Gonsalvus Hispanus on the Principle 'Everything that is Moved is Moved by Another'

Gonsalvus Hispanus was the Franciscan regent master while Scotus was lecturing on the Sentences at Paris ca. 1302-4 and who recommended him for promotion. Scotus apparently even shows up in some of Gonsalvus' disputes, which I am currently reading.  Here is the description from the 'Franciscan Authors' website:


Gonsalvus Hispanus de Balboa (ca. 1255, Galicia - 13. 04, 1313, Paris)
Theologian and minister general. Studied theology in Paris and became baccalaureus sententiarum in 1288. Provincial minister of Santiago. Master of theology in Paris, ca. 1297. Regent master in the general studium of Paris (1302-1303). Became minister general in 1304. Active as a reformer of the order: promotion of studies, and suppression of the spirituals. Active in the council of Vienna.

Here I have translated some comments on the principle 'omne quod movetur ab alio movetur' which figures in Aquinas' first proof for the existence of God.

Gonsalvus, QQ disputatae, q. 2-3, ad arg. princ. 5 (BFS IX, 28, 47):

[arg. princ. 5] Again, it also seems unfitting on account of some particular; if we do not know to avoid it, we ought not to deny a principle known per se, of the sort whichs that nothing at once is in  act and in potency with respect to the same.

[...]

To the fifth, that it is not a principle that everything that is moved is moved by another, because that is not a principle of which there is a doubt concerning a particular, nor is it manifest to sense. So it is here, because it is certain that heavy things are moved; by what, however, they are moved, whether by themselves or by another, is doubtful, nor is it manifest to sense.

Again, Thomas, in IaIIae denies that principle, saying that the will in act moves itself through the end (per finem) to those things which are for the end.

Again, it is a principle among the philosophers that an accident is not without a subject. If therefore by Scripture it is implied that an accident is without a subject, as in the sacrament of hte altar, will we deny that principle? But will we deny scripture?

Visions of Gonsalvus

Alvaro Pelagio (d. 1349) De statu et planctu ecclesiae lib. 2 c. 67 fol. 169v-170r:

"Et quamquam sanctae memoriae frater Gonsalvus hispanus de provincia Galiciae, nobilis genere, sed nobilior vita et moribus et evangelica paupertate, vere frater minor et zelator ardentissimus Regulae et dominus paupertatis... et dominicae humilitatis, cum quo in loco fratrum de Luca scutellas lavi in eadem pelvi lapidea, magister in theologia realissimus verbo et opere, de maioribus mundi litteratis in trivio et quadrivio, qui parum post mortem suam Parisiis, in visione quibusdam fratribus nostris apparuit gloriosus in throno residens cum corona aurea et sceptro, qui dixit tunc quod sedes throni sibi assignata erat in caelo, quia purissime in Ordine iustitiam observaverat... generalis, magister noster, totum Ordinem expropriaverit in vita sua et sententiam excommunicationis tulerit contra omnes fratres subditos et praelatos, nisi intra certum terminum illis a quibus habebant reditus vel eorum haeredibus resignarent, quod et factum est... Et ipse cum patribus sanctis requiscit in pace beati Francisci verus vicarius et successor"

Gonsalvus Redivivus!

In the fourteenth century, at least. This is for Michael, a quote from Petrus Thomae's Quodlibet q.3 from a question about whether items such as truth, good, etc. as they are attributes of being are absolute or relative. It is on p.54 of the edition of Peter Thomae. I don't think he goes back to this later or comments much on it. But it shows Gonsalvus Hispanus had some influence in the 1320's.

"Ad hoc idem arguit frater Gonsalvus. Cuius fundamentum cui innititur est quia istae duae potentiae, videlicet intellectus et voluntas, sunt aequalis ambitus, quia quidquid potest attingi ab una, potest similiter ab alia; nec aliqua ratio potest ab una attingi quod non possit attingi ab alia. Ergo videtur quod earum non possint poni diversae rationes formales obiectivae"

Brother Gonsalvus argues to the same, the foundation of which argument is that those two powers, namely the intellect and will, are of equal range, because whatever can be attained by one, can likewise be attained by the other; nor is there some concept that can be attained by one that cannot be attained by the other. therefore it seems that there cannot be posited diverse formal concepts of them.