More on Unitive Containment and the Formal Distinction

From the last volume of the Ordinatio, which has just arrived at my library. The segment here translated is from a question on the distinction between justice and mercy in God (the standard 12th c. examples, used, for example, by the Lombard). Here's a first stab at translation.

Ordinatio IV d. 46 q. 3 ad arg. princ. 4 (ed. Vat. XIV, 215-217):

To the second, it is said that mercy connotes something other than justice, although those two are unqualifiedly [simpliciter = realiter] the same as each other.

But against this: that connotation does not require some distinction of this kind from that as it is in itself, but only as it is understood [accipitur] and signified, because connotation is required for this. The argument, however, requires that there is some distinction between them [justice and mercy] as they are causes of distinct effects. Nor does the distinction of reason suffice for this, because a relation of reason is not that by which some effect is really made [efficitur], rather, generally, no real distinction in an effect depends on a relation of reason in a cause, just as was proved in d. 13 of the first book. That distinction of effects depends essentially on a distinction in the cause, therefore that is not only one of reason.

I concede, therefore, to that argument that just as in God the intellect is not formally the will, nor contrariwise, although one is the same as the other by the truest identity of simplicity, so also justice is not formally the same as mercy or contrariwise. And according to this formal non-identity, that [= mercy] can be the proximate principle of some external [= extra] effect, of which the other [= justice] is not the principle, in the way in which just as if this and that [= mercy and justice] were two things [res] because to be a formal principle befalls each as it is formally such.

Contra: the divine esse is most actual, therefore it includes every divine perfection; but it would not include, if there were a formal distinction there, because everything distinct formally is there actually, and consequently, as distinct, it is there in act, and so the essence as distinct does not include every act. 

Again, if there are there real distinct formalities, therefore there are distinct realities there, and so distinct things [res]. Proof of the first consequence: because formality is distinct by its own reality.

To the first: the divine esse contains every actuality of the divine essence unitively. [Entities] are not contained unitively which are contained without all distinction, becuase union is not wihout all distinction; nor are they contained unitively which are contained as unqualifiedly [simpliciter] really distinct, because are contained in a multiple manner or separately [dispersim]. Therefore this term 'unitive' includes some distinction of the [entities] contained, which suffices for union, and nevertheless such a union which is repugnant toall composition and aggregation of the distinct [entities]. This can not be unless there be posited formal non-identity with real identity.

To the argument, therefore, I concede that the essence contains every actuality, and consequently every formality, but not as formally the same, becaues then they would not be contained unitively.

To the second it can be said that as many formalities as are there, so many are there realities and things [res]; but each reality is only qualified [secundum quid], just as was shown there [Ord. I d. 13, according to the Vat. editors]. Otherwise, that consequence can be denied: 'many real formalities, therefore many realities', just as 'many divine persons, therefore many deities', is denied. But the first response is more real [realier]. 

Divine Simplicity III: Univocity

[NB: this is a first draft; I will make every effort in the future to revise by adding commentary and fixing typos, etc.]

As promised, here is the post on the topic that inspired this series of "fundamenta" posts: how can Scotus reconcile his theory of univocity with divine simplicity?

We all know what Thomas says. The terms that we predicate of God from creatures (being, wise, good, just, etc.) exist in a divided way in creatures, as distinct from their essence. But God is simple, admitting no plurality. Consequently, the terms must be predicated analogically, not univocally.

Scotus' discussion of the issue is found in Ordinatio I d. 8 q. 3, entitled "Whether to say that God, or something formally said of God, is in a genus is consonant with divine simplicity.

He is trying to avoid a model of reality in which Being is a genus and God and creatures are species of being. If this were the case, divine simplicity would be violated. This is because there would be a common reality of the genus by which God and creatures would agree, and a reality that was proper to each.  God would then have composition of genus and specific difference.

For the negative position, Scotus examines the opinion of Henry of Ghent (not Aquinas), citing a number of arguments, offering arguments against the position (these are the arguments for univocity I have already posted) and replying to Henry's arguments. He also cites an opinion for the positive position, though it is probably more of a set-up than an opinion anyone actually held (i.e. that God is in a genus).

Scotus, then, holds a middle position:

Ordinatio I d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 (ed. Vat. IV, 198):

I hold the middle position, that it stands with divine simplicity that some concept is common to God and to a creature, not nevertheless some concept common as of a genus, because neither a concept said in 'quid' of God, //nor by whatever kind of formal predication said of him// is per se in some genus.

The first part was proved by arguing against the first opinion [i.e. Henry]

So Scotus then argues that the concept is not going to be common like a genus is in common. He has two arguments for this, one from the notion of infinity, the other from the notion of necessary being.

1. Infinity (ed. Vat. IV 199-203):

A concept having indifference to some things to which a concept of a genus cannot be indifferent can not be a concept of a genus; but whatever is said commonly of God and creatures is indifferent to finite and infinite, speaking of essential [things], or at least to the finite and not finite, speaking of certain others, because a divine relation is not finite; no genus can be indifferent to infinite and the finite, therefore etc.

The first part of the minor is clear, because whatever essential perfection is in God, is formally infinite, in creatures finite.

I prove the second part of the minor, because a genus is taken from some reality which according to itself is potential to the reality from which the difference is taken; no infinite is potential to something...

This argument, by treating it further, I understand in this way: that in some creaures the genus and difference are taken from another and another reality (just as by positing many forms in man, animal is taken from the sensitive and rational from the intellective), and then that thing, from which the genus is taken, truly is potential and perfectible by that thing from which the difference is taken. Sometimes, when there are not there thing and thing (just as in accidents), at least in one thing there is some proper reality from which the genus is taken and another reality from which the difference is taken; let the first be called a and the second b: a according to itself is potential to b, so that by precisely understanding a and precisely understanding b, a as it is understood in the first instant of nature, in which it is precisely itself, it is perfectible by b (just as if it were another thing), but that it is not perfected really by b, this is because of the identity of a and b to some total [totum] thing, to which really they are primarily the same, which indeed totum first is produced and in that totum both those realities are produced: if nevetheless one of those would be produced without the other, truly it would be potential to it and truly it would be imperfect without it.

That composition of realities - potential and actual - is the smallest which suffices for the notion of genus and difference, and that does not stand with this that whatsoever reality in something is infinite: for reality, if it would be infinite of itself, however precisely taken, would not be in potency to some reality; therefore since in God whatsoever  essential reality is formally infinite, there is nothing from which the notion of a genus can be formally taken.

2. From necessary being (ed. Vat. IV, 204 ff.)

I argue third from the second middle [term], namely from the notion of necessary being, and this is the argument of Avicenna, VIII Met. ch. 4. If necessary being has a genus, therefore the intention of the genus will be of itself necessary being or not. If the first, 'then [the inquiry] will not cease until there is a difference'. I understand this thus: the genus would then include a difference, because without it it is not in ultimate act and the 'necessary in itself' is in ultimate act; if however the genus includes a difference, then it is not a genus. If the second option is followed, it follows that 'necessary being will be constituted from what is not necessary being.

[there follows an addition by Scotus here] but this argument proves that necessary being has nothing in common with another, because that common intention is 'not necessary being'; hence I answer: an understood intention neither includes necessity nor possibility, but is indifferent; that however in reality which corresponds to an intention, in 'this' is necessary being, in 'that' possible (this is disproved if a proper reality corresponds to the intention of a genus, and not if it corresponds to another common intention). [end of addition]

With respect to that which is added in the question 'of whatever formally said of God' [see the opening paragraph], I say that no such is in a genus, because of the same, because nothing is said formally of God  which is limited; whatever is of some genus, whatever genus that might be, is necessarily limited.

But then there is a doubt about what sort are those predicates which are said of God, such as wise, good, etc.

I answer. Being is first divided into infinite and finite than into the ten categories, because one of those, namely the finite, is common to the ten genera; therefore whatever befalls being as indifferent to finite and infinite, or as it is proper to infinite being, befalls it not as determined to a genus but as prior, and consequently as it is a transcendental and is outside every genus. Whatever is common to God and creature, are such which befall being as it is indifferent to finite and infinite: for as they befall God, they are infinite, and as they befall a creature they are finite; therefore first they befall being than being is divided into the ten genera, and consequently whatever is such is transcendent [transcendens].

But then there is another doubt, how wisdom can be called a transcendental since it is not common to all beings.

I answer.  Just as it is of the definition of 'most general' that it does not have under itself many species but not to have another genus above it (just as this category 'where', because it does not have a supervening genus it is most general, although it has few or no species), so a transcendental has no genus under which it is contained. Whence it is of the notion(ratio) of a transcendental that it does not have a predicate that supervenes, except being, but that it is common to many inferiors, this befalls it.

This is clear in another way, because being does not have passions/attributes that are simply convertible, just as one, true, and good, but has some passions where opposites are distinguished against each other, just as necessary being or possible being, act or potency, and suchlike. Just as convertible passions/attributes are transcendent because they follow upon being in so far as it is not determined to some genus, so disjunctive passions/attributes are transcendental, and each member of the disjunct is transcendental because neither determines its determinable to a certain genus: and nevertheless one member of the disjunct formally is special, not befalling unless one being, just as necessary being in that division between necessary being or possible being, and the infinite in that division of finite or infinite, and the same is true of the rest. So also wisdom can be a transcendental, and whatever other, which is common to God and creature, although some such is said of God alone, something however is also said of God and some creature. It is not necessary that a transcendental, qua transcendental, be said of every being unless it is convertible with the first transcendental, namely being.

[to the first principal argument, (ed. Vat. IV 221ff):

To the first principal argument I concede that that concept said of God and a creature in 'quid' [i.e. essentially] is contracted by some contracting concepts saying 'quale' , but neither is that concept said in 'quid' a concept of a genus, nor those concepts said in 'quale' are concepts of differences, because that 'quidditative' concept is common to finite and infinite, which community cannot be in the concept of a genus -- those concepts contracting mean the intrinsic mode of the contracted, and not some reality perfecting it: differences however do not mean the intrinsic mode of the reality of some genus, because in whatever grade animality is understood, not on account of this is rationality or irrationality understood to be the intrinsic mode of animality, but still animality is understood in such a grade as perfectible by rationality or irrationality.

But here there is a doubt: how can a concept common to God and creature be understood as 'real', unless by some reality of the same genus, and then it seems that it is potential to that reality from which the distinguishing concept is taken, just as was argued before about the concept of a genus and a difference, and then the argument made for the first position still stands, that if there would be some reality distinguishing in re, and another distinct, it seems that a thing is composed, because it has something by which it agrees and something by which it differs.

I answer that when some reality with its intrinsic mode is understood, that concept is not so irreducibly simple (simpliciter simplex) that that reality cannot be conceived without that mode, but then it is an imperfect concept of that thing; it is able also to be conceived under that mode, and then it is a perfect concept of that thing. Example: if there would be whiteness in the tenth grade of intensity, howsoever simple it might be in the thing, it can still be conceived under the aspect of such whiteness, and then perfectly it will be conceived by an adequate concept of that thing, or it can be conceived precisely under the aspect of whiteness, and then it would be conceived by an imperfect concept which falls from the perfection of the thing; an imperfect concept however can be common to this and that whiteness, and a perfect concept would be proper.

Therefore a distinction is required between that from which a common concept is taken and between that from which a proper concept is taken not as distinction of reality and reality but as distinction of reality and proper and intrinsic mode of the same, which distinction suffices for having a perfect concept or imperfect of the same, of which the imperfect is common and the perfect is proper. But the concept of genus and difference requires the distinction of realities, not only of the same reality perfectly and imperfectly conceived.



To summarize:

Scotus takes two doctrines as given, because they were proven elsewhere.

1. Divine simplicity
2. univocal predication of creaturely properties of God, with qualification.

In this question, Scotus expands this picture

3. the properties predicated of God are not in a genus, because this would require a distinction of realities: the reality of the genus is other than the reality of the difference [keep in mind, the model Scotus is trying to avoid is that Being is a genus, and creatures and God are two species of being. There would be one reality, being, by which God and creatures agree, and one reality by which they are distinct]

4. The properties are transcendentals, arranged in four grades: being, attributes of being (one, true, good, maybe thing), disjunctive attributes of being (necessary being vs. possible being, etc.), pure perfections (wisdom, justice, etc.).

5. univocal predication gives us a common concept, say of wisdom; it is common to God and creatures. As such, the common concept is imperfect. The univocal notion can be contracted to God and creatures by means of intrinsic modes. The concept of God or a creature taken with its respective intrinsic mode is imperfect, but this is not a distinction between two realities, but of one reality. Hence the problem mentioned in 3 is avoided.

On Unitive Containment

I came across the following quote in the Reportatio the other day while trying to tease out the intricacies of Scotus' theory of divine ydeas.  It is quoted in QQ. in Met. IV q. 2 (OPh IV 355-6) by the editors (though they make transcription and emendation errors).

The title of the question is Utrum imago Trinitatis in anima rationali subsistat in tribus potentiis realiter distinctis is Rep. II d. 16 q. un. (Oxford, Merton College Library, Ms. 61, not foliated/ff. 179v-180r according to the Scotus editors. The following transcription is mine):

De continentia unitiva loquitur Dionysius V De divinis nominibus quia continentia unitiva non est omnino eiusdem ita quod idem omnino contineat se unitive nec esse omnino manentium distincte; requirit ergo unitatem et distinctionem. Est ergo continentia unitiva duplex: uno modo sicut inferius continet superiora essentialia et ibi contenta sunt de essentia continentis sicut eadem est realitas a qua accipitur differentia in albedine et a qua genus proximum ut color et qualitas sensibilis et qualitas et quamquam essent res alie, unitive continentur in albedine. Alia est continentia unitiva quando subiectum unitive continet alia que sunt quasi passiones sicut passiones entis non sunt res alia ab ente quia quecumque detur ipsa, res est ens, vera et bona; ergo ut oportet dicere quod non sunt res alie ab ente vel quod ens non habet passiones reales, quod est contra Aristotelem IV Metaphysice expresse, nec tamen magis sunt tales passiones de essentia nec idem quidditatem quam si essent res alia, ideo non sunt potentie idem formaliter vel quidditative nec inter se nec esse[etiam?] essentie anime nec tamen sunt res alie, sed idem identice. Ideo talia habent talem distinctionem secundum rationes formales qualem haberent realem distinctionem si essent res alie realiter distincte. Principium ergo volendi et intelligendi immediatum est in secundo instanti nature et ista principia sunt unitive in essentia anime que est in primo instanti nature quasi pasiones unitive contente.

[...]

In divinis enim quamquam in supposito sint essentia et relatio et essentia continet relationem, non tamen e contra in proposito; nec intellectus continet voluntatem nec e contra, ideo ista sunt idem idemptice, quia in contente solum, non quia ipsa inter se sunt idem sicut sunt attributa divina non solum idem idemptice sed inter se. Similiter quia quelibet persona in divinis est intrinsece infinita ideo perfecte continet intrinsece quamlibet perfectionem simpliciter que est in alia non sic continet intelligentia memoriam, sed solum concomitantur.

Translation:

Dionysius, V On Divine Names, speaks about unitive containment, that unitive containment is not entirely of the same [thing] so that entirely the same [thing] contains itself unitively, nor is it of things remaining entirely distinct; it requires, therefore, but unity and distinction.

Unitive containment is twofold. In one way, as the inferior contains its essential superiors and there the containment is of the essence of the containing just as it is the same reality from which the difference in whiteness is taken and from which the proximate genus, as color and sensible quality and quality, and although there might be other things unitively contained in whiteness.  The other unitive containment is when when a subject unitively contains other things which are quasi attributions/passions just as the attributes of being are not other things than being because whichever one is granted, the thing is being, true and good; therefore either it is necessary to say that they are not other things than being or that being does not have real attributes which is expressly contrary to Aristotle, IV Metaphysics; nevertheless such attributes are not more of the essence nor the same quiddity than if they would be other things. Therefore [the intellect and will] are not formally the same powers or quidditatively, nor between each other nor are they of the essence of the soul nor are they other things [than the soul]; but [they are] the same identically.  Therefore such have such a distinction according to their formal definitions of the sort that would have a real distinction if they would be other things really distinct.

[...]

In the divine, although the essence and the relation are in the supposit and the essence contains the relation, nevertheless it is not to be taken contrariwise in the matter at hand; neeither does the intellect contain the will nor contrariwise, therefore they are identically the same, because they are in the containing along, not becuse between them they are the same just as are the divine attributes, not only identically but among each other.  Likewise, because whichever of the divine persons is intrinsically infinite therefore perfectly contains every absolute perfection found in another [person]; not so does the intelligence contain the memory, but only accompanies it.

Summary:

Unitive containment is a tool at times employed by Scotus derived directly from pseudo-Dionysius.  It is not of the same thing containing itself, nor is it of distinct things remaining completely distinct.  Consequently, it requires recourse to both unity and distinction. There are two kinds of unitive containment: one in which an inferior (in the categorical/predicamental line) contains its superior.  On this kind, there is a similarity of essence.  The second is when the things contained have different essences, and these essences remain formally distinct from each other and from whatever does the containing.

Scotus on the Soul, Immortality, and Resurrection

A segment of the blogosphere has been ablaze of late with discussion of the soul and whether hyle/o-morphic dualism is inconsistent.  See for this Dr. Feser's blog, and his links to the Maverick Philosopher. Scotus holds to hylemorphic dualism like most other scholastics, with the twist that he does not accept the unicity of substantial form thesis (though that does not enter into the discussion quoted below), holding instead that there are two substantial forms in the human composite.  In the following selection, Scotus examines a bad version of the Aristotelian-Thomistic argument for the immateriality of the intellect based on the fact that it is not the act of a bodily organ. He also gives a better version and subjects it to analysis.

Scotus' question is about the general resurrection. Specifically, "Can it be known by natural reason that there will be a general resurrection of mankind?"  His procedure is to evaluate whether three propositions can be proven by means of a priori or a posteriori arguments:

1. The Intellective Soul is the Specific Form of Man 

2. The Intellective Soul is Immortal

3. The Human Soul will not Remain Outside the Body Forever

In the end, Scotus will argue that propositions 2 and 3 cannot be proven demonstratively by natural reason, that instead they admit of only probable arguments.

In what follows, I will be using Wolter's translation as found in Duns Scotus Philosophical Writings, which, in the absence of a critical edition, corrects the Wadding edition against the Assisi 137 manuscript. These will only short selections.

Ordinatio IV d. 43 q. 2 (Wolter, pp. 133-62):

[About prop. 1, after several authorities there is a proof from reason]

As to the second, it is not easy to find either an a priori or an a posteriori argument, unless it be based on a function proper to man, for the form is known from its proper function, even as matter is known from the existence of change.

One argument based on the function of the intellect that is used to establish the proposed conclusion is this. To understand is a function  proper to man. Therefore, it has its source in the form  proper to man. The intellective form then is that proper to man.

This argument, however, is open to criticism inasmuch as those who propound it admit that the intellect has only a passive and not an active relation to intellection. Hence, this proposition 'A function that is proper proceeds from the proper form' really does not prove that the intellective part is the proper form of man, for this operation does not proceed from the form but according to them it is caused by the intelligible object, or according to the view of others it proceeds from the sense image.

I put this argument, then, in another form. Man formally and properly understands; therefore the intellective soul is the proper form of man.

[...]

...we should try to prove the antecedent by reason lest some contentious individual deny it. Now in the antecedent, I take 'to know' or 'to understand' in the proper sense of the term as an act of knowledge which transcends every type of sense knowledge.

One way of proving this antecedent, then, is this. Man knows by an act of knowledge which is not organic; hence he knows or understands in the proper sense of the term. The consequence is evident for the reason already given, since intellection  properly speaking is a knowledge which transcends all sense knowledge. All sensation, however, is organic knowledge as Aristotle shows in De anima, Bk. II. There the antecedent of this enthymeme is proved from the fact that every organ is determined to a certain kind of sensible, and this because it consists in a balance between two extremes. But we do experience in ourselves some knowledge which we do not have in virtue of some organ, for if it were organic, this knowledge would be limited precisely to the sensibles of some determined kind, which is the very opposite of what we actually experience. For by such an act we know precisely how one kind of sensible differs from another, and conseqently we know both extremes. This consequence is evident from the Philosopher, who uses this argument in De anima bk. II, in regard to common sense.

[...]

[Second proof] Another proof for the principal antecedent is based on the fact that we possess some immaterial knowledge. No sense knowledge, however, can be immaterial; therefore, etc.

This word 'immaterial' is frequently used by the Philosopher in this connection, but it appears to be ambiguous. There are three relevant ways in which it can be understood. (a) Either this knowledge is immaterial because it is incorporeal in the sense that it is not an operation that involves a corporeal part or organ. In this sense, the present proposition is the same as that previously posited with regard to non-organic knowledge. (b) Another way in which this knowledge could be immaterial would be that it is not extended in any way. In this case much more is asserted than the fact that it is not organic. For although everything organic is extended inasmuch as it is received into something extended [viz. the organ], this is not the only reason. It would still be extended if it were received immediately by the composite as a whole,a because the composite itself is extended. (c) Immateriality can be understood in a third sense, namely with reference to the object, inasmuch as this knowledge considers the object under immaterial aspects, as for instance, abstracting from the 'here and now' and such like, which are said to be material conditions. If we would prove this knowledge to be immaterial in the second sense and not merely in the first our proposed conclusion would follow all the more. But it seems that the only way we could do this would be from the conditions which characterise the object of such an act (unless perhaps we could do so on the basis of reflection, since we experience ourselves reflecting on this act of knowledge, for what has quantity is not capable of reflecting upon itself). At an rate the proof of the antecedent ultimately rests upon the object of this act.

The proof is as follows. We possess some knowledge of an object under an aspect it could not have as an object of sense knowledge; therefore etc. [various proofs of the antecedent and consequent follow]

[one proof of the principal consequent is as follows] We can prove the same from the second operation characteristic of man, namely volition, for man is master of his acts to such an extent that it is within his power to determine himself at will to this or to its opposite ... And this is something known by natural reason and not merely by faith. Such a lack of determination, however, cannot exist in any organic or extended appetite, because every organic or material appetite is determined to a certain class of suitable objects so that what is apprehended cannot be unsuitable nor can the appetite fail to seek it. The will, therefore, by which we can will in such an indeterminate way, is not the appetite of a material form, and in consequence it belongs to something which excels every such form. But this is just what we assume the intellective form to be. And therefore, if this appetite is formally in us inasmuch as its act is in us, it follows that this form is our form.

[Concerning prop. 2. Various arguments and authorities for and against immortality follow]

[arg. 5] Also, some arguments can be constructed from the dicta of the Philosopher. One of his principles is that a natural desire is not in vain. Now the soul has a natural desire to exist forever.

[...]

It can be stated that although there are probable reasons for this second proposition, these are not demonstrative, nor for that matter are they even necessary reasons.

[...]

Another answer, and one more in accord with facts, is that not all the statements by the philosophers were established by proofs both necessary and evident to natural reason. Frequently, what they gave was nothing more than rather persuasive probable arguments or what was commonly held by earlier philosophers... Hence, in those matters where they could find nothing better without contradicting the principles of philosophy, 'slight indications' frequently had to suffice for the philosophers. ... Therefore the philosophers agreed to things sometimes because of probable persuasive reasons, at other times because they had asserted as principles, propositions which were not necessary truths. And this reply would suffice for all the testimonies cited above; even if they clearly asserted the proposed conclusion, they still do not establish it. nevertheless, these arguments can be answered in order as follows.

[To 1] To the first: Aristotle understands this separation to mean nothing more than that the intellect does not use the body in performing its operation, and for this reason it is incorruptible as to function. This is not to be understood in the sense that it is unlike an organic power which perishes precisely because the organ decays. this type of decay pertains exclusively to an organic faculty... Hence, the faculty of vision grows weak or decays only from the standpoint of its organ and not in so far as its  operation directly is concerned. From the fact that the intellect, however, is incapable of decay in the sense that it has no organ by which it could perish, it does not follow that the intellect is imperishable as to function in an unqualified sense, for then it would indeed follow that tis also imperishable in being as the argument maintains. What does follow is this. So far as its ability to operate alone is concerned, the intellect is incapable of dissolution in the same sense that an organic power is corruptible. Absolutely speaking, however, the intellect is assumed to be perishable according to the Philosopher's statement in De anima bk. III, that the intellect perishes in us once the interior sense perishes. And this is just what one would have to maintain if he assumed the soul to be a principle which ash an operation proper to the composite as a whole. The composite, however, is perishable. Consequently, its operative principle is also perishable. That the soul is the operative principle of thew hole composite and that its operation is also that of the while is just what Aristotle seems to say in De anima, bk. I

[to 5] The other argument about the natural desire will be answered in the reply to the initial arguments, for the first three proceed from this notion.

[Concerning prop. 3] So far as this proposition is concerned, it seems that if the Philosopher had assumed the soul to be immortal, he would have held that it continued to exist outside the body rather than in the body, for everything composed can be destroyed by its contraries.

[Evaluation of the a priori proof] Of the three propositions used to construct a kind of a priori argument in the sense that the proof is based on the nature of the form of man that is to be restored, I say that the first is known by natural reason and that the contrary error, which is proper to Averroes only, is of the very worst kind. Not only is it opposed to theological truth but to philosophical truth as well. For it destroys knowledge itself inasmuch as it denies any act of knowledge distinct from sensation or any act of choice distinct from sense appetite and hence does away with all those virtues which require an act of choice in accord with right reason. One who errs in this way, consequently, should be banished from the company of men who use natural reason.

The other two propositions, however, are not known adequately from natural reason even though there are a number of probable persuasive arguments in their favour. The reasons for the second, indeed, are more numerous as well as more highly probable. For this reason, the Philosopher appears to have held this doctrine more expressly. For the third, however, the reasons are fewer. The conclusion, then, which follows from these three propositions is not sufficiently known a priori by natural reason.

[The a posteriori proofs]

The second way to prove the resurrection is by a posteriori arguments. Some probable arguments of this kind were mentioned in the initial arguments, for instance, those concerning the happiness of man. To the latter this argument based on the justice of a rewarding God is added. In the present life the virtuous suffer more punishments than those who are wicked. It is this line of argument that the Apostle seems to have in mind in the first letter to the Corinthians: "If with this life only in view we have had hope in Christ, we are of all men the most to be pitied," etc.

[Evaluation of the a postiori arguments] These a posteriori arguments, however, are even less conclusive than the a priori proof based on the proper form of man, since it is not clear from natural reason that there is one ruler who governs all men according to the laws of retributive and punitive justice. It could also be said that the good act is itself sufficient reward for anyone... Such arguments are nothing else than probable persuasive proofs, or they are reasons derived from premises that are matters of belief, as is evident if we examine them individually.

[Solution to the Question] to put it briefly, then, we can maintain that natural reason cannot prove that the resurrection is necessary, neither by way of a priori reasons such as those based on the notion of an intrinsic principle in man, nor by a posteriori arguments, for instance, by reason of some operation or perfection fitting to man. Hence we hold the resurrection to be certain on the basis of faith alone.

[Reply to the Initial Arguments. arg. 1] to the first argument: If the argument is based on the notion of natural desire taken in an exact and proper sense, and a natural desire in this sense is not an elicited act but merely an inclination of nature towards something, then it is clear that the existence of such a natural desire for anything can be proved only if we prove first that the nature in question is able to have such a thing. To argue the other way round, therefore, is begging the question. Or if natural desire is taken in a less proper sense, viz. as an act elicited in conformity with the natural inclination, we are still unable to prove that any elicited desire is natural in this sense without first proving the existence of a natural desire in the proper sense of the term.

But suppose that someone were to argue that whatever is immediately desired, once it is known, is something that is desired naturally, since such proneness seems to arise only from some natural inclination. One answer to this objection would be to deny the first statement, since a person with bad habits is inclined to desire immediately whatever is in accord with these habits just as soon as such a thing presents itself. However, if nothing else intervenes, nature of itself is not vicious; neither is it vicious in everyone. Consequently, if everyone immediately desires such a thing as soon as he knows of it, it would follow that the desire in this case is not vicious. The first answer to this objection, then, is not adequate. Therefore it could be answered like this. We must show that such knowledge is not erroneous but is in accord with right reason. Otherwise, it does not follow that just because everyone, on the basis of an erroneous conception, were immediately to elicit an act of desire, this desire is in accord with an inclination of nature. Indeed, it is rather the opposite that follows. Now it is not clear by natural reason that the argument establishing eternal existence as something desirable is not erroneous, since man must first be shown to be capable of such a thing.

To put it briefly, then, every argument based on natural desire seems to be inconclusive, for to construct an efficacious argument, it would be necessary to show either that nature possesses a natural potency for eternal life, or that the knowledge which immediately gives rise to this desire, where the latter is an elicited act, is not erroneous but in accord with right reason. Now the first of these alternatives is the same as the conclusion to be established. The second is more difficult to prove and is even less evident than the conclusion.

As for the proof that man has a natural desire for immortality because he naturally shuns death, it can be said that this proof applies to the brute animal as well as to man.

Divine Simplicity II: Divine Attributes

This post covers another aspect of divine simplicity, namely, how it can be reconciled with a plurality of divine attributes. This problem itself is an expression of the more general problem of the relation between divine transcendence and human language. Divine simplicity is one way to ensure that God is unlike everything in the created world, for it is, after all, a negative doctrine: God is not composed, does not have parts, etc.

The scholastics came up with three solutions to the problem. The first was largely semantic. God is so transcendent and ineffable that he cannot be grasped by human thought or captured by human language. Divine attributes, such as wisdom and justice, are all one in God; when these are predicated of God, they signify primarily the divine essence as one. But there is also a secondary sense of these terms, which connotes the created realm as an effect of God. Only in the second sense are they considered distinct. Most of the twelfth-century thinkers held this view, and it was revived by Ockham and Auriol in the fourteenth century.

The second solution was primarily concerned with elaborating the role of the human intellect. Divine attributes are distinct only as a result of the operation of the intellect (that there are divine attributes is generally assumed based on the Dionysian via eminentiae). The intellect is too weak on its own in its present state to directly grasp God, so it requires a plurality of concepts. This plurality of concepts corresponds to the plurality of attributes. This second solution was authored by Bonaventure and Aquinas; or, more accurately, Bonaventure sketched it out and Aquinas developed it more fully. But he could never make up his mind about it, and one of his students that held one of his views was secretly investigated, and in general, Aquinas' changing views caused lots of problems for his would-be followers (such as, what "causes" the attributes, how can the divine essence be the fundamentum in re, is a "ratio" just a concept in the human mind or does it have an objective correlate in God?). So we will omit any further discussion of Aquinas. And in any case, Aquinas is irrelevant for understanding Scotus on this issue.

The relevant thinkers are Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines (and, to a lesser extent, Thomas of Sutton). Henry has very complicated views on attributes, and they probably do a lot more work in his system than any other medieval thinker I know. For our purposes here, it suffices to note that Henry had a view regarding the origin of the attributes similar to Scotus' theory of instants of nature (see all the posts labeled "intelligible being"). Henry basically applies the three acts of the intellect from the Aristotelian commentary tradition to God. So we have an instant of simple apprehension in which the divine intellect apprehends the divine essence as one simple thing or one simple nature. But "then" it starts to reason about the essence, and by doing this it generates the attributes (attribute=divine essence+ratio from the intellect). However, and this is important, it does not generate the will, even though it is a sine qua non cause of volitional acts. So in the third instant the will is actualized and begins to go through its own series of movements. In the end we have then two fundamental attributes that cannot be reduced to each other, and all other divine attributes are ordered to one of these primary attributes (incidentally, intellect and will serve as the principles for the emanation of the divine persons, but visit the "Henry of Ghent" blog for more on this).

Godfrey of Fontaines thought all this was bullcrap, and instead extended Aquinas' views on divine ideas to help out the problem of attributes. Basically, ignoring his arguments against Henry, Godfrey thinks that God can compare the divine essence to any creature, and since he is omniscient, and because creatures imitate the divine essence in various ways (hence the multiplicity of perfections that are attributed to God), God can compare his essence to the contents of the human mind and see that the human mind, because of its weakness, sees a plurality of attributes in God. So the distinction of attributes is not really in God at all, just the human mind, but God does know that in a derivative sense he has attributes. So in the end, Godfrey cannot avoid positing some movement in divinis either. [this is not entirely accurate, but I don't want to reread either Godfrey or that chapter of my diss.]

We turn now to Scotus. As is probably well known now to all readers of this blog, Scotus has two commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, a Lectura and an Ordinatio, as well as a series of student reports, Reportationes, the most trusty of which seems to be the one labeled I-A. In the first two commentaries, Scotus’ discussion of divine attributes is in d. 8 q. 4 in Reportatio I-A, although the doctrine is the same (save more possible variations regarding the formal distinction), the discussion of it has migrated to d. 45, which is about the divine will. Consequently, I will focus here on the Ordinatio. I do recommend reading the Reportatio, however, for it adds the notion of the propositio famosa, which holds that whatever is distinct in reason can be treated as if it were really distinct; Scotus uses this principle to help him escape from objections to his views based on the identity of indiscernables (as Scotus puts it, if a is the same as c and b is the same as c, then a is the same as b).

The basic point that Scotus argues is that the attributes are distinct prior to or apart from any operation of the intellect, whether the intellect in question is divine, human, or angelic. To start off, in the solution of d.8 q.4 Scotus accepts that there are distinctions of reason in God, as well as distinct formal objects, that is, between different modes of conceiving the same object. This suffices for distinctions between say ‘wise’ and ‘wisdom’, but not between entities like wisdom and truth. This is because God knows the divine essence intuitively (see here for intuitive cognition), and can only find these entities in the essence; he does not cause them by means of his intellect. Here is the argument to this effect:

Ordinatio I d. 8 q. 4 (ed. Vat. IV, 257):

“Praeterea, intellectus intuitivus nullam habet distinctionem in obiecto nisi secundum quod exsistens est, quia sicut non cognoscit aliquod obiectum nisi ut exsistens, ita non cognoscit aliqua distincta formaliter in obiecto nisi ut exsistens est. Cum ergo intellectus divinus non cognoscat essentiam suam nisi intellectione intuitiva, quaecumque distinctio ponatur ibi in obiecto – sive sit distinctiorum obiectorum formalium, sive ut rationum causatarum per actum intellectus – sequitur quod ista distinctio erit in obiecto ut actu exsistens est: et ita si ista est obiectorum formalium distinctorum in obiecto, erunt ista distincta formaliter (et tunc sequitur propositum, quod talis distinctio obiectorum formalium praecedit actum intellectus), si autem sit rationum causatarum per actum intelligendi, ergo intellectus divinus causabit aliquam intellectionem in essentia ‘ut relationem rationis’, ut est exsistens, quod videtur absurdum.”

Translation:
"Furthermore, an intuitive understanding has no distinction in an object except according as it is existing, because just as it does not know some object save as existing, so it does not know something to be formally distinct in the object unless as it is existing. Since therefore the divine intellect does not know its essence except by an intuitive intellection, whatever distinction is posited there in the object – whether it is of distinct formal objects or as definitions caused by the act of the intellect – it follows that that distinction will be in the object as it is existing in act; and so if that is of formally distinct objects in the object, they will be formally distinct (and then the matter at hand follows, that such a distinction of formal objets precedes the act of the intellect), if however it is of definitions caused by the act of understanding, therefore the divine intellect will cause some intellection in the essence, as a relation of reason, as it is existing, which seems absurd."

The result of this is that there is a distinction preceding the operation of an intellect, such that wisdom is in God and goodness is in God, but wisdom in God is not formally goodness in God. Scotus thinks he has an argument that proves this.

Ord. I d. 8 pt. 1 q. 4 n. 192 (ed. Vat. IV, 261)
Quod probatur, quia si infinita sapientia esset formaliter infinita bonitas, et sapientia in communi esset formaliter bonitas in communi. Infinitas enim non destruit formalem rationem illius cui additur, quia in quocumque gradu intelligatur esse aliqua perfectio (qui tamen ‘gradus’ est gradus illius perfectionis), non tollitur formalis ratio illius perfectionis propter istum gradum, et ita si non includit formaliter ‘ut in communi, in communi’, nec ‘ut infinitum, infinitum’.

Translation:
"This is proved: because if infinite wisdom would be formally infinite goodness, then wisdom in common would be formally goodness in common. For infinity does not destroy the formal ratio of that to which it is added, because in whatever grade some perfection is understood to be (which grade, nevertheless, is a grade of that perfection), the formal ratio of that perfection is not taken away because of that grade, so if it [wisdom], as in common, does not formally include [goodness] in common, neither [will wisdom] as infinite [include goodness] as infinite."

This is a pretty compressed argument, and I’m not at all sure what’s going on at the end. This is the clear part:

If infinite wisdom were formally infinite goodness, then wisdom in common would be formally goodness in common.

The likely interpretation of this is that Scotus has in mind his doctrine of ultimate abstraction from Lec./Ord. I d. 5. According to this notion, the mind can perform a series of abstractions from a material object and ultimately arrive at a pure quiddity or definition. With this in mind, the argument means that if wisdom and justice, qua infinite, are the same, then at the level of pure abstraction (that is, with infinity having been abstracted) wisdom and justice must also be the same. Scotus takes this to be false, and the remainder of the quoted passage supports the claim that infinity does not alter the definition of something, in this case, a pure perfection.

Scotus follows this argument with further considerations on what if means to be formally included in the definition of something:

Ordinatio I d. 8 pt. 1 q. 4 (ed. Vat. IV, 261-62)

Hoc declaro, quia ‘includere formaliter’ est includere aliquid in ratione sua essentiali, ita quod si definitio includentis assignaretur, inclusum esset definitio vel pars definitionis; sicut autem definitio bonitatis in communi non habet in se sapientiam, ita nec infinita infinitam: est igitur aliqua non-identitas formalis sapientiae et bonitatis, in quantum earum essent distinctae definitiones, si essent definibiles. Definitio autem non tantum indicat rationem causatum ab intellectu, sed quiditatem rei: est ergo non-identitas formalis ex parte rei, et intelligo sic, quod intellectus componens istam ‘sapientia non est formaliter bonitas’, non causat actu suo collativo veritatem hiuius compositionis, sed in obiecto invenit extrema, ex quorum compositione fit actus verus.

Translation:
I declare this, because ‘to include formally’ is to include something in its essential definition, so that if a definition of the including could be assigned, the included would be a definition or part of a definition; just as the definition of goodness in common does not contain wisdom, so neither [does the definition of] infinite [goodness contain the definition of] infinite [wisdom]. Therefore there is some formal non-identity of wisdom and goodness, insofar as they would have distinct definitions, if they were definable. A definition, however, does not only indicate the notion/definition caused by the intellect, but the quiddity of the thing. Therefore there is formal non-identity form the side of the thing, and I understand this in such a way that the intellect composing that proposition ‘wisdom is not formally goodness’, does not cause the truth of the proposition by its own comparative act, but it finds the extremes in the object, from the composition of which the act is made true."

The basic idea here is that none of the divine attributes include each other in their definitions or parts of definitions, and this is true apart from any operation of the intellect.

So there you have it. The attributes are distinct ex natura rei (which means they are distinct prior to the operation of any intellect, human or divine), a distinction that is formal (the formal distinction is doing most of the work here, so see the relevant post). In God the attributes all exist under the extrinsic mode of infinity, which safeguards divine simplicity (for more on infinity see the ‘natural knowledge of God’ post in this series). When ultimate abstraction is performed, the intellect discovers that these attributes are distinct because none of them fall into the definitions of the others.

Trancendentals

Another entry in the series on the fundamentals. As with my recent post on intuitive and abstractive cognition, it might be helpful to begin with a reminder of how Aquinas approaches the issue before seeing what Scotus adds.

Aquinas discusses the transcendentals in, for instance, De veritate I.1. According to him, the transcendentals are properties of being, or rather concepts about being, which are not contained in the concept of being as such but automatically follow upon it. They add nothing essential to the notion of being, because as soon as essential content is added to being you get something which falls under a genus and belongs to one of the ten categories. (God, of course, is not in a genus and does not belong to a category because his essence is not something other than his existence.) Rather they express non-essential aspects of being which serve either to delimit one being from another or to express how beings are ordered without saying anything about their essence. Such notions are the transcendental concepts unus (one), res (thing), aliquid (something), verum (true), and bonum (good). These concepts add to being the notions of unity, of being in oneself, of being as against other things, or being ordered to the intellect, and of being ordered to the will. All of these are simply different ways of apprehending being which are not contained directly in the notion of being itself, and so they are each coextensive with being and distinct from being only secundum rationem, only in our way of thinking about it and not because of any real difference between them.

Now, Scotus also accepts the "coextensive transcendentals", and, like Aquinas, he affirms that the transcendentals are things belonging to being prior to its division into the ten categories or most general genera. But in addition to being and its coextensive properties he recognizes two other classes of transcendentals. The key text is in the Ordinatio I D.8 p.1 q.3. Here he says that even prior to its division into the ten categories being is divided between finite and infinite, and the transcendentals are prior to this division as well. So whatever belongs to being as indifferent to being finitely or infinitely is a transcendental. This includes:

1) The disjunctive transcendentals. That is, Scotus recognizes an indefinite number of disjuncts, of which "either member of the disjunct is transcendental, for neither one determines its determinable to a certain genus." Every being must belong to one or the other member, and both are transcendental. Examples are the disjuncts finite-infinite, potential-actual, possible-necessary, posterior-prior, dependent-independent, etc. So: not everything is infinite, since only God is infinite, and not everything is finite, since God is not finite, but everything is either finite or infinite, and so falls within the disjunct finite-infinite. Belonging to "finite-infinite" does not indicate belonging to a determinate genus; but neither does belonging to either member: "finite" does not indicate belonging to a given genus, since being finite applies to member of every genus.

In addition to the disjunctive transcendentals, the other kind of transcendental property, that is, properties which are indifferent to being finite or infinite, are:

2) The pure perfections. If I recall correctly St Anselm defines the pure perfections as whatever it is better to have than not to have, but Scotus' notion of a pure perfection as whatever does not imply limitation is probably better. So, quantity, say, or materiality, or location, are all out, because each of these imply being finite. But (to take an example that Scotus uses) wisdom is a pure perfection and so a transcendental. It can be either finite or infinite. As finite, say in Socrates, wisdom is an accidental quality inhering in the soul and so belongs to a genus, but wisdom is capable of being infinite, in which case it is not a quality, not an accident, and is really identical with God. (It should be obvious how this way of looking at things does some of the same job that analogy does in Aquinas.) Similarly for life, which in finite things is an operation, but when infinite is really identical with God. Finite wisdom and finite love are really distinct and are separable in man, but not in God, and so forth.

The pure perfections are transcendentals that, unlike the others, do not belong to every being or to being as such, since some things do not have certain pure perfections: ants are not wise and do not love. But they still count as transcendental because they do not belong to a genus and can exist in either a finite way or in an infinite way, or even simply in an infinite way: there may be pure perfections which only exist in God and in no creature. Unlike for Aquinas, therefore, for Scotus a transcendental is not necessarily coextensive with being, does not automatically follow upon the notion of being, and is not merely notionally distinct from being. Different properties which in themselves are transcendental may either a) not exist in a given being, b) exist as really distinct in a given being, or c) exist as really identical but formally distinct (as wisdom and love do in God). Similarly, for the disjunctive transcendentals, for each disjunct the greater or infinite member must exist but the lesser or finite member need not, while the existence of the lesser or finite member implies the existence of the greater. (Bonaventure uses a consideration much like this to prove God's existence in the Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity.)

The study of the transcendentals is thus the study of a) what applies to all being as such; b) what applies only to God; and c) what applies to creatures in relation to God. In other words the science of the transcendentals is both the science of being qua being and the science of the noblest being and the science of the causes and principles of beings as such. That is, of course, how Aristotle defines metaphysics. So in the prologue to his Very Subtle Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Scotus says that metaphysics, as a universal science which studies being as prior to falling into particular genera, is the science of the transcendentals.

"The theory of the transcendentals is not simply an important section of Scotus' metaphysics. It is his metaphysics."

-Allan Wolter, The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, 184.
(for an excerpt see here.)

Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition

This post is meant to belong to the series Fundamenta Scoti, all of which so far have been by Faber, so it seems to be my turn. The subject of intuitive and abstractive cognition didn't appear on Faber's original list, but it's an important and influential part of Scotus' thought, so here it is.

To begin with, let's briefly recall how thinking works in Aquinas, whose epistemology is probably the scholastic one most familiar to any readers coming here. For Aquinas it goes, roughly speaking, like this: first the senses receive sense impressions. From these sense impressions the mind forms phantasms, reproductions or representations of the sense-data in the imaginative power. Out of the phantasms the intellect abstracts universal intelligible content, forming intelligible species, which are always and necessarily universal. Understanding consists in the apprehension of these intelligible species. When we want to understand something about individuals, what we do is take our understanding of the universal intelligible content and apply it back, in a kind of reflex action, upon the individual phantasms, which always and necessarily represent singulars, understanding that this universal is the intelligible content of this singular. (For Aquinas anything not universal in the singular material object is matter, which is intrinsically unintelligible.)

For Scotus things are different. Besides what is abstracted as a universal there is an irreducible singularity to a form, a haecceitas or thisness which makes the thing not only "such-and-such" a thing but also "this" thing. Since the principle of individuation is formal, not material, it is also intelligible, which means that, contrary to Aquinas, it is not the case that all intellection is of universals.

In addition to this Scotus recognizes a kind of cognition which Aquinas either does not or else doesn't flesh out very fully. In addition to abstractive cognition there is also a kind of cognition he calls intuitive, which is related to abstractive roughly as vision is to imagination, and indeed Scotus calls intuitive cognition a kind of intellectual "vision". Abstractive cognition abstracts from actual existence, and its object can be considered regardless of whether it is real or imaginary or hypothetical or past or distant; intuitive cognition is the kind of knowledge we have of something as existing and present to us in its actual existence. Key texts in which Scotus considers this distinction are found in Ordinatio Book II Dist. 3 P.2 Q.2, and in Questions on the Metaphysics Book VII Q.15. Here's a snippet from the latter:

There is a double intellection; one quidditative which abstracts from existence; the other, which is called “vision,” is of the existent as existent. The first, although it is generally of the universal, can be primarily of the singular . . . For the singular of itself is not determined to existence, because is abstracts from it just as the universal does. The second intellection is of both together, i.e. of the singular insofar as it is existing. And in this way . . . it does not include some accident but only existence, which does not pertain to the individual’s formula, neither insofar as it is a quiddity, nor insofar as the singular participates in this quiddity.

In addition to the familiar kind of cognition in which the intellect abstracts a universal from the phantasm, here Scotus argues that there is another way for our minds to encounter things, a direct and immediate “act of simple awareness in which some object is grasped . . . as present and existing here and now.” (The quote is from Allan Wolter.) The fact that we apprehend our own mental acts and memories has been cited as evidence that our minds grasp singulars not only in their common natures but also qua singulars, even if not in their very singularity. This distinction between these two kinds of cognitions makes this possible, although it may require some elucidation.

I cannot apprehend my thoughts or my memories (or take mental cognizance of any of my experiences) only as thoughts or memories in general, but only as my thought which I am thinking now, or my experience which was given to me then and there. Grasping my thought in this way is different from grasping the absolute nature of thought; knowing my thoughts involves knowing of their actual existence, even if in this particular thought of mine which I consider I can find nothing to distinguish it from every other thought. Thinking about the nature of thought in general (as when I think about logic) and considering the particular train of thought I am engaged in now are examples of “a double intellection; one quidditative which abstracts from existence; the other, which is called ‘vision,’ is of the existent as existent.” An analogy can be drawn between these two cognitions and the two faculties of sense and imagination; both sense and imagination involve the presentation of images to the awareness but imagination can take place without the presence or existence of its object: it is “abstractive”; while sensation only happens when an existent object is present to act upon the sense-faculty to directly produce the sense act: it is “intuitive.” Now just as the imagination presents singular images abstracted from existence, so the intellect in the type of thinking Aristotelians are most familiar with considers concepts whose objects may either exist or not. These abstractive concepts, Scotus points out, are usually but not always universals: I can think about the rage of Achilles as well as the serenity of Socrates, even if the one probably never existed and the other did, for both Achilles and his rage are intelligible as individuals whether they ever actually were or not. And when I think of Achilles and Socrates I don’t primarily think “man” and then add some determining difference to distinguish them, but first I think of the individuals, under whom “Greek” and “man” and “ancient” are included (though only one of whom perhaps also includes “wise”).

On the other hand, just as sensations only occur when the sense-object is existing, present and acting on the sense-organ, so Scotus argues that there must be an analogous intellectual activity which is so moved. One reason to think this is because of an argument Scotus advanced at the beginning of the Question, that the intellect as the superior power must know whatever the inferior sense power does. Superior power or not, however, according to the accepted maxim whatever is in the intellect (at least as regards material objects) was first in the senses, and here the intellect shares some of the defects of the sense. The intellect, like the sense powers, perceives the singular as singular without apprehending the singularity precisely speaking. Socrates and Achilles can both then be understood as individuals having the same quiddity, and as either existing or not existing, “for the singular of itself is not determined to existence, because it abstracts from it just as the universal does.” Only Socrates, however (presuming Achilles to be a non-existing fictional character), can be both seen and understood as “this singular insofar as it is existing.” This intellectual grasp however is only sufficient for the intellect to know the existence of something as a “this”; for the knowledge of quiddities, either of the essential nature or the quiddities of the accidents, pertains to abstraction, and the sense is not moved by the singularity which contains the quiddities per se.

(By the way, . Much of the difficulty for other philosophers on this issue and on the intelligibility of singulars in general came from the traditional Aristotelian axiom that while sense was concerned with particulars, the understanding pertained to universals. Some non-Christian philosophers took this to mean that the intellect was as unconcerned with particulars as the senses were with universals, to the extent that even God does not know individuals, a doctrine which seems to contain traces of the platonic tendency against which Scotus has been fighting from the beginning. While none of Scotus’ Christian opponents could follow the implications of the axiom so interpreted to such extremes, they still had difficulties in grappling with it. In the passage just cited Scotus shows that the axiom can be interpreted to mean that the intellect can do something the senses cannot, without meaning that sense has a domain of its own from which the intellect is excluded, thus eliminating the difficulty. See Sebastian Day, Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Later Scholastics, 59-60.)

In men, intuitive intellectual cognition, since it never acts without the sense in considering material things, is subject to the limitations of sense in a way that an intellect not hampered by such restrictions would not be. Scotus writes:

The intellect immediately receptive of the action of the object can be moved by singularity; not however that which is receptive through the mediacy of a natural action. Only the first is [true of] the angelic intellect which sees immediately the material singular. The second is [true of] our intellect, on which nature acts only through the mediacy of something begotten in the sense, which can be called a material natural action, with respect to that which is intelligible, operative on the intellect.

God, on the other hand, has no need for universal concepts. This is because God knows everything he knows by an immediate intuitive cognition. Not having to rely on intermediary senses and images to think with, he has no need to abstract anything from them. Our minds, however, are limited in what they can grasp intuitively and must rely on abstraction for the rest, which as it turns out is not wholly adequate.

Scotus' theory of how we think about sensible things seems to go something like this.. The sense faculty apprehends the substance as a “simul totum,” as a unified conglomeration of attributes, colors and noises and shapes and smells, etc., and alongside this activity the intellect has an intuitive grasp of the fact that the sense is perceiving this “simul totum,” this existing acting something. From the phantasm of the attribute-conglomeration the intellect removes accidents one by one until it grasps the nature underlying them: my mind understands that this short white bald Greek-speaking something is a man, to whom the accidents short and white as so forth belong. “And thus,” Scotus continues, “the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem of the reflection is something confused and in the middle it is distinct.” I take it that the terminus a quo is the confused conglomeration in the phantasm. The nature stands in the middle and is understood distinctly because it is the primary principle of assimilable action in the substance. But the mind can penetrate no further before becoming entangled in the accidents. Socrates acts on my mind to the extent that I understand not only the common nature humanity but also the fact that this something acting on me (known by intuitive cognition) is this man (known by abstractive cognition). I can therefore name him not only by species but as an individual. But when I attempt to go on and grasp what makes Socrates himself and no one else, all I have to fall back on are his characteristics of being short, bald, ugly, wise—-none of which are unable to be true of other men, either singly or all together. Even though Socrateity does not form an accidental unity with humanity, I only understand him in a quasi-accidental way, as the (an) individual man with these accidental, non-unique attributes. Thus the terminus ad quem remains confused as well. I know that containing the humanity and supporting all the accidents of Socrates is Socrateity, but I do not ever reach a concept of Socrateity which actually picks him out of all other possible men. “And without such a concept we never conceive the singular distinctly.”

Besides the way we encounter sensible objects, however, Scotus' account of intuitive cognition has widespread implications ranging from how we know our own acts to the nature of the beatific vision.

Formal Distinction

The Formal Distinction, of course, is not a “fundamental position” in the sense employed by the other posts in this series. It is a tool rather than a doctrine, though it does have its own set of arguments designed to show its necessity. It is fundamental in the sense that it is part of Scotus’ solution to a variety of problems in both theology (relation of personal properties, divine attributes, and so on, to the divine essence) and philosophy (the relation of being to the other transcendentals, discussions of universals and particulars). Consequently, prior to examining these issues we must lay out what Scotus thinks the formal distinction is.

It is well-known that there were three sorts of distinctions developed by the scholastics. The first is the distinction of reason, or logical distinction; this is a distinction generated by the intellect, is not based on anything outside the intellect in the world; though the scholastics use it a great deal, they don’t have much to say on its nature. It posits the least degree of distinction in the entities to be distinguished, a difference only in thought. In later scholasticism, in reaction to Scotus, it was differentiated into a distinction of reason-reasoning and reason-reasoned but this desperate Thomist move need not concern us here.

There is also the real distinction, which was also used by everyone but very little was done to define it. Aquinas posited this between essence and existence, for example, though he arrived at it by arguing from a distinction concepts (see De ente), and never bothered to define it. After Aquinas, it became common to distinguish this distinction from the rational distinction by what is today called the “separability criterion”; according to this, two things are really distinct if they are separable and one can exist without the other (for example, the body and soul). I don’t know who first used this criterion; generally Giles of Rome is blamed by those Thomists particularly obsessed with detailing the precise stages of decline away from Aquinas. It is also found in Godfrey of Fontaines, Scotus and later fourteenth-century philosophy (note that I have made no great search for it). This is not the only version of the real distinction, however, for Thomas of Sutton interprets it as having distinct beings (res) in act, as well as any distinction not caused by the intellect.

There were also various versions of what is often called a “middle distinction” a distinction supposed to be half-way between the mind and reality. Generally, most theologians in the thirteenth-century used them, and often attacked other versions of them for violating the principle of excluded middle. A classic example can be found in Bonaventure, and Aquinas employed one early in his career as well. For Aquinas, this was the celebrated distinction in the mind with a fundamentum in re, in which entities were potentially distinct in the world but rendered actually distinct by the “completive” action of the intellect (ratio completiva). This distinction was somewhat popular, adopted by even non-thomists such as Henry of Ghent, who also authored a “middle-distinction” which he called an “intentional distinction” .

Anyway, the point of all this is to make it clear that while there are “general” notions or theories of distinction with common terms to describe them, often individual authors have their own ideosynchratic theories. So one has to be careful not to simply quote Scotus and then view him refuted by Thomas of Sutton simply because the latter rejects a “real distinction”

Turning to Scotus, we find that he also employes the rational and real distinctions, as well as the formal. It is a matter of dispute whether the formal distinction is a middle distinction or a real distinction. I myself am on the real distinction side, as will become clear, but the topic was disputed during the medieval period, and still disputed today. The contemporary form of the dispute is whether Scotus changed his mind at Paris and mitigated the reality of the distinction, or did not. However, a great deal seems to hang not on what Scotus actually said but in what order he is thought to have said it. That is, different conclusions about the distinction are often reached by holding a different chronology of Scotus’ works. Most of the “Scotus changed his mind” crowd hold to Balic’s (the father of the modern Vatican critical edition) claim that the Ordinatio is the last work of Scotus, and should be the ultimate and final arbiter of any apparent contradictions, and is equivalent to the Summa of Aquinas. This then leaves the chronology as Lectura-Reportatio-Ordinatio. The opposition has a different view, which runs Lectura-Ordinatio-Reportatio+further additions to primative text of Ordinatio. I will say no more about this controversy, and the interested reader can consult Hoffmann’s bibliography (see the sidebar) under the names: Hester Gelber, Marilyn Adams, Michael Jordan, Richard Cross, Stephen D. Dumont.

The obvious division based on differences in terminology is between the Ordinatio/Lectura and the Reportatio. A common observation that appears to be true is that at Oxford Scotus spoke of entities, formalitates that were distinct, while at Paris he focused rather on the distinction itself rather than on what was being distinguished (though, as is apparent from the Quaestio de formalitatibus and other passages of the Reportatio, the formalitates are still present).

The basic division of distinctions for Scotus is between those caused by the mind and those independent of the mind. Distinctions independent of the mind he calls distinctions ex natura rei. This includes the real distinction, which he calls a distinctio realis-actualis and devotes little space to the examination of it, and the formal distinction. The real distinction is distinguished from the formal distinction by real separability. Items distinguished by a real distinction can exist independently of each other, while for the formal distinction this is not the case; they are inseparably united.

Texts:

Ordinatio II d. 1 q. 4-5 (ed. Vat. VII, 101-103):
“...nihil est idem realiter alicui, sine quo potest esse realiter absque contradictione... Hanc etiam propositionem ‘illa sunt distincta realiter quorum unum potest manere sine altero’, negaret protervus. Ista autem negata, perit tota doctrina Philosophi VII Topicorum...”	... nothing is really the same as something, without which it can really be without contradiction... a reckless person might deny this proposition also, ‘those things are really distinct of which one can remain without the other’. With that denied, however, the doctrine of Aristotle in VII Topics is destroyed.
Ordinatio II d. 3 pars 1 q. 2 (ed. Vat. VII, 198):
“Accipio igitur quod nihil potest concludi ‘distinctum ab alio’ nisi vel propter separationem actualem, vel potentialem, vel propter proportionem istorum ad aliqua alia quorum alterum est ab alterio separabile.”	I hold therefore that nothing can be distinct from another unless either because of actual separation, or potential, or because of the proportion of those things to some other of each one is separable from the other.
Ordinatio I d. 2 pars 2 q. 1-4 (ed. Vat. II, 355):
“Sed numquid haec distinctio dicetur realis? Respondeo: non est realis actualis, intelligendo sicut communiter dicitur, ‘differentia realis actualis’ illa quae est differentia rerum et in actu... et sicut non est realis actualis, ita non est realis potentialis...”	But should this distinction be called real? I answer: it is not real-actual, meaning by this as is commonly held a real-actual difference, that which is a difference of things and in act... and just as it is not real-actual, so it is not real-potential.
ibid. (350):
“Et intelligo sic ‘realiter’, quod nullo modo per actum intellectus considerantis, immo quod talis entitas esset ibi si nullus intellectus esset considerans; et sic esse ibi, si nullus intellectus consideraret, dico ‘esse ante omnem actum intellectus’.”	And I interpret the term ‘really’ as in no way by the act of the intellect considering, indeed that such an entity would be there if no intellect would be considering. And so to be there, if no intellect would consider I call ‘to be before every act of the intellect’.
Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IV q. 2, edited by Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1997), 354-355:
Ideo quaelibet potest dici pars perfectionis, non tamen realiter differens quod sit alia natura, sed alia perfectio realis – alietate, inquam, non causata ab intellectu, nec tamen tanta quantum intelligimus cum dicimus ‘diversae res’; sed differentia reali minori, si vocetur differentia realis omnis non causata ab intellectu... Exemplum huius aliquale in continuo, in quo sunt multae partes; ista multitudo est realis, sic quod non causata a ratione. Non tamen tanta quantam hic intelligimus ‘diversae res’, sed minor realis, quia multitudo non simpliciter diversorum in uno tamen toto contentorum.”	Therefore whatever can be called a part of perfection, nevertheless no really differens as it is another nature, but another real perfection – by an otherness, I say, not caused by the intellect, nor of the kind that we understand when we say ‘diverse things’; but by a real-minor difference, if a real difference be called every difference not caused by the intellect... An example of this is of the continuum, in which there are many parts; that multitude is real, such that it is not caused by reason. Nevertheless we do not here understand ‘diverse things’ but a minor-real, because a multitude not simply of diverse things contained in one total.
Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VII q. 19 (Opera Philosophica IV, 370):
“Alia est opinio... Sed realis differentia ponitur habere gradus. Est enim maxima naturarum et suppositorum; media naturarum in uno supposito; minima diversarum perfectionum sive rationum perfectionalium unitive contentarum in una natura.”	There is another opinion... but a real difference is posited to have grades. For it is most of all of natures and supposits; medium of natures in one supposit; least of all of diverse perfections or perfectinal definitions unitively contained in one nature.

As for their correlatives, real and formal identity, Scotus sees the highest form of identity as being formal identity. This the identity of sharing the same definition. The second highest is real identity.

Texts:

Ordinatio I d. 2 pars 2 q. 1-4 (ed. Vat. II, 356):

“...possumus invenire in unitate multos gradus – primo, minima est aggregationis; in secundo gradu est unitas ordinis, quae aliquid addit supra aggregationem; in tertio est unitas per accidens, ubi ultra ordinem est informatio, licet accidentalis, unius ab altero eorum quae sunt sic unum; in quarto est per se unitas compositi ex principiis essentialibus per se actu et per se potentia; in quinto est unitas simplicitatis, quae est vere identitas (quidquid enim est ibi, est realiter idem cuilibet, et non tantum est unum illi unitate unionis, sicut in aliis modis) – ita, adhuc ultra, non omnis identitas est formalis. Voco autem identitatem formalem, ubi illud quod dicitur sic idem, includit illud cui sic est idem, in ratione sua formali quiditativa et per se primo modo.”

We can find many grades in unity: first, the least is that of aggregation. In the second grade is unity of order, which adds [order] over aggregation. The third is accidental unity, where beyond order there is [an] informing, although it is accidental, of one from another which are thus one. In the fourth is the per se unity of a composite [composed] from essential principles per se in act and per se in potency. In the fifth is unity of simplicity, which is truly identity (for whatever is there is really the same to any other, and not only is it one by the unity of that union, as is the case in the other modes); so still beyond this [real unity of simplicity], not every identity is formal. I call however formal identity where that which is said to be the same includes that to which it is the same in its formal-quidditative definition per say in the first mode [of per se predication; this means to predicate a definition or part of a definition].

Here we find that real identity is equivalent to simplicity, which is “true”identity. Beyond this however is formal identity. consequently, simplicity/real identity is compatibile with formal non identity (= formal distinction).

An argument based on intuitive cognition that was to prove influential shows how Scotus arrives at the formal distinction; this also illustrates his practice of referring to entities that are formally distinct:

Ordinatio I d. 8 q. 4 (ed. Vat. IV, 257):

“Praeterea, intellectus intuitivus nullam habet distinctionem in obiecto nisi secundum quod exsistens est, quia sicut non cognoscit aliquod obiectum nisi ut exsistens, ita non cognoscit aliqua distincta formaliter in obiecto nisi ut exsistens est. Cum ergo intellectus divinus non cognoscat essentiam suam nisi intellectione intuitiva, quaecumque distinctio ponatur ibi in obiecto – sive sit distinctiorum obiectorum formalium, sive ut rationum causatarum per actum intellectus – sequitur quod ista distinctio erit in obiecto ut actu exsistens est: et ita si ista est obiectorum formalium distinctorum in obiecto, erunt ista distincta formaliter (et tunc sequitur propositum, quod talis distinctio obiectorum formalium praecedit actum intellectus), si autem sit rationum causatarum per actum intelligendi, ergo intellectus divinus causabit aliquam intellectionem in essentia ‘ut relationem rationis’, ut est exsistens, quod videtur absurdum.”

Furthermore, an intuitive understanding has no distinction in an object except according as it is existning, because just as it does not know some object save as existing, so it does not know something to be formally distinct in the object unless as it is existing. Since therefore the divine intellect does not know its essence except by an intuitive intellection, whatever distinction is posited there in the object – whether it is of distinct formal objects or as definitions caused by the act of the intellect – it follows that that distinction will be in the object as it is existing in act; and so if that is of formally distinct objects in the object, they will be formally distinct (and then the matter at hand follows, that such a distinction of formal objets precedes the act of the intellect), if however it is of definitions caused by the act of understanding, therefore the divine intellect will cause some intellection in the essence, as a relation of reason, as it is existing, which seems absurd.

To boil this down:

1.intuitive cognition, which is cognition of the object as present, causes no distinction in the object being cognized.

2. Since the divine intellect knows the divine essence by intuitive cognition, any distinction (whether of diverse formal objects or definitions caused by the intellect) posited in the divine essence will be in the essence as it is existing in act.

3. If the distinction is of distinct formal objects, then Scotus has what he is trying to prove, a formal distinction.

4. If it is of definitions caused by the act of understanding, then the divine intellect will cause intellection in the essence, which is absurd.

At Paris the basic organization of distinctions is into distinctions that are simpliciter, that is, absolute or unqualified, or secundum quid. Under the secundum quid distinction falls both the formal distinction and another distinction called adequate non-identity (for situations in which one of the distinguenda exceeds the other). The difference between the two classes of distinctions is in a series of four conditions. All four are required for a distinctio simpliciter, while only the first three are required for a distinction secundum quid.

Reportatio I-A d. 33 q. 2 (ed. Wolter-Bychkov II, 328):

“...ad hoc quod aliqua simpliciter distinguantur, quattuor requiruntur condiciones. Prima est quod sit aliquorum in actu et non in potentia tantum, — quomodo distinguuntur ea quae sunt in potentia in materia et non simpliciter, quia non sunt in actu. Secunda est quod est eorum quae habent esse formale et non tantum virtuale, — ut effectus sunt in sua causa virtualiter et non formaliter. Tertia condicio est quod est eorum quae non habent esse confusum (ut extrema in medio et miscibilia in mixto), sed eorum quae habent esse distinctum propriis actualibus. Quarta condicio, quae sola est completiva distinctionis perfectae, est non-identitas...”

For this that something is distinguished simpliciter, for conditions are required. The first is that it is of things in act and not in potentcy only, in the way in which those things are distinguished which are in potency in matter and not simpliciter, because they are not in act. The second is that it is of those which have formal being and not only virtual, as an effect is in its cause virtually and not formally. The third condition is that it is of those which do not have confused beng, as the extremes in a medium and mixable in the mixted, but of those which have distinct being by their own actuals(?). The fourth condition, which alone completes perfect distinction, is non identity.

The terminology of this distinction appears to come from discussions of fallacies, especially the fallacious move from secundum quid to simpliciter. This is a common fallacy treated by numerous medieval logicians. The ‘secundum quid’ is a determinatio deminuens, a determination that once applied diminishes the reality of what it is applied to.

To sum up:

There are basically two versions of the formal distinction, corresponding to Scotus’ Oxford and Parisian periods. In the Oxford version entities are formally distinct if they are found in a third thing inseparably united but really identical. This distinction obtains apart from any cognitive activity on the part of God or creatures, even when the subject of the distinction is God. At Paris Scotus is more interested in discussing the reality of the distinction itself, which he says is a diminished distinction, not a fully distinct or fully actual distinction. He sets out a series of conditions for an unqualified distinction, and if the last is not met there is only a qualified distinction present (the other features of the Oxford account, such as obtaining prior to the operation of the intellect, hold true of Paris as well).