Sadr Calls For Attacks On U.S. Troops & Endorses A Theocracy

Moqtada al Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Militia movement in Iraq, has given an interview on al Jazeera that aired Friday, March 28 and in which he called for his followers to attack U.S. and coallition soldiers. This certainly sounds like the end to the ceasefire, at least in so far as U.S. forces are concerned. And Sadr states that he shares the same ideology as Iran's theocratic rulers.


_______________________________________________________

Sadr has given an interview justifying the continued existence of his Mahdi milia as an armed organization on the presence of U.S. soldiers in Iraq and called upon his followers to attack the U.S. This certainly sounds like the end of any cease-fire, at least as far as we are concerned. Sadr says that expects the U.S. will be "vanquished as it was in Vietnam."

And if there was ever any doubt that Sadr wants to see theocratic rule in Iraq, his interview should dispel it. He states that he shares the same ideology as Iran's theocratic ruler, the Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei. This from a MEMRI translation of the interview aired on al Jazeera March 28, 2008:

Muqtada Al-Sadr: . . . It is the duty of the Al-Sadr movement and of the Iraqi people to strive to gradually liberate Iraq. The liberation of Iraq does not mean only bearing arms. There is also cultural liberation, social liberation, military liberation, and so on. The assault against Islam is not only military. It is both cultural and military, and it requires, at any given period, diversification of the resistance. But the liberation of Iraq remains a national duty, and a primary goal of the Al-Sadr movement. . . .

"It is true that Saddam was occupying Iraq with his dictatorship and his reckless policies, which were hundreds of miles removed from reason - policies that were, in fact, devoid of any reason. However, the military intervention of the occupying forces of all nationalities does not constitute liberation. The proof is that we did not get rid of Saddam or the Ba'thists. They are still around and still have a negative influence in Iraq.

"The second thing is that the American influence on the Iraqis is even more negative than that of the former Ba'th Party. The Iraqi people still suffers as it did in the days of the Saddam - there are no services, there is a lack of security, and we still suffer from all the things we suffered from in the past. Therefore, this was occupation, not liberation. I call it occupation. I have said in recent years: Gone is the 'little Satan,' and in came the 'Great Satan.'"

Interviewer: "After five years of war, do you still believe that Iraq is occupied?"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "Bush used to say that his picture would hang in all the Iraqi homes. No, sir. His picture is now trampled underfoot by the Iraqis."

Interviewer: "But is Iraq still occupied by the American forces?"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "Yes, it is, and American popularity is dropping daily - why daily? It is dropping by the minute." . . .

Interviewer: "Do you consider acts of resistance to be legitimate when directed against these forces, which you call 'occupying forces?'"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "No one can deny [the right] to conduct resistance. No human mind would deny it. Resistance is the legitimate right of all peoples. Resistance automatically appears wherever there is occupation. Allah willing, the U.S. will be vanquished, just like it was in Vietnam."

Interviewer: "Do you support any armed resistance against these forces, which you label 'occupiers?'"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "This is the reasonable right..."

Interviewer: "Do you support it? Do you support armed resistance against the forces you call 'occupiers?'"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "Against the occupiers - yes, but not against others."

Interviewer: "Since you claim that Iraq is now occupied, and that the occupiers are the Americans, do you support conducting acts of armed resistance, in order to liberate Iraq from the occupying American forces, as you call them?"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "On condition that these acts do not harm the Iraqi people."

Interviewer: "I will get to that. We will talk later about your general political position. Do you openly support these acts?"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "Yes, I do."

Interviewer: What do you mean when you say 'on condition that they do not harm the Iraqi people?'"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "For example, that the battles should not be waged within the city. This is just one example of how to avoid harming the Iraqi people. The targets should be hit accurately, so that others will not be harmed. The people who conduct resistance know these things better than me."

Interviewer: "What we abroad understood was that you disbanded the Al-Mahdi Army, because you had lost control over it."

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "The Al-Mahdi Army is under control, or at least most of it. They are obedient, loyal, and faithful. They are even capable of gradually liberating Iraq, Allah willing, along with some other resistance forces." . . .

"This will be the army of the Reformer [the Mahdi], Allah willing. At the end of time, the Mahdi will appear, and if by that time, we are still around, and if we are capable mentally, physically, militarily, and in terms of faith, we will all be his soldiers, Allah willing. Hence, the Al-Mahdi Army is a matter of faith, and it cannot be disbanded."

Interviewer: "What is the strategic goal of the Al-Mahdi Army?"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "At present, it is to liberate Iraq, and to defend the Iraqi people in times of crisis, and at the moment Iraq is in a crisis - it is occupied - and should be liberated."

Interviewer: "So you state clearly that the goal of the Al-Mahdi Army is..."

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "To defend Iraq. I never have and never will deny this."

Interviewer: "So you continue with this?"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "Of course, and if I’m not around - if I am killed, if I die, retire, or whatever - the goal of the Al-Mahdi Army will remain the liberation of Iraq."

Interviewer: "Let me say that this comment might sound peculiar to many..."

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "It will sound peculiar only to the Americans." . . .

"There are plans to divide Iraq - to divide what has already been divided, if I may say so. The Al-Sadr movement must oppose this, and strive to maintain the unity of the Iraqi land and people under any circumstances. Another important goal is to make society religious, rather than secular. People keep talking about an 'Islamic government' and so on. What is more important is to make society, not just the government, Islamic. An Islamic government without an Islamic society cannot..."

Interviewer: "You mentioned your opposition to the division of Iraq. What exactly did you mean? Did you mean the partitioning of Iraq into independent countries, or do you consider federalism and decentralization to be part of this division? People talk about a district in the south, another in the north, the center, the west... What do you mean?"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "If federalism does not entail the division of Iraq, it is fine. The important thing is that the occupation is an obstacle to federalism. There can be no federalism as long as there is occupation. As long as there is occupation in Iraq, federalism will constitute the partitioning of the country, even if it is centralized."

Interviewer: "You say this unequivocally?"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "Yes. If there was no occupation, my answer would be different. Then there would be room for discussion." . . .

Interviewer: "Do you fear there will be more sectarian violence in Iraq in the near future? I am not talking about the resistance, but about internal violence."

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "Sectarian violence? It’s possible, because the Americans are in Iraq, and they are constantly touching on this sensitive spot - Shiites against Sunnis, Kurds against Arabs... They are always... I have seen this on TV or somewhere... The Americans are responsible even for the car bombs. . . .

"The Al-Sadr movement is Islamic even more than it is Iraqi. An attack against any Islamic country or people will mean that the Al-Sadr movement will become an interested party."

Interviewer: "In what way?"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "It will defend Islam however necessary. It will do whatever it can at the time. If any Islamic or Arab country is attacked, the Al-Sadr movement will be an interested party." . . .

Interviewer: "How do you view Iran’s role in Iraq, and what are your relations with the Iranian leadership?"

Muqtada Al-Sadr: "First of all, I don’t do anything in secret. It is all out in the open. I try to maintain good relations with everybody. With regard to the Iranians and the Iranian Republic... In a previous meeting with Khamenei, during a pilgrimage, I told him that we share the same ideology, but that politically and militarily, I would not be an extension of Iran, and that there were negative things that Iran was doing in Iraq. I mentioned to him a few things that Iran needs to rectify with regard to Iraq. Iran committed mistakes that it should not have made."

Read the entire transcript and watch the video.

Sadr is dangerous. We made a tremendous tactical error by not dealing with him in 2004, as there is little doubt that there will be a day of reckoning. Even with support for Sadr waning substantially in Iraq, he is being propped up by Iran to use in their own game of chess for influence in Iraq - whatever the cost in blood.

Read More...

Summary only...

Well, That Was Quick

No sooner had I written below that al Sadr would not push an uprising in Iraq than he should wave the unofficial French flag and sue Maliki for peace.

___________________________________________________

Perhaps our MSM's reports of an Iraqi Army quagmire in Basra were a trifle premature. The offensive in Basra and the response to Sadrist uprisings in Baghdad have resulted in several hundred Mahdi Army casualties. And now Sadr has ordered his militia off the streets and sued for a cease fire. This from the Washington Post:

Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr Sunday ordered his armed militia to get off the streets in Basra and to cooperate with the government to restore security. In exchange, he asked the government to release prisoners and declare an amnesty.

The Iraqi government quickly welcomed the comments as a move toward restoring calm.

A spokesman for the government, Ali al-Dabbagh, said on state-run Iraqi television that the government considered Sadr's statement a "positive step."

He repeated government assertions that the military operations in Basra were not aimed at Sadr's followers. "We expect all those who claim that they are followers of the Sadr movement to heed this call and those who do not shall be treated as outlaws and criminals."

In his statement, Sadr made the offer in exchange for the government stopping "random, illegal raids and arrests." He also called on the government to declare a general amnesty and to release prisoners taken during the fighting, especially his followers.

Sadr's statement stopped short of directing fighters to turn over weapons to Iraqi security forces, which has been a key demand of the government.

The move came after Sadr over the weekend told his supporters to ignore the government's orders to disarm.

. . . Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who launched the offensive Monday against armed groups, vowed "to stand up to these gangs in every inch of Iraq."

Maliki denied accusations that the Iraqi government was trying to undermine political rivals before provincial elections this year. "We came to Basra to fight the outlaws and the smugglers, not to confront a party or a political group, because we do not seek political confrontation," he said.

. . . Sadr, speaking in a television interview aired Saturday, said the Iraqi government "is far from the people and is dealing with them in a dictatorship way." He also said his militia's "strategic objective" was "the liberation of Iraq from the occupier."

In the interview, Sadr called for a demonstration April 9 against the U.S. occupation of Iraq. He also rejected accusations that he was being supported by Iran, saying, "I am an independent in that I am not a political or military extension to Iran or any others." . . .

Read the entire article. Maliki would be as foolish to stop now as the U.S. was in allowing Sadr to survive in Najaf in 2004. Unfortunately, Sadr is somewhere in Iran, far from coalition crosshairs at the moment. None-the-less, Maliki needs to disarm Sadr's militia in Basra and establish government control. Now is not the time to blink.

Read More...

Summary only...

Sadr, Iran & The Iraqi Government

If Moqtada al-Sadr allows the ceasefire he had declared in August to expire, than we will learn a lot about the strength of the central government from their response and the likelihood that Iraq will be able to survive as a sovereign nation.







_________________________________________________________

I posted recently that Iran is increasing its operationa tempo inside Iraq, and that Sadr had only til Saturday to decide on whether to lift his ceasefire. The AP is reporting on it today:

Al-Sadr's Shiite Mahdi Army is among the most powerful militias in Iraq, and the cease-fire he ordered last August has been credited with helping reduce violence around Iraq by 60 percent or more in the past six months.

Sheik Salah al-Obeidi, a spokesman for al-Sadr in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, said that if the cleric failed to issue a statement by Saturday saying the cease-fire was extended, "then that means the freeze is over." Al-Sadr's followers would be free to resume attacks.

On an Internet site representing al-Sadr, al-Obeidi said that al-Sadr "either will announce the extension or will stay silent and not announce anything. If stays silent, that means that the freeze is over."

Al-Obeidi said that message "has been conveyed to all Mahdi Army members nationwide."

Assuming that Sadr allows the cease-fire to end, than what the Maliki government does should tell us a lot both about the perceived strenght of the Sadr organization and the likelihood that Iraq will be able to survive as a nation.

During the short life of the Iraqi government - it is not even two years old yet - Sadr's support for the Maliki government was initially a major part of Maliki's ruling coalition. As the Mahdi Army became ever more bellicose and responsible for violence, Maliki, under pressure from the Sadrists, tried to protect the Mahdi movement from the U.S. That changed in the months leading up to the surge, as Maliki and Sadr had a falling out. It wasn't until the surge was announced in January that Maliki finally stopped his protection of the Mahdi Army - and Sadr withdrew his ministers from the government.

Contrary to what the AP has reported, there are many reasons to think that Sadr's organization does not enjoy the popular support of the people anymore. Prior to the surge, the Mahdi movement legitimized itself by providing security to its members. But at the top, the Mahdi movement is not all that much different in terms of its radicalization than al Qaeda. It is merely the Khomeinist Shia variant of Salafi Islam that undergirds al Qaeda. The Sadrists have imposed medieval rules of Islam in areas where they have held sway. Thus, as security has returned to Iraq, as I discussed in detail here, there seems very little in the way of public support for the Mahdi Army.

Unless the Mahdi Army is disarmed and Sadr's movement destroyed, they will, I think, become another Hezbollah, with Sadr fully in the pocket of Iran. The school solution to this would be a declaration that the end of the cease fire is a declaration of war against the central government, and that they should vote to outlaw the Sadr'ist movement, indict Sadr for treason, and give to the members of the movement an opportunity to declare their alleigance to the central government. It would finally break the back of the Iranian tool that is Sadr, and it would go a long way to establishing the authority of the central government as one that exists for all Iraqis.

Read More...

Summary only...

Four Days For Sadr As Iran Picks Up Its Efforts In Iraq

Within four days, the temporary cease-fire imposed by Moqtada al-Sadr on his Mahdi Army will end. As the time nears, U.S. and Iraqi forces are clearly sending him a message with a bevy of raids on Iranian backed special groups to extend the cease fire or be squarely in the cross-hairs. Against this backdrop, Iran is apparently increasing their activity inside Iraq. Will Sadr extend the cease fire and, if not, what will be the consequences?

___________________________________________________________

There is more unknown about Moqtada al-Sadr than there is known. The major unknowns are:

1. To what degree is Sadr controlled by Iran? We know that his movement has been financed and supplied by Iran. We know that Sadr is studying for a high clerical rank under the Khomeinist school of political Shia'ism. Is Iran pulling Sadr's strings? And if so, what does Iran want?

2. What is the number of the Mahdi Army and how much support does Sadr enjoy? These are two very big questions. As the Iraqi national government gets ever greater control over the security situation in Iraq, the motivation of many people to support Sadr for the protection offered by his Mahdi Army seems to be on the wane. So would a revolt now by Sadr be a bang or a whimper?

3. Conversely, if Sadr keeps his movement in a cease fire posture, will that further degrade his influence as the government consolidates their position?

These are some of the questions we may soon have answers to when, by February 23, Sadr must either extend his cease fire or allow it to expire, potentially coming into open conflict again with U.S. and a far more robust Iraqi government security force than he ever faced previously. All of this is playing out against a backdrop of increased Iranian adventurism inside Iraq. In the run-up to February 23, U.S. and Iraq forces are sending a clear message to Sadr, as reported at the Long War Journal:

As previously reported at The Long War Journal, US and Iraqi forces have stepped up operations against the Iranian-backed and Mahdi Army-linked Special Groups terror cells. The increase in activity comes as Muqtada al Sadr is deliberating the reinstatement or cancellation of the self-imposed cease-fire.

Since the last report, the US military has singled out a former Mahdi Army commander as being behind violence in northern Baghdad while a senior spokesman said Iran is still supporting terror operations in Iraq. "The intent of Iran in supporting the training and financing [the Special Groups] we believe continues," said Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, the director of Multinational Forces Iraq's Communication Division. "In just the past week, Iraqi and coalition forces captured 212 weapons caches across Iraq, two of those coming from here inside Baghdad, with growing links to the Iranian-backed special groups."

A look at the press releases from Multinational Forces Iraq's website shows the command has stepped up operations to counter the Special Groups. Eight operations were reported against the terror cells in the three-day period from Feb. 12 to Feb. 14. Ten encounters were reported from Feb. 15 to Feb. 17. Several of the engagements, including a major clash between police and a Special Groups platoon, involved Iraqi security forces: . . .

• US soldiers captured a top lieutenant of Arkan Hasnawi, a Special Groups leader, during an operation in northern Baghdad Feb. 17. "Northern Baghdad is an area that Special Groups criminals have wanted to dominate for some time, and it is pretty clear that this is the foreign influenced Special Groups," said Lieutenant Colonel David Oclander, the executive officer for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, which operates in the region.

Several of the press releases ended with the standard warning to Sadr and his Mahdi Army. "We will continue to disrupt the networks of those who choose not to obey al-Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr’s ceasefire pledge. ... The people of Iraq have made it clear that they will not tolerate the criminal activities of these splinter groups." The US military is warning Sadr that ending the cease-fire will result in operations designed to dismantle the Mahdi Army.

The identification of the Arkan Hasnawi Special Groups Network as a major threat is another overt message to Sadr. Arkan Hasnawi was a brigade commander in Sadr's Mahdi Army, and thus serves as a link to Sadr. Hasnawi has been linked to multiple attacks on US and Iraq security forces and was behind the kidnapping of Shia and Sunni tribal leaders in Diyala province in October 2007. His network was also behind the kidnapping of six Sons of Iraq from a checkpoint in Baghdad’s Ur neighborhood on Feb. 7. Three are still missing.

The Iraqi government is also applying legal pressure on Sadr. The government will begin the trial of former Deputy Health Minister Hakim al Zamili and Brigadier General Hameed al Shimmari, who served as the chief of the ministry's security forces. Both Zamili and Shimmari, who are members of the Mahdi Army, were arrested by Iraqi soldiers last year after being charged with running terror operations from the Health Ministry. The Health Ministry was one of six ministries run by Sadr's political party before it withdrew from the government. A spokesman for the Sadrist movement called the charges "false and baseless."

The increase in military, legal, and political pressure is causing rifts within the Mahdi Army and Sadrist movement leadership. One of the five panels formed by Sadr to advise on the course of action with regards to the cease-fire has counseled against the extension. Salih al Ukayli, a Sadrist movement parliamentarian, has openly pushed to end the cease-fire.

Sadr's decision to either continue or end the cease-fire has serious implications for his political movement. Ending the ceasefire puts him in the crosshairs of the US and Iraqi military, and expose the depth or shallowness of his support in the Shia community. This would also risk any remaining goodwill that exists in the Shia community, which has enjoyed the recent reduction in violence and has become increasingly hostile to the activities of the Mahdi Army.

But extending the ceasefire may further erode Sadr's power within his political movement and the Mahdi Army. "As the pressures on the Sadrist Current mount with what it sees as a campaign of politically motivated arrests against its supporters, it may raise the question of Muqtada al Sadr's ability to impose his will on the political leadership of the Sadrist Current," IraqSlogger reported. Sadr's inability to enforce a ceasefire would reduce his political and military power, which has waned over the past year since the surge began.

Read the article. If Sadr does not extend the ceasefire, than the U.S. should target him directly. Sadr's studies in the Iranian political form of Shia'ism portends all sorts of mischief in the future. Arguably, the U.S. should have killed Sadr in 2004. We may yet seriously rue the failure to pull the trigger back then. All of that said, Sadr has minimal support in the Iraqi government at the moment, and making further mischief would be a dangerous gamble for him at the moment indeed. We shall soon hear of his decision, one way or the other.

Read More...

Summary only...

Sadr, Iran, and A Special Groups Commander Captured

Whether Sadr is Iraq's Nasrallah is open to debate, but seems probable. While the remenants of al Qaeda are still the main concern of U.S. forces, Iran poses the most significant threat to Iraq. Sadr is supposed to rule on whether to continue the "Mahdi Army" cease fire beyond February 23. As the date approaches, Iran is significantly increasing its infiltration into Iraq and U.S. forces are conducting high level raids on Iran's Special Groups, with the latest being the capture of a high level Special Group commander along with other members of Sadr's clique.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This today from the Long War Journal:

With Muqtada al Sadr set to decide on the status of the Mahdi Army ceasefire on Feb. 23, US and Iraqi security forces continue to step up operations against the Iranian-backed Special Groups and Sadr's Mahdi Army. The latest raid netted a senior regional Special Groups leader and ten others. According to the Iraqi press, two senior members of the Sadrist current were detained in the raid.

The senior Special Groups leader was captured in Hillah during a raid conducted by a joint Coalition Special Forces team and elements of Iraqi police. The leader is believed to be a regional commander of Special Groups teams in Wasit, Babil and Najaf provinces, as well as a coordinator for weapon shipments, and a planner and operational leader of attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces. Eleven Special Groups operatives were reported captured in the raid.

Two of those captured were senior leaders in Muqtada al Sadr's political movement, according to Voices of Iraq. A raid by "joint Iraqi Scorpion forces and U.S. troops arrested Basim al Kilabi, the tribal affairs official at al Sadr's office, and ten others following a raid on one of Hilla's villages on Sunday," a member of Sadr's media office told the Iraqi newspaper. Also captured was Qassem al Fatlawi, another member of the Sadrist current.

While it is unclear if either Kilabi or Fatlawi are the captured senior Special Groups operative, it is likely Kilabi was the target of the raid. As tribal affairs officer, Kibali would have contacts cutting across the provincial boundaries, and his position would mask his movements and contacts.

The Special Groups was created by Iran's Qods Force, the special operations branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, to destabilize the Iraqi regime, strike at US and Coalition forces, and extend Iran's sphere of influence in southern and central Iraq. Iran established the Ramazan Corps as a sophisticated command structure to coordinate military, intelligence, terrorist, diplomatic, religious, ideological, propaganda, and economic operations. The Special Groups falls under Qods Force's Ramazan Corps.

. . . The US and Iraqi military commands have stepped up pressure on Sadr to extend the ceasefire beyond the February deadline by increasing raids on Mahdi Army and Special Groups operatives throughout central and southern Iraq.

Read the entire article.

Read More...

Summary only...