Layton v. Howard County Board of Appeals (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed May 9, 2007. Opinion by Judge Dale R. Cathell. Dissenting opinion by Judge Alan M. Wilner (retired, specially assigned).

From the official headnote:

Reaffirming the Yorkdale Corporation v. Powell, 237 Md. 121, 205 A.2d 269 (1964) rule that a change in statutory law that takes place during the course of the litigation of a land use or zoning issue shall be retrospectively applied by appellate courts whether it operates to deny, i.e., moot an application (provided that it does not affect the vested rights of a party), or applies in an opposite context.

The owners and operators of a wildlife and primate sanctuary ("Layton") had sought a special exception from the Howard County Board of Appeals (the "Board") to bring their operation into compliance with that county's zoning ordinances, but were denied permission to operate as a primate sanctuary. Prior to the Circuit Court's hearing of Layton's appeal of the Board's decision, the pertinent part of the Howard County Code was amended, changing the definition upon which the Board had relied in denying the special exception. Nonetheless, the Circuit Court affirmed the Board's decision, ruling in part that the change was not to be given retroactive effect. The Court of Special Appeals, in a reported decision, affirmed.

On appeal, the Court noted that the general rule is that statutes, and substantive statutory changes, are to be given only prospective, and not retrospective, effect, unless otherwise indicated by the legislature. One relevant exception to the general rule was stated in the Yorkdale case, where retrospective application is given to changes to statutes that impact land use issues made during the course of litigation in land use and zoning cases, unless vested or accrued substantive rights would be disturbed or the legislature had shown a contrary intent. Reviewing the cases since Yorkdale, the Court concluded that the rule set forth in Yorkdale was still good law, and had not been overturned, in the Riverdale case, the CSA's Holland case, or otherwise.

In dissent, Judge Wilner argued that, though the Court had treated zoning cases differently in the past, there was "no practical or jurisprudential basis for such a distinction, and the Court offers none." Absent legislative expression that a law is to be applied retrospectively, Judge Wilner argued for a consistent rule that prospective application would be given to substantive changes, and retrospective application only for procedural changes, and overruling the exception created in Yorkdale and its progeny.

The majority and dissenting opinions are available in PDF format.

City of Annapolis v. Bowen et al. (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Decided March 30, 2007—Opinion by Judge Peter Krauser

Retired firefighters and police officers sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the City of Annapolis (“City”) to increase their pension payments in tandem with reclassification of the positions of their active-duty counterparts. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County agreed that Annapolis City Code § 3.36.150A1 required that the retirees receive pension increases commensurate with wage increases received by active-duty personnel. The City appealed, contending that pension increases under ACC § 3.36.150A1 were limited to cost-of-living adjustments.

The retirees first argued that Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.) § 12-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article barred the City’s appeal. Reasoning that circuit court had been exercising mandamus jurisdiction below, the Court of Special Appeals found that it had jurisdiction to hear the City’s appeal.

On the merits, the retirees argued that their interpretation of ACC § 3.36.150A1 was supported by “similar legislation” in DC. The “similar” DC provision contains an explicit “equalization provision” granting retired police officers and firefighters increases in their pension when active-duty counterparts receive wage increases. The Court of Special Appeals held that the DC provision was not a cost-of-living provision like ACC § 3.36.150A1, and was in fact created to compensate for the absence of such a provision in DC. Thus the Court reversed the lower court’s decision.

The opinion is available in PDF.

Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Kelly (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed March 14, 2007 – Opinion by Judge Lynne Battaglia

Anthony Kelly was adjudged incompetent to stand trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County because his delusional disorder prevented him from understanding the adversarial nature of the proceedings against him, and precluded him from assisting in his criminal defense. He was committed to a state health institution for treatment, where the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene sought to forcibly medicate him. The Department convened a Clinical Review Panel that approved the forcible medication and that decision was upheld by an ALJ. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City reversed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Section 10-708 (g) of the Health-General Article of the Maryland Code (1982, 2005 Repl. Vol.) requires the State to prove that an individual, because of his mental illness, is dangerous to himself or others within a state institution before it can forcibly administer medication. Finding nothing in the record to show that Kelly was, because of his mental illness, dangerous to himself or others within the state institution, the Court determined that he could not be forcibly medicated pursuant to Section 10-70 8 (b)(2) and (g).

In a concurring opinion, Judge Alan Wilner raised a concern that the Court had addressed a broader question that the one presented in the case. Judge Wilner would have courts look at the nature and purpose of the prescribed medication when psychiatrists in a State hospital to which a criminal defendant has been committed believe it is necessary to forcibly medicate the defendant. Where the State could demonstrate that the purpose of the medication was not just to suppress but also to treat and ameliorate the symptoms that caused the patient to be committed in the first place, Judge Wilner would put the focus on whether (1) without the medication, those symptoms will not be treated or ameliorated and the patient will therefore remain ineligible for release, and (2) with the medication, the patient will likely become eligible for release. Judge Wilner would put the burden on the State to show both that the prescribed medication is for that broader purpose and that, alone or in conjunction with other medications or therapies, it has a reasonable chance of achieving that objective without undue side effects. Judge Glenn Harrell joined in the concurrence.

The opinion is available in PDF.

Centre Insurance Co. v. J.T.W. (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed January 9, 2007--Opinion by Judge Dale R. Cathell.

Issue: When, under Title 2 of Maryland's Insurance Article does the 30-day filing period for a petition for judicial review of an administrative decision begin?

Held: The plain language of the pertinent statutes provides that, in the context of the relevant sections of the Insurance Article, the 30-day filing period for a petition for judicial review of an administrative decision under §§2-204(c) and 2-215(d)(1) begins when the order resulting from a relevant administrative hearing is mailed.

Not considered in opinion: The effect of Maryland Rule 1-203(c)

Full opinion available in PDF.