What Do Monitors Actually Do?

Regular readers will be fully aware of the many and varied failures of the MoJ, especially in the field of contract design and management. The Rainsbrook saga and former probation contractor MTC Novo's involvement is simply astonishing by any measure and here we have former MoJ insider and finance director Julian Le Vay spelling it out in all its gory detail:- 

RAINSBROOK TELLS US TWO THINGS. MTC ISN'T FIT TO RUN PRISONS. AND THE MoJ ISN'T FIT TO RUN PRISON CONTRACTS

The Justice Secretary has just announced that Rainsbrook Secure Training Centre, run under contract by MTC, has been treating the children it its care so badly for so long that he’s taking all the children out of it. It’s a saga that tells us that not only is MTC not fit to run prisons, but MoJ is not fit to run prison contracts.

Secure Training Centres

The Management and Training Corporation (MTC) is an American company that runs 24 prisons in the US, also training schemes for young adults. It gained a foothold in the UK with the privatisation of probation, running the service in 2 areas. Privatisation was an unmitigated disaster and has now been reversed. In 2016 the MoJ gave it the contract to run Rainsbrook Secure Training Centre, which had had a troubled history under G4S. It got worse under MTC. Three successive inspection reports were negative (jointly between Prisons Inspectorate, Ofsted and the CQC for healthcare). Despite this, the MoJ last year extended the contract to 2023.

To be fair to MTC, no company has made a success of STCs, a sort of prison for children, introduced by Michael Howard, but then carried forward by Labour. Four were built, under the Private Finance Initiative. They exemplify the perennial problem – possibly never entirely solvable – of providing in the same place both secure custody for children who’ve been convicted of sometimes quite serious crimes, and also care and education provision for children who are often seriously damaged, disturbed and disruptive. They are small units, 80 or so fully occupied, with high staffing levels and hugely expensive. Two have been closed, two remain, while the MoJ dithers about what’s to replace them. Meanwhile, as the number in custody shrinks, the remaining population has become much more difficult.

The failure of MTC

When the Inspectors returned in October last year, they were so appalled at what they found that they met the MoJ officials and wrote to Buckland on 5 November, who replied on 18 November saying that necessary action was being taken. That inspection report is here. When the inspectors returned in December, they found little evidence of progress. Children were locked in their bedrooms for 23 1/2 hours out of 24. On 16 December the inspectorate issued an Urgent Notification to Buckland, their last resort where institutions don’t just fail, but fail unacceptable and persistently (2). They said:

“Children’s daily experiences were bleak. They continue to receive a spartan regime. They receive little encouragement to get up in the mornings and there are very few efforts by staff to engage meaningfully with children…. there is no evidence of children’s’ educational entitlement being met…. senior managers were unaware of the regime.”

Whatever your views on crime, who in Hell’s name could think such a place could do other than lasting harm to deeply troubled children? Even Priti Patel might blench.

Buckland replied on 15 January, again saying that the necessary action was in hand. The inspectors returned on 26 January and found some improvement - an action plan had been drawn up - but little of it actually actioned. In March the Justice Committee held a special one off session and questioned the inspectors, Buckland, MoJ officials and MTC managers. The transcript is here.

It should be said that the Committee’s session focussed primarily on the Urgent Notification and the report made at that time. It paid relatively little attention to the brief report of the further visit in January, which noted some early signs of improvement. Nor did the Committee pay much attention to the fact that there was a COVID outbreak at the time, causing staff to be off duty and requiring newly arrived children to be isolated (though Oakhill STC managed isolation with a lot more time out of cell). MTC may well have felt aggrieved at that. And it was especially hard on the new Director, Ian Mulholland, who’d arrived only on 4 January. But clearly MTC had by then expended all credit with its critics. It had had one too many drinks in the Last Chance Saloon. The unfortunate Mulholland arrived just in time to pickup the tab.

The Committee reported on 29 March (2), saying that they were

‘shocked and appalled by what we heard’ and were ‘deeply concerned about MTCs ability to manage the Rainsbrook contract’.

What shocked them most was that not only did the MoJ and YCS not know, at the time of the inspection, the state of affairs at Rainsbrook, but neither did MTC managers on site. Indeed, when inspectors told them face to face, in their December visit, that children were still being locked up 23/12 hours a day, the response by MTC managers was first to tell the inspectors they were wrong, and then to add that the children themselves were wrong.

Here’s the Ofsted Inspector:

“When I sat…with the director and deputy director and said ‘Children are still being locked up for 23 1/2 hours a day’ and they said ‘We don’t think they are’, I do not think they were lying. I just do not think they know the basic principles of going once a day to talk to the children…they were just not doing it…it was utter incompetence.’

The inspectors pinpointed the root of the problem:

“senior managers issues instructions; they write procedures and protocols, often very detailed; but they are not implemented at middle and junior management level…. they do not have the means…. to follow through to make sure these things happen on a day-to-day basis, so they just keep repeated….”

This is a familiar problem in prison management. The task of ‘managing upwards’ is very time consuming, and more so when an institution is in trouble and there are lots of inspectors and lots of questions. But all the more important to ‘walk the walk, and talk the talk’ to ensure that you are not blinded or mislead by all the paper, and that what you said should happen is happening.

What makes this incomprehensible in this case – certainly to the Justice Committee – is the tiny scale of this institution. In a prison of 1,800 prisoners and maybe 500 staff spread out between many blocks and with layer upon layer of management, such a failure to check on reality would be more comprehensible. But this unit had, at the time of the last inspection, just 45 occupants. 45! From the Director’s office to the children’s rooms was a 2 minute walk. But they just did not do it. Moreover staff: prisoner ratio, 1:5 in some adult jails, was here more like 1:1, or even lower (3). How could managers not know the reality of something so fundamental as time out of room - something inspection after inspection had focussed on as unacceptable, and on which MTC gave assurances to the MoJ which were simply untrue?

To my mind, this alone should disqualify MTC from any further contracts for custodial facility in this country. If it gets the basics of management this wrong, under this much external pressure, in such a tiny, heavily staffed unit, how on earth could they cope with a 1,800 prisoner new prison?

The report reveals other fundamental and long-standing problems with MTC’s operation:

• An impossibly high turnover of managers – 4 different appointed Directors in 4 years, and interims in between
• Recruitment of staff with a background in adult prisons, with few having experience of the very different world of child offenders
• An impossibly high turnover rate for staff as well – the Justice Committee was told that most left before a year in the job (as I note in my book, in the past this was often seen in prisons that failed)
• A culture focussing on paperwork and meetings

I suspect there is another problem behind this all. MTC is a huge American company with a tiny UK business, that’s not doing at all well. The majority of Directors of MTC (UK) appear, from the accounts, to be Americans. I have experience of just such an environment in the IT sector. I know how difficult it is to get backing or even understanding from the US parent for the very different trading and operating environment of the UK – especially when, as is the case with Rainsbrook, they were not making a profit. (I’ve seen critics denounce MTC for making money while failing the children in its care: incredibly, it didn’t.) I suspect the UK business was not regarded at all positively by the American parent, especially after the failure of the bid for Wellingborough prison, and the collapse of the probation contracts.

Then there is another failure, equally fundamental to a good contractual relationship. Incredibly, MTCs reaction to the inspector’ comments, and (it would seem therefore) Buckland’s decision to withdraw all children from the unit, is to say that they are wrong! They said :

“Given the previous positive assessments, including Ofsted’s follow up visit in January, we were very surprised to receive Ofsted’s feedback at the end of last week’s inspection. We have a number of concerns about their approach and ultimately the conclusions they have reached. We plan to vigorously challenge this as we go through the fact checking process”

And this is MTCs’ preferred style – confrontation, not contrition. We’ve seen they told the inspectors to their face they were wrong – that the children were wrong about what they were actually experiencing. Mulholland then upset the Justice Committee by declaring that MTC would only accept Inspector’s recommendations they thought ‘fair and grounded in evidence’– an exceptionally foolish thing to say, in the circumstances. Likewise, in the recent competition run Wellingborough prison, when their bid was unsuccessful, they immediately threaten legal action against MoJ. (Again I suspect this comes from the very different American background, where there are many possible customers, so you can afford a fight – here, one only, and you can’t.)

The relationship between a prison contractor and its customer is a subtle one. Relying just on the formalities of the contract is not enough. These contracts are long term – typically 15 years for prisons – and inevitably, in prisons, there are problems, inevitably, requirements change, and inevitably, sensitivities to be managed with ministers, with the media. So there has to be some sense of partnership, and partnership must be based on mutual trust and understanding of each other’s position, without of course losing sight of their fundamentally different roles.

MTCs track record of assuming such an adversarial role – and so quickly and so publicly – suggests to me that it will not be possible for them to enter into the right sort of long-term relationship with MoJ as customer. I am not, God knows, saying MoJ is always right. And in fact, I have sympathy for the stance that what is to be done in an institution should be determined by MoJ as customer, not by an outfit whose role is inspection and which is not charged with considering the resource consequences, feasibility or effectiveness of its recommendations, nor considering other approaches. But it’s the bull-headed way MTC charge at its critics frontally and publicly that is so unacceptable.

For all these reasons – the failure over many years to provide a decent environment for children, the failure over a long period to do what they said they’d do, the failure in the basic management grip on what is going on in the institution, the high turnover of staff and mangers alike, the lack of understanding of work with children, and the ready assumption of a legalistic, adversarial relationship with MoJ and the inspectorates – it seems inconceivable that MoJ can now ever offer MTC a contract to run any custodial institution.

MTC is currently on the MoJ’s framework agreement to enable it to bid to run new, 1800 place adult prisons. It should now be removed. MTC has no prospect of significant further business in the correctional services of the UK. And that means, looking at its accounts, it would then no longer be viable in the UK. It is finished.

The failure of the MoJ

A truism to which I often return, so often ignored by those criticising the private sector, is that when a service is being supplied under contract, failure by the contractor very often reveals failure by the customer also. Failure to properly appraise the supplier before contract, failure to specific the service properly, buying a service too cheaply, failure to get the commercial terms or performance sanctions right, failure to manage the contract properly, failure to deal with failure, failure to ensure a competitive market. As I note in my book, most of these have applied at one time or another to the market in corrections in the UK.

And this applied in spades to the Rainsbrook saga. Something the Justice Committee understood:

‘The Ministry of Justice, Youth Custody Service and HMPPS are equally responsible for some failings at Rainsbrook because of significant and fundamental failings in the way they have overseen what happened there…. the YCS and MoJ manifestly failed to understand what the conditions were at Rainsbrook…and it is a question that goes wider than..…one custodial institution.’

The inspectors also understood this. They told the Committee:

“You cannot lay this solely at the door of the provider. The YCS when it contracts for a service does not absolve itself of responsibility for making sure the service is delivered…”

I set out here different ways in which the MoJ, in which I include the YCS and HMMPS, failed to do their job as customer for Rainsbrook and for youth custody services generally.

1. They did not know what was going on

This is perhaps the most extraordinary thing: that MoJ did not know that children were being locked up 23 1/2 hours a day. Of course, MTC consistently misled them. But – here’s the thing -the great strength of contacting for prisons in the UK, unlike the US, is that the customer has a permanent staff of monitors within the prison. At Rainsbrook, there were three YCS monitors working fulltime inside the institution. Three, full time! With just 54 children! Their failure to notice what was happening is even worse than that of MTC managers, because the monitors were there only you monitor what was actually happening. What on earth did they do with their days – in this tiny, tiny institution – is beyond comprehension. (MoJ’s response on this is a Civil Service classic: to appoint a fourth monitor!)

2. They extended the contract in 2020 - despite MTCs serious failures documented by inspection after inspection

The Justice Committee were perplexed by this, but, as with so much of this story, never got an answer from the MoJ. It is surely linked to MoJ’s other failure, their endless dithering over the future shape of youth custody, see 4) below. MoJ were perpetually ‘planning’ to replace STCs, having already closed 2, but are still years way from doing so. In those circumstances, no other provider would take on the poison chalice of Rainsbrook, two operators already having failed. Nor could the Prisons Service step in, because the whole point of STCs was to be an alternative to mainstream prison culture (and the absorption of that culture into Rainsbrook was part of the reason it failed).

3. The YCS failed to use the contract to push MTC into doing better

As I’ve said, a good contractual relationship doesn’t rely solely on contractual sanctions when dealing with persistent failure. But a time comes when they should be used: they get the attention of senior management in the company because it’s all lost profit (4). My book showed this in relation to earlier failures by prison providers. And in the case of an institution which has failed so completely for so many years that the customer withdraws all business, you’d expect significant financial penalties. Well, the grand total for the 5 years of MTC’s contractual failures at Rainsbrook is…£76k. Against a total contract value of £50 million. An irrelevance. I’ve FoI’d the details, but expect to be stonewalled – this Government has set up a unit specifically charged to obstruct FoI requests. So, I can’t say whether the fault was in the way the contract was written or the way the contract was managed, but either way, it makes a mockery of contracting. (By comparison, the operator of the now closed Medway STC was fined nearly £1 million.)

4. MoJ have dithered for years about the future of youth justice

Following the Taylor report in 2016, the Government accepted his recommendation to replace STCs with ‘Secure Schools’ and proposed two pilots would be opened, one in the north, the other in the south of the country (see Justice Committee's summary in their report on the future of youth custody, here ). They said the one in the south would open in 2020. That was then postponed, to 2022. And postponed again, to the end of 2022 (‘working towards’ December 2022, so let’s be clear, 2023). Seven years after the report. Never mind the points made by critics, that 1 or even 2 are not remotely enough, that there are still huge questions about what they will be like. This timetable means that STCs cannot be fully replaced for the best part of a decade after Taylor’s recommendations were accepted (certainly a decade after Grayling announced 'Secure Colleges' would be the future of youth custody, in 2013 - on which he spent some millions before cancelling 2015). And still MoJ cant spell out how they will be different from STCs (5).

The reason for the delay isn’t, as often with prisons, finding a site, nor planning consent – they are using the site of an old STC, it’s ready and waiting – but because MoJ let the contract to a charity only to find that….. a charity can’t legally run such an institution. They seemingly hadn’t thought to check.

This delay echoes the truly pathetic failure of the MoJ to deliver on the promise of 9 new prisons with 10,000 new places, originally made in 2016, of which 5 were to have opened last year. In actuality the first will not open til 2022. That delay was also self-inflicted. MoJ believed they could only afford the programme through Private Finance. But HMT had decided to drop PFI. That meant a long and – of course! -doomed paperchase to persuade HMT change its mind.

5. The original choice of MTC to run Rainsbrook

As I say, MTC is an American company. When I was FD, we were dubious about appointing an American company as prison contractor, because of the very different culture of American prisons. MTC has since tried several times to enter the prisons market here and has consistently been rejected, most recently for the Wellingborough contract. Yet the YCS nevertheless appointed them to the far more specialised, notoriously sensitive job of looking after troubled children, of which the MTC had seemingly no experience, certainly not in the UK. (This is why, in my book I argued that an STC should never be a new operators first experience of running a custodial facility). Of course, G4S had already failed with its STCs, it is possibly that none of the other UK custodial operators – Sodexho, MITIE - wanted to get involved. Nevertheless, appointing MTC turned out to have precisely the consequence one might have predicted, a failure to understand the specialised work of STCs.

6. Organisational complexity

I do not know, but I suspect another factor is the labyrinthine structures and relationships with the MoJ. When I was FD of HMPS, things were blissfully straightforward. We held all the prison contracts; we had the procurement people and the contract managers and the operational managers; we decided, subject to ministers, what prisons should be asked to do: we decided on the shape of the make and how and when it should move forward. And, I may say, we made a fair success of it (little of that down to me, I should say – I had just very able procurement people).

As far as I can see for youth custody, the contracts are held by the Youth Custody Service, they rely on MoJ for procurement, someone in the MoJ decides on policy and on development of new operating models, the YCS answer to the head of HMPPS even though HMPPS also supply custodial services to the YCS….plenty of opportunity there for accountability to diffuse.

Note: what is the difference between the failure of MTC, and the failure of MoJ?

Come on – you know this! It is of course that people at MTC will lose their jobs, while no one in the MoJ will suffer the least consequence. That, Buckland has already made clear, at his appearance before the Committee. They never, ever do.

Why I've changed my mind on contracting for custody

My book, published in 2015, argued the case that competition for running custodial institutions worked to the public good. I think I now have to revisit that conclusion. Not because I think contracting out inherently wrong, nor because the private sector always does badly – in fact, at present, privately run adult prisons are doing better than publicly run ones. But because I have come to the conclusion that the MoJ is institutionally incompetent as customer. And as I’ve said before, an incompetent customer sooner rather than later leads to failure by the supplier.

As it has with contracts for probation, with Birmingham prison, with facilities management, with electronic tagging, now with Rainsbrook, and with the replacement, Secure Schools.

The catch 22 of outsourcing : a Government that isn't good at managing services is probably not good at managing outsourcing.

Afterword: the curious incident of the dog in the night time

And what of Barnardos, paid to supply an advocacy service for these children on site? It seems it did not bark…

UPDATE 22 JUNE

MoJ has just published here a further letter from Ofsted which explains why Buckland had to act to remove all children from Rainsbrook immediately. So much for MTCs extraordinary decision to publicly challenge Ofsted's findings. I doubt I've ever seen a more damning report, and that's certainly saying something.

Julian Le Vay

NOTES

1. About £160, 000 per occupant per year, or 4 times the cost of a place in an adult jail, PQ, 23 May 2018. Secure childrens' homes cost even more, around £180,000 - £200, 000 a year per place. Most bizarre thing is, no one has ever properly evaluated either of them, despite these eye watering amounts.

2.The Committee's report contains the correspondence on the Urgent Notification. 17th report HC 1266, Rainsbrook Secure Training Centre. Can be found here.

3. MoJ wont let us know actual numbers. Commercial secret. Or that’s what they say now – in the past they freely published these figures. See

4. For those who accuse MTC of profiting through maltreating children: it appears from what they said to the Justice Committee that MTC are making a loss on the contract.

5. For those who appreciate the ebb and flow of history, a mordant account of the endless circling of policy on youth custody round 'punishment' or 'care' can be found at: Hagell, A., and Hazel, N.: 'Macro and micro patterns in he development of secure custodial institutions for serious and persistent young offenders in England and Wales', Youth Justice 1 (1), 2001

More Trouble at MoJ

Ever since the writing was on the wall for the CRCs, US company MTC Novo must have had their eye on forthcoming lucrative MoJ prison contracts, but the Rainsbrook omnishambles has surely put paid to that? Of course we are talking of the MoJ here, their legendary contracting skills and the dysfunctional outfit run by Antonia Romeo of TR fame and currently in the process of wresting total control of the Probation Service. 

Sir Bob Neil at the Justice Committee has clearly lost his patience with both MTC Novo and the MoJ judging by this terse statement issued today:- 

Ministry of Justice still has questions to answer over Rainsbrook

The Justice Committee calls on the Ministry of Justice to explain why prison operator MTC was granted a two-year extension in 2020 to its contract to run Rainsbrook Secure Training Centre despite long-term concerns about its performance.

Read the Report: Rainsbrook Secure Training Centre

On 16 June, it was announced that all children would be removed from Rainsbrook amid serious concerns for the safety of those housed there. The facility had previously received a catalogue of negative inspection reports by Ofsted, the Inspectorate of Prisons and the Care Quality Commission, and also issued with two Urgent Notifications in less than a year. The Justice Committee’s own report, published in March this year, called for the running of the facility to be brought back in-house, should MTC fail to deliver the improvements necessary.

In a follow-up report published today, the Committee has set out a series of questions about the decision making process that led to the contract to run the facility to be extended despite repeated criticisms from independent inspectors, two improvement notices being issued and financial penalties levied.

Questions also remain over the financial cost of extending the contract and what termination costs may now apply, as well as what the future use of the Rainsbrook facility will be. The Ministry has been requested to disclose this information.

The Committee expects to receive a reply in two weeks.

--oo00oo--

This from BBC website 16th June:-

Rainsbrook: Children to be removed over training centre safety fears

The Ministry of Justice is removing all children from a key institution detaining young criminals in the UK, amid serious concerns for their safety. All 33 children currently detained at the Rainsbrook Secure Training Centre will be transferred to other institutions. Justice Secretary Robert Buckland said private contractor MTC had "failed to deliver" vital changes. The company said it was surprised by the move and challenged the findings.

During the peak of the pandemic last year, detainees were being locked up in near solitary confinement as a quarantine measure. Three watchdogs were so concerned to find that children were still being held in those conditions in December, despite an order to the centre's management to stop, they ordered ministers to take urgent action. That prompted Justice Secretary Robert Buckland to order major changes to how private contractor MTC ran the facility in Northamptonshire, including new managers responsible for more closely monitoring how the young detainees were being cared for. But in a statement on Wednesday, the Ministry of Justice revealed that a further inspection by the education watchdog Ofsted had rated the centre as "inadequate", despite attempts to turn it around. It said that the most urgent concerns about the time children spent locked up had been addressed - but the government did not believe that MTC had done enough to resolve "wider long-standing issues".

Mr Buckland said: "Six months ago, I demanded that MTC take immediate action to fix the very serious failings at Rainsbrook. They have failed to deliver and I have been left with no choice but to ask that all children are moved elsewhere as soon as possible. This move will help protect the public by ensuring often vulnerable children get the support they need to turn their lives around - ultimately resulting in fewer victims and safer streets."

The 33 current detainees will be moved out of the facility to other accommodation within the youth justice system. In practice that means the only other operating secure training centre (STC) or secure children's homes that are dotted around the country.

In a statement, MTC said the welfare of children had been its priority and it had been working in close partnership with officials from the Ministry of Justice since late last year.

"Given the previous positive assessments, including Ofsted's follow-up visit in January, we were very surprised to receive Ofsted's feedback at the end of last week's inspection," said the statement. "We have a number of concerns about their approach and ultimately the conclusions they have reached. We plan to vigorously challenge this as we go through the fact-checking process."

Rainsbrook will be mothballed while the MOJ considers its future, including its contract with MTC. It's not clear whether the contract can be automatically terminated. The potential complete closure of Rainsbrook would mean that two of the three STCs in England have been emptied after serious allegations of poor management and care - the other being Medway in Kent.

A Shot Over The Bows

Regular readers, especially those associated with the MTC Novo-run CRCs, will be fully aware of Helga Swidenbank. Over the years we've covered the goings-on many times, so the following shot over the bows from an irritated Sir Bob Neill, Chair of the Justice Select Committee to Robert Buckland, Secretary of State for Justice, will be of interest:-

By Email 21 April 2021

Dear Robert

It has been drawn to the Committee’s attention that Helga Swidenbank, the Executive Director of the Youth Custody Service, who gave evidence with you to the Committee on 9 March this year in regard to the Urgent Notification Procedure recently raised over Rainsbrook STC had previously worked for Rainsbrook’s operator, MTC, as director of the London CRC it ran and, briefly, as effective interim managing director before David Hood filled that role in 2017. 

While we appreciate that these facts are publicly available and that no rule was broken, we feel that it would have been appropriate, given the subject matter under discussion, for Ms Swidenbank to have declared her obvious interest in MTC during the session, particularly given how clear it must have been that MTC’s performance at Rainsbrook had been severely criticized and was likely to attract comment from the Committee. 

We would ask that, as a matter of good practice, any civil servant appearing before the Committee in future be encouraged to make any such interest clear and transparent during the evidence session, and we would appreciate a commitment from you to that effect as soon as is possible. 

I am copying this letter to Helga Swidenbank. 

Best wishes

Sir Robert Neill MP

News Roundup March 2021

As we know, there's absolutely nothing to see at the MoJ, but here's what the Justice Select Committee had to say by way of Conclusions and Recommendations regarding the Rainsbrook Secure Training Centre affair:-

Introduction

1. The litany of inaction and what one inspector called “utter incompetence” at Rainsbrook year after year provides a cautionary tale of how badly an arms-length relationship between the Ministry of Justice as a client and MTC as the company hired to deliver on contract can fail to deliver basic standards of care to vulnerable children. (Paragraph 2)

2. We recognise that all prisons and other custodial institutions face additional pressures during the current covid-19 pandemic, but we do not consider those to be justification or excuse for the continued poor conditions at Rainsbrook and the repeated absence of effective action to remedy them by staff employed by MTC at Rainsbrook and senior staff at the Ministry of Justice and Youth Custody Service. (Paragraph 9)

Inspectorate findings

3. Staffing at Rainsbrook was affected by covid-19, but so was the number of children at the centre, down to around half of capacity. The staff-to-child ratio was broadly unaffected and additional financial resource was provided to MTC by the Ministry of Justice. We cannot fathom why children were left in their cells for 23.5 hours a day after that practice had been identified and criticised and had supposedly ceased. Even more, we cannot understand why that fact went unnoticed and unaddressed by managers and monitors whose offices were two minutes’ walk from the children’s cells. It seems extraordinary that MTC managers and YCS monitors did not leave their offices to find out for themselves the condition in which the children in their care were kept. (Paragraph 22)

4. We are glad that new management is in place at MTC, particularly a new director on site and a new head of education, and that the YCS has taken steps to improve its on-site presence. We note the promises Mr Mulholland made to improve matters, but the experience of the inspectorates over the past 12 months has been that promises are worth less than the paper they are written on and we expect to see evidence of real change at Rainsbrook. We are concerned by Mr Mulholland’s statement that he plans to accept only recommendations “we think are fair or grounded” and recommend that he make a clear, public commitment to implementing the change the inspectorates, as independent external bodies, tell Rainsbrook to make unless there are clear, evidenced and transparently recorded reasons for doing otherwise in any specific case. (Paragraph 30)

5. High staff turnover experienced at Rainsbrook, has, without a doubt, contributed to the significant failings at the centre. Youth custodial institutions are vastly different to the adult estate, and require staff who have an understanding and experience of the environment they will be working in. While there is nothing wrong with staff moving across to the youth estate from the adult estate, it is not appropriate for these staff to operate as though they are in the adult estate. We recommend that the management at MTC set out clearly what they are doing to address the existing issue of staff retention, including what incentives and support they offer to staff. MTC should also set out what training is given to staff to ensure that staff are adequately skilled and equipped to work in the youth custodial estate. If consideration has not been given to this, MTC should set out what plans it has in place to ensure that staff are adequately trained and supported to work well in a youth custodial environment. (Paragraph 35)

6. The children held in secure institutions have committed often very serious crimes but also include some of the most vulnerable members of society. Those in detention at Rainsbrook were considered too vulnerable to be placed in Young Offender Institutions. The evidence we have heard is shocking; it is unacceptable to lock children in their cells twenty three-and-a-half hours a day, with limited meaningful social contact, a practice tantamount, as the three inspectorates rightly say, to placing them in solitary confinement. Whatever crimes they have committed, children—vulnerable children—deserve to be treated with dignity and respect, and it is clear that this has not been so at Rainsbrook. (Paragraph 37)

7. It is a startling indictment of senior managers at MTC that the overwhelming majority of recommendations made by the joint inspectorates in February 2020 were not actioned. Those managers and the company appear largely to have ignored those recommendations until the Urgent Notification was invoked. A picture has been painted of a bureaucratic response built on managing the requirements of a contract, producing pieces of paper, and providing assurances that all was well when nothing was being done to make it so—even to the extent that the Secretary of State put his name in good faith to a letter saying that improvement was happening when it was not. An action plan without any action is pointless. MTC Managing Director Mr Mulholland told us he plans to accept only recommendations he thinks fair, a response that gives little confidence that the new management installed since Urgent Notification is demonstrating the necessary grip or understanding. (Paragraph 38)

8. We are not confident in MTC’s ability to deliver the action required by recommendations repeatedly made over a period of years by the three inspectorates. We recommend that MTC and the Youth Custody Service report to us by June 2021, setting out in detail what progress has been made against the action plan now developed. MTC should also set out what impact changes made have had on children at the centre. If no substantial improvement is then apparent, the Ministry should consider taking Rainsbrook back in house. (Paragraph 39)

9. It is clear that further work needs to be done on the way in which the prison service more generally responds to recommendations. It is important for all organisations that they are able to learn from external sources of assurance. Inspectorates have told us, in this and in other inquiries, that they repeatedly make the same recommendations over a sustained period without effective action resulting. This brings into question how seriously the prison service takes the recommendations made. The Ministry of Justice should set out in detail, what work they are doing to ensure that recommendations made by Inspectorates are taken seriously and acted upon quickly and effectively. (Paragraph 40)

Oversight of Rainsbrook STC

10. We welcome the implementation of a new assurance process. More is required than that, however, given what we have heard about action plans being written but not acted on. Those charged with overseeing previous assurances processes failed in the basic task of checking for themselves what was going on and we need greater confidence that a new process will improve upon the existing one. We recommend that MTC set out what their new assurance process is and how it differs from the one previously in existence. In particular, what practical steps will MTC take to ensure that its senior managers at the centre know, for themselves, whether improvements reported to them are real and long-lasting? We also recommend that the Ministry of Justice and the Youth Custody Service set out clearly what they will do to assess the provider’s new assurance processes to ensure that they are operating effectively, and to confirm, for themselves, that what they are being told is true. (Paragraph 51)

11. The Ministry of Justice, Youth Custody Service, HMPPS and MTC failed in their management and oversight of Rainsbrook STC, and the evidence suggests that, in varying degrees, that failure was not limited to one body. We are deeply concerned that processes in place to oversee Rainsbrook failed to fully safeguard children in the care of the establishment. We welcome work being done to address failings, but the issues identified here in poor leadership and oversight are not new and a greater sense of urgency is required. We welcome the independent review being carried out to understand what went wrong, directed by HMPPS, and recommend that HMPPS share its findings with the Committee and set out clearly what changes will be made to national oversight to ensure that HMPPS, YCS and MoJ have sufficient grip and oversight on all institutions, both contracted and public. (Paragraph 58)

12. We recommend that the Ministry of Justice review monitoring processes in place across the youth secure estate to ensure that robust central monitoring is in place. The Ministry should also set out how they intend to learn lessons from the failings at Rainsbrook, and ensure that the same mistakes are not made in the delivery of secure schools. (Paragraph 59)

13. Embedding YCS staff within the institutions whose performance they are monitoring is clearly good practice in principle but is not sufficient on its own. The Minister should consider having additional monitors travelling around sites, or a further form of independent monitoring. We recommend that the Ministry consider how it can manage the risk of its staff either failing to see what is happening or failing to challenge it. Whichever of those things happened at Rainsbrook, neither is acceptable. (Paragraph 60)

14. We are concerned that Ministry of Justice awarded MTC the maximum possible contract extension. Based on the evidence heard on 9 March, coupled with the inspectorates’ findings, it is clear that MTC have failed to fulfil a number of contractual obligations. The company clearly did not fulfil the requirement to “deliver a service that places Young People at its heart and considers their needs, wants and wishes at all stages of their stay at the STC”. While the difficulties of re-letting a contract and potentially changing a Secure Training Centre provider during the covid-19 pandemic may be considerable, there can be little justification for retaining the services of a badly under-performing contractor, and even less for giving them two more years of that contract. Notwithstanding the complications of letting a contract during a pandemic period, no one’s needs, and in particular the needs of some of our society’s most vulnerable children, should be placed second to administrative considerations. (Paragraph 68)

15. We seek a clear explanation of why the Ministry of Justice chose to extend MTC’s contract by two years when the contractor’s ability to deliver was already in question, and we ask what ministerial involvement there was in making that decision and, in particular, in signing it off. (Paragraph 69)

16. Consistently sub-standard performance of a contract does not merit renewal in any circumstances. We recommend that the Secretary of State urgently reviews whether his Ministry plans to renew any other contract or any contractor whose performance is similarly consistently poor. (Paragraph 70)

17. We are glad to hear the Secretary of State, Rt Hon. Robert Buckland QC MP, say “I absolutely take and hold accountability overall, which I am prepared to accept, and I do so in front of the Committee”. No-one likes, in his own phrase, being “played for a fool” and we appreciate his commitment to ensure that there are serious consequences in store should any attempt be made to mislead him or his Ministry again about what is being done at Rainsbrook. (Paragraph 72)

--oo00oo--

This from the BBC news website:-

A scheme to fit electronic tags on offenders to see if they are breaching court-ordered drinking bans is being rolled out across England.

The "sobriety tags" monitor a wearer's sweat levels every 30 minutes, and alert probation services if alcohol is detected. Offenders breaching their abstinence order can then be returned to court to face further sanctions. The scheme has been in operation across Wales since October. The government said more than 100 people have been tagged there since then, with offenders staying sober on over 95% of days monitored.

The rollout across England was meant to begin in late 2020, but has been delayed. Under the scheme, courts will be able to hand out "alcohol abstinence orders" to offenders who commit crimes fuelled by alcohol. These can require the offender to abstain from alcohol for up to four months and wear the electronic tag to monitor compliance.

Policing and Crime Minister Kit Malthouse said the tags were a "powerful new tool" to combat alcohol-fuelled violence and help steer offenders away from "bad habits". The tags can only be used with offenders over the age of 18, who are not dependent on alcohol or have certain medical conditions. The government says the tags can distinguish the difference between drinks and other types of alcohol - such as in hand sanitiser or perfume. The scheme has already been trialled in Humberside, Lincolnshire, North Yorkshire and London.

--oo00oo--

Hi Jim

Apologies for the random cheek of this request, but I wonder if you or any of your readers might be able to assist or put me in touch with someone else.

I was formerly employed by the Probation Service in Norwich (Norfolk and Suffolk Probation Trust) between 2005 and 2013. I was subject to a TUPE transfer in 2013 to a local charity and was TUPE’d once more in 2018 to another charity.

I am now in the position of either being redeployed as part of a restructure or being made redundant. My employer states I am still subject to my probation terms and conditions but has admitted they do not have a copy of the staff handbook or any relevant policies and have said I will not get any excess mileage if I remain and will get statutory redundancy pay if I leave.

I have tried speaking to the Norwich probation office but was told they no longer have an HR department on site. I contacted the Welsh service centre who explained they took over the HR function in 2017 so they cannot help either.

Unison aren’t willing to help as I’m not currently a member and although NAPO were kind enough to send some information it all relates to 2014 when the CRCs were created as prior to this apparently it was all by local agreement and they don’t hold records for NSPT.

I am really at a loss as to where to turn and am being pressed to make a decision over whether I wish to stay or be made redundant. Would you mind putting a shout out to see if any of your readers can help.

Thank you for taking the time to read this.

--oo00oo--

Finally, I'm told that Monday's Nottingham Evening Post included reporting of the Inquest into the death of Janet Scott and calls for another PO head to roll. Many might feel this is another scapegoating exercise. Sonia Flynn is quoted as saying “standards falling well below what was expected, etc.“ The same words used in the Campbell Case.

Transition News

As the probation service prepares for yet another major upheaval, morale is undoubtedly low with the prospect of another 'shafting' and omnishambles as everything is thrown in the air with no one at all sure how or where they will land. Of course the order of the day is to put a brave face on things and assure staff everything will be fine. This from London gives a flavour of things:-  

Welcome

A few words from Kilvinder Vigurs and Kirsty Blair

Welcome to this first edition of Transition News, bringing you all the latest updates on the transition to the new unified model for probation, in one handy monthly publication. 

We’re delighted to come together as the respective directors of London National Probation Service (NPS) and MTC, to bring you this joint update, and are committed to continuing to work together to ensure a smooth transition to the new service. With less than 12 months until the new unified model commences, we’re committed to telling you what we know about the transition plans as they develop – and we learn more. And to give you an opportunity to ask questions or raise any concerns you may have along the way. 

Stronger together 

The transition to the new unified model will signal the start of a new era for the probation service. And with that comes an opportunity to deliver even better quality probation services by building on the strengths of colleagues from the NPS and those from MTC and London Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC) who will transfer to the new unified service – whether that be to the NPS or Dynamic Framework provider. We both continue to work closely with the HMPPS Transition Programme Team to help shape and influence their plans, with a firm focus on ensuring our services, employees and service users can safely transition to the new arrangements. 

We aim, through each edition of this newsletter, to:

• Share significant transition milestones with you, and provide updates against them.
• Give you a better understanding of what the transition will mean for you and your role, once this detail is known.
• Answer some of your frequently asked questions. 

The reality is, the transition plans are very top-level at this stage, the details are still being developed, and we don’t have all the answers as yet. But we’ve taken the opportunity in this edition to outline and provide what we hope you will find to be a useful reminder of what we know so far.

A continued focus on quality 

With Exceptional Delivery Model (EDM) recovery planning underway across probation nationally, between now and June next year the focus for colleagues in London CRC, MTC and London NPS must be firmly on continuing to deliver quality probation services. This will ensure we have solid foundations to build on when we come together as colleagues in the new unified NPS. We know we can rely on your support as we start to safely increase our service delivery in line with local recovery plans. In the meantime, we hope you find the contents of this newsletter interesting and helpful, and would love to hear from you if you have any questions. Simply email your organisation’s inbox – TransitionNews@mtcgroup.org.uk or londonnps.bsc@justice.gov.uk – and we’ll do all we can to answer them in the next edition. A big thank you for all your hard work and commitment during these unprecedented times.

Kilvinder Vigurs Regional Probation Director, NPS

Kirsty Blair Interim Managing Director, MTC 

What we know so far 

Coinciding with all Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC) contracts coming to an end, probation service delivery in England will transition to the new unified model from 25 June next year. The new model will see colleagues from CRCs and the National Probation Service (NPS) coming together to deliver probation services across 11 unified regions across England. This will mirror the approach taken in Wales where probation service delivery has already been unified. 

End-to-end service delivery 

As announced in June this year, delivery of Unpaid Work, Accredited Programmes and structured interventions will now be managed by the new unified NPS alongside case management. While this means the Probation Delivery Partner (PDP) framework is no longer a component of the unified model, the Dynamic Framework (DF) is, and the competition to select providers is under way – starting with ETE and moving on to Accommodation, Personal Wellbeing, and Women’s Services. Under this framework, practitioners in the unified NPS will be able to access a range of rehabilitative services which meet regional requirements, and are provided by pre-qualified voluntary and private sector organisations. With experience of developing and delivering structured interventions, MTC which runs London CRC, is tendering for this piece of work. 

On 25 June, depending on the work they do, individuals who currently work for London CRC or in MTC corporate roles which support case management and are identified as in scope to do so, will transfer to the NPS or the regional DF provider. A standard, nationwide process, which looks at the tasks performed by individual roles, will determine which roles are in scope to transfer to the unified service. All private sector probation providers have been asked to contribute to this process by providing information to the Transition Programme Team by the end of September. 

Coming together to deliver quality services 

Recognising the complexity of bringing two organisations together, and with a firm focus on ensuring services can continue to be delivered safely, a phased approach will be taken to integrating operational delivery under the unified model. This means, wherever appropriate, CRC, MTC and NPS colleagues will continue to do their existing jobs and be based at their existing locations initially when the unified model for probation launches on 25 June. Everyone who transfers from London CRC and MTC will have an induction on any new systems (including OASys and nDelius) and processes before this date. 

A key principle for the new model for probation is to create a new, unified service which combines the skills, experience and best practice approaches of both NPS and CRC colleagues to deliver consistent, quality end-to-end probation services to reduce reoffending and protect the public. Once the new model has launched, the focus for Kilvinder and her senior leadership team will therefore be to build on this and work with you to shape London probation’s new service and organisational culture. 

Enabling you to be your best 

HMPPS have recently published their Probation Workforce Strategy which outlines their three year vision to make probation a rewarding place to work. Developed by the Probation Workforce Programme – working closely with NPS Regional Directors, CRC CEOs, probation employees, trade unions, and other key stakeholders – the strategy covers five objectives of the HMPPS People Plan: 

• Investing in and promoting wellbeing for all employees. 
• Attracting and retaining talented people. Ã Supporting and developing employees. 
• Creating a more diverse workforce where everyone feels included. 
• Fostering confident leaders who inspire and empower others. 

The strategy also confirms an increase in recruitment of probation employees this year, with a target of a minimum of 1,000 new Probation Officers in training by January 2021. You can read the Probation Workforce Strategy here.

Failure Rewarded Again!

I've been a bit distracted of late and this from the Independent is slightly old news, but it's certainly worth highlighting and especially as 'outsourcing' is proving so spectacularly bad at running Covid test and trace:- 

G4S wins £300m government contract to run ‘mega-prison’

G4S has won a £300m government contract to run a new “mega-prison” which will house 1,680 inmates. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) selected the security company to manage HMP Five Wells, a category C jail in Wellingborough, despite a series of scandals and after the firm was stripped of its contact to run crisis-hit Birmingham prison last year. The government had named G4S as its preferred choice to run the new £253m prison in July but faced a legal challenge from a rival bidder. 

Prisons minister Lucy Frazer confirmed on Tuesday the company had been awarded the 10-year contract. Five Wells is set to open in early 2022, on the site of a former jail which closed in 2012, creating 700 jobs.

Birmingham prison was taken back into state control in April last year after G4S was stripped of the contact seven years early. The jail, one of the largest in the country, had plunged into crisis under private management, according to damning findings by the chief inspector of prisons, Peter Clarke. His report likened scenes to a war zone and said inmates walked around "like zombies" while on drugs and flouted rules with impunity.

G4S also pulled out of running Brook House immigration removal centre near Gatwick Airport last year and stopping running Medway secure training centre in Kent in 2016 after BBC's Panorama programme broadcast undercover footage of inmates and detainees being allegedly assaulted and verbally abused at two sites.

The company runs four other prisons - Altcourse, Parc, Rye Hill and Oakwood - which have won praise from inspectors. But just days after it emerged G4S was the front-runner for the Wellingborough contract, the firm was fined £38m by the Serious Fraud Office for “dishonestly” overcharging the government for the electronic tagging of offenders.

Frances Crook, chief executive of the Howard League for Penal Reform, said: 

“At a time when we should be investing in public health, ministers are once again pouring millions into the coffers of G4S. Even after a major tagging scandal and the disastrous management of Birmingham prison, the profiteers of punishment continue to be rewarded for failure. Unfortunately, the people of Northamptonshire will be the ones picking up the tab, as a huge new prison in their county will bring more crime and heap more pressure on police, hospitals and other public services.”

David Lammy, Labour’s shadow justice secretary, said: “G4S’s past performance illustrates the failings of privatisation in the justice system. Its well-publicised failure to manage HMP Birmingham led to reports of violence, unsanitary conditions, drink, drugs, and the bullying of staff. Serious questions must be asked about why the government has handed the contract for the new prison in Wellingborough to G4S.”

The MoJ said the UK’s privately run prisons were "among the best-performing across the estate and have been consistently praised by independent inspectors". It added 95 per cent of inspection scores awarded to jails run by G4S graded their performance as good or reasonably good. 

An MoJ spokesman said: "G4S-managed prisons have also brought innovative new approaches to offender rehabilitation, including a cutting-edge families intervention programme and peer-led initiatives, praised by prison inspectors for building 'excellent personal and social skills' so prisoners contribute in jail and are prepared for resettlement."

Graham Levinsohn, UK chief executive of G4S, said: “In partnership with the Ministry of Justice, our mutual aim is to ensure that Five Wells becomes the blueprint for innovation, rehabilitation and modernisation in the prison service."

Napo Annual Report 2019/20

The Annual Report stretches to 82 pages and I notice that the NEC met 5 times since the last report:-

"The NEC has met five times since the last annual report was written: scheduled meetings in September and November of 2019 and in March and June of 2020; and a Special NEC in July 2020. The Special NEC was to consider constitutional amendments to go to AGM in October. The NEC oversees the work of all Napo’s standing committees and networks and receives regular reports from them. Much of the business conducted by the NEC is therefore reported in other sections of the Annual Report."

Probation Negotiating Committee

1. The Committee carried one vacancy in Bands 1-3, one vacancy in Band 4 and one vacancy in Bands 5+. It has met in November, March, May July and August since the last annual report was written. The Committee would also want to thank former PNC members Esther Barton and Dino Peros for their work over previous years. 

2. The items below were discussed at meetings and incorporated regular updates by Link National Officials for their respective CRC areas. 

3. Probation Reunification update. The announcement in June this year that Interventions and Programmes would follow Sentence Management into the NPS, completed the first part of Napo’s campaign to return Probation back to full public ownership and control. 

4. Since the first announcement in May 2019 the General Secretary and National Chair have been involved in intensive negotiations on a new staff transfer and protections agreement to facilitate this major project, and after the new announcement in June 2020 the negotiations changed to accommodate the new plans. 

5. At the time of writing it is expected that there will be a CRC members’ ballot on the outcome of the negotiations in the summer. 

6. NPS Pay. The two year NPS pay deal ended in March 2020 but it became clear late last year that agreement on a Competency Based Framework model that was to provide the basis for future pay progression with effect from April 2020 would not be possible. This was through no fault of the recognised trade unions but a failure by the NPS to sufficiently resource this project. 

7. After further negotiations, the employer agreed that pay progression would be awarded to NPS staff in April 2020 and that unless the CBF was in place for a 12-month period prior to April 2021 then pay progression would also be enacted at that date. 

8. Unfortunately, the election of a new 80-seat majority Tory Government in December saw a hardening of attitude in respect of the pay remit policy and we heard the bad news that pay progression for NPS staff would be delayed. 

9. Napo were among many trade unions who had expressed concern prior to the General Election at what another Tory Government would mean for public sector pay. 

10. Obviously, the trade unions expressed outrage that our members were facing this unjust scenario and several meetings have taken place with the Director General for Probation and the Justice Minister over recent months. We have been reassured that pay progression will be paid when the 2020 pay negotiations are concluded. 

11. At the time of writing NPS Pay negotiations are at last set to resume. 

12. Pay Unity Campaign. Napo National Officials have maintained pressure on CRC owners to take positive steps to redress the imbalance between CRC and NPS pay rates, and recognise the significant recruitment and retention challenges across the whole of probation. 

13. On-Going HR Process issues, including PAYE and Pensions. Whilst further progress has been made in addressing the high number of members who continue to suffer from PAYE, pension and HR processing errors – including over and under payments. There have been intermittent problems since the last AGM. 

14. Representations on these systematic failings continue and Napo has continually raised the loss of trust and confidence in these systems with Ministers, as they must inevitably impact upon confidence in how safely staff from CRCs can be absorbed into the NPS when the CRC contracts come to an end in June 2021. 

15. CRCs Negotiating Items: 

a) Kent Surrey and Sussex CRCs/Seetec (including ex-Working Links owned CRCs) 

• Pay. After months of hard work by reps and national officials from Napo and our sister unions, SEETEC KSS CRC, made a pay offer at the turn of the year covering staff across all of their regions for 2020/2021. This follows an earlier joint pay claim and the declaration of a pay dispute which led to further talks between the parties. 

• It is fair to say that the improvement in industrial relations between senior SEETEC Management and the Unions since SEETEC took over the CRC contracts in Wales and the South West from Working Links, was a major factor in this pay offer being made. 

• SEETEC KSS CRC were the first employer to declare that they were prepared to match the current NPS pay rates. This was a major step forward in Napo’s long running campaign to achieve pay parity across both arms of the Probation service. 

b) The SEETEC offer 

• Realignment of all salary bands to the current NPS Pay bandings (if this results in less than a 3% increase for any employee, SEETEC would apply an unconsolidated payment for the % differential) 

• This proposal resulted in staff moving directly to the 2019 NPS position. Increasing the maxima of the band enabled employees at the top of the current pay band to receive an actual increase on their base pay. The employers offer meant that that the new minimum salary for any employee would be £19,977. 

• Mirroring the NPS bandings resulted in 74% of the workforce receiving an increase of 4% or above, and 52% of the workforce receiving an increase of 5% or above. 

• The offer was subsequently overwhelmingly accepted by members 

c) Interserve CRCs - pay 

• Following the 2018-19 award which was paid in February 2019 and was back dated to April 18, Napo and UNISON submitted a pay claim for 2019-20 in March 2019 for a minimum 3% increase for all Interserve CRC employees to be achieved through the payment of an annual increment on 1 April, restructuring of the pay spine and an unconsolidated payment if necessary. 

• An initial offer was rejected by 92% of Napo members and a series protracted pay talks ensued. Eventually a new offer emerged which was accepted by Napo members in July this year as follows: 

- April 2020 to November 2020 - one spine point increment. This was paid in May 2020, for all eligible staff; 

- April 2020 to November 2020 - an unconsolidated amount of £200 for those at the top spine point for their grade (This is pro-rata of the £300 full year amount taking it to December 2020);

- Removal of pay band overlap between bands 4 and 5, effective from 1 April 2020; - 5 December 2020 to June 2021 (at which point the CRC contract ends)

- NPS pay parity which will be paid in December 2020 payroll; 

- April 2021 to June 2021 (at which point the CRC contract ends) - one spine point increment to those eligible as per the NPS national agreement reached with the unions; 

- Allowances will remain unchanged. Any agreed changes with the NPS will take effect when pay parity is implemented in December. 

d) Sodexo CRCs 

• Pay. Napo and UNISON have held a number of further meetings on pay with Sodexo since the last AGM. Significant progress was made and the employer has recognised the importance of delivering pay reform in these discussions. 

• The Sodexo Pay agreement covers the six Sodexo CRCs for the years 2020/21 and 2021/22 (up to the CRC contract end). The offer was designed to modernise the pay structure so that staff will reach the top of the scale within a much shorter timeframe. 

• The main terms of the offer comprised for 2020/21 a 2.5% Non-consolidated payment for those at the top of their pay band A minimum pay increase for all other staff of 2.0%. For most this will be achieved through incremental progression however in instances where incremental progression is less than 2.0% a non-consolidated payment will be made. 

• The 2021/22 Pay Offer is a 2.5% non-consolidated payment for those at the top of their pay band 4 and a minimum pay increase for all other staff of 2.0%. For most this will be achieved through incremental progression however in instances where incremental progression is less than 2.0% a nonconsolidated payment will be made. 

e) Durham Tees Valley CRC 

• Pay. The second instalment of the two year pay agreement reached with Durham Tees Valley CRC has been enacted 

• This comprised a deal for 2020/21 and 2021/22 covering the remaining 15 months to contract end in June 2021. The pay deal provides a guaranteed minimum pay award of 6%, payable from April 2020 and assimilation onto the NPS pay scales. This means that the new pay scales will significantly reduce the time to progress through each pay band and the value of progression will be larger than in the current pay structure. Also, the offer guarantees each member of staff a minimum increase of 6% and some staff will receive a greater increase. As this offer met Napo’s demand, that the pay scales at DTV CRC are aligned to the NPS, Napo recommended acceptance of the pay offer. As a result Napo members voted overwhelmingly to accept the offer. The result of the ballot was 92% accept and 8% reject with a 50% turnout. 

f) MTC – London and Thames Valley 

• Pay. Whilst MTC have proposed a series of initiatives to help recruit and retain more staff across London and Thames Valley, where the problem continues to undermine workloads and performance, progress on taking forward the issue of pay beyond incremental progression has been very slow. 

• At the time of writing it was hoped that the employer would soon be in a position to make a realistic pay offer to the unions but the business case was awaiting central clearance. 

g) RRP: Staffordshire West Midlands and Derby, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire & Rutland 

• Pay. At the time of writing the company CEO is hoping to be in a position to make a formal pay offer to the unions once the business case has been cleared. The pay offer is only from October 2020 onwards but is a better position than was originally offered. Napo are working with RRP to push the MoJ into signing off the proposal as soon as possible. 

h) WWM CRC: Warwickshire West Mercia 

• Pay. WWM have only been able to make incremental progression payments and have been slow to address the wider issues of excessive workloads and staff shortages. At the time of writing a business case has been made for the opening of formal pay talks in September when the CRC believes it may be in a position to offer an increase for the last 6 months of their contract running from January 2021 until June. 

16. National NPS JNC and TU Engagement Meetings 

a) Privatisation of NPS Approved Premises - Double Waking Night Cover 

• Napo has continually raised the issues arising from the privatisation of DWNC at senior levels of the NPS and with Ministers. The results of a review of the project is expected later this year and we have made it clear that we do not believe that these contracts should be extended. 

• Regular reports on the impact of these flawed arrangements have been made to the PNC by the National Link Officer Siobhan Foreman (Vice-Chair) on which valuable feedback has been provided by PNC members. 

b) Approved Premises – Transition of Approved Premises to Community Interventions 

Regular reports on the progress of this project have been made to the PNC by the National Link Officer Siobhan Foreman (Vice-Chair) on which valuable feedback has been provided by PNC members. 

c) AP Staff Rota 

Trade unions have regularly raised issues around the impact of the national rota and this is now under review at the AP TU meetings. 

d) AP Pay Issues Update 

The unions have raised the issues around inconsistencies with pay in particular pay- protection, toil, overtime, unsocial hours and SSCL errors. 

e) National Facility time agreement update 

• The NPS presented an offer calculated on the basis of Cabinet Office rules i.e. the entitlement to facilities is a proportion of the pay bill. We have not yet accepted this and continue to discuss the actual allocation of time needed to support the employer in their reform programme. 

• The emergency measures introduced as a result of C-19 has meant that Napo has successfully sought additional time for our representatives to undertake Health and Safety duties. 

• Once circumstances allow it is intended to resume the negotiations and it is hoped that the introduction of a new Regional structure within the NPS will facilitate these exchanges. The changes to branch structure will further support negotiations at regional level. 

f) Offender Management in Custody 

• This has been a complex and difficult issue and the following summary reports the position that has been reached at the time of writing. 

• The consultation process. Napo have been consulted by the employer on the plans to implement OMiC. This is a consultation not a negotiation and although we can raise concerns and make suggestions and requests, we are not in a position to agree (or fail to agree) the plans. We are aware that many members have significant concerns over the fundamental design of OMiC and we have communicated these concerns. 

• The implementation process. There are Divisional Implementation Boards (DiBs) which are made up of both prison and probation representatives. These boards have now all submitted their OMiC implementation plans and Napo reps should have been consulted on this locally via the NPS JCC (Joint Consultative Committee) for the division/region. 

• The Women’s Estate. The model for the Women’s Estate varies in that the allocation of resource is based on complexity of need rather than risk. In the most complex cases (around 19% of the total) the POM will carry out the key work rather than having a separate keyworker allocated. This, it is hoped, will aid continuity and relationship building. 

• The contracted out estate. These are the privately run prisons and the original plan was to require (via the contracting process) them to have an SPO who holds a Probation Qualification but not to require these prisons to have Qualified Probation Officers holding cases as POMs. More work was undertaken on the plans for the contracted out estate following representations that Napo and the NPS senior leaders have made about this. Napo’s position is that Offender Management should only be done by someone who has the appropriate skills and qualification for the role they are carrying out and who are offered the appropriate support and remuneration for doing so. 

• The current position is that there will be POMs with a Probation qualification in each contracted out prison and they will either hold high risk cases or oversee the work done on these cases using the Case Management Support model. This does not necessarily have to be a member of NPS staff however it is reported that most of the private prisons have requested a staff loan/secondment arrangement from the NPS which will have a further impact on staffing. 

• Workloads for SPOs and POs working in OMiC 

The current method for looking at SPO workload is on a ratio basis. In community teams this is 1:10 FTE (full time equivalent). Under the OMiC model it will be up to 1:14 FTE. This means that some prison SPOs will have a high workload in terms of team members reporting to them in addition to the other tasks they need to undertake in their role. Napo have made representations on this, as well as the fact that the SPOs will be managing a team made up of staff from differing employers who will have different terms and conditions and potentially differing expectations in terms of line management. We will continue to press the employer on these issues and a review is underway. 

• The introduction of EDMs during the Covid-19 crisis highlighted the issues relating to NPS SPOs being line managed by Prison Governors. There have been reported tensions between expectations of prisons and NPS and the plans for line management have not been fully implemented as yet. We continue to use every opportunity to press HMPPS to rethink this part of the model. 

• IT solutions. There is a new IT based allocation system for use in prisons. This is to assist with the allocation of cases to either Prison staff OMs or NPS OMs within the team. The tool has been tested with some users and further work and testing will be carried out. Napo have asked that this tool is properly tested for AT compliance by end users before it is rolled out. We have also asked if an aspect of workload measurement can be built in to further assist the SPO will allocation decisions and this is in progress. Further work is being done on digital tools for the project and we are being consulted on them. 

g) Workloads 

• Workloads remain a critical issue across probation. It is hoped that the reunification of the service will allow for a wholesale review of the workload measurement and management process and the mis-match between demand and staffing levels in both CRCs (where they have not recovered from often cutting staff at the start of contracts) and the NPS (where they have not recruited enough POs after under-estimating how much work would remain in the NPS at the time of the original staff split). 

• Current data is still being gathered from CRCs, but at time writing there is a 23% + vacancy rate for POs across the NPS. Napo’s work in the wider reunification campaign has featured the fact that staff routinely report a normal case load allocation that places them at 130-140% on the workload measurement tool. This is dangerous and unsustainable. 

• Napo have also issued guidance to branches and members about how to protect themselves from excessive workload, including how to serve a foreseeability notice on their employer ahead of likely injury. 

• PNC has also focused much discussion on the particular pressures that increased workload and excessive additional HR burdens have placed on SPOs in CRCs and especially the NPS. Overloading SPOs creates wider problems – mistakes occur that stall HR processes; local employee relations become tense, reducing engagement and productivity levels; staff feel unsupported or isolated so become more prone to mistakes; and higher than expected sickness amongst SPOs has a disproportionate multiplying factor on all the other challenges. 

h) Serious Further Offence (SFO) procedures

 • There continue to be a number of high profile (as well as less high profile) SFOs coming to light. Napo has supported members who have been involved in resulting processes such as capability and disciplinary as well as those called to give evidence in Coroner’s Courts. HMPPS has consulted on both updates to SFO investigation and reporting guidance (making this more streamlined and the report more of a narrative than tick box as well as updating disclosure guidance) and updated guidance to support managers who, as a result of information that comes to light in an SFO process, need to consider taking action using either capability or disciplinary processes. 

• Throughout these consultations we have successfully argued for the consideration of workloads and have ensured that managers are always prompted to consider ‘no action necessary’ as an outcome. SFO investigations are necessary to ensure that organisations learn from these tragic events. We support all efforts to do this, especially where lessons can be learned by the organisation(s) involved however we will use whatever steps necessary to protect members from being unfairly scape-goated for organisational and systemic failings.

Justice Committee Hears From CRCs 2

Here we have the final part of the oral evidence from the CRCs:-

Q45 Dr Mullan: We heard from the probation inspectorate that two of the providers are rated as good. You have all talked about some of the positive work that you think you do. We are all keen to make sure that is carried across in some way. 

There are two things. The dynamic framework obviously sets out, just for resettlement services, that other people will be involved in providing services out of house. If the dynamic framework could be adjusted, and if there was an ability for providers like yourselves, on a non-geographical basis or even a smaller basis, to get involved in providing some of the intervention services that, for example, at the moment are going to go in-house, would that work for you? Would you be able to respond to that market approach, where you did not have a whole contract but could come in and help deliver some of the services that you may have a good track record of delivering? 

Trevor Shortt: There are some really good principles underpinning the dynamic framework. It gives local commissioners real opportunity to commission services that make sense in their patch. The wash-out on it, if you like, is that the procurement of those services is now under way, but not all of them will be in place for 26 June next year. The question we need to deal with is what happens to services that are not part of the day one services, and what happens to the organisations that are currently providing some of those, and indeed the people who were involved in some often small and bespoke organisations and local services that we need to look after through the transition. 

Q46 Dr Mullan: Let me pick up on that answer. I get from that that you perhaps think there is a wider scope. Our current interpretation is that the dynamic framework just allows for the resettlement services and not the broader interventions that you might undertake with a probationer. Do you have a different interpretation? 

Trevor Shortt: I think we see it as being both. From a Sodexo perspective, we are interested in what we might be able to provide in the dynamic framework. To answer your original question, we are looking at each of the call-offs in their own right, but it is not something we are seeing as a substitute for what might have been under the PDP. 

Suki Binning: The employee owners of Seetec are very much interested in continuing to provide services in this space, including the dynamic framework. Some of the concerns we have are that it appears that some services that we currently provide will fall between the cracks. For instance, at the moment we do not quite know where restorative justice sits. We have dedicated teams that provide restorative justice and mentoring services. From some of the initiatives that we have seen up and down the country with other CRCs it is not really clear where they sit. That is our concern. Certainly, the employee owners are interested to continue contributing in this field. 

David Hood: The first question was on whether we would interested in providing services that at the moment are going to be taken in-house— the intervention type services. Of course, we would be interested in exploring that. We have some very capable people in our organisation. That was part of our PDP approach, so the answer to that is yes, we would be interested in exploring that. 

It is important to echo Suki’s point, because it applies to us as we look at the current dynamic framework and what appears to be in scope for day one. There are services, including in London in particular, that are not currently in scope for day one of the dynamic framework. A question arises as to staff, but also what about the needs of service users currently receiving those services? 

Adam Hart: I would echo but not repeat the points that have been made. My understanding of the day one services is that they include employment, training, education, personal wellbeing and accommodation types of services. There is a reasonable spectrum with, hopefully, more to follow. We think we have a great deal to offer in all those spaces. That is of interest to us, but, as Suki articulated, there is a potential gap that we need to make sure is filled. Suki cited restorative justice. I would cite mentoring, specifically peer mentoring. 

Within my organisation—others do something similar—I now have over 40, either voluntary or employee, ex-service users. They have been on our case load and have shown a desire to come and work with us, and we have provided employment for those individuals. It is important because they are the ones with real lived experience. We place them in a peer mentoring programme. At the moment, we cannot position that anywhere in the framework or, indeed, potentially in the services that are going to the NPS. The dynamic framework has some very good aspects, but it would be even healthier if it could be widened a little bit further. 

Q47 Dr Mullan: Would you agree with me that there is perhaps a bit of tension? You currently have people working in this field and you currently hold those contracts. Then there will be a switchover, but probably ideally what would happen is that the people you are working with transition over time to a different provider. You are holding people that we might want to recruit directly in-house to deliver some of the stuff that you are doing at the moment. 

Trevor Shortt: There is no doubt that we are facing a challenge as we head into the end of these contracts for that reason. A number of our staff sit very comfortably in the new arrangements in the national service, but that does not capture everyone, particularly staff who fall into the dynamic framework arrangements where those services are not competed and settled this side of June. They face some uncertainty, and there may be disruption to service that we will need to manage as part of that. 

David Hood: Because it is an important point, I echo Trevor’s point. We need to resolve the position quickly in relation to those staff. Some of those staff are some of the best staff in the service, and the most capable. Losing them elsewhere would be a tragedy and not in anyone’s interest, where they decide that the uncertainty means they need to look elsewhere. 

Q48 Dr Mullan: I will move on and ask Suki in particular about how the changes to the model affect Wales. Obviously, the arrangements are different in Wales. 

Suki Binning: The Wales transfer of case management took place in December. The transition went quite smoothly. We had reservations that maybe post the transfer we might see a drop in referrals for programmes because we would have two organisations, but I am really pleased that that has not happened. The number of referrals for the behaviour change programmes has continued. 

We have a group of staff who were really motivated to take on the unpaid programmes work and be solely dedicated to do that, and they are quite disappointed now. In terms of the transfer, we were transferring case management which, on the whole, nationally is quite similar. There are only so many ways you can do case management of probation. Where we have differences is in how across the CRCs we deliver our unpaid work programmes, and we are transferring a very different thing. That is where it gets more complicated. 

Q49 Dr Mullan: Can I ask all of you about the impact of Covid-19 on the delivery of services? 

Adam Hart: Obviously, there is no getting away from the fact that there has been substantial impact on the service. I repeat a little bit of what I said earlier about the way people have managed to approach that. Organisations have stood up their best available people, plans and technology capabilities to rise to the challenge. What we are seeing now is the real impact of local lockdowns and the need to be incredibly flexible. We are literally monitoring the situation daily, if not hourly, to respond to that position. 

It is having a huge bearing on the way we operate. It is also of course increasing backlogs where they exist in the system. They exist in many places, so the pandemic is obviously a very long-lasting situation for all of us in the system. We are very mindful about how we hand that system back to the National Probation Service. We want it to be in the best possible space it can be. 

It is right to say that there have been some elements of the pandemic that have forced the system, and us as organisations, to react and respond slightly differently. There have been some benefits. I would cite the ability to work flexibly and remotely. Our capability has increased as a response to the pandemic. Also, some of what we do and how we do it has fundamentally shifted. It would be good if we did not lose that good-quality change, and if we embedded it in the new system. Overall, it is obviously a very significant and challenging time across the piece for us. 

Q50 Chair: Does anybody disagree or have anything to add? 

David Hood: I entirely agree. Adam has just made a good summary from our perspective. It would be remiss not to make the very clear and important point that heroic through this process have been the staff. Our staff have been quite remarkable in their adaptability, resilience and willingness to work together and with the Department to do something that is very different from what they are normally used to doing. I think we would all pay tribute to the staff within our organisations for that. They have been exceptional. 

Chair: Fair point. 

Q51 Rob Butler: I would like to talk, if I may, about some of the specifics of transition. I will pick up where Mr Hood left off in paying tribute to your staff. In my previous role as non-executive director of HMPPS, I met staff from all your companies, and was always incredibly impressed by their dedication, their commitment and their absolute determination to do the best by the service users. It is important that we do not lose sight of that when having discussions about the bigger picture. I am sure that view is shared by other members of the Committee. We would probably all wish you to pass on our thanks to them for working through an incredibly difficult period, not just because of Covid but because of the added uncertainty that the transition is creating for them, none of which has been brought on by themselves.

With that in mind, I am clear that they are working incredibly hard to try to hand over as effectively as they can. Some are going to move into the new unified model by next June. I would like to hear a little bit from each of you about how you see the transition going. If I may, I would like to start with Mr Hood, simply because I was in one of your hubs—the Bicester hub—a couple of weeks ago. It happens to deal with offenders from my constituency. I know there are particular concerns there about the case management system. Could you kick us off by talking through where you see us with transition, please? 

David Hood: Transition is incredibly difficult. If I can go back again to the points that Justin Russell made, he made the point that as with any transition of this dimension there are many moving parts. It is exceptionally complex. You are trying to take 21 CRCs, many of which have different operating models, and combine them with NPS regions. You are trying to deliver a dynamic framework and do all of it in the context of Covid, and within a period of less than a year. That is incredibly hard. 

The approach the Department is trying to take, as I understand it, is to do what they refer to as lift and shift and, rightly, try to deliver a new model with as little disruption on day one as possible. The reality is that, when you look at our CRCs, they are not delivering a lift and shift. The case management system is a good example, because it is a fundamental tool that our staff use. It is very different from what the NPS uses. It took us well over six months just to roll it out and train staff on that new tool. It sits within a suite of other technologies that support operations and are delivering operations in the context of reduced staff numbers over the years. Combining all those things together, we are presented with a very difficult proposition to get all of it working in June 2021. 

Q52 Rob Butler: Do you think there is any risk to public safety as a result of those difficulties? 

David Hood: In June 2021, if we have not effectively transitioned and we end up with something a bit chaotic, inevitably there must be some risk to public safety. The goal and the aim of all of us must be to make sure that that is not the case. That is certainly our goal. I acknowledge that it is also the Department’s goal, but they have really taken on a difficult task. 

Q53 Rob Butler: Do you feel that you have sufficient input to the Department to flag warnings when they are appropriate, and that they are being heeded? 

David Hood: Initially, when it started off, I think we were probably kept a little bit at arm’s length in terms of the planning. That has improved. We have a reasonable amount of input at the centre, and that seems to be increasing—necessarily so. At regional level, we have a lot of input in London and in the Thames Valley. Both those regions are served, I must say, exceptionally well by two very exceptional regional directors, who are very collaborative, as are their teams. That picture has improved, but it does not take away from the fact that this is an incredibly complex and challenging exercise. 

Q54 Rob Butler: Ms Binning, from your CRC’s perspective, how would you assess the process of transition? 

Suki Binning: Similarly to what David said. The timetable is very ambitious. It is not helped by the Covid situation. Locally, relationships with the regional transition boards are positive and very collaborative. That is all very good. I would, however, welcome a pause and a reflection on the timetable for transition in the light of Covid. 

Q55 Rob Butler: What would feel a more realistic timeframe to you? 

Suki Binning: I would look for a pause to look at where we are now and, in light of today’s news about further restrictions, take that into account and say, “Is June 2021 now a reasonable date to transfer?” The staff you have spoken about are very committed and are working very hard on making sure that we continue to provide a service that serves our communities, at the same time as doing the transition. I would like some time to have a look at that date and say, “Is that realistic now because of the pandemic?” 

Q56 Rob Butler: I infer from what you are suggesting that you do not think it is realistic. 

Suki Binning: I think it is really ambitious. It is putting a huge amount of stress on the operational delivery of services. 

Q57 Rob Butler: Mr Shortt, what is your assessment of the transition process, and would you share similar concerns to those we have already heard? 

Trevor Shortt: Yes, I share the concerns that have already been expressed. This is a complex transaction. We have the added complexities of Covid and the speed at which it is being done, all of which are stressors. Doubtless, there is a real will to deliver it both on this side and on the side of the Department. There is a huge amount of resource, time and energy going into that. 

As David said, at the beginning we felt perhaps a little distant from it. That position has improved at national and regional level. We also have some incredibly good regional directors across the NPS working with our own regional chief executives across some quite complex programme lines on the project to deliver it, but there is likely to be a chunk of outstanding work post transfer that will take some time to pack down and for the system to be performing again in the way we would all like it to be. 

Q58 Rob Butler: Mr Hart, do you want to add anything to what has been said about the generalities of transition planning? I would be particularly keen to hear your views on risks that are associated with it, and what you are doing to mitigate them. 

Adam Hart: I have a couple of points to add. First and foremost, it is right for me to say that I believe we have had very good engagement from the Department, especially over latter weeks and months. They are to be commended for the efforts that they are undertaking. It is a challenge. It is incredibly ambitious. I think that is recognised. 

It feels, however, that, because of that engagement, we are able to shine a spotlight on the areas of deficiency at this moment in time. We have to recognise that we are three months in, since the Lord Chancellor’s announcement. I would articulate that it perhaps does not quite feel like three months into a 12-month programme. I think we are still getting off the blocks. We need to expedite in order to safely deliver a transition in June 2021.

It feels like we are trying to do a 12 to 18-month programme in the remaining nine months. That would be my best descriptor. I say that because of the complexities of the programme itself, which is, effectively, taking 20 or 21 unique models and moving them into a unified model, whether that is technology, training requirements or staffing. The second reason I say that is that operating in the pandemic is, quite rightly, draining resources away to the frontline service that we need to provide and giving less management time to something as important as the successful transition. That can only heighten the risk. 

We are looking to mitigate as a CRC provider. I know that the MOJ is always seeking to mitigate risks, but for me those are the risks that we are currently facing. Having continued open and frank dialogue is a big risk mitigator. I am encouraged that that is there, but I think the way to best mitigate the risk is to slow things down a little bit and take stock. We should make sure that we have all the attributes of the system understood, known and planned for. We should have a single detailed plan. At the moment, we have a relatively high-level milestone-based plan. We need something of real rigour that sits underneath that milestone plan. I have no doubt that is being worked up, but, three months in, it would be good for all of us to be working to that. 

Another way of de-risking is to make sure we have clear dependencies between what is a donor recipient arrangement between the CRCs and the National Probation Service, and indeed the DF providers, and to understand the critical path to try to head off some of the risks that we have not even identified yet, because we do not have detailed analysis. If we could determine that critical path, we could head off quite a few of the risks of the future. I am sure some of those things will be available, hopefully in the near future. 

Some of them link to having a detailed target operating model for us all to share as the end state, the goal. As was mentioned in the previous evidence session, I do not believe that is due until early in the new year. Along with other materials, those are the types of things that will de-risk the approach and make it a success, which we all want, regardless of what our individual thoughts are about the good and the bad of undertaking the change. The change is going to happen; it needs to happen safely. 

Q59 Rob Butler: Briefly on that last point, do you share any of the concerns that Mr Hood expressed that there could potentially be a risk to public protection and public safety? Adam Hart: Given the statement that I just made, running what feels like a 12 to 18-month programme in a nine-month window has to heighten the risk to public safety. We are duty-bound to attempt to mitigate that. 

Q60 Rob Butler: Mr Shortt and Ms Binning, would you share those concerns? 

Suki Binning: Yes. The risks increase when you are trying to rush the transition through. 

Trevor Shortt: Any structural change brings its risks. I support what has been said, and we will obviously do everything we possibly can, together with the Department, to ensure that we mitigate those risks. 

Q61 Maria Eagle: You have all just expressed varying levels of concern about the risks of transition to the capability of the system and to public safety. Do you think there has been enough consideration of the needs of those who are being supervised by the system in the design of the new arrangements and the implementation of the transition? 

David Hood: I will leave one of those points to Suki. In terms of the transition, it feels to me that the best outcome for service users will be that the transition is carried out and completed smoothly, so that the services, as far as service users are concerned, feel very much the same moving from one to the other. 

That must be at risk if we are rushing a transition that is in danger on day one of being in a difficult position. It will inevitably therefore have an effect on the quality of service to service users. Coming back to the point made earlier, we need to be very careful that the transition is done effectively in the best interests of service users. 

Q62 Maria Eagle: Does anybody else want to come in on that point? 

Suki Binning: We have a service user council with representation from our service users, and they have been involved. We are also inviting the National Probation Service to seek representation from our service user council on the transition boards, which will ensure that they are part of the plans and can highlight concerns from a service user perspective. 

Adam Hart: Every major service I have ever run has always benefited from having service users in the design process. We are about to undertake a substantial change. To my knowledge, service users are not directly involved in the design of the future state solution. It is a little bit difficult because we do not have the TOM in the underlying plan to fully understand whether it is planned to engage with service users. I do not believe that service users across our communities have been engaged. I think that is one of the ways we will mitigate the residual risks. 

Where we have managed to engage with service users as groups and as communities, we have always taken stock and managed to improve services. Like Suki, we have something similar where we listen to the concerns and the positives that come from service users. We tailor our services on a regular basis. That would feel a totally appropriate thing to do. 

Trevor Shortt: I echo that. I do not think there has been, to my knowledge anyway, any input from service users in the overall design. However, we have service user councils, which are quite mature, running across all our services. Since the initial change in direction 12 months ago, when it was clear that CRCs were not going to be part of the landscape, we have been working quite closely with NPS regional directors as they have come into post to extend those service user arrangements and join them up, with User Voice as the VCS organisation sitting behind that and helping us to operate those services. 

I echo one other previous point. Critically in this transition, we want to ensure that some of the small bespoke and local arrangements that are of real benefit to service users are able to be picked up and carried on. 

Q63 Maria Eagle: How are the probation service users or offenders who are being managed by the system being supported during the transition? Are there plans in place? What are some of the risks, if any, associated with the transition for those who are being managed at present by your organisations and by the NPS separately? 

Trevor Shortt: Our expectation, which was set out by Justin Russell in evidence earlier this afternoon, is that, as case loads move, the staff working on those case loads move together with them. There should be a fundamental underpinning continuity that helps in the transition. As I said a moment ago, it is some of the other services that are placed in and around the interventions that we particularly need to secure. 

David Hood: Agreeing with Trevor’s point, I reiterate a point I made earlier. Continuity is critical. We know what our services and needs are. You can predict them looking forward. At the moment, many of those needs are met by the additional services that we receive and benefit from, delivered in particular by third sector providers. It is critical that those are available on day one of the new world. It is not clear to us that all of them will be either the type of service or the volume of service to meet the need. 

Adam Hart: The only thing I would add is that every CRC is relatively unique in its delivery model to some extent. In the CRCs in which we are involved, we have a model where approximately one in two, or one in three, of our staff are probation practitioners offering supervisory and other services. The other staff provide wrap-around services. Some provide interventions, but quite a lot provide services that do not readily appear in the user manual. Some of them are peer mentors or are in other services that we provide outside the norm. It is important in terms of the day one service in June 2021 to recognise that those wrap-around services are really important to the transition process itself, not only the safety of that process but the quality of the process. 

Q64 Andy Slaughter: I am reflecting on this discussion as we get towards the end of it. It has a bit of a feeling of after the Lord Mayor’s show about it. You are all concerned that there are risks in the transition or at least in the timetable for the transition. A lot of other people were concerned, including the Government, that it is a model that has not worked and that is why it is being abandoned after a short period of time. Whichever perspective you come from, it is a traumatic process and perhaps an unusual process for the public sector to go through. 

It affects the public and it affects users. I want to go back and look at staff again. As Mr Butler said, staff are at the heart of this. It is the quality of staff and the morale of staff that will deliver a decent service. Without being too personal about it, what is going to happen to all of you? Some of you come from a public sector background. Are you going back to that, or are you going to manage other parts of your private company’s organisation? What is happening to the senior management, and what is happening to the staff on the ground? 

Suki Binning: Senior managers and the staff will be transferred to wherever the work is going. If it is work that is going to the NPS—unpaid work programmes and case management—they will be on the list to transfer to the National Probation Service. If the work they do falls into the dynamic framework, they will move to those services. That includes staff across the spectrum. 

Q65 Andy Slaughter: I think you said you had a probation service background. Are you going back to that, or are you sticking with your company? 

Suki Binning: I will be on the list for transfer. What happens in the future, I do not yet know. 

Q66 Andy Slaughter: Does that go for the rest of you? I think some of you have more of a consultancy background, so I do not know where you are going. 

Trevor Shortt: The process of assignment is happening right now for the majority of our staff. There is, in all fairness, quite a degree of clarity for people who sit in very obvious places in the national system post June next year. There is less clarity for some of the parent organisation staff and some of what we call our back-office staff—that is inelegant; they are staff who look after things like finance, HR and other services. Finally, there is a group of staff who perhaps sit across different service areas. The balance of that is not quite clear yet in the new model. Some of them are disproportionately represented in the VCS partnerships we have. There is still some degree of uncertainty for a section of our staff, albeit with clarity for the majority. 

Q67 Andy Slaughter: That must add another layer of uncertainty on top of what must be a very traumatic period for the staff in any event. I do not know whether any other panellists want to comment on that, particularly with an eye to the fact that perhaps a high proportion of your staff will not have worked for the National Probation Service previously. For them, it will not be going back to something; it will be something fresh. How are you supporting them, and how is that transfer being managed? 

Adam Hart: We are very much at the start of that assignment process. It certainly has not completed yet. What we are already experiencing are probably more questions than the answers we are able to provide at this moment at time. Where that leads us is having very regular dialogue with our staff, who, in some respects, fall into at least two categories: those who have certainty about their future and those who do not. Those who do still have a huge number of questions that remain to be answered; hence my points about the target operating model and so on. That would immensely help with being able to answer those questions. The second group, however, are the people I and Mr Shortt mentioned in terms of the support service—the back-office staff. We are awaiting those responses as we speak. 

It is worth adding that various key senior members of staff have already started to transfer under agreement, where it is seen as appropriate to do so. I think that is the correct collaborative approach to take, but it applies more pressure to the CRCs in general, as we are now starting to lose quite senior managers to the NPS system, to allow the NPS to run their own programmes of change, because of course they are changing at the same time. That is a really important point. 

We have also undertaken quite a few secondments in both directions to look at how we embed some of the thinking from CRCs into NPS, and NPS into CRCs, so that we can learn rapidly. There is willingness to collaborate and demonstration of that fact. However, I do not think that gets us to the point of being able to answer everybody’s questions quite yet. It feels like we are a little way from knowing those answers just yet. 

David Hood: Echoing Adam’s point, there are a lot of opportunities for communication with staff and for staff to ask questions about the transition. Many of those opportunities are very collaborative. Last week, there was a joint session in London that involved the current MD of MTC and the London regional director. It involved CRC and NPS staff. It was focused very much on transition. The opportunities are there, but Adam is absolutely right: until we have answers to critical questions around where certain individuals will be placed and whether they have a role in the NPS, we are in a place where a lot of the answers to the questions that are being asked cannot be given. Therefore, the uncertainty cannot be addressed. The sooner we get to a place where it can be, then of course the better. 

This is obviously a staff business, and we have to make sure that they are retained and looked after. The history of the last few years has seen many experienced staff depart from probation. The challenge is how we stem that and, indeed, how we bring more experienced staff back into that world. Giving them clarity around the future will be critical to that. 

Q68 Andy Slaughter: If you are not getting answers to those questions at this stage, with only a matter of months to go, why is that happening and who are you not getting answers from? 

David Hood: The answers are not coming from the Department at the moment. That reflects where they are in their transition planning. We are about to enter a process of identifying those in the CRCs who will be assigned. That will take place over the coming months. As Adam said, we are expecting an answer on other staff very soon. We expect the answers to come soon. From my perspective, they cannot come soon enough, but they need to come from the Department as part of their planning process. 

Suki Binning: We have been working very closely with the regional probation directors on the transfer of staff, particularly from a cultural perspective. The staff in my CRCs are going from being employee owners to the civil service. We are conscious that on both sides that is going to be quite a significant change. We have been working very closely with the regional directors and having joint communications to make the transition, and ensuring that staff adapt to those changes. 

Q69 Andy Slaughter: I will end on this point. You are not quite as garrulous as a lot of the witnesses we have in front of us. 

Chair: That is a compliment. 

Andy Slaughter: It is a sort of compliment. I get the feeling that you all feel rather bruised by this experience, but also a little bit reticent. I do not know whether that is because you have to continue to negotiate the transition or because your companies have other contracts with Government, but I will give you a final chance. Our role is to report and send a message to the Ministry to say what we think has gone wrong and what still needs to be got right. Can you have a final go at saying what you think are the key mistakes and what still needs to be got right? 

Adam Hart: I would summarise it very succinctly: there is no contingency. To move forward with a programme as important as this and as sensitive towards public safety as this with no contingency is the area that needs to be looked at. 

There is no doubting that given sufficient time the risks can be mitigated, but I do not think that the nine months or so available is sufficient time to mitigate all of the risks to a highly satisfactory level. The simple comment I would make is to try to create that space and the contingency so that nothing feels rushed, and everything feels appropriately considered before action is taken. 

Chair: That is a fair observation. Thank you very much for your help and for your assistance. Although I appreciate that the circumstances cannot be easy for everybody, whatever one’s views of the policy decisions that were taken, I want to thank all of you for the work that you have done in relation to the sector. I hope you will pass that on to all your staff and your colleagues. We appreciate it. If we do not have more evidence from you, we wish all of you individually well and also those who work for you. I am very grateful to you for your time and for your evidence today.