Quaeritur: Doesn't the Necessity of Baptism Imply a Miopic View of Salvation?

Quaeritur: Doesn't the Necessity of Baptism Imply a Miopic View of Salvation?

Quaeritur: The dogma that there is no salvation without baptism bothers me.  Can't God work outside our little theological box?  It seems miopic and close minded to think that God is bound by the Sacraments that He Himself instituted.  And it is especially arrogant for you theologians to think that your little theological boxes can contain God's infinite mercy.

Respondeo: Your criticism of theology is (1) self-referentially inconsistent, and (2) not sufficiently aware of what Catholic theology actually says regarding this matter. 

(1) You clearly think theology does not have the full story about God and salvation.  And in doing so you are theologizing.  In fact, any criticism of the very project of theology is ipso facto a theological act.  So you can't belittle all theology without at the same time creating your own theology, therefore criticizing your own act of theologizing.  That is, in critizicing all theology you are critizicing your own (theological) criticism of theology.  So first of all please stop and think about how your insufficiently reflected-upon theology could in fact possibly be less adequate than the theology that you belittle, given how little you have thought about it, and compared to two thousand years of theological discussion. 

(2) Moreover, you are clearly underestimating Catholic theology.  Actually, the principles of our theological "box" are the articles of faith, which were revealed to us by God Himself.  And in that box we know there is not only sacramental baptism, but also baptism of desire and baptism of blood.  And also that God is not bound by His sacramental economy, but that He chose to institute this economy as the ordinary means of salvation for all humankind.  And not only that, but also the very limitations of our theological knowledge and of intellectual knowledge in general are a vast topic of discussion in traditional Catholic theology.  And all of this is either explicitly or implicitly contained in God's revelation, and theologians for centuries have discucssed this.  Theology --any theology--cannot help being miopic in a certain sense, because while we are in via, short of seeing the Divine Essence, we cannot really understand God's truth fully.  But its being limited does not give us the right to belittle this sacred science, which ultimately is nothing other than a humbling of human intelligence before God's gift of revealing Himself to us. 

Free PDFs of Doronzo and Jesuit BAC Manuals!!!

Free PDFs of Doronzo and Jesuit BAC Manuals!!!

Below are some links for you to download free ITOPL files of tremendously valuable manuals of dogmatic theology published in the 1940s and 50s.  These works (among others) represent the most advanced state of Catholic theology so far... i.e., the pinnacle of organic, traditional theological development before most theologians in the West lost their grip and decided to turn their focus elsewhere.  The Spanish Jesuit manual, published by the Madrid-based Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos (B.A.C.) is an impressive work done by different authors from the generation before Vatican II, each an expert in his field; it represents the peak of Jesuit theology before the order drank the cool-aid.  Doronzo was a professor of Dogma at Catholic University of America (Washington, D.C.), and his massive dogmatic work on the Sacraments remains unsurpassed.  I must say that although I tend to prefer Dominican Thomists (such as Garrigou-Lagrange, Hugon, Ramírez, etc.), true greatness must be recognized where it is really present.  

By the way, the B.A.C. manual was translated into English a few years ago by Fr. Kenneth Baker, S.J. and is available from Amazon.  The set is not cheap (8 vols., $35 USD apiece), but it is truly worth its weight in gold.  If anyone were to give it to me for my birthday or for Christmas, I totally wouldn't mind.

Also, the Mercaba website, a Catholic resource supersite based off of Spain, has both the philosophy and theology manuals of the Spanish Jesuits (both published by B.A.C.) available in html in Spanish translation.

But of course, if we want to do serious theology, we should rather be reading the original Latin.  So here it is below, for free!  Enjoy!!!

(For future convenience, I'm providing permanent links to these and lots more on the "Downloadable PDFs" tab above, so when you need them you can just visit us and download from here.)

-Patres S.J. in Hispania. Sacrae Theologiae Summa (BAC), v. 1: Theologia Fundamentalis.
-Patres S.J. in Hispania. Sacrae Theologiae Summa (BAC), v. 2: De Deo Uno, Trino, Creante, Elevante; De peccatis.
-Patres S.J. in Hispania. Sacrae Theologiae Summa (BAC), v. 3: De Incarnatione; Mariologia; De gratia; De virtutibus.
-Patres S.J. in Hispania. Sacrae Theologiae Summa (BAC), v. 4: De Sacramentis; De novissimis.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. The Science of Sacred Theology for Teachers, Bk. 1: Introduction to Theology.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. The Science of Sacred Theology for Teachers, Bk. 2: Revelation.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. The Science of Sacred Theology for Teachers, Bk. 3: Channels of Revelation.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. The Science of Sacred Theology for Teachers, Bk. 4: The Church.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Theologia Dogmatica, v. 1: De Revelatione, De Locis Theologicis, De Deo Uno.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Theologia Dogmatica, v. 2: De Deo Trino, De Deo Creante et Elevante, De Gratia.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Sacramentis in genere.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Baptismo et Confirmatione.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Eucharistia, t. 1,.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Eucharistia, t. 2.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Poenitentia, t. 1.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Poenitentia, t. 2.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Poenitentia, t. 3.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Ordine, t. 1.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Ordine, t. 2.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Ordine, t. 3.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Extremaunctione, t. 1.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Extremaunctione, t. 2.

Quaeritur: On the Eternal Destiny of Aborted Babies

Quaeritur: On the Eternal Destiny of Aborted Babies

Quaeritur: I have entered into a (friendly) debate on abortion and someone asked me what the Catholic Church teaches about the eternal destiny of the souls of aborted babies. I'm a recent convert, so I wanted some help before I reply. Grazie!

Respondeo:  Most Catholics today sadly just canonize the souls of aborted babies, assuming that since they never sinned, they automatically go to Heaven. But they either forget original sin and the necessity of Baptism, or gloss over these problems by citing God's mercy as the demonstrative proof that they are in fact in Heaven, regardless of what God may have revealed on the matter. But in fact, there is a sharp discrepancy between these new theological tendencies (promoted by the nouvelle theologie) and what the sources of Revelation have to say on the matter. 

The sources of Revelation all point to the concept of the 'Limbo of Children' (limbus puerorum)---to be distinguished from the 'Limbo of the Fathers' (limbus patrum), which is where Christ descended after his death. Limbo itself is not a dogma (i.e., not de fide, but only sententia certa or even a doctrina catholica); but it it is derived from other revealed doctrines that are de fide definita, such as the impossibility of salvation for those who die in original sin. 

First of all, it is a defined dogma that souls of those who die in the state of original sin but without having committed actual sins (this includes generally those who die without Baptism and before the age of reason) cannot enter Heaven. However, they do not suffer the bodily pains of hell either. 

Pope Gregory X, in the 2nd Council of Lyons, declared: 

“Now, the souls of those who depart in mortal sin, or only with original sin, immediately descend into hell, but to be punished differently” (Denzinger 464 [858]). 

This doctrine was infallibly defined and ratified by Eugenius IV, in the Concil of Florence (cf. Denzinger 693 [1306].)  This dogma, that souls with original sin only are punished differently from those which die in mortal sin, is the basis for the constant teaching of the theologians on Limbo. You can read a pretty thorough theological defense of Limbo that cites the authority of the theological sources, including the Magisterium and the consensus of approved theologians throughout the centuries, here.

Now, this is not to say that Limbo is a third eternal destiny, in addition to Heaven and Hell, as is often erroneously supposed. This hypothesis, that Limbo is a distinct state besides Heaven and Hell, was actually condemned: at the end of time, only two states will remain: Heaven and Hell. (Oddly, I've heard and read fallacious arguments that try to refute the existence of Limbo by citing the condemnation, thinking that what is condemned is Limbo itself. But in reality what is condemned is the claim that Limbo is a third state distinct from Heaven and Hell; see Pius VI, Auctorem Fidei; Denzinger 1526 [2626].). No, Limbo is in fact part of Hell. It involves the eternal loss of the Beatific Vision, which is the essence of Hell, even if it does not involve the horrible physical sufferings that we usually associate with Hell and which are only an accidental aspect of the latter.

St Thomas Aquinas specifically distinguishes in hell the punishment or 'pain' of sense (poena sensus) from the punishment of separation or loss (poena damni), which is not really 'pain' at all: souls with actual mortal sins suffer both, but souls with original sin only, are only subject to the latter: they do not see God face-to-face, but they do enjoy a natural sort of happiness where their natural powers (intellect, will, etc.) and body are fulfilled to their natural capacities. And this is known to the faithful by the term 'Limbo' (from the Latin, limbus, border), and was popularized in Catholic imagination by Dante, who wonderfully describes Limbo as the 'first circle' of hell.  (See Summa theologiae Ia-IIae, q. 87, a. 4; IIIae Supp., q. 97, a. 5.)

That's the traditional teaching, but as you can see, it is considered to be a bit harsh for modern sensitivities and so there has been a push within contemporary theology, especially within the nouvelle theologie to replace it with a more 'merciful' view (sound familiar?). Some contemporary theologians theorize that just as there can be a 'baptism of desire' on the part of adult catechumens who die without Baptism, and we thus hope for their salvation, so there could be a sort of 'vicarious' baptism of desire for those babies who die without Baptism but whom the Church desires to baptize. 

The Catechism of the Catholic Church, which is steeped in the nouvelle theologie, somewhat dodges the issue (and fails to teach the traditional doctrine of Limbo) in paragraph 1261. In the immediately preceding paragraphs it is noticeably 'soft' on the necessity of Baptism for salvation (as compared to the Catechisms, encyclicals, doctors, theologians, etc. of the previous millenia). And in this context it goes on to state that the Church entrusts the souls of those who die in original sin only to the mercy of God:

1261 As regards children who have died without Baptism, the Church can only entrust them to the mercy of God, as she does in her funeral rites for them. Indeed, the great mercy of God who desires that all men should be saved, and Jesus' tenderness toward children which caused him to say: "Let the children come to me, do not hinder them" (Mk 10 14; cf. 1 Tim 2:4), allow us to hope that there is a way of salvation for children who have died without Baptism. All the more urgent is the Church's call not to prevent little children coming to Christ through the gift of holy Baptism.

These hypotheses are problematic. At heart they seem motivated by a characteristically modern (and partly erroneous) idea of divine justice and of the gratuitousness of salvation; and in the case of some theologians, even perhaps an implicit denial of the reality of original sin. Modern minds find it inconceivable that God would deprive an 'innocent' baby of Heaven. After all--they claim--these babies have done nothing wrong, so why would God deprive them of what they were made for? Wouldn't it be unfair for God to damn them in Hell? 

But, you see, lurking behind the scenes here are two very erroneous assumptions: (a) original sin doesn't really take away these souls' innocence; and (b) God owes it to them to save them, because presumably salvation is what a soul deserves by nature, by default, so long as it does not lose this right by sinning. But of course, these presuppositions are false and heretical. (Most theologians would not dare to state them explicitly; but naïvely the general population does buy into them.) Despite our sensibilities to the contrary, Catholic dogma tells us that these souls are not innocent, but bear the stain of sin and are thus unworthy of the glory of Heaven. Morevoer, God does not owe Heaven to anyone anyway; salvation is a free gift and no one really deserves it (or merit it de condigno). And, what's more, rather than there being some sort of 'unfairness' by assigning to them this eternal lot, God is in fact being merciful towards these souls. God is not punishing them for something they didn't do, but is mercifully granting them an eternal and superabundant natural happiness that they do not deserve. Divine justice, original sin, the gratuity of salvation: we may not like these doctrines, but it's what God revealed. If we really believed in them, we would not find shocking the doctrine of limbo that is widely taught to us by the Catholic tradition throughout the ages, and we wouldn't need to replace it with some vain 'hope' devised to fit our un-Catholic sensibilities.

Quaeritur: Which Sacrament is the Greatest?

Quaeritur: Which Sacrament is the Greatest?

Rogier Van der Weyden, Seven Sacraments (ca 1445-50)

Quaeritur: Which is the most important of Sacraments?  The Council of Trent, in Canon 3 of Session 7, says we should not consider all the Sacraments to be equally excellent.  So naturally there arises the question of which of the Sacraments is the most important.

I have had many encounters with people who have disagreed on what is the most excellent Sacrament. They usually tend to get into some impossible argument from causality. It usually goes something like this:

Person 1: What is the most important Sacrament?

Person 2: It must be the Eucharist, because it's Christ himself!

Person 1: But without an ordained priest you would have no Eucharist, so isn't Holy Orders more important? 

Person 2: OK, but without the family no future priests would be born, so doesn't marriage have precedence?

Etc.

What is the best way of settling this question?


Respondeo: Indeed, Trent taught that: "If any one saith, that these seven Sacraments are in such wise equal to each other, as that one is not in any way more worthy than another; let him be anathema" (Session 7, Can. 3).  At least everyone in the conversation agrees that not all Sacraments are of the same worthiness or excellence.  But which one is higher or more important than the others, and what is their order, is a bit more complex.

St. Thomas has a very nuanced way of resolving this issue.  First, we need to make a distinction: "importance" (or "excellence" or "nobility," etc.) and "precedence in causality" are not the same.  Christ could not have been born without Adam, but that doesn't make Adam more 'important' than Christ.

So in terms of excellence or importance, you are right in saying that the Holy Eucharist is Christ himself, the Author of grace, whereas the rest of the Sacraments are instrumental causes of grace, and thus, absolutely speaking (simpliciter), the Holy Eucharist is the greatest, noblest, and most excellent Sacrament.  This is so primarily for the reason that the other Sacraments are creatures, and all creatures are inferior to their Creator.   Moreover, all Sacraments are ordered to the Holy Eucharist as to their end, and even ritually terminate with the Eucharist (i.e., a Mass is normally offered after each of the Sacraments).

Yet, when considered in one respect or another (secundum quid), some Sacraments may have precedence as compared to others.  For example, Baptism is the greatest in terms of necessity for salvation.  Holy Order is the greatest in terms of the character it confers upon the recipient.  

Even Marriage is greatest in one respect, namely, its signification: "As regards what is signified [...] marriage is the noblest, because it signifies the conjunction of the two natures in the person of Christ” (In IV Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3; Cf. Peter Kwasniewski, "St. Thomas on the Grandeur and Limitations of Marriage," Nova et Vetera 10 (2012), 415-36).  

But yes, simpliciter they are all ultimately inferior to the Holy Eucharist, the Body and Blood of the Son of God Himself.

St. Thomas summarizes this teaching beautifully in Summa theologiae, IIIa, q. 65, a. 3, c & ad 4:

Respondeo dicendum quod, simpliciter loquendo, sacramentum Eucharistiae est potissimum inter alia sacramenta. Quod quidem tripliciter apparet. Primo quidem, ex eo quod in eo continetur ipse Christus substantialiter, in aliis autem sacramentis continetur quaedam virtus instrumentalis participata a Christo, ut ex supra dictis patet. Semper autem quod est per essentiam, potius est eo quod est per participationem.	I answer that, Absolutely speaking, the sacrament of the Eucharist is the greatest of all the sacraments: and this may be shown in three ways. First of all because it contains Christ Himself substantially: whereas the other sacraments contain a certain instrumental power which is a share of Christ's power, as we have shown above (Question [62], Article [4], ad 3, Article [5]). Now that which is essentially such is always of more account than that which is such by participation.
Secundo hoc apparet ex ordine sacramentorum ad invicem, nam omnia alia sacramenta ordinari videntur ad hoc sacramentum sicut ad finem. Manifestum est enim quod sacramentum ordinis ordinatur ad Eucharistiae consecrationem. Sacramentum vero Baptismi ordinatur ad Eucharistiae receptionem. In quo etiam perficitur aliquis per confirmationem, ut non vereatur se subtrahere a tali sacramento. Per poenitentiam etiam et extremam unctionem praeparatur homo ad digne sumendum corpus Christi. Matrimonium autem saltem sua significatione attingit hoc sacramentum, inquantum significat coniunctionem Christi et Ecclesiae, cuius unitas per sacramentum Eucharistiae figuratur, unde et apostolus dicit, Ephes. V, sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et in Ecclesia.	Secondly, this is made clear by considering the relation of the sacraments to one another. For all the other sacraments seem to be ordained to this one as to their end. For it is manifest that the sacrament of order is ordained to the consecration of the Eucharist: and the sacrament of Baptism to the reception of the Eucharist: while a man is perfected by Confirmation, so as not to fear to abstain from this sacrament. By Penance and Extreme Unction man is prepared to receive the Body of Christ worthily. And Matrimony at least in its signification, touches this sacrament; in so far as it signifies the union of Christ with the Church, of which union the Eucharist is a figure: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32): "This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church."
Tertio hoc apparet ex ritu sacramentorum. Nam fere omnia sacramenta in Eucharistia consummantur, ut dicit Dionysius, III cap. Eccles. Hier., sicut patet quod ordinati communicant, et etiam baptizati si sint adulti.	Thirdly, this is made clear by considering the rites of the sacraments. For nearly all the sacraments terminate in the Eucharist, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii): thus those who have been ordained receive Holy Communion, as also do those who have been baptized, if they be adults.
Aliorum autem sacramentorum comparatio ad invicem potest esse multipliciter. Nam in via necessitatis, Baptismus est potissimum sacramentorum; in via autem perfectionis, sacramentum ordinis; medio autem modo se habet sacramentum confirmationis. Sacramentum vero poenitentiae et extremae unctionis sunt inferioris gradus a praedictis sacramentis, quia, sicut dictum est, ordinantur ad vitam Christianam non per se, sed quasi per accidens, scilicet in remedium supervenientis defectus. Inter quae tamen extrema unctio comparatur ad poenitentiam sicut confirmatio ad Baptismum, ita scilicet quod poenitentia est maioris necessitatis, sed extrema unctio est maioris perfectionis.	The remaining sacraments may be compared to one another in several ways. For on the ground of necessity, Baptism is the greatest of the sacraments; while from the point of view of perfection, order comes first; while Confirmation holds a middle place. The sacraments of Penance and Extreme Unction are on a degree inferior to those mentioned above; because, as stated above (Article [2]), they are ordained to the Christian life, not directly, but accidentally, as it were, that is to say, as remedies against supervening defects. And among these, Extreme Unction is compared to Penance, as Confirmation to Baptism; in such a way, that Penance is more necessary, whereas Extreme Unction is more perfect.

Ad quartum dicendum quod [...] Baptismus, cum sit maximae necessitatis, est potissimum sacramentorum. Sicut ordo et confirmatio habent quandam excellentiam ratione ministerii; et matrimonium ratione significationis. Nihil enim prohibet aliquid esse secundum quid dignius, quod tamen non est dignius simpliciter.	Reply to Objection 4: [...] Baptism, being of the greatest necessity, is the greatest of the sacraments, just as order and Confirmation have a certain excellence considered in their administration; and Matrimony by reason of its signification. For there is no reason why a thing should not be greater from a certain point of view which is not greater absolutely speaking.

St. Thomas on the Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments (IIIa, q. 62, a. 3)

St. Thomas on the Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments (IIIa, q. 62, a. 3)

Lately, I've been reviewing St Thomas' questions on the sacraments in general (de sacramentis in genere), in Summa theologiae IIIa pars, qq. 60-65. I was simply blown away by the depth of his discussion on the topic of the instrumental causality of the sacraments in q. 62, a. 3.

For St. Thomas, the sacraments are not a mere occasion for God to cause grace, but are God's instrumental cause of grace, and thus relate to God as an instrument to the principal agent.  And since the being and action of the instrument is not its own, but that of the principal agent, whereas the principal agent acts in himself, so the power transmitted in a sacrament is God's own power, and hence the sacrament possesses power only transitorily, only as long as God utilizes it as a sacrament/instrument. 

Now, there are two types of instruments: conjoined instruments and separate instruments. Conjoined instruments, like the hand, move separate instruments, like a cane.  God, the Word, existing from eternity is the principal Agent who confers grace, utilizing both the conjoined instrument of His own sacred humanity and the separate instrument of the sacraments.

Here is the text of Summa theologiae IIIa, q. 62, a. 3 (taken from the Dominican House of Studies Priory page):

Whether Christ as man had the power of producing the inward sacramental effect?

Respondeo dicendum quod interiorem sacramentorum effectum operatur Christus et secundum quod est Deus, et secundum quod est homo, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam secundum quod est Deus, operatur in sacramentis per auctoritatem. Secundum autem quod est homo, operatur ad interiores effectus sacramentorum meritorie, et efficienter, sed instrumentaliter. Dictum est enim quod passio Christi, quae competit ei secundum humanam naturam, causa est nostrae iustificationis et meritorie, et effective, non quidem per modum principalis agentis, sive per auctoritatem, sed per modum instrumenti, inquantum humanitas est instrumentum divinitatis eius, ut supra dictum est.

I answer that, Christ produces the inward sacramental effect, both as God and as man, but not in the same way. For, as God, He works in the sacraments by authority: but, as man, His operation conduces to the inward sacramental effects meritoriously and efficiently, but instrumentally. For it has been stated (Question [48],Articles [1],6; Question [49], Article [1]) that Christ's Passion which belongs to Him in respect of His human nature, is the cause of justification, both meritoriously and efficiently, not as the principal cause thereof, or by His own authority, but as an instrument, in so far as His humanity is the instrument of His Godhead, as stated above (Question [13], Articles [2],3; Question [19], Article [1]).

Sed tamen, quia est instrumentum coniunctum divinitati in persona, habet quandam principalitatem et causalitatem respectu instrumentorum extrinsecorum, qui sunt ministri Ecclesiae et ipsa sacramenta, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo, sicut Christus, inquantum Deus, habet potestatem auctoritatis in sacramentis, ita, inquantum homo, habet potestatem ministerii principalis, sive potestatem excellentiae. Quae quidem consistit in quatuor. Primo quidem, in hoc quod meritum et virtus passionis eius operatur in sacramentis, ut supra dictum est. Et quia virtus passionis copulatur nobis per fidem, secundum illud Rom. III, quem proposuit Deus propitiatorem per fidem in sanguine eius, quam fidem per invocationem nominis Christi protestamur, ideo, secundo, ad potestatem excellentiae quam Christus habet in sacramentis, pertinet quod in eius nomine sacramenta sanctificantur. Et quia ex institutione sacramenta virtutem obtinent, inde est quod, tertio, ad excellentiam potestatis Christi pertinet quod ipse, qui dedit virtutem sacramentis, potuit instituere sacramenta. Et quia causa non dependet ab effectu, sed potius e converso, quarto, ad excellentiam potestatis Christi pertinet quod ipse potuit effectum sacramentorum sine exteriori sacramento conferre.

Nevertheless, since it is an instrument united to the Godhead in unity of Person, it has a certain headship and efficiency in regard to extrinsic instruments, which are the ministers of the Church and the sacraments themselves, as has been explained above (Article [1]). Consequently, just as Christ, as God, has power of "authority" over the sacraments, so, as man, He has the power of ministry in chief, or power of "excellence." And this consists in four things. First in this, that the merit and power of His Passion operates in the sacraments, as stated above (Question [62], Article [5]). And because the power of the Passion is communicated to us by faith, according to Rm. 3:25: "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in His blood," which faith we proclaim by calling on the name of Christ: therefore, secondly, Christ's power of excellence over the sacraments consists in this, that they are sanctified by the invocation of His name. And because the sacraments derive their power from their institution, hence, thirdly, the excellence of Christ's power consists in this, that He, Who gave them their power, could institute the sacraments. And since cause does not depend on effect, but rather conversely, it belongs to the excellence of Christ's power, that He could bestow the sacramental effect without conferring the exterior sacrament.

A very good and relatively-recent article that goes into some of these themes is Benoît-Dominique de la Soujeole, OP, "The Economy of Salvation: Entitative Sacramentality and Operative Sacramentality," Thomist 75 (2011), 537-53.

Quaeritur: Can Circumstances Change the Species of a Human Act? (Part 1)

Quaeritur: Can Circumstances Change the Species of a Human Act? (Part 1)

Quaeritur: Can circumstances change the species (i.e., moral object) of a human act or do they only change the degree of the species of a human act?

Technically, the circumstances in a human act are always accidental to the object of the act; whereas it is the object (the thing that is done) in an act that primarily gives the act its essence or species (see ST I-II.18.2).  For example, suppose I steal some money from someone: who I steal from, how much I steal, etc. are considered circumstances, and therefore are accidental to the object or essence of the act, which was theft.  Whether I steal $5 or $5,000, it's still theft.  And whether I steal from a stranger or from my uncle, it's still theft.  These circumstances do not affect the essence of the act.

However, there are factors in a human act which seem to be circumstantial, but in reality are not circumstances at all, but are "conditions for the object," as St. Thomas calls them (see ST I-II.18.10c).  For example, if you 'steal' a wallet, but that wallet happens to belong to you in the first place, the fact that it belongs to you is not really a circumstance, but a 'condition for the object', and it makes the act not theft at all; rather, the essence of the act is that you're taking what is yours.  Or to use St. Thomas' example, if you steal from a holy place, like a church, you're definitely committing theft, but additionally, the fact that you're doing it from a holy place adds another object to the act, namely, that of sacrilege.  That apparent circumstance is not a circumstance in the sense of an accident; it adds another species to the act.  (And, if you're wondering, yes, a human act can have more than one moral species, unlike a natural thing, like a plant or animal, which can only have one species.)

So stealing from a church is actually two sins, theft and sacrilege? Or is it still one – sacrilegious theft?

Two sins.  And both have to be confessed.  In other words, it's not enough to say merely "I stole something from a building," or "I committed sacrilege at the church"; one has to confess having stolen from the church, both theft and sacrilege.  And so with other acts that involve multiple species of sin, as when one does one bad thing for the sake of another.

In ST I-II.18.6 St. Thomas explains that when one does one evil for the sake of another, the evil that is the end relates to the evil means as form to matter: for example, when one steals in order to commit adultery---which incidentally is the reverse of Aristotle's example in the Ethics: adultery for the sake of theft---the two sins come together in one act.  In St. Thomas' example the theft is material and the adultery is formal, whereas in Aristotle's example, the adultery is material, the theft is formal.  Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, Beatitude (commentary on Summa Theologiae Ia-IIae, available through ITOPL), p. 274: 

One who steals in order to commit adultery is an adulterer rather than [i.e., moreso than] a thief, because adultery, the subjective purpose, is the form of which theft is the material.  In this case there are two sins specifically distinct, to be declared in confession.

Thank you, Doctor!  Clear as usual!

You're welcome!  Also, feel free to use our Quaestiones Disputatae forum.  Your questions can actually help many people in that forum and you can also benefit from the input of other traditional Catholic scholars who join in.

The Invalidity of SSPX Absolutions

The Invalidity of SSPX Absolutions

Link to Fr. Z's post: QUAERITUR: Going to SSPX priest for absolution of excommunication.

Voris on Priscillianism, Communion in the Hand, and Spain

Voris on Priscillianism, Communion in the Hand, and Spain

Disciplinary Infallibility and the New Mass

Disciplinary Infallibility and the New Mass

From Arnaldo Vidigal Xavier da Silveira, La nouvelle messe, qu'en penser?, French translation of Considerações sobre o 'ordo missae' de Paulo VI, ("The New Mass, What Should We Think?"), Chiré-en-Montreuil: Difussion de la Pensée Française, 1975.

The following is taken from the Appendix to the First Part, "Lois et infallibilité" (not published in the original Portuguese), pp. 208-11.

Schultes, O.P. on the Church's Disciplinary Infallibility

Schultes, O.P. on the Church's Disciplinary Infallibility

From Reginald Schultes, O.P. De ecclesia catholica praelectiones apologeticae (1925), pp. 318-21; available from ITOPL. 

The Disciplinary Infallibility of the Church: The Novus ordo Missae Cannot be Strictly Heretical

The Disciplinary Infallibility of the Church: The Novus ordo Missae Cannot be Strictly Heretical

"The prayers prescribed or approved for universal use in public worship cannot be opposed to any revealed truth.  Hence the axiom, Lex orandi est lex credendi,--the rule of prayer is the rule of faith."

The following is taken from Sylvester Berry, D.D., The Church of Christ (1927), Ch. XVI: "The Extent of Infallibility," pp. 503-9 (available from the ITOPL collection).  

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Pope Leo XIII on the Church's Authority over the State in Marriage Legislation

Pope Leo XIII on the Church's Authority over the State in Marriage Legislation

On the 131st Anniversary of Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical Arcanum (On Christian Marriage, Feb. 10, 1880)

Lastly should be borne in mind the great weight and crucial test of history, by which it is plainly proved that the legislative and judicial authority of which We are speaking has been freely and constantly used by the Church, even in times when some foolishly suppose the head of the State either to have consented to it or connived at it. It would, for instance, be incredible and altogether absurd to assume that Christ our Lord condemned the long-standing practice of polygamy and divorce by authority delegated to Him by the procurator of the province, or the principal ruler of the Jews. And it would be equally extravagant to think that, when the Apostle Paul taught that divorces and incestuous marriages were not lawful, it was because Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero agreed with him or secretly commanded him so to teach. No man in his senses could ever be persuaded that the Church made so many laws about the holiness and indissolubility of marriage (34), and the marriages of slaves with the free-born (35), by power received from Roman emperors, most hostile to the Christian name, whose strongest desire was to destroy by violence and murder the rising Church of Christ. Still less could anyone believe this to be the case, when the law of the Church was sometimes so divergent from the civil law that Ignatius the Martyr (36), Justin (37), Athenagoras (38), and Tertullian (39) publicly denounced as unjust and adulterous certain marriages which had been sanctioned by imperial law.

22. Furthermore, after all power had devolved upon the Christian emperors, the supreme pontiffs and bishops assembled in council persisted with the same independence and consciousness of their right in commanding or forbidding in regard to marriage whatever they judged to be profitable or expedient for the time being, however much it might seem to be at variance with the laws of the State. It is well known that, with respect to the impediments arising from the marriage bond, through vow, disparity of worship, blood relationship, certain forms of crime, and from previously plighted troth, many decrees were issued by the rulers of the Church at the Councils of Granada (40), Arles (41), Chalcedon (42), the second of Milevum (43), and others, which were often widely different from the decrees sanctioned by the laws of the empire. Furthermore, so far were Christian princes from arrogating any power in the matter of Christian marriage that they on the contrary acknowledged and declared that it belonged exclusively in all its fullness to the Church. In fact, Honorius, the younger Theodosius, and Justinian (44), also, hesitated not to confess that the only power belonging to them in relation to marriage was that of acting as guardians and defenders of the holy canons. If at any time they enacted anything by their edicts concerning impediments of marriage, they voluntarily explained the reason, affirming that they took it upon themselves so to act, by leave and authority of the Church (45), whose judgment they were wont to appeal to and reverently to accept in all questions that concerned legitimacy (46) and divorce (47); as also in all those points which in any way have a necessary connection with the marriage bond (48). The Council of Trent, therefore, had the clearest right to define that it is in the Church's power "to establish diriment impediments of matrimony" (49), and that "matrimonial causes pertain to ecclesiastical judges" (50).

23. (= Denz. 1854) Let no one, then, be deceived by the distinction which some civil jurists have so strongly insisted upon - the distinction, namely, by virtue of which they sever the matrimonial contract from the sacrament, with intent to hand over the contract to the power and will of the rulers of the State, while reserving questions concerning the sacrament of the Church. A distinction, or rather severance, of this kind cannot be approved; for certain it is that in Christian marriage the contract is inseparable from the sacrament, and that, for this reason, the contract cannot be true and legitimate without being a sacrament as well. For Christ our Lord added to marriage the dignity of a sacrament; but marriage is the contract itself, whenever that contract is lawfully concluded....

--------------

Notes:

34. Canones Apostolorum, 16 17, 18, ed. Fr. Lauchert, J. C. B. Mohr (Leipzig, 1896) p. 3.

35. Philosophumena (Oxford, 1851), i.e., Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, 9, 12 (PG 16 3386D-3387A).

36. Epistola ad Polycarpum, cap. 5 (PG 5, 723-724).

37. Apolog. Maj., 15 (PG 6, 349A, B).

38. Legal. pro Christian., 32, 33 (PG 6, 963-968).

39. De coron. milit., 13 (PL 2, 116).

40. De Aguirre, Conc. Hispan., Vol. 1, can. 11.

41. Harduin, Act. Conch., Vol. 1, can. 11.

42. Ibid., can. 16.

43. Ibid., can. 17.

44. Novel., 137 (Justinianus, Novellae, ed. C. E. Z. Lingenthal, Leipzig, 1881, Vol. 2, p. 206).

45. Fejer, Matrim. ex instit. Chris. (Pest, 1835).

46. Cap. 3, De ord. cogn. (Corpus juris canonici, ed. cit., Part 2, col. 276).

47. Cap. 3, De divort. (ed. cit., Part 2, col. 720).

48. Cap. 13, Qui filii sint legit. (ed. cit., Part 2, col. 716).

49. Trid., sess. xxiv, can. 4.

50. Ibid., can. 12.

Aquinas on the Ordination of Women

Aquinas on the Ordination of Women

From Summa Theologiae, Suppl.39.1:

Article 1. Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving Orders?

Objection 1. It would seem that the female sex is no impediment to receiving Orders. For the office of prophet is greater than the office of priest, since a prophet stands midway between God and priests, just as the priest does between God and people. Now the office of prophet was sometimes granted to women, as may be gathered from 2 Kings 22:14. Therefore the office of priest also may be competent to them.

Objection 2. Further, just as Order pertains to a kind of pre-eminence, so does a position of authority as well as martyrdom and the religious state. Now authority is entrusted to women in the New Testament, as in the case of abbesses, and in the Old Testament, as in the case of Debbora, who judged Israel (Judges 2). Moreover martyrdom and the religious life are also befitting to them. Therefore the Orders of the Church are also competent to them.

Objection 3. Further, the power of orders is founded in the soul. But sex is not in the soul. Therefore difference in sex makes no difference to the reception of Orders.

On the contrary, It is said (1 Timothy 2:12): "I suffer not a woman to teach (in the Church),* nor to use authority over the man." [The words in parenthesis are from 1 Corinthians 14:34, "Let women keep silence in the churches."]

Further, the crown is required previous to receiving Orders, albeit not for the validity of the sacrament. But the crown or tonsure is not befitting to women according to 1 Corinthians 11. Neither therefore is the receiving of Orders.

I answer that, Certain things are required in the recipient of a sacrament as being requisite for the validity of the sacrament, and if such things be lacking, one can receive neither the sacrament nor the reality of the sacrament. Other things, however, are required, not for the validity of the sacrament, but for its lawfulness, as being congruous to the sacrament; and without these one receives the sacrament, but not the reality of the sacrament. Accordingly we must say that the male sex is required for receiving Orders not only in the second, but also in the first way. Wherefore even though a woman were made the object of all that is done in conferring Orders, she would not receive Orders, for since a sacrament is a sign, not only the thing, but the signification of the thing, is required in all sacramental actions; thus it was stated above (Question 32, Article 2) that in Extreme Unction it is necessary to have a sick man, in order to signify the need of healing. Accordingly, since it is not possible in the female sex to signify eminence of degree, for a woman is in the state of subjection, it follows that she cannot receive the sacrament of Order. Some, however, have asserted that the male sex is necessary for the lawfulness and not for the validity of the sacrament, because even in the Decretals (cap. Mulieres dist. 32; cap. Diaconissam, 27, qu. i) mention is made of deaconesses and priestesses. But deaconess there denotes a woman who shares in some act of a deacon, namely who reads the homilies in the Church; and priestess [presbytera] means a widow, for the word "presbyter" means elder.

Reply to Objection 1. Prophecy is not a sacrament but a gift of God. Wherefore there it is not the signification, but only the thing which is necessary. And since in matters pertaining to the soul woman does not differ from man as to the thing (for sometimes a woman is found to be better than many men as regards the soul), it follows that she can receive the gift of prophecy and the like, but not the sacrament of Orders.

And thereby appears the Reply to the Second and Third Objections. However, as to abbesses, it is said that they have not ordinary authority, but delegated as it were, on account of the danger of men and women living together. But Debbora exercised authority in temporal, not in priestly matters, even as now woman may have temporal power.