest object is the everlasting goodness by which Christ brings life to the dead. Charity's object is "that incomprehensible beauty which shines in the countenance [face] of Christ the son of the living God." I.11.6, 119.

These three theological virtues enjoy a development, perhaps better, a virtual transfiguration, between life here, and the life hereafter. Faith begins in this world "with a weak apprehension of things not seen." It ends with "the intuitive vision of God in the world to come." Hope begins on earth as a "trembling expectation of things far removed, and as yet but only heard of." Hope ends, however, "with the real and actual fruition of that which no tongue can express." Charity begins with a "weak inclination of heart towards him unto whom we are not able to approach," that is, God. Charity ends, "with endless union, the mystery whereof is higher than the reach of the thoughts of men." I.11.6, 119.

The theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity are necessary for salvation. This is disclosed to us in the revealed Word of God:

[C]oncerning that Faith, Hope, and Charity without which there can be no salvation: was there ever any mention made saving only in that law which God himself has from heaven revealed? There is not in the world a syllable muttered with certain truth concerning any of these three, more than has been supernaturally received from the mouth of eternal God.

I.11.6, 119.

The natural law, the law of reason, is therefore silent about Faith, Hope, and Love. It mutters nary a syllable of these virtues, of their quiet, seminal incipience, or of their ramified, ebullient end in the beatific vision, in the very bosom of the eternal God.

In respect to matters of salvation, these laws are divine, both in form and in substance, and not part and parcel of the natural law:

Laws therefore concerning these things are supernatural, both in respect of the manner of delivering them which is divine, and also in regard of the things delivered which are such as have not in nature any cause from which they flow, but were by the voluntary appointment of God ordained besides the course of nature to rectify nature's obliquity withal.

I.11.6, 119. Though salvation is supernatural in origin, and though there are supernatural duties relating thereto, this does not make the natural law obsolete. "When supernatural duties are necessarily exacted, natural are not rejected as needless." I.12.1, 119. Indeed, many of the natural laws which are accessible through reason, are also revealed in Scripture, suggesting no divine abrogation. The relationship between the divine law and natural law as revealed in Scripture will be further addressed by Hooker. In the next section of his work, Hooker addresses why so many natural laws are revealed in Holy Scripture. And that is the section to which we will next turn.

Portrait of Richard Hooker

Law, Sit Up Higher: Richard Hooker and the Natural Law, Part 14

PERFECT HAPPINESS IS NOT MAN'S LOT IN HIS EARTHLY LIFE. It is not man's lot so long as he is living in time and space, in the sublunary world. Here, man is subject to imperfection, to "griefs of body," and "defects of mind." The best things do not come to us without pain, and the constant and continual effort required to maintain those goods which are most desirous as perfecting us make us weary. In this world, we are subject to the tedium of time, to the burdens of labor. Not so is it for those "in a state of bliss," something which arises "when our union with God is complete." I.11.3, 113.

While our intellect and will may be limited during the span of our temporal life, it is not so before God when we are in complete union with him.

Complete union with him must be according unto every power and faculty of our minds apt to receive so glorious an object. Capable we are of God both by understanding and will, by understanding that he is that sovereign truth, which comprehends the rich treasures of all wisdom; by will, as he is that sea of goodness, whereof who so tastes shall thirst no more.

I.11.3, 113. There is a remarkable fit between our intellect and will, and God. But how is this so? In answer to this, Hooker explores the differences between man's temporal life, and his life hereafter, and he enters thereby into a discussion of the difference between man's natural and supernatural life.

Man's will in this life is moved principally by a self-regarding desire. When in union with God, this self-regarding desire will be, as it were, replaced by a selfless, supernatural love cum natural desire. So the dross of selfishness by which our desires move us in this world will be transformed, by the grace of glory, into the pure caritas of God. "As the will does not work upon that object [good] by desire, which is as it were a motion towards the end as yet unobtained, so likewise upon the same hereafter received it shall work also by love." I.11.3, 113.

Hooker here misquotes St. Augustine: Appetitus inhiantis fit amor fruentis, which he freely translates as: "The longing disposition of them that thirst is changed into the sweet affection of them that taste and are replenished." I.11.3, 133. [The quote, from St. Augustine's De Trinitate (IX.18) should be: Appetitus quo inhiatur rei cognoscendae fit amor cognitae, , that is, "the desire which led us to long for the knowing of the thing, becomes the love of the thing when known." The intendment is the same. One thinks here of Psalm 41:2-3: "As the hart panteth after the fountains of water; so my soul panteth after thee, O God. My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God; when shall I come and appear before the face of God? Sicut areola praeparata ad inrigationes aquarum sic anima mea praeparata est ad te Deus; sitivit anima mea Deum fortem viventem quando veniam et parebo ante faciem tuam.]

This remarkable transformation, purification, refinement of our desires into love is the apostolic "crown which withereth not." I.11.3, 113 (cf. 2 Tim. 4:8 and 1 Pet. 1:4).

Whereas we now love the thing that is good, but good especially in respect of benefit unto us, we shall then love the thing that is good, only or principally for the goodness of beauty in itself. The soul being in this sort as it is active, perfected by love of that infinite good, shall, as it is receptive, be also perfected with those supernatural passions of joy, peace, and delight. All this is endless and everlasting.

I.11.13, 113.

Hooker clarifies that this transformational destiny of man is not one that is inherited or obtained by his own nature, his own powers. Rather, this is a supernatural destiny, one that is given, as gift, by God. This supernatural destiny "does neither depend upon the nature of the thing itself, nor proceed from any natural necessity that our souls should so exercise themselves." I.11.3, 113. No, this supernatural destiny proceeds "from the will of God, which does both freely perfect our nature in so high a degree and continue it so perfected." I.11.13, 113. So while this grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it, this grace is clearly supernatural.

This dignity is man's alone. Brute creation does not enjoy this grace. "Under man no creature in the world is capable of felicity and bliss." I.11.13, 113. And this for two reasons. First, the perfection of brute creation is that which is best for them. Second, the good sought by brute creation is always some external good lesser than themselves. Contrariwise, our perfection is the best simpliciter and absolutissimum, that is God, the perfectissimum. This a remarkable calling, and one that should not lead to hubris, but to humble marvel and wonder, even praise of God, such as that expressed by David in Psalm 8:5-10:

What is man that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man that thou visitest him?
Thou hast made him a little less than the angels, thou hast crowned him with glory and honour:
And hast set him over the works of thy hands.
Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen: moreover the beasts also of the fields.
The birds of the air, and the fishes of the sea, that pass through the paths of the sea.
O Lord our Lord, how admirable is thy name in all the earth!

Man is designed to be happy; it is a fundamental aspect of his nature. So intrinsic is this desire for happiness, that one may even say that man is compelled to seek his happiness. The desire to be happy "in man is natural. It is not in our power not to do the same: how should it then be in our power to do it coldly or remissly?" I.11.4, 114. For Hooker, this desire for happiness is, as it were, an involuntary response; like the heart, it beats and throbs willy nilly. A man who does not desire happiness is an oxymoron, a metaphysical impossibility, a non-man. It is impossible for man to desire unhappiness, or even to give a lie to it: "so that our desire being natural is also in that degree of earnestness whereunto nothing can be added." I.11.4, 114.

What then can be inferred from this intrinsic desire for happiness we find in man? What, further, can we infer from the fact that in this world man simply is unable to fulfill this desire? Applying reason to these two facts allows us to anticipate man's eternal destiny.

And is it probable that God should frame the hearts of all men so desirous of that which no man may obtain? It is an axiom of nature that natural desire cannot utterly be frustrate. This desire of ours being natural should be frustrate, if that which may satisfy the same were a thing impossible for man to aspire unto.

I.11.4, 114.

[In Keble's version of Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, cite is made to St. Thomas as author of the Commentary on Aristotle referred to by Hooker: "Si comprehensio esset impossibilis, tunc desiderium esset otiosum: et concessum est ab omnibus, quod nulla res est otiosa in fundamento naturæ et creaturæ." But from what I've gathered, this is not St. Thomas Aquinas, but a Latin translation of Averroes's Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Regardless, it is a principle that the pagan Aristotle, the Muslim Averroes, and the Christian St. Thomas all shared.]

Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie

Consonant with both man's nature and supernatural destiny, man seeks a "triple perfection," a sensual, an intellectual, and a spiritual or divine perfection.

Man does seek a triple perfection, first a sensual, consisting in those things which very life itself requires either as necessary supplements, or as beauties and ornaments thereof; then an intellectual, consisting in those things which none underneath man is either capable of or acquainted with; lastly, a spiritual and divine, consisting in those things whereunto we tend by supernatural means here, but cannot here attain unto them.

I.11.4, 114.

It is error to forget the tripartite destiny of man, to overemphasize one at the exclusion of the other, or to disregard any one of them. Those that focus merely on the first perfection are, in essence, atheists, or perhaps better, idolaters.

They that make the first of these three the scope of their whole life, as said by the Apostle [Paul] to have no God, but only their belly, to be earthly minded men.

I.11.14, 114. To desire the second perfection is not as vicious, for the second perfection leads to knowledge and to virtue, to moral and civil perfection. And yet, the second perfection, though apparently a good, does not satisfy. Hooker's conclusion is worthy of being quoted in full:

That there is somewhat higher than either of these no other proof is needed, than the very process of man's desire, which being natural should be frustrate if there were not some farther thing wherein it might rest at the length contended, which in the former [two perfections] it cannot do. For man does not seem to rest satisfied either with fruition of that wherewith his life is preserved, or with performance of such actions as advance him most deservedly in estimation; but does further covet, yea oftentimes manifestly pursue with great sedulousness and earnestness that which cannot stand him in any stead for vital use; that which exceeds the reach of his sense; yea, somewhat above capacity of reason, somewhat divine and heavenly, which with hidden exultation it rather surmises than conceives; somewhat it seeks and what that is directly it knows not, yet very intentive desire thereof does so incite it, that all other known delights and pleasures are laid aside, they give place to the search of this but only suspected desire. If the soul of man did serve only to give him being in this life, then things appertaining unto this life would content him, as we see they do other creatures: which creatures enjoying what they live by, seek no further, but this contentation [i.e., satisfaction] does show a kind of acknowledgment that there is no higher good which does any way belong to them. With us it is otherwise. For although the beauties, riches, honors, sciences, virtues, and perfections of all men living were in the present possession of one: yet somewhat beyond and above all this there would still be sought and earnestly thirsted for. Sot that nature even in this life does plainly claim and call for a more divine perfection, than either of these that have been mentioned.

I.11.4,114-15. For Hooker it is clear: Anima naturaliter Christiana!

Hooker's argument (and Tertullian's anima naturaliter Christiana) is none other than the argument that Orestes Brownson advanced in his Essay, "Labor and Association," found in Volume 10 of his Works (pp. 51-52):

Man is never satisfied by the possession of the natural objects to which he is naturally drawn. All experience proves it; the experience of each particular man proves it; else wherefore this deep wail from the heart of every one who lives simply the life of nature, this outbreak of despair, Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas? Build man the most splendid palace; lavish on it all the decorations of the most perfect art; furnish it with the most exquisite and most expensive taste; lodge him in it on the soft, voluptuous couch; spread his table with the most delicate viands and the rarest fruits; refresh him with the most costly wines; regale him with the richest music; rain down upon him the most fragrant odors; ravish him with beauty; gratify every sense, every taste, every wish, as soon as formed; and the poor wretch will sigh for he knows not what, and behold with envy even the ragged beggar feeding on offal. No variety, no change, no art, can satisfy him. All that nature or art can offer palls upon his senses and his heart,— is to him poor, mean, and despicable. There arise in him wants which are too vast for nature, which swell out beyond the bounds of the universe, and cannot, and will not, be satisfied with any thing less than the infinite and eternal God. Never yet did nature suffice for man, and it never will.

This great and solemn fact, which it is vain to attempt to deny,—a fact deep graven on all hearts that have experience, that have lived the natural life,—should lead thoughtful men to ask,—nay, it does lead thoughtful men to ask,—if, after all, it be not a mistake to attempt to satisfy ourselves with the vain and perishing things of this world; if the inability to find our satisfaction in nature be not a strong presumption that our Creator did not design us for a natural destiny; if, in fact, he did not intend us for an end above nature; and therefore, that our precise error is in seeking a natural destiny in opposition to his design, in neglecting our true destiny for a false destiny, that is, neglecting true good and pursuing real evil. We should suppose that this universal experience of all men would have created, at least, a doubt, in the minds of our friends, as to the soundness of their assumption of the natural as the true destiny of man on this globe.

Indeed.

How then is this third perfection which is intimated, suggested, implied by our disaffection with all the world's sensual and intellectual goods, but not naturally known or naturally available to us, obtained? The answer to that question is what Hooker next turns to.

Portrait of Richard Hooker