Lloyd v. General Motors (Ct. of Appeals)

Issued February 8, 2007 -- Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell -- Concurring Opinion by Judge John C. Eldridge

From the Court's headnote beginning its lengthy opinion:

Even in the absence of actual personal injury, economic loss, the cost to fix the defect alleged, is recoverable where it is also alleged that such defect has caused, in other cases, serious bodily injury and, thus, constitutes an unreasonable risk of death or serious injury.

Petitioners Mr. and Mrs. Lloyd ("Lloyd") were the representative plaintiffs for a class action on behalf of designated purchasers of vehicles with certain types of front seats installed. They sought to recover from the respondents the cost of repairing and/or replacing the front seats in each class vehicle. Lloyd alleged that the seats were unsafe because they would allegedly collapse rearward in moderate and severe rear-impact collisions. None of the petitioners or any putative class members alleged that he or she had experienced personal injury as a result of the mechanical failure that caused the alleged defect.

In its Amended Complaint, Petitioners alleged seven causes of action:

1. negligence
2. strict liability
3. implied warranty of merchantability
4. "negligent failure to disclose, failure to warn, concealment and misrepresentation" ("negligent misrepresentation")
5. fraudulent concealment and intentional failure to warn
6. unfair or deceptive trade practices
7. civil conspiracy

The core issue examined by the court in responding to the Respondent's Motion for Dismiss for failure to state a claim was whether the risk of harm that has not yet occurred was sufficient to sustain a legal claim for each of the counts in the Amended Complaint, in particular those in tort. After a review of Maryland precedent, the Court of Appeals held that the facts alleged, if proven at trial, would satisfy each of the severity and probability "prongs" of the test for economic loss recovery in tort from Morris v. Osmose, 340 Md. 519, 533:

"Thus, if the possible injury is extraordinarily severe, i.e., multiple deaths, we do not require the probability of the injury occurring to be as high as we would require if the injury threatened were less severe, i.e. a broken leg or damage to property. Likewise, if the probability of the injury occurring is extraordinarily high, we do not require the injury to be as severe as we would if the probability of the injury were lower."

This precedent, driven by policy concern balancing a skeptical eye toward mere speculative damages against the policy of averting harms either reasonably foreseeable or severe, led the Court to uphold in turn each of the seven counts in Lloyd's Amended Complaint.

In his concurring opinion, Judge Eldridge noted his agreement with the holding and reasoning of the Court's opinion, but maintained his agreement today with his support of the dissenting opinion in the Morris case and one other precedent cited in the opinion, in which cases Judge Eldridge had previously dissented as an active member of the Court.

The full texts of both the opinion of the Court and Judge Eldridge's concurring opinion are available here in PDF.

Jones v. Murphy (Maryland U.S.D.C.)

Signed January 4, 2007 -- Memorandum and Order by Judge Catherine C. Blake.

This case involves a proposed class action suit brought on behalf of eight named plaintiffs, bringing constitutional claims (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment) against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("City") and the Baltimore Police Department ("BPD") (collectively the "City defendants") and current and former wardens ("Wardens") of the Central Booking and Intake Center ("CBIC") (collectively the "State defendants") for alleged mistreatment (strip searches and "over detention") of people arrested and taken to CBIC for booking and processing. Motions before the court were the City defendants' motion to dismiss, the State defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs' motion to deny the State defendants' motion for summary judgment or alternatively to permit discovery. The motions were considered on the briefs without a hearing.

The plaintiffs proposed five classes: 1) suspicionless strip search class, 2) non-private strip search class, 3) equal protection strip search class (males searched, females not), 4) underwear strip search class (males searched, females not), and 5) over detention class (held unreasonable time before presentment). The plaintiffs' theories were that the CBIC has both a policy and practice of unconstitutional strip searches and over detentions, that the State defendants were liable for establishing and being indifferent to those policies and practices, and that the City defendants, knowing of such unconstitutional policies and practices, continued to transport arrestees to CBIC rather than seek alternative dispositions.

For the consideration of the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the judge accepted the plaintiffs' factual allegations as true, testing instead the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claims. The judge had little difficulty finding that both the strip search and over detention claims against the State defendants were not subject to dismissal, and had little more difficulty rejecting the challenge to the claims against the Wardens based on a lack of supervisor liability or qualified immunity, or the plaintiffs' standing to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief. Claims against one of the Wardens were dismissed, though, since none of the currently named plaintiffs was detained during his tenure.

By contrast, the City defendants fared much better. The judge found that the plaintiffs in effect sought to bring claims against the City defendants under the theory of "entrustment liability," which has neither been adopted nor rejected in the Fourth Circuit, though it has been adopted in other circuits. Where adopted, entrustment liability can be imposed when a municipal body maintains a policy of entrusting arrestees to a jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional treatment those persons will face upon their confinement. The judge found it unnecessary to consider the entrustment liability claim, though, since to impose entrustment liability, the charged party must have had the authority to choose an alternate facility. Here, the City defendants had no choice, since they were not legally permitted to maintain their own facility, and the possibility of alternative dispositions (such as by citation) did not track against the proposed groups, and even if it did, would involve unwarranted judicial assessment of discretionary law enforcement. Thus, the judge found it unnecessary to consider the validity of an entrustment liability claim under Fourth Circuit law.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Baltimore City Police Department (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(not approved for publication)

Decided December 1, 2006--Opinion by Catherine C. Blake (not approved for publication)

Motion to deny class certification status is premature when class certification had not yet been requested. Sovereign immunity is available for claims for monetary damages, but not equitable relief. Governmental immunity is available for common law claims. Preliminary denial of motion to certify question to state court when there is a purely federal question pending as to whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied.

The full opinion is available in PDF.