Martin V. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed May 3, 2007--Opinion by Judge Arrie Davis.

Martin was convicted by a jury of robbery and sentenced to eight years imprisonment, all but eighteen months suspended, accompanied by three years of supervised probation. His appeal presented the following questions for review:

1. Was the evidence legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery where the prosecution failed to show that [Martin] used threat of force to obtain property?
2. Did the trial court err when it refused to clarify and supplement a jury instruction upon a critical issue?
3. Did the trial court err in its jury instructions that excluded a defense at issue?
4. Did the trial court err when it substituted an erroneous statement of the law in the jury instructions?

The alleged victim ("Turner") testified that he stopped to speak with a neighbor while walking his dog when Martin accosted him with a baseball bat demanding that Turner return $150 to him from a botched drug buy. Demanding more than the $100 in Turner's pocket, Martin followed Turner home where he recovered the remaining $50. The encounter at Martin's home was accompanied by a 911 call for police assistance by Turner's wife. Conversely, Martin testified that Turner had stolen $150 from him in a sham drug transaction. He encountered Turner walking his pit bull and, afraid of the dog, broke off a branch from a nearby tree, approached Martin, and requested his money back. Turner gave him $100 from his pocket, and Martin accompanied him home to recover the remaining $50.

Martin's counsel contemplated raising as a defense that Martin lacked the intent to steal from Turner because he was recovering his own money, i.e., the claim of right defense. Defense counsel's proposed jury instructions to support this claim were summarily rejected by the court.

During deliberations, one of the notes sent by the jury asked, "Does it matter whether the victim felt threatened for there to be a threat of force?" Upon declining to answer the question, the court instructed the jury to rely on prior instructions.

Martin contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to intimidate or intimidated Turner, which is a prerequisite of a robbery conviction. Further, in his brief, he attempted to rationalize the jury verdict and any implications arising therefrom by commenting on what testimony the jury found more credible. This Court disagreed.

Robbery has been defined as "the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of another, from his person or in his presence, by violence or putting in fear . . . or, more succinctly, as larceny from the person, accompanied by violence or putting in fear . . .." The "putting in fear" aspect of that definition is of particular relevance to the instant case. The requisite level of fear, utilizing the objective standard, is "any attempt to apply the least force to the person of another constitutes an assault. The attempt is made whenever there is any action or conduct reasonably tending to create the apprehension in another that the person engaged therein is about to apply such force to him. It is sufficient that there is an apparent intention to inflict a battery and an apparent ability to carry out such intention." Martin admitted possessing an object -- whether a bat or a tree branch -- and also admitted that he threatened to hit Turner with the object if he did not produce the money. In the instant case, context is given to the incident in light of Turner's testimony, which indicated he was "scared."

The Court found no need to address Martin's position that the jury rejected Turner's testimony and only Martin's testimony informed the jury what had transpired. In performing a fact-finding role, the jury has authority to decide which evidence to accept and which to reject. Because the trial record demonstrated the applicable objective standard of fear was met, there was sufficient evidence to convince the jury of Martin's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Next, Martin contended that the trial court erred by failing to answer the jury's question. Subsequent to the trial court's response to the jury note, the State filed a motion to reconsider. Martin's counsel did not object to the instruction. Maryland Rule 4-325(e), which sets forth:

No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection. Upon request of any party, the court shall receive objections out of the hearing of the jury. An appellate court, on its own initiative, may however take cognizance of any plain error in the instructions, material to the rights of the defendant, despite a failure to object.

Pursuant to this rule, the Court has consistently held that a party waives his rights when he fails to request an instruction or object to an instruction. Here, Martin did not object to the instruction given nor did he request that an amended instruction be given when the note was sent to the court. The State objected; however, the appellant must object himself to preserve the issue for appellate review. Accordingly, Martin is precluded from raising this issue.

Martin next argues that the claim of right defense has not been abrogated in Maryland and, accordingly, his request to propound a jury instruction should have been granted and that the instruction regarding possession versus title to the property misled the jury. The Court's analysis required determination of whether the requested instruction constituted a correct statement of the law: whether it was applicable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case; and whether it was fairly covered in the instructions given. In general, a party is entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the jury through a requested instruction provided that theory is a correct exposition of the law and it is supported by the evidence. Regardless of any testimony to the contrary, if the Court were to find merit in Martin's contentions and overturn his conviction, the decision would have the practical effect of condoning an otherwise illicit activity. Consequently, the trial court did not err by denying Martin's request for a claim of right jury instruction.

Finally, Martin argues that the final portion of the instruction misled the jury into believing that [Turner's] theft was immaterial and to ascribe it no weight, contending that such instruction was not a proper statement of the law in light of the circumstances. The Court held the disputed portion of the instruction is a correct statement of the law, is applicable based on the facts of the instant case, and was not covered by other instructions.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Edmund v. State (Ct. of Appeals)

Issued April 17, 2007 -- Opinion of Judge Lawrence J. Rodowsky

HEADNOTE: Criminal Law - First Degree Assault - Victim in shooting fled and never located. Held: Charging document that identified victim by description, but not by name, charged a criminal offense and was not jurisdictionally defective.

Defendant was arrested after reports of an alleged shooting of a victim later described by ethnicity and race, approximate weight, height, facial and specifics of attire. After arrest, Defendant confessed to firing a handgun at such a victim after a neighborhood dispute with an unidentified victim fitting that general description. A charging document was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County describing but not identifying the victim and accusing Defendant of first degree assault and handgun violations. The grand jury returned an indictment on all counts.

Defendant's counsel filed a general omnibus motion objecting, inter alia, to the sufficiency of the charging documents, but without specificity as to the nature of the insufficiency. The State objected to the timeliness of the motion but the Circuit Court ruled instead on the merits that the charging document was sufficient, notwithstanding Defendant's counsel's arguments in open court that the failure of the charging document to identify the victim was a defect depriving the Circuit Court of jurisdiction. After trial, conviction and sentence before the Circuit Court, Defendant appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari sua sponte before the Court of Special Appeals ruled on the appeal.

Reviewing the text of the first degree assault statute, Code CL 3-202, the "sufficient" form of pleading provided in Code, CL 3-206, the developed common law of Maryland and of some other states and Great Britain and the text of and precedents under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the Court concluded that none of those authorities required that the charging document identify the victim of the first degree assault in this case.

In summary fashion, the Court also held that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt, and upheld the discretion of the Circuit Court to allow Defendant to present a more specific argument orally than was presented in written motion, finding no prejudice to the State in this case.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals upheld Defendant's conviction before the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for first degree assault.

The full opinion is available in PDF form here.

Jones v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed March 29, 2007—Opinion by Judge Sharer

Tyshawn Jones was convicted by a Washington County jury of first-degree felony murder, depraved heart second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and numerous other related and lesser included offenses. He appealed based on alleged error in allowing his statement into evidence; sufficiency of the evidence for the armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and first-degree felony murder convictions; and error in not polling the jury or hearkening the verdict before the jurors were discharged.

The court reversed the first-degree felony murder conviction, holding that the State did not establish a casual connection between the robbery of Victim A and the later shooting of Victim B. The Court remanded for a new trial on the other counts because the verdicts were not perfected by either a jury poll or the verdict being hearkened. The court noted that failure to poll the jury, absent a request, is not error as long as the verdict is hearkened. The Court ruled that a poll of the jury is a fully commensurable substitute for hearkening, which is of ancient origin, but in the absence of a request for a poll, hearkening is required. The Court nixed a recall and swearing of the same jurors weeks later as ineffective to cure the defect since once jurors are discharged and dispersed, they no longer constitute a jury.

The opinion is available in PDF.

Massey v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed March 7, 2007--Opinion by Judge J. Frederick Sharer.

Appellant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance and possession of cocaine following a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. Appellant noted this appeal after his motion for a new trial and to correct an illegal sentence was denied, raising four issues:

1) Whether the suppression court erred in denying Massey's motion to suppress.

2) Whether the trial court erred by not directing the State to provide the defense with a witness's report.

3) Whether the trial court erred by considering evidence outside the record.

4) Whether the trial court erred in accepting Massey's jury trial waiver.

In limited review of the disposition of the motion to suppress, the Court considered de novo evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in this instance the State.

Takoma Griffith was arrested as a result of a narcotics investigation at the Delmarva Inn. In his post-arrest interview, he telephoned and arranged for Massey to drive down from Delaware and come to the room to deliver crack cocaine. Seated next to him during the call, Griffith's arresting officer could hear partial voices on the other end of the call but admitted he could not identify the person to whom Griffith was speaking. Griffith confirmed Massey's identity from a photograph officers printed from the Delaware Criminal Justice Information System computer, and when Massey arrived at the Inn officers took him into custody and seized 3.9 grams of crack cocaine from his person and an additional 3.1 grams from his automobile. Massey now asserts that the suppression court erred in concluding that Griffith was trustworthy and takes issue with the rationale that Griffith was known to the police and was motivated to cooperate.

The Court reasoned that Griffith was neither a confidential informant, an anonymous tipster, nor an innocent civilian. Rather, he was caught red-handed, and the fact that he was interviewed "face-to-face" by police strengthens the reliability of his information. The basis of Griffith's knowledge was easily established because his information was grounded on his past conduct with Massey and by the events as they unfolded in police presence. The reliability of his information was confirmed by corroboration of details by the police, and his veracity was enhanced by the fact that he provided the information with police under circumstances that would make his information more likely to be true -- face-to-face after his arrest.

At issue in the second question was whether the officer who found the crack cocaine in Massey's automobile should have been permitted to testify even though the State failed to provide, through discovery, any report that he may prepared. During cross-examination, the officer stated that he believed he had prepared a report but had not used it to prepare his testimony and did not bring a copy to court. The Court concluded that the State had the obligation under Maryland Rule 4-263 to provide any such reports during discovery and made no effort to assuage the issue by providing relevant information. The State should have affirmatively advised the trial court that such report either did or did not exist or, if the State was likewise uncertain, ought to have sought from the court the opportunity to clarify whether such report was made. It is not for the witness to declare that the report was not used for his testimony; whether the report is useful to the defense is up to the defendant. As such, the trial court had an affirmative duty to ascertain whether the officer's report indeed existed and, if so, to ensure that it was available for review. Conviction vacated and remanded for new trial.

Third, Massey refers to the two seized baggies of cocaine. Massey's objection to the admission of the laboratory analysis of the baggie seized from his person was sustained, and admission was precluded as a discovery sanction against the State. Nonetheless, the arresting officer made reference to the baggie during his testimony, and the court engaged in a colloquy as to the significance of the difference in the weights of the two baggies (intent to distribute as opposed to personal use). Massey now argues that the trial court erred in permitting the discussion of the first baggie even though the laboratory analysis was excluded. In other words, Massey argues that the court took into account the total amount of cocaine seized from him in reaching its verdict of possession with intent to distribute, and that the possession of only 3.1 grams (the amount found in the second baggie) is insufficient to infer such an intent. While the trial judge was aware of what evidence had been admitted and what was not in the record, his decision demonstrates that the substance from the first baggie played some part in the finding that Massey had possessed cocaine in sufficient quantity to indicate the intent to distribute. Notwithtanding that there is sufficient evidence of possession with intent to distribute based solely on the possession of 3.1 grams of cocaine, the Court was unable to conclude that the trial judge ignored the persistent references to the other baggie. As such, this conviction was also vacated and remanded.

Finally, Massey asserts that the trial court made no finding that his waiver of his right to a trial by jury was intelligently and voluntarily made. This Court, however, found satisfaction that the waiver procedure was adequate and in compliance with Md. Rule 4-246.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Cox v. State (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed February 8, 2007–Opinion by Judge Clayton Greene.

Petitioner sought to suppress a baggie of marijuana seized after police had obtained information about Petitioner’s outstanding arrest warrant subsequent to an arguably illegal stop. The two issues to review were (1) whether a police encounter, in which a uniformed officer approached Petitioner on the street claiming that he "loosely fit" the description of the perpetrator of a recent string of robberies, asked Petitioner for identification, and ran a check on his identification, constituted an illegal stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether a police officer’s subsequent discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant represented an intervening circumstance, such that if the stop were illegal the arrest on the warrant attenuated the taint of the illegal stop.

The Court focused on three factors: (1) the Temporal Proximity Factor, (2) the Intervening Event Factor, and (3) the Flagrancy of the Police Conduct Factor.

The Temporal Proximity Factor suggests that the greater the time lapse between the illegality and discovery of evidence, the greater the chance that the taint has been purged. In this case, there existed a mere two minutes between the illegal stop and the discovery of the marijuana. However, since the temporal proximity factor has been labeled ambiguous and the question of timing is not dispositive on the issue of taint, the court focused on the other two factors.

An Intervening Circumstance is an event that breaks the causal connection between the unlawful conduct and the derivative evidence. In this case, the officers discovered the baggie of marijuana after the police learned of Petitioner’s outstanding arrest warrant, stood Petitioner up from the curb and arrested him pursuant to that warrant. The police did not ask Petitioner to sit on the ground until after the radio alert of the outstanding warrant. Although Petitioner may have discarded the baggie while he was seated on the ground, that fact is not dispositive to the Court’s analysis or holding.

The final factor is the Flagrancy of the Police Misconduct. The Court found nothing in the record indicating the police acted in bad faith. Once the officer discovered the outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest, he "gained an independent and intervening reason to arrest and search [Petitioner]." Furthermore, merely because the officer’s stop of Petitioner was determined to be invalid does not mean that his conduct was flagrant.

Holding:
Assuming arguendo that the police encounter constituted an illegal stop, the ultimate question is more appropriate: whether it was proper for the trial court to grant Petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence. The police officer’s discovery of an outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest pursuant thereto represents an intervening circumstance sufficient to attenuate the taint of what appears to be an illegal stop.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Jones v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed January 30, 2007. Opinion by Judge Deborah S. Eyler.

Defendant/appellant Jones appealed his conviction in Baltimore County of first-degree sexual offense, second-degree sexual offense, sodomy, and second-degree assault. On appeal, Jones challenged his conviction on the grounds that the trial court erred in rejecting his territorial jurisdiction argument as a matter of law, instead of submitting the issue to the jury, and in ruling the evidence was legally sufficient to establish a proper chain of custody for the DNA evidence.

Somewhere around midnight in early December, 1998, the victim went to a bar on Liberty Road in Baltimore County. After drinking heavily and passing out after falling outside, she was abducted from the bar's parking lot into the back seat of a car. Although she couldn't describe her assailant, she recalled being beaten and sodomized in the back seat, while a driver in the front seat drove the car, sometimes at high speed. When she began to throw up, the assailant dragged her out of the car. She then passed out again or fell asleep, and woke up some time later to find herself in Leakin Park in Baltimore City, dressed only in shirt and socks, some four or five hours after her abduction. She was taken to Mercy Medical Center, where a SAFE (Sexual Assault Forensics Examination) nurse performed an examination, and took an anal swab sample from the victim.

When after two months no viable suspect had been found, the case was closed by the Baltimore County police. Then, in 2004, DNA evidence from the swabs was sent to an independent lab for analysis. The results matched Jones' records in the State's DNA database, and he was indicted in early 2006.

At trial, the victim had not been able to testify as to her location during the period of her abduction, other than the beginning point in Baltimore County and the end point in Baltimore City, and couldn't rule out the possibility that she had been in the District of Columbia or Virginia when the assaults had actually taken place. At the end of the trial, the defense moved to dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The judge denied the motion, finding that the jury could make a reasonable inference from the testimony that the assault had in fact taken place in Maryland. Counsel for defense failed to request a jury instruction on territorial jurisdiction, but did mention in closing argument the lack of certainty of location as one element leading to reasonable doubt.

The Court noted that in Maryland, territorial jurisdiction is not an element of the offense, but must be raised as an affirmative defense based on evidence presented at trial. The Court distinguished the case at hand from the earlier cases of West v. State, Painter v. State, State v. Butler and McDonald v. State, finding that unlike the earlier cases, the issue of territorial jurisdiction had not been preserved for appellate review by the failure to request a jury instruction, and in any event the evidence here did not generate a genuine dispute of fact, at most raising a mere possibility or speculation that the crime might not have been committed on Maryland.

The Court then considered the evidence at trial on the issue of chain of custody of the DNA material, and found that it was sufficient to show by a reasonable probability that the DNA sample had not been tampered with, notwithstanding some missing details that did not indicate tampering or contamination. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgments against Jones.

This opinion is available in PDF format.

Price v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Decided January 25, 2007--Opinion by Judge James R. Eyler

Price was convicted by a jury of possession of heroin, possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm under sufficient circumstances to constitute a nexus to a drug trafficking crime. The court sentenced Price to eight years imprisonment on the heroin possession, a consecutive eight years imprisonment on the cocaine possession, two years concurrent on the marijuana possession, and another twelve years imprisonment consecutive on the possession of a firearm conviction.

Four issues were raised on appeal:

1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Price's convictions;

2) Whether the court erred by refusing to ask an impaneled juror, who was later dismissed, whether he had discussed the reason for his dismissal with any of the other jurors;

3) Whether the court erred by doubling Price’s sentences for all three drug possession convictions pursuant to Maryland Code (2002 Repl. Vol.) §5-905 of the Criminal Law ("C.L.") Article;

4) Whether the court erred by allowing the jury to convict Price of possession of a handgun in connection with trafficking, and acquit him of all other drug trafficking charges.

Held:

1) To support a conviction for the offense of simple possession, the evidence must show directly or support a rational inference that the accused did in fact exercise some dominion or control over the prohibited drugs in the sense contemplated by the statute, i.e., that the accused exercised some restraining or directing influence over it. Additionally, the accused, in order to be found guilty, must know of both the presence and the general character or illicit nature of the substance and referred to the following factors to determine the issue of possession:

(i) proximity between the Defendant and the contraband, (ii) the fact that the contraband was within the view or otherwise within the knowledge of Defendant, (iii) ownership or some possessory right in the premises or the automobile in which the contraband is found, or (iv) the presence or circumstances from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the Defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.

The evidence adduced at trial consisted mainly of testimony of the police officers who were conducting surveillance. From this testimony, the court found, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Price was in close proximity and had knowledge of the presence of the drugs, inferred that Price was participating in the sale and that the gun and money thrown by Price were instruments related to the sale of the drugs. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support Price's possession convictions.

2) A note left by juror number 4 for the judge indicated concern by the juror of potential reprisal given that he resided within close proximity to the neighborhood where Price was arrested. Prior to dismissal of the juror, Defense argued that the juror should be questioned as to whether he explained his dismissal to other jurors, potentially tainting the jury. The court found that, on several occasions, the jurors had been admonished not to discuss the case, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the juror without further inquiry as to whether he had discussed with anyone his reasons for wanting to be dismissed.

3) The State contends that C.L. §5-905 authorized the court to double Price's sentences because of his status as a repeat offender. Price countered that doubling his sentences is explicitly limited to one count only. The court found the language of §5-905 ambiguous; that the language of the statute does not make clear whether an enhanced penalty can be imposed on each and every count arising out of a single course of conduct, or whether an enhanced penalty can only be imposed on one count of a multi-count charging document based on a single course of conduct. Relying on Diaz v. State, the rule of lenity applied and required vacating Price's sentences.

4) The court noted that although unexplained, inconsistent verdicts rendered by a trial judge cannot stand, inconsistent verdicts in a jury trial are generally tolerated under Maryland law. At the appellate level, the court will review such inconsistent verdicts where real prejudice is shown and the verdicts may be attributable to errors in the jury charge.

The jury, without finding Price guilty of one of the drug trafficking offenses, found him guilty of possession of a firearm with a nexus to drug trafficking. Price conceded that the jury instructions were correct and the court decided not to disturb the jury’s verdict.

A copy of the opinion is available in PDF.

Christian v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Decided January 2, 2007--Opinion by Judge Timothy Meredith.

A police officer conducting covert narcotics surveillance observed the Appellant hide a bag between the screen and entry doors of a Baltimore City rowhouse, and engage in other suspicious behavior which seemed to suggest that illicit drugs were being sold. The police officer opened the screen door, searched the bag, discovered it contained heroin, and promptly arrested the Appellant.

While arrest was in progress, a second man arrived on the scene who identified himself as the Appellant's brother, and indicated that the Appellant lived with him. According to the police officer, this second man gave him permission to search the house, at which time other drugs were discovered in plain view. In the circuit court, the Appellant's motion to suppress the seized drugs was denied, the case proceeded on a not guilty/agreed statement of facts. The Appellant was found guilty and appealed.

On appeal, the Appellant raised two issues: first, that the circuit court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress; and second, that the circuit court failed to determine that the Appellant's jury trial waiver was knowing and voluntary. The circuit court's guilty verdict was affirmed.

The circuit court denied the Appellant's motion to suppress the drugs found behind the screen door, because it found that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in this area, as opposed to any area behind the entry door. In affirming the circuit court on this point, the Court of Special Appeals characterized this ruling as a finding of fact which was not clearly erroneous.

The circuit court denied the Appellant's motion to suppress the drugs found in the house, because (a) it resolved in favor of the police officer a conflict in testimony between the police officer and the Appellant's brother regarding the circumstances under which consent was given; and (b) it found that the brother did have authority to consent to search house, because Appellant and his brother had mutual use of the area searched. Again the Court of Special Appeals affirmed because the circuit court was in the best position to resolve conflicts in testimony, and it was correct as a matter of law on the brother's right to consent to the search.

Finally, with respect to the waiver of the jury trial, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but suggested a litany of questions to be asked to ensure that a waiver is knowing and voluntary.

The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.

Johnson v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Decided December 26, 2006 -- Opinion by Judge Paul E. Alpert, Concurring Opinion by Chief Judge Joseph F. Murphy, Jr.

Appellant sought to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant and supporting documentation authorizing a search of the residence, car and person of both Appellant and an unidentified third party, on the grounds that the State did not provide Appellant an opportunity to inspect that warrant with respect to the third party. The trial court refused to exclude such evidence and the Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court, noting that:

1) Appellant had no standing to challenge on constitutional or other ground the validity of warrant against the third party;

2) The State had an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of confidential informants, an interest conceded by the Appellant;

3) Appellant had not requested an in camera review of redacted version of the warrant materials for the purpose of obtaining of possible exculpatory evidence;

4) Appellant had not preserved the issue in prior proceedings of whether the application for the warrant for the unidentified person may have tainted the warrant application for the search of Appellant's person and property; and

5) The State did not call or intend to call the unidentified person as a witness against the Defendant, and therefore the material was not discoverable under Rule 4-263(c)(2).

Chief Judge Murphy noted in a brief concurring opinion that the case at bar did not present the issues of the use of the warrant material for the unidentified person for cross-examination purposes or for proving a tainted warrant application by the strategic misinformation or omissions by an affiant to produce the illusion of probable cause.

The full opinions are available in WPD and PDF.

U.S. v. Coley (Maryland U.S.D.C.)

Decided December 13, 2006--Chief Judge Benson Everett Legg.

Fourth Amendment, motion to suppress evidence. Defendant contended that a gun found as a result of a pursuit by Baltimore City detectives should not be admitted into evidence because it was the fruit of an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

The defendant, when stopped by police officers, began to run. He was then taken into custody. After he was taken into custody, one of the police officers reported that he saw the defendant throw something away during the chase. Further investigation resulted in the recovery of a handgun. The defendant claimed that (i) the officers acted without probable cause when taking him into custody, (ii) that the seizure of the gun was the result of that arrest and was thus the fruit of an illegal seizure.

The Court found that because defendant ran from the detectives, he did not submit to police authority and, therefore, there was no seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Since there was no seizure, the gun Defendant dropped during the pursuit was abandoned property and would be admitted as evidence.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

State v. Rollins (Ct of Special Appeals)

Filed: December 13, 2006 - Opinion by Chief Judge Joseph F. Murphy, Jr.

Evidence; Criminal Procedure, Cross-examination of the defendant about his or her testimony in an unrelated criminal case: A defendant who testifies in an unrelated case does not thereby submit to a discovery deposition. Nor does a defendant’s unrelated case testimony "open the door" to cross-examination questions that are of consequence only to the defendant's upcoming case, and have nothing to do with the direct examination testimony.

If, however, a criminal defendant who is awaiting trial and represented by counsel elects to testify on behalf of another criminal defendant in an unrelated case, the State may cross-examine the defendant about his or her unrelated case testimony, as long as the record shows that

• the judge presiding in the unrelated case had advised the defendant of the possibility that the State may be able to use the defendant's testimony during the defendant’s trial; and


• the unrelated case testimony was given by the defendant either on (a) direct examination, or (b) cross-examination that was, pursuant to Md. Rule 5-611(a), "limited to the subject matter of the direct examination."
  

The full opinion is available in WPD and PDF.

Fields v. State (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed December 8, 2006--Opinion by Judge Irma Raker.

Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that petitioner's nickname, "Sat Dog," which was displayed on a television monitor above a bowling lane, was not hearsay. Even if the court erred with respect to the evidentiary issue, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Court did not reach the hearsay issue.

The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.