Filed April 3, 2007--Opinion by Judge Mary Ellen Barbera.
The issue is what a petition alleging juvenile delinquency must contain as a factual basis to support the allegation. The issue implicates the requirements of notice embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the specific dictates of Maryland Code § 3-8A-13 and Maryland Rule 11-103.
The State filed a juvenile delinquent petition alleging that Roneika made a false statement to a police officer, in response to which Roneika filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition did not sufficiently allege the facts supporting the charged delinquent act; specifically, the petition failed to include a "to wit" clause indicating the specific false statements.The Circuit Court for St. Mary's County decided that the brief description in the charging document was unsatisfactory. Roneika knew she was charged with making a false statement but did not know what statement the State claimed was false, preventing her from properly preparing for trial. Additionally, the lack of a specific statement did not protect Roneika from a future prosecution for the same offense because, again, the specific content of the statement was not set forth.
On appeal, Roneika interposed the preliminary argument that the State’s appeal should be dismissed because the State sought relief – reinstatement of the delinquency petition and an adjudicatory hearing – which would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Double jeopardy principles preclude, among other things, further trial proceedings after an acquittal or equivalent adjudication on the merits in favor of the accused. Roneika’s argument was based on the premise that the juvenile judge granted her motion to dismiss for reasons of legal insufficiency of the evidence. This Court held that argument failed because, based on discussion among the court and counsel that preceded the ruling, the circuit court dismissed the petition because it believed it to be legally inadequate on its face. Because the court’s dismissal was not substantively an acquittal, jeopardy did not attach to that decision.
In the matter of whether the juvenile court erred or abused its discretion when it dismissed the delinquency petition, this Court held that juveniles are entitled to fair notice under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The protections afforded a criminal defendant to be informed of the accusation against him must apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Finally, the Court held that the delinquency petition passed muster under the Due Process Clause, Article 21, C.J. § 3-8A-13, and Rule 11-103(c). Reasoning that the technical details required of common law pleading have been relaxed and little factual detail, beyond a statement of the essential elements of the offense, e.g., the precise manner and means of committing the offense, generally is required in the charging document. The offense of making a false statement to police contains no element that is cast in such generic terms as would embrace a variety of conduct. The petition not only set forth the elements of the charged offense but also set forth the date and place of the alleged act, the officer to whom Roneika made the statements, and the names of witnesses. The question of whether the petition could have been more factually particular is not the question. Rather, the question is whether the petition was legally sufficient and this Court reasoned that it was.
The opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label 14th Amendment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 14th Amendment. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 4, 2007
Monday, March 5, 2007
Waybright v. Frederick County Dept. of Fire & Rescue, et al. (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (Approved for Publication)
Signed March 1, 2007. Memorandum Opinion by Judge Richard D. Bennett.
Defendants' motions for summary judgment GRANTED in part (as to the federal and state constitutional claims) and DENIED in part (as to Maryland tort law claims), and REMANDED to state court for determination of the surviving claims.
This case arose out of the death of a firefighter recruit during training in Frederick County, Maryland, and was originally filed with the Circuit Court for Frederick County against the Frederick County Maryland Department of Fire & Resuce Services, the individual trainer directly involved ("Coombes"), and other individual members and officers of the Department and the Board of Commissioners of Frederick County, Maryland, and later removed to federal court in light of the claimed violation of substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
Coombes and the other defendants filed separate summary judgment motions on all federal and state law claims. Coombe asserted a defense of qualified immunity with respect to the constitutional claims, where "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory of constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known", quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald. In attempting to determine whether the actions at issue here "shock the conscience", the plaintiffs suggested that the "deliberate indifference" standard be applied, either under the "special relationship" or "state created danger" theories of DeShaney, or the "opportunity to deliberate" theory of the 6th Circuit Estate of Owensby case. The judge noted that the Fourth Circuit had not yet adopted the approach taken in the Owensby case, and found neither of the other approaches to apply in this case. Thus, the higher intent-to-harm standard would be applied, and in this case there was no allegation that Coombe intended to harm the trainee fireman. Therefore, the state and federal constitutional claims against Coombe failed, and summary judgment in his favor was granted.
The constitutional claims against the other defendants relied on "supervisory liability" and the judge found that they must fail, since as above there was no constitutional violation by Coombes as employee, insufficient showing of knowledge of risk of a constitutional violation, and insufficient showing of deliberate indifference to such risk. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the other defendants on the state and federal constitutional claims was granted.
Defendants also sought summary judgment on the state tort claims, but the judge declined to rule on them, instead ordering a remand to state court for further consideration.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
Defendants' motions for summary judgment GRANTED in part (as to the federal and state constitutional claims) and DENIED in part (as to Maryland tort law claims), and REMANDED to state court for determination of the surviving claims.
This case arose out of the death of a firefighter recruit during training in Frederick County, Maryland, and was originally filed with the Circuit Court for Frederick County against the Frederick County Maryland Department of Fire & Resuce Services, the individual trainer directly involved ("Coombes"), and other individual members and officers of the Department and the Board of Commissioners of Frederick County, Maryland, and later removed to federal court in light of the claimed violation of substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
Coombes and the other defendants filed separate summary judgment motions on all federal and state law claims. Coombe asserted a defense of qualified immunity with respect to the constitutional claims, where "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory of constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known", quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald. In attempting to determine whether the actions at issue here "shock the conscience", the plaintiffs suggested that the "deliberate indifference" standard be applied, either under the "special relationship" or "state created danger" theories of DeShaney, or the "opportunity to deliberate" theory of the 6th Circuit Estate of Owensby case. The judge noted that the Fourth Circuit had not yet adopted the approach taken in the Owensby case, and found neither of the other approaches to apply in this case. Thus, the higher intent-to-harm standard would be applied, and in this case there was no allegation that Coombe intended to harm the trainee fireman. Therefore, the state and federal constitutional claims against Coombe failed, and summary judgment in his favor was granted.
The constitutional claims against the other defendants relied on "supervisory liability" and the judge found that they must fail, since as above there was no constitutional violation by Coombes as employee, insufficient showing of knowledge of risk of a constitutional violation, and insufficient showing of deliberate indifference to such risk. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the other defendants on the state and federal constitutional claims was granted.
Defendants also sought summary judgment on the state tort claims, but the judge declined to rule on them, instead ordering a remand to state court for further consideration.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
Monday, February 12, 2007
Fritszche v. Maryland State Board of Elections (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed February 12, 2007. Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell.
From the opinion's headnote:
The petitioner is a Maryland resident and student living in New York who had, in mid-August 2006, requested an absentee ballot from the County Board of Elections in Catonsville. The absentee ballot sent to her was postmarked on November 1, 2006 but did not arrive in New York until November 6, 2006, the day before the election. The returned ballot was postmarked November 7, 2006, and was not counted in the final tally since it was not "completed and mailed before election day," as required by the relevant section of COMAR.
The petitioner filed suit, asserting a violation of the "right to vote" provisions of Article I, Sections 1 and 3 of the Maryland Constitution and Article 7 of the Declaration of Rights, the "equal protection" guarantees of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights and the 14th Amendment of the federal Constitution, and the provisions of Section 9-304 of the Election Law Article of the Maryland Code, and asking that all absentee ballots postmarked on Election Day be accepted. The petitioner noted the extraordinary number of absentee ballots requested in this election, prompted in part by concerns over use of the new electronic voting machines, as expressed by Governor Ehrlich and others, and a number of examples of very late mailing of many of those ballots.
The respondents noted that there is no constitutional right to an absentee ballot, and argued that the regulations were reasonable restraints designed to protect the integrity of the voting process. Moreover, the petitioner had not sufficiently demonstrated harm, in that the ballot could have been hand-delivered to the polling place and counted on election day. The judge agreed, and denied the petitioner's request for a TRO.
On appeal, the petitioner argued that the respondent, by failing to answer the overwhelming call for absentee ballots in a timely fashion, had denied the petitioner the right to vote, or at least had imposed a severe burden on that right, and that the COMAR provision was only a discretionary exercise of the respondent's regulatory powers and was not required by statute. The respondent countered that it was impossible to determine the actual reason for the late mailings, since a number of factors were simply unknown. The Court agreed, noting that the skimpy record below gave little reason to overturn the judge's decision below in denying the TRO, given the petitioner's burden to prove 1) the likelihood that the petitioner would succeed on the merits, 2) the 'balance of inconvenience' between granting or denying the TRO, 3) the petitioner would suffer irreparable injury, and 4) the public interest.
The Court also rejected the petitioner's argument that Lamb v. Hammond required that state election statutes be strictly applied notwithstanding the negligence of state officials, instead finding that, in a absence of any clear evidence of the opposite conclusion, Lamb compels the exclusion of the noncompliant votes in order to safeguard the election process.
From the opinion's headnote:
ELECTIONS - ABSENTEE VOTING - DEADLINESIn an interlocutory appeal from the decision of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, the petitioner asked the Court to overturn the decision below, which had denied a temporary restraining order against election officials stemming from the alleged late delivery of some absentee ballots.
The mere occurrence and/or experiencing of processing problems with absentee ballots does not justify an extension of time for the filing of such ballots, absent proof that those problems were the direct cause for voters not voting.
The petitioner is a Maryland resident and student living in New York who had, in mid-August 2006, requested an absentee ballot from the County Board of Elections in Catonsville. The absentee ballot sent to her was postmarked on November 1, 2006 but did not arrive in New York until November 6, 2006, the day before the election. The returned ballot was postmarked November 7, 2006, and was not counted in the final tally since it was not "completed and mailed before election day," as required by the relevant section of COMAR.
The petitioner filed suit, asserting a violation of the "right to vote" provisions of Article I, Sections 1 and 3 of the Maryland Constitution and Article 7 of the Declaration of Rights, the "equal protection" guarantees of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights and the 14th Amendment of the federal Constitution, and the provisions of Section 9-304 of the Election Law Article of the Maryland Code, and asking that all absentee ballots postmarked on Election Day be accepted. The petitioner noted the extraordinary number of absentee ballots requested in this election, prompted in part by concerns over use of the new electronic voting machines, as expressed by Governor Ehrlich and others, and a number of examples of very late mailing of many of those ballots.
The respondents noted that there is no constitutional right to an absentee ballot, and argued that the regulations were reasonable restraints designed to protect the integrity of the voting process. Moreover, the petitioner had not sufficiently demonstrated harm, in that the ballot could have been hand-delivered to the polling place and counted on election day. The judge agreed, and denied the petitioner's request for a TRO.
On appeal, the petitioner argued that the respondent, by failing to answer the overwhelming call for absentee ballots in a timely fashion, had denied the petitioner the right to vote, or at least had imposed a severe burden on that right, and that the COMAR provision was only a discretionary exercise of the respondent's regulatory powers and was not required by statute. The respondent countered that it was impossible to determine the actual reason for the late mailings, since a number of factors were simply unknown. The Court agreed, noting that the skimpy record below gave little reason to overturn the judge's decision below in denying the TRO, given the petitioner's burden to prove 1) the likelihood that the petitioner would succeed on the merits, 2) the 'balance of inconvenience' between granting or denying the TRO, 3) the petitioner would suffer irreparable injury, and 4) the public interest.
The Court also rejected the petitioner's argument that Lamb v. Hammond required that state election statutes be strictly applied notwithstanding the negligence of state officials, instead finding that, in a absence of any clear evidence of the opposite conclusion, Lamb compels the exclusion of the noncompliant votes in order to safeguard the election process.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
The case was a "highlighted case." Thus, the briefs and other material are posted online by the Court of Appeals and are available here.
Tuesday, February 6, 2007
Andrew v. Clark (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(Approved for Publication)
Issued February 5, 2007 -- Opinion of Judge Andre M. Davis. Approved for publication.
Plaintiff served as a Major in the Baltimore City Police Department (BCPD) and was the Commanding Officer of the Eastern District of the BCPD at times relevant. After a barricade incident, Plaintiff prepared and distributed to his chain of command an "internal memorandum" criticizing the BCPD's handling of that incident. Receiving no response from his chain of command, Plaintiff released a copy of the internal memorandum to a Baltimore Sun reporter. Internal Affairs investigated the release and Plaintiff was subsequently fired.
Plaintiff filed and subsequently moved to amend a complaint in U.S. District Court alleging multiple state and federal counts against then Police Commissioner Kevin Clark and other parties. The complaint as amended alleged inter alia that Defendants' firing of Plaintiff:
1. violated the procedural due process requirements under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution and 14 U.S. Sec. 1983 of the United States Code, as amended, due to the defendants' failure to provide either:
a. an adjudicatory hearing; or
b. a demotion to a civil service position at which a hearing would ostensibly apply under the Maryland Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights ("LEOBR"); and further
2. violated Plaintiff's right to freedom of speech with respect to the preparation and release of the internal memorandum.
Defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all federal counts from the complaint.
The U.S. District Court held that Plaintiff acted in his capacity as a agent of the BCPD in preparing and distributing the internal memorandum, and accordingly had no such protected freedom of speech rights in that professional capacity under the First Amendment as would trump the BCPD's power to discipline or fire an employee. It held further that Defendant had not violated any of Plaintiff's procedural due process rights, as Plaintiff had no "property' right in his as an at-will employee under Maryland law, and thus no federal constitutional provision protected him from the deprivation of that "property". The Court also held that while state law may entertain a right of Plaintiff to be demoted to a protected, civil service rank as an intermediate discipline in lieu of termination, no constitutional principles commanded such a right.
Accordingly, the U.S District Court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) all federal claims in the complaint with prejudice and all non-diversity of citizenship state law claims without prejudice.
The Memorandum Opinion may be read here in PDF.
Plaintiff served as a Major in the Baltimore City Police Department (BCPD) and was the Commanding Officer of the Eastern District of the BCPD at times relevant. After a barricade incident, Plaintiff prepared and distributed to his chain of command an "internal memorandum" criticizing the BCPD's handling of that incident. Receiving no response from his chain of command, Plaintiff released a copy of the internal memorandum to a Baltimore Sun reporter. Internal Affairs investigated the release and Plaintiff was subsequently fired.
Plaintiff filed and subsequently moved to amend a complaint in U.S. District Court alleging multiple state and federal counts against then Police Commissioner Kevin Clark and other parties. The complaint as amended alleged inter alia that Defendants' firing of Plaintiff:
1. violated the procedural due process requirements under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution and 14 U.S. Sec. 1983 of the United States Code, as amended, due to the defendants' failure to provide either:
a. an adjudicatory hearing; or
b. a demotion to a civil service position at which a hearing would ostensibly apply under the Maryland Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights ("LEOBR"); and further
2. violated Plaintiff's right to freedom of speech with respect to the preparation and release of the internal memorandum.
Defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all federal counts from the complaint.
The U.S. District Court held that Plaintiff acted in his capacity as a agent of the BCPD in preparing and distributing the internal memorandum, and accordingly had no such protected freedom of speech rights in that professional capacity under the First Amendment as would trump the BCPD's power to discipline or fire an employee. It held further that Defendant had not violated any of Plaintiff's procedural due process rights, as Plaintiff had no "property' right in his as an at-will employee under Maryland law, and thus no federal constitutional provision protected him from the deprivation of that "property". The Court also held that while state law may entertain a right of Plaintiff to be demoted to a protected, civil service rank as an intermediate discipline in lieu of termination, no constitutional principles commanded such a right.
Accordingly, the U.S District Court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) all federal claims in the complaint with prejudice and all non-diversity of citizenship state law claims without prejudice.
The Memorandum Opinion may be read here in PDF.
Friday, January 12, 2007
Koshko v. Haining (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed January 12, 2007--Opinion by Judge Glen T. Harrell, Jr. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Dale R. Cathell
Maternal grandparents established significant relationship with the grandchildren while their daughter and first grandchild resided with them and after the daughter married and moved away. This substantial relationship encompassed the child that had resided under their roof, as well as two grandchildren born after their daughter moved away.
Following a family disagreement between the grandparents and husband on how the husband should act toward his dying mother, the daughter and her husband cut off all visitation. Grandparents brought an action for visitation in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County under the Grandparent Visitation Statute (GPS ), found at Md. Fam.Law Code Ann.§9-102. The trial judge established a rolling schedule of four-hour visits every 45 days and quarterly overnight visits. The trial court also directed that the parents and grandparents attend at least four joint, professional counseling sessions to discuss issues relating to the visitation. After an unsuccessful bid for a new trial, the Koshkos appealed the judgment of the Circuit Court.
Maternal grandparents established significant relationship with the grandchildren while their daughter and first grandchild resided with them and after the daughter married and moved away. This substantial relationship encompassed the child that had resided under their roof, as well as two grandchildren born after their daughter moved away.
Following a family disagreement between the grandparents and husband on how the husband should act toward his dying mother, the daughter and her husband cut off all visitation. Grandparents brought an action for visitation in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County under the Grandparent Visitation Statute (
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment, Koshko v. Haining, 168 Md.App. 556, 897 A.2d 866 (2006), holding that the GVS was neither facially unconstitutional nor unconstitutional as applied to the Koshkos. The intermediate appellate court rejected the argument that the GVS violated the Koshkos' fundamental right to parent, as articulated in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000) (plurality), simply because it lacked an express presumption that parental decisions are in the best interests of children. Under the principle of constitutional avoidance, the court interpreted the GVS to contain such a presumption. Upholding the trial court's order of visitation The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the parents' position that there must be a threshold finding of either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances as a predicate to the statutorily-imposed best interests of the child inquiry.
The Koshkos petitioned the Court of Appeals, which granted a writ of certiorari to consider the Koshkos' substantive due process challenge to the GVS.
Held:
The natural parents' decisions regarding the care, custody and upbringing of their minor children are presumptively correct which can only be overcome by a threshold showing of either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances demonstrating current or future detriment to the child, absent visitation from his or her grandparents, as a prerequisite to application of the best interests analysis, overruling the portions of Fairbanks, Maner, Beckman, Herrick and Wolinski that are inconsistent with the ruling.
While less of an intrusion than custody, parents in a visitation case have a fundamental constitutional right to parent their children which is only rebutted by a showing of unfitness or exceptional circumstances.
In deciding the issue of fundamental constitutional rights afforded to parents the court stated that visitation was a temporary form of custody.
Because of the fundamental constitutional right afforded to parents, the proper standard in reviewing the constitutionality of the GVS is strict scrutiny.
Under the principal of constitutional avoidance, The GPS as interpreted and glossed by the Court of Appeals was not facially unconstitutional because of the requirement of a threshold finding of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances demonstrating the detriment that has or will be imposed on the children absent visitation by their grandparents before the best interests analysis may be engaged.
In applying the strict scrutiny standard the Court held that the GVS was unconstitutional as applied.
In affected cases pending at the time this opinion was filed, where appropriate, courts may allow amendments to pleadings or the presentation of additional evidence in light of the holdings announced here. In cases filed after this opinion, the petitioners, in order to avert or overcome a motion to dismiss their petition, must allege a sufficient factual predicate in the petition so as to present a prima facie case of unfitness or exceptional circumstances, as well as invoking the best interest standard.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Eldridge agreed that the GVS was not facially unconstitutional, but argued that the Court placed a great deal of reliance on Justice O'Connor's opinion in Troxel, which was not the opinion of the Supreme Court and did not appear to reflect the views of a majority of the Supreme Court.
Full opinion PDF.
Saturday, January 6, 2007
Jones v. Murphy (Maryland U.S.D.C.)
Signed January 4, 2007 -- Memorandum and Order by Judge Catherine C. Blake.
This case involves a proposed class action suit brought on behalf of eight named plaintiffs, bringing constitutional claims (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment) against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("City") and the Baltimore Police Department ("BPD") (collectively the "City defendants") and current and former wardens ("Wardens") of the Central Booking and Intake Center ("CBIC") (collectively the "State defendants") for alleged mistreatment (strip searches and "over detention") of people arrested and taken to CBIC for booking and processing. Motions before the court were the City defendants' motion to dismiss, the State defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs' motion to deny the State defendants' motion for summary judgment or alternatively to permit discovery. The motions were considered on the briefs without a hearing.
The plaintiffs proposed five classes: 1) suspicionless strip search class, 2) non-private strip search class, 3) equal protection strip search class (males searched, females not), 4) underwear strip search class (males searched, females not), and 5) over detention class (held unreasonable time before presentment). The plaintiffs' theories were that the CBIC has both a policy and practice of unconstitutional strip searches and over detentions, that the State defendants were liable for establishing and being indifferent to those policies and practices, and that the City defendants, knowing of such unconstitutional policies and practices, continued to transport arrestees to CBIC rather than seek alternative dispositions.
For the consideration of the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the judge accepted the plaintiffs' factual allegations as true, testing instead the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claims. The judge had little difficulty finding that both the strip search and over detention claims against the State defendants were not subject to dismissal, and had little more difficulty rejecting the challenge to the claims against the Wardens based on a lack of supervisor liability or qualified immunity, or the plaintiffs' standing to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief. Claims against one of the Wardens were dismissed, though, since none of the currently named plaintiffs was detained during his tenure.
By contrast, the City defendants fared much better. The judge found that the plaintiffs in effect sought to bring claims against the City defendants under the theory of "entrustment liability," which has neither been adopted nor rejected in the Fourth Circuit, though it has been adopted in other circuits. Where adopted, entrustment liability can be imposed when a municipal body maintains a policy of entrusting arrestees to a jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional treatment those persons will face upon their confinement. The judge found it unnecessary to consider the entrustment liability claim, though, since to impose entrustment liability, the charged party must have had the authority to choose an alternate facility. Here, the City defendants had no choice, since they were not legally permitted to maintain their own facility, and the possibility of alternative dispositions (such as by citation) did not track against the proposed groups, and even if it did, would involve unwarranted judicial assessment of discretionary law enforcement. Thus, the judge found it unnecessary to consider the validity of an entrustment liability claim under Fourth Circuit law.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
This case involves a proposed class action suit brought on behalf of eight named plaintiffs, bringing constitutional claims (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment) against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("City") and the Baltimore Police Department ("BPD") (collectively the "City defendants") and current and former wardens ("Wardens") of the Central Booking and Intake Center ("CBIC") (collectively the "State defendants") for alleged mistreatment (strip searches and "over detention") of people arrested and taken to CBIC for booking and processing. Motions before the court were the City defendants' motion to dismiss, the State defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs' motion to deny the State defendants' motion for summary judgment or alternatively to permit discovery. The motions were considered on the briefs without a hearing.
The plaintiffs proposed five classes: 1) suspicionless strip search class, 2) non-private strip search class, 3) equal protection strip search class (males searched, females not), 4) underwear strip search class (males searched, females not), and 5) over detention class (held unreasonable time before presentment). The plaintiffs' theories were that the CBIC has both a policy and practice of unconstitutional strip searches and over detentions, that the State defendants were liable for establishing and being indifferent to those policies and practices, and that the City defendants, knowing of such unconstitutional policies and practices, continued to transport arrestees to CBIC rather than seek alternative dispositions.
For the consideration of the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the judge accepted the plaintiffs' factual allegations as true, testing instead the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claims. The judge had little difficulty finding that both the strip search and over detention claims against the State defendants were not subject to dismissal, and had little more difficulty rejecting the challenge to the claims against the Wardens based on a lack of supervisor liability or qualified immunity, or the plaintiffs' standing to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief. Claims against one of the Wardens were dismissed, though, since none of the currently named plaintiffs was detained during his tenure.
By contrast, the City defendants fared much better. The judge found that the plaintiffs in effect sought to bring claims against the City defendants under the theory of "entrustment liability," which has neither been adopted nor rejected in the Fourth Circuit, though it has been adopted in other circuits. Where adopted, entrustment liability can be imposed when a municipal body maintains a policy of entrusting arrestees to a jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional treatment those persons will face upon their confinement. The judge found it unnecessary to consider the entrustment liability claim, though, since to impose entrustment liability, the charged party must have had the authority to choose an alternate facility. Here, the City defendants had no choice, since they were not legally permitted to maintain their own facility, and the possibility of alternative dispositions (such as by citation) did not track against the proposed groups, and even if it did, would involve unwarranted judicial assessment of discretionary law enforcement. Thus, the judge found it unnecessary to consider the validity of an entrustment liability claim under Fourth Circuit law.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
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