Dealing With The Devil

Pakistan presents a near intractable problem as the country's weak government refuses to stand up to the Islamist snake in its midst. Indeed, now the U.S. government is turning to one of the snakes, Nawaz Sharif, in order to try and stabilize the Pakistani government.

Political Islam was birthed by General Zia in 1970's and given ever more life by succeeding Pakistani governments, who saw in the Islamist movement a force to be deployed against India and, in Afghanistan, against Russia, and also to create a political power base inside Pakistan. One of the key individuals in the growth of this movement was Pakistan's former President Nawaz Sharif (pictured above) - himself heavilly supported by the Wahhaists and their petro dollars out of Saudi Arabia. He oversaw the vast expansion of Saudi madrassas in Pakistan as well as the development of Pakistan's nuclear program. Just prior to his ouster in a coup by General Perez Musharraf, Sharif was, as I recall, attempting to force through a change to Pakistan's Constitution to impose Sharia law throughout the country. The man is a very dangerous radical with ties to the very Islamists that now threaten Pakistan's existence.

Thus its breathtaking to hear the Obama administration talk about turning to Sharif in order to try to solve the existential threat to Pakistan by the Islamists. The NYT reports this as a positive development.

I do not see how anything good can come out of it. If we have learned nothing over the past decade it's that there is only one possible answer to the Islamist threat. It comes at the end of a gun. It comes from doing a deal with India that will allow Pakistan to withdraw its troops off the Indian border and send them into the NWFP. At best, playing to Sharif will accomplish nothing but putting such actions off while the Islamists grow ever stronger. Sharif has no motivation to weaken the Islamists - they are his power base.

I marvel at just how insipid the Obama government - and Sec. of State Hillary Clinton - really are.

Read More...

Summary only...

"The Civilized World Ought To Recognize The Immense Danger That Salafi Islam Poses"

The title of this post is a quote from Dr. Tawfiq Hamid. Dr. Hamid is a Cairo born physician who eventually became a practitioner of Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi / Salafi Islam, a jihadist, and a member of the terrorist organization Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). JI was an organization led by Ayman al-Zawahiri that later merged with al Qaeda as Zawahiri became Osama bin Laden's executive officer. What follows is Dr. Hamid's autobiographical story. It is a condemnation of Saudi Arabia's brand of Islam being exported across the world today with billions of petrodollars. And it chronicles Dr. Hamid's own belief that the Koran can and should be reinterpreted to promote equality and non-violence. I have mentioned Dr. Hamid several times before as one of those brave men who seeks to evolve his religion at great personal risk. And here is his story:

What occupies the mind of a jihad-driven Muslim? How is such fervor planted in young and impressionable believers? Where does it originate? How did I - once an innocent child who grew up in a liberal, moderate and educated household - find myself a member of a radical Islamic group? These questions go to the root of Islamic violence and must be addressed if free societies are to combat radical Islam. To further this aim, I will explore the psychological development of a jihadi's mind through my own firsthand experience as a former member of a Muslim terrorist organization.

I was born in Cairo to a secular Muslim family. My father was an orthopedic surgeon and an agnostic at heart; my mother was a French teacher and a liberal. Both considered Islam to be, primarily, an integral part of our culture. With the exception of my father, we would fast on Ramadan. Even though my father was not religious, he understood our need to fit into the community and never forced his secular views on us. He espoused diverse philosophical ideas but encouraged us to follow our own convictions. Most importantly, he taught my brother and me to think critically rather than to learn by rote.

I never had any doubt, however, that we were Muslim - that Allah was our creator, Muhammad his messenger and the Koran our book. I believed that if I performed good deeds, I would be admitted to paradise where I could satisfy all my personal desires. I also knew, alternatively, that my transgressions would be punished by eternal torture in hell. I absorbed these beliefs largely from the surrounding environment rather than from my parents; they were shared by most children around me.

. . . When I was nine, I learned the following Koranic verse during one of our Arabic lessons: "But do not think of those that have been slain in God's cause as dead. Nay, they are alive! With their sustainer have they their sustenance. They are very happy with the reward they received from Allah [for dying as a shahid] and they rejoice for the sake of those who have not joined them [i.e., have not yet died for Allah]" (Koran 3:169-70).

It was the first time I was exposed to the concept of shahid (martyr), and naturally, I began to dream of becoming one. The thought of entering paradise very much appealed to me. There I could eat all the lollipops and chocolates I wanted, or play all day without anyone telling me to study.

What made the concept of shahid even more attractive was its power to quell the fear I experienced as a young boy - for we were taught that if we were not good Muslims (especially if we did not pray five times a day), a "bald snake" would attack us in the grave. The idea of dying as a martyr provided a perfect escape from the frightening anguish of eternal punishment. Dying as a shahid, in fact, was the only deed that fully guaranteed paradise after death.

In secondary school I watched films about the early Islamic conquest. These films promoted the notion that "true" Muslims were devoted to aggressive jihad. While jihadi seeds were thereby planted in my mind, they did not yet seriously influence my personality or behavior. . . In my early years of high school, I was also - as many teenagers are - preoccupied with sex and hobbies. A variety of religious and cultural constraints made it virtually impossible to experience sexual activity, however.

During my last year of high school, I began to ponder seriously the concept of God while reading about the molecular structure of DNA in a biology book.

These thoughts prompted me to learn more about Islam and to devote myself to serving Allah. I remember one particularly defining moment in an Arabic language class when I was sitting beside a Christian friend named Nagi Anton. I was reading a book entitled Alshaykhan by Taha Hussein that cited the Prophet Muhammad's words: "I have been ordered by Allah to fight and kill all people [non-Muslims] until they say, 'No God except Allah.'" Following the reading of this Hadith, I decisively turned toward Nagi and said to him, "If we are to apply Islam correctly, we should apply this Hadith to you." At that moment I suddenly started to view Nagi as an enemy rather than as a longtime friend.

What further hardened my attitude on this matter was the advice I received from many dedicated Muslim fellow students, who warned me against befriending Christians. They based their counsel on the following verse: "O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends: They are but friends to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them [for friendship] is of them [an infidel]. Verily Allah guideth not a people unjust" (Koran 5:51).

In view of this verse and the previous one, I felt obliged as a Muslim to limit my relationships with my Christian friends. The love and friendship I once felt for them had been transformed into disrespect, merely because I wished to obey the commandments of my religion. The seductive ideas of my religious studies had diluted the influence of my secular upbringing. By restricting my contact with Christians, I felt that I was doing a great deed to satisfy Allah.

My high test scores enabled me to gain admission to the medical school at Cairo University in the late 1970s. At the time Islamism was proliferating rapidly. This was due in part to the money and textbooks Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi sect donated to promote Salafi Islam, but, more importantly, Islamism gained adherents because Egyptians attributed the growing wealth of Saudi Arabia to its strict practice of Salafism. We enviously lamented, "Look how Allah has blessed the Saudis with money and oil because they apply Shari'a." We believed that our economic problems would be solved if we did the same - just as Allah had blessed the Saudis, He would bless us.

At medical school I met members of Jamaah Islamiyah, an Islamic organization then approved by both the Egyptian government and the university, though later classified as a terrorist organization. Jamaah built a small prayer room in our medical school that later developed into a mosque with an associated library. The mosque was behind the physiology and biochemistry departments, and members of Jamaah came there daily before science classes to lecture us on Islam. They warned us about the punishments awaiting us after death if we did not follow Islam strictly and were effective in advancing Islamism among many of the students, including me.

Our fear of being punished after death was exacerbated by our work in the cadaver room, where we dissected dead bodies. Seeing death regularly during anatomy and physiology courses made us feel that the life of this world was meaningless compared to "real" life after death. Jamaah Islamiyah impressed that idea on us by citing the following Koranic verse: "Those who desire the life of the present and its glitter, to them we shall pay [the price of] their deeds therein, without diminution... [yet] it is they who, in the life to come, shall have nothing but the fire - for in vain shall be all good things that they have done in this [world], and worthless all that they ever did" (Koran 11:15-16). Indeed, the preachers used a range of verses to warn those who did not follow Muhammad and Islam rigorously that they would suffer in hell forever.

. . . The rising power of Jamaah Islamiyah inside the medical school was another critical factor in fostering my religious zealotry and that of my fellow students. Once Jamaah Islamiyah became influential, it prohibited such social events as listening to music, which it deemed un-Islamic. Female students were separated; they were not allowed to sit with males. Students were afraid to defy the group's hostile decrees. Its control reached the point where Christian professors were threatened. I will never forget when they attacked an anatomy professor, Dr. Edward, because he asked Jamaah leaders to end their "mandatory" daily sermon so that he could start his anatomy class. Jamaah Islamiyah's control of our medical school gradually limited our rights. Its members exploited the lack of restrictions on their conduct to deprive everybody else of freedom.

During my first year of medical school, a Jamaah member named Muchtar Muchtar invited me to join the organization. Muchtar was in his fourth year, and Jamaah had given him the title amir (prince or caliph) - a designation taken from early Islamic writings that is associated with the Islamic caliphate or amir almomenin (prince of the believers). I accepted his invitation, and we walked together to Jamaah's mosque for noon prayers. On the way there Muchtar emphasized the central importance in Islam of the concept of al-fikr kufr, the idea that the very act of thinking (fikr) makes one become an infidel (kufr). (In Arabic both words are derived from the same three root letters but have different meanings.) He told me, "Your brain is just like a donkey [a symbol of inferiority in the Arab culture] that can get you only to the palace door of the king [Allah]. To enter the palace once you have reached the door, you should leave the donkey [your inferior mind] outside." By this parable, Muchtar meant that a truly dedicated Muslim no longer thinks but automatically obeys the teachings of Islam.

Initially, I thought that I would experience an ordinary prayer session like those in other mosques. But before the prayers began, the participants were required to stand shoulder to shoulder and foot to foot. The leading cleric, Muhammad Omar, personally checked our arrangement for 15 minutes to make sure that there were no gaps between our shoulders or feet. The reason for this exercise became apparent when Omar recited the following verse: "Truly Allah loves those who fight in His cause in battle array, as if they were a solid cemented structure" (Koran 61:4). This militaristic attitude during prayers was the first step in preparing me for the concept of jihad against "the enemies of Allah," the non-Muslims.

Following the prayers, members of Jamaah welcomed me and introduced me to a "brother" named Magdi al-Mahdi, who advised me to start reading Salafi books. I followed his advice and became immersed in those texts. After a few months of listening to Jamaah's belligerent religious sermons and reading the materials they recommended, my personality was utterly transformed. I started to grow my beard. I stopped smiling and telling jokes. I adopted a serious look at all times and became very judgmental toward others. Bitter debates with my family ensued. My behavioral and intellectual transformation greatly alarmed my father. My mother was also concerned; she said that the Koran should be understood in a more moderate manner and advised me to stop reading Salafi materials.

Salafi teachings expressly forbid acting on sexual desire. They prohibit a man from touching any woman or even looking at one. Speaking to a woman on a personal level is not permitted. To be alone with a woman without relatives present, it is believed, would "invite Satan to be the third person." Women became for members of Jamaah, therefore, forbidden creatures. But while relations with women were strictly proscribed, the erotic passages in Salafi writings simultaneously aroused in us a powerful sexual desire. This dilemma led us to conclude that dying for Allah provided our only hope for satisfying our lust, because that lust could be satisfied only in paradise. It is not surprising that Osama bin Laden and other terrorist leaders sent letters to their suicide murderers that described to them the hur, or white ladies awaiting them in paradise.

In addition to its severe prohibitions governing sexual conduct, Salafi Islam also strictly limits most artistic expression, which it considers to be satanic. Music involving string instruments is haram (forbidden). Songs, especially romantic ones, are prohibited as well. It is haram to listen to a woman's singing voice. Even drawing is restricted. Such harsh prohibitions suppressed my ability to appreciate beauty and prepared my mind to accept the inhuman elements in Salafi doctrine. By way of contrast, it is interesting to note that Sufi Muslims enjoy music, singing and dancing, and they rarely, if ever, engage in terrorism.

Unfortunately, I followed Salafi Islam. My hatred toward non-Muslims increased dramatically, and jihadi doctrine became second nature to me. My goal of being a physician and healing the sick grew tainted, infected by my strong wish to subjugate non-Muslims and impose Shari'a.

At one afternoon prayer session, an imam I had never met before gave a sermon. He was one of the fiercest speakers I had ever heard. His passion for jihad was astonishing. He advocated complete Islamic dominance, urging us to pursue jihad against non-Muslims and subdue them to Shari'a - the duty of every true Muslim. His rhetoric inspired us to engage in war against the infidels, the enemies of Allah. He particularly condemned the West for the freedom of its women. He hated the fact that Western women were permitted to wear what they pleased, to work and to have the same opportunities as men.

He dreamt of forcing the West to conform to a Taliban-style system in which women were obliged to wear the Islamic hijab, were legally beaten by men to discipline them and were stoned to death for extramarital sex. After the imam's speech my friend, Tariq Abdul-Muhsin, asked me if I knew this speaker. When I said I did not, Tariq told me that he was Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and, because I was a new member of Jamaah, offered to introduce us.

Zawahiri was exceptionally bright, one of the top postgraduate students in the medical school. We called him by his title and first name - Dr. Ayman.

He came from a well-known, highly-educated and wealthy family. As was customary for Jamaah members, he wore a beard and dressed occasionally in the Pakistani style of the Taliban. He disapproved of Egypt's secular government; he wanted Egypt to follow Shari'a law and Coptic Christians to be made dhimmis - second-class citizens submissive to Islam. To disparage secular Arab governments, he cited the following verse: "For they who do not judge in accordance with what God has bestowed from on high are, indeed, infidels" (Koran 5:44).

When I met him, Zawahiri welcomed me affectionately. He spoke quietly, gazing intently at me through his thick glasses. With a serious expression he placed his hand on my shoulder and said, "Young Muslims like you are the hope for the future return of khilafa [caliphate or Islamic global dominance]." I felt a great sense of gratitude and honor. I wanted to please him by contributing to his "noble" cause. Throughout my membership in Jamaah, I would meet with Zawahiri on six more occasions. He did not have much time to spare, however, for he was deeply involved in several Islamist organizations.

One of Zawahiri's significant achievements was to personalize jihad - that is, to have transformed it from a responsibility of the umma, the Islamic collective, to a duty of Muslim individuals. His goal is to spread the empire of Islam through the actions of individual radical Muslims, each of whom is incited to wage a personal jihad. This allows young Muslims to carry out suicide bombings without the endorsement of the collective body.

Zawahiri and his fellow jihadis base their philosophy on the verse that states, "Then fight in Allah's cause - you are held responsible only for yourself - and rouse the believers [to fight]" (Koran 4:84).

Within several months I was invited to travel to Afghanistan to join other young Muslims in training for jihad. It was fairly common to be recruited after the end of Friday prayers. Volunteering to train in Afghanistan was very simple: I only needed to register my name in certain mosques, and organizers would carry out all the logistical and financial arrangements. I was excited to go because I believed that I would be fulfilling "the command of Allah" to wage jihad. It seemed the easiest way to guarantee my salvation in the afterlife and to attain my purpose in life.

We viewed both the Soviets and the Americans as enemies. The Soviets were considered infidels because they did not believe in the existence of God, while the Americans did not follow Islam. Although we planned to fight the Soviets first, our ultimate objective was to destroy the United States - the greatest symbol of the infidel's freedom. My personal dream was to be an Islamic warrior, to kill the enemies of Islam, to smite their necks in accordance with the Koranic verse that read, "When ye meet the unbelievers smite at their necks" (Koran 47:4).

We considered the Prophet Muhammad to be our role model. The Koran commanded us to follow in his footsteps: "Ye have indeed in the messenger of Allah a beautiful pattern [of conduct] for anyone whose hope is in Allah and the final day, and who engages much in the praise of Allah" (Koran 33:21).

Salafi Islamic texts demonstrate Muhammad's uncompromising nature. They encourage devout Muslims to emulate the prophet's deeds and to accept and defend his actions in even the harshest passages. When confronted by outsiders, however, these same Muslims insist that such stories are misinterpreted because they are taken out of context - though they rarely, if ever, provide the context. This self-protective denial effectively paralyzes further criticism by the West. Meanwhile, these texts are taught and understood in a very literal way by both the young members of Jamaah and many other Muslims.

I was not allowed to question any established teaching of Salafi ideology. The Salafists consider any criticism of Islamic texts as redda (apostasy) punishable by death and eternal damnation. Out of simple fear, then, I attempted to idolize Muhammad and to emulate him as he is portrayed in the Sunna. The fear of such harsh punishment deters most other Muslims from criticizing Salafi teaching as well.

I increasingly felt at ease with death because I believed that I would either defeat the infidels on earth or enjoy paradise in the afterlife.

Jihad against non-Muslims seemed to me to be a win-win situation. The following verse, commonly cited by Jamaah members, validated my duty to die for Allah: "Allah has purchased the believers, their lives and their goods. For them [in return] is the garden [of paradise]. They fight in Allah's cause, and they slay and are slain; they kill and are killed... it [paradise] is the promise of Allah to them" (Koran 9:111).

I passed through three psychological stages to reach this level of comfort with death: hatred of non-Muslims or dissenting Muslims, suppression of my conscience and acceptance of violence in the service of Allah. Salafi religious indoctrination played a major role in this process. Salafists promoted our hatred for non-Muslims by emphasizing the Koranic verse that read, "Thou wilt not find any people who believe in Allah and the last day loving those who resist [i.e. do not follow] Allah and His messenger" (Koran 58:22).

Salafi writings also helped me to suppress my conscience by holding that many activities I had considered to be immoral were, instead, halal - that is, allowed by Allah and the prophet. My conscience would normally reject polygamy, for example, because of the severe psychological pain it would cause my future wife. Salafi teaching encourages polygamy, however, permitting up to four wives as halal: "Marry women of your choice, two or three or four" (Koran 4:3). I accepted such ideas - ideas that contradicted my moral outlook - because I came to believe that we cannot negotiate with God about his commandments: "He cannot be questioned for His acts, but they will be questioned [for theirs]" (Koran 21:23).

Once I was able to suppress my conscience, I was open to accepting violence without guilt - the third psychological stage. One Salafi method of generating this crucial attitude is to encourage violence against women, a first step in developing a brutal mentality. Salafists emphasize the following text: "Men are superior to women because Allah has given them more preference than to women, and because they financially support them. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in [the husband's] absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part you fear that they do not obey you, admonish them, avoid making sex with them [as a form of punishment], and beat them; but if they return to obedience, seek not against them means [of annoyance]: For Allah is most high, great [above you all]" (Koran 4:34).

A mind that accepts violence against women is much more likely to be comfortable murdering hated infidels and responding to the verse that reads: "O prophet, strive hard [fight] against the unbelievers and the hypocrites, and be harsh with them. Their abode is hell, an evil refuge indeed" (Koran 9:73). It is clear that the three psychological stages in Salafism that I have described are deeply interconnected.

. . . It is unfortunate and disastrous that the theological underpinnings of Salafism are both powerful and prevalent in the approved, traditional Islamic books. These texts teach, moreover, that the Koran's later, more violent passages abrogate its earlier, peaceful ones. This concept, called nasikh wa-l-mansukh, has effectively diminished the influence of the peaceful verses.

When I discussed the implications of the violent passages with a few Sufi clergy, they suggested that one "should be good and peaceful to all mankind" and that "the understanding of the violent verses will be clarified on the day of judgment." These views were not based on rigorous Islamic eschatology, however, or on an objective analysis of the religious books.

They merely embodied a desired perception of Islam. My secular parents offered the same tolerant perspective, insisting that Islam is a religion of peace. But for me both responses were unsatisfactory because they suffered from the same problem - they were not theologically grounded. My difficulty was not resolved, and I continued to live with a complex dilemma.

My crisis of conscience was mostly internal, but I did share some of my doubts with my mother. On one occasion a fellow medical student named Abdul Latif Haseeb started a conversation with me about religion. We discussed whether it was right to kill apostates or stone women to death, as well as whether Muhammad could be considered a pedophile because he married the seven-year-old Aisha. We weighed the merits of declaring war on non-Muslims to spread Islam and agreed that it should be rejected because it is condoned only by supplemental Salafi books rather than by the Koran itself.

Haseeb belonged to a sect known as Koranist, which strictly adhered to the teachings of the Koran but rejected other writings. This opened my eyes. I was impressed that my new friend disagreed with many Salafi teachings. I also realized that Haseeb was not alone in his beliefs; his father and several mutual acquaintances shared the same ideas. They relied on new interpretations of the Koran and spurned the traditional Salafi textbooks.

They accepted and tolerated different views within Islam and, in most circumstances, had a peaceful analysis of the verses.

Haseeb invited me to join the sect, and I accepted his invitation in order to examine the Koranists' ideas more thoroughly. Though not without problems, the sect possessed at least some rigor and was more moderate than Salafism. It provided me with a protected sanctuary that allowed me to keep my identity as a Muslim while giving me the flexibility to reinterpret Koranic verses in a nonviolent way. The group counted among its members the liberal peace activist Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, whom I met on one occasion.

Mahmoud was later murdered in Sudan by exponents of Salafi doctrine for the crime of "apostasy" because his teaching clashed with theirs. I eventually built on the Koranists' ideas in developing a fresh understanding of the Koran that is compatible with the values of human rights and modernity.

By immersing myself in Salafi ideology, I was better able to judge the impact of its violent tenets on the minds of its followers. Among the more appalling notions it supports are the enslavement and rape of female war prisoners and the beating of women to discipline them. It permits polygamy and pedophilia. It refers to Jews as "pigs and monkeys" and exhorts believers to kill them before the end of days: Say: "Shall I tell you who, in the sight of God, deserves a yet worse retribution than these? Those [the Jews] whom God has rejected and whom He has condemned, and whom He has turned into monkeys and pigs because they worshiped the powers of evil: these are yet worse in station, and farther astray from the right path [than the mockers]" (Koran 5:60). Homosexuals are to be killed as well; to cite one of many examples, on July 19, 2000, two gay teenagers were hanged in Iran for no other crime than being gay.

These doctrines are not taken out of context, as many apologists for Islamism argue: They are central to the faith and ethics of millions of Muslims, and are currently being taught as part of the standard curriculum in many Islamic educational systems in the Middle East as well in the West.

Moreover, there is no single approved Islamic textbook that contradicts or provides an alternative to the passages I have cited. It has thus become clear to me that Salafi ideology is what is largely responsible for the so-called "clash of civilizations." Consequently, I have chosen to combat Salafism by exposing it and by providing an alternative, peaceful and theologically rigorous interpretation of the Koran.

My reformist approach naturally challenges well-established Salafi tenets, and leads Muslims who follow Salafi Islam to reject me. Why? I have not altered the Koran itself. My system is simply one of inline commentary, in which dangerous passages are flagged and reinterpreted to be nonviolent. I have added these inline interpretations to key Koranic passages and examples of the commentary are freely and easily available.

For over 15 years I have tried to preach my views in mosques in the Middle East, as well as to my local community in the West, but have faced the unwavering hostility of most Salafi Muslims in both regions. Muslims who live in the West - who insist to outsiders that Islam is a "religion of peace" and who enjoy freedom of expression, which they demand from their Western hosts - have threatened me with murder and arson. I have had to choose between accepting violent Salafi views and being rejected by the overwhelming majority of my fellow Muslims.

Even though radical Islam began to reassert itself in the 1970s, it did not become widely pervasive until quite recently. In the early 1990s many people were intrigued by my ideas, and only a few militants threatened me with violence. One day, after I gave a peaceful Friday sermon, I walked home with a friend. To my surprise, several men ran up and threw stones at us from behind to intimidate me from returning and speaking in their mosques. As time has passed, this violent and threatening behavior has become more common: Dr. Wafa Sultan in the US, Abdul Fatah in Egypt and many others have received and continue to receive death threats. Recently, Dr. Nawal al-Sadawi, a liberal Muslim thinker and women's rights activist, was forced to flee Egypt because of her public statements. Dr. Rashad Khalifa was murdered in the United States after he published his own reinterpretation of the Koran which was less violent than was traditional.

In Egypt, Dr. Faraq Fuddah was shot to death after publishing condemnations of Jihadists. Egyptian Nobel Prize winner Najib Mahfouz was stabbed in the neck for writing his novel, Awlad Haretna, perceived by Salafists as blasphemous. The list goes on. Still, the majority of members in many Muslim communities have adopted the violent teachings of the Islamists.

Salafi indoctrination operates through written words and careful coaching. It is enormously seductive. It rapidly changed me into a jihadi. Salafi sacred texts exert a powerful influence on millions of Muslim followers throughout the world, and terrorism is only one symptom of the Salafi disease. Salafi doctrine, which is at the root of the West's confrontation with Islamism, poses an existential threat to us all - including Muslims.

Indeed, Salafism robs young Muslims of their soul, it turns Western communities against them, and it can end in civil war as Muslims attempt to implement shari'a in their host countries. A peaceful interpretation of Islam is possible, but the Salafi establishment is currently blocking moderate theological reform. The civilized world ought to recognize the immense danger that Salafi Islam poses; it must become informed, courageous and united if it is to protect both a generation of young Muslims and the rest of humanity from the disastrous consequences of this militant ideology.

Read the article.

Read More...

Summary only...

Interesting News - 14 January 2008

This is hilarious. All the reasons to vote for Fred, Part II


(H/T Blogs of War)

Normalcy returns to Baghdad, block by block.

Do read this eloquent posting from the Covenant Zone on the Danish Cartoons, the prosecution of Ezra Levant, and the left’s defining cult of victimhood ascendant in Canada today.

Read this superb roundup on the situation in Pakistan from Dinah Lord. And do see this on the plot to blow up the Eiffel Tower.

From the Int’l Herald Tribune: "Former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi received an Islamist death threat Friday in a letter containing two bullets that was sent to a newspaper owned by his family's media empire. . . In September 2001, when Berlusconi was prime minister, he inflamed the Muslim world and angered Western diplomats by stating that Western civilization was "superior" to that of Islam." Just as a curious aside, why would Berlusconi’s statement anger Western diplomats? If they think Islamic culture superior, they should adopt it. (H/T MK’s Views Down Under)

The Velvet Hammer takes note of Hillary playing the . . . Osama card?

At Gates of Vienna, a response to the taqiyah of main stream British Islamist and grandson of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Tariq Ramadan.

See Dr. Sanity for her incisive thoughts on capitalism.

And on a related note, see the Glittering Eye for a review of the blunders of those who are supposed to be watching and assessing capitalism for us.

Soccer Dad has a great analysis Shibley Telhami’s editorial in today’s paper about the driving motivation of Arab regimes today.

American Digest has a great roundup of "Science Made Stupid"

Britney Spears to go burkha? Apparently so. According to the Jawa Report, Britney Spears, currently involved in a relationship with a British Sunni Muslim, "will be converting to Islam, thus ending all doubt that she belongs in a mental institution."

And lastly, from the Shield of Achilles: The photo [below] is Mayor Carmen Kontur-Gronquist, from Arlington, Oregon, a short time before she took office. The photo . . . upset some people in the town enough to demand her resignation. Holy cow, people need to get a life: 1) The photos were taken before her job as Mayor, and have nothing to do with her job; 2) These aren't nude photos anyway (you can see the same amount of skin at the beach), and 3) she looks great! You don't see too many town mayors with that kind of muscle tone and flat stomach. Wow! She should be proud. It's actually the kind of example in physical fitness that America needs more of, not less.

Read More...

Summary only...

The Intersection of Islam, Government & Democracy

We’ve been treated to a bevy of articles recently discussing the intersection of Islam and politics in the Middle East, all of which raise some troubling questions with surprising answers. The threshold question is how do such parties perform in democratic elections?

Amir Taheri answers that question, and it would seem, throughout the Middle East, that their popularity is not strong:

. . . [I]n Jordan's latest general election, held last month, the radical Islamic Action Front (IAF) suffered a rout. The IAF's share of the votes fell to five per cent from almost 15 per cent in the elections four years ago. The group, linked with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, managed to keep only six of its 17 seats in the National Assembly (parliament.) Its independent allies won no seats.

. . . The Islamists' defeat in the Jordanian elections confirms a trend that started years ago. Conventional wisdom was that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and lack of progress in the Israel-Palestine conflict, provide radical Islamists with a springboard from which to seize power through elections.

. . . So far, no Islamist party has managed to win a majority of the popular vote in any of the Muslim countries where reasonably clean elections are held. If anything, the Islamist share of the votes has been declining across the board.
In Malaysia, the Islamists have never crossed beyond the 11 per cent share of the popular vote. In Indonesia, the various Islamist groups have never collected more than 17 per cent.

The Islamists' share of the popular vote in Bangladesh declined from an all-time high of 11 per cent in the 1980s to around seven per cent in the late 1990s.
In Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, won the 2006 general election with 44 per cent of the votes, far short of the "crushing wave of support" it had promised.

Even then, it was clear that at least some of those who run on a Hamas ticket did not share its radical Islamist ideology. Despite years of misrule and corruption, Fatah, Hamas' secularist rival, won 42 per cent of the popular vote.

In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has won two successive general elections, the latest in July 2007, with 44 per cent of the popular vote. Even then, AKP leaders go out of their way to insist that the party "has nothing to do with religion".

"We are a modern, conservative, European-style party," AKP leader and Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan, likes to repeat at every opportunity. In last July's general election, the AKP lost 23 seats and, with it, its two-third majority in the Grand National Assembly (parliament).

AKP's success in Turkey inspired Moroccan Islamists to create a similar outfit called Party of Justice and Development (PDJ). The PDJ sought support from AKP "experts" to prepare for last September's general election in Morocco.
And, yet, when the votes were counted, the PJD collected just over 10 per cent of the popular vote to win 46 of the 325 seats.

Islamists have done no better in neighboring Algeria. In the latest general election, held in May 2007, the two Islamist parties, Movement for a Peaceful Society (HMS) and Algerian Awakening (An Nahda) won just over 12 per cent of the popular vote.

In Yemen, possibly one of the Arab states where the culture of democracy has struck the deepest roots, elections in the past 20 years have shown support for Islamists to stand at around 25 per cent of the popular vote. In the last general election in 2003, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah) won 22 per cent.

Kuwait is another Arab country where holding reasonably fair elections has become part of the culture. In the general election last year, a well-funded and sophisticated Islamist bloc collected 27 per cent of the votes and won 17 of the 50 seats in the National Assembly.

In Lebanon's last general election in 2005, the two Islamist parties, Hezbollah (Party of God) and Amal (Hope) collected 21 per cent of the popular vote to win 28 of the 128 seats in the parliament.

And, this despite massive financial and propaganda support from Iran and electoral pacts with a Christian political bloc led by the pro-Tehran ex-General Michel Aoun.
Afghanistan . . . [has] held a series of elections since the fall of the Taliban in Kabul . . . By all standards, these have been generally free and fair elections, and thus valid tests of the public mood. In Afghanistan, Islamist groups, including former members of the Taliban, have managed to win around 11 per cent of the popular vote on the average . . .

Read the entire article. Thus, it would seem that Islamist movements have only limited support throughout the Middle East where reasonably free elections have occurred.

One of the other interesting aspects of using religion to justify a political party is the backlash when such parties take power and do not deliver – as is often the case since you can’t eat a holy book, nor do sacred texts generate electricity of serve to make water potable. Thus, in Iraq as pointed out in this article here, and now in Pakistan, when religious parties had in fact taken political control of some of the provicial areas, their failure to perform as promised is not being excused by the electorate, irrespective of their religious credentials:

In 2002, Ibrar Hussein voted for an Islamic takeover.

Fed up both with Pakistan's military-led government and with the mainstream, secular opposition, Hussein decided that religious leaders should be given a chance to improve living conditions in this sprawling frontier city.

But five years after support from people like Hussein propelled the Islamic parties to power in the provincial government -- and to their strongest-ever showing nationally -- the 36-year-old shopkeeper is rethinking his choice.

"You can see the sanitation system here," Hussein said, pointing with disgust to a ditch in front of his shop where a stream of greenish-brown sludge trickled by. "People were asking for clean water, and they didn't get it. We were very hopeful. But the mullahs did nothing for us."

Hussein's disenchantment is just one reason why, with Pakistan on the eve of fresh parliamentary elections, the religious parties are struggling to appeal to voters.

On the surface, at least, they have many things going for them: Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, is deeply unpopular. So, too, are his backers in Washington. The leading opposition politicians have had their opportunities before, and failed. Overall, frustration in Pakistan is running high.

And yet the Islamic parties seem poorly positioned to benefit from that frustration. Beset by bitter internal divisions, they have failed to come up with a unified campaign strategy. Their candidates, meanwhile, have to answer for a dubious record in governing North-West Frontier Province, their traditional base of support. And out on the stump, they are finding that anti-American sentiments are not quite as raw as they once were. . .

Read the article here.

Thus, in terms of democracy, Islamists would seem to have a limited appeal that tends to degrade further when they are actually voted into office. But the danger of Islamist parties is that, at least some seek only one democratic vote - the one to ensconce them into power. Or as Bernard Lewis put it, "one man, one vote, one time." That is what happened in Iran when they voted in a government structure that included the unique Khomeini construct of the Supreme Guide. Time will tell whether that holds true in the Gaza strip, where Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot, took total control in a coup some months ago.

On a final note, it is interesting to note that the imposition of a theocracy in Iran has had an effect beyond just the political realm. The theocracy is doing a tremendous job of secularizing a large portion of its youth who comprise over 70% of its population.

Read More...

Summary only...

Riots In France Again

This today from the New York Times on renewed rioting in Parisian suburbs:

Dozens of youths clashed with the police for the second night in a row in a working- and lower-class suburb north of Paris on Monday, throwing stones, glass and firebombs against large contingents of heavily armed riot police officers and moving nimbly from target to target on several fronts, torching cars and a garbage truck.

. . . The clashes began when two teenagers traveling on a motorbike died in a collision with a police car on Sunday afternoon in the town of Villiers-le-Bel, about 12 miles north of Paris, in the Val d’Oise department. The two teenagers were identified in the French news media merely as 15-year-old Moushin and 16-year-old Larami, who were riding a motorbike in Villiers-le-Bel.

On Monday night, more than 100 youths had pushed riot police officers into the middle of a four-way intersection, raining projectiles on them from at least two directions. Police officers responded with tear gas and paint guns to mark the attackers for future arrest. Broken glass and used tear-gas canisters littered the roads.

At least one police officer was wounded. Within sight of the intersection, a garbage truck was on fire, apparently unattended as youths were lined up behind it.
At least 15 cars were burned, with the police guarding the local fire department and protecting firefighters as they put out fires. At least three buildings suffered some fire damage, including a library and a post office, a spokesman for the police in Val d’Oise said.

. . . The police expected more unrest on Monday night.

“We’ve talked to our colleagues from the domestic intelligence services, who themselves talked to their contacts, in particular in schools, and what they are hearing are the little brothers saying, ‘My big brother told me to stay home tonight because they are going to destroy everything,’” Patrick Trotignon, who is in charge of the Paris area for the Synergie Officiers police union, said Monday.

The two deaths in Villiers-le-Bel recall the deaths of Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré, teenagers who were electrocuted in a power station in another suburb, Clichy-sous-Bois, in October 2005. Their deaths led to the three-week civil unrest that eventually spread to many urban areas in France. Mr. Sarkozy, who was interior minister at the time, made a name for himself by calling for tough measures against the youths involved.

There were riots just a few months ago in Parisian suburbs when police arrested an illegal immigrant with 22 convictions after he jumped a subway turnstyle and then headbutted one of the inspectors. The violence subsided after a few days.

The 2005 riots that convulsed France lasted for twenty nights and effected 19 provinces. By the time it was over, one person was dead, 8,973 vehicles had been destroyed and damage to property amounted to over 200 million euros. 2,888 people were arrested.

The problems of “suburban violence” by the disaffected, largely Muslim youth has been ongoing in France for decades. As Harvard Professor Jocelyne Cesari wrote after the 2005 riots, the riots resulted from three separate problems of poverty, ethnicity and radicalized Wahhabi / Salafi Islam:

. . . [V]iolence in the suburbs is nothing new. In the 1980s, the suburbs of Paris and Lyon were similarly set aflame. And in November of 2004, the violence of the suburbs broke out in the very heart of Paris when two rival gangs clashed on the Champs Elysées. Nor is the isolation of French youth a new phenomenon. Since the 1981 “rodeo riots” in the Lyon suburb Les Minguettes, social and economic conditions in the suburbs have only deteriorated, despite the often generous funding of urban development projects. It is not sufficient, however, to attribute these outbreaks of violence solely to factors of social and economic marginality. This marginality is exacerbated by a general context of urban degradation: a degradation, furthermore, which affects a very specific sector of the population. That is, the crisis of the banlieues primarily concerns first- and second-generation immigrants from the former colonies of the Maghreb. This population has frequently been treated as a separate case, not only in terms of the history and conditions of immigration, but also in terms of the politics of integration. This constant exclusion results in the fact that the issues of poverty, ethnicity, and Islam tend to be conflated, both in current political discourse and in political practice. The recent violence is but the direct consequence of the constant amalgamation of these three separate issues. . . .

Read the entire article.

The riots are just the most visible symptom of a violent subculture in the suburbs, much of it associated with Wahhabi / Salafi Islam. Other notable examples of this violent subculture are here and here.

And there is this from an essay by Fjordman in May, 2007, highlighting the problems with France's large population of Muslim youth

. . . In France, Muslims already have many smaller states within the state. Criminologist Lucienne Bui Trong wrote that: “From 106 hot points in 1991, we went to 818 sensitive areas in 1999.” The term she used, “sensitive areas,” was used to describe Muslim no-go zones where anything representing a Western institution (post office truck, firemen, even mail order delivery firms) was routinely ambushed with Molotov cocktails. The number was 818 in 2002, when the French government decided to stop collecting the statistics.

In some of these areas, the phenomenon of gang rape “has become banal.” Violence against and pressure on women is part of daily life in the suburbs, where boys can dictate how girls should dress. Pressure is mounting for Muslim women to wear veils. In 2002, a 17-year-old girl was set alight by an 18-year-old boy as his friends stood by. The support group “Ni Putes, Ni Soumises” (“Neither Whores nor Submissives”) says the number of forced marriages has risen in recent years, with roughly 70,000 girls pressured into unwanted relationships each year in France. A leaked study conducted between October 2003 and May 2004 under the auspices of France’s inspector-general of education, Jean Pierre Obin, described an educational system where Muslim students regularly boycotted classes that concerned Voltaire, Rousseau and Moliere, whom the students accused of being anti-Islamic. Orbin’s report cited Muslim students’ refusal to use the “plus” sign in mathematics because it looks like a crucifix; Muslims boycotting class trips to churches, cathedrals and monasteries; and forcing wholesale changes in school lunch fare to accommodate their religious practices.

The influence of radical Islamist groups is a growing threat to French business, too, a leading intelligence expert warned, citing the discovery of secret prayer-rooms at the Disneyland theme-park outside Paris. A report commissioned by several retail and courier companies stated that the Islamists’ strategy is to “take control of Muslims within the workforce” and then “challenge the rules in order to impose Islamic values.” French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy said that the riots in 2005 were rather “well organized.” Caroline Glick of the Jerusalem Post noted that some Muslim leaders explained that what they wanted was autonomy in their ghettos: “They seek to receive extraterritorial status from the French government, meaning that they will set their own rules based, one can assume, on Sharia law. If the French government accepts the notion of communal autonomy, France will cease to be a functioning state.” Following three weeks of unrest, the police said 98 vehicles torched in one day marked a “return to a normal situation everywhere in France.” Some of the rioters left boasting messages on various Internet forums. “We aren’t going to let up. The French won’t do anything and soon, we will be in the majority here.” One observer stated: “In France, the majority of young Muslims believe that French society is dying, committing suicide. More like 10 percent to 20 percent of them believe that they are in the process of replacing European civilization with an Islamic one.” In the southern city of Marseille, Muslims make up at least a quarter of the population, and rising fast.. . . .

Read the entire essay.

Read More...

Summary only...

Secular Author Debates Merits of Islam on al Jazeera

This is a must-read transcript from MEMRI involving a debate between secular Syrian author Nidhal Na'isa and Egyptian cleric. Mr. Na'isa is eloquent in his damning of Islamism and the evils that Islam has visited on the Middle East:

Interviewer: . . . Despite the Western, economic, political, cultural, media, and social invasion of the region, the Arab individual's hatred of the foreign platforms only grows, and his adherence to the Islamic platform increases. You have the results before you: About 90 percent of the voters reject the modernizing, secular, Western platforms - call them what you will. How do you respond to this?"
. . .
Nidhal Na'isa: "As you know, these voters are a bunch of people misled and numbed by the proselytizing, generalized, deceptive, romanticized discourse, which promises them black-eyed virgins and boys in Paradise, and such things. This discourse merely postpones the resolution of their problems - instead of resolving them today, let's resolve them in a billion years. This is escapism into the future. That's one thing. If those voters had managed to get a job and a visa to America, none of them would have voted, and nobody would have watched your show. You would be fired from Al-Jazeera and would be left jobless.

"Secondly, these votes reflect disgust for the totalitarian regimes. Like the hijab and all this Islamization, we are talking about disgust with the totalitarian regimes that have denied these people the good life. They are not voting this way out of love for these platforms... "

Interviewer: "They're not voting this way out of love for the Islamic platforms?"

Nidhal Na'isa: "The platforms are Islamist, not Islamic. We must draw a distinction between Islam and the Islamists. There are Islamists, who use Islam for their political designs, and there is Islam. We respect Islam in the religious, spiritual, and ideological sense. But those peddlers of Islam, who accuse others of heresy, are the ones we must confront. They mislead these wretched people and make fools of them, by the deceptive proselytizing discourse.

. . . "Ever since these Bedouins invaded and colonized these countries, these countries have lived in a cycle of subjugation, oppression, and torture. These countries live under the burden of totalitarianism, backwardness, and ideological and social decay. 'From Tangier to Jakarta' - that is the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamic Al-Tahrir Party. From Tangier to Jakarta, all you see is poverty, totalitarianism, and decay..."

. . . "This platform has been failing for 1,400 years, and now they say to you: 'We will revive this platform.' Brother, if this platform was politically successful, we would welcome it, and would hope that people live a life of happiness. But this platform has brought nothing but wars and conflicts. People from the same country have become enemies because of these platforms, these lies, this animosity, this sectarianism, and this tribal fanaticism, which was revived by those Bedouins who invaded and colonized these countries.

"Egypt, Iraq, and Syria have been centers of civilization since the dawn of history. They gave rise to civilization. Every day the sun rose, civilization shone on them. But when those Bedouins went in, they destroyed these countries, which have never recovered since. Since those Bedouins entered these countries, they have never recovered. They have become decaying countries, suffering from poverty, misery, and tyranny."

Ibrahim Al-Khoulib: "First of all, who are these Bedouins to whom you refer?'

Nidhal Na'isa: "The Bedouins who invaded these countries."

. . . Ibrahim Al-Khoulib: "Who were they exactly? Do you mean the Bedouins of Najd in modern times?"

Nidhal Na'isa: "In modern times and in ancient times."

Ibrahim Al-Khoulib: "What do you mean?"

Nidhal Na'isa: "In modern times, they have invaded these countries, armed with petrodollars and Wahabism..."

Ibrahim Al-Khoulib: "The Bedouins who conquered these countries, according to you..."

Nidhal Na'isa: "They invaded them by means of the sword..."

Ibrahim Al-Khoulib: . . . Western civilization is not really a civilization, brother."

Nidhal Na'isa: "Western civilization is not really a civilization?" . . . "How did you come here from Egypt in two hours? On camels, it used to take you over six months to make a pilgrimage." . . .

Read the entire transcript.

Read More...

Summary only...