Department of Human Resources, Child Care Administration v. Roth (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed: (undated in the original, but posted March 22, 2007) Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell.

From the official headnote:

JURISDICTION - MOOTNESS
"A case is moot when there is no longer any existing controversy between the parties at the time that the case is before the court, or when the court can no longer fashion an effective remedy." In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 452, 906 A.2d 915, 927 (2006). In October 2001, the relevant portions of the Code of Maryland Regulations 07.04.01.02 and 07.04.01.47 were amended, changing the language from the "Office of Child Care Licensing and Regulation" to the "Child Care Administration." Thus, there was no longer any existing controversy between the parties.

This matter arose out of the revocation of a registered family day care facility license held by the respondent ("Roth") by the appellant ("CCA"), following an investigation that found Roth had hit and inappropriately supervised children in her care. The revocation was upheld by an administrative judge, but overturned by the Circuit Court for Harford County, on the basis that CCA had no authority to revoke family day care licenses, that authority having been entrusted by regulation to the Office of Child Care Licensing and Regulation ("OCCLR"). The judge noted that some, but not all, references to OCCLR in the regulations had previously been changed from OCCLR to CCA. CCA timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari prior to consideration by that court.

The court found this case to be moot, since the regulations in question had since been amended to clarify that CCA, rather than its former incarnation, OCCLR, was empowered to regulate family day care licensing. Further, Roth was no longer operating a family day care facility. However, the court did VACATE the decision below and REMAND the matter to the trial court with instructions to affirm the decision of the Department of Human Resources.

The opinion is available in PDF format.

Thompson v. Beneficial Mortgage Co. of Maryland (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (Not Approved for Publication)

Signed March 9, 2007 -- Memorandum Opinion by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow. (Not approved for publication.)

Thompson filed this action in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County asserting claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and several state tort claims. Her action was removed to this Court which subsequently, by Order dated July 18, 2006, dismissed all of Thompson's federal claims without prejudice and some of her state claims. As a result of Thompson's clarification that she would not replead her federal Fair Credit Reporting Act claim, the Court exercised its discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining claims, all of which arose under state law. Upon remand of Thompson's remaining state claims, one of the defendants, Provident Bank of Maryland, requested entry of final judgment in its favor pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), which provides:

"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties."

Accordingly, the Order dismissing Thompson's claim against Provident was not final when that Order was entered, and, in fact, the Court subsequently denied a motion by Thompson for reconsideration of that ruling.

An interlocutory order becomes final, absent an explicit certification to the contrary, only when all claims against all parties are resolved. In the context of a case remanded to a state court, the remand order, regardless of whether it is itself final and subject to appeal, resolves all matters before the court as to all parties, and renders any previous interlocutory orders final and subject to appeal. Provident's request for entry of final judgment is, therefore, moot under this doctrine. The Court's July 2006 Order decided the merits of Thompson's claim against Provident and, by dismissing this claim, decided the parties' substantive rights. As a result, the Court's remand Order rendered the prior interlocutory Orders final and started the time for any appeal as to those interlocutory Orders pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 4.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Gordon Grocery, Inc. v. Associated Wholesalers, Inc. (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (Approved for Publication)

Signed February 28, 2007--Memorandum opinion by Judge Andre M. Davis. (Approved for publication.)

Held: Dispute over stock redemption procedures remanded back to state court on the basis of mootness.

Plaintiff Gordon Grocery, Inc. ("Gordon Grocery") is a shareholder in defendant Associated Wholesalers, Inc. ("Associated"), which is a Pennsylvania corporation operating as a cooperative engaged in the business of purchasing, manufacturing, processing, warehousing and distributing food and related merchandise for retail merchant shareholders such as plaintiff. In the fall of 2005, Associated notified Gordon Grocery that it had failed to satisfy the minimum purchase requirements of the cooperative, and that Associated would redeem Gordon Grocery's shares, thereby terminating their relationship. Associated proposed to do so in two installments, one-third initially, and two thirds in 2010, while Gordon Grocery asserted the right to immediate redemption, and filed in state court for a declaratory judgment to that effect. Associated had the case removed to federal court.

During discovery, Associated elected to rescind the redemption determination and retain Gordon Grocery as a shareholder, thus rendering the dispute over redemption procedures abstract, and moved for summary judgment on the ground of mootness. The judge agreed, but rather than rendering the requested "judgment" in favor of Associated, remanded the case to state court from which it had been removed, where the judge speculated (but declined to decide) that the state trial court might determine it lacks subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of mootness.

The memorandum opinion is available in PDF.

Halkas v. Grigsby (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(Not Approved for Publication)

Signed February 15, 2007--Opinion by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow (Not aproved for publication)

In a follow up to an earlier Memorandum Opinion in the same case, discussed here, the debtor ("Halkas") challenged the motion by the bankruptcy trustee ("Grigsby") to dismiss the appeal of the debtor from the bankruptcy court. The earlier opinion had required Grigsby to file an affidavit or other evidence of the disbursement of funds to creditors from the estate on or about September 30, 2006, in order to establish that the matters at issue were now moot. Grigsby filed an affidavit and accompanying financial records as proof of those transactions.

Halkas challenged the submissions as inadequate to demonstrate the appeal was moot in that they were not admissible as evidence, and further argued that the appeal was not moot because the debtor might file a claim against the trustee, and that even if the appeal is dismissed, the bankruptcy court's order below should be vacated.

On the first point, Halkas argued that Grigsby's affidavit did not state that it was based upon Grigsby's personal knowledge, and that the checks and financial records submitted were hearsay statements which had not been properly authenticated. The judge had little difficulty in finding that the records qualified as "business records" exempt from exclusion as hearsay, or in finding that Grigsby in fact had personal knowledge of the submitted materials and thus had established a sufficient foundation for admission of the records, notwithstanding some minor technical and format issues with the submission.

The judge also found Halkas' claim that she might have a cause of action against Grigsby for fees retained by the trustee or arising from improper disbursements made to nonparty creditors to be speculative and counter to the fact that no such claims had been made to date, and in fact no basis for such claims had been submitted by Halkas.

The judge also found that dismissal of the appeal was the proper remedy rather than vacating the order below, given both the mootness of the matters raised on appeal and the inability of the court below to effect a remedy even if Halkas could prevail on the merits, given the prior disbursal of all available funds to nonparty creditors.

This memorandum opinion is available in PDF.

In Re: Timothy J. (Ct. of Appeals)(Per Curium Order)

Per Curium Order filed February 2, 2007. Order signed by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell.

In its entirety:

The Court having considered the briefs and oral argument submitted by the parties in the above-captioned case, it is this 2nd day of February, 2007,

ORDERED, the the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the appeal be, and it is hereby, dismissed as moot. Costs to be evenly divided between the parties.

The Per Curium Order is available in PDF format.

Halkas v. Grigsby (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(not approved for publication)

Decided January 22, 2007--Memorandum Opinion by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow (not approved for publication)

Debtor initially filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2001 which was ultimately converted to Chapter 13 in 2002. At the time the Chapter 13 plan was confirmed, Debtor owned two residential properties. The plan called for Debtor to retain both properties while making payments to her creditors; however, in 2003, Debtor consented to sell one of the properties, the proceeds of which would be partially retained by Debtor, partially paid to Trustee for the benefit of the creditors, and partially remitted to Debtor’s former spouse who had been co-owner before the sale. In August 2005, a motion to dismiss by Trustee was pending because Debtor did not stay current on payments agreed to in a modified plan from 2004 reducing her monthly payment. Debtor moved to sell the second residential property and in October 2005 the bankruptcy court ordered that all net sale proceeds be paid directly to Trustee and disbursed to pay creditors, up to the amount required to pay all claims against Debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

After completion of sale and Trustee’s distribution of proceeds, Debtor filed a motion contesting whether Trustee had the right to retain all proceeds of the sale. The bankruptcy court denied this motion in September 2006. Debtor filed a notice of appeal and filed an emergency motion in the bankruptcy court to stay the disbursement of the sale proceeds, which motion was denied September 29, 2006. On or about September 30, 2006, Trustee disbursed all remaining funds in the bankruptcy estate pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s Orders. Trustee filed a notice of plan completion in the bankruptcy court on October 5, 2006, and the bankruptcy court granted Debtor a discharge the next day.

On Debtor’s appeal, Trustee argued for dismissal pursuant to the doctrine of equitable mootness, definining mootness as when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. To survive an assertion that a claim is moot, a party must have suffered an actual injury that can be redressed by favorable judicial decision. Even the availability of a partial remedy is sufficient to prevent a case from being moot. Since Trustee paid out all the proceeds of the sale pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s Orders, and no creditors were parties to the appeal, it would be impossible to fashion any relief for Debtor even if she prevailed in the appeal because the nonparty creditors could not be ordered to return funds they had received. Consequently, the action was moot.

Debtor argued that the case was not moot because if she were to prevail on appeal, she could attempt to enforce a money judgment against Trustee for the distributed funds. The Court found that Debtor could not recover funds from Trustee personally because Trustee never held the proceeds from the sale for her own use and Trustee indicated that the funds were distributed pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s Orders.

Debtor relied on an unpublished opinion, Walker v. Grigsby, No. AW-06-62, slip op. at 4 (D.Md. April 11, 2006), in which the court concluded that an appeal by a debtor’s attorney contesting an order granting him only part of his requested fee was not constitutionally moot. Because the Debtor and Trustee remained parties to the case and at least one creditor continued to be subject to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, the court reasoned that the attorney might have the ability to seek payment, if he succeeded on appeal, from the Debtor, the Trustee, or other creditors. The instant case, however, differs in that the Trustee alleged she had paid out all available funds to nonparty creditors pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s Orders.

The full opinion is available in PDF

Prince George's County v. Fraternal Order of Police (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed January 4, 2007--Opinion by Judge Timothy Meredith.

In 2004, the P.G. County Chief of Police established a new promotion policy, based on the "Rule of 3," wherein promotions would be an officer selected by the Chief from among the top three eligible candidates, rather than promoting the top scoring candidate as had been the previous practice. The local FOP chapter ("FOP 89") filed a grievance, claiming a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The appeal was denied by the Labor Commissioner. FOP 89 then filed a request for arbitration of the denial, and in March of 2005 the arbitrator found a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, required the promotion of the highest candidate on the eligibility list, and ordered the retroactive promotion of any officer passed over by out-of-order promotions.

Prince George's County (the "County") petitioned the local Circuit Court to vacate the arbitration award; the Circuit Court affirmed the arbitrator's decision, whereupon the County appealed.

On its own, the Court of Special Appeals (the "Court") raised the issue of mootness, since the collective bargaining agreement at issue had expired in 2005, thus rendering the matter at issue moot. The Court noted an exception to the rule that courts are not to decide academic or moot questions where there is no longer an existing controversy, if there is a public benefit to be derived from deciding a matter of important public interest raised, for the guidance of courts and litigants in the future. The Court noted that the collective bargaining agreement at issue here had subsequently been renegotiated, and that the County had resisted a clarification of the section at issue urged by FOP 89 and instead the existing language had been continued. Thus, the Court found justification to address the issues raised, even though moot in this case.

The Court had little difficulty finding that arbitration was required in this case, noting that arbitration is a favored remedy, and that in the case of ambiguity over the scope of matters subject to arbitration, the arbitrator and not the courts should initially determine the matter. Upon review, the Court found the dispute was within the scope of the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

Turning to the arbitration award itself, the Court noted that mere errors of law or fact would not ordinarily justify vacating or refusing to enforce an arbitration award, but only if the award is base on fraud, misconduct. bias, prejudice, corruption or lack of good faith on the part of the arbitrator, or if the award is contrary to a clear public policy, or if beyond the scope of the issues submitted or failing to consider all matters submitted, or to correct a mistake of form such as an evident miscalculation of figures. The Court found nothing to support the contention that the award was a mistake so gross as to work a manifest injustice or contained a palpable mistake of law or fact, or that the arbitrator's decision was completely irrational. Contrary to the County's contention that provisions of county law supersede, interpret, or limit the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the Court found that the terms of such collective bargaining agreements are explicitly incorporated into and supersede inconsistent provisions of the county law.

Although the technical ruling of the Court was a dismissal on the basis of mootness, after considering the merits of the issues raised the Court upheld the arbitration award on all counts.

The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.