News

1. There is a fairly new blog that treats the Franciscan Intellectual Tradition, in particular Scotus and Bonaventure, with some political commentary thrown in for good measure. See The Socratic Catholic for your Scotist reflections, now that we here at the Smithy are nearly inactive.

2. Thomas Williams has published a book of translations from Scotus, which is much needed now that many of the Wolter translations seem to be going out of print (including that of the Tractatus de primo principio). It looks like a must-have for every enthusiast and hater of Scotus.

From the website:

• A new anthology of one of the most important thinkers of the Middle Ages
• Translated from the most reliable critical editions of Scotus' texts
• Presents Scotus's full treatment of the issues, including his engagement with other thinkers
• Contains many texts never before translated into English

Thomas Williams presents the most extensive collection of John Duns Scotus's work on ethics and moral psychology available in English. John Duns Scotus: Selected Writings on Ethics includes extended discussions-and as far as possible, complete questions-on divine and human freedom, the moral attributes of God, the relationship between will and intellect, moral and intellectual virtue, practical reasoning, charity, the metaphysics of goodness and rightness, the various acts, affections, and passions of the will, justice, the natural law, sin, marriage and divorce, the justification for private property, and lying and perjury. 

Relying on the recently completed critical edition of the Ordinatio and other critically edited texts, this collection presents the most reliable and up-to-date versions of Scotus's work in an accessible and philosophically informed translation.

Introduction
Topical guide to the translations
1: Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics IX, q. 15
2: Ordinatio prologue, part 5, qq. 1 and 2 (omitting nn. 270-313)
3: Ordinatio I, d. 1, part 1, q. 1
4: Ordinatio I, d. 1, part 2, q. 1, nn. 65-73
5: Ordinatio I, d. 1, part 2, q. 2 (omitting nn. 100-133)
6: Ordinatio I, d. 8, part 2, q. un., nn. 223-225, 269-274, 281-301
7: Ordinatio I, d. 17, part 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 55-67, 92-100
8: Ordinatio I, d. 38, q. un.
9: Reportatio IA, dd. 39-40, qq. 1-3, nn. 24-59
10: Ordinatio I, d. 44, q. un.
11: Ordinatio I, d. 47, q. un.
12: Ordinatio I, d. 48, q. un.
13: Ordinatio II, d. 6, q. 1
14: Ordinatio II, d. 6, q. 2
15: Ordinatio II, d. 7, q. un., nn. 28-39
16: Ordinatio II, dd. 34-37, q. 2
17: Ordinatio II, d. 38, q. un.
18: Ordinatio II, d. 39, qq. 1-2
19: Ordinatio II, d. 40, q. un.
20: Ordinatio II, d. 41, q. un.
21: Ordinatio II, d. 42, q. un.
22: Ordinatio II, d. 43, q. un.
23: Ordinatio II, d. 44, q. un.
24: Ordinatio III, d. 17, q. un
25: Ordinatio III, d. 27, q. un.
26: Ordinatio III, d. 28, q. un.
27: Ordinatio III, d. 29, q. un.
28: Ordinatio III, d. 32, q. un. (omitting nn. 12-18)
29: Ordinatio III, d. 33, q. un.
30: Ordinatio III, d. 34, q. un., nn. 1-5, 24-38, 45-83
31: Ordinatio III, d. 36, q. un.
32: Ordinatio III, d. 37, q. un.
33: Ordinatio III, d. 38, q. un.
34: Ordinatio IV, d. 15, q. 2, nn. 78-101
35: Ordinatio IV, d. 17, q. un., nn. 1-2, 17-33
36: Ordinatio IV, d. 21, q. 2
37: Ordinatio IV, d. 26, q. un., nn. 12-31
38: Ordinatio IV, d. 29, q. un., nn. 11-28
39: Ordinatio IV, d. 33, q. 1
40: Ordinatio IV, d. 33, q. 3
41: Ordinatio IV, d. 46, qq. 1-3
42: Quodlibetal Questions q. 18

New Simpson Translations

Some more news: Peter Simpson (webpage here) has recently completed a translation of Franciscus de Mayronis' Tractatus de univocatione entis, probably an excerpt from the Conflatus. He has also started translating a commentary on the Sentences attributed to Antonius Andreas. Simpson notes in the preface to the latter translation that:

The Subtle Doctor’s theology, just as such and without the scholars' qualifications and updatings, deserves to much more widely known and so needs to be made available in easier forms. Not everyone has to be a scholar or familiar with the scholars' findings to attain a basic and salutary grasp of Scotism.

Francis of Meyronnes on whether there is a transcendental notion more common than being

Now that the Philosophers have finished their work, it is time for things to go back to normal here at The Smithy. We (that is, I) shall return to the dusty stacks of the library, leaving behind the world of Things that Matter, matters of contemporary philosophical relevance, for some classic Smity latinophilic blogging: an obscure text by an obscure writer on a topic that is currently being discussed privately by my co-blogger and I (co-blogger: see esp. concl. 4).

Here are four conclusions from Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus prologus q. 13 (ed. Venezia 1520, ff. 18rb sqq.).

Utrum sit aliqua ratio transcendens communior ente

[...]

Pono igitur quattuor conclusiones:
Prima est quod licet nulla ratio intentionis primae sit communior, tamen ratio aliqua secundae intentionis est communior ente.

[...]

Secunda conclusio quod in respectibus transcendentibus aliquid est communius ente, quia quaecumque sunt distincta, distinctio est eis communis et communior quolibet illorum. Quaecumque etiam sunt ordinata, ordinatio etiam est eis communior; huiusmodi sunt ista ens, verum, bonum; omnia enim sunt distincta et ordinata; ergo etc.

Tertia conclusio quod in aptitudinalibus est aliquid communius ente, nam quod dicitur de ente et de aliis ab ente est communius ente; huiusmodi sunt istae aptitudines, scilicet intelligibilitas, volibilitas, etc.

Quarta conclusio quod in privativis est aliquid communius ente, nam privatio est communior quae dicitur de ente et de aliis ab ente; sed non solum ens, sed et alia ab entitate, scilicet passiones, quodlibet istorum est unum (veritas est una, bonitas est una, et sic de aliis); ergo etc.

Rough Translation:

I posit four conclusions:

The first is that although no ratio of first intention is more common than being, some ratio of a second intention is more common than being.

The second conclusion is that in transcendental relations something is more common than being, because whatsoever things are distinct, distinction is common to them and more common than each one of them. Whatsoever things are ordered, ordering also is more common than they are; of this sort are being, true, good, for all of them are distinct and ordered.

The third conclusion is that in aptitudinals there is something more common than being, for what is said of being and of others other than being is more common than being; of this sort are those aptitudes, namely intelligibility, volibility/willability(?), etc.

The fourth conclusion is that in privatives there is something more common than being, for privation is more common which is said of being and of others other than being; but not only being, but also other than entity, namely passions/attributes, for each one of these are one (truth is one, goodness is one, the same is true of the rest); therefore, etc.

New Translations

CUA press has two new translations coming up:   Scotus' commentary on the Categories, and the commentaries on the Perihermenias. Furthermore, I was reading on a Facebook thread on the Thomistic discussion forum where I noticed a comment from someone at Benedictine college, stating that they were working on the Porphyry commentary as well. So, if we recall that Wolter and Etzkorn already translated the questions on the Metaphysics, that really leaves only the De anima, Elenchorum and the Theoremata before we have a complete translation of the Opera Philosophica. This is certainly welcome news, as some of Wolter's translations have been going out of print. So far, by my count, the De primo principio, the Duns Scotus Metaphysician volume, and of course the Quodlibet, which has been out of print for years.

Lest the nefarious quidam accuse me of keeping a double standard, for I have been known to complain about re-translating the works of Aquinas, let me say that, sure, it's not ideal, everyone should learn latin. I agree with my co-bloggers' comments regarding latin that he made in the course of the debate with Feser. But it is better for people to be reading Scotus in translation than not at all (which is a very real danger), so let the translators continue their work with my thanks.

And hey, once they get done, why not re-translate the Summa contra gentiles? That translation is pretty old, after all.

More on Unitive Containment and the Formal Distinction

From the last volume of the Ordinatio, which has just arrived at my library. The segment here translated is from a question on the distinction between justice and mercy in God (the standard 12th c. examples, used, for example, by the Lombard). Here's a first stab at translation.

Ordinatio IV d. 46 q. 3 ad arg. princ. 4 (ed. Vat. XIV, 215-217):

To the second, it is said that mercy connotes something other than justice, although those two are unqualifiedly [simpliciter = realiter] the same as each other.

But against this: that connotation does not require some distinction of this kind from that as it is in itself, but only as it is understood [accipitur] and signified, because connotation is required for this. The argument, however, requires that there is some distinction between them [justice and mercy] as they are causes of distinct effects. Nor does the distinction of reason suffice for this, because a relation of reason is not that by which some effect is really made [efficitur], rather, generally, no real distinction in an effect depends on a relation of reason in a cause, just as was proved in d. 13 of the first book. That distinction of effects depends essentially on a distinction in the cause, therefore that is not only one of reason.

I concede, therefore, to that argument that just as in God the intellect is not formally the will, nor contrariwise, although one is the same as the other by the truest identity of simplicity, so also justice is not formally the same as mercy or contrariwise. And according to this formal non-identity, that [= mercy] can be the proximate principle of some external [= extra] effect, of which the other [= justice] is not the principle, in the way in which just as if this and that [= mercy and justice] were two things [res] because to be a formal principle befalls each as it is formally such.

Contra: the divine esse is most actual, therefore it includes every divine perfection; but it would not include, if there were a formal distinction there, because everything distinct formally is there actually, and consequently, as distinct, it is there in act, and so the essence as distinct does not include every act. 

Again, if there are there real distinct formalities, therefore there are distinct realities there, and so distinct things [res]. Proof of the first consequence: because formality is distinct by its own reality.

To the first: the divine esse contains every actuality of the divine essence unitively. [Entities] are not contained unitively which are contained without all distinction, becuase union is not wihout all distinction; nor are they contained unitively which are contained as unqualifiedly [simpliciter] really distinct, because are contained in a multiple manner or separately [dispersim]. Therefore this term 'unitive' includes some distinction of the [entities] contained, which suffices for union, and nevertheless such a union which is repugnant toall composition and aggregation of the distinct [entities]. This can not be unless there be posited formal non-identity with real identity.

To the argument, therefore, I concede that the essence contains every actuality, and consequently every formality, but not as formally the same, becaues then they would not be contained unitively.

To the second it can be said that as many formalities as are there, so many are there realities and things [res]; but each reality is only qualified [secundum quid], just as was shown there [Ord. I d. 13, according to the Vat. editors]. Otherwise, that consequence can be denied: 'many real formalities, therefore many realities', just as 'many divine persons, therefore many deities', is denied. But the first response is more real [realier]. 

Ordinatio Translations

I came across this link  of a webpage for a scholar who has translated several volumes of the Ordinatio (from the Vatican edition). There is also some other material of interest, such as Suarez, and Jerome of Montefortino, an 18th c. Scotist.

Scotus on Whether God can be named by a Wayfarer

Rep. I d. 22 q. un. (trans. Wolter/Bychkov II, p. 11 ff., slightly modified)

I reply to the question, then, that it is possible for the pilgrim to assign some name in order to signify distinctly the essence of God in itself, even though he may not know that [essence]. Now whether this is actually the case or not, I do not doubt that he [at least] can use a name given by himself or someone else for the purpose of expressing such an essence distinctly. For we do use many names given by God or the angels, as well as by us, in order to express or signify distinctly something in itself, e.g., God or other things.

...

But if the question is understood in the senes of referring to the person to whom I address a name, I say that just as I intend to express distinctly that essence of God in itself through that name, so he intends to conceive it through that name, although neither I who use it, nor he to whom I address it, could understand distinctly that essence that I intend to express distinctly in this manner, with him [subsequently intending] to use the name thus expressed in this way. Nor is this to be wondered at. For we talk the whole day trying to distinguish the essence as it is in itself from the relations and attribute perfections, [saying] that it is an abyss and a sea of infinite substance. Now whatever, considered in itself, can be distinguished from everything else in this way can, for example, be called a, and afterwards we use this [appellation.]

But is it possible, in the case if God is expressed distinctly through some name, for a pilgrim to have or express some distinct concept about him as he is in himself, by means of which [the pilgrim] could understand or comprehend [God]?

Response: I say that it is not, because nothing moves the intellect of the pilgrim naturally in his present state to [produce] a distinct notion or concept of something, except if the latter's sense image [in the imagination], together with the agent intellect, can become the sufficient causes that move the possible intellect to [produce] such concepts, because such a concept only depends upon these [images] as its causes. But those things of which there cannot be a sense image cannot, in conjunction with the agent intellect, move the possible intellect to a distinct and perfect knowledge of them, but only to common and general concepts that apply indifferently to them and other things. Now God has no [corresponding] sense image, because he is not a body nor is informed by accidents, and therefore he cannot move the intellect of the pilgrim to have some distinct concept of him, but only to [produce] common and general concepts that apply indifferently to him and other things. Therefore, as we know him, we can have no concept distinct from [concepts of] other things to express [God ] as he is in himself.

Also, in our experience, we do not form some irreducibly simple concept of God thorugh which we could distinguish God from 'not God,' because in this way we would know him in his entirety [already] in this life. [...] if God were known bu us in his entirety, he would not be known [to us] in compound common concepts [put together by joining simple concepts] with one another, e.g. under the notion of an infinite being [or] a purest infinite act. Such concepts, which we can have about God in this life, are more specific and more proper, and nevertheless any such concept is resolvable into prior notions that are simple, common, and not proper to God. This is evident in the case of 'infinite being' [or] 'first principle', because the first is resolvable into entity and infinity, the second into primacy and origination, which are prior to the compound ones.

A Comparison

In Reportatio I-A, Dist.2 Part I Q.1-3.11, in the Wolter-Bychkov text, we read:

Nam primum in quolibet genere praeeminet alteri posteriori illius generis, et tamen non est causa illius. Primitas enim exemplaris non distinguitur a primitate efficientiae, quia primum exemplans alia in esse intelligibli, non est nisi primum efficiens per intellectum; et sicut naturale efficiens non distinguitur contra efficiens, immo continetur sub eo, sic nec exemplaris distinguitur ab efficiente. Sunt ergo duae causalitates contra se distinctae, scilicet causae efficientis et finalis.

Judging the soundness of the Latin text is well beyond my competence; that's Faber's domain. The present edition isn't a critical one (it includes no variants), but until the critical edition is available it's what we have to go on, though it has come under some pretty severe criticism from trustworthy critics. Taking the Latin as it is, though, I want to look for a second at the English translation. This passage gives a good example for why, granted all the good he's done for Scotist scholarship, the reader should be wary of relying on Wolter's translations for a precise grasp of Scotus' thought. Wolter's translation:

For the most eminent [species] in any genus excels each less eminent [species], and yet is not its cause. Note also that the primacy of exemplarity is not distinguished from that of efficiency, for the first to model another in thought is nothing other than a first efficient cause endowed with an intellect. Now just a natural efficient cause is not distinguished from efficient cause - indeed it is a subdivision thereof - so neither is the exemplar cause. Hence, there are only two sorts of causality that are distinct from each other, namely what pertains to an efficient cause and final cause respectively.

Here is my own translation:

Now the first in any genus is preeminent over another posterior member of that genus, and yet is not its cause. For the primacy of exemplarity is not distinguished from the primacy of effectivity, for the first thing exemplating another into intelligible being is nothing but the first thing effecting another through intellect; and as a natural effecting [cause] is not distinguished against an effecting [cause], but rather is contained under it, so neither is an exemplary cause distinguished from an efficient one. There are therefore two causalities distinct over against each other, namely that of an efficient cause and that of a final one.

Some of the differences in my translation are mere quibbles. I don't like Wolter's "efficiency", since the ordinary meaning of the English word seems just too far from its meaning here. More seriously, I don't see why he twice inserts the bracketed "species", which does not seem obviously demanded or implied by the sense of the passage. Some are not quibbles, however. While in places Wolter's translation is extremely literal, "for the first to model another in thought is nothing other than a first efficient cause endowed with an intellect" seems to me intolerably loose. It's almost as though he doesn't grasp the crucial point here, and so doesn't know how to render it precisely, and thus totally glosses over the relevance of this passage to the problem of intelligible being.

When I "model something in thought," there are two ways for me to do it, depending on what exactly I am modeling. Say I am modeling in my thought some mathematical object, the five platonic solids; or say I'm a detective modeling out scenarios to match the evidence of a crime scene. In these cases the objects of thought are already intelligible before I think of them, before I form my mind so that their intelligibility is activated in my intellection. The task is to bring what is already in itself potentially intelligible by the nature of its intrinsic formal integrity to being actually thought-out.

On the other hand, when I "model in thought" something like this blog post, or the plot of a detective novel, I am in a sense creating a new intelligibility, not discovering in thought what is already out there to bring into thoughtfulness. My act of intellection causes rather than is caused by the intelligibility of the intelligible object. However, my intelligible productions are artifacts. Like material artifacts, they don't have substantiality beyond that of the material from which they are produced. I can't create intelligibility any more than I can create physical things; I can only make new things by taking intelligible content and rearranging it in new ways. I can't invent a new platonic solid, although I can produce a new mathematical proof or pedagogical technique concerning the five that are always already there.

Now, the most pressing question about intelligible being concerns, not the way we think intelligibles, but the way God does. I can't make substances, only artifacts. But the substantial, natural world is in its entirety like an artifact of God's, who makes it. Is this true for the intelligible world as well? Does God think things, "model them in thought", in the first way or in the second? Does he think thinkables because they are first thinkable or are things thinkable because he first thinks them? If the former, one has to explain why finite things don't have some kind of eternal existence apart from God, in the separate platonic heaven of forms. If the latter, one has to explain how forms can have any internal necessity or non-arbitary features, and why in this case the potential seems logically posterior to the actual. By its looseness and imprecision Wolter's translation here totally obscures the fact that Scotus thinks that God produces intelligibles into intelligible being, a position which some later Scotists found untenable and ultimately incoherent. Someone reading only the English would not only be unable to tell which position Scotus takes, but even that this passage is relevant to the question at all. The question is not whether God is "endowed with intellect", but whether intelligibles are intelligible through the activity of his intellect or prior to his intellection.

A final note: in my opinion Wolter's "only" in the last sentence is neither justified in the Latin, nor correct. Scotus is not, I think, saying that efficient and final causality are the only kinds of causality; here he's talking about extrinsic causes, those which produce something into being, and not about the intrinsic causality of matter and form, which of course he recognizes. The point is that among extrinsic causes natural and exemplary causality are species of efficient causality, but that final causality is not; the point is not that there are no other kinds of causes.

So I reiterate a point I've made before: this sort of thing is not at all uncommon in Wolter's translations. Taken as a whole his work has been enormously beneficial for the study of Scotus in English; but it should never be relied on in place of the Latin for matters of detail.

Note on Some Translations of Scotus

The following post is the result of a question that came in over email about the reliability of the following translations. Note that if our readers have any requests I am willing to oblige. Otherwise, you will have more of the same fare of rants against Thomism followed by uncontextualized quotations from manuscripts.

Here is the list:

(1) A Treatise on God as First Principle, ed. Allan Wolter (Franciscan Herald Press)

(2) Philosophical Writings, ed. Allan Wolter (Hackett)

(3) Duns Scotus, Metaphysician, with four texts and commentary, ed. William A. Frank and Allan B. Wolter

(4) God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions, trans. and ed. Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter

Here are my comments:

(1) Wolter's edition of the De primo principio is based on Evan Roche's edition, itself based on the critical edition of Mueller, completed during the 1940's (independent of the Vatican commission).  I have seen several articles refer to the inadequacies of Mueller's edition, but I am not sure what they are. Wolter mentions that some of the theorems are out of order in the Wadding ed., but he didn't accuse Mueller of the same. In terms of punctuation I found it (Mueller's edition) a little hard to read, but that was all. It does have a stemma codicum, which not even all the modern editions of Scotus have. Wolter's edition, in addition to the Latin and English text, also contains extensive commentary that I found helpful when I read it several years ago. Bottom line: this is the standard edition of the text and is commonly cited by contemporary scholars. Of course, something like 50% of it is cribbed verbatim from the Ordinatio.

(2) Here Wolter used the Wadding ed. and updated it with the Assisi 137 (=MS A) that plays such an important role in the Vatican edition. I would say it's fine for class, but given the complexities of the Vatican edition (extra's, revisions, Ms. A crapping out in bk II, etc.) one would want to cite the Vat. ed. in any publication.

(3) The texts in this volume are taken from the Vatican edition, the Opera Philosophica, as well as the Vienna ms. of the Reportatio which claims to be examined in the presence of Scotus. I would say this volume is fine for class, but obviously one ought to cite the Vat. ed directly (scholarly snobbery I suppose, though the editions of Scotus are fairly complicated and one ought to consult them in any case before making any claims about Scotus).

(4) In this work Wolter translated the Wadding edition, itself based on earlier printings. The version of the Wadding ed. was that published by Alluntis in the BAC series. There is no critical edition of this text. Wolter checked the text against three mss. suggested to him by the Roman editors, though I am not sure how extensively. One ought to cite the latin, but for now Wadding is all there is unless one is willing to dig up mss. or earlier printings.

One ought to note the Wolter-Bychkov edition of Reportatio I as well. The edition claims to be 'hermaneutic', which seems to mean that all readings were chosen for sense. The edition also claims to be the "examined report", which means it is supposed to be based on the Vienna ms. (the only one to contain 'examinata' in the colophon, and which contains many unique readings as well as passages it shares with the Additiones). Though I have heard many rumors regarding the origins of this text and the method employed, all I will say is that I have myself spot-checked passages from Rep. I d.36 for an article I was writing (note that Noone published a critical edition of this distinction). I found that the Vienna ms. was not followed consistently (again, 'hermaneutic' absolves them from this); also, there was a homoeoeleuton introduced by the editors found in no manuscript. Note, however, that I checked only 7 or 8 passages. A full review would require rather more extensive soundings.

So if the general conclusion isn't clear, it is this: these editions and translations are fine for use in classes and private study, but one ought to be careful when basing any claims on them when publishing. One then runs the risks of a faulty text as well as misunderstanding the nature of the work one is reading. Just yesterday I was reading an article by the Radically orthodox Philip Blond, who was complaining about univocity. He quoted a line of Scotus, and said it was contained in the "De Metaphysica" of Duns Scotus. I had never heard of this work, but it turns out that this is one of Wolter's editorial insertions on the first page of (2) above. Wolter himself rather confusingly has a single paragraph from the QQ. in Met. under that heading, immediately followed by the Ordinatio; I'm not sure which Blond meant to cite.

Scotus on whether Relations Individuate

On the Thomistic view of individuation, matter is the individuating factor (or "signate" quantified matter depending on what work of Aquinas you happen to be reading).  But this leaves a problem for Thomists in the case of human souls, which are supposed to subsist after death.  For there is no matter remaining at all (Aquinas famously rejects spiritual matter). Consequently, we should expect subsistent human souls to be universals, or perhaps to be absorbed in the common nature of humanity (... but Aquinas thinks common natures have no being or unity...). Not so fast says the Thomist (or, if you prefer, the A-T theorist; this subject recently came up on Feser's blog), the soul still has a relation to its body. It is this relation that keeps the soul a particular (other Thomists have told me that the soul is individuated at the instant of its creation and just stays that way).  Scotus rejects this line of thought in the passage I have translated below.  This question is something of an embarrassment for Scotists of the strict observance (including the editors), for Scotus endorses spiritual matter (that old foolish doctrine that Thomas allegedly refuted for all time). Well, sort of. The following quote is labeled (without evidence) as "ad mentem Guilelmi de la Mare". For details on Scotus' views on spiritual matter (for example, who actually wrote the following section), see our co-blogger Michael's dissertation.

Duns Scotus, Quaestiones de anima, q. 15 n. 10-(Opera Philosophica V, 131-2):

I respond that probably [probabiliter] it can be said that there is matter in the soul, and this according to the Philosopher and those who posit the contrary. One [argument] is that the plurality of individuals in one species requires matter in those individuals, just as is clear from XII Metaphysics, where it is said " that there are not many in the same species moving heaven, because the first does not have matter." This is also clear from diverse [thinkers] positing matter to be the principle of individuation; but in the species of the rational soul there are many individuals, also when it is separated from the body; therefore, etc.

You might say, just as the contrary [party] does, that the soul has matter which it perfects or is made apt to perfect, namely the body. And by reason of the aptitude for diverse perfectible bodies, the [separated soul] can be plurified, not however does it have matter from which it is made.

Against them:

The soul does not exist on account of the body, but rather contrariwise; therefore neither is the distinction nor plurality of souls on account of the distinction of bodies, but rather contrariwise. Whence the Commentator VII Metaphysics says that the members of a lion differ from the members of a deer, because their souls differ; and not contrariwise.

Again, with the foundation or term of a relation destroyed, there is no relation; but that inclination or aptitude to the body is a certain relation; therefore, with the body destroyed after death, there is no inclination of the soul to the body.

The argument is confirmed: because there is no real relation of being to non-being, for relatives are simultaneous in nature; the soul is separated, not however the body which it informs; therefore, etc.

Again, if the distinction of souls is from the side of bodies only, God cannot create two souls without bodies; because there would not be distinguished by bodies, nor also by an inclination to a body; therefore, etc.

Again, every relative form presupposes something absolute in which it is founded; but that inclination to the body is a certain relative form founded in the essence of the soul which is so inclined; therefore the essence of the soul is prior to that inclination; the prior however is not distinguished by the posterior just as neither is it constituted by it, but rather contrariwise; therefore, etc.

Again, that inclination is not of the essence of the soul, because the soul is an absolute nature in itself; therefore it can be understood by an essential understanding [?? intellectu essentiali] without such an inclination, and consequently one is distinguished from another without an inclination to diverse bodies.

Again, because the soul is a 'this', therefore it has such an inclination to this body, not contrariwise; therefore, etc.

William of Alnwick on Virtual Containment

Here are some lines from Scotus' secretary Guillelmus de Alnwick on virtual containment, a development of Scotus' theory of unitive containment, which in turn is rooted in the pseudo-Denys.  In Scotus' writings, the notion appears during his Parisian period, that is, from 1302.  In this passage, William also lays out most of the causal theory assumed by the scholastics.  Note that we are not talking about how the divine attributes are in God, but how creatures and the perfections of creatures are contained in God.

Guillelmus de Alnwick, Quodlibet q. 8 (ed. Ledoux, BFS 10, 445-6):

The third question concerning the containment of the perfections of creatures in God is that, namely, whether the perfections of creatures, inasmuch as they are contained in God, are virtually distinguished from God and among themselves formally or intentionally from the nature of the thing.

Concerning the solution of that question I proceed thus: first I will declare what it is to contain another and to be contained by another virtually, second I will show that creatures, inasmuch as they are contained in God virtually, according to their contained perfection, are distinguished from God formally and really, third, I will show that the perfections of creatures, inasmuch as they are virtually contained in God, according to the perfection of the containing [being], are not distinguished from God formally or really, fourth, the arguments of the contrary opinion will be refuted.

[art. 1]

As far as the first is concerned, it should be known that to contain something virtually is to have the perfection and the nature of the contained in its own power or effective causality. For power is ordered to operation and action, and therefore what contains another and not in effective causality does not contain it virtually, although it may contain it eminently, just as a final cause, or in the fashion of an exemplar, just as an exemplar form, or potentially, just as a material cause. Therefore only the effective cause of some effect contains properly virtually that effect, through whose power such an effect is produceable and conservable.  An effective cause is twofold, namely univocal and equivocal. An effective univocal cause contains its effect virtually in the power adequate to the effect. Whence a univocal cause contains its effect adequately, because the perfection of a univocal cause does not exceed its effect in perfection. An effective equivocal cause contains its effect virtually in excessive power, because it contains the effect in its power with an excess of perfection.  God however with respect to the caused is an equivocal cause and does not properly contain all creatures virtually, because he contains their perfections in his effective power with an infinite excess.

So, nevertheless, to contain some effect virtually, whether by univocal power or equivocal, comes about doubly: in one mode rootedly [radicaliter], just as a remote cause, in another mode sufficiently, just as a proximate, complete and ultimated [ultimata] cause. In the first mode the divine essence contains the perfections of creatures virtually, because rootedly and quasi remotely. For the divine essence is the root of all perfections in God and of the divine power, whether ad intra or ad extra, just as an infinite sea of perfection, because the divine essence, inasmuch as it is distinguished against other perfections in God, does not immediately produce a creature; for if so it would produce a creature in the mode of nature.  Therefore the divine essence is not a quasi proximate power for producing an effect, nor consequently does it contain the effect virtually in proximate power. On account of the same, the divine knowledge and the divine intellect contain a creature virtually not in proximate power and executive power, but in dispositive power, and so in a certain way it contains a creature in its power remotely and not proximately [de proximo]. But creatures are contained virtually in the divine will in proximate and executive power, because, according to Augustine III De trinitate cap. 6, "the divine will is the highest cause of all", for its efficacious willing is to produce a creature. Whence the divine will virtually contains the perfection of whatsoever creature in proximate and immediate power, and therefore the divine will properly is said to contain all creatures virtually.

According to this it is clear what it means to be contained in something virtually, because it is to be contained in its causative power according to its total causal being [??] and because the first cause is the effective cause of all others than itself, therefore all others are contained in the effective power of the first cause, for every effect is either immediately caused by the first cause or by a second cause, one or many. If the first way, since whatever perfection there is in the effect necessarily is in the total cause, otherwise there would be something of perfection in a creature which would not be caused, it follows that every effect  immediately from the first cause according to its total causal being is contained in its [the first cause's] causative power. If however it is caused immediately by a second cause, one or many, since the causative power of the second cause is contained in the power of the first cause, otherwise the second cause would not be the second, but the first, it follows that every effect caused by the second cause, univocal or equivocal, one or many, is contained in the effective power of the first cause, and consequently that all other beings than the first cause are contained virtually in the first cause.

Scotus on Intensive and Extensive Infinity

Embedded in a lengthy question on the "action" of the created and uncreated agents with respect to the Eucharist, Scotus examines an interesting objection based on the divine attributes.  Basically, the claim is that if the divine will is formally infinite, then it must include very other perfection intrinsic to God, because there can be no addition to infinity, and thus the will, rather than the divine essence, is the infinite sea of substance that John Damascene spoke of and the scholastics so love to cite.  Scotus' answer is to distinguish between two kinds of infinity, intensive and extensive.  The passage is long enough and probably well enough generally known that I give only a translation.

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV d. 13 q. 1 nn. 122-24 (Vat. XII 472-3):

Therefore briefly, it is clear, because God is unqualifiedly blessed in the operations of his intellect and will; for he is not unqualifiedly blessed in his essence as it is infinite, unless he comprehends it; and just as the intellect comprehends by seeing, so the will ... comprehends by loving, for this that it is perfectly blessed. And consequently, each power and each act of each power around the divine essence -- as it perfectly makes itself blessed -- will be infinite.

As proof of that minor [premise] I say that there can be understood in the divine a quasi extensive infinite, as if there would be understood a quasi infinite number of perfections; in another way, an intensive infinite of some unqualified perfection, so that that perfection, according to its own definition [ratio], is without limit and term. And in this second way something can have not only formal infinity, but also fundamental, -- something, however, can have formal intensive [infinity], although not fundamental [infinity].

I say therefore that nothing of one formal definition [ratio] is infinite in the first way, indeed neither perhaps is there such an infinity absolutely in God: for perhaps just as the persons are finite, speaking about that finitude, so also the unqualified perfections are finite in number or in their multitude, and the relations and notions, and this and that are joined together; but formal intensive infinity and fundamental [infinity] are together there in the divine essence as it is essence, and for this reason it is called by the Damascene a 'sea'. Formal [infinity] only, however, not fundamental, is in every other perfection [than the will] unqualifiedly; for each one has its own formal perfection from the infinity of the essence just as from a root and foundation. Neither formal nor fundamental infinity, however, is in the relations, as was shown in Book I distinction 13, because it is better for the Father not to have filiation; 'an unqualified perfection is that which it is better for something to have than not to have'. [cf. Anselm, Mon. c. 15]

The response is then clear, that although the will is formally infinite, nevertheless it does not formally include in itself all intrinsic perfections, because neither the essence nor something other includes them in that way; but neither does it fundamentally include all perfections, but so only the essence [does include them], which is a 'sea'; it includes by identity both whatever unqualified perfection and whatever relation.

An Early Text on Analogy

Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum, q.15 (Opera Philosophia II, 336-7):

"To the question it should be said that as far as it is from the side of the utterance (vocis) signifying, it is not possible for an utterance to signify one per prius and a second per posterius, for to signify is to reprsesent something to the intellect. What therefore is signified, is first conceived by the intellect. But evertything which is conceived by the intellect, is conceived under a distinct and determinate definition/concept (ratio), because understanding is a certain kind of act, and therefore what understands distinguishes by another (?). Therefore everything which is signified, is signified under a distinct and determinate definition/concept (ratio). This is clear for prime matter which of itself is being in potency, if it is understood, it is necessary that it be understood under a distinct ratio. And if such is the case with matter, much more will this be true of everything else.

If therefore an analogous statement (dictio) or utterance (vox) is imposed to diverse [things, entities], it is necessary that it is imposed under a distinct and determinate ratio. Therefore if an analogous statement, under diverse rationes, is imposed to diverse [things, entities], it is necceary that those thing, insofar as it is the case from the side of the signifying utterance, represents equally. Whence in a thing there can be analogy, but in an utterance signifying there can fall no priority or posteriority, because there is some property which more befalls one thing than another. But there is not some property which more befalls the substance of an utterance than another. This is clear by a sign, because Aristotle in the book of the Categories, where he determines about signifying utterances, makes no mention of those things which are analogates in the thing, but he only speaks there about univocals and equivocals. Whence Boethius says in the same place that, since Aristotle said that 'equvocals are those of which the name is common and the ratio of the substance are diverse' that under that definition he includes those things which in the thing are analogates and every genus of equivocation. Whence 'ratio of substance' according to him is received there for a determinate ratio which the intellect attributes to those things, and not for a reason inasmuch as it is present(constat) from genus and difference. On account of which I say that, as far as the case is from the side of the signifying utterance, there falls no priority or posteriority, although the things signified have a relation (habitudo) to each other.

[Against the Principal Arguments]

To the first argument it should be said that as far as it is from the side of the utterance signifying, there is no medium between a univocal and equivocal.

To the other argument it should be said that a natural philosopher, and also the metaphysician, consider things themselves; the logician considers things of reason. And therefore there are many univocals according to the logician,wqhich are called equivocal by the natural philosopher. For the natural philosopher would say that 'body' is said equivocally of an inferior and superior body. But a logician would say that it is said of each univocally. Whence from each a logician can abstract one common notion (ratio), and says that in that notion the common is united or univocated (univocari). Whence because in superior and inferior bodies it befalls to find one common notion (because this and that body agree in having three dimensions), therefore the logician says they are both united in that univocal notion. But because a natural philosopher applies his consideration to the things themselves, and the nature of corruptible body is other than the nature of an incorruptible one, therefore the natural philosopher says that 'body' is said of this and that body equivocally. The logician however says that all species of one genus are univocal in their genus. But the natural philosopher says that 'many equivocations lie hid in the genus'. Whence the logician considers things as they fall under reason. But between the same and diverse there is no medium, and therefore the lgoician does not posit a medium between the equivocal and the univocal.

Whence by this to the form of the argument it should be said that because the first philosopher considers thingsd according to their quiddities, and in the thing it is the case that certain things have a relation (habitudo) to each other, therefore the Philosopher says that being is said analogically of substance and accident. But because a logician considers things as they fall under reason, therefore he says that being is said equivocally of substance and accident. Whence Porphyry says that 'if someone should call all things beings, he will name them equivocally, not univocally.'

St Gregory on Heretics, II

III.47. When they had lifted up their eyes, they did not know him. Now when heretics consider the deeds of Holy Church, they look up at her, because they are placed down below and when they see her works, what they regard is placed on high; but when the Church is set amid sorrow they do not know her. For she seeks to accept evils so that, being purged, she can come to the reward of eternal recompense. Often she fears prosperity and rejoices to learn from discipline. Therefore heretics, who desire present good as the great thing, do not recognize her covered with wounds. For they do not read written in their own hearts what they see in her. When therefore the Church profits even from adversities, they are stuck in their own stupor, because what they see is unknown to their experience.

48. They tore their clothes, and scattered dust to heaven upon their heads. As we and all the faithful receive the clothes of the Church, for which reason the prophet says: You clothe all these like a decoration; so the clothes of the heretics are all those who by agreeing with them and sticking with them are wrapped up in their errors. For heretics have this property, that they are not long able to stand on the level they came to on leaving the Church; but daily they fall down to lower places and by thinking worse and worse things they cut themselves into many parts and are divided from each other more and more by their arguments and confusion. Therefore because they tear into pieces those they join to their faithlessness, it is rightly said that the friends who come tear their clothes. When the clothes are ripped the body is revealed, because often when the heretical followers are cut away, the malice of their thought is openly seen; so that discord reveals the treachery that the burdensome guilt of their previous harmony concealed.

49. Now they scatter dust to heaven upon their heads. What should we understand by dust except things of the earth? What is designated by the head, except that which is our principle part, namely the mind? What is meant by heaven except the command spoken by heaven? Therefore to scatter dust to heaven on the head is to corrupt the mind with a secular understanding and to think earthly things about heavenly words. For they dissipate the divine words more than they receive them. Therefore they scatter dust because they bring against the commands of God an earthly understanding which is in fact beyond the power of their minds.

50. They sat with him on the ground for seven days and seven nights. In daytime, we can know what we see; at night either, being blind, we see nothing, or if it is dim what we see is doubtful. So day stands for understanding and night stands for ignorance. By the number seven the whole universe is expressed; so that this transitory time is completed in no more than seven days. What then does is mean that the friends of blessed Job sat with him for seven days and seven nights, except that, whether in those things about which they really see the light, or in those things about which they suffer the darkness of ignorance, they act in a pretending condescention towards the Church (as though towards an invalid), and under a show of kindness prepare the treachery of deception? And although, whether in those things which they do understand, or in those which they are unable to understand, among themselves they can think great things about themselves, swelled up with the character of exaltation, still sometimes they make a show of respect to Holy Church, and while they use soft words, they pour in the poison. Therefore to sit on the ground is to show something of the image of humility, so that while they fake being humble they can persuade their hearers of the pride which they teach.

51. The ground or the earth can also stand for the incarnation of the Mediator. So that it was said to Israel: Make for me an altar of earth. To make an altar of earth for God is to hope in the incarnation of the Mediator. Our offering indeed is accepted by God when upon the altar of faith in the Lord’s incarnation our humility places whatever we do. We place an offering upon an altar of earth when we solidify our actions with faith in the Lord’s incarnation. But there are some heretics who do not deny the fact of the Lord’s incarnation, but think differently from us either about the divinity itself or about the quality of the incarnation. So those who profess along with us the true incarnation of the Redeemer, as it were sit equally on the ground with Job. They are said to sit with him on the ground for seven days and seven nights because, whether they understand something of the fulness of truth or are blinded by the darkness of their stupidity, still they cannot deny the mystery of the incarnation. To sit on the ground with blessed Job, therefore, is to believe along with Holy Church in the true flesh of the Redeemer.

52. Sometimes the heretics rage against us with punishments, sometimes they pursue us with words alone, sometimes if we are quiet they provoke us, and sometimes if they see us silent they are quiet too; friends to the silent, they are enemies to us if we speak. So because blessed Job had not yet said anything to them it rightly follows: And no one spoke a word to him. For we have silent adversaries if we neglect to beget sons of the true faith by our preaching. But if we begin to speak what is right, we will immediately feel the heavy blows of their response; they will instantly leap forward in enmity and burst out against us with the voice of indignation, because they fear lest a voice speaking what is right lead to the heights the hearts which the weight of their stupidity has dragged to the depths.

- St Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, my translation.

St Gregory on Heretics, I

III.42. In all this Job neither sinned with his lips nor said anything stupid against God. Therefore three friends of Job, hearing about all the evils that had happened to him, came each one from his own place: Eliphaz the Themanite, Baldad the Suhite, and Sophar the Naamathite. In the preface of this work we said that the friends of blessed Job, although they came to him with good intentions, nevertheless take on the appearance of heretics because they fall into guilt by speaking indiscretely. On account of which the same blessed Job says to them: I want to dispute with God, but first showing that you are weavers of lies and keepers of perverse dogmas. And so Holy Church in all the time of its pilgrimage is established in affliction, when she suffers wounds, when she grieves over the lapse of her members, and on top of this when she endures the enemies of Christ coming in the name of Christ. For to the augment of her suffering, in addition to her other troubles heretics also come and pierce her with unreasonable words.

43. But it is well said: They convened from their own place. Now the place of heretics is pride, because unless they were first swelled up in their hearts, they would not have come to the struggle with crooked assertions. So the place of the wicked is pride just as on the contrary the place of the good is humility. About which Solomon says: If a powerful spirit rises up against you, do not yield to him your place. As if he were to say openly: If you see that the spirit of the Temptor is stronger than you in anything, do not abandon the humility of penitence. Because he shows by the following words that our place is the humility of penitence when he says: Because to stop taking medicine produces the greatest sins. For what is the humility of weeping but the medicine of sin? Heretics therefore come from their place because they are moved against Holy Church from their pride.

44. Their perverse actions can be discerned from the interpretation of their names. For they are called Eliphaz, Baldad, and Sophar; and as we said above, Eliphaz interpreted means “contempt of God.” For unless they had contempt of God, they would never have thought perverse things about Him. But Baldad only means “age.” For while they avoid being beaten and by their perverse study they seek to be the victors, they neglect the behavior of the new life, and what they intend comes only from the old. Sophar means “destruction of the watchtower.” For those whose place is in Holy Church humbly contemplate with true faith the mysteries of their Redeemer; but when the heretics come with their false allegations, they destroy the watchtower, because they turn the minds of those they draw to themselves away from the watchfulness of upright contemplation.

45. But the places from which these men come are well described as congruent with the actions of heretics. For they are called Themanites, Suhites, Naamathites. Now Thema means “the South;” Suhi, “speaking;” Naama, “charming.” But who does not know that the South wind is hot? Therefore because heretics wish to taste of [divine things] more ardently, or as it were more than is necessary, they are eager to be inflamed with passion. Of couse ebbing away to the numbness of cold and again to the restlessness of an immoderate curiosity is each consistent with intemperate heat. And therefore because they desire to feel the heat of wisdom more than they ought, they are said to come from the South. Paul took care to temper the minds of the faithful away from this heat of an immoderate wisdom, when he said: Do not taste more than you ought to taste, but taste to sobriety. This is why David struck the valleys of the salt-pans, namely because our Redeemer in his severe judgment against those who think perverse things about him will quench the stupidity of an immoderate taste. But Suhi means “speaking.” Now you see that they desire to have this heat not in order to live well but in order to speak loftily. Therefore they come from Thema and from Suhi, that is, they are said to come from heat and from loquacity, because they like to show how well-studied they are in the scriptures; but they inflamed only with the passion of loquacious words and not with the heart of charity. Now Naama means “charming.” Because they do not wish to be learned, but to appear so, from erudite words they take on the appearance of living well; and through the heat of their loquacity they show in themselves a charming image, so that with the beauty of their tounges they can more easily persuade their hearers of perversities; and so they cleverly hide from the senses the foulness of their lives. Now the narration gives the names of these places in the right order. First it gives Thema, afterwards Suhi, and then Naama; because first inordinate heat kindles the heretics, then the sparkle of loquacity rouses them up, and then finally it shows men charming hypocrisies.

46. For they said to one another that they would all go visit and console him. Heretics speak to one another when they agree in thinking certain perverse things against the Church; and in certain things where they are all discordant from the truth, they harmonize together in falsity. For what do those do who teach us about eternity, but console us in the affliction of our pilgrimage? But the heretics, because they desire to teach Holy Church their own doctrines, approach her as consolers. Nor should we be surprised if those who are shown to be enemies are called friends, when it was said to the traitor himself [Judas]: Friend, why have you come? And the rich man burning in the fire of hell was called a son by Abaham; because although they refuse to be corrected by us, still it is fitting that we should name them not by their wickedness but out of our kindness.

- St Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, my translation.

Scotus in English

Unlike for St Thomas, most of Scotus' writings have not been translated into English. None of his most important theological works have been translated in full. The situation is better for St Bonaventure, but there is still no translation of his Sentences in book form comparable to the excellent and relatively cheap translation of the Summa theologiae by the Dominican Fathers.

That being said, one can go a pretty long way towards studying Scotus in English. This is mostly thanks to the labors of the late Fr Allan Wolter, who was a one-man Scotus publishing powerhouse. Wolter has published both anthologies of excerpts and some complete works, sometimes with commentary and sometimes without. These are the books I would recommend most highly:

Duns Scotus, Metaphysician, published by Purdue. Anthology of long excerpts from different works. Lots of commentary, covers a number of Scotus' most unique or famous arguments and positions.

A Treatise on God as First Principle, published by Franciscan Herald Press. The first complete work by Scotus you want to read, concerning proofs for the existence and attributes of God. Contains probably the most metaphysically complex and sophisticated proof of God's existence ever. My edition, the second (1982) has a very full commentary.

Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by John Duns Scotus, published by Franciscan Institute Press. Read this to test your manhood: it's two volumes of 600 pages each, not for the faint of heart. No commentary. A very impressive, very confusing, very stimulating, very difficult work. I spent a summer trudging through the whole thing (before my Latin was good enough to read the original) and wrote my M.A. thesis on a little bit of it.

A Treatise on Potency and Act, also by Franciscan Institute Press. This consists of Book Nine of the Questions on the Metaphysics just cited, but with commentary and other helps.

All of the above (except the complete Metaphysics Questions) include the Latin with the English, which may come in handy if your Latin is so-so or if you plan on learning it. To really study Scotus or any scholastic, of course, you should learn Latin well enough to not need a translation. If it's any consolation, it takes significantly less effort to learn to read Thomas or Bonaventure than to read Virgil or Livy. Scotus is somewhat of a different matter because his Latin is weird and abstruse and difficult. Of course he's abstruse and difficult in English; there's no getting around it. But he's not syntactically complex or using a huge vocabulary like the classics.

I should mention that Wolter's commentary is not always very helpful. I remember it being pretty good in the "Metaphysician" volume, so-so in the "First Principle" volume (sometimes very illuminating and sometimes baffling), and completely useless in the "Potency and Act" volume.

Also necessary to mention is the Wolter-Bychkov edition and translation of Scotus' Reportatio I-A, also put out by Franciscan Institute, which is in two huge volumes. I didn't mention these above because I haven't read all the way through the first volume and don't have the second, but if you really want to study Scotus' theology and you can't read the Ordinatio in Latin (or can't afford it or find it), you will probably want this.

So there you have it. Just shell out a few hundred bucks, give it a couple years of onerous study, and you can be a Scotist too! While you're at it, learn Latin, dredge up another thousand from somewhere, and buy the Opera Philosophica and what's been produced so far of the Vatican edition! Then, if there's any water left in the well, send some of the good stuff over to us at The Smithy. I'm still missing a couple of volumes.

Fragment

Going through my private manuscript hoard again, and I've discovered another snippet from the writings of Ioannis de Ultima Thule, this time taken from his Commentarium in librum rubrum occidensmerci, long thought to be utterly lost. Only the beginning of a single question is preserved in the codex I've examined, and it begins Quartum, quaeritur utrum unus anulus habeat aliquantulus esse? Et videtur quod non . . . I translate the fragment below:

Whether the One Ring has any kind of being? And it seems not:

For the One Ring neither exists now, nor did it exist at any time in the past, for it is legendary [fabulosus]. But whatever exists at no time has no being, ergo etc.

On the contrary: whatever is the object of knowledge exists, for of nothing nothing is known. But of the One Ring many things are known, for instance, the names of its possessors: Sauron, Isildur, Smeagol, Bilbo, Frodo. Ergo, etc.

Again, we may indicate the Ring's exemplary cause, namely elvish lore [doctrina Eldaliae seu Larum antiquorum]; its efficient cause, namely the Dark Lord [Dominus ater seu anularius magnus]; its formal cause, namely roundness [figura orbis]; its material cause, namely gold [aurum]; and its final cause, as its own inscription said:

Unus anulus omnes regere, unus anulus eos comperire,
Unus anulus omnes redigere et in caligini eos devincire.*

But where the cause is posited insofar as it is a cause, the effect is also posited. Ergo, etc.

*The verse, of course, famously concludes in terra Mordor [indcl. n.] ubi tenebrae latunt.

It remains to be seen whether any more fragments, or even the whole work, might surface at some future date when the world's libraries are better catalogued.

Theoremata Scoti, Pars I

The first part of Scotus' infamous Theoremata is concerned with the universal, and its relation to the singular existent on the one hand and the intellect on the other hand. There are six main propositions, with explanations and--as always with Scotus--some rabbit trails. This preliminary study will be English-only, since I don't feel like typing in the Latin (hey, if you want real scholarship, read a print journal!), but for the record I'm using as my text Vol. II of Scotus' Opera Philosophica.

I. The intelligible precedes intellection by nature.

"Which is because reception [passio] presupposes an agent and every action is about something." If we are to understand something there must be something to understand. The intellect does not create all of its own intelligible content, any more than the sense power creates the objects of the senses: sight presupposes the visible object as well as light and a working eye. Unlike sight, of course, the intellect can create some of its intelligible content.

II. It is impossible for the first intelligible to be caused by intellection.

"Which is from comparing intellection and the intelligible to the same intellect." Even if the intellect received no information from outside itself it would still have to understand something other than its own concepts: no intellect could know nothing but logic. The intellect itself is an intelligible object before it understands or is understood.

III. We understand the universal first.

Scotus spends a lot of time arguing this point. Unlike, say, Thomas, Scotus admits that the singular is intelligible per se, since for him singularity is a formal property, not some material detritus. Why then is the singular not the first intelligible object? After all, it is the singular thing which acts, not its abstracted universal nature, and so the singular should be the first thing to act on the intellect. Scotus reminds us, however, that there is for us no science of the singular, that the intellect forms a universal by separating the intelligible nature from the leftover singularity. "It is true [that it is the singular which acts], but not insofar as it is singular. For the nature is the ratio of acting." Just as in natural generation the species is multiplied, but not the individual, so in cognition the singular gives rise to an intelligible universal, not a proper concept of the singular.

Our lack of knowledge about the singular per se is neither because we fail to actualize our capacity for it, nor because the singular is unintelligible per se, but because our intellect is too imperfect to achieve it. Just as an intrinsically visible object might not be seen by feeble eyes in weak candlelight, the light of our intellect is strong enough to illumine the nature but not the singularity. Our knowledge then is always imperfect. "For although in a precise comparison the nature is a more perfect knowable than the singularity, nevertheless the cognition of a singular nature is more perfect than that of the nature alone, because it is more distinct."

Scotus goes on to discuss possible reasons for this weakness of the intellect at some length, with more comparisons to the sense powers.

IV. To any universal there corresponds in reality [in re] some grade of entity, in which the things contained under the universal itself coincide.

Scotus says this should be clear from I. and II. For if the universal is not created by the intellect then it must have something corresponding to it in reality. This correspondence is not fictional, but real, or else there could be no true quidditative predication and metaphysics would not differ from logic.

V. In essential predication it is impossible to go to infinity.

Otherwise nothing would be knowable, since we can't pass through an infinite series, nor can our finite intellect apprehend an infinite series all at once. Definition has a limit, and we can really know what something is, even if only confusedly.

VI. It is simply impossible for the first and most universal to be plural.

There cannot be a plurality of first and most universal concepts or grades of entity. In analyzing we always proceed to the simpler concept, and therefore eventually to the first and simplest. And as in any order it is impossible to find two firsts, it is even more so in the highest order, to which multitude is more repugnant.

To conclude:

I. The universal, although produced by the agent intellect, is strictly speaking not caused by it, because something in reality corresponds to it. II. That universal, insofar as it has being in something or with something singular, we first understand as a kind of primary whole object, although the intellect from its imperfection can per se understand the nature as a quasi-part of the primary whole object, and can distinguish this from that [i.e., can distinguish the nature as such from the whole object], while not conceiving the other part, namely the singularity.--For which intellection the action of the agent intellect is required. Whence any part of the first whole object can be first for the intellect, and afterwards the intellect can per se distinguish it from another. Whence a child first distinguishes his father from non-man, then from non-father.

Pius Guilelmus

Guilelmus de Alnwick, Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q.6 (ed. Ledoux 161):

"Therefore it seems to me that, although the one so opining [i.e. Scotus] says in many places that creatures according to their eternal intelligible being are produced by God, and that the divine intellect by understanding a creature institutes it in intelligible being, nevertheless his arguments in many places show the opposite, and therefore I think that if he had held a special question about this he would have spoken carefully; for in this matter he was speaking according to the common opinion, which then was running in the mouth of men saying that creatures had no being from themselves, and therefore also according to intelligible being they are produced from another, and this indeed I have experienced in him, that by following the common opinion of the ones speaking he was accustomed with them to say that creatures according to their eternal intelligible being are produced by God. But now by more diligently inquiring after the truth the contrary is completely clear to me. So also the Solemn Doctor, Master Henry of Ghent, said many things in determining some questions which then did not pertain to his principal intention, and this indeed according to the common opinion of others, of which nevertheless he said the opposite afterwards when he held a special question over the matter, and so I save each doctor from contradiction. So also Aristotle said many things according to the common opinion of the philosophers, of which nevertheless he said the opposite when he determined about them specially from intention."

Comments: Not much in the way of argument here, but the passage does contain some precious historical information. Prior to reading this I had thought that Scotus' opinion was a novelty (if you recall, Scotus posits the production of the quiddities of creatures by the divine intellect in a series of four instants of nature) but Alnwick describes it as the common opinion. Probably the common opinion didn't involve instants of nature; just that the divine intellect or divine essence in some manner generates the essences of creatures. Both Alnwick and Peter Thomae argue against this opinion of Scotus/common opinion, although without attacking the use of instants of nature, while the rest of the Scotistae in the 14th century up to Maestrius et al. follow Scotus. Both Alnwick and Peter Thomae in the end remained without any influence (although they have quite convinced me). It is an interesting  that Alnwick, and probably other scholastics as well, were aware of contradictions in the thought of the great masters (even Thomas changed his mind on the verbum, as Auriol pointed out), but still try to harmonize them anyway. Well, sort of. In some of the questions in this work Alnwick exploits Scotus' contradictions by using the arguments from his Parisian period in the Reportatio and Quodlibet against the Oxford positions expressed in the Ordinatio.

Univocity of Being and the Knowledge of Substance

This one's for our esteemed co-blogger, who was so scandalized by Pini's paper at the St. Bonaventure Scotus congress. I don't remember if the following passage came up, so here it is again. Scotus is claiming that we don't have direct access to substance, only accidents. If we are to have any knowledge at all, the being of substance and accidents must in some sense be univocal. This is from the Quaestiones de anima, which, having read the introduction and the entire work, I think actually post-dates the Ordinatio, the editors to the contrary. This is because Scotus is clearly abbreviating people like Gonsalvus (dated to 1302-4), as well as himself. But I do think that the editors sufficiently established that the manuscript tradition derives from Oxford, and that Scotus might have taught the de anima course during his year-long exile from Paris in 1303. However, he could also have taught it in Paris in the franciscan studium. After Scotus' death, the main impetus among his students was to get a copy of the Ordinatio out and circulating. Other works were ignored and then taken back to Oxford. I suspect this was the case with the Logica Scoti/Quaestio de formalitatibus as well as the De anima questions. Owing to these considerations, I don't think it necessary to posit a Parisian period for Scotus in the 1290's to account for his knowledge of Parisian sources as I think he taught after 1302. 

Here's the argument:

Quaestiones super secundum et tertium de anima, q.21 n.25 (OPh V 218):

"I prove that the concept of being is common univocally to substance and accident: because if not, we would have no concept of substance. For either we would have of substance a concept proper and quidditative and intuitive, or abstractible; not the first, as was proved; therefore a concept abstractible from substance and accident and common to each; but no concept is common to each unless the concept of being; therefore, etc. That however we are not able to know substance in the wayfaring state by a simple and first concept, is clear from this that all our cognition arises from sense; substance however is not per se sensible; and therefore we are not able to know it intuitively or by a simple concept, but by that mode: because from accidents sensible to us we abstract the concept of being, by saying that they are of being, and by inquiring further we find that it is such being which is inhering to another; it is necessary however for that being to be subsistent, and to such a subsisting one we give the name of substance. And therefore so confusedly do we know substance, by joining its subsistence to being, by saying that it is being per se subsisting; we do not however have an intuitive concept of it in the wayfaring state, by which we know it to be this being, except in the aforesaid way, as experience teaches."

Proof that we do not have a proper, quidditative and intuitive concept of substance from n.12:

"But that substance cannot be the first object [of the intellect], I prove: for it is not first according to predication, because it is not predicated essentially of all intelligibiles, because it is not predicated of accidents. Nor [is it the first object] according to power, because it does not sufficiently move the intellect to knowledge of itself and of others. Which is proved so: because this would only be according to a simple and quidditative and intuitive concept; for this to be first is impossible, because whatever our intellect is able to know intuitively through its presence, it is able to know its absence by nature; but our intellect is not able to know by nature the absence of the substance of the bread in the sacrament of the altar, but only by faith--for equally the substance of the bread is known when it is not there, just as when it is there, therefore etc. The major premise is clear by the example and authority of the Philosopher saying that sight is perceptive of light and darkness, which is the absence of light. Minor is declared. Therefore, etc. Since therefore neither God nor the true nor substance is the first object of the intellect, it follows that being is that first object."