Showing posts with label Reducing Reoffending Partnership. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Reducing Reoffending Partnership. Show all posts

Wednesday, 30 September 2020

Justice Committee Hears From CRCs

A few days ago we covered what HMI Justin Russell had to say to the Justice Select Committee. Here we have the first instalment of what the CRCs had to say and unsurprisingly they are not happy:- 

Q31 Chair: Let us move to our second panel, all of whom are appearing virtually for us. Lady and gentlemen, thank you very much for coming to help us and give evidence to us today. As there are four of you, I will ask you each to introduce yourselves. 

Suki Binning: I am Suki Binning, chief executive of the Seetec-run CRCs covering the south-west, Wales and the south-east. 

David Hood: I am David Hood. I am the vice-president of international business for MTC. I was the MD for MTC in the UK. We run London and Thames Valley CRCs. 

Chair: Yes. We met, I think, in the London context. 

David Hood: Yes, we did. 

Chair: It is nice to see you. 

Adam Hart: I am Adam Hart, the CEO of the Reducing Reoffending Partnership. We operate the two CRCs across the midlands. 

Trevor Shortt: I am Trevor Shortt. I run six of the CRCs in the east of England and across the north for Sodexo.

Q32 Chair: Thank you all very much for the introductions. Obviously, we saw from the things you said at the time that you were not best pleased when the decision was taken to end the probation delivery partnership contracts. How much of that do you think was a result of a bit of hard cheese sort of thing—“We lost these contracts. We have to defend our professional reputation”? Were you surprised when they were brought to an end? The decision was taken, rightly or wrongly. 

David Hood: I think that, yes, we were disappointed; there is no doubt about that. We had put in a lot of time and investment, and our staff had put a lot of time and investment into the work that happened over the last few years in the PDP competition. We thought we had something to offer the system going forward. 

Our primary concern now is that we are going to lose some of the innovations that were introduced over the last couple of years that have made a difference and helped the system. We also lose the prospect of the future innovation that would have come out of a mixed economy model, with private sector providers operating with the public sector. I think we lose that and it is not a good thing. For us, that was part of the disappointment. 

Q33 Chair: Can you give me an example of some of the innovations that you think might be lost? 

David Hood: From our perspective, I heard Justin Russell refer to our case management system, Omnia, which we introduced in MTC. We think that is a fundamental shift forward from the systems that are currently used in the NPS—nDelius and OASys. I agree with the point he was reflecting that was made by our staff. It is a backward step. For us, it is a fundamental tool in delivering the service, and that will be gone. 

Suki Binning: To echo some of what David said, when the decision was made to unify case management I and my staff understood the rationale behind that, particularly in light of the inspection reports that we had seen. We had also seen some very positive comments about the innovation in the CRCs in relation to behavioural change programmes. Yes, there is acknowledgment that the CRCs did not necessarily do as well on public protection, but certainly when it came to community payback programmes, my staff particularly were really enthusiastic about the probation delivery partners and the role that a mixed economy could take in probation. That was something that staff were really looking forward to. It was a significant disappointment that there was a U-turn on the probation delivery partners. 

In Wales, where we only deliver those services now, we did a poll survey the following day; 78% of staff said that they were really disappointed at the news. 

Trevor Shortt: I echo what has already been said. We were both surprised and disappointed by the decision, particularly coming just 12 months after the decision not to re-let the CRCs. Like Suki, we understood some of the backcloth to the initial decision, but our view on this was that it was a fairly uncontroversial outsourcing of some particular pieces of probation work that we had had, as CRCs, some direct experience of delivering over the past five years. 

On the second point, I echo what David said. It is ensuring that we do not lose some of the really good work that has been done over the past five years. We have somehow failed to grasp the breadth of that, particularly around the grassroots work that has been done in multidisciplinary and multi-agency ways at local level across the country. 

Q34 Chair: Mr Hart, what about you? 

Adam Hart: Incredibly disappointed is the best description, not least of all because I felt it very much played to the strengths that the CRCs have demonstrated, and indeed what the HMIP had called out as being in good shape for the most part across CRCs, or indeed excellent in some. I felt that that was the sweet spot; the PDP and the separation of case management was really playing to everybody’s strengths. We had invested a lot of time, energy and effort. Our staff are incredibly disappointed. Yes, we are incredibly disappointed with the outcome. 

Q35 Chair: What was the level of consultation you had? 

Adam Hart: I suggest that we had engagement as opposed to consultation. I think we were engaged pretty late down the line. Indeed, we were still very much turning up and participating in active procurement meetings the week before the announcements were set to be made. The disappointment came a little bit from that, but was also in terms of the engagement. It was not the very detailed suite of engagements that one might have expected would lead into consultation. It was very much an opportunity, almost singular in nature perhaps, to voice our thoughts around that eventuality, should it happen. Subsequently, it has happened. 

Q36 Chair: Are there any other views, or is it a similar picture for everybody? When the Secretary of State made the announcement, he appeared to be framing it quite substantially in terms of the disruption caused by Covid19 making delivery of the plans more complex, so they needed flexibility to deliver a national response. To what extent do you think that Covid-19 was a driver, or did it go deeper? 

Suki Binning: That is a question I am regularly asked by my staff: “Suki, can you explain how the decision was made?” I struggle to give a narrative to staff around the role that Covid played. What we would have thought would be ideal would be a period of stability, where those who are providing services at the moment—particularly around unpaid work programmes—continue to do that. We are now under huge pressure to deliver a transition plan with the backdrop of a pandemic. That is quite difficult for us.

David Hood: I echo Suki’s point. It is a question that often gets asked. I would have thought, and many of the people who work with me think, that the best situation in the Covid environment—probably emphasised by today’s announcements—is to try to keep things in all other respects as consistent as possible. If we accept the principle that the service moves back, let’s give ourselves enough time to make sure that that is done safely. 

Q37 Andy Slaughter: Could I pursue that point? You have been very frank, both in the comments that your companies made when the announcement was made and indeed in your comments to the Chair just now, which is refreshing. On the Covid point, the logic, if the Secretary of State were right, and the reason you have been excised from the services is that you could not cope effectively with a crisis, that would not say very much about your competence generally. If you disagree with that reason given for the change of service, why do you think the change has been made? 

David Hood: Probably the simple answer is that I am not sure. At the time the announcement was made, that was the explanation given. We have not been given any other explanation. At the time the announcement was made—this was partly reflected in some of Justin Russell’s comments—we were working exceptionally well with the Department to deal with the Covid circumstances. 

In very rapid time, we had deployed a new operating model. That was done with exceptional collaboration across the system and with the Department. We have continued to be flexible in meeting the needs and the demands of the current environment and the customer, the Ministry of Justice, as we have gone on. I am not sure why they would have thought that we could not deal with the Covid circumstances because, demonstrably, we were dealing with the Covid circumstances. 

Q38 Andy Slaughter: Could I ask the others to comment as well, because it is a crucial point? Either the Secretary of State is right and you were not up to coping with running the service during a time of crisis, or he is wrong, in which case there must be another reason. Which is it, and what is the answer? It cannot be that you do not know. 

Adam Hart: The first three months of the Covid crisis were very telling, in the fact that I think we rose to the challenge incredibly well. We spun on a sixpence in terms of the continuity arrangements that we had ready to go. I think the data bears out the performance across the CRCs, which was just slightly ahead of the NPS’s own performance when it came to the offender management contacts that we were able to continue with. I think in Mr Russell’s statements he was giving figures of 75% and 80% of contacts being retained, which is a pretty high figure in the very early period. 

I can only say that I think it is a question for the Secretary of State, but from my vantage point, running a couple of the CRCs in the system, we responded incredibly well in a very collaborative space. HMPPS and NPS were incredibly collaborative in those first few months as well. I believe it worked very well. I cite it as a very good example of co-operation and good working practice. 

Trevor Shortt: I won’t repeat what has already been said; I agree with both the previous witnesses. The only other comment I would make is that there is some rationale in the decision around the issue of volumes playing into the future competition. Our view as an organisation is that those volumes could have been dealt with commercially, but it was a risk in relation to Covid. That was something new and needed to be factored into the competition. 

Q39 Andy Slaughter: We seem to agree that Covid is an excuse perhaps for the reason for taking the services back in-house. Surely, it must be that the current Government formed the view that this was not a model that was working, which was a lot of people’s view at the time the experiment was set up. There is nothing inherently good or bad about a mixed economy model, but a lot of people had concerns that the probation service had moved over to that model. That now appears to be a concern that the current Government share. 

I can understand that you would not share that, but what do you think of the new model? What do you think is the future for any private sector role in the probation service?

Adam Hart: I do not agree with that particular side of the jigsaw. However, it would be remiss of me not to acknowledge the significant challenges in the first few years of the CRCs; we did not get everything right. 

The biggest frustration that we have, and my teams have, is that a lot of those things have been corrected, including by the Ministry of Justice in terms of the funding parameters. There is demonstrable improvement. Again, I cite the HMIP reports that came out over the last six months. They have seen an improving trajectory, with some CRCs moving from a lower rating to a good rating, and the overall score actually increasing. There is a little frustration that we have bedded in a system and overcome immense challenges. The MOJ recognised the structural underfunding and addressed that from December this year. We have seen improvements across CRCs. There is much more work to go, but that is what I would like to start us off with, if I may, because that is the backdrop that I see. 

In moving that forward into the future, it is important to take stock of all the challenges and innovations that have been overcome and embedded in the CRC structure and system. We are potentially in danger of losing all that good groundwork. I invite others to come in on that. 

Suki Binning: With regard to the new model, we have spoken about the strengths of the mixed market in terms of unpaid work. The other issue we had was that the first set of reforms, which I was party to, having worked in the public sector for two decades, was rushed. It again appears that we are rushing into another set of reforms without taking the time to look at alternative models. 

We had a moment in time when, as a system, we could have looked at alternative models that were best for those serving custodial sentences and community orders, and linking into local governance such as PCCs. I think that was a missed opportunity. I do not think we took the time to look at alternative models. We reacted to the issues with the current contracts and put in a solution too quickly. 

Q40 Andy Slaughter: For those of you who came from a public sector background—I suspect many of the Members here have had dealings with their local probation services over many years—there was no real demand, I felt, coming from within the probation service that the solution was to externalise, privatise or introduce a mixed economy. Do you think with hindsight that that was done in the wrong way or too hastily? Again, a number of us have had involvement with your private organisations in other roles, which have not been entirely successful. What would you say was wrong about that, and what would you do differently? 

Suki Binning: On the original reforms, we have rehearsed that the issues were around funding and volumes. Justin mentioned that as well. 

Q41 Andy Slaughter: But, to interrupt, you knew about the funding situation. It is all right with hindsight to say that it was because the funding was wrong, but you knew about that at the time. 

Suki Binning: But having been in the public sector for 20 years, what we thought worked really well was the mixed economy and having an approach that brought in innovation. Certainly, I saw investment from my parent company in terms of IT, estates strategy and the ability to respond very quickly to local needs. For instance, when my local criminal justice board and my police forces started to see a rise in stalking offences, we put in place a programme, which was the first of its kind in the UK, to deal with stalking. We were able to do that because we were fleet of foot. For me, those were some of the advantages of moving from the public sector to the mixed economy sector. 

Q42 Richard Burgon: I have two questions. First of all, I want to turn to some comments made by the former chief inspector of probation, who concluded in 2019 that the model for the part-privatisation of probation was, in her words, “irredeemably flawed”. She also identified, crucially, that it was not possible to reduce probation work to a series of contractual requirements. 

I would like to ask each member of the panel whether you agree with this assessment or do you think that the previous chief inspector got it wrong?

David Hood: On the first point, the point that Justin Russell made in his evidence is important: the expectation around the level of investment available through the period of the contracts was significantly greater than turned out to be the case. If the expectation had been met, I think we would have seen very different outcomes from the model. As we got towards the back end of the contracts, the improvements as things became more stable reflect that fact. We cannot underplay the significance of the commercial and funding environment. 

On whether you can reduce these types of services to contracts, I would accept that there are challenges around that. You need to work hard at it, but it is possible. In London, for example, we came to arrangements with the Department around delivering our services according to a series of quality metrics that were not reflected in the original contract. That was in the end us taking a position that said the Department was going to have to make some inevitably subjective judgments around what quality meant. We were prepared to accept that, because we all felt that in the end we could get to the same place on what good looked like. I accept that it is difficult, but I do not accept that it is impossible. 

Adam Hart: I will not repeat what David said, but I echo it. There was the benefit of knowing the levels of improvement within the CRCs, as indicated from subsequent HMIP reports, and the addressing of the funding model and indeed the additional funding that has gone into enhanced through-the-gate services, among other services. I am not sure all of that was prevalent at the time the report was written, so with the benefit of hindsight perhaps some of those factors would be included in the report. 

In terms of the contracts, measurement of a real-life situation is always difficult to contractualise. I and others have seen successful implementations of that pan-Government, in many of the Government Departments that have managed to do something not too dissimilar. It takes a great deal of trust and flexibility on both the commissioner and the provider parts to come up with the right types of measures, especially around quality, to be able to suggest that it can be measured, and that outcomes can equally be measured, as well as quality. 

I think it is possible to place relevant measures in a contractual setting that works and gives the public the protection requirement, first and foremost. It requires an amount of energy and an amount of rehabilitative activity towards an individual. I believe that both can be achieved through a contract. 

Q43 Richard Burgon: Secondly, I obviously understand that people from CRCs are going to defend their organisations. It is part of their remit as part of those organisations. We need to be clear that the Government were forced into the embarrassing U-turn to bring probation back into public hands after the part-privatisation was found to have left the public less safe. It also racked up hundreds of millions of pounds-worth of public money in bail-outs to the outsourced companies. What are you doing to ensure that the public are not further ripped off or endangered before this part-privatisation, which has been a disaster, is finally brought to an end? 

Chair: Who wants to respond to that? You do not have to agree with all the propositions. 

Suki Binning: When the south-west and Wales CRCs went into administration, the Department undertook a process to look at what would be the best way to ensure that services did not fall down. I understand that proposals were put in by the public sector and by us as a current provider. The decision was made for us as an organisation to step into those areas and provide a service. 

We have stabilised the service in Wales and the south-west. I have spoken with the staff who have gone through that process and can now start to see that we are protecting the public. We have invested resources to bring the organisation back to a steady state. We have definitely played our part in protecting the public and giving taxpayers value for money. 

David Hood: On the second point, we are committed to make sure that services are transferred back in a safe way. In the meantime, we will continue to ensure that they are delivered as best they can be. 

On the first point, it is not quite right to characterise what the Department did as in all respects a bail-out. What I am talking about is separate from the Working Links situation. What the Department did over recent years was to make sensible adjustments to the contract and in doing so was able to return some of the expected funding back to the service. That is part of the reason why, as we move towards the end of the contracts, the environment has been more stable; there has been an ability for us to plan financially year on year in a way that we had not been able to do previously. 

Q44 Chair: Mr Hart, do you want to add anything? 

Adam Hart: It is very much akin to what David Hood was saying. The proof of the pudding is in the fact that there was a very substantial underspend when it came to the services that were originally procured for the CRCs. That would intimate to me that there has not been a mass bailout. I do not recognise bail-out, so I would like to say for the record that I do not believe we have received any bail-out. We have managed to adjust to a system that now has the potential to work. The previous system did not in terms of its funding mechanisms. 

Trevor Shortt: I echo what the others have said. The structural underfunding at the beginning was a critical factor in where we got to mid-term. It is worth saying that the cost of a CRC place is significantly less than a place in the NPS. As we look to the future, that will be levelled up. 

The issue now, as David said, is that as we look to the future we can ensure that our services are handed across in a way that ensures the confidence of the public on the one hand, critically, but also that we do not lose some of the really good work that has been going on, in the rapid transition that we are now facing against the context of the uncertainty of Covid.

To be continued

Monday, 19 March 2018

Napo Evidence Part Two

Annex 1 - OPERATION OF THE COMMUNITY REHABILITATION COMPANIES 

Eight employer groups currently hold contracts to run the 21 CRCs. These are Sodexo (6), Interserve (5), Working Links (3), RRP (2), MCT Novo (2), Seetec (1), People Plus (1) and ARCC (1). 

1. Sodexo 

Sodexo holds the contract for six CRCs: Northumbria; South Yorkshire; Cumbria & Lancashire; Essex; BeNCH (Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire, and Northamptonshire); and Norfolk & Suffolk. 

There are two management structures: Northumbria, South Yorkshire and Cumbria & Lancashire are managed by the Northern CEO; and Essex, BeNCH and Norfolk & Suffolk are managed by the Southern CEO. 

In 2015 Napo produced a critical analysis of the proposed Sodexo Operational model. This report gave a fair and balanced view of the proposed new approach and its focus on desistance. However, as reported by the HMIP the operating model has not been fully implemented across the Sodexo CRCs as the implementation depends on the IT enabled Operational Model Management System (OMS) and Justice Star being activated. Also, members report that the supply chain (2nd & 3rd Tier Providers) that should undertake significant work with clients hasn’t happened. 

A recent joint union survey shows that only 9% of respondents said that they were clear about how changes introduced by the employer would work in practice. In addition, an employer survey carried out across the six Sodexo owned CRCs gave similar results showing that staff are disillusioned. Only headline figures from this report have been shared with the unions but there is acknowledgement from the employer that more needs to be done to engage with staff. 

Sodexo was the first of the new privatised companies to announce staff reductions. This huge organizational change process caused massive disruption to service delivery. FTE staff in post across the CRCs has fallen between 51% and 32%. 

CRC Employed staff FTE* Employed Staff FTE** Difference FTE % Change 

Northumbria                    316 155 161 51% 
BeNCH                            385 250 135 35% 
South Yorkshire               233 153 80 34% 
Cumbria and Lancashire 337 201 136 40% 
Essex                               279 167 112 41% 
Norfolk and Suffolk          190 130 60 32% 

* Staff in Post FTE figures CRC Workforce Information Summary Report: Quarter 3 2014/15 ** Staff in Post FTE Notified by the employer June 2017 

The reduction in staff and the failure to implement the new operating model has had a corresponding detrimental impact on workloads. This has had a massive impact on staff well-being and health and safety. Surveys have been carried out by Napo that show the stark position facing staff. A recent joint union survey carried out by Napo and UNISON showed that 85% of respondents said that they often or always have to work very intensively. 72% said that they often or always have to work very fast and 62% often or always have to neglect some tasks because they have too much to do. High workloads and stress caused to members have a direct consequence on the ability of the organisation to carry out its core function to protect the public and reduce reoffending. (The full findings from the survey can be made available to the Committee on request). 

Of particular concern is the use of “booths” as part of the Sodexo operating plan. The booths are “burger style” interview pens, Napo alongside its sister union has raised concerns about the use of booths in a probation setting from the start. The unions in all six Sodexo CRCs are currently in dispute with the employer on Health and Safety grounds about their use. Moreover, the unions have reported Sodexo to the Information Commissioners Office (ICO) in order to address our concerns about the use of booths and a potential breach of the Data Protection Act. 

Overall the following the paragraph written by HMIP in their report on Cumbria & Lancashire CRC (October 2017) can be applied to all the Sodexo CRCs and sums up the current situation: “Poor working conditions in some offices and the open-plan booths we have found in Sodexo Owned CRCs elsewhere made things difficult for service users and staff alike. Also, the CRC’s supply chain of services –those support it commissions from the community organisations, in both the private and voluntary, third sectors - was too thin”.

2. Interserve 

There are five Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) owned by Interserve, Cheshire and Greater Manchester, Hampshire and Isle of Wight, HLNY (Humberside/Lincolnshire/North Yorkshire), Merseyside and West Yorkshire. The situation across these five CRCs is as follows: 

Staffing
Experienced staff continue to leave the Interserve CRCs, some to do agency work (often in the NPS). The staff turnover rate is at 17%, which is very high (average rate is around 10%). The CRC cannot replace the staff it is losing fast enough and therefore it is using agency staff. Training new recruits is also proving a challenge. There are high levels of sickness absence due to workload stress which then impacts on the already high workloads of the remaining team members. 

Job cuts 

In total there has been a reduction of around 206 members of staff since February 2015. At the beginning of 2016 Interserve Justice announced a major restructure and re-organisation across their five CRCs. As a consequence the total number of Interserve staff reduced by 143.

Well reported financial problems in the Interserve parent company have led to it commencing consultation on merging corporate service functions across its three business units within the Interserve Citizen’s Services Division (which includes Interserve Justice). The company estimate this will lead to approximately 80 jobs being shed across the units. This will impact on CRC staff seconded to shared services. 

Additionally Interserve has announced that they are going to close the Fareham PSC (probation support centre). It is anticipated up to 10 CRC staff seconded to the Fareham office could be effected by the closure of the Fareham PSC as will a further 13 members of staff directly employed by Interserve. 

It will also mean Intervention Managers/SPOs in the CRCs taking on additional corporate service functions in addition to the HR responsibilities that have been added to their job descriptions. This in turn will impact on their pivotal role for the Interserve Justice Interchange flex team model to work. 

Workloads 

The reduction in the number of staff has been one of the issues that have led to very high workloads for the remaining staff. 

Results of a Joint Napo/UNISON Members Stress Survey carried out in March of this year showed that workloads, deadlines and work pressure are very significant issues for our members employed on the Interserve CRCs: 
  • 89% of respondents said that they often or always have to work very intensively 
  • 70% often or always has to neglect some tasks because they have too much to do. 
  • 61% often or always considered themselves to have unrealistic time pressures are hard to combine 
  • 47% considered that they were pressured to work long hours. 
  • 46% believed that they often or always have unachievable deadlines. 
(The full survey results can be made available to the Committee on request) 

Quality and performance 

The following Interserve CRCs have been partially inspected by the HMIP since the TR was implemented: 

HLNY CRC - on the whole this as a good report. The inspectorate noted that the problems caused by the TR programme in other areas had not impacted to the same extent, with “business as usual” and less obvious evidence of the “dissonance” they had seen elsewhere. However, this inspection was undertaken before Interserve’s ‘interchange model’ had been introduced. 

Cheshire and Greater Manchester - the report says that; ”Overall, the CRC had not protected those at risk of harm sufficiently” … “A notable number of inexperienced responsible officers reported that the level of training provided by the CRC was not sufficient to help them develop the required skills to complete high quality assessments and plans." 

Operating models 

The Interserve model included significant staffing cuts and the outsourcing of some probation services to Interserve’s Professional Service Centres (PSCs). The recently announced closure of the Fareham PSC calls this model into question. 

Ian Mullholland, Interserve Director of Justice wrote to CRC staff on 10 November explaining the operational reason for deciding to close the Fareham PSC: “The responsibility for managing the delivery of interventions in our Community Rehabilitation Companies is fragmented. Currently different job roles hold different parts of the process and there are areas of duplication and competing priorities. I listened to feedback from you, and it is clear that the model has reduced the level of CRC ownership over the delivery of interventions and the crucial job of aligning staff and resources”. 

"The vision for the PSC delivery of programmes was to create a central team to coordinate all service users, programme tutors and resources to maximise service user attendance and completion. This was dependent on establishing a new IT system, but – for a variety of reasons – we are unable to achieve this at this time." 

Another key aspect of the Interserve's Interchange model is the flex teams. Napo has questioned this operation model saying that in members’ view it places disproportionate pressures on PSO grade staff who have been directed to fulfil a dual role managing high caseloads and delivering Accredited Programmes. Role changes for PO grade staff have resulted in those affected exiting the organisation and PSOs managing cases that they are neither trained nor appropriately remunerated for. 

IT 

Interserve Justice ‘Interchange model’ is very reliant on new IT systems, which staff report frequently ‘go down’ leaving them unable to access Delius and OASys for long periods. This has an impact on meeting targets, risk and enforcement issues. 

3. Working Links 

Working Links owns BGSW (Bristol, Gloucester, Somerset and Wiltshire) CRC; Dorset, Devon and Cornwall CRC and Wales CRC. 

Unfortunately we must report that the Working Links Partnership under the ownership of Aurelius has been the subject of a dispute with recognised trade unions for some 20 months. 

The genesis of the dispute was the decision to reduce staffing provision by some 50% in the first year of the contract and the failure of the provider to recognise the terms of the Staff Transfer and Protection Agreement and a lack of serious engagement with the unions on collective bargaining issues. 

Despite the best efforts of senior ACAS officials and highly experienced trade union negotiators talks to resolve the outstanding issues in respect of the operational model across the three CRC contracts in Devon Dorset and Cornwall, Bristol Gloucester Somerset and Wiltshire and Wales are at something of an impasse. 

Meanwhile, Napo has had no option but to respond to the considerable media interest that has highlighted the failings of Working Links in the supervision of clients and management of resources. This has followed two seriously critical HMIP reports in Gwent and Gloucester, one Serious Further Offence resulting in the murder of a young person by a perpetrator who had missed several appointments, and another being the subject of a current court case, the use of a public library to interview probation clients (where children were nearby), and a well-documented case of substandard supervision of a client undertaking unpaid work due to insufficient staffing resources being available to maintain appropriate standards. 

Indeed, Napo are receiving regular reports of problems in relation to the organisation and delivery of Community Payback along with excessive workloads and extraordinary levels of staff sickness. 

We have told Ministers and HMPPS contract managers that unless this this provider can urgently demonstrate an ability to deliver against contract and engage with its staff in a dignified way, then consideration must be given to removing them from the three contracts that they are responsible for. 

4. RRP (Reducing Re-offending Partnership) 

RRP (Reducing Reoffending Partnership) owns two CRCs, Staffordshire West Midlands (SWM) and Derby, Leicestershire, Nottingham and Rutland (DLNR). The organisation is made up of a private employment company Ingeus, a private employment company with current DWP contracts, St Giles Trust, a criminal justice charity and CGL, formerly CRI a substance misuse provider. Ingeus is the leading partner in this organisation. 

In 2016 the organisation embarked on a staff reduction programme that saw 77 posts being made redundant. There were concerns at the time raised by Napo that these cuts were disproportionately impacting on DLNR as they had the least favourable redundancy policy. Since making these cuts there has been some recognition that the staff reductions were too large and RRP has since had to recruit in the DLNR area. 

The cuts have had a sizeable impact on the organisation’s ability to maintain standards. The HMIP report on Staffordshire and Stoke in January 2017 highlighted this issue stating that workloads were very high. On average staff in Stoke hold 90-100 cases each. 100% of administrators were made redundant in Staffordshire as RRP moved to a central hub model of case administration across the organisation. This has caused significant issue for frontline staff. 

Napo is carrying out a workload survey in RRP. (Final results for the survey can be made available to the committee on request). Initial findings show that: 
  • 91% of staff said they are consistently overworked. 
  • 79% said that workloads impact on public protection 
  • 73% said workloads impact on safeguarding issues 
  • 77% said that workloads adversely affect their ability to reduce re-offending 
RRP are currently going through a second wave of redundancies, this time within corporate services as opposed to frontline staff. They state that despite receiving additional money from the Ministry of Justice in the summer there are still significant shortfalls in their finances. As such they are reducing corporate services to avoid having to make further cuts to the frontline. There are currently 50 posts at risk of redundancy, although it is hoped this can be reduced to 30 if internal opportunities are utilised. 

A further exercise to reduce costs is being carried out with RRP’s estates. They are in the process of closing down all of the probation offices in the Black Country with the exception of Wolverhampton. Napo is deeply concerned about the impact this will have on staff due to travelling, especially those with caring responsibilities or disabilities. More worrying is the impact this will have on service users who will be expected to make much longer journeys in order to comply with their order. 

5. MCT Novo 

MCT Novo owns London CRC and Thames Valley CRC. There is an on-going re-inspection of MTC Novo and the NPS performance in the London area, following the hugely critical inspection of part of the London CRC area in 2016. 

Before the contract sale significant operational challenges, especially around staff recruitment had been identified across London. These have been embedded and amplified by the split, on-going pay freeze and inflexibility in the probation pay system; and by the impact upon morale of working within a service in crisis. Sickness absence rates and turnover have, we believe increased since the split, although hard data on this is rarely shared with unions. 

Competition for the London contract was sparse. We believe only two companies remained as bidders when the contract was let and that MTC Novo had not been expecting to win the London contract. Their operating model was, we believe designed for Thames Valley and applied to London. This involved grouping provision into specialist teams (or cohorts) – e.g. all women offenders managed by the same teams across the contract area; likewise with young males, etc. Although there are workload pressures in the Thames Valley CRC (partly due to recruitment and retention challenges common across the public sector in the area as evidenced by the NPS having to make additional payment to recruit in the Reading and Oxford areas) which we feel are impacting upon the quality of service delivery the is seemingly providing a reasonably stable service. 

However, the cohort model was disastrous in London. Logistically it was never going to work, giving rise to huge variations in caseloads and pressures on staff. As documented in the 2016 HMIP Inspector’s report, this led to corners being cut, record keeping falling dangerously behind and an increase in risk to the public. 

The London CRC is working, increasingly in partnership with staff, to recognise and address the weaknesses but the next HMIP Inspection report will inform the Committee on the scale of progress and the continuing challenges for MTC Novo in London. 

One particularly illustrative case study of the weaknesses in TR delivery and on-going management compared to the aspiration of TR can be seen in the Rise Mutual. This spun out of the TR programme, supported and encouraged by the MoJ, aiming to deliver accredited programmes in innovative and effective ways. Due to the weaknesses in the contract forecasting the expected cases didn’t materialize. This was no different to the rest of the London CRC contract, but the MoJ has now given up on Rise and agreed that MTC Novo (despite limited evidence of expertise and proven performance in accredited programmes or generally), can take over this work with over 80% of Rise CIC members being in scope to transfer to the London CRC. It appears that Rise had successfully won other contracts in competition with MTC Novo in local authorities and prisons and it is for debate if MTC Novo’s motives for taking on this work include driving out a competitor. What is without doubt is that the CRC are in effect the commissioning body now, and as such is monopoly provider/commissioner. This does not look like a sensible model for ensuring public money is spent efficiently.

6. Seetec 

Kent, Surrey, Sussex (KSS) CRC is owned by Seetec. 

On the whole there have been fewer problems in this area than in the other CRCs. A HMIP inspection carried out in October 2016 found that “Kent is doing some excellent work but, the National Probation Service (NPS), who manage higher-risk offenders, is struggling due to staff shortages.. This is in contrast with other areas in England and Wales, where inspectors have so far found the NPS to be generally delivering good work while CRCs are still embedding large-scale organisational change”. 

The inspectors reported that “CRC had adopted a straightforward way of working and had implemented it confidently and quickly. It was committed to involving people fully in planning their own route away from crime, which was impressive. Staff morale was good, with leaders enjoying the confidence of their staff”. 

Napo does however know that the CRC is experiencing now continuing recruitment difficulties and is in competition with the NPS for experienced staff. There are also problems with high workloads as reported by members in the Napo workload and stress survey undertaken in March 2017. 

HMIP did also note however that: “There was certainly more for the CRC to do so that offenders could do unpaid work in the community, and to make sure enough staff were sufficiently well trained so as to be able to do their jobs well and recommended that the CRC took steps to reduce the rate at which people were “stood down”. 

7. People Plus 

Warwickshire West Mercia Community Rehabilitation Company (WWM CRC) is owned by People Plus, a subsidiary company of Staff Line a large private recruitment company that has had DWP contracts. 

Previously Warwickshire and West Mercia were two separate Trusts although there were plans to merge the two areas before TR to align with the increasingly merging police forces. 

Prior to TR both Trusts were rated as being in the top five performing Trusts with the lowest reoffending rates in the country. It is a very rural area which brings with it additional challenges. West Mercia was a flagship Trust for its innovative use of partnership agencies and new ways of working such as care farms and its partnership with Willowdene, a unique intervention. 

Since TR WWM CRC has maintained some of its partnership contracts with Willowdene and YSS. However, due to ongoing financial difficulties these contracts are now being reviewed and reduced as cost saving exercise. 

This was noticed and commented on by HMIP when they carried out their recent inspection. Despite these proving to be effective interventions for reducing reoffending there is not the money to support them. 

This is in part due to the flawed payment mechanism which does not recognise these unique interventions in terms of cash payment. WWM CRC is a good example of how TR has in fact stifled innovation, new ways of working and increasing other providers as oppose to increasing it as was originally hoped for with the ideology behind the reform programme.

In 2016 WWM CRC made frontline staff redundancies of approximately 10%. Whilst this has not had a detrimental impact on caseloads it has had a negative impact on an already demoralised workforce. The recent HMIP report was quite poor for the area. Whilst acknowledging that they are maintaining their contract performance it criticised the quality of work being delivered. It is therefore of great concern that in just three years two highly performing trusts could be reduced to being near the bottom of the performance table. 

This is also reflected in the recently published reoffending rates. WWM CRC is the only CRC that is definitely facing a financial penalty as reoffending rates have significantly increased since contracts began. That is not to say the area has seen an increase in crime but that prior to TR both Trusts were reducing reoffending so effectively, their bench mark was considerably higher than other areas. In truth they had to perform better than good to reap any reward for their efforts. 

This highlights not only that performance has dropped in the area but that the MoJ’s own measurement tool is deeply skewed and does not reflect accurately the real picture of reoffending rates. The CRC is now taking steps to address these issues and is working with unions to understand how things can be improved. However, trust is extremely low between the two parties.

8. ARCC 

Durham Tees Valley (DTV) CRC is owned by a not for profit consortium called ARCC. 

Since Transforming Rehabilitation the CRC has faced substantial financial pressures and embarked upon a massive reorganisation, this has resulted in disruption to service delivery and had a detrimental impact on staff morale. These changes were introduced without full and proper consultation with the unions. This resulted in Napo together with our sister union registering a dispute on the failure to follow the recognised and established consultation process. In addition, the Service Delivery Model adopted by DTV CRC incorporates “agile working” and delivery through “community hubs” the unions have raised serious concerns on health and safety grounds for both staff and members of the public using those community venues.

Tuesday, 21 November 2017

Latest From Napo 165

Regular readers may well have noticed that there's been a paucity of Napo updates for some time. Mostly, but not exclusively, I tend to cover the General Secretary's weekly blog, but only if I feel there's something new or of particular interest contained in it. Here we have a slightly edited version of the latest blog post from last Friday:- 

FAILING CRC’s HIT THE REDUNDANCY BUTTON AGAIN

Just when you thought the probation crisis had reached a nadir comes news that two CRC owners have decided to make further cuts to staffing in a desperate attempt they tell us to keep their front line operations afloat.

Interserve, following another profits warning to investors and a share price that plummeted by 50% has announced that they are going to close the Fareham PSC (probation support centre). It is anticipated up to 10 CRC staff seconded to the Fareham office could be effected by the closure of the Fareham PSC as will a further 13 members of staff directly employed by Interserve.

National Official Sarah Friday reporting to this weeks Napo Officers and Officials meeting said that the unions were told that it will also mean Intervention Managers/SPOs in the CRCs taking on additional corporate service functions in addition to the HR responsibilities that have been added to their job descriptions. This in turn will impact on their pivotal role for the Interserve Justice Interchange flex team model to work.

In the West and East Midlands the Reducing Reoffending Partnership (RRP) are currently going through a second wave of redundancies, this time within corporate services as opposed to frontline staff. They state that despite receiving additional money from the Ministry of Justice in the summer, there are still significant shortfalls in their finances. As such they are reducing corporate services to avoid having to make further cuts to the frontline. There are currently 50 posts at risk of redundancy, although it is hoped this can be reduced to 30 if internal opportunities are utilised.

A further exercise to reduce costs is being carried out with RRP’s estates. They are in the process of closing down all of the probation offices in the Black Country with the exception of Wolverhampton. National Official Tania Bassett has told Interserve that Napo is deeply concerned about the impact this will have on staff due to travelling, especially those with caring responsibilities or disabilities. More worrying is the impact this will have on service users who will be expected to make much longer journeys in order to comply with their order.

These are but two more examples of the disastrous impact of TR on what was once an award winning service. Many CRC’s are holed so far below the waterline that no amount of taxpayers cash will save them from sinking later if not sooner.

In other areas such as the CRC’s operated by Working Links we are seeing significant numbers of experienced Probation Officers jumping back to the not exactly green and grassy pastures of the NPS telling reps that they have had enough of the incompetent regime that is presiding over community safety.

Napo submits its evidence to the Justice Select Committee

Sorry, but Parliamentary protocols prevent us from providing you with sight of this until the Committee give their permission, but take it from me its a high quality offering that reflects the massive amount of work that your employees and Officers are putting in to help hold the MoJ and CRC’s feet to the fire.

Not that it is all negative; as we have suggested steps that can be taken to restore morale to staff, embed ‘good practice’ benchmarks and how a licence to practice is a ‘must do’, along with creating greater transparency and accountability by involving Police and Crime Commissioners and metro-Mayors to monitor performance.

The submission is supported by detailed appendices that provide a withering critique of the post-TR landscape and where we make it clear that failing contractors should be shown the door marked exit.

PSO Conference next Friday 24th November

Really looking forward to my speech to next Friday’s PSO conference to be held at the NUT, Hamilton House, Mabledon Place Kings Cross, London WC1H 9BD. Registration opens at 10:00am and the conference formally starts at 10:30am.

Professional training in a changing landscape is the theme, and I have been asked to make a keynote address. Here I will be sharing my thoughts on the steps that Napo needs to take to bring about a greater focus on training and development among NPS and CRC providers and how this sits with Napo’s own strategy for growth and my intention to see our practitioner members paid a proper rate for the job (a key trade union objective that is often forgotten in the world of corporate speak that is regularly spewed out from the MoJ and politicians). Even more reason why our members, whatever job they hold within the justice system, should be afforded the respect and dignity that they deserve.

More news next week, telling it like it is.


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I'm aware that the General Secretary has given another interview to Russia Today and his contribution can be viewed from approximately 13 minutes in. As always, there is concern amongst some members as to the wisdom of helping to legitimise what many feel is a pretty much unvarnished propaganda machine of the Russian State. 

Friday, 13 January 2017

Inspector Finds Problems with RRP

Here we have the latest inspection report from the Probation Inspectorate:- 

Foreword

This is our second inspection of adult probation work undertaken in the Midlands division of the National Probation Service (NPS) and in a Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC) owned by the Reducing Reoffending Partnership (RRP). 

RRP is applying the same ambitious operating model in the two CRCs it owns, and it is reassuring to see the progress made since our inspection in Derbyshire just a few months ago. Implementation in Staffordshire and Stoke is almost complete - albeit case management software and systems are still pending - and the operating model is now almost fully fledged. 

RRP’s model provides for an extensive range of interventions and it was pleasing to see some in good use, for example, substance misuse services. We were impressed as well by RRP’s commitment to specific services for women, and commend its strategy to others. 

That said, the CRC is not yet delivering the full range of planned services. Delivery has been inconsistent during a period of rapid change, but there is the prospect of steadier times ahead. Individual caseloads, however, look set to stay high with some officers now responsible for up to 80 cases. 

High individual caseloads are becoming commonplace in CRCs. Of course CRCs must manage within anticipated resource, but the public is at greater risk when officers are spread too thinly and if quality assurance is not robust. 

In common with other regions, the Midlands division of the NPS has so far experienced less (and less complex) change. It was not surprising then that the organisation was more stable and effective. This is generally consistent with what we have found elsewhere. 

Overall, the NPS work inspected was of sufficient quality but there were notable weaknesses in places, for example in the provision of rehabilitative services. There was little evidence of the NPS purchasing services from the CRC to assist here, whereas CRC provision of services to the NPS is a key tenet of the model for probation services nationally. In practice and despite leaders’ intentions, the rate card (listing services available) and/or concerns over pricing remain sticking points, here and elsewhere in the country. 

Both the CRC and NPS in Staffordshire and Stoke need to improve the quality and impact of their work. We hope that the findings and recommendations from this inspection will help them to do just that.

HM Chief Inspector of Probation January 2017

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Russell Webster has summarised the report here and the following is is a taster. 

The main inspectors’ findings of the work of the CRC were:
  • Assessments of risk of harm were done consistently and to an acceptable standard, thereby providing a good grounding for future work, but those assessments were not followed through sufficiently well.
  • In almost half of the cases insufficient steps had been taken to keep to a minimum the service user’s risk of harm to others. Moreover, in a high proportion of cases, sentence planning was poor.
  • There was no evidence of the CRC seeking to quality assure public protection work. Management oversight was limited.
  • The CRC was not sufficiently effective in delivering interventions to reduce reoffending.
  • In most cases, the CRC produced an assessment and plan sufficient for the purposes of reducing reoffending. There was evidence of some effective work but this was offset by adverse consequences of organisational change, particularly disruption to the continuity of supervision due to frequent changes of responsible officer.
  • Members of staff were confused about their roles, and the availability of appropriate interventions.
  • The use of ‘step down’, where contact is reduced or managed by telephone calls, was not compatible with the risks associated with cases, nor did it support rehabilitative work.
  • Most CRC service users had abided by the conditions of their sentence. If they did not, appropriate enforcement action was taken.
  • Individual diversity was taken into account in the assessment, planning and delivery arrangements in almost all cases.
  • The high turnover of responsible officers was less of a problem in this area of work, but in almost one in four cases the lack of continuity led to unacceptable levels of contact and poor enforcement work.

Friday, 23 September 2016

TR in Derbyshire

Especially aimed at those persistant commentators on this blog who say things are 'just fine' with TR, here's how it's going in Derbyshire, as reported on the BBC website:-

Probation in Derbyshire has 'slipped' after reforms, says report

Supervision of criminals in Derbyshire has got worse since the government out-sourced parts of the probation service, the chief inspector of probation says. Dame Glenys Stacey said the standard of some services in the county was now "significantly lower" than before.

In 2014, the government replaced probation trusts in England and Wales with 21 rehabilitation companies, made up of private firms and charities. A Probation Service spokesperson said it would "monitor performance closely".

Probation reforms, implemented by the then Justice Secretary Chris Grayling, overhauled the supervision of released prisoners and people serving community sentences in England and Wales. As part of the changes, the probation service was split in two, with community rehabilitation companies (CRCs) supervising low and medium-risk offenders.

At the same time a National Probation Service (NPS) took over the supervision of high-risk offenders.

In one of her first inspection reports since the new system was introduced, Dame Glenys says she found no evidence that public protection was being made a priority by Reducing Reoffending Partnership - the CRC that won the contract in four counties in the East Midlands.

Her report said the "quality of work" provided by the company in Derbyshire was "significantly lower" than it was under the former Probation Trust - describing it as "poor" in some areas. Dame Glenys said many staff felt the new approach to rehabilitation was "not yet a reality". She said the CRC had "ambitious plans for an effective and modern probation service, to make a difference to people's life chances and reduce re-offending". However, she said the implementation of the changes has been "troublesome and slow" and that "standards have slipped. Leaders do need to focus on delivering good quality services today as well as improving tomorrow," she said.

She went on: "The public can be reassured, however, that the National Probation Service in Derbyshire is managing high-risk offenders well."

Catherine Holland, chief executive of Reducing Reoffending Partnership, said the probation team in Derbyshire was working hard to keep the public safe "by reducing reoffending". 

"We welcome this inspection report which identifies recommendations and many areas of good practice. We will use its findings to further strengthen our work," she said.

A government spokesman said "public protection and reducing reoffending will always be our priority. "We hold providers rigorously to account for their performance and insisted a robust action plan was developed by the CRC. We will continue to monitor performance closely."

However, Andrew Neilson, from the Howard League for Penal Reform, said the report indicated the probation service was "letting down people who are trying to change their lives.The Howard League warned that ministers were taking a huge risk by dismantling a service that was performing well. We remain of that view," he added.

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From the report:-

Overview

Overall, the quality of work was mixed, and differed as between the CRC and the NPS. 

The quality of CRC work was significantly lower than that we saw formerly in the Probation Trust, and was in some respects poor. Assessments and plans were often not good enough, and purposeful rehabilitation work was seen in too few cases. We expect to see public protection prioritised, yet we did not find evidence of this. The organisation was still in transition, with systems implementation taking longer than anticipated. 

The NPS was in a better position. A strong, legacy culture of good professional practice and a focus on public protection prevailed. The quality of work was generally good and the NPS was effective in protecting the public and assisting the rehabilitation of offenders. 

Staff and leaders in the CRC had experienced and were still experiencing a great deal of change, those in the NPS less so. No doubt this affected the quality of CRC work: CRC senior staff were still occupied with the imperatives of change implementation.

Staffing 

CRC leaders thought the organisation was short-changed in the allocation of staff to Derbyshire on inception. Derbyshire were slightly under the allocated resource at the time of the Probation Trust split and this was compounded by a disproportionate number of staff, compared to the rest of the CRC, leaving for jobs in the NPS and prisons around January 2015. Numerous attempts have been made to recruit permanent staff, with varied success, leading to a high level of agency staff being deployed in the interim. At the time of the inspection Derbyshire were continuing to recruit as current operational staffing levels were below those identified in the target operating model. 

Managers 

First line manager numbers had reduced from seven to four, in line with the operating model. Several front-line staff said they did not feel adequately supported, with those managers taking on new responsibilities for buildings, performance, personnel issues and other matters. Managers reported they had not been able to maintain a focus on service delivery, for similar reasons. The changes had reduced significantly the time available to them for promoting quality practice. We found few instances of management oversight adding value to the work of practitioners. Only 4 (of 36) practitioners said that inadequate management oversight had limited their ability to achieve positive outcomes with service users. We considered the situation was more problematic than this figure suggests, as few cases could show that management input had either added value to the work, or resolved concerns about work that was of poor quality. 

Workloads 

Frequent reassignment of cases, together with staffing levels below those planned and new (short sentence cases) work led to very high caseloads for responsible officers. Several said their caseloads were around 70. They felt their caseloads and workloads had increased since CRC inception. For some, the workload pressures had increased as a consequence of holding more complex cases. The frequent use of agency staff led to high levels of caseload reassignment. Some staff told us that often they did not know anything about the case when they saw a service user for the first time. There was an element for many service users of having to ‘start again’. One was very critical of the number of different responsible officers he had had. He said: 
“I’m well p***ed off. I’ve now had four different workers in six months. I’m sick of telling them the same stuff. Can they not look in my file? Yeah, I did wrong but how would they feel if they had to keep telling different people about their personal stuff?” 
Delays in implementing key aspects of the operating model (new IT systems and interface, and the customer services centre) designed to free up responsible officer time and improve efficiency and effectiveness left individual workloads not conducive to delivering high quality services. 

It was not reasonable to expect responsible officers to achieve consistently the rehabilitation and public protection goals required. We asked responsible officers if their workload had an impact on their ability to deliver positive outcomes in their work with service users. Almost three-quarters said it was having a negative impact on the quality of their work. 

Staff told us that the reality for them consisted of fewer staff with higher caseloads, having to do what they could with the limited resources available. A practitioner told us:
“high caseloads have led to us having less time to spend with service users. Some cases can have five or six responsible officers over the term of their order. There is no consistency for service users. We have had a big turnover of staff and agency workers. It tends to be agency workers’ cases that are getting passed around the team. Some cases are going two to three weeks without a responsible officer. Some agency workers are not up-to-speed when they start, as they are not familiar with the work or systems, having been out of practice for a while”.
Just over half of the 36 staff who answered the question felt that that their training and support had enabled them to help the individual who had offended to achieve positive outcomes. Several staff told us that they felt their level of professionalism had dropped since CRC inception and that they did not experience the CRC as prioritising quality of work.

Operational sites 

The CRC’s estates strategy had seen the Derby team recently move into new business premises. Staff had encountered a number of problems with the new building and several reported that they had not had suitable responses to the concerns raised. Ongoing issues in respect of IT, the perceived lack of suitable interview spaces, and health and safety concerns had left many staff demoralised. Some were concerned that critical telephone or email messages were not getting through and that they might be missing important information about, and from, service users and others. During the coordination of this inspection we also encountered difficulties in communicating with CRC staff, both by telephone and email. Much of this was no doubt initial ‘teething problems’ with the new building but the experience of staff in Derby was raising concerns for staff elsewhere, as others would also be moving to new premises in the near future. 

Supporting systems 

The CRC was still reliant on legacy systems, but had provided staff with new hardware while innovating, and developing a new case management system known as ‘Partnership Works’. Partnership Works is designed to reduce double entry of information, support case administration, and help practitioners to develop quality sentence plans and put in place the right interventions, thereby enabling them to manage high caseloads and spend more time with service users. 

Development has progressed, but before use the system must be approved NOMS. The approval process is onerous, staged, and lengthy (the process began in 2015). Managers were anxious, as the CRC’s new operating model depends on successful implementation of the system. Managers were hopeful of conditional approval in late September, but were concerned at the likely demands of the further stages to full approval, and the potential for significant consequential delays in implementing the new operating model. 

The CRC was the first to try and link to the Ministry of Justice’s Strategic Partnership Gateway, the facility that would enable the various systems to work together. The Strategic Partnership Gateway was not yet available. CRC managers confirmed all those involved understood its importance and Ministry of Justice staff had been working to provide interim solutions. The delay was nevertheless hampering the CRC’s ability to provide their new customer services centre. The customer service centre aimed to go live in September 2016, using alternative enablers, until Partnership Works is launched.

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I notice that news about Derbyshire has prompted a rare press release from Napo - apparently the first since May:-

Probation union Napo responds to HMIP report on Derbyshire Probation Services.

The HMIP report on Derbyshire Probation Services is damning of the service being provided by the Community Rehabilitation Company owned by RRP.

The report highlights that there has been a significant reduction in the quality of the service being provided in comparison to the previous Probation Trust which was dissolved in 2014.

Napo is deeply concerned that the report exposed so many failings and in particular those relating to public protection and safeguarding. However, this is in line with reports from our members about excessive workloads and a shortage of experienced staff following an unnecessary redundancy process. There has been a consistent failure on the part of the CRC to provide adequate ICT and the introduction of a poor telephony system has only exacerbated the issue of poor communication between agencies and service users.

Napo General Secretary Ian Lawrence said: "Whilst Napo is not surprised by this report we are saddened that our predictions of service failure following the privatisation of probation have come true. We warned the government that these so called reforms would reduce the quality of service delivery and have direct impact on public protection. We now call on the Minister to urgently review these arrangements and set a clear and strict timetable for the CRC to implement the recommendations of the report. If the CRC is unable to improve then the MOJ needs to seriously consider removing the contract and returning the probation service back to public ownership."

Napo's AGM, due to start 29 September in Cardiff, will be debating a number of motions regarding the new delivery of probation services. However, the Minister Sam Gymiah has declined an invitation to attend and to speak to members directly about their concerns for the profession and for public safety.