New Issue of MERIA Journal: Articles on Egypt, Gulf, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey

The latest issue of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal (Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2009) is available . You can read online or download the following articles. You can also subscribe to have them delivered to you

Here are the articles, available in html and pdf:

Jonathan Spyer
ISRAEL AND LEBANON: PROBLEMATIC PROXIMITY

Eser Sekercioglu
TURKEY'S MARCH 2009 ELECTIONS: LOSS WITHOUT DEFEAT, GAIN WITHOUT VICTORY

Barry Rubin
U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY: TOO MANY CHALLENGES AND YET A SINGLE THEME

Panel Discussion
THE SMALL GULF STATES: THE BEST CASE EXAMPLES IN THE ARAB WORLD?

Adel Guindy
THE TALIBANIZATION OF EDUCATION IN EGYPT

Joana Dodds and Ben Wilson
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: UNATTAINABLE OBJECTIVES

Panagiotis Dimtirakis
THE 1978 BATTLE OF LARNACA AIRPORT, CYPRUS, AND UK DIPLOMACY

Syria Allied with al-Qaida Against the United States? Might that be a Problem?

While the United States has been trying to engage Syria, the Syrian regime has been busily engaging Americans: in battle.

That’s indirectly of course but it is all part of Damascus’s never-ending battle against America.

What is spectacularly important—and should be a major crisis with energetic responses by the United States and European countries—is that the Syrians are smuggling al-Qaida terrorists into Iraq. This has been going on for years but when the Bush administration said so the media paid less attention. Now this is not only being confirmed by the Obama administration as happening but it’s increasing.

Let me repeat this: al-Qaida, which is the Enemy Number One for the United States, remember those people responsible for September 11, is working closely with the Syrian government to murder Americans.
Sounds like a matter for high-level concern, doesn’t it?

Although lower than in previous years, there are about 20 suicide bombers helped across the Syria-Iraq border by the Damascus government each month.

So Syria is in fact in a state of war with the United States allied with Usama bin Ladin. This is confirmed by President Barack Obama’s own Defense Department. That’s Syria, the country intervening to put a client government in power in Lebanon, allied with Iran, smuggling weapons to Hizballah, being investigated for political murders in Lebanon by an international tribunal, prime sponsor of Hamas.

This is also the country which the United States and Europe wants Israel to give the strategic Golan Heights in exchange for…well it’s not clear what it’s in exchange for. Perhaps Syria’s promise only to sponsor terrorism against Israel only two weeks a month and just from Lebanese territory.

I think President Obama has an enemy on his hands. What’s he going to do about it? And why are we subjected to a continuous barrage of articles in the media and in international affairs’ journals about how Syria is moderate or can easily be made so?

One theme is that Syria can be broken away from Iran. Well, this is constantly denied most persuasively in Syria, though somehow these statements don't make it into the American or European media. Here's one from an authoritative source:

“Syria believes it can have good ties with Iran and America, that it does not have to choose between one or the other,” said Marwan Kabalan, of the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Damascus. “That is the official position here and I can’t see it changing significantly.

“There might be certain amendments to the relationship but I am sure Syria will not abandon the Iranians altogether. I don’t see what the Americans are providing as an alternative.

“Why would the Syrians break a strong historical relationship now?"

Why, indeed? Especially since they are getting away with it so nicely.

New publications

Two new books have been published:

1. Barry Rubin, editor, Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East is in my Middle East Military Studies series from Routledge.  There are a lot of good studies in the book of recent wars in the region (of which there are all too many) by an international cast of authors. See table of contents at the end. To order

2. Barry Rubin, editor, Lebanon Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis is published by Palgrave-Macmillan and is very timely examining the modern history, politics, culture, and international relations of Lebanon See table of contents at end.  To order

Inquiries about review copies and publicity materials welcomed.

Also you can read my article Barry Rubin, "U.S. Middle East Policy: Too Many Challenges and Yet a Single Theme," in the 2009/II issue of Orient, pp. 4-12.

Details.

1. CONFLICT AND INSURGENCY IN THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST

Barry Rubin, editor

Chapter 1: Barry Rubin, “What Do Middle Eastern Armies Do?”
Chapter 2 Norvell B. DeAtkine, “Why Arab Armies Lose Wars but Defeat Insurgencies”
Chapter 3 Joana Dodds and Benjamin Wilson, “The Iran-Iraq War: Will Without Means”
Chapter 4: Hassan Mneimneh, “The Lessons of the Jihadist Insurgency in Saudi Arabia”
Chapter 5: Barry Rubin, “Egypt’s Civil War”
Chapter 6: Boaz Ganor, “Terrorism as a Military Factor: the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process Era, 1993-2000”
Chapter 7: Jonathan Spyer, “Lebanon 2006: Unfinished War”
Chapter 8 Antoine Badran “Lebanon’s Militia Wars”
Chapter 9: Lester Grau, “The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains”
Chapter 10: Jacob Mundy, “The Morocco-Polisario War for Western Sahara, 1975-1991”
Chapter 11: Yahia Zoubir, “Islamism and Insurgency in Post-Independence Algeria”
Chapter 12: William McCallister, “Iraq and U.S. Military Doctrine”
Chapter 13: James Russell, “Innovation and War: The U.S. Military and the Iraq Insurgency”


2. Barry Rubin, editor, Lebanon Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis

Chapter 1: William Harris, “Reflections on Lebanon”
Chapter 2 : Eli Fawuz, “What Makes Lebanon a Distinctive Country?”
Chapter 3 : Tony Badran, “Lebanon’s Militia WarsMilitary Conflicts in Lebanese Politics
Chapter 4: William Harris, “Lebanon’s Roller Coaster Ride”
Chapter 5: Mark Farha, “Demographic Dilemmasy and Democracy in Lebanon”
Chapter 6 : Charles Freund, “Lebanon’s Culture: Popular Music as a Case Study
Chapter 7: Nimrod Raphaeli, “Lebanon’s Economy between Violence and Political Stalemate
Chapter 8: Gary Gambill, “Islamists Groups in Lebanon: A Survey
Chapter 9: Eyal Zisser, “Hizballah’s Strategy: Islamist Revolutionary or Arab Nationalist Patriot Hizballah in Lebanon: Between Tehran and Beirut, between the Struggle with Israel, and the Struggle for Lebanon”
Chapter 10: Omri Nir, Lebanese Shi’a as a Political Community
Chapter 11: Jonathan Spyer, “Israel and Lebanon: Problematic Proximity”
Chapter 12: David Schenker, “America and the Lebanon Issue

Turkey's New Foreign Minister and Its Foreign Policy Strategy

Ahmet Davutoglu became Turkey’s foreign minister, May 1, after having served as foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan since 2002. He’s the architect of Turkey’s current foreign policy. And that’s not good.

While the 50-year-old Davutoglu played a key role in running the Israel-Syria talks, he also has been central in such policies as: close cooperation with Iran and Syria alongside meeting leaders of Hamas, Hizballah, and the most important anti-American Iraqi militia.

For Davutoglu, this represents a balanced policy between Turkey’s European and Middle Eastern interests. “Our foreign policy regarding the EU is compatible with and in the same systematic framework as our relations with the Middle East,” he said in a June 2008 lecture. But isn’t there a conflict between the way he defines these two policies? After all, Turkey isn’t courting Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, but rather the regional radicals?

The issue is not that Davutoglu is a radical or an Islamist. He is quite thoughtful about balancing Turkish interests and in some ways he seems like a Turkish version of the kind of thinking that typifies the EU. But here’s where the problem lies. By the way, people who have met him say that he is very unfriendly, even contemptuous, toward the United States.

Davutoglu’s belief is that Turkey should have the best possible relations with all its neighbors and especially with those forces that are most threatening. It is the equivalent of the neutralist paradigm during the Cold War. Or, in his words,

“You have to ensure that there are minimum risks around you. Turkey is surrounded by international risks....Throughout the 1990s we had certain problems with almost all of our neighbors. Now we have excellent relations with all of our neighbors.”

It tells a lot about Davutoglu and contemporary Turkey, that he neglected to interpose the ideal quote from Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish republic, here: “Peace at home, peace abroad.” There are also parallels with U.S. President Barack Obama’s world view.

But there is an assumption here that can be called into question, the belief that extremist forces can be defused by dialogue, and that the more radical and aggressive they are, the more dialogue is needed.
In his “four principles” Davutoglu said:

“Security for both sides is vital, since in the Middle East, if we want to have a real peace, security for the Palestinians should be equal to security of Israelis. Security of the Shi’ite Iraqis should be equal to the security of the Sunni Iraqis. Security of the Christian Lebanese should be equal to the security of a Shi’ite or Sunni Lebanese. Security for an Arab should be equal to the security of a Turk or Kurd or anyone. If we don’t have security for all in the region you cannot have security for one particular group or nation or state.”

That makes sense in its own terms. But not everything can be reconciled. To strengthen Hamas, as the current Turkish regime has done, makes security impossible for both Palestinians and Israelis. To back Hizballah, as the Turkish regime has often seemed to be doing, makes security impossible for Lebanese. To work so closely with Iran and Syria as the current Turkish regime does makes security impossible for Palestinians, Israelis, Lebanese, Iraqis, and probably ultimately for Turkey as well.

And as this becomes apparent which side will the Turkish government choose? When the regime foments hatred of Israel and grassroots’ anti-Americanism (despite the warm welcome given to Obama) this goes beyond such neutrality.

Davutoglu applies similar criteria elsewhere:

“We are a huge contributor to NATO - this is our strategic choice. But this will not compromise our relations with Russia. The Cold War is over.”

True, the Cold War is over and Europe-Russia relations are not a zero-sum game. But if Russia advances in the Caucasus and Central Europe through bullying or more militant methods, which side will Turkey choose?

Moreover, if what is happening in the Middle East today is the equivalent of the Cold War--and sometimes even a much hotter one--because of a clash between two blocs, the new Turkish policy is the equivalent to having refused to join NATO and oppose the Soviet threat decades ago.

Finally, he concludes, "Our integration process with the EU is not an alternative to this understanding; its compatible."

He might think so, but will European leaders think so? It might well be true that no matter what Turkey did and does it will not get into the EU as a full member. Yet this policy is making that outcome even more unlikely.

Ideally, Davutoglu’s strategy of being friends with everyone seems an ideal policy for Turkey. But choices will have to be made and already the current regime has been shown to show in which direction it is tilting.

Having been honored by a special visit by Obama and warmly praised by him, one might think that the regime--if Obama's style of diplomacy was going to work in such situations--would have at least refrained (see below) from inviting a stridently anti-American militia leader and appointing a foreign minister who is personally anti-American a few weeks later.

Here are two cases in point regarding how the Turkish regime favors the radical forces.

First, having developed good relations with Iran, which are expanding steadily on the economic front despite international sanctions; backing Hamas and Hizballah, and doing a joint military exercise with Syria (albeit small in scale) the Turkish regime recently played host, May 1-3, to Moqtada al-Sadr, a client of both Syria and Iran whose forces repeatedly attacked U.S. soldiers in Iraq.

Even though he holds no official post and is a client of Iran and Syria, Sadr held personal meetings with Turkey's prime minister and president. This is another of many steps showing the Ankara regime's moves closer to the Iran-led alliance. Turkey's government says the meeting was one of a number consulting with all political forces in Iraq.  But clearly Sadr was given red carpet treatment on a level usually accorded a visiting top foreign leader.

In April’s local elections, the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) suffered some setback but remained the most popular party by a large margin. The opposition remains deeply divided and largely ineffective.

Second, Hussein Jaafar, the main suspect in the April ambush of a Lebanese army unit in the Bekaa Valley, killing four soldiers, was caught crossing from Syria into Turkey with forged Syrian documents. In a case like this, it is reasonable to think that Jaafar was working for the Syrians or at least one of their client groups in one more assault on Lebanon's moderate government. That's how he got the Syrian passport after all. But a Lebanese court had indicted Jaafar and he was wanted in Beirut for questioning.

Presumably, the Syrians will now protect Jaafar and the Lebanese will never get him. Turkey should have extradited him to Lebanon--the man is a Lebanese citizen wanted by the courts in Lebanon--but chose to send him to Syria, knowing the consequences of that choice.