Memorandum Opinion and Order Signed April 23, 2007--Judge J. Frederick Motz.
Gerald Williams, in an action against his former employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Maryland Wage & Hour Law ("MWHL"), and the Maryland Wage Payment & Collection Law ("MWPCL"), presented the question whether Williams, while employed by Maryland Office Relocators ("MOR") fell within a class of employees over whom the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") has the power to establish "qualifications and maximum hours of service." If Williams does not fall under this exemption (the "Motor Carrier Act" exemption), it is undisputed that he is entitled to overtime pay. If, on the other hand, he does fall within the exemption, it is undisputed that he is not entitled to overtime pay.
In this instance, the critical consideration in determing whether Williams falls within the Motor Carrier Act exemption is whether his activities "affect safety of operation" of a motor vehicle in interstate commerce. Therefore, where the "continuing duties of the employee's job had no substantial direct effect on such safety of operation or where such safety-affecting activities are so trivial, casual, and insignificant as to be de minimus, the exemption will not apply to him in any work week so long as there is no change in his duties."
In testimony, MOR failed to present any person supervised by Williams, who saw Williams on a job, any truck driver or mover who worked with Williams on a job, or indeed any operations manager contradicting Williams' own description of the work he actually performed. This Court found that, as a result, the Motor Carrier Act exemption applied and Williams was entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA and MWHL.
Two ancillary questions relating to Williams' claims remained under the FLSA and MWHL. First, was Williams entitled to liquidated damages under the FLSA and, second, was MOR's non-payment of Williams' overtime compensation "willful" so as to entitle Williams to three, rather than two, years back overtime pay?
An employer who violates the terms of the FLSA "shall be liable to the employee(s) affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the cause may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages." However, if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or ommission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing his act or ommission was not a violation of the FLSA," a court may refuse to award liquidated damages or may award liquidated damages in an amount less than that of the unpaid overtime compensation. The employer bears the plain and substantial burden of pursuading the court by proof that his failure to obey the statute was both in good faith and predicated upon such reasonable grounds that it would be unfair to impose upon him more than a compensatory verdict. Here, MOR's averments were entirely insufficient and it was found liable for the liquidated damages.
The statute of limitations for the FLSA is normally two years. However, if a plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant's violation was "willful," the plaintiff may recover for the preceding three years. Violations are "willful" if the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof of whether the defendant's actions were willful.
Williams' final claim for treble damages under the MWPCL was found without merit. Williams' claim was governed by the FLSA and the MWHL, not the MWPCL.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label labor law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label labor law. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 1, 2007
Friday, April 13, 2007
Green v. Carr Lowery Glass Company, Inc. (ct. of Appeals)
Filed April 13, 2007 – Opinion by Judge Irma Raker
The Court of Appeals considered whether, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, a claimant whose hearing has been damaged as a result of his occupation is entitled to have hearing aids provided by his employer/insurer, even though he does not meet the criteria for monetary compensation under the Act. The Court held that the claimant is not eligible for medical benefits, i.e. hearing aids, unless he mets the criteria for eligibility for compensation under the Act.
Thus the Court affirmed the Court of Special Appeals, which had affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer/insurer.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
The Court of Appeals considered whether, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, a claimant whose hearing has been damaged as a result of his occupation is entitled to have hearing aids provided by his employer/insurer, even though he does not meet the criteria for monetary compensation under the Act. The Court held that the claimant is not eligible for medical benefits, i.e. hearing aids, unless he mets the criteria for eligibility for compensation under the Act.
Thus the Court affirmed the Court of Special Appeals, which had affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer/insurer.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Saturday, January 20, 2007
Toulan v. DAP Products, Inc. (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(not approved for publication)
Signed January 17, 2007 -- Opinion by Judge Catherine C. Blake (not approved for publication)
Plaintiff Toulan brought suit against her employer, DAP Products, Inc. ("DAP"), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"). Upon consideration of DAP's motion for summary judgment, the judge entered judgment in favor of the defendant and dismissed the case.
Toulan had alleged discrimination based upon her race (Caucasian), national origin (American) and gender (female) while working under a male supervisor of Asian Indian descent. Toulan's problems began in 2004 during a reorganization of her workplace, when she was assigned to work under the supervisor by the Vice President of Technology, also an Asian Indian male. Her initial objections were because her supervisor had the same job title, Chemist II, but Toulan and her supervisor did not work well together, and after a month she was reassigned to another supervisor. Toulan subsequently received several disciplinary warnings and negative comments, and was temporarily reassigned to another location, returning a few months later. Toulin continued to receive pay raises, and was not demoted or otherwise penalized in spite of the disciplinary actions.
Upon consideration, the judge found no direct evidence of employment discrimination, nor had Toulan established a prima facie case (a showing that 1) she is a member of a protected class, 2) she was performing her duties in a satisfactory manner, 3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and 4) circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action support an inference of discriminatory intent) sufficient to shift the burden to DAP to prove a non-discriminatory basis for the alleged discrimination, in that no sufficient adverse employment action was alleged.
Toulan's wage discrimination claims under Title VII and EPA also fell short, since her evidence did not amount to a showing that she received lower pay than her male co-workers for performing work substantially equal in skill, effort and responsibility under similar working conditions, since there was little evidence to support the similarity of, and evidence of a number of key differences between, the compared positions, and the ranges of compensation for male and female co-workers were co-extensive.
Toulan was also found to have failed to establish retaliatory action by DAP (in temporarily reassigning her to a less desirable location, giving her warnings and negative evaluations, requiring her to use unpaid leave after her paid leave was exhausted, and creating a hostile work environment), either by again failing to establish adverse employment actions even under the more relaxed standards applied to claims of retaliatory action, or by failing to rebut DAP's proffered non-discriminatory basis for those actions when found.
In concluding, the judge acknowledged that Toulan may have been correct in claiming the terms, conditions and privileged of her employment differed from other co-workers, but found that that such differences arose from personality differences rather than discrimination, and declined to sit as a "super-personnel department", citing Beall v. Abbott Labs.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Plaintiff Toulan brought suit against her employer, DAP Products, Inc. ("DAP"), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"). Upon consideration of DAP's motion for summary judgment, the judge entered judgment in favor of the defendant and dismissed the case.
Toulan had alleged discrimination based upon her race (Caucasian), national origin (American) and gender (female) while working under a male supervisor of Asian Indian descent. Toulan's problems began in 2004 during a reorganization of her workplace, when she was assigned to work under the supervisor by the Vice President of Technology, also an Asian Indian male. Her initial objections were because her supervisor had the same job title, Chemist II, but Toulan and her supervisor did not work well together, and after a month she was reassigned to another supervisor. Toulan subsequently received several disciplinary warnings and negative comments, and was temporarily reassigned to another location, returning a few months later. Toulin continued to receive pay raises, and was not demoted or otherwise penalized in spite of the disciplinary actions.
Upon consideration, the judge found no direct evidence of employment discrimination, nor had Toulan established a prima facie case (a showing that 1) she is a member of a protected class, 2) she was performing her duties in a satisfactory manner, 3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and 4) circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action support an inference of discriminatory intent) sufficient to shift the burden to DAP to prove a non-discriminatory basis for the alleged discrimination, in that no sufficient adverse employment action was alleged.
Toulan's wage discrimination claims under Title VII and EPA also fell short, since her evidence did not amount to a showing that she received lower pay than her male co-workers for performing work substantially equal in skill, effort and responsibility under similar working conditions, since there was little evidence to support the similarity of, and evidence of a number of key differences between, the compared positions, and the ranges of compensation for male and female co-workers were co-extensive.
Toulan was also found to have failed to establish retaliatory action by DAP (in temporarily reassigning her to a less desirable location, giving her warnings and negative evaluations, requiring her to use unpaid leave after her paid leave was exhausted, and creating a hostile work environment), either by again failing to establish adverse employment actions even under the more relaxed standards applied to claims of retaliatory action, or by failing to rebut DAP's proffered non-discriminatory basis for those actions when found.
In concluding, the judge acknowledged that Toulan may have been correct in claiming the terms, conditions and privileged of her employment differed from other co-workers, but found that that such differences arose from personality differences rather than discrimination, and declined to sit as a "super-personnel department", citing Beall v. Abbott Labs.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Thursday, January 4, 2007
Prince George's County v. Fraternal Order of Police (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed January 4, 2007--Opinion by Judge Timothy Meredith.
In 2004, the P.G. County Chief of Police established a new promotion policy, based on the "Rule of 3," wherein promotions would be an officer selected by the Chief from among the top three eligible candidates, rather than promoting the top scoring candidate as had been the previous practice. The local FOP chapter ("FOP 89") filed a grievance, claiming a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The appeal was denied by the Labor Commissioner. FOP 89 then filed a request for arbitration of the denial, and in March of 2005 the arbitrator found a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, required the promotion of the highest candidate on the eligibility list, and ordered the retroactive promotion of any officer passed over by out-of-order promotions.
Prince George's County (the "County") petitioned the local Circuit Court to vacate the arbitration award; the Circuit Court affirmed the arbitrator's decision, whereupon the County appealed.
On its own, the Court of Special Appeals (the "Court") raised the issue of mootness, since the collective bargaining agreement at issue had expired in 2005, thus rendering the matter at issue moot. The Court noted an exception to the rule that courts are not to decide academic or moot questions where there is no longer an existing controversy, if there is a public benefit to be derived from deciding a matter of important public interest raised, for the guidance of courts and litigants in the future. The Court noted that the collective bargaining agreement at issue here had subsequently been renegotiated, and that the County had resisted a clarification of the section at issue urged by FOP 89 and instead the existing language had been continued. Thus, the Court found justification to address the issues raised, even though moot in this case.
The Court had little difficulty finding that arbitration was required in this case, noting that arbitration is a favored remedy, and that in the case of ambiguity over the scope of matters subject to arbitration, the arbitrator and not the courts should initially determine the matter. Upon review, the Court found the dispute was within the scope of the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Turning to the arbitration award itself, the Court noted that mere errors of law or fact would not ordinarily justify vacating or refusing to enforce an arbitration award, but only if the award is base on fraud, misconduct. bias, prejudice, corruption or lack of good faith on the part of the arbitrator, or if the award is contrary to a clear public policy, or if beyond the scope of the issues submitted or failing to consider all matters submitted, or to correct a mistake of form such as an evident miscalculation of figures. The Court found nothing to support the contention that the award was a mistake so gross as to work a manifest injustice or contained a palpable mistake of law or fact, or that the arbitrator's decision was completely irrational. Contrary to the County's contention that provisions of county law supersede, interpret, or limit the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the Court found that the terms of such collective bargaining agreements are explicitly incorporated into and supersede inconsistent provisions of the county law.
Although the technical ruling of the Court was a dismissal on the basis of mootness, after considering the merits of the issues raised the Court upheld the arbitration award on all counts.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
In 2004, the P.G. County Chief of Police established a new promotion policy, based on the "Rule of 3," wherein promotions would be an officer selected by the Chief from among the top three eligible candidates, rather than promoting the top scoring candidate as had been the previous practice. The local FOP chapter ("FOP 89") filed a grievance, claiming a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The appeal was denied by the Labor Commissioner. FOP 89 then filed a request for arbitration of the denial, and in March of 2005 the arbitrator found a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, required the promotion of the highest candidate on the eligibility list, and ordered the retroactive promotion of any officer passed over by out-of-order promotions.
Prince George's County (the "County") petitioned the local Circuit Court to vacate the arbitration award; the Circuit Court affirmed the arbitrator's decision, whereupon the County appealed.
On its own, the Court of Special Appeals (the "Court") raised the issue of mootness, since the collective bargaining agreement at issue had expired in 2005, thus rendering the matter at issue moot. The Court noted an exception to the rule that courts are not to decide academic or moot questions where there is no longer an existing controversy, if there is a public benefit to be derived from deciding a matter of important public interest raised, for the guidance of courts and litigants in the future. The Court noted that the collective bargaining agreement at issue here had subsequently been renegotiated, and that the County had resisted a clarification of the section at issue urged by FOP 89 and instead the existing language had been continued. Thus, the Court found justification to address the issues raised, even though moot in this case.
The Court had little difficulty finding that arbitration was required in this case, noting that arbitration is a favored remedy, and that in the case of ambiguity over the scope of matters subject to arbitration, the arbitrator and not the courts should initially determine the matter. Upon review, the Court found the dispute was within the scope of the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Turning to the arbitration award itself, the Court noted that mere errors of law or fact would not ordinarily justify vacating or refusing to enforce an arbitration award, but only if the award is base on fraud, misconduct. bias, prejudice, corruption or lack of good faith on the part of the arbitrator, or if the award is contrary to a clear public policy, or if beyond the scope of the issues submitted or failing to consider all matters submitted, or to correct a mistake of form such as an evident miscalculation of figures. The Court found nothing to support the contention that the award was a mistake so gross as to work a manifest injustice or contained a palpable mistake of law or fact, or that the arbitrator's decision was completely irrational. Contrary to the County's contention that provisions of county law supersede, interpret, or limit the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the Court found that the terms of such collective bargaining agreements are explicitly incorporated into and supersede inconsistent provisions of the county law.
Although the technical ruling of the Court was a dismissal on the basis of mootness, after considering the merits of the issues raised the Court upheld the arbitration award on all counts.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
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