Signed March 30, 2007--Memorandum and Order by Judge J. Frederick Motz.
In an action for alleged racial discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment to which Plaintiff (who was represented by counsel) did not respond. The motion was granted because:
First, the summary judgment record contained no direct or indirect evidence that Defendant had a discriminatory attitude in dealing with the Plaintiff;
Second, Plaintiff did not establish on the summary judgment record that her job performance was satisfactory (the second element of a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas protocol); and
Third, Plaintiff did not establish that there were any employees who were not members of the protected class who were retained under apparently similar circumstances (the fourth element of a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas protocol).
The opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label racial discrimination. Show all posts
Showing posts with label racial discrimination. Show all posts
Thursday, April 5, 2007
Friday, March 30, 2007
McClintick v. Leavitt (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (Not approved for publication)
Signed March 26, 2007. Opinion and Order by Judge Richard D. Bennett.
Memorandum and Opinion granting summary judgment in part.
Held: 1) A federal employee can seek relief for employment discrimination only by asserting causes of action under Title VII.
2) Not being nominated for a discretionary merit-based award may constitute an adverse employment action actionable under Title VII if the plaintiff can show that such a determination represents a decision on permanent pay status.
Facts: Plaintiff, white male, worked for U.S. Dept. Health and Human Services. His direct supervisor was an African-American female. In 2004, the Plaintiff was not nominated for a so-called Quality Step Increase ("QSI"). QSI's are awards given for sustained performance of high quality that significantly exceeds an acceptable level of competence. The Plaintiff had been nominated to receive a QSI for 2003, and had received other merit-based awards, when he was previously supervised by a different supervisor, who was Caucasian.
The Plaintiff sued, alleging that he did not receive a QSI for 2004 because of racial discrimination and retaliation for filing an earlier discrimination charge. The Plaintiff alleged four causes of action: Count I - race discrimination (Title VII), Count II - race discrimination (§1981); Count III - retaliation for participating in protected activity (Title VII); Count IV - retaliation in violation of §1981.
The Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The Court dismissed Counts II and IV because they were based upon §1981, a cause of action not available to Plaintiff, a federal employee. The Court denied the motion as to Counts I and III, finding that the Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action.
A full copy of the opinion is available in PDF format.
Memorandum and Opinion granting summary judgment in part.
Held: 1) A federal employee can seek relief for employment discrimination only by asserting causes of action under Title VII.
2) Not being nominated for a discretionary merit-based award may constitute an adverse employment action actionable under Title VII if the plaintiff can show that such a determination represents a decision on permanent pay status.
Facts: Plaintiff, white male, worked for U.S. Dept. Health and Human Services. His direct supervisor was an African-American female. In 2004, the Plaintiff was not nominated for a so-called Quality Step Increase ("QSI"). QSI's are awards given for sustained performance of high quality that significantly exceeds an acceptable level of competence. The Plaintiff had been nominated to receive a QSI for 2003, and had received other merit-based awards, when he was previously supervised by a different supervisor, who was Caucasian.
The Plaintiff sued, alleging that he did not receive a QSI for 2004 because of racial discrimination and retaliation for filing an earlier discrimination charge. The Plaintiff alleged four causes of action: Count I - race discrimination (Title VII), Count II - race discrimination (§1981); Count III - retaliation for participating in protected activity (Title VII); Count IV - retaliation in violation of §1981.
The Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The Court dismissed Counts II and IV because they were based upon §1981, a cause of action not available to Plaintiff, a federal employee. The Court denied the motion as to Counts I and III, finding that the Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action.
A full copy of the opinion is available in PDF format.
Wednesday, February 7, 2007
Bouie and Jones v. Rugged Wearhouse, Inc. (Maryland U.S.D.C.)
Memorandum and Order Issued February 5, 2007–Opinion by Judge Andre M. Davis
Bouie and Jones filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 racial discrimination and common law defamation claim from an accusation of attempted shoplifting while shopping in Rugged Wearhouse. Dismissal of the racial discrimination claim by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City left pending defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages for the state law claim. Without hearing, their motion was granted in part and denied in part.
The case deals with allegedly defamatory speech involving two private parties in a matter of a private concern. The plaintiffs claim that, after being followed by store employees, they attempted to leave without making a purchase at which time the store manager spoke harshly to Bouie, essentially accusing Bouie and Jones of stealing or attempting to steal items and threatening to call police if they returned.
In Maryland, the elements of defamation with regard to private figures are:
(1) that the defendant made a defamatory communication, i.e., that he communicated a statement tending to expose the plaintiff to public scorn, hatred, contempt, or ridicule to a third person who reasonably recognized the statement as being defamatory; (2) that the statement was false; (3) that the defendant was at fault in communicating the statement; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered harm.
Defendant conceded that plaintiffs generated genuine disputes of fact on the issue of liability but contended plaintiffs’ damages must be limited. The court agreed in part based on Maryland’s distinction between defamation per se and defamation per quod. Viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs, the manager’s speech constituted defamatory communication and injury is presumed. However, the record was wholly bereft of any evidence that plaintiffs suffered actual harm. "Harm" is not limited to monetary loss; in fact, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering. Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony showed conclusively that neither suffered actual damages, either personal or business, from the store manager’s defamatory statements. Plaintiffs did not allege mental anguish as an element of damages, and there was nothing in the record to support an award of damages for any such harm.
As a matter of law, plaintiffs failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact as to the existence of actual damages flowing from the defamatory statements made by the store manager. Therefore, as a matter of law, defendant is entitled to determination that any damages award shall be limited to "presumed damages" from the defamatory per se statements that plaintiffs were shoplifters. The issue of "actual malice," i.e., wether the store manager knew his allegations were false, thereby permitting an award of punitive damages, is for the jury. In a defamation action, punitive damages are not recoverable based on ill will, spite or an intent to injure; instead, to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must establish that the defamatory falsehood was made with actual knowledge that it was false.
The full memorandum is available in PDF.
Bouie and Jones filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 racial discrimination and common law defamation claim from an accusation of attempted shoplifting while shopping in Rugged Wearhouse. Dismissal of the racial discrimination claim by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City left pending defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages for the state law claim. Without hearing, their motion was granted in part and denied in part.
The case deals with allegedly defamatory speech involving two private parties in a matter of a private concern. The plaintiffs claim that, after being followed by store employees, they attempted to leave without making a purchase at which time the store manager spoke harshly to Bouie, essentially accusing Bouie and Jones of stealing or attempting to steal items and threatening to call police if they returned.
In Maryland, the elements of defamation with regard to private figures are:
(1) that the defendant made a defamatory communication, i.e., that he communicated a statement tending to expose the plaintiff to public scorn, hatred, contempt, or ridicule to a third person who reasonably recognized the statement as being defamatory; (2) that the statement was false; (3) that the defendant was at fault in communicating the statement; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered harm.
Defendant conceded that plaintiffs generated genuine disputes of fact on the issue of liability but contended plaintiffs’ damages must be limited. The court agreed in part based on Maryland’s distinction between defamation per se and defamation per quod. Viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs, the manager’s speech constituted defamatory communication and injury is presumed. However, the record was wholly bereft of any evidence that plaintiffs suffered actual harm. "Harm" is not limited to monetary loss; in fact, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering. Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony showed conclusively that neither suffered actual damages, either personal or business, from the store manager’s defamatory statements. Plaintiffs did not allege mental anguish as an element of damages, and there was nothing in the record to support an award of damages for any such harm.
As a matter of law, plaintiffs failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact as to the existence of actual damages flowing from the defamatory statements made by the store manager. Therefore, as a matter of law, defendant is entitled to determination that any damages award shall be limited to "presumed damages" from the defamatory per se statements that plaintiffs were shoplifters. The issue of "actual malice," i.e., wether the store manager knew his allegations were false, thereby permitting an award of punitive damages, is for the jury. In a defamation action, punitive damages are not recoverable based on ill will, spite or an intent to injure; instead, to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must establish that the defamatory falsehood was made with actual knowledge that it was false.
The full memorandum is available in PDF.
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