"And What Do You Want to Say to the Iraqi People?" (& Everyone Else in the Middle East)

By Barry Rubin

In the new Middle East where people talk a lot behind the scenes using high-technology communications, we have far more frequent interactions with people who live in countries ostensibly at war with Israel. Such conversations are always interesting and useful for analysts.

Sometimes the exchanges are even happening in public. I’ve been interviewed a number of times, for example, by Iraqi journalists. But this time there was a different kind of question at the end of the interview.

That last query was the journalist’s asking me what message I had for Iraq’s people. For a moment, I was speechless. I’ve been waiting more than 30 years for that kind of opportunity.  What should I say that wasn’t just special pleading or an obvious exercise in hasbarah?

But let me start at the beginning. Not long ago I wrote that Iraq might be the best model realistically available right now for the Arabic-speaking world. Iraq dropped out of the seemingly endless and futile race by countries to conquer the region; moved away from radical and disastrous ideology; developed a measure of democracy, pluralism, and federalism; defeated an internal terrorist insurgency that was being helped by its neighbors; and seemed to be pursuing a pragmatic path.

Unfortunately, though, there has been steady deterioration. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is grabbing for supreme power; Vice-President Tariq al-HashimI has fled, pursued by al-Maliki’s charges of terrorism. President Jalal Talabani was thrust into the middle. What’s important to keep in mind is that the first man is a Shia Muslim, the second is a Sunni Muslim, and the third is a Kurd.

So while these are personal rivalries—not everyone lines up neatly along sectarian or ethnic lines--such disputes also represent communal rifts and could reignite a bloody civil war in Iraq. This is risky.

Then there’s the perennial question of how much influence does Iran have in Iraq? Less than one might expect on the national level, I’d say, but still some real behind-the-scenes power in southern Iraq and a relative ease of interfering in the country. Tehran has apparently instructed its Shia Iraqi assets to support the current government and not make trouble.

So the threat is not high at this point. Still, the Baghdad government is going to be careful to stay on good terms with Tehran. At the same time, though, Iraq's leaders have no desire to be Iran's clients, despite some of them having such close ties during the Saddam Hussein era. And so the whole sad tragedy may be starting again.

As Michael Corleoni said, “Just when I thought I was out... they pull me back in.”

What are the diseases of the Middle East that refuse to go away?

--The belief that one country—nowadays mainly Egypt, Iran, and Turkey—think they can dominate the whole region and a willingness to sacrifice blood and treasure to do so.

--Instead of fixing problems, hate is focused on scapegoats.

--The assumption that one ideology—formerly Arab nationalism, now Islamism—can conquer everyone and everywhere.

--The conclusion that one can only be a leader by being a dictator.

--The rejection of pluralism, freedom, pragmatism, and the emphasis on political power maneuvers over socio-economic development.

Whatever its shortcomings, Europe overcame these maladies. Many in Asia are doing so, as are some leaders and countries elsewhere. In the Middle East, though, while there are hints of enlightenment, outside of Israel it cannot really be found enthroned elsewhere.

Turkey, which long seemed immunized to the Middle East malady, has leaped back into the swamp. Lebanon has long since already done so. Morocco and Jordan linger on the brink. The Iraqi Kurds are—temporarily?—on dry land.

And so that was the theme of my message to Iraqis:

 Does it make sense to plunge back into conflict at a moment when the region is descending toward an international struggle between Sunni and Shia blocs that will last decades? No country can suffer more from that battle than Iraq.

At a time when revolutionary Islamism is adding additional bloodshed and misery for millions, is this the direction Iraq wants to go in? After sacrificing so much of its wealth to no less than three avoidable wars—Iran Iraq (1980-1988), Kuwait (1990-1991), a war provoked by Saddam Hussein’s breaking sanctions (2003)—followed by a horrible civil war, isn’t that enough?

Are Iraq and the Middle East really doomed to plunge into another 60 years of horror? Who is going to try to remain outside this fray?

Unfortunately, the West is not going to save you from this and America, at least under its current leadership, won't help you. On the contrary, the Obama Administration is rewarding the radicals, pushing the Islamists, and neglecting its friends. People in the region are well aware of this reality; Western "experts" and governments are not.

Several people lately have asked me what I think of Israel’s future. My answer is that I’m extremely optimistic. But as for everything else for a thousand miles or so in every direction, things look grim. Please wake up and don’t do it all over again.  This is your chance to escape from the waterboarding of history, from the grim cycle of war, hatred, and death. Choose life, democracy, moderation, pragmatism, and prosperity.

But I know that plea probably won't work. I feel a grim sense that the watchword of the day is: Here we go again.


(Improved version of a Jerusalem Post column)

The Iraqi Model: As Good As It Gets

By Barry Rubin

Iraq is in a mess. Violence continues. Factionalism leads to endless bickering. Corruption is at high levels. Christians live in fear or flee altogether. Islamism is constantly creeping forward. Yet I would suggest that with all these shortcomings the “Iraqi model” is the best that can be expected for the Middle East.

What’s the worst-case scenario? Iran, Afghanistan, Gaza, Sudan, or the permanent civil war situation in Syria, Yemen, and probably Libya.

It isn’t that democracy is theoretically impossible or incompatible in principle with Islam or Arab society. The problem is that it just isn’t going to happen at this particular point in history. What you or I or small groups of moderate democratic Arabs, or naïve Western journalists want isn’t relevant here.


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The reporters can pal around with Muslim Brotherhood members every day of the week and talk about how moderate they are but that won’t make them moderate.  Tens of thousands of well-financed, fanatical, hard-working, and tactically creative cadre are laboring long hours throughout the region to bring revolutionary Islamist dictators to power in each country.

They are opposed by dozens of moderates who are concentrated in the capital cities, have hardly any money, usually don’t know how to relate to the masses, have no strategic sense, are more badly divided than the Islamists and confuse writing an op-ed piece or holding a demonstration with organizing a mass movement to seize state power.

Wishful thinking has no place in political analysis or statecraft or journalism. The fact that the moderates are so much “like us” is not an advantage for them—except in getting favorable media coverage--but a fatal disadvantage in their own societies.

Personally, I would prefer that the moderates win, but then I grew up watching the Washington Senators baseball team finish in last place in the American League every year.

The model usually put forward, including by the Obama Administration, is the Turkish regime. It is rare in history for a democratic state to promote a foreign government that is so antithetical to its own interests in almost every way. There are some positions in common but far more that are different. Two put it as briefly as possible, there are two problems.

The first problem is that the Turkish regime is boosting radical Islamist movements and governments that are America’s biggest enemy. These include Iran, the Gaza Strip (Hamas), and the current government in Lebanon (Hizballah). The Turkish regime has tried to back the Muslim Brotherhood but has been rebuffed, since the Brotherhood has no interest in following non-Arab leadership. And in Syria, the Turkish regime has been backing the Islamists in the opposition, intending to produce an anti-American regime in Damascus.

The Turkish regime also loathes Israel and supports radical Islamist forces against it. Only regarding Iraq do U.S. and Turkish interests basically coincide.

The second problem is that the Turkish regime has systematically reduced democracy at home. Hundreds of moderates have been arrested on ridiculous charges. The armed forces, formerly the guardian of secularism and the basic democratic system, have been broken. The media is intimidated. Radical Islamists have been infiltrated into all parts of the government. This well-coordinated creeping tendency toward dictatorship has barely been reported in the West.

What is the Turkish model in terms of the Arabic-speaking world? It is a formula for radical Islamist groups to seize state power and fundamentally transform their societies while appearing to be moderate. It is a step by step process, the equivalent of the Russian revolutionary movement graduating from anarchism to Bolshevism precisely a century earlier.

The most surprising thing is not that the West has been taken in by this trick but that it has happened so thoroughly.

At a time when even Lebanon is governed by a combination of Islamists and radical clients of Tehran and Damascus, Tunisia has a mostly Islamist government, and when the secular Turkish republic is being transformed by Islamists there is not much of an alternative.

In Morocco and Jordan, as usual, the kings have brilliantly maneuvered to provide the appearance of democratic pluralism and even Islamist participation while they continue to hold the real power.  In Algeria, as usual, the army is running things. In Saudi Arabia and the small sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf (Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), as usual, traditionalist regimes rule but they are now now intimidated by radical Islamist threats as they were once so cowed by radical Arab nationalist threats.

And at a moment when President Barack Obama has transformed America from being leader of the Free World to reflecting the effete, unrealistic elite from the Brie World, there’s not much hope from that quarter.

So that brings us to Iraq. As I’ve outlined above, the situation there is far from ideal. Yet there are some significant advantages. Internally, there are elections that mean something, a real element of pluralism, space for freedom of speech, and some working decentralization.

Of the greatest importance is the fact that Islamist elements have been defeated (in the Sunni case) or held at bay (in the Shia case). Things can certainly get worse but some stability seems to have been achieved at this time.

Another key factor is that Iraq is acting more “normally” as a state by minding its own business. It is not subverting neighbors or trying to take over the Middle East. Iraq also has decent relations with the West.  This is a country that is trying to deal with its own problems. And if there is factionalism and corruption, at least it appears to be clear that no force can monopolize power and establish a repressive dictatorship.

Call it chaotic pluralism as an alternative to Islamist dictatorship. And, yes, that appears to be the best that can be expected in those countries not still dominated by traditionalist monarchies.  It is certainly preferable to the “Turkish model.” Yet I don’t expect many people in the West to appreciate that point.

Is my assessment too pessimistic? Well, you are free to be optimistic. You can imagine an Israel-Palestinian peace based on a comprehensive treaty ending the conflict and establishing a two-state solution. You can fantasize about moderate Muslim Brotherhood leaders pragmatically getting down to solving Egypt's problems by creating jobs, building housing, and establishing new industries. You can pretend that various forces will be grateful to America and President Obama for demolishing several dictatorships.

But none of this is going to happen. It is vital to understand why and to comprehend what must be done in the face of this situation.

By pretending to soar to the heights of democracy, the Islamists are on the road to autocracy, and an anti-Western, regionally destabilizing autocracy at that.  By being so gullible, the West is assisting a repressive anti-Western force to dominate the region and to set it back 60 years (to the origin of radical Arab nationalist hegemony) if not 600 years.

A different version of this article was published in the Jerusalem Post. Please read and link to the above version.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center  and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Hizballah Brags About Waging War on America; The U.S. Government Ignores It

By Barry Rubin

Sometimes a big scoop is lying in plain sight and this often happens nowadays because either the mass media does not pick up a big story or the experts don’t properly analyze it. So while what I am about to tell you has been in the public domain for more than three years, it is of tremendous policy importance yet has been totally neglected:

Hizballah, the Shia group that now dominates Lebanon’s new government, is at war with the United States in Iraq.

Consider that this fact—as we will see in a moment—has been known to high-ranking U.S. government officials for years but has had zero impact on policy. The Obama Administration has accepted Hizballah’s political power as well as its Iranian and Syrian sponsorship, with no real opposition. It does not regard Hizballah as an enemy and senior officials favor official contacts with that terrorist group.

Consider this information from the public record and the statements of U.S. officials that was published almost three years ago:

read more

GLORIA Center Senior Fellow, Dr. Jonathan Spyer Visits Northern Iraq: An Interview

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By Barry Rubin

I interviewed my colleague Dr. Jonathan Spyer who has just returned from northern Iraq where he met with the region's Kurdish leaders. It was published in Pajamas Media. Here. For your convenience I am publishing the full text here also:

Dr. Jonathan Spyer, senior fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, has just returned from a visit to northern Iraq. He is the first Israeli analyst to meet leaders of the Kurdish-ruled region there, and to interview the leader of the radical Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). He is interviewed here by Professor Barry Rubin, director of the GLORIA Center.

Rubin: What were your impressions of Kurdish-ruled northern Iraq?

Spyer: The most important impression is of stability and rapid economic development. It is far safer than central and southern Iraq, where there is a lot of violence and kidnapping for ransom. There is an enormous amount of construction. New hotels, malls, and private housing projects are springing up. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has successfully attracted U.S. investment. The Erbil airport, opened in September, is ultra-modern and looks like the airport of an independent state.

The second main impression is that northern Iraq in many ways resembles a quasi-state. Kurdish flags line the airport road, but there’s just one Iraqi flag. The first language on all signs is Kurdish, followed by English, and only then Arabic. Kurdish is also spoken by almost everyone. Arabic is rare. Northern Iraq has its own military and security forces — the Peshmerga — and KRG officials are particularly proud that they have kept Islamist terrorism out of their region even at the height of the insurgency.

Rubin: How do Iraqi Kurdish leaders view Israel and their own role in the Middle East?

Spyer: They are cautious, expressing a general hope for peace between Israelis and Arabs, and a general sympathy for both sides. Clearly, KRG leaders don’t want to be drawn into the conflict. They know they occupy a precarious space both geographically and politically. They also know their enemies routinely dismiss them as U.S. and Israeli stooges. Thus, their obvious natural sympathy and empathy with Jews and Israel is understandably overlaid by a desire to protect their interests.

Rubin: How do they rank various threats or allies, including Iraq’s central government and Turkey?

Spyer: Their most immediate concerns are with the Baghdad government and Turkey. They know they must walk a narrow line, asserting their interests while not antagonizing unduly either of these powerful neighbors. This relates to such issues as the disputed, oil-rich city of Kirkuk, other Kurdish-speaking areas of Iraq that haven’t been included in the KRG’s region, the presence of anti-Turkish PKK guerrillas in the north, and Turkish fears of Kurdish sovereignty.

Rubin: What do they say about U.S. withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq?

Spyer: There was an absolute consensus among everyone I spoke to that withdrawal was premature.

Yet they have a pragmatic, problem-solving mentality. So I didn’t hear resentment but rather gratitude to the United State for freeing Iraqi Kurds from the rule of Saddam Hussein.

Rubin: You spoke to the head of the Turkish Kurdish PKK group, which historically was allied with Syria and Iran. What is the current status of those links?


Spyer: Syria was once the PKK’s key state ally, providing bases and safe haven for its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. This changed with Syria’s reorientation toward alliance with Turkey after the near-war between them in 1997. Ocalan was captured after Syria made him leave. Thus, Syria-PKK links appear broken.

As for Iran, the PKK’s sister organization among the Iranian Kurds, PJAK, maintains a presence alongside the PKK in the Qandil mountains area where Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish borders meet. As a result, that stronghold is subject not only to Turkish aerial attack, but also to Iranian bombardment. The PKK is thus diplomatically isolated, having lost its links to Syria and Iran without finding alternative alliances. Nevertheless, the PKK has a powerful infrastructure and guerrilla force on the Qandil mountains and shows no indications of facing crisis.

Rubin: How does the PKK assess current politics in Turkey and set its strategy?

Spyer: The PKK considers that the early hopes that Prime Minister Erdogan’s regime would make reforms benefiting Turkish Kurds has proven empty. It hopes to capitalize on their disappointment and anger. The PKK asked Kurds to boycott the recent referendum on constitutional reform in Turkey, arguing the changes brought Kurds no benefit. This succeeded, with large numbers of Turkish Kurds boycotting the referendum, reaching over 90% in some areas of southeast Turkey.

I interviewed PKK leader Murat Karayilan, and he stressed the growing strategic alliance between Iran and Turkey, which he says is also directed against the Kurds. Karayilan considers that Turkey has plans for a major all-out, “Sri Lanka” style operation into the Qandil mountains and is trying to create a diplomatic situation to make this possible.

The PKK seems aware that it has nothing to gain from all-out, open confrontation with the Turks, but wants enough fighting to keep the Kurdish issue alive in Turkey. Thus, it is alternating unilateral ceasefires with attacks on infrastructure such as the recent mining of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The goal is to pressure Ankara to grant greater autonomy to Turkish Kurds.

Rubin: What was it like as an Israeli to be in northern Iraq, and how did people there react to you?

In the Kurdish zone the atmosphere and prevailing attitudes are very different from the rest of Iraq. In meetings, the general sense was one of obvious core sympathy with Israel, combined with a desire for caution in expressing opinions on Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians and with the broader Arab world.

Yet there is a sense of normality in the attitude toward Israel. Israel is seen as simply another player in the region. That’s to say that the shrillness, paranoia, and strangeness so obviously and depressingly present in so much Arab (and pro-Arab) discussion of Israel is simply, and very refreshingly, absent.

Rubin: In your new book about your personal experiences and fighting in the 2006 war, you focus on the transformation of the conflict into one of revolutionary Islamism versus Israel. Please explain about that.

Spyer: The book, The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict, focuses on the development of an Iran-led alliance, including Hamas and Hizballah, seeking to destroy Israel. This has transformed the challenges facing Israel in a way that hasn’t received sufficient attention. So the “international community” busies itself with reviving the 1990s “peace process” and so on, remaining unaware that the region’s transformed strategic situation renders all such attempts worthless.

The Iran-led bloc will prevent progress towards peace. The Palestinian national movement is not ready for historical compromise with the Jewish national project. It is also split, with the more powerful element aligned with Iran. The book discusses these issues, but also contains accounts of my own experiences, including participation in the 2006 Lebanon war, subsequent travels to Lebanon, and Israel at the time of the Second Intifada.

All of these things interweave to affect not only the political situation in the region but also the lives of those who live here.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

What, If Anything, Has Changed in Iraq?

By Barry Rubin

George Packer, a writer on Iraq who rather likes President Barack Obama, gave a devastating critique of the chief executive's claim that the U.S. troops had now ended their combat mission. This was, Packer said:

“A meaningless milestone, constructed almost entirely out of thin air,” since the remaining 50,000 troops are still combat troops “in everything but name.” Packer agreed that Obama had kept his word by declaring on the designated date what he had said he would.

What’s most important of all, however, is the political mess in Iraq. Packer explains:

“”Almost six months after national elections, the country’s politicians remain unable to compromise and cut a deal….In the vacuum, Sunni extremists are showing just how much—and how little—Iraqi security forces are going to be capable of in the post-American-combat-mission era. It’s not a very encouraging picture,” especially when one adds in the ongoing violence, lack of security, plus shortages of electricity and water.

Who is at fault is not my concern, though I'm on record as favoring a withdrawal as early as 2005. What is essential is that Iran and Syria are now likely to take advantage of the situation by simultaneously pushing their local proxies, aiding the terrorist insurgents, and proclaiming that the withdrawal proves that America is weak and an unreliable ally.

Of course, the Iraqi government can and should be able to defend itself, that is why a withdrawal is the right thing to do. But coupled with a weak U.S. stance and a lack of credibility, the withdrawal is much more of a potential strategic problem.

Combined with the growing Iran-Syria-Hizballah control over Lebanon, Hamas’s escape from heavy sanctions, the shift of Turkey’s regime toward Tehran, and Iran’s steady advance toward nuclear weapons, the tide is shifting against the West in the region. The Obama Administration not only has no answers for these problems, in many cases it doesn’t know that these defeats and dangers exist.

Of course, it is aware that Iran’s getting nuclear weapons is dangerous and the increase of sanctions has been significant—more than I had predicted—though this still falls far short in extent and implementation to be effective. But the threat posed by Syria, the Turkish regime, events in Lebanon, and by Hamas, along with the other issues mentioned above is simply not comprehended in Washington.

The congratulations over Iraq may well be accompanied by a worsening situation in Iraq and the Gulf. I'm not saying that Iraq will collapse or be taken over by Iran. Not at all. I'm just saying that this is one more element adding to the instability mix in the area and things could go wrong.

Iraq and The Real Middle East Conflict

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By Barry Rubin

Aymenn Jawad is a talented young Arab writer who shows how to analyze regional politics well. His short article on Iraqi politics and how they fit into the Nationalist-Islamist, Iran-Syria-Turkey bloc versus Arab regimes' conflict really makes the issues clear. Recommended reading.

Basically, he shows how Saudi Arabia and Iran are competing for influence in Iraq just as the Saudis were battling with Iran and Syria in Lebanon but gave it up as a lost cause. Meanwhile, the United States and Europe are acting clueless about this huge struggle in the region that will determine its future. The central issue is not Israeli-Palestinian or even, in a sense, Iranian nuclear. It is the massive conflict between two blocs.

One of them is composed of Iran, Syria, the Turkish regime, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Iraqi insurgents. The other consists of all of the Arab regimes except for Syria and the Lebanese March 14 coalition. There are some forces, like Qatar, that play on both sides at times.

The revolutionaries have Islamist ideology and both financial and terrorist backing from Tehran and Damascus. The relative moderates--whose interests in some ways parallel those of Israel and in most ways the West--are hoping for Western backing. Poor relative moderates to depend on such unreliable patrons.

The West continues to see the region largely in terms of the outmoded Arab-Israeli conflict when there is a battle to the death among Arabs and among Muslims going on in front of its eyes. It is often more concerned with engaging or apologizing for the radicals than it is in helping the relative moderates against them.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

What's Wrong--and Dangerously So--With U.S. Strategic Policy in the Middle East

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By Barry Rubin

I've just read two interesting articles by David Goldman (better known by his pen name, Spengler) and Lee Smith which have different themes but fit together very nicely and make some incredibly important points.


Spengler shows that current U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian Authority consists of creating heavily armed local armies, then withdrawing with the dubious expectation that they will be moderate, democratic, and pro-American.

In Iraq, for example, the United States is building up both regular Iraqi forces and a Sunni militia to fight terrorists who are clients of Iran and Syria. Yet the outcome might well be a bloody Iraqi civil war between U.S.-subsidized and trained armies. Moreover, when Washington stops bribing those involved they might well turn against their creator.

Regarding the Palestinian Authority (PA), the forces trained by General Keith Dayton and his team are more likely to wage war on Israel than on Hamas some day. Already, Goldman points out, the Taliban is seizing American money and weapons being handed out in Afghanistan. I could add that the United States, on a far smaller scale, is arming a Lebanese army which is close to being in Hizballah's pocket.

Goldman writes:


"Having armed all sides of the conflict and kept them apart by the threat of arms, the United States now expects to depart leaving in place governments of national reconciliation that will persuade well-armed and well-organized militias to play by the rules. It is perhaps the silliest thing an imperial power ever has done. The British played at divide and conquer, whereas the Americans propose to divide and disappear."

Lee Smith discusses a totally different aspect of the issue: the current U.S. concept of counterinsurgency. He points out that U.S. strategy in Iraq under both the Bush and Obama administrations might be setting up a future in which Iran wields dominant influence in that country:


"The test of victory is simply whether or not you are capable of imposing terms on your adversaries; if you can’t, if rather they shape your strategic decisions--e.g., if they determine your security environment by funding, arming and training militias--then you have not won."

Smith continues:

"If Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Al-Qods force can heat things up now with U.S. troops present, what do you think they will do once we have gone?...Not only have we not won, we have rendered ourselves incapable of acting against the agent that is most desirous of ruining our position across the region. In short, we have deterred ourselves on behalf of our enemy, the Islamic Republic of Iran."

Indeed, there are three other points that can be added here. First, current U.S. strategy very much reminds me of Vietnamization, the plan that was supposed to win the Vietnam war. The U.S. approach was to turn the fighting over to local forces and withdraw. This was a short-run success. The fact that the local forces then collapsed and the other side won the war was redefined as something for which U.S. policy wasn't responsible. A congressional funding cut-off played a role here, too.) Yet isn't what we're seeing today the old Richard Nixon strategy which could be summarized, to quote the formula of an antiwar senator earlier, as: Declare victory and bring the troops home.

It is funny how failed policies of the past are revived and given a change of name--often by the side that once opposed them--and then presented as bold new thinking.

That doesn't mean I'm advocating keeping the troops there, especially when it comes to Afghanistan but also to Iraq. Not at all. The real problem is the failure to define the real enemy and do everything possible to foil it by other means, too. One of the most important ways to do so is to maintain credibility, toughness, and vigorous leadership of allies, all ideas very much out of fashion in official Washington.

The other two points are central to my soon-to-be published piece in Foreign Affairs (which I will make available on publication). That is, the main task for the United States today is a long, difficult battle that the United States will have to wage against the Iran-led alliance, and other revolutionary Islamist groups, throughout the region to contain or defeat them. (For a detailed discussion of what U.S. foreign policy should be understanding and doing, see HERE.)


Given the weakness and unreliability of most local U.S. allies--the Afghan government, internally divided Shia leadership in Iraq, PA and Fatah, faint-hearted and quick-to-appease Arab states--this struggle is going to be all the more difficult.

There is also a mountain-sized paradox in current U.S. policy which is so obvious it is remarkable virtually everyone is missing it:

On the one hand, the Obama Administration tends to appear fearful of angering, much less confronting, enemies. On the other hand, this same government insists it can contain Iran by making it fear America! At the same time, it insists local U.S. allies will stand up and take risks because they are so certain that the United States is strong and determined!

After having shown itself to be so non-scary, so opposed to intimidation and power politics, how is the Obama Administration going to make Iran tremble?

You don't cease looking like a paper tiger by suddenly issuing a quavering growl that you have muscles of stainless steel.

Perhaps the Obama Administration might jump into a phone booth and emerge as a new and transformed leadership? But there's no sign of this happening at all.*


Both Goldman and Smith show that the U.S. government is eager to claim victory in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Israel-Palestinian peace process. Yet the actions undertaken by that government will in fact make things worse.

Smith puts it very well:

"We did we not win in Iraq because states like Syria and Iran did not pay a price for the acts of force they used to shape political effects to their own advantage; when we failed to do so we abandoned our Middle East policy to the mercy of our enemies, who, as we are repeatedly told, can ruin Iraq and Afghanistan whenever they decide to take off their gloves. We did not win because our leadership, abetted by Washington policy intellectuals, is more interested in political effects in Washington than strategic victories in the Middle East. Seen in this light, the only American victory in the region is a pyrrhic one, the bitter harvest of which we may well be reaping for many years to come."

I'm not sure that the United States could have done better directly in Iraq itself than has happened in direct terms. But ignoring the daily involvement of Iran and Syria in sponsoring, arming, training, and financing terrorists to kill Americans is a disaster. Similarly, not holding Syria and Iran responsible for their policy in Lebanon while not developing a truly tough anti-Hamas policy are also setting up a sharp decline in American credibility combined with a boost for the revolutionary Islamist (and Iran-Syria) side.

All these points will be very clear in 20 or 30 years as people look back on these mistakes but are powerless to change them. It would be far better if they were understood and corrected right now.


*For those who don't know, Superman disguised himself as the mild-mannered Clark Kent but when faced with a crisis he jumped into a phone booth and changed into his superhero clothes before going off to bash the villains. Unfortunately, there are no more phone booths in America, which has a certain symbolic significance in this context, doesn't it?

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Will Obama Have an Iraq Crisis?

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By Barry Rubin

If—and I repeat, if--this story is true it is going to be a very big development that may, as they like to see in the television promos, change the Obama administration forever. According to Thomas Ricks, the former Washington Post military correspondent, General Raymond Odierno, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, is asking for an additional combat brigade to be put into Kirkuk and to stay beyond Obama’s August 2010 withdrawal deadline for all combat forces.

Reportedly, Odierno is worried about Kurdish-Arab-Turkoman conflict in the city, which would be a reason why an Iraqi brigade of Arab soldiers might further inflame the situation. Such a request makes the administration very uncomfortable. We saw how it took three months to make a decision over military strategy in Afghanistan which resulted in a highly politicized strategy designed to please all.

Ricks concludes: “I expect that Obama actually is going to have to break his promises on Iraq and keep a fairly large force in Iraq,” He knows better than I do about such things but I wonder if that’s true. I’d expect that for political reasons—and especially just before the critical congressional elections in November—Obama’s team will go for political profit rather than strategic safety.

By the way, this story clears up a mysterious detail that hints the U.S. military is thinking along these lines. The Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review Report for 2010 says: “The United States will…manage a responsible force drawdown in Iraq and support an orderly transition to a more normal diplomatic and civilian presence.” The word “drawdown” means fewer troops, not complete withdrawal. This suggests the Defense Department wants to keep serious forces in Iraq.

Ricks mentions that he heard the story from three different sources, which not only attests to its likely accuracy but also implies that a number of people in the army feel this is something really important to push with the White House.

So the Obama administration might have an unpalatable choice coming up:

Keep the commitment of getting out all the combat forces, say "no" to the commnder on the scene, thus appearing to sacrifice the safety of troops and endanger an important place for political expediency and public relations’ points.

Or break his promise, anger some of his constituency, and possibly create more electoral problems for his party.

This might not happen but a few hours ago such a potential crisis wasn’t even on the horizon.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Obama's General Says: Syria Allied with Al-Qaida, Attacking U.S.; White House Says: Is that a Problem?

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By Barry Rubin

Does anyone read the newspapers in the U.S. government? How about checking out the dispatches coming from its generals in the field? Here’s a news story which tells all.

A Reuters’ dispatch from Iraq interviews the commander of U.S. forces there. What’s he say?

Al-Qaida is joining forces with Saddam Hussein’s supporters.

And where are both al-Qaida’s forces fighting in Iraq and Saddam’s backers headquartered with lots of money stolen from Iraq? Syria.

Syria? So Damascus is now allied with al-Qaida, the perpetrators of the September 11 attack to kill Americans and defeat the United States in Iraq? Is that right, general?:

“Investigations into massive suicide bombings in Baghdad on Oct. 25, in which more than 150 people died, indicated that explosives or fighters were coming across from Syria, U.S. General Ray Odierno also said.”

So, again, Syria is letting al-Qaida and Saddamist terrorists come in, get armed and trained, cross the border in Iraq, and run back for safe haven. Right, general?:

“The U.S. commander's comments reinforced accusations by the government of Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki that al Qaeda and former Baathists were working together to undermine improved security and elections expected to be held in January. Maliki's government has also accused neighboring Syria of giving a safe haven to Baathists plotting attacks in Iraq.”

Yes, that’s what I said, right? And do remember that the Obama Administration has refused to support Iraq’s complaints against Syria. Are the Syrians helping kill a lot of people?:

“Overall violence in Iraq has fallen sharply in the past 18 months and November so far has experienced one of the lowest civilian casualty levels since the 2003 U.S. invasion. But attacks by suspected Sunni Islamist insurgents like al Qaeda remain common. The twin suicide bombings in Baghdad on Oct. 25 devastated the Justice Ministry and the Baghdad governorate headquarters, while two similar suicide bombings on Aug. 19 killed almost 100 people at the foreign and finance ministries.”

So violence is continuing. As U.S. forces withdraw someone is trying to wreck the situation there so that the U.S. departure looks like defeat. Wonder who?

"`We believe that there will be attempts to conduct more attacks between now and the elections because they want to destabilize those,’ Odierno said.”

And who might be making those attacks, general?

"`My experience is there probably was some movement of fighters or explosives coming from Syria,’" he said when asked if the investigations had indicated any links to Syria.”

Thank you. So, the Obama Administration’s military commander says Syria is behind massive attacks and working closely with Usama bin Ladin’s guys.

Has the president of the United States said anything about this? Has he made any criticism of Syria? Is he ready to break off engagement efforts with the dictatorship? Has he backed up Iraqi government requests for backing in demanding Syria stop facilitating such attacks and turn over those Iraqis responsible?

No, no, no, and again no.

If the Obama Administration is fighting a war against al-Qaida why is Syria, today that group‘s main organizational and military base in the Middle East getting away with allying to the people who murdered 3,000 Americans on September 11?

If the Obama Administration is fighting a war in Iraq why is it doing nothing about the main ally of the insurgents killing American soldiers and so many Iraqi civilians, trying to wreck your policy?

Not to mention Syria trying to take over Lebanon, allying with Iran, sponsoring Hamas and Hizballah, being a major sponsor of international terrorism, and trying to build nuclear weapons’ facilities secretly?

There is an old expression about fighting with one hand tied behind your back. The Obama Administration is waging a foreign policy with both hands tied behind its back, plugs in its ears, and a gag over its mouth.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Where does Terrorism Come from In Iraq: Hundreds killed but there's no mystery

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By Barry Rubin

You know that two car bombs hit three government buildings in Baghdad on October 25 and killed 132 people. You probably know that this was a devastating hit against the effort to stabilize the country, which in turn is a precondition for U.S. withdrawal. Many analysts viewed this as an attemt to discredit the January election and to pull the rug from under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who has staked his job on reducing violence to a minimum.

But here's what you don't know: Where did the bombs come from? Where did the terrorists come from? Where did the orders to stage a very politically focused attack come from.

The Iraqi government has now answered these questions with one word: Syria.

Remember that the Iraqi government has been warning about this for months, blaming Damascus for specific attacks based on evidence and interrogations. When this last happened in September, the U.S. government refused to take Baghdad's side. Nor was there any break in the move to engage Syria. Nor was there any interruption--in fact, the exact opposite--in the European move to make a partnership agreement which would pump more money into Syria.

Nothing. No denunciation. No UN resolution. No international investigation. No U.S. efforts to punish those responsible.

Just as with the 241 American soldiers killed in Beirut in 1983 through similar means.

So what is the result of Syria being involved in sponsoring, financing, organizing, and facilitating terrorist attacks on Iraq without any cost?

More attacks on Iraq. U.S. policy unintentionally sent Damascus a signal: you can do whatever you want and not fear retribution from the United States or its European allies. Naturally, the Syrians stepped up attacks.

This has happened before, notably in 1990, when a soft U.S. stand in defending Kuwait convinced Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein that he could invade and take over that country without the United States reacting.

Iraq was wrong in 1990--the George Bush administration did fight back and defeat Iraq--but Syria might well get away with aggression in 2009, and of course what Damascus is doing now is more subtle and thus easier for Washington to ignore.

True, the Obama Administration has declared the "war on terror" to be over and stated that only al-Qaida and its allies would be the target of American wrath.

But wait a minute! Isn't al-Qaida the group that is being based in Syria and carrying out many of these attacks? Doesn't that make Syria an ally of al-Qaida?

When one of my readers raised the issue in a university class on the Middle East, his professor said, no, not so, it is very complicated.

Well, how complex can it be? Al-Qaida terrorists operate in Syria with the government's approval. They get money, arms and training there. They cross the border into Iraq to launch attacks and at times cross back into Syria.

Can anyone refute that? Why then is Syria getting away with murder at no cost, not even verbal denunciation?

More people die; U.S. efforts are destabilized. There's a very serious mistake being made here. American soldiers and Iraqi civilians are paying the price. Think about that when you hear news coverage about these attacks and all the attacks to come.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

How the West's Enemies Are Saving It

By Barry Rubin

When people are very pessimistic, I say to them: Don’t worry our enemies will save us.

By that I mean that the enemies of peace, progress, and democracy—Islamists and radical Arab nationalists, terrorists and silly people in the West alike—are so intransigent, obviously lying, and dangerously wrong about society that they will convince and force most people to reject and combat them.

Even when thrown lifelines, even when confronted with naiveté, they reject concessions, turn up their nose at compromise, go too far, and make their nonsense so illogical and apparent, as to either teach the naïve in political and intellectual power or persuade others push them aside in order to survive.

Today offers some examples of this idea:

The presidency of Barack Obama and the relatively soft stands of European states have given Iran a great opportunity. Tehran could have made a show of flexibility, a strong pretense about being cooperative, and met with Obama. This would have forestalled a higher level of Western sanctions, while Iran could still work secretly on nuclear weapons.

After all, even after a virtual coup by the most hardline faction, the stolen election, the strong repression, the show trials of dissidents, and the appointment of a wanted terrorist as defense minister [that’s a pretty amazing list, isn’t it?], the West was still willing to deal with the regime.

Instead, Iran produced an “offer” to negotiate so minimal that even the Europeans rejected it. While this doesn’t mean all is well—Russia and China will block and sabotage even moderate sanctions; the West Europeans will oppose really strong ones—at least Iran’s last-minute effort to derail the process altogether will fail.

Imagine what the Iranian regime could have done if the ruling establishment had let someone less extreme than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad get elected, then claimed this showed what a moderate and democratic state they were running. A charm offensive could have defused the nuclear controversy and the sanctions would have fallen away. Iran would have been set loose and a few years from now could have finished its nuclear program in a relaxed manner.

But no!

Turn to Lebanon. The Syrians were riding high. A new government was going to be set up in Lebanon with their clients have both thirty percent of the cabinet seats and veto power over all government policies. But when the March 14 coalition, which won the recent elections, presented its own list of ministers, the Syrians and their Hizballah allies rejected it: not subservient enough. March 14, which has been giving ground steadily, was pushed so hard that it dug in its heels and rejected the Syrian demands. The negotiations will now have to start all over again.

Syria could have gotten back around 80 percent of its former total power over Lebanon in one day, but that wasn’t enough for Damascus.

The same applies to U.S. attempts to engage Syria. The Obama Administration was eager for progress, but the Bashar al-Assad dictatorship would even give an inch to gain a yard. The talks have been frustrating for Washington. The Syrians weren’t willing even to deescalate the terrorism in Iraq for a while.

Syria could have gotten out from under U.S. sanctions, reestablished normal relations with Washington, and have the Obama Administration turn a blind eye to its sponsorship of terrorism and subversion throughout the region.

But no!

The same applies to Hamas. It tried a little to pretend to moderate and already Western suckers were swallowing the bait, but it couldn’t—and wouldn’t –sustain the pretense very long. It couldn’t resist going back to its super-hardline statements and actions.

But the Palestinian Authority (PA) offers an even clearer example. Imagine how much it could have obtained if it played along with the U.S. president’s eagerness to help. A show of flexibility, an eagerness to negotiate, and an effort to get a Palestinian state on something approaching reasonable terms real fast probably would have brought success.

Atmost, there could have been a Palestinian state within 18 months on pretty favorable terms for the Palestinians. Or should one say, at most the PA could easily—and I mean easily—engineered a U.S.-Israel conflict unseen in the history of the Jewish state. But from the start PA leader Mahmoud Abbas made it clear that he was asking for everything and giving nothing. His best chance is already past.

And similar things can be said about various Arab countries regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict specifically and also getting in good with the president.generally. They could have rushed to make minor, meaingless gestures toward Israel in exchange for U.S. support on their broader demands.

Can I have a “But no!”?

One more, historic example: Remember Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein? In late 1990 or early 1991 he could have cut a very favorable deal which would have left his country with part of Kuwait, billions of dollars, and the Saudis trembling at his every command. Instead, he refused any deal, kept his army in Kuwait, and suffered a military defeat.

He did the same in the 2000-2003 period when he could have made some kind of bargain for stopping his nuclear program in exchange for all sorts of concessions. Instead, he did the opposite: he pretended to keep up the program even when he cut it back.

It is very important to understand why this kind of thing happens repeatedly and, though ultimately disastrous for Saddam, usually works out pretty well for the dictators or the leaders of powerful opposition movements.

First, all these forces really are radical and extremist. They don’t want a deal; they want total victory, all the disputed land, total rule, complete dictatorship, the expulsion or extinction of their adversaries. And they can also rightly argue: these methods got me this far.

Second, they really believe their own propaganda. They think they can win and assume that those on the other side—whether Israel, the West, or other regimes they want to overthrow-- are weak and doomed. And, in turn, their enemies give them enough signals to this effect to make them continue to believe this is true.

Third, they are wedded to brutal methods. Terrorism is no accident; it is the tool of people who exult in deliberate violence against civilians. And in such political groups the gunmen and their values rise to the top.

Fourth, they are afraid of internal rivals and their own followers. They know that the people have been so conditioned by extremism as to reject moderates as traitors. This is obviously less true in Iranian but more true in Palestinian politics.

But the other part of this factor is even if a given leader, say from Hamas, wanted to follow a more moderate policy he knows that this would be used against him by rival leaders to destroy his power and maybe even kill him. They must continue to ride the tiger or be eaten. And the fact that they helped give birth to the tiger in the first place won’t save them.

Finally, this is the region’s political style, which to some extent mirrors Western history. Toughness counts; fear is better than popularity.

Many Western leaders and much of the Western intelligentsia are like someone sleeping through a burglary. But not only their friends are trying to wake them up, so are—however inadvertently—their enemies.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Neutrality on Iraq-Syria: Obama Administration Betrays Ally and Doesn't Even Defend Its Own Soldiers

By Barry Rubin

On August 26, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly was asked what the United States thought about the Iraq-Syria dispute. His answer shockingly recalls the last time a U.S. government made the mistake of being neutral between an enemy radical dictatorship and a friendly moderate government.

First, some background. Iraqi leader Nuri al-Maliki visited Syria on August 18 to discuss the two countries' relationship. He offered Syrian dictator-President Bashar al-Assad a lot of economic goodies in exchange for expelling 271 Iraqi exiles involved in organizing terrorism against their country. Assad refused. Maliki left.

The next day, huge bombings struck Baghdad, directly targeting the government’s foreign and finance ministries. More than 100 Iraqis were killed and over 600 were wounded. The Iraqi government blamed the very same exiles living in Syria who Maliki was trying to get kicked out and implicated the Syrian government directly in the attacks. The two countries recalled their ambassadors; the Iraqis are calling for an international tribunal to investigate.

Enter the United States. Since the Iraqi government was created by elections made possible by the U.S. invasion, since the same terrorists murdering Iraqis have killed American soldiers, and since Iraq is a U.S. ally while Syria is a terrorist sponsor allied with Iran, what U.S. reaction would you expect?

Why, support for Iraq, of course. For decades under several U.S. presidents, Syria has been unsuccessfully pressed to kick out terrorists targeting Israel, and later Lebanon. This is an old issue and a very clear one for about a half-dozen reasons.

And what did the Obama administration do instead? Declare its neutrality!

Here’s what Kelly said, reading from his State Department instructions:

“We understand that there has been sort of mutual recall of the ambassadors. We consider that an internal matter. We believe that, as a general principle, that diplomatic dialogue is the best means to address the concerns of both parties. We are working with the Iraqis to determine who perpetrated these horrible acts of violence.…We hope this doesn’t hinder dialogue between the two countries.”

Before analyzing this response, let me tell you of what it reminds me. Back in 1990, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was threatening Kuwait, demanding that the weaker neighbor surrender to an ultimatum. Iraq was no friend of America; Kuwait, though not an ally, was a state that had good relations with the United States. A decade earlier, America had gone to the verge of war with Iran to protect Kuwait.

What did the U.S. government say? This was a matter between Iraq and Kuwait in which the United States wouldn’t take sides.

A few days later, Saddam invaded and annexed Kuwait. At the time and afterward, everyone said: What a terrible mistake! The announcement of neutrality, the refusal to support a small threatened country against a bullying neighbor ruled by a blood dictatorship, gave a green light to Saddam and set off a war.

And now the Obama administration has done precisely the same thing. Of course, Syria won’t invade Iraq, it will just keep welcoming, training, arming, financing, transporting, and helping the terrorists who do so.

The Obama administration has declared the war on terrorism to be over. But it also said that the United States viewed as an enemy al-Qaida and those working with it. The Syria-based Iraqi terrorists fall into that category. America sacrificed hundreds of lives for Iraq’s stability. Most of those soldiers and civilian contractors were murdered by the very terrorists harbored by Syria.

How can the administration distance itself from this conflict instead of supporting its ally and trying to act against the very terrorists who have murdered Americans?

Nominally, of course, the cheap way out was to say: We don’t know who did these particular bombings. Well, who do you think did it, men from Mars? Even this is not relevant since the Iraqi demand for the expulsion of the terrorists—who have committed hundreds of other acts—came before the latest attack even happened.

Moreover, the administration not only invoked its obsession with dialogue at any price but did so in an incorrect and dangerous manner. The Iraqi government had sought dialogue, had used diplomatic means, and was turned down flat. To make as your main point the theme that diplomatic dialogue should continue is to side with Syria against Iraq. The message conveyed by the U.S. government is: don't impose any sanctions against Syria, keep talking, and if the Syrians do nothing and continue sending terrorists across the border, well, you can...keep on talking forever.

So is this administration incapable of criticizing Syria? Even if it wants to engage in talks with Syria (or Iran or anyone else) it should understand that diplomacy is not inconsistent with pressure and criticism. On the contrary, these are tools needed to push the other side into concessions or compromises.

Looking at this latest development, how can any ally have confidence that the U.S. government will support it if menaced by terrorism or aggression? It can’t. The problem with treating enemies better than friends is that the friends start wondering whether their interests are better served by appeasing mutual enemies and by reducing cooperaiton with an unfaithful ally which ignores their needs.

Here's an excellent backgrounder on the Iraq-Syria issue. And on the al-Qaida connection with Syria, go here.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

An Open Secret: Syria Daily Sponsors and Aids Terrorists Murdering Iraqi Civilians and Americans: Doesn’t This Require Action?

By Barry Rubin

One of the world’s biggest open “secrets” is this: Syria is arming, helping, training, financing, and giving access across the border into Iraq for terrorists who are murdering Iraqi civilians and American soldiers or civilian workers.

Everyone knows it, statistics are kept on it. Yet this fact simply doesn’t seem to figure in U.S. policy. If it were known that a foreign country was waging covert war against America, that Americans were dying because of its direct involvement in terrorist attacks, don’t you think there would be some tough response (and I don’t mean an invasion)?

Yet this is precisely what’s happening. Naturally, the Iraqi government is angry about it. In fact, Baghdad just recalled its ambassador after two terrorists--Mohammad Younis al-Ahmed and Sattam Farhan--who it says are operating from within Syria just carried out bombings which killed more than 100 people.

Syria is a dictatorship. Nothing happens inside its territory without government approval. A U.S. official told me that the bus taking terrorists from Damascus to the border left from a place that can be seen from the U.S. embassy there.

Iraq also asked Syria to throw out the terrorist groups. Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said,

“We…demand that Syria hand over every person wanted for committing murders and crimes against Iraqis and to kick out all terrorist organizations that use Syria as a base to launch and plan such operations against Iraqi people.”

The United States has been trying to get Syria to do this for other groups—Hamas, Hizballah, and many smaller organizations—for decades with no success.

But obviously the Iraqis are getting nowhere, so Dabbagh got angrier:

"Our relations with Syria have reached a crossroads of whether they choose to have good relations with Iraq, or whether they choose to protect persons who attack Iraq."

But what can Iraq do about it without serious Western support? Nothing. And so the terrorists are safe in Syria, laughing at their victims, continuing to attack. 

Meanwhile, despite strenuous U.S. efforts, the Syrian regime's position has become even more intransigent.

Is Syria an enemy of the United States which is only emboldened by American inaction and concessions? What do you think?

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan).
To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books: http://www.gloria-center.org
To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com

Conversations with Readers: Middle East dictators, Western comprehension, and the Iraq war

One advantage of new technology is it brings experts and readers together more closely. I often find that I get my best ideas when talking to readers and non-experts who ask interesting, basic questions and force a writer to express things clearly. Here’s a two-part interview with blogger James Biga which explores a number of interesting questions about the contemporary Middle East. I hope you find it interesting and useful.

James Biga: You always seem to be more positive about things. You always provide a "but if."

Barry Rubin: Most things in politics are more laid back, loose, and complex than they seem. It is easy to make a situation sound apocalyptic when it isn’t. I predicted for months that Netanyahu's trip to DC would go fine. It did. I predicted for months the Obama Administration won't bash Israel in a material way. It hasn't. When I forget about this principle—as in predicting the outcome of the Lebanese election, when in fact nothing much changed—I usually discover I should have remembered it.

After you've been dealing with the Middle East for many decades you realize that there is a Western misconception of imminent catastrophe—unless of course something is done, which nowadays means unilateral concessions. Yet in the 1950s, they believed that Nasser’s Egypt, pan-Arab radicalism, and Soviet influence was on the verge of seizing the region. In the 1960s it was neo-Marxist revolutionary groups. From the late 1970s, there were supposedly going to be a wave of Islamist revolutions emanating from Iran. And so on.

That doesn’t mean big events don’t happen—in the last 30 years one should count among them the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis, Iran-Iraq war, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the rise and fall of the peace process, September 11, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, for example—but more rarely than we expect. And even then the world isn’t really transformed.

At the same time, though, we see the repetitive nature of mistaken assumptions about how international affairs work or what the Middle East is like which constantly mislead people. One example nowadays is the concept that force never achieves anything, so we get a progression like this:

Israel defeats Hamas in a military campaign
Hamas stops firing missiles
Western conclusion: Hamas is acting that way because it has become more moderate rather than it has been somewhat intimidated into changing its behavior, at least temporarily.

James: Treating the sniffles doesn't get rid of the flu.

Barry: Ah! But if you always have the flu you feel normal with it. That's an important point! In the West, they are used to what they think of as a perfectly stable society in which there is no risk, no violence, and no threats. But when you are used to a higher level of tension and difficulties, having problems seems more normal. This Western juxtaposition of saying things like: We must solve the Palestinian problem right now or the region will blow up has repeatedly been proven wrong.

But you are right. The idea, for example, that the goal of Western policy should be to bring down the Hamas regime is unthinkable in Europe and America. It is a terrorist, openly antisemtiic, and genocide-minded movement; it is a client of Iran trying to spread subversion and revolution; it is a huge barrier to any successful peace process; it is extremely oppressive to Palestinians in Gaza; and it is generally seeking to foment bloody armed conflict with Israel. Yet despite all that, the best that can be hoped for is a policy of isolation, and many Europeans seem eager to retreat  from even that posture.

Yet leave aside Israeli interests, does a policy of accepting a Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip accord with Western interests or any serious desire to have a successful Israel-Palestinian peace process? Definitely, no.
James: If someone such as me sees this, it has to be more than ideology that keeps this going. People like you write about this every day. What prevents people from actually stepping back, take in what is really going on, and then acting accordingly?

Barry: I would prefer the world to be different. There are answers to that question. First, many do see accurately and sometimes they even have the power to affect events. I also remember the phrase: In the kingdom of the blind the one-eyed man is king, and in the kingdom of the insane, the half-wit is hanged. The first part applies to establishment thinking; the second to those of us who try to explain things differently.

What are some of the factors involved, though, in the shortcomings of world view?

--Ideology. Certain things must be true and to hell with the facts.
--Mirror-imaging, there really isn’t any difference between the West and the Middle East.
--A good way to build a successful career is to tell people what they want to hear.
--Revolutionary romanticism.
--Some want to see the West destroyed and therefore deliberately subvert its interests while pretending to do the opposite.
--Some decide to support radical groups because that coincides with their ethnic, nationalist, or religio-political world view.
--Dissenting thought is dismissed between it is attributed to Zionism and American or Western imperialism.
--Mouthing certain ideas is a great way to make a lot of money.
--Short-term memory, forgetting the lessons of the relatively recent past repeatedly.

James: But these radical groups are power-hungry and in the end destroy themselves.

Barry: Yes, quite right. Though how long that takes, how much is destroyed, and how many die is the problem in that process. Consider Fatah, for example, it is now 50 years old. It has behind it a huge number of disasters and failures. In addition, the honest truth is that it is dominated to a large extent by thugs and thieves yet it—and the Palestinian Authority which embodies its influence—is the darling of the world. Money pours into their pockets and from thence to Swiss bank accounts.

Like so much that happens in the Middle East if it weren't so tragic it would be hysterically funny.

James: Arafat had billions in his bank account when he died.

Barry: Right. But also one cannot understand Arafat unless it is remembered that he wasn't interested in money. For him, money—as with Hafiz al-Asad, Saddam Hussein, Gamal Abdel Nasser, etc.--was a way to control others. He was interested in power. If the dictator is interested in money rather than power he's in trouble. But he used it because he knew everyone else's weakness.

James: These factors get all kinds of political leaders in trouble eventually.

Barry: Well, no, not necessarily.

James: How’s that?

Barry: If they are good at what they do and not blind. One shouldn’t just think of the Caligula type who goes crazy from these processes, or say an Idi Amin or a Bokassa.

James: If they are good then they have some ability to keep these characteristics in check

Barry: Precisely. Nasser, Assad, and others died in power, and Saddam could have also except for some unusual circumstances. I wrote a book about this called Modern Dictators.

James: Was the toppling of Saddam Hussein the right thing to do?

Barry: I don't know. That’s a very complex question and there are no easy answers. I never was an advocate of that war. In 2005 I wrote an article calling for withdrawal. Contrary to mythology, nobody in Israel was enthusiastic about this operation for a number of reasons, though of course when the U.S. government decided on it everyone had to go along. But people in Israel had no illusions that the United States would make Iraq into a peaceful, stable, democratic state.

The reason was that people in Israel who worked on the region knew too well how Arab polities and societies work. In addition, there was a belief at the time—which proved wrong--that Iraq might attack Israel. More correctly, there was concern that if the war went well, Israel would have to pay for it politically, and the same would happen if the war went poorly. I suppose that this is what’s happening now, because of the perception in Europe and America that the war was a mistake and went poorly.

One might say, to put it into a brief phrase, that Obama’s administration is to Iraq what Carter’s administration was to Vietnam.

James: If the US had fought this war in the same manner as, say, World War Two and fought for true victory instead would that have made it more palatable to American public opinion? America's fear of appearing colonial may have had a lot to do with how the war was fought and how it was handled afterwards.

Barry: One shouldn’t forget, though, the factor of Iraqi society, politics, and religion. You don’t win a victory over an Arab or Muslim or, perhaps more broadly, a Third World polity and then everything is fine ever after. If the basis isn’t there, one cannot create a moderate, democratic society which is going to be grateful to America for what it’s done. The German and Japanese post-World War Two model doesn’t work.

Look at Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Even there, one doesn’t find eternal gratitude for the fact that in 1991 the United States saved them from being crushed, raped, and ruined. The United States didn’t kill locals, didn’t inflict economic damage, didn’t try to change those societies, and didn’t stay very long and yet we see the results ranging from relative non-cooperation to Usama bin Ladin’s popularity.

So one can have success, one can greatly improve the situation, but victory is something else. This is part of the problem with a Western expectation of “solution” in which problems come to an end. So Israel can win meaningful successes, as in 1967, 1973, and 1982 wars, or the military successes that ended the two intifadas, or the leverage against Hizballah in 2006 and Hamas in January 2009, but the conflicts continue. And that is why some misperceive many of these events as either defeats or deadlocks. What is important, however, is that afterward Israelis can live their normal lives and the threats are reduced for some time.

But there won't be anyone on the other side who will say: We lost. Let's end the conflict. We want nice quiet lives and we won't bother you any more. Arab liberals have visited China or Japan and been astounded by the contrast. The Chinese say they suffered greatly under imperialism; the Japanese were hit by two nuclear weapons, but their attitude is: ok, that's history now. Let's move on, not bear grudges, and be constructive in avoiding violent conflict and building up our own countries. That's not the Middle Eastern approach.

Diplomatic Deportment Lessons from Saddam Hussein

By Barry Rubin

Every day we have evidence of how people think and politics function in the Middle East. There are, however, two particular malformations of thinking that inhibit Western understanding of the Middle East.

First, what is necessary is to understand the differences between those systems and world views and those of Western democratic states. Ironically, the biggest barrier to that knowledge are the empowered experts in academic, government, and the media who so often insist that there is any difference at all.

But, ironically, if the Saudi prince thinks exactly like the Swedish Social Democratic politician, or the Hamas chieftain looks at the world precisely in the same way as the Danish ambassador, what do we need experts for at all?

(This reminds me of a statement decades ago by a Jordanian monarch that he would govern his people as in Switzerland when his people behaved like the Swiss.)

Second, just because other people think differently—and we are aware of it—does not mean it is equally valid or that we should accept that perspective. The idea of “perceptions” is important: I need to know how others perceive the world—and consider that in evaluating their behavior, while asking if there is some validity in it that might shift my own view--without losing my own perception.

Many diplomats, academics, and journalists simply take on a new persona, in short becoming virtually identical in their views to those they are studying. The colonial British used to call this contemptuously, “going native” while the more contemporary, respectable phrase is “clientism.” (Sometimes, there is an exchange of cash or access that goes beyond the merely psychological motivation.)

Or, to put it more bluntly, the post-modernist, political correctness crowd is right in saying that everyone has their own narrative. What they fail to understand is that most of those narratives are wrong (in accurately describing reality).

[A digression:

How do we know this, merely due to our own personal prejudices and interests? No, because we honestly and sincerely examine our own views, compare them to the evidence, subject them to logic, employ experimentation where possible, seek out reliable sources, see if our concept has predictive power, defy or redefine our interests if necessary, and be willing to alter our thinking so it is accurate.


All those things that people used to do in those long-forgotten times when journalists sought balance and objectivity, universities were places for unfettered inquiry (real diversity rather than ideological hegemony described as such), and people were taught to understand and take price in being part of Western civilization. End of digression]

What is the difference between these two, often compatible and negative phenomena, I described above?

In effect, the first, more moderate concept says, for example: If they think you are aggressive imperialists maybe they have a point.

The second, more militant, asserts: They're right (or even, We're right). You are aggressive imperialists.

The bottom line amount to about the same thing.

These thoughts are prompted by reading the now available interrogation transcripts of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein with his captors. Near the beginning, Saddam is asked to discuss his achievements and mistakes. After being expansive on the former point and trying to evade the latter one, he finally bursts out:

“Do you think I would tell my enemy if I made a mistake?”

Compare this with the Western propensity for admitting error—or having independent institutions which, rightly or wrongly, are eager to point out the mistakes of others. In the Obama era, it would seem as if the main job of the politician is to make apologies. Naturally, the apologies are usually not so much an admission of one’s own mistakes as they are throwing dirt on one’s country and predecessors.

Of course, admitting mistakes is an important element in democratic and Enlightenment intellectual life. It can be most effective for fixing what’s broken, righting what’s wrong. Saddam's refusal to admit errors (including to himself, not just his enemies) is part of the reason why dictatorships aren't the best form of governance.

Still, it should be used in moderation. One shouldn’t, to make a pun appropriate for Iraq, throw out the baby with the Baathwater, or should we say the Bushwater?

For Western politicians, a variation, or rather three, should be made to Saddam’s approach:

--Do not exaggerate or make up mistakes in order to appease enemies. Remember that those who hate you don’t give a Saddam for your apology.

--Understand that others see you through their cultural-historical prism. In a society where no one apologizes, apologies and concessions are seen as signs of weakness, insanity, or an admission that you are terribly evil.

--Finally, recognize the fact that in this world you—or at least your country, its people, and its values—do have enemies.