Guest Blog 100

Probation Past but not Forgotten 

Just to be upfront with my readers this blog is focussed upon the use and development of Business Processes and Computer Systems within the National Probation Service (NPS) and then a Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC) being based upon my working experiences from 2006 to 2016. I am not a qualified Probation Officer. But I have a long career prior to joining probation in the private sector in Business and Computer systems. First employed in 2006 within the NPS West Midland Trust, Learning and Development Unit, Selly Oak, Birmingham as a Business Support Training Officer. 

Then I jointly supported the Learning and Development Unit and the Central Birmingham based Business Transformation Unit (BTU) initially supporting the System Testing and Implementation of Delius. Then in 2013 I was appointed as a Transformation Administration Manager within the Birmingham based Business Transformation Unit (BTU). I was then transferred to a CRC in 2014 before being made redundant in 2016. 

I cannot blog on the current (2024) HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) since I have been outside the Probation Service since 2016. So essentially it is more of a historical record but the effort to write it is based upon me wanting to communicate on “a lessons learnt” basis that may influence and benefit those currently working within the HMPPS. It is also an historical record of the events I experienced at the NPS and then CRC.

So why start blogging on Probation after 8 years outside of the service?

When I was at Probation, like many others, I followed Jim Brown daily since he was telling the “truth” particularly through the blitzkrieg period of change. But over the last 8 years I have only on rare occasions popped onto his blog to see how things are going at Probation, now the HMPPS. So having done one of my normal LinkedIn posts that covered a bit about Probation, I was surprised to get a personal message to call him. Which I did and we had a brief chat on Monday 23/09/24. He asked me if I had any more relevant contributions. I explained that obviously all my experiences are now from the 2006 – 2016 period so lacking relevance to HMPPS in 2024. 

Then it occurred to both of us during our conversation that those experiences might help those trying to sort out HMPPS today. I explained that particularly my NPS experience, not my CRC experience, was a very positive part of my career, particularly in respect of the people with whom I worked. Whilst my experience of the Business Systems and Computer Systems was just the opposite. But I had started in 2006 with the best intentions of improving both of these aspects and to be perfectly frank, after 10 years of hard motivated work, I achieved nothing. I don’t know another part of my career where it was so difficult to influence and effect change to Business Processes and Computer Systems. So if any contribution on here could help those now within the HMPPS family achieve these changes now, I wouldn’t feel my 10 years was such a waste of effort. My commitment can only be a positive and constructive one since I don’t do negative or political.

So I walked out of the Probation Offices in Central Birmingham for the last time on the 3rd July 2016, having been disposed of by Reducing Reoffending Partnership (RRP), a Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC) that was now trying to run the Probation Private Services for Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland, Staffordshire and the West Midlands. I was deemed redundant and my services were no longer required. Not the best of timing for them or me. In their case with me having a long career prior to Probation in Business Systems design and implementation in the Private Sector, they needed me and others like me more than ever with the chaos now being unleashed. Instead they were dependant on the ”all knowing” but “knowing nothing” highly paid consultant swarms now descended on Probation. Many just out of university but deemed chargeable to the Ministry of Justice no doubt with a cashback into the RRP coffers. But it also has to be acknowledged that there were some very smart experienced consultants with some clearly wanting to support our side of how we wanted change implemented. That is carefully and progressively.

These consultants actually listened and didn’t just feedback but actively joined us in trying to get some constructive steer on the changes themselves and the rate of change being planned. They also took some risks within their own Consultant Management Companies, who had won the lucrative change management contracts from the MoJ, in supporting our side of the story. But unfortunately they weren’t listened to either, so blitzkrieg commenced at pace.

The tide of change from Government and the MoJ was too strong and too fast for all of us to contain or control it. They had enforced a blitzkrieg approach to changing Probation. Probation had established its fundamental principles over 100 years and these were already being improved upon as a result of the Carter Report, by a Probation Officer, and its implementation through the 2006 to 2010 period. Things were improving in a Japanese style of incremental improvements like the national use of a new Offender Management System called Delius and access to the Police ViSOR System. 

Although OASys was in most need of re-engineering it was not on the to do list. Probation had never faced a blitzkrieg Government attack before and it was very ill prepared to counter it. Other Government Departments, particularly our own HM Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) never came in with any support since whilst we were under attack they could standby, avoiding being attacked themselves. Needless to say HM Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) was also being attacked under austerity principles with many local court closures impacting the application of good and tried local justice principles. The blitzkrieg approach funded by the Government threw money at the private sector to establish the principles of probation moving to the private sector in the form of the CRC’s. So I was transferred to a CRC.

We CRC staff, being ex- NPS staff, were now considered only eligible to be treated with a sort of private sector employment status. Essentially exiled out into the wilderness. With no doubt their planned lowering of pay rates to reflect our drop in both economic and social status. Yes I was now employed by a new lowly entity in the Government MoJ come Probation hierarchy, which was soon to be dropped a peg down on bloc below the unit with the lock and keys the Prisons which were to upstage Probation in the political hierarchy creating the illogical HMPPS.

NPS Induction Training in West Midland taught the hierarchy where the Courts were the very top, supported by the Probation Service with the Prisons as a service locking them up as punishment and to protect the public. Whilst the Carter Report rightly recommended the Prison’s rightly focussed on rehabilitation whilst in a custody setting. Training Prison Officers on Rehabilitation Practices, we were always amazed at how enthusiastic they were about acquiring these new skills and looking forward to applying them within their prison settings. Just the locking up although critical was very boring and contributing to prisoners futures much more rewarding. Probation was a highly respected Court Service which has been that way almost from the beginnings of Probation as detailed in the Probation of Offenders Act 1907. Totally integrated into the Court System allowing them to administer justice and protect the public. Probation was a service geographically distributed in the community operating in support of the Courts as a Court Service.

So that was it. Probation was over for me. I had tried very hard with many other like minded and motivated people to get the Probation Business Processes into a better state. We even organised a group of Trusts covering London, Devon and Cornwall, Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire, South Yorkshire and the West Midland to establish a common National Business Standards System on the TIBCO Nimbus business mapping product we all had installed and were using daily. Although we tried we got little support from the MoJ in terms of this initiative which was in fact seeded from the bottom of the organisation upwards. Never the right way to get something established. 

The West Midlands had already led on Business Change with its Modelling District Projects but it was only when we combined with the Staffordshire Trust that we gained access to their more advanced use of TIBCO Nimbus which we quickly adopted. Obviously other Trusts had quite independently taken to using TIBCO Nimbus no doubt being targeted by the TIBCO sales force. Whilst we had some MoJ meetings in London where they were impressed by our TIBCO Nimbus efforts, it was never formally adopted and was not included in any MoJ Directives to the Trusts.

I suspect many in Probation may not even be aware of this TIBCO Nimbus initiative taking place in some Trusts. Even within the TIBCO Nimbus active Trusts their own staff were not always aware of its purpose and presence. Not being a subject included in any National Probation Communications for many using it was not seen as a priority. There was certainly no national sign off of the TIBCO Nimbus Business Processes thereby not making them the de facto way of working for everybody. It was a mess. Had it been better established it may have helped us better deflect some of the blitzkrieg attack on our undocumented working practices. We really had nothing concrete or national to defend ourselves with in respect of standardised business processes. With no defences it was inevitable we would lose the battle.

But the one last stand I took supported by my Business Process Design colleague along with surprisingly an RRP Consultant, was to try and convince the Reducing Reoffending Partnership Board to use our Business Processes already mapped in TIBCO Nimbus as a basis for building the new business models brought about by the creation of the CRC’s It made so much sense. This proposal to the RRP CRC Board was dated the 9th July 2015 and I still have a copy I can share on here in the future. I also initiated a brilliant commercial negotiation with TIBCO to virtually have free use of Nimbus for a period to get it established. What was there not to like. But the proposal got rejected by the RRP CRC Board.

The TIBCO Nimbus Servers were torn out of their server racking and sent for scrap. Somewhere I have photos of them lying on the scrap pile representing many years of process design and data entry work. Then beyond belief they started a Business Process Mapping Project to go around collecting all the information again from relevant Probation staff groups and then re mapping it all in Microsoft Visio a product considered very unfriendly for everyday business users being more aligned with the needs of IT Staff.

So to the end of my story at Probation with the CRC RRP making me redundant on 3rd July 2016. Exactly 1 year after our TIBCO Nimbus proposal to the RRP CRC Board had been rejected. My work Nimbus colleague was kept on to continue but without having TIBCO Nimbus and having to return to using Microsoft Visio the objective of installing business systems onto all employee desk tops where they would be used daily by the service was now impossible. My Nimbus work colleague soon left since Business Process Planning was not a priority in the midst of all the firefighting now required to maintain some sort of Probation Service.

Now just to complete the conversation I had with Jim Brown. He said write me a “taster” and I will see if I want to link to it. This is that taster. But included in it is a early High Level Flowchart for use in the West Midlands that I produced way back to illustrate the importance of having a holistic view of all the Business Systems.

The truth is I have many other resources that are now dated like all the original TIBCO Nimbus Process Maps extracted in a PowerPoint format. Along with various other methodologies and techniques we developed and used like iPresentation and iProcess along with Work Instructions. In fact lots of my historic bits and pieces accumulated over 10 years at Probation that may possibly interest probation staff historically or maybe in some cases prove worth reusing today in the HMPPS.

But to be effective though what Probation needs is what my last American Company had which was what they called its own university (Pollak University). In fact it wasn’t a University in our sense of the use of the word meaning a verified academic learning institution. But it was where all product knowledge, manufacturing knowledge, research knowledge, business processes knowledge and computer systems knowledge was documented, co-ordinated, researched and communicated. It had dedicated librarianship, research and training capabilities. Research papers could be submitted and reviewed and so forth. Essentially a “one stop” place for all knowledge and processes within the business entity. So they called it a University. 

Now if this blog got to the MoJ and it triggered them to setup up a “Probation University” that would justify all the 10 years I spent and enjoyed at the National Probation Service. The first thing that needs researching, documenting and standardising and communicating is all the Business Processes. This is about adopting an ideology that Probation can have a common set of Business Processes applied right across all geographical and business areas. To make it happen it needs a champion in this ideology and that champion being in a position at the top with the powers to implement it. There is an argument that computer systems in the future will have built into them workflow principles and this has been accelerated by the AI developments. But until these systems are developed and made available it is vital that all Business Processes are standardised and documented in a user friendly way.

Some may consider the Probation Institute established in 2014 could act like the Probation University I have proposed. My view is it should definitely form part of the Probation University. But a concern might be that once it became MoJ financed would it as a "membership" financed organisation have its independence compromised. I don't see it this way. The membership of the Probation Institute are working at the front line of the Service and their constructive contribution is vital and should be within the proposed Probation University framework. 

But the scope of the Probation University is much larger than that of the Probation Institute. The Probation University defines and drives the operational activities of Probation both staff and systems. I appreciate it's a much used cliche to suggest we should all operate like Amazon and some strong views exist suggesting you cannot apply their methods of effectively shipping goods to essentially the practice of a social science. All I would just say is let an Amazon IT system designer with their keystroke counting audit techniques and workflow engineering skills redesign OASys. The time we waste on OASys could then be spent with our clients (Do we call them clients or offenders these days?) doing our social science best practices more effectively.

Within the Probation University the study of Social and Behavioural Sciences should far exceed the focus on Business and Computer Systems. They are our prime activity. It is what we do working with our clients. So Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology and Criminology along with an endless list of other subjects that need to be included within the Probation University framework. If this blog post achieved the setting up of a Probation University whilst I am now outside the organisation it would be amazing since I could never achieve it whilst working within the organisation.

Now to share with you a High Level Offender Management Vertical Workflow Map which is now 12 years old covering Offender Management Process Flows (circa 2012) within the Staffordshire and West Midlands Probation Trust. I am sure this could be edited in less than a few hours to accurately represent current HMPPS Probation Business Processes since I suspect much of the supporting documentation (paperwork) has remained unchanged. Although the computer record updating may have changed. I just don't know. Maybe it is a starting point to commencing Business Workflow and Process Mapping. Certainly Indeterminate Prison Sentencing has changed with the removal of IPP's by coincidence in 2012 (As usual just after the map was drawn !!!!) although their removal was from memory not retrospective. If it generates any interest I have another High Level Horizontal Workflow Map I can share showing the relationships between all those parties linked to Probation once again somewhat dated but easily updated. 

Enjoy, 

Banno

Link to High Level Map below.

Once launched use the normal "pinch-to-zoom" gesture to zoom in and zoom out of the PDF to read the small print.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Pw4dIYts48SVHQxhE1iKxl5r6eil4RJE/view?usp=sharing

Russell Reflects

Silence from the MoJ and HMPPS of course, but as HMI Justin Russell heads for the door later this month, it's worth reading his analysis of the last few years, not least in the hope that any in-coming Labour administration might learn something:- 

Chief Inspector's foreword

This will be my final annual report as His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Probation after four years in post, so it is an opportunity to look back over what has been a tumultuous and difficult period for the Probation Service and to offer some reflections on the future as well. 

During those four years, the service has undergone yet another major structural reorganisation (its fourth in 20 years). It has had to change its entire operating model overnight in response to the Covid pandemic and then, like the rest of the public sector, had to deal with the long-term impacts of that pandemic on backlogs, staff morale and the partners it works with. This made coming out of the pandemic, if anything, even more difficult than going into it. Added to that has been the more recent impact of the cost of living crisis on staff wellbeing and living standards. 

The simultaneous impact of all these factors has been profound and is illustrated clearly in our inspection ratings over the past year. And it’s been evident too in the high profile serious cases we have reported on since I became Chief Inspector – including those of Joseph McCann, Damien Bendall and Jordan McSweeney. 

In June 2021, when the private sector Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) and the public sector National Probation Service (NPS) were re-unified into a single public sector Probation Service, I cautioned that re-unification by itself was not going to be a silver bullet for all the problems that the unified service was inheriting. Merely shifting large volumes of cases from the private sector into the public sector, I said, wouldn’t improve the quality of work that probation staff are able to do. Real transformation was a long-term commitment, and re-unification was just the beginning of that journey. 

Two years on from re-unification, that prediction has sadly turned out to be true. As this annual report shows, the performance of the service against our quality standards has if anything got worse not better since it came back together in 2021. 

Why is that? Part of the answer is the depth of the problems inherited from the Transforming Rehabilitation period. That applies particularly to staffing levels and caseload pressures. In response to a real-terms reduction in funding caused by a flawed payment-by-results contract mechanism, many of the private sector probation providers were forced to cut the number of qualified probation officers (often replaced by unqualified and inexperienced PSOs) and to scale back investment in other areas. This pushed average individual caseloads up to unsustainable levels in some local areas. 

Given that staffing numbers for the CRCs were never published, the extent of this staffing shortfall didn’t become known until re-unification, when it became evident that the service was thousands of officers short of what was necessary to deliver manageable workloads. Ambitious recruitment targets were set to fill these gaps, and an additional £155 million was added to the service’s budget, taking it past £1 billion a year. However, an influx of inexperienced new staff all needing to be trained and mentored has created its own problems.

Working remotely and receiving all their training online during the pandemic, new staff found it difficult to access the practical support and advice that comes with sharing an office with more experienced colleagues. And in the meantime, those more experienced colleagues have been resigning from the service in greater numbers. While the number of probation officers with up to two years of service has increased significantly (by 46 per cent in the 12 months to 31 March 2023) the number with five or more years’ service has fallen. 

But not all of the problems we have seen in our inspections since re-unification can be put down to the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms or the pandemic. While I welcomed re-unification at the time, and praised the way this transition programme was managed at pace, it wasn’t without its downsides. In particular, I regret the way that transition disrupted some of the positive innovations and progress that the better CRC providers had been starting to make. 

That is particularly the case in relation to Through the Gate resettlement services. Our final round of CRC inspections had shown that these services were making real progress in some areas thanks to significant extra investment in enhanced provision after April 2018 and some increasingly mature and positive relationships with voluntary sector partners. All 12 of the CRC areas we visited in our final round of pre-unification inspections were rated as either ‘Good’ or ‘Outstanding’ for their Through the Gate services. 

Re-unification brought an abrupt end to these partnerships in favour of a new set of centrally commissioned service contracts. This left staff in many Through the Gate teams up in the air and unsure of their futures. As our recent thematic inspections have shown, the Offender Management in Custody framework, which has replaced Through the Gate services for those serving longer sentences, has performed poorly, and we found that it is not understood well by staff and prisoners. 

In the longer arc of history, the most recent structural reorganisation marks the final step from probation being an entirely locally run and funded service at the beginning of the 20th century, to being an entirely national one in the third decade of the 21st, with probation staff now all government civil servants. While that may have created opportunities for probation staff to move into other roles across government, and economies of scale in terms of business partner arrangements, not everyone has been happy with this change. 

Civil Service procurement and recruitment processes can be notoriously slow. Equipment that could be purchased in days, can now take weeks to procure; posts can take many months to fill; multiple layers of approvals and standardised and centralised commissioning processes stifle innovation and can feel disempowering for local leaders. 

To that must then be added the impact of the new, merged ‘One HMPPS’ structure for prisons and probation. His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) has lost the separate Director General role for probation, which I had previously welcomed as giving the service strong and visible leadership. Past experience with the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) is that the day-to-day operational and political demands of the prison service can all too easily distract from the Probation Service and its particular (and very different) needs. The insertion of new HMPPS area executive director posts between regional probation directors and national HMPPS leadership will also, I suspect, feel like a downgrading of their status and influence to regional probation leaders. 

I know that strong concerns have been raised about these changes and it’s important that the voice and interests of the Probation Service continue to get the leadership attention they so desperately need. Many in the service hark back to the days (not that long ago), when probation was a genuinely local service – locally accountable rather than run from Whitehall, focused on local partnerships and able to act autonomously within them. Given our results from the past year, and after speaking to probation leaders and managers around England and Wales, I have to say I have increasing sympathy with this view. The Prison Service will always need to be national, given the constant pressure on prison places and the need to manage scarce functions like the high security, women’s and youth estate at a national level.

And some probation functions, like the management of terrorist offenders after release and perhaps of the approved premises estate, are best managed nationally too. But for the great majority of the probation caseload, all of the most important relationships for probation staff and the people they work with are local, with locally run and accountable partners. These include local police services; local authority housing and social service departments; local mental health trusts; and local drug and alcohol services. The Probation Service should be a key player in these partnerships, and it has a seat at all the important partnership meetings – but to make the most of that seat, local leaders need the freedoms to commit resources and staff; to agree local contracts; to decide on investments in local infrastructure and to be able to speak publicly to both defend and advocate for their local services. Local probation leaders are heavily constrained in relation to all of these freedoms and flexibilities by current structures. It is telling that our inspection scores for youth offending services, which can do all of these things, have been far better than for probation over the past year and if anything seem to have improved, in spite of the pandemic. 

In part, of course, this is because youth justice services (YJS) have much more manageable caseloads – far lower than probation equivalents. But I think it also reflects the greater resilience and potential for flexibility and innovation that’s possible with a locally run and accountable service, with YJS now for the most part firmly embedded in local authority children’s services. Strong local relationships are also cemented by local YJS management boards. These include senior representatives of all of the local services with which YJS staff and service leaders will be working, who have the power to get things sorted within their own services on behalf of the children on each YJS caseload. 

While I recognise that another reorganisation of the service, and any shift in this direction would have to be with the explicit agreement of local managers and staff, I think the time has come for an independent review of whether probation should move back to a more local form of governance and control, building on the highly successful lessons of youth justice services – 70 per cent of which we rated as ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ last year. 

In the second part of this report, we consider the needs of people on probation that may be driving their offending behaviour – such as a drug or alcohol problem; insecure accommodation or a lack of employment; or poor thinking skills – and whether these are being met. The short answer is that they are not. We rated the quality of service provision as ‘Inadequate’ in 13 out of 31 of the local PDUs we had inspected by May 2023. These judgements were borne out by our individual case assessments, where my inspectors found that in only 44 per cent of the cases they inspected did the implementation and delivery of services effectively support the person on probation’s desistance. And for services like drug or alcohol treatment, the picture was even worse. In almost half of the local cases we inspected, the individual had a drug problem linked to their offending, but in only 29 per cent of these was delivery of services sufficient to meet that need. 

In an important new initiative, we have also started to ask people on probation whether they think their needs are being met. Since April 2022, the organisation User Voice, which is run and staffed by people who have been through the criminal justice system themselves, has been surveying and interviewing people on probation on our behalf in every local area that we inspect. Of over 1,350 people on probation who answered their surveys across 21 local PDUs, only 61 per cent said they were getting the services they needed, although the high number who said they didn’t need any services suggests that many didn’t recognise their own needs or the services that might have been available to them. 

The impact of the pandemic can still clearly be seen in the low start rates and long waiting times for the accredited programmes ordered by the courts and in the high numbers of unpaid work orders reaching the 12-month point without being completed. Here, too, high staff vacancy rates and poor enforcement and compliance have taken a toll. 

But it is in the area of public protection that my concerns remain greatest. The Probation Service’s ability to accurately assess and robustly manage potential risks of serious harm from people on probation was already its weakest area of performance before the pandemic, and has become even worse since re-unification. We have rated two-thirds of the individual cases inspected across 10 regions as insufficient. The picture is even worse for medium risk cases, which generate a majority of the murders committed by people on probation and so will often need as careful management as higher risk cases. Large caseloads have reduced the time that practitioners can spend assessing, planning or managing each individual case. In too many cases, this has reduced face-to-face appointments to little more than welfare check-ins, which is not helped by the reduced time that staff are spending in the office rather than working from home. And heavily loaded line managers (senior probation officers) lack the time to properly scrutinise the work of their teams or engage in the sort of coaching and support needed to improve the practice of large numbers of trainee or newly qualified staff – so mistakes are being missed. Across the cases we’ve inspected management oversight was insufficient in an alarming 72 per cent of cases. 

Time and again we’re also finding that practitioners are failing to draw on a wide enough range of information when assessing risk. Domestic abuse enquires with the police, for example, were made in only 49 per cent of the cases where we felt they should have been and safeguarding enquiries were made with local children’s services in only 55 per cent. A focus solely on the most recent conviction means that past evidence of risk such as violence against previous partners or evidence of weapon use or gang membership is being missed.

All of these factors were clearly evident in the high-profile independent reviews we published earlier this year into the supervision of Damien Bendall and Jordan McSweeney, which attracted huge media interest. While we did find clear failures in the quality of individual probation practice in both cases, there were also broader systemic issues that we are seeing time and time again in our local probation inspections and thematic reviews. These included overloaded practitioners and line managers with well above their target workloads; significant delays in handing over cases from prison to community probation staff, resulting in last-minute and inadequate release planning; incomplete or inaccurate risk assessments being carried out at both the court stage and start of supervision; and very inexperienced staff being handed inappropriately complex cases with minimal management oversight. 

But what of the future? While this has been a disappointing year on which to finish my term of office as Chief Inspector, I hope for better things to come. We now know that good quality probation practice makes a significant difference to outcomes. In an important research report we published earlier this year, based on an analysis of cases inspected before re-unification, we found that effective probation practice in individual cases significantly correlated with the outcome for that person on probation, as revealed by the Police National Computer and the service’s own data. In the cases where our inspectors judged that the delivery of probation supervision both engaged the person on probation and supported their desistance, the sentence completion rate was 24 percentage points higher and the reoffending rate was 14 percentage points lower than in cases where both judgements were negative. This shows not only that we are inspecting the right things when making judgements on quality, but also that those things make a real difference to the life outcomes of the people the service is working with. 

A new Chief Probation Officer has made public protection her number one priority for the service, and I’m pleased that HMPPS has accepted all the recommendations from our reviews of the Bendall and McSweeney cases. New staff have been recruited to provide the police and children’s safety enquiries that we’ve found missing in too many cases. A major recruitment drive is finally paying off, with the number of practitioners and senior probation officers starting to increase in the past 12 months. A three-year pay deal may encourage more people into the service, and there are some signs in our inspections that individual caseloads may be coming down, even if that is not yet feeding into the quality of practice. Staff are back in the office after the pandemic and seeing people on their caseloads face-to-face (albeit sometimes only once a month) and unpaid work parties are back out on site as normal. But most of all I sense a determination amongst service leaders and managers to improve. I’ve been lucky enough to meet hundreds of probation staff across England and Wales in my time as Chief Inspector and I’ve never doubted their desire to do the right thing. In the effective practice guides that I’ve introduced as Chief Inspector, we’ve been able to showcase the many things that individual staff and managers are doing right and the innovations that still survive – to balance what we’ve had to say in our inspection reports about what’s going wrong. And as our interviews with people on probation show, when things are done right it can be life changing (and sometimes life-saving) for the people involved, so I’d like to finish on a positive note by quoting one of them: 

“Probation has been really supportive of me and I'm so glad to have them. I was really worried about my future and probation continue to help me keep calm and focus on the future not the past.” 

Justin Russell 

HM Chief Inspector of Probation

--oo00oo--

Postscript - Keen observers might have noticed a staggering increase in viewing figures over the last week or so, just shy of 10,000 yesterday and 9,000 the previous day. I could pretend this is due to a genuinely massive interest in this blog and the world of probation, but sadly it appears to be as a result of 'bots' based in Singapore. I have absolutely no idea why, but maybe someone could enlighten us? 

Third SFO

Yes, a third SFO and we await the Review, which will surely be published. As always, we must think of the victims, their families and the officers involved and hope all are well-supported. This is most certainly not a good time for probation, but we must all endeavour to make sure that the systemic and structural issues, as well as political decisions, are all brought out into the open, examined and explained so that lessons really can be learned. 

Last night's Ch4News top story about pressure to alter risk levels for spurious reasons such as resource allocation is a case in point. The probation service must now be allowed to speak up for itself and not be forced to remain silent under HMPPS/MoJ imposed administrative silence. This from the BBC website:-   

Lee Peacock sentenced to life over Westminster double murder

A "jealous" killer has been sentenced to life in prison for killing his girlfriend and an associate weeks after being released from jail. Lee Peacock, 50, attacked his partner Sharon Pickles, 46, and Clinton Ashmore, 59, in Westminster over two days in August 2021. An Old Bailey jury found him guilty of the two murders on Tuesday. Jailing him for a minimum of 39 years, Judge Mr Justice Murray said Peacock would likely die in prison.

The self-confessed burglar, who had been released from prison on 4 June 2021, refused to attend his sentencing hearing. The jury previously heard Peacock, who denied the two murders, had gone out to "punish" Ms Pickles and Mr Ashmore.

On the evening of 19 August 2021, Peacock's father alerted police that his son had visited him and confessed to being a killer. Officers went to Ms Pickles' home in Marylebone and found her body wrapped up and hidden under a bed, with a signed confession nearby. Later that day, Peacock was captured on CCTV walking with Mr Ashmore towards his Westminster flat, then leaving alone 15 minutes later. Two hours later, Mr Ashmore was discovered dead by friends. Both victims died from similar knife wounds to the neck.

'Fit of rage'

The judge concluded that while the killing of Ms Pickles was not premeditated, there was "a significant level of premeditation and planning" in the murder of Mr Ashmore. Addressing a court room packed with grieving relatives, Mr Justice Murray said the defendant had "lashed out at Sharon in a fit of rage, jealous of her sexual relationship with another man", while a bedridden man she cared for slept in another room. In his remarks addressed to Peacock, he said the minimum term meant "that even if you live a long life, there is a strong possibility that you will die in prison even before you are eligible for consideration for release by the Parole Board".

Before the killings, Peacock had been supervised by the London Community Rehabilitation Company before being transferred to the London branch of the Probation Service when the system was nationalised on 26 June 2021. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) has said it was not appropriate to comment on the findings of a review into how Peacock was able to commit serious crimes while on probation until they have been shared with the victims' families. An MoJ spokesman said: "This was a horrific crime and our sympathies are with the families of Sharon Pickles and Clinton Ashmore. Serious further offences are rare but we are investing £155m more every year into the Probation Service and recruited thousands of extra staff to improve the supervision of offenders and, keep the public safe."

HMPPS Not Fit For Purpose

Here we are again with yet another SFO, exactly as predicted as a direct result of imposing part-privatisation of the Probation Service with TR. Reunification under HMPPS command and control is not the answer because that department is simply not fit for purpose. How long is it going to take before either the present government understands this, or more significantly, the Labour Party understands the Probation Service must be reconfigured as a distinct and separate agency. Todays HMI press release:-

Independent Serious Further Offence review of Jordan McSweeney

Background:

On 14 December 2022, Jordan McSweeney was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 38 years, having pleaded guilty to the murder and sexual assault of Ms Zara Aleena. These offences occurred as Ms Aleena walked home, alone, with McSweeney following her, before he subjected her to a sustained physical and sexual assault. Jordan McSweeney was subject to probation supervision when these offences occurred.

In July 2022, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice asked HM Chief Inspector of Probation Justin Russell to conduct an independent review into this case, as Jordan McSweeney was on probation when he is alleged to have committed these offences. The review was completed in January 2023.

Statement:

Chief Inspector of Probation Justin Russell said: “Jordan McSweeney should have been considered a high risk of serious harm offender. If he had, more urgent action would have been taken to recall him to prison, after he missed his supervision appointments on release from custody. The Probation Service failed to do so, and he was free to commit this most heinous crime on an innocent, young women. Our independent review brings into sharp focus the consequences of these missed opportunities and reveals a Probation Service, in London, under the mounting pressure of heavy workloads and high vacancy rates.

“McSweeney murdered Zara just days after being released from prison. During his sentence, he was considered a violent and threatening man – to other prisoners and to prison staff – and had carried weapons. Known to the criminal justice system, since 2005, McSweeney had been imprisoned many times before, and had displayed violent and racially aggravated behaviour. He also received a restraining order for an offence, against a woman, in 2021.

“All the evidence shows that McSweeney should have been assessed, on release from prison, as high risk of serious harm. Instead, he was incorrectly assessed as being of medium risk because each of the offences, his behaviours in prison, and his criminal history, had been reviewed in isolation. Probation staff involved were also experiencing unmanageable workloads made worse by high staff vacancy rates – something we have increasingly seen in our local inspections of services. Prison and probation services didn’t communicate effectively about McSweeney’s risks, leaving the Probation Service with an incomplete picture of someone who was likely to reoffend.

“Following his release from prison and successive appointments being missed, the Probation Service failed to take prompt action to recall him to custody. Once that decision had been made, there were also delays in signing the necessary paperwork to initiate the recall. Had this been done sooner, opportunities for the police to locate and arrest McSweeney would have been maximised.”

--oo00oo--

Highlights from the full report:-

1. Foreword 

On 14 December 2022, Jordan McSweeney was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 38 years, having pleaded guilty to the murder and sexual assault of Ms Zara Aleena. These offences occurred as Ms Aleena walked home, alone, with Mr McSweeney following her, before he subjected her to a sustained physical and sexual assault. This crime has devastated her family and shocked the local community and beyond. 

Jordan McSweeney was subject to probation supervision when these offences occurred. The Probation Service typically conducts a Serious Further Offence (SFO) review when an individual on probation commits a serious violent or sexual offence. However, in this case, the Secretary of State for Justice asked me, as Chief Inspector of Probation, to conduct an independent SFO review into the Probation Service’s management of Jordan McSweeney.

This report sets out the findings of that independent review. My inspectors found that the assessment of the level of risk posed by Jordan McSweeney was inaccurate given information that was known regarding past offending, behaviour in custody and patterns of behaviour. Subsequently this impacted on the way his case was managed and the level of oversight he was subject to. 

Had the correct assessment of risk of harm been undertaken to identify that Jordan McSweeney posed a high risk of serious harm, actions taken in terms of pre-release planning, plans for accommodation on release and speed of response to non-attendance after release could have been significantly different and potentially more urgent. 

Following his most recent sentence, in April 2022, there were significant delays in McSweeney’s case being correctly allocated to a probation officer in the community. This impacted on the time available to update his risk assessment and plan effectively for his release on 17 June 2022. 

Following his release, and successive probation appointments being missed, the Probation Service failed to take prompt action in respect of recalling him to custody. Once that decision was made there were also delays in signing the paperwork to initiate the recall. Had this been undertaken sooner, opportunities for the police to locate and arrest Jordan McSweeney would have been maximised. 

The practice deficits in this case are set against a backdrop of excessive workloads and challenges in respect of staffing vacancies in the London region. I have commented on this in recent local probation inspections and the recommendations made in this report correspond to many of our findings in these. This is far from the first time we have made recommendations relating to the need to improve the assessment and management of the risks of serious harm to the public posed by some people on probation. The need for us to repeat them yet again raises questions as to whether HMPPS is learning the lessons of past mistakes. It is vital that they do so in the future.

Justin Russell 

HM Chief Inspector of Probation 

2. Background to the review 

On 26 June 2022, Ms Zara Aleena had been out socialising with a friend and was walking home in the early hours of Sunday morning in Ilford, Essex, when she was physically attacked and sexually assaulted. CCTV footage showed a white male, identified to be Jordan McSweeney (JM) following Ms Aleena and attacking her from behind. The victim suffered multiple injuries, including serious injuries to her head. She sadly passed away later in hospital. On 14 December 2022, JM was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 38 years. 

At the time the offence was committed, JM was supervised by the Probation Service – London region, having been released from custody on 17 June 2022. He had previously received a 16-month custodial sentence on 13 April 2022 for five counts of possession of an offensive weapon, three offences of criminal damage and one racially aggravated public order offence. All the index offences were committed whilst in custody serving a previous 32-month sentence for burglary. 

JM’s arrest for murder constituted a Serious Further Offence (SFO). SFOs are specific violent and sexual offences committed by people who are, or were very recently, under probation supervision at the time of the offence. They are committed by a small proportion of the probation caseload (fewer than 0.5 per cent) 1 however, while this percentage is small, for the victims and families involved, the impact and consequences are devastating and cannot be underestimated. 

An SFO review is triggered when a person is charged and appears in court for a qualifying offence alleged to have been committed while they were under probation supervision or within 28 working days of the supervision period terminating. These reviews are normally internal management reports conducted by the Probation Service itself but, occasionally, the Secretary of State for Justice asks HM Inspectorate of Probation to review a particular case, or aspects of a case, as he did in this instance on 01 July 2022. 

To inform this independent review, HM Inspectorate of Probation has reviewed the quality of the work undertaken by the Barking, Dagenham, and Havering (BDH) probation delivery unit (PDU), within the London Probation region (see annexe 1 for terms of reference). Current probation practice guidance, policy documents and relevant strategies have also been considered at a local, regional, and national level. Given JM had been released from custody 10 days prior to the SFO, practice and policy was also explored in HMP Belmarsh, by colleagues from His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons.

4. Summary of key findings: 

Our Inspectors have found that, overall, there were significant omissions and practice deficits which impacted on the management of this case, outlined in the summary below. 

Risk of serious harm – inaccurate assessments and underestimation of risk 

JM was managed as a “medium risk of serious harm Integrated Offender Management (IOM) acquisitive individual” however his level of risk should have been escalated to “high” in February 2021, based on the range of information available on his past history of violence as well as acquisitive offending. There was information known about risks present in custody, such as possession of weapons, violent and threatening behaviour. In addition, he had carried weapons in the community, as well as the risks posed to known adults. The risk to the public, staff and other prisoners, should have been assessed as high risk of serious harm. The risk of serious harm to known adults should also have been high based on information related to offences against a known female received in 2021, which later resulted in a restraining order being imposed. 

The risk should have been reviewed by the Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC) who were responsible for the case at that time. JM’s persistent poor behaviour in custody was seen in isolation and risk management in the community was not given sufficient consideration. The risk of harm posed was not viewed holistically in this case, with the focus being on acquisitive offending, and a thorough assessment of other presenting risk factors was missing. 

The lack of effective information sharing between prisons and probation contributed to an incomplete picture of JM’s risks and potential for violence and disruptive behaviour. The fact he spent a significant proportion of his adult years in custody made it difficult to gather significant information about his circumstances and potential behaviour in the community. This strengthens the need for effective information sharing to ensure all known risk factors, behaviours and intelligence is gathered to produce effective risk management plans to use both whilst in custody and when in the community. 

Had he been correctly assessed as high risk of serious harm – specifically in respect of other prisoners, staff, known adults and the public – the planning for release, licence conditions, reporting instructions, and action taken when he failed to attend on release could have been significantly different and potentially more urgent (for example following his failure to attend initial probation appointments on 17 and 20 June). He may also have been eligible for joint Multi Agency Public Protection (MAPPA) management, and for consideration for an Approved Premises (AP) placement, which would have afforded more monitoring of his risk in the community as well as opportunities for rehabilitation. 

With the correct risk assessment, it is likely that the level of monitoring through the IOM arrangements would have been enhanced, allowing timely responses to non-compliance but more importantly, contributing towards a release plan appropriate to the risk posed. 

A critical omission in the case was the failure to apply sufficient professional curiosity and management oversight to ensure all available information was analysed to assess the risk posed by Jordan McSweeney. This review identifies that a significant amount of information became known regarding his circumstances confirming that he was in a relationship, had a stepchild and deteriorating family dynamics, particularly regarding his mother. While information was recorded, there was little evidence of this being explored in any detail or informing assessments undertaken by agencies. This led to risk factors being assessed in isolation and not building a picture of the overall risk posed.

The inaccurate classification of risk was a key theme in our recent PDU inspections in London. Of the 137 medium risk of serious harm cases that were inspected across six local probation areas, seven per cent were deemed to have had their risk underestimated and should have been rated as high risk of serious harm rather than medium. Whilst this is only a sample, it does demonstrate the urgent need to ensure risk categorisations are accurate.

Case Allocation 

There were issues highlighted with the allocation of JM’s case. Although JM received 16-months in custody, taking into account his time spent on remand, he only had two months left to serve in prison at the point of his sentence and so his case should have been allocated directly to a community practitioner. The processes for allocating cases when a custodial sentence is imposed is confusing and cumbersome, impacting significantly on pre-release planning. Had allocation taken place correctly and earlier, probation staff would have had more opportunity to consider the risks posed by this individual and to amend the risk of serious harm assessment. As outlined above, this would have allowed for the exploration of other release arrangements and restrictive conditions. 

Enforcement decisions and recall process 

JM had a history of non-compliance. However, during his periods on licence, delayed decision-making by probation staff and ineffective management oversight resulted in non-compliance continuing without relevant action being taken. Following his release on 17 June, there were missed opportunities to recall JM following failed appointments and risk factors emerging. Recall should have been initiated following non-attendance on 20 June 2022, but management consultation did not consider recall and efforts made to locate JM were insufficient. 

When the recall was initiated on 22 June, this occurred following an informal discussion and PO1’s manager SPO1 was not fully included in the process. A delay to signing off the recall until 24 June, outside the 24-hour target specified in the related guidance , meant the recall was not timely and ultimately delayed the opportunity for JM to be arrested by police. 

Data indicates that the public protection casework section (PPCS), who process licence revocations in HMPPS, take an average of seven7 hours to issue a licence revocation. National data on recalls also shows that the median time8 between licence revocation and a return to prison custody is three days. Had a recall been initiated following the missed appointment on 20 June, or completed within the specified timescale on 23 June, the time for police to locate and arrest JM would have been maximised. 

Diverse needs 

Throughout the records relating to JM, differing needs are highlighted. At different junctures records stated JM had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Personality Disorder (PD) and had suffered from depression. He was stated to be medicated at various times for ADHD, but little analysis was undertaken of how this affected his day-to-day cognitive functioning and learning styles, and if there were links with offending behaviour.

5. Recommendations 

Between July and October 2022 HM Inspectorate of Probation inspected six PDUs in the London Region. Barking, Dagenham and Havering PDU was one of those inspected, many of the findings from this independent review mirror those from the London PDU inspections9 . They focus on critical concerns such as the quality of work to assess and manage risk of serious harm, the delivery of interventions, information sharing between agencies, quality assurance processes and management oversight, staff training and development, and resourcing and retention of staff. These recommendations are relevant to the practice observed in the case of JM. It is crucial that the service deals with these broader issues to address the practice deficits, and wider systemic issues identified in this independent review.

Notably, some recommendations in this report mirror what has previously been recommended by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of probation, particularly in the independent review of Joseph McCann . It is therefore imperative that these are actioned urgently given they have been highlighted previously as recommendations. 

This independent review makes a further nine recommendations specific to the case of JM.

HMPPS should: 

1. conduct a thorough, senior led review of the processes its staff use to assess the risks of harm that people on probation may pose to others, to ensure that all staff understand and apply the correct criteria for identifying high risk of serious harm cases and that this then informs robust and appropriate risk management plans and regular reviews. This action should be conducted urgently 

2. implement effective arrangements to ensure all risk of harm assessments, including at pre-sentence stage, are quality assured for accuracy until regular and appropriate management oversight arrangements are established, given the national staffing resource shortage and middle management oversight limitations 

3. develop processes to ensure all known information on past behaviour or current risks in prison or the community is available to probation practitioners and is properly analysed when formulating risk assessments pre and post sentence 

4. create robust processes to record and analyse on probation case files when a person on probation is acquitted of offence(s) and where information remains relevant to inform risk of harm assessment and management 

5. while cases are in custody ensure timely and accurate allocation of each case to probation practitioners in the community for supervision before and after release and a mechanism for checking this process 

6. undertake an urgent review of processes for information and intelligence sharing between prisons and the probation service to be completed by June 2023. (A recommendation from the independent review of McCann, this should be given urgent attention given issues are still apparent). 

7. develop processes to ensure that all recall decisions are signed off and submitted by Senior Probation Officers within the 24-hour target period – with compliance against this target monitored in every Probation Delivery Unit on at least a monthly basis 

8. ensure that data on the time from licence revocation by HMPPS Public Protection Casework Section to an individual being received into prison custody is monitored on a regular basis by HMPPS jointly with the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) and that joint probation and police plans are agreed for maximising performance against this metric 

9. ensure the EPF2 tool is used when determining licence conditions and develop a mechanism for effective management oversight of this process to ensure that all appropriate licence conditions, including GPS tagging, are applied after release 

10. develop a London wide initiative on neurodiversity and invest in trauma informed training for staff.

14. ‘Early Look’ and onward actions 

Following JM’s arrest for murder, an ‘early look’ SFO review was completed by the Probation Service – London region in June 2022 in line with HMPPS expected practice. The purpose of an ‘early look’ is to quickly review the practice in the case and promptly identify, to senior leaders within HMPPS, any practice and training deficits that require immediate attention and to begin appropriate actions, and human resource (HR) processes if assessed as being necessary. Inspectors found the quality of the ‘early look’ to be mostly of a sufficient standard. However, on further exploration, some information contained within it, and therefore subsequent actions, were inaccurate. This related specifically to the following: 

The assessment undertaken at Court as part of the allocation process was inaccurate as it pulled through information from historic assessments that required updating. Whilst PO2 was limited by the fact that he did not have the opportunity to meet with JM, the offence analysis did not relate to the index offences and I would have expected this to have been updated.

Having spoken with PO2 and the line manager, and considered the guidance in place, PO2 was required to undertake an “RSR only” OASys which does not require a full review. The process requires an OASys assessment to be generated solely for this calculation, to determine allocation. There is no expectation of court officers to undertake a review of risk. We found that although the correct process was followed here, the process led to inaccurate information being contained within assessments but in line with guidance, should have been updated by the receiving COM or POM. 

The ‘early look’ also indicated that the inclusion of a licence condition to engage with Catch 22 was not appropriate as their remit was to support people to build emotional resilience. We disagreed with this, as it was clear this would be of benefit to JM. However, we did agree other conditions were omitted which would have been beneficial to risk management, such as the imposition of a curfew/GPS tagging. 

When considering the recall prior to the SFO, the ‘early look’ states SPO1 was included in the discussion on 22 June, however on further investigation we know this did not occur, with them only being informed by PO1 a recall was being completed. Actions relating to management oversight and recall processes which were highlighted in the ‘early look’ have already been progressed. 

Following this, HR investigations procedures were initiated in respect of two staff members. These have now concluded, with no further action taken in either case. 

In respect of other areas which have been highlighted as significant in this review, we discussed work that is underway to address some of the deficits. We were told there are significant changes being made to IOM case management in London, in particular work is underway to improve liaison between prisons and IOM colleagues. With regards to neurodiversity, the Head of Operations for north east London boroughs (HOOP) told us there are aims to embed a trauma-informed approach to practice, and projects are already set up in some areas of London focussing on specific needs particularly in respect of young adults.

Although not eligible for OMiC management, the effectiveness of this process is under review by HM Inspectorate of probation with a number of recommendations to review the process which aim for improvements across the OMiC spectrum .

15. Conclusion 

Inspectors found that overall, there were significant omissions and practice deficits which impacted on the management of this case. 

JM was managed as a “medium risk of serious harm IOM acquisitive individual,” however, his level of risk should have been escalated to high risk of serious harm in February 2021, based on the range of information available had it have been sufficiently analysed and considered.

The risks present when he was recalled, in February 2021, were not sufficiently considered for a potential escalation to high risk of serious harm and management by the then National Probation Service. When a restraining order (RO) was imposed in 2021, the PDU were not sufficiently aware which was another missed opportunity to reassess the risk posed. Furthermore, JM’s persistent poor behaviour in custody was seen in isolation and not given sufficient consideration in terms of his risk management in the community. 

Issues were found with sharing of information between prison and probation and assessments were completed in isolation. This led to agencies managing the individual without thorough consideration of the impact on the risks posed, and how they should be managed, both in a custodial and community setting. 

A lack of professional curiosity coupled with a failure to consider information known about JM holistically, led to inaccurate and insufficient risk assessments. There was a significant amount of information known about JM which should have been analysed and explored more fully.

The delay in JM’s case being allocated to a probation officer meant his case was not formally allocated for two months following sentencing. Positively, PO1 continued to work with JM and did undertake some pre-release planning. However, given the delay in allocation, a pre-release assessment was not completed prior to release. This was a missed opportunity to review all the available information and inform pre-release planning and the risk of serious harm assessment. Tools such as the EPF tool which was developed by the probation service to determine relevant licence conditions was not utilised and therefore not all relevant conditions were included. 

On release, the PDU missed opportunities to recall following failed appointments and evidence of risk factors emerging, such as significant use of alcohol. A recall should have been initiated following the missed appointment on 20 June 2022. However, relevant senior leader consultations did not take place, and insufficient efforts were made to locate JM. When the recall was initiated, this was because of an informal discussion and PO1’s line manager was not included formally in the process. A delay to signing off the recall, 24 hours later than the specified timescale, meant the recall was not timely and ultimately delayed the opportunity for JM to be arrested by police. 

The findings from this review mirror findings from the recent HM Inspectorate of probation inspections of London PDUs, including Barking, Dagenham and Havering (BDH) PDU where the overall quality of work delivered to manage people on probation was insufficient and we rated the PDU as ‘Requires improvement’.

Probation's Journey

The latest Academic Insight paper from HM Probation Inspectorate very succinctly charts the journey 'probation' has found itself on over recent time and how it might yet be restored to something worthwhile following the TR omnishambles, the pathetic justification for which still makes my blood boil. The following is the first of two lengthy extracts, but as always readers are encouraged to read the whole document.   

Professionalism in Probation

Foreword 

HM Inspectorate of Probation is committed to reviewing, developing and promoting the evidence base for high-quality probation and youth offending services. Academic Insights are aimed at all those with an interest in the evidence base. We commission leading academics to present their views on specific topics, assisting with informed debate and aiding understanding of what helps and what hinders probation and youth offending services. 

This report was kindly produced by Dr Matt Tidmarsh, reviewing the literature on ‘professionalism’ and applying it to the probation service. After years of instability, the recent unification of the service provides an opportunity to refocus on the professional status of practitioners. It is vital that there is sufficient recruitment and that staff then benefit from ongoing investment, developing their professional knowledge, expertise and autonomy, so that they are able to deliver a high-quality service. At the same time, the history and culture of probation should be respected, embracing its identity as a relational, collaborative and person-centred service. Practitioners thus need to be empowered to develop positive relationships with people on probation and other key stakeholders. Within our inspections of probation services, we will continue to examine whether staff are being enabled to deliver a high-quality, personalised and responsive service for all people on probation. 

Dr Robin Moore 

Head of Research

2.1 Probation’s professional project 

McWilliams’s (1983, 1985, 1986, 1987) seminal quartet of essays on the professionalisation of probation comes closest to a ‘life history’ (Abbott, 1988) approach to the study of the service as a would-be profession. He documented how, over the first few decades of the twentieth century, the service came to exhibit ideal-typical professional traits. For example, after several decades of ad-hoc provision coordinated by the Church of England, the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 established probation as a public service with a clear mission, to ‘advise, assist, [and] befriend’ – words that constituted an ideology of service premised on relationships with those subject to supervision in the community. Religious influences on practice were gradually displaced by social work knowledge learnt through education and training, which proved the ‘scientific’ basis for autonomy over work delivered with people on probation. That McWilliams (1985, p.260) considered such knowledge, methods, and values the ‘justification for claims of professionalism’ hints at the importance of the acquisition of ideal-typical traits in shaping the service’s professional identity and legitimacy (Tidmarsh, 2022).

Probation’s ‘professional project’ (Larson, 1977) was consolidated in the postwar period, as the service was unequivocally recognised as a profession. The 1962 Morison Report, for example, recognised the probation officer as ‘a professional caseworker, employing in a specialized field, skill which he holds in common with other social workers’ (c.f. Jarvis, 1972, p.66). Given this institutional support, the service continued to expand: it assumed responsibilities for prisoners’ pre-release ‘throughcare’, post-release ‘aftercare’, and community service (Jarvis, 1972). Between 1951 and 1981, the number of full-time, qualified probation officers increased from just over 1,000 to nearly 5,500 while the service’s total caseload grew from 55,000 to approximately 157,000 (McWilliams, 1987). As such, imbued with state support for its knowledge, methods, and values, the probation officer was viewed as: 

‘an independent practitioner, supported and supervised in professional practice by the probation service hierarchy’ (May and Annison, 1998, p.161). 

However, the ideal-typical tenets on which probation’s claims to professionalism rested have, in recent decades, been subjected to considerable challenge. This has occurred against the backdrop of several significant changes, including a more punitive socio-political climate; the rise of risk management practices; and numerous, centralising organisational restructurings oriented towards greater efficiency and accountability. Heightened political and media hysteria over crime (Downes and Morgan, 2007) heralded the emergence of ‘tough on crime’ policies and a significant increase in the prison population (Garland, 2001). As political confidence in the service waned, successive governments targeted the autonomy of practitioners, chief officers, and locally administered services (Robinson et al., 2012). The convergence of performance targets and National Standards (introduced in 1988 and 1992, respectively) and monitored via an intensification of audits have thereby limited practitioners’ ability to exercise discretion (Mair and Burke, 2011). 

Following the growth in those subject to criminal justice supervision, in prison and in the community, risk management practices became entrenched within probation. Following the abolition of social work training requirements for practice in 1995, risk has arguably become the dominant knowledge-base within probation (Tidmarsh, 2021a). While evidence indicates that practitioners have welcomed the greater consistency provided by risk assessment tools such as the Offender Assessment System (Mair et al., 2006; Phillips, 2016), for their use promotes ‘defensible’ decision-making (Kemshall, 1998; see also Academic Insights paper 2021/14) in ways that are not ‘anti-professional’ (Robinson, 2003), pressures to record information have nevertheless detracted from the time available to spend with people on probation (Tidmarsh, 2021b).

Since the turn of the century, the service has undergone numerous restructurings which have sought to enhance central control over services – such that, for staff, organisational change has become ‘a defining characteristic of their professional existence’ (Robinson and Burnett 2007, p.332). And yet, despite changes which have attempted to bring organisational culture into line with prevailing punitive ideology (Robinson and Ugwudike, 2012), probation’s ideology of service has persevered. Mawby and Worrall (2013) have shown that several generations of probation staff are united through a shared value base centred on working with people. Indeed, research has consistently emphasised the durability of ‘probation values’ premised on a belief in the capacity of individuals to change (Deering, 2010; Robinson et al., 2016; Tidmarsh, 2020a). These values remain key to professionalism in probation, especially after the changes wrought by Transforming Rehabilitation.

2.2 Transforming Rehabilitation: the ‘diminution of the probation profession’ 

As argued above, ‘professionalism’ was integral to the justifications given for the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms. This was primarily expressed in terms of professional discretion: top-down, bureaucratic state provision of services, it was contended, contributed to ineffective practice and the spiralling costs of justice, as practitioners were focused on meeting performance targets. Competing for services, by contrast, would spark the ‘innovation’ required to reduce reoffending and render probation more efficient (MoJ, 2010, 2013). The desire ‘to unlock… professionalism’ (MoJ, 2010, p.9) to improve performance thus sought to bring together the interests of diverse groups – the public, private providers, practitioners, and people on probation – with appeals to the superiority of the market over the state. 

However, Transforming Rehabilitation merely continued the decades-long challenge to the ideal-typical tenets on which professionalism in probation was grounded – such that, in her final report as Chief Inspector of Probation, Dame Glenys Stacey lamented the ‘deplorable diminution of the probation profession’ (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2019a, p.3). For example, the manner in which staff were allocated after the reforms spoke to the Government’s view on professional knowledge, education, and training in the private sector (Tidmarsh, 2020b), with most qualified probation officers being shifted to the publicly-owned National Probation Service (NPS) – which was presented as a specialist body, ‘drawing on the expertise and experience of its staff… and managing those who pose the greatest risk of harm to the public’ (MoJ, 2013, p.4). Many experienced staff also left the service in protest at the reforms, leaving a much diminished ‘pool of collective professional knowledge’ (Kirton and Guillaume, 2019, p.12). That less qualified staff in the privately-owned Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) were doing work formerly undertaken by qualified officers (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2019a) meant the boundaries between Probation Service Officer and Probation Officer roles were blurred, part of an attempt to render services more ‘efficient’ through cheaper labour (Tidmarsh, 2020b). As such, the NPS were perceived, by many in the service and the wider criminal justice infrastructure, as the superior organisation in a ‘two-tier’ system (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2017). 

Relationships between staff and people on probation were not ‘sufficiently protected’ (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2019a, p.9) after services were split. Some staff in Robinson et al.’s (2016, p.167) ethnography of the transition to employment in a CRC reflected on ‘the pains of separation from service users with whom they had built good working relationships but who were now in the process of being transferred to the NPS’. Staff-client relationships were further exacerbated by the financial strains under which CRCs operated. Initial caseload estimates suggested that CRCs would supervise 80 per cent of people on probation, but the reality was closer to 60 per cent – in part because concerns over the CRCs’ quality of services meant fewer were assessed as low-to-medium risk (NAO, 2019). The subsequent funding shortfalls resulted in ‘substantial reductions’ (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2019a, p.74) in staffing in the CRCs. Accordingly, while organisational caseloads decreased, individual workloads increased (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2017). One such implication is a loss of professional autonomy: practitioners in the CRCs were focused on meeting the ‘fee for service’ targets through which providers derived the majority of their income, reducing the time available to build relationships with people on probation (Tidmarsh, 2020b, 2021b).

Relationships with other organisations also deteriorated under Transforming Rehabilitation. HM Inspectorate of Probation and HM Inspectorate of Prisons (2017) found that ‘Through the Gate’ provision was over-reliant on signposting to other agencies, particularly in the voluntary sector. Both the NPS and CRCs referred to such agencies, many of whom were external to supply chains, without being financially obligated to contribute to their delivery (NAO, 2019). This disincentivised many smaller voluntary organisations from involvement in probation while entrenching a ‘tick-box culture’ of monitoring (Clinks, 2018, p.24) among those that continued to deliver services, as downward pressures inhibited their ability to build meaningful relationships with clients and partners. The financial instability that characterised partnership working with the voluntary sector demonstrates how Transforming Rehabilitation damaged probation’s function as a ‘broker’ between different social spheres (Senior et al., 2016). Dominey (2019) conceptualises probation relationships through notions of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ supervision: 

• ‘thick’ supervision refers to a productive relationship with the person on probation, embedded within the community 

• ‘thin’ supervision is predominantly office-based, with poor links to the community. 

Dominey concluded that, if probation is underpinned by networks of relationships, both among people and between people and organisations, then the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms pushed supervision in the CRCs ‘in the direction of thin supervision’ (Dominey, 2019, p.298; see also Tidmarsh, 2021b). 

The contractual pressures faced by CRCs thus created barriers to realising an ideology of service in probation. Indeed, the ability to build relationships – with clients and other stakeholders – is at the heart of probation staff understandings of professionalism (Tidmarsh, 2021a). However, both supervisor-client and probation-community relations were diminished nationally as a result of Transforming Rehabilitation (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2019a). The practitioners in Tidmarsh’s (2020a) ethnography of a CRC, for example, struggled to reconcile client-centred values with caseload pressures and a heightened focus on performance targets. These ‘thin’ practices also permeated intra-organisation relationships, thereby impacting practitioners’ capacity to develop professionally. Staff in Coley’s (2020, p.237) study of a CRC valued supervision time with Senior Probation Officers; however, the combination of caseload pressures and staff shortages meant that staff supervision time was often ‘compressed, offering less space for individual and personalised activities’. Likewise, in the NPS, Phillips et al. (2016) observed the ‘relentless’ emotional impact of working exclusively with high-risk offenders, for which practitioners did not receive enough organisational support or opportunities to reflect meaningfully on practice. 

As such, Transforming Rehabilitation further undermined the wide range of relationships on which professionalism in probation is founded. Professional knowledge was lost in the CRCs, eroded by an enforced contractual focus on targets. An ideology of service persists within probation, but the convergence of increased workloads and the financial consequences of a failure to conform to performance metrics impeded the autonomy to enact such values. The ways in which Transforming Rehabilitation failed to enhance professionalism in probation raises questions as to how the service can reclaim its ideology of service and the frameworks needed to recapture meaningful relationships with people on probation and other stakeholders. The next section, then, advocates for a relational, person-centred, and co-productive approach to the future of services.

to be continued

Price of Everything and Value of Nothing

Jim,

Are you aware of an ongoing project to remove the band four staff from the delivery of sex offender programmes? There is currently a consultation ongoing and a job evaluation which is being done with the clear aim of down grading this work due to cost implications.

They want band 3 staff to deliver Domestic Abuse and Sex Offender programmes. Of course, this work used to be all done by band 4 staff (PO), it was only a cost cutting TR exercise that saw programmes work split with DA going to the CRC who immediately down graded the staff needed. However, CRC practice on DA was not generally well regarded as we know. HMIP found very patchy practice when they looked at BBR work in the report linked below.

You'd have thought that taking practices embedded in the totally discredited TR clusterfuckery and extending them to a further risky group of politically sensitive offenders might not be the best idea?

The excellent Probation Journal article by Renehan documents the impact of the Domestic Abuse work on largely female band 3 CRC staff. When I read this personally what I took was that the abuse of these staff by the organisation mirrored the abuse that the course was supposed to address. They were not adequately trained and supported to do this work. Again, doesn't seem the best footing on which to extend these staff into working with another group of POPs who's offending may bring a even greater degree of complexity and emotional labour.

In prisons Sex Offender programmes are delivered by a mix of "unqualified" prison officers alongside forensic psychologists I think, but then prison SO programmes have been found not be very effective so again, perhaps not the best model.

Ultimately, this is a cost cutting exercise and cutting costs while not cutting quality is always fool's gold. 

--oo00oo--

Domestic abuse: the work undertaken by Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs)

Foreword

An estimated two million people experienced domestic abuse last year. A good proportion of people in receipt of probation services are domestic abusers, and domestic abuse constitutes a sizeable proportion of the work of Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs). In this inspection we set out to assess how well CRCs are working to reduce domestic abuse and protect victims. Overall, we found CRCs nowhere near effective enough in this critical area of work, and yet good work here could make so much difference to the families and individuals concerned, and to society as a whole. 

Yes, we found pockets of good practice, as we have come to expect, and we saw examples of good public protection partnership work as well. But overall the work was characterised by a lack of awareness and applied expertise. It is not an exaggeration to say that many individuals were drifting through their supervision period without being challenged or supported to change their predilection for domestic violence, and that simply won’t do. 

Those left unchallenged and unassisted pose a particular threat to others, most especially those close to them. Too often we were left wondering how safe victims and children were, especially when practitioners failed to act on new information indicating that they could be in danger. Practitioners often underestimated the level of harm victims and children were exposed to. Some practice was of grave concern to us. 

In the cases we looked at, we found that very little meaningful work had been completed in custody. In the community, domestic abusers were not making enough progress, and many had completed little work to help them improve their relationships and behaviour. While a range of domestic abuse interventions were being offered, I am not assured that these were all evidence-based, evaluated or delivered effectively. Too few individuals were either starting or completing Building Better Relationships, the only accredited domestic abuse programme that the court can impose as part of a community sentence. 

Many practitioners had unmanageable workloads. Inexperienced staff were managing complex issues with little training or management oversight. Some were too busy to do a thorough job, while others simply didn’t have the knowledge needed to do a good job. Some CRCs had introduced new structures, policies and case management tools but, generally, CRCs should be taking a more strategic and determined approach. In my view, they should be making sure that practitioners know the current evidence base and that they are equipped to supervise domestic abusers well in all respects. That is not happening: there is insufficient focus on domestic abuse. 

There is a lack of clear and specific contractual obligations and incentives for CRCs to actively manage domestic abuse. The Ministry of Justice has the opportunity to consider this, as and when it recasts contracts. 

Our recommendations are focused on what we see to be the big priorities. There is enough in this report to help CRCs identify what needs to be done and where things are working well. I encourage them to build on the pockets of good practice identified here and to give domestic abuse the priority and attention it deserves.

Dame Glenys Stacey 

HM Chief Inspector of Probation

September 2018

--oo00oo--

Facilitators of probation-based domestic violence perpetrator programmes: ‘Who’s in the room?’

Abstract

The role that probation practitioners play in the desistance process has begun to receive much needed attention. Yet, the experiences of facilitators of probation-based, domestic violence perpetrator programmes have long been neglected. This article explores the experiences and wellbeing of eight facilitators from one cohort of the Building Better Relationships (BBR) programme in England. Drawing upon five-months’ observations and in-depth interviews, I demonstrate how working with domestically violent men with insufficient knowledge, experience, or support, exacerbated within the context of Transforming Rehabilitation reforms, impacted significantly on facilitator well-being, professional identities, and practice. Practice implications are discussed.

Discussion

The thematic inspection of domestic abuse work within CRCs offered a rare glimpse into the BBR programme. However, it was limited in scope given it did not seek to identify who exactly is ‘in the room’ (Burke, 2014). Understanding the capacities of group facilitators who undertake such work, and the effects on them, is crucial not only for desirable outcomes but for the well-being of those who are tasked with facilitating change in others. Unfortunately, to date, facilitators of DVPPs have been forgotten in between the debate of programme fetishism and desistance focused supervision with probation practitioners (Durnescu, 2012).

I have highlighted that facilitators were not enabled to work in ways that were commensurate with their own personal and professional values for many reasons: there was a lack of adequate training which focused on delivering (some) exercises from a manual and ‘lumped’ together amongst other accredited programme training; the video equipment which was used to record group sessions and monitor practice had not worked for over 2 years and so practice development was not in force; supervision was not supportive; facilitators felt de-valued due to a lack of pecuniary incentives, professional development, and promotional opportunities; and the emotional demands of the job was overlooked even though this affected how they felt and worked. This was further complicated in those cases where facilitators had their own personal encounters with trauma which had both positive and negative effects on them and in how this shaped their practice. What is important to note here is that some facilitators felt they had to leave their own trauma at the door, or face professional judgement or risk losing their jobs.

While many of the facilitators were able to humanise the traumatising but traumatised men with whom they worked, the lack of time, low confidence, and investment in them as valued professionals had impacted on their wellbeing and their professional identities, experiences that were interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Even while the Transforming Rehabilitation agenda of the Coalition Government of 2013 sought to de-professionalise part of probation services, the facilitators in this study, like many other probation practitioners in CRCs (Tidmarsh, 2020a), were still invested in the discourses of professionalism in which they endeavoured to deliver a service that valued the clients with whom they worked. But calls to ensure they were response-abled were met with solutions that diluted the standard of service they had strived to provide. Supervision was not adequate to deal with the emotional demands of the job, vicarious trauma, or the psychological impact of re-living their own traumas. The lack of due care towards facilitators resulted in them feeling devalued, exhausted, desensitised and disincentivised to do their job which was executed with a mixture of enthusiasm and dread. Almost 12 months on, five facilitators were either on long term sick leave or had left.

Nicole Renehan

June 2021