Showing posts with label Religion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Religion. Show all posts

Saturday, February 25, 2017

St. Thomas: We Catholics Do Adore Images


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Adapted from Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo, "Aquinas’ Reception of John of Damascus’ Philosophy of Religious Worship," (forthcoming).  

You can download the original paper (draft) from my Academia.edu page.

Protestants have always accused Catholics of "worshipping images."  The standard response of Catholic apologists is simply to deny the charge, and instead respond that we really just 'venerate' the images.  This type of response is not only grossly insufficient, but actually runs afoul of the language of our tradition, as expressed in the writings of the saints.  For example, a Protestant can easily search through St. Thomas and find him saying that we do adore images.  When a Protestant brings this up to an untrained Catholic apologist, the apologist usually has nothing intelligent to say in reply.

In order to solve this puzzle, let's do what we do best: "Go to Thomas" (Ite ad Thomam).

According to St. Thomas, the first and most important of the exterior acts of religion (religio), i.e., of the virtue of worship (ST IIa-IIae, q. 81-100) is that of ‘adoration’ (adoratio).  The terminology here can be misleading.  We might be inclined to think of 'adoration' as simply being synonymous with ‘worship’, the kind of reverence that is reserved to God alone.  But Aquinas, who in this regard simply follows the received tradition, together with its complex and sophisticated theological language, already has a particular Latin term for divine worship, namely, látria (from the Greek, λατρεία, latréia).  Adoratio for Aquinas means concretely any kind of a physical humbling of the body, such as genuflections, prostrations, bowing down, etc., before something sacred or something that is worthy of respect or veneration.  As such, adoratio signifies primarily a physical act comprising a set of bodily postures.  Within the context of divine worship, these acts of adoratio are of course done as signs of an interior attitude of latria, but in themselves they are physical acts.  This is how it can be explained why we find St. Thomas saying that Catholics can and should 'adore' images.  

But the problem is deeper than that.  We actually find him saying that we should offer latria to images.  Yes, the worship due to God alone, should be given to images.  Why?

One of the most important practical points that St. Thomas makes in Christology is that Christ’s humanity, though in itself created, is deserving of the ‘adoration of latria’ in virtue of its Hypostatic or Personal Union with the Second Person of the Trinity: “the adoration of latria is not given to Christ’s humanity by reason of itself, but by reason of divinity to which it is united.”[i]  This is in contrast to the ‘adoration of dulia’, which is the kind of veneration given to the Saints and their relics, and that of hyperdulia, which is given to the Mother of God.

Yet, perhaps surprisingly, the humanity of Christ is not the only creature which is in some way deserving of latria.  There are other created things that are formally associated with Christ's humanity and thus are themselves deserving of latria (without this entailing the sin of idolatry): these are the true Cross of Christ—the actual historical instrument of Christ’s passion—as well as any image or icon of Christ.  By ‘icons’ or images we mean any pictorial representation of Christ, or of the Cross of Christ, whether in fresco form, or mosaics, “made of colors, pebbles, any other material that is fit, set in the holy churches of God, on holy utensils and vestments, on walls and boards, in houses and in streets,” in the words of the Second Council of Nicaea (AD 787), which addressed the issue of Iconoclasm, the anti-icon heresy that crept into the Church due to nascent Islam's hatred of religious imagery.[iv]

And interestingly, in another text, Aquinas relies again on St. John Damascene for a quote by St. Basil on this point. “Damascene quotes Basil as saying: ‘The honor given to an image reaches to the prototype,’ that is, the exemplar. But the exemplar itself, namely, Christ, is to be adored with the adoration of latria; therefore also His image.”[v]  What follows this quote is a remarkable text, where Aquinas uses Aristotelian semiotics as a basic premise to address to the issue on his own terms:

As the Philosopher says in the book De Memoria et Reminiscentia, there is a twofold movement of the mind towards an image: one indeed towards the image itself as a certain thing; another, towards the image insofar as it is the image of something else. And between these movements there is this difference; that the former, by which one is moved towards an image as a certain thing, is different from the movement towards the thing: whereas the latter movement, which is towards the image as an image, is one and the same as that which is towards the thing. Thus therefore we must say that no reverence is shown to Christ’s image, as a thing, for instance, carved or painted wood: because reverence is not due save to a rational creature. It follows therefore that reverence should be shown to it only insofar as it is an image. Consequently the same reverence should be shown to Christ’s image as to Christ Himself. Since, therefore, Christ is adored with the adoration of latria, it follows that His image should be adored with the adoration of latria.[vi]
In other words, we can think of an image in two ways: as a thing in itself, or as a sign.  When we think of it as a thing in itself, we do not necessarily treat it as we treat the object of which it is a sign, but when we do think of it as a sign, we treat it in the same way as we treat the object of which it is a sign.  For example, if I look at a picture of my wife, it is entirely reasonable for me to point to the picture and say “I love her.”  No one would think that what I mean is that I love the picture itself, qua inanimate object.  All of my affection in this case is directed at the person of my wife, almost as though the picture were not involved.  I do not give the picture itself a different kind of love from the love I give my wife.  To paraphrase Basil and Damascene, my attitude towards the image is directed at the exemplar.  Hence, it matters not whether I point to the picture and say “I love her” or actually point to my wife and say “I love her”: it is the same love that is expressed in both cases.  Aquinas is saying that similarly, in the case of religious worship, it matters not whether the latria given to Christ is given to Him directly or by means of an image or icon: it is latria all the same.  The worship given is not directed at the image in itself as a thing, but to Christ through the image, the latter being only a sign that leads the mind to Christ. 



Given this doctrine on the adoration of images, Aquinas has now the trouble of explaining why, even though in the Hebrew Scriptures the use of images was forbidden in worship, the prohibition nonetheless no longer applies since the coming of Christ.  He cannot simply claim that the prohibition is only of adoring images, and that Christians only venerate them, as many contemporary Christians would argue.  Rather, he is committed to the doctrine that images of Christ are deserving of latria.  His response focuses instead on the doctrine of the twofold movement of the mind towards an image, affirming that whereas in the case of Old Testament idolatry, the adoration of images was adoration of the gods of the gentiles, where since the coming of Christ the adoration of images is of God Himself made man.

[B]ecause, as was said above, the movement towards the image is the same as the movement towards the thing, adoration of images is forbidden in the same way as adoration of the thing whose image it is.  Therefore here we are to understand the prohibition to adore those images which the Gentiles made for the purpose of venerating their own gods.... But no corporeal image could be made of the true God Himself, since He is incorporeal; because, as Damascene says, “It is the highest absurdity and impiety to make a figure of what is Divine.” But because in the New Testament, God was made man, He can be adored in His corporeal image.[vii]

In other words, according to Aquinas, the great difference between the Judaism and Christianity in regards to the adoration of images is that in Judaism, God cannot be represented in imagery because God is strictly incorporeal, but in Christianity God is believed to have taken human flesh and it is therefore possible not only to represent Him, but also to worship him, through imagery.

A few points on the reception of this doctrine in later Catholic theology are in order here.  This analysis of the use of images in worship, which Aquinas shares not only with Damascene, but also with other prominent 13th Century sources such as Albert, Bonaventure, and the Summa Fratris Alexandri, is not standard within modern Catholic theology.  Later Catholic theologians such as Bellarmine, Bossuet, and Petavius taught that the proper attitude due to religious images is not that of latria, but a veneration along the lines of dulia.[viii]  And this latter opinion has become a commonplace in contemporary Catholic theology, catechesis, and especially apologetics.  And yet, rather inconsistently, John Damascene and Aquinas are still frequently used as reference points on the issue.  For example, the Catechism of the Catholic Church (AD 1992) teaches that “[t]he honor paid to sacred images is a ‘respectful veneration’ (reverens veneratio), not the adoration (adoratio) due to God alone.”[ix] Rather astonishingly, right after making this statement, the Catechism immediately quotes Aquinas' words for support:

The cultus of religio is not rendered to images as considered in themselves, as things, but insofar as they are images leading to God incarnate. Now the movement directed to an image insofar as it is an image does not stop at the image itself, but tends towards that of which it is an image.[x]

Although the quote in the Catechism ends here, the text of St. Thomas continues: “Hence neither latria nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious worship is paid to the images of Christ.”[xi]  Clearly, this text points to an account of the use of images in worship that is at odds with what the Catechism teaches in the preceding line, since the basic idea in this text of Aquinas is that the same latria is given to the image of Christ as to Christ Himself.

Some Thomists and commentators have used the language of ‘relative latria’, to describe the worship due to an image of Christ.  This terminology should not lead us to think that the latria offered to the image is of a different sort from the latria given to Christ.  The image is indeed being given latria in relation to Christ, Who is the terminus of the one movement of latria; but as Aquinas says, it is one movement of the mind that tends to both the image of Christ and to Christ Himself, one and the same latria being offered to both.

The take-home message is that we do adore images (i.e., we bow down to them, kneel before them, etc.).  But 'adoring' in this sense refers to just an exterior religious act.  The inner religious act that is expressed outwardly in adoration depends on what the image is of.  If the image is of Christ, then, yes, we give latria to the image; or more precisely, to Christ in the image.  We do not give latria to the image simply because it is an image, but because it is an image of Christ, the God-man.  And if the image is of a saint, then we give dulia to the image, or rather to the saint in the image.  And in the case of images of Our Lady, it is hyperdulia.  There is nothing wrong with doing this: it is the same movement of the mind that is directed to the image and to the person in the image.  Christ is thus deserving of the same latria, or worship, whether in person or in an image. To do otherwise would amount to a misuse of images.

So let us be traditional Catholics.  Let us not feel pressured by un-Catholic (ultimately Protestant) cultural sensibilities to miss the importance and value of Catholic iconography, religious sculpture, and sacred art in general.  Let us confidently adore Christ in our icons and statues.  And venerate our Saints in our images.  That is why these sacramentals fill our churches (or should fill them).   They are there as a powerful religious resource, and not as a 'mere symbol' or decoration.  The Church has so much confidence in them as powerful sacramentals, as "windows to heaven," that she dedicated a whole Ecumenical Council to defending them. 

The Eastern Churches have the beautiful tradition of celebrating this council, "The Triumph of Orthodoxy" as they call it, in their liturgies every year on the first Sunday of Great Lent by processing around their churches holding icons up high. It is quite a spectacle to behold.  Let us imitate them in defending the faith through these wonderful trophies of the Incarnation.







Notes:


[i] ST III.25.2 ad 1: “Adoratio latriae non exhibetur humanitati Christi ratione sui ipsius, sed ratione divinitatis cui unitur.”
[ii] Ibid. s.c.: “Adoratio latriae non exhibetur humanitati Christi ratione sui ipsius, sed ratione divinitatis cui unitur.”
[iii] Ibid., c.: “Sed quia, ut dicit Damascenus, si dividas subtilibus intelligentiis quod videtur ab eo quod intelligitur, inadorabilis est ut creatura, scilicet adoratione latriae. Et tunc sic intellectae ut separatae a Dei verbo, debetur sibi adoratio duliae, non cuiuscumque, puta quae communiter exhibetur aliis creaturis; sed quadam excellentiori, quam hyperduliam vocant.” 
[iv] Second Council of Nicaea (Denzinger 302 [600]; Mansi 12, 377D): tam quae de coloribus et tessellis, quam quae ex alia materia congruenter in sanctis Dei ecclesiis, et sacris vasis et vestibus, et in parietibus ac tabulis, domibus et viis....
[v] ST III.25.3 s.c.: “Damascenus inducit Basilium dicentem, imaginis honor ad prototypum pervenit, idest exemplar. Sed ipsum exemplar, scilicet Christus, est adorandus adoratione latriae. Ergo et eius imago.” 
[vi] ST III.25.3c: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in libro de Mem. et Remin., duplex est motus animae in imaginem, unus quidem in imaginem ipsam secundum quod est res quaedam; alio modo, in imaginem inquantum est imago alterius. Et inter hos motus est haec differentia, quia primus motus, quo quis movetur in imaginem prout est res quaedam, est alius a motu qui est in rem, secundus autem motus, qui est in imaginem inquantum est imago, est unus et idem cum illo qui est in rem. Sic igitur dicendum est quod imagini Christi inquantum est res quaedam, puta lignum sculptum vel pictum, nulla reverentia exhibetur, quia reverentia debetur non nisi rationali naturae. Relinquitur ergo quod exhibeatur ei reverentia solum inquantum est imago. Et sic sequitur quod eadem reverentia exhibeatur imagini Christi et ipsi Christo. Cum igitur Christus adoretur adoratione latriae, consequens est quod eius imago sit adoratione latriae adoranda. 
[vii] ST III.25.3 ad 1: “Et quia, sicut dictum est, idem est motus in imaginem et in rem, eo modo prohibetur adoratio quo prohibetur adoratio rei cuius est imago. Unde ibi intelligitur prohiberi adoratio imaginum quas gentiles faciebant in venerationem deorum suorum.... Ipsi autem Deo vero, cum sit incorporeus, nulla imago corporalis poterat poni, quia, ut Damascenus dicit, insipientiae summae est et impietatis figurare quod est divinum. Sed quia in novo testamento Deus factus est homo, potest in sua imagine corporali adorari.
[viii] Cf. F. Cabrol, “The True Cross,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia, New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1908.    
[ix] Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 2132: “Honor sanctis imaginibus tributus est reverens veneratio, non adoratio quae soli Deo convenit.”
[x] ST II-II.81.3 ad 3: “Imaginibus non exhibetur religionis cultus secundum quod in seipsis considerantur, quasi res quaedam: sed secundum quod sunt imagines ducentes in Deum incarnatum. Motus autem qui est in imaginem prout est imago, non sistit in ipsa, sed tendit in id cuius est imago.”
[xi] Ibid.: “Et ideo ex hoc quod imaginibus Christi exhibetur religionis cultus, non diversificatur ratio latriae, nec virtus religionis.”

Thursday, January 05, 2017

"Aquinas' Reception of Albert the Great's Account of the Virtue of Religion"


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Sts. Albert and Thomas
by Alonso Antonio Villamor (1661-1729)

Today I'd like to share with you, in the video below, something I'm currently working on.  As part of my ongoing project on the philosophical account of religious worship in St. Thomas and his sources (which derives from my doctoral dissertation), I wrote the following paper titled "Aquinas' Reception of Albert the Great's Account of the Virtue of Religion." It was delivered at the 2015 Aquinas and the 'Arabs' Fall North American Workshop, which was held at Universidad Panamericana in Mexico City, October 2015.  For work-related reasons I was unable to attend the conference physically, so I presented it remotely, via video.  You can download a hard copy of the paper from Academia.edu.  It is not-yet published, so I would appreciate your feedback, so I can polish it up and send it to a journal for publication.

NB: It is not a lecture or discussion but an academic paper, which I read in its entirety for an expert audience.  Please do not expect a flashy presentation with engaging voice inflections or even a catchy PowerPoint or images at all.  The audience consisted primarily of philosophy professors and scholars, who mostly work in the field of the history of medieval philosophy; and this is the style in which we present our work in scholarly conferences. However, the paper is, I think, greatly relevant to a non-expert, traditional Catholic audience.  It will be of special interest to those who wish to acquire a more solid, profound, and coherent philosophical (and indirectly theological) understanding of the nature of Catholic liturgy, and of divine worship in general.  Given that the paper seeks to elucidate the Angelic Doctor's teachings on the matter, particularly as compared to that of another great Doctor of the Church, St. Albert the Great.

Abstract: Recent studies have focused on diverse aspects of Aquinas’ philosophical account of natural religion. Few, however, have delved into Aquinas’ use of his sources, especially his more immediate predecessors, in dealing with this topic. This paper seeks to make a contribution in this regard by showing how Albert, his teacher, addressed these questions and prepared the way for Aquinas’ more sophisticated account. The paper aims to shed light on some of the decisions that Aquinas had to make when faced with Albert’s account of latria. Aquinas seems to think that Albert’s arguments settle some issues; but surprisingly he often disagrees with Albert and offers alternative approaches. In particular, we see that for Thomas, Albert settled definitively the question on how religio or latria is to be entirely categorized under the virtue of justice, following the authority of Cicero, and not under the theological virtues, as earlier predecessors had suggested in light of Augustine’s teachings—an issue that has important ramifications for the very possibility of a philosophical account of religious worship. But we also see how, for example, in Aquinas’ mind Albert does not quite offer a satisfactory account of the range of action of the virtue of religion: whereas for Albert there are many virtuous acts that are entirely outside of the virtue of latria, for Aquinas any act of a moral virtue can become also a ‘commanded’ act of the virtue of religio. Ultimately, the paper highlights both the originality of Aquinas’ account of religion and his debt to his master Albert on this issue.

Download a hard copy of the paper and handout (among other things) from my Academia.edu page.


Friday, September 10, 2010

Quaeritur: What are the Techniques of Neo-Modernism and the Nouvelle Theologie?


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Quaeritur: [In your previous post on the nouvelle theologie], you have named 'resourcement' as an inherently dangerous neo-modernist strategy.  Would you elucidate more such strategies we might encounter equally capable of confounding our understanding and leading us away from the Church?

Respondeo: Yes, ressourcement is a technique that is used (most often) to "raze the bastions," i.e., to destroy the positive foundations of the traditional interpretation of the faith.  But we must distinguish between positive theology and ressourcement.  

Positive Theology vs. Ressourcement Theology.  Positive theology is a perfectly legitimate method mastered by the Fathers of the Church and perfected by the Scholastics throughout the centuries which consists in studying the sources of theology, first in their own native literary context, and then collating them topically, so they may be ultimately used in support for a given thesis. (Nouvelle theologie practitioners often criticize the Scholastics because, supposedly, the Scholastics used the sources merely to formulate "proofs from authority"; but these self-professed lovers of historical theology don't bother to realize that Scholastic proofs were merely the end-result of a much more elaborate study of sources that involved intensive literary courses, the resulting commentaries, along with its sophisticated divisiones textus, consequent florilegia, etc., etc. It was a whole culture of historical and literary awareness of classical sources that modern scholars can only envy and not imitate.) St Thomas was a master in this technique, as is evident, not only from his employment of the fruits of positive theology in the Summa or his disputed questions (for example, whenever he cites Scripture, St Augustine, Aristotle, etc. in support of a thesis), but especially as it is evident from his commentaries on Scripture, Aristotle, and other thinkers, and in particular from his impressive biblical patrology, the Catena aurea. It is important for theologians especially to use this technique, for their conclusions must ultimately be based on the sources of Revelation. And the Scholastics were very aware of this. St Thomas speaks of this theological task explicitly in Summa theologiae I.1.8 ad 2.

Ressourcement, however, goes beyond a mere proof from authority; if it were, it would be nothing new.  Rather, it is a collective attempt by neo-modernist theologians--who are experts in the history of dogma and theology--to replace the traditional understanding of the faith by selectively citing (or re-interpreting) obscure sources and texts to their advantage, in such a way that discredits the traditional understanding of the faith it is  expressed by the overwhelming consensus of Fathers of the Church, of the Doctors of the Church, the approved theologians, the Councils, the Popes, catechisms, and faithful throughout the ages.  Essentially this is the old informal fallacy of special pleading, except glorified by a triumphalistic title that means essentially 'returning to the sources'.  The word is supposed to give us warm-and-fuzzy feelings, the sense of finally understanding the faith the way it was originally meant to be understood, after over a millenium of not getting it, and half a millenium of that horrible old 'Tridentine' religion. 
  
Other Methods.  Now, ressourcement is their chief method, but they employ other techniques as well, most of which are logical corollaries of ressourcement. These methods are applied not only to dogma, but to every area of the Church: Philosophy, Apologetics, Ecclesiology, Fundamental Theology, Morals, Scripture, Liturgy, Canon Law, Homiletics, etc. It is a new theology that is supposed to 'renew' the entire life of the Church, which is now considered to be in its 'Springtime' and in a 'new Pentecost'.  Among these corollaries are (A) the new 'historical' theology, (B) the rejection of Scholasticism, (C) the introduction of false modern philosophies, and (D) the exclusion from their thought of all scientific order.

(A) The new 'historical' theology logically follows from resourcement and its neo-modernist epistemology: if truth is the correspondence of the intellect with our modern way of life (adaequatio intellectus et vitae), rather than with reality, then theology is not the science of God's reality as it is contained in revelation; rather, is no more than a narrative of the different ways in which theological minds have corresponded to the lifestyles of the different times in which they have lived. The value of the great Fathers, Doctors, and Theologias of the Church boils down to the fact they expressed the faith to their contemporaries 'using the categories of their own times'.

(B) The abandonment of Scholasticism also logically follows from this and is simply its negative counterpart. We are to 'return to the Fathers', which really does not mean imitating the Fathers (that would be too traditional) but rather attaining a historical consciousness of patristic thought. But this historical consciousness excludes the supposedly anti-historical (and 'boring'!) mode of reasoning employed in the Scholastic method. Therefore, a good practitioner of the nouvelle theologie must 'return to the Fathers' and bypass Scholasticism altogether. Accordingly, Thomistic philosophy and theology are no longer pursued as sciences that concern God and reality taking inspiration and guidance from the thought of St Thomas, but as a historical narrative of what St Thomas said and believed.

(C) As logical consequence, the role that Thomistic philosophy traditionally played in the Church is neutralized, and in its place, new, vague, existentialist philosophies such as phenomenology and personalism are introduced in order 'justify' neo-modernism (although in really it is impossible to give epistemic justification to a self-referentially inconsistent theory--I shall explain in a later post why both modernism and neo-modernism are self-referentially inconsistent).

(D) The exclusion of scientific order from their thought follows from their existentialist philosophy and is a common denominator they have with their predecessors, the modernists. Here we can quote Pope St Pius X's Pascendi (paragraph 4): 
But since the Modernists (as they are commonly and rightly called) employ a very clever artifice, namely, to present their doctrines without order and systematic arrangement into one whole, scattered and disjointed one from another, so as to appear to be in doubt and uncertainty, while they are in reality firm and steadfast, it will be of advantage, Venerable Brethren, to bring their teachings together here into one group, and to point out the connexion between them, and thus to pass to an examination of the sources of the errors, and to prescribe remedies for averting the evil.
There are lots of other techniques that are used by particular neo-modernists, but these are at least the most commonly used by the movement. Ultimately, however, all of these methods are only means that are subservient to the end of aggiornamento: destroying tradition and establishing a new interpretation of the Catholic faith. They will employ any other method that helps them achieve this end. Resourcement happens to be their favorite (because it is so clever, deceptive, and effective), but it not the only one.

Further Reading.  All of this is already outlined in Ven. Pope Pius XII's Humani generis, and discussed with technical precision in the two Garrigou-Lagrange previously cited:


An revealing book on the Nouvelle Theologie has been published recently, Nouvelle Thologie - New Theology: Inheritor of Modernism, Precursor of Vatican II.  It is written by Jurgen Mettepenningen, a liberal who celebrates the triumph of modernism through the Nouvelle Theology.  Here is the product description from amazon.com:

This title provides an introduction to the most influential movement in Catholic theology in the 20th century which prepared the ground for the Second Vatican Council. La nouvelle theologie - New Theology - was the name of one of the most dynamic and fascinating movements within Catholic theology in the 20th century. Although first condemned by Pope Pius XII. in 1946 and later in his encyclical Humani generis in 1950, it became influential in the preparation of the Second Vatican Council. The movement was instigated by French Dominican Yves Congar with his Dominican confreres Marie-Dominique Chenu and Louis Charlier and linked with the Dominican academy at Le Saulchouir (Tournai), but soon taken over by Jesuits of the same generation of theologians: Henri de Lubac, Jean Danielou, Henri Bouillard and Yves de Montcheuil. They laid strong emphasis on the supernatural, the further implementation of historical method within theology, the ressourcement (back to Scripture, liturgy and Fathers), and the connection between life, faith and theology. Many of them were participating as periti in the Second Vatican Council, which finally accepted the striving of the new theology. Hence, the original perception of the New Theology as novitas would become an auctoritas in the field of Catholic theology. On the basis of research of archives and literature Jurgen Mettepenningen shows in his book the different theological positions of both Dominican and Jesuit protagonists, the development of their ideas in close relationship with the theological view and the sanctions of the Roman Catholic Church, and the great importance of the generation of the discussed Dominican and Jesuit theologians and their New Theology. He proves that the protagonists of both the first and the second phase of the nouvelle theologie constituted together the generation of theologians necessary to implement the striving of the modernist era within the Church at the time of Vatican II.

Wednesday, September 08, 2010

'Vital Immanence': Modernism and its Phenomenological Explanation of Religion


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On the 103th Anniversary of Pope St Pius X's encyclical Pascendi Dominici gregis, On Modernism.

Vital Immanence

7. However, this Agnosticism is only the negative part of the system of the Modernist: the positive side of it consists in what they call vital immanence. This is how they advance from one to the other. Religion, whether natural or supernatural, must, like every other fact, admit of some explanation. But when Natural theology has been destroyed, the road to revelation closed through the rejection of the arguments of credibility, and all external revelation absolutely denied, it is clear that this explanation will be sought in vain outside man himself. It must, therefore, be looked for in man; and since religion is a form of life, the explanation must certainly be found in the life of man. Hence the principle of religious immanence is formulated. Moreover, the first actuation, so to say, of every vital phenomenon, and religion, as has been said, belongs to this category, is due to a certain necessity or impulsion; but it has its origin, speaking more particularly of life, in a movement of the heart, which movement is called a sentiment. Therefore, since God is the object of religion, we must conclude that faith, which is the basis and the foundation of all religion, consists in a sentiment which originates from a need of the divine. This need of the divine, which is experienced only in special and favourable circumstances, cannot, of itself, appertain to the domain of consciousness; it is at first latent within the consciousness, or, to borrow a term from modern philosophy, in the subconsciousness, where also its roots lies hidden and undetected.

Should anyone ask how it is that this need of the divine which man experiences within himself grows up into a religion, the Modernists reply thus: Science and history, they say, are confined within two limits, the one external, namely, the visible world, the other internal, which is consciousness. When one or other of these boundaries has been reached, there can be no further progress, for beyond is the unknowable. In presence of this unknowable, whether it is outside man and beyond the visible world of nature, or lies hidden within in the subconsciousness, the need of the divine, according to the principles of Fideism, excites in a soul with a propensity towards religion a certain special sentiment, without any previous advertence of the mind: and this sentiment possesses, implied within itself both as its own object and as its intrinsic cause, the reality of the divine, and in a way unites man with God. It is this sentiment to which Modernists give the name of faith, and this it is which they consider the beginning of religion.

8. But we have not yet come to the end of their philosophy, or, to speak more accurately, their folly. For Modernism finds in this sentiment not faith only, but with and in faith, as they understand it, revelation, they say, abides. For what more can one require for revelation? Is not that religious sentiment which is perceptible in the consciousness revelation, or at least the beginning of revelation? Nay, is not God Himself, as He manifests Himself to the soul, indistinctly it is true, in this same religious sense, revelation? And they add: Since God is both the object and the cause of faith, this revelation is at the same time of God and from God; that is, God is both the revealer and the revealed.

Hence, Venerable Brethren, springs that ridiculous proposition of the Modernists, that every religion, according to the different aspect under which it is viewed, must be considered as both natural and supernatural. Hence it is that they make consciousness and revelation synonymous. Hence the law, according to which religious consciousness is given as the universal rule, to be put on an equal footing with revelation, and to which all must submit, even the supreme authority of the Church, whether in its teaching capacity, or in that of legislator in the province of sacred liturgy or discipline.


Saturday, August 07, 2010

Hermeneutics of Discontinuity? JP2 vs. Florence on the Revocation of the Mosaic Covenant


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Commemorating the 565th Anniversary of the Closing of the Council of Florence


The previous post on Pope John Paul II's claim that the Church did not have a philosophy drew many interesting comments.  I would like to try another topic within the same broad theme of the apparent discontinuity between traditional Catholic doctrine and post-Vatican II doctrine: the supposed non-revocation of the Mosaic covenant.

In an allocution to the Jewish community of West Germany at Mainz (November 17, 1980), Pope John Paul II spoke of "... the people of God of the Old Covenant, which has never been revoked.'" 

[Information Service No. 57, 1985/I, 16-21, 16. Comp. H. H. Henrix in: Hinweise fuer eine richtige Darstellung von Juden und Judentum in der Predigt und in der Katechese der katholischen Kirchen - 24. Juni 1985 (Arbeitshilfen 44), Bonn o. J. (1986), 12-44.]


Compare this with Session 11 of the Council of Florence (4 February 1442, Bull of Union with the Copts):


It [The Holy Roman Church] firmly believes, professes and teaches that the legal prescriptions of the old Testament or the Mosaic law, which are divided into ceremonies, holy sacrifices and sacraments, because they were instituted to signify something in the future, although they were adequate for the divine cult of that age, once our lord Jesus Christ who was signified by them had come, came to an end and the sacraments of the new Testament had their beginning. Whoever, after the passion, places his hope in the legal prescriptions and submits himself to them as necessary for salvation and as if faith in Christ without them could not save, sins mortally. It does not deny that from Christ's passion until the promulgation of the gospel they could have been retained, provided they were in no way believed to be necessary for salvation. But it asserts that after the promulgation of the gospel they cannot be observed without loss of eternal salvation. Therefore it denounces all who after that time observe circumcision, the sabbath and other legal prescriptions as strangers to the faith of Christ and unable to share in eternal salvation, unless they recoil at some time from these errors. Therefore it strictly orders all who glory in the name of Christian, not to practise circumcision either before or after baptism, since whether or not they place their hope in it, it cannot possibly be observed without loss of eternal salvation...."  (Denzinger 712)

Are these reconcilable?  Comments from all positions are welcome, but especially those who argue using the scholastic method (Major, Minor, and Conclusion, etc.).


Saturday, February 06, 2010

The Finality of Religion in Aquinas' Theory of Human Acts (Doctoral Dissertation)


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by Francisco J Romero CarrasquilloMarquette University

Download the Marquette University version (PDF) free.

Abstract

The study examines the end or purpose of the acts of the virtue of religion within Thomas Aquinas' ethics of human action. What is the end of religious worship? Is it God, or is it the worshippers themselves? On the one hand, one would presume that God cannot be the end of religion because, from the perspective of Classical Theism (of which Aquinas is a main proponent), God cannot benefit from the activity of creatures. But on the other hand, if the worshipper is the end of religious acts, would not worship be a self-centered or an egotistic act? The standard Thomistic account of the problem, first laid out by Cajetan and later adopted by countless followers, is that God is the finis cuius ("the aim toward which") of the acts of the virtue of religion, whereas the religious worshipper is the finis quo (the beneficiary) of the acts. I argue that this solution, which is based on a single text of Aquinas (ST II-II.81.7c), is insufficient. After examining Aquinas' theory of action (the doctrine of object, end, and circumstances presented in ST I-II.18), I show how the object of a particular human act can be interpreted as the finis operis (the end of the agent's act). Utilizing this principle of the identity between the object and the finis operis, I argue that the finis operis of religion can be summed up as a threefold sequence of ends: the honor, reverence, and glory of God. As a result, the ultimate beneficiary of acts of religious worship is neither God nor the individual worshiper, but rather the totality of the universe, encapsulated by Aquinas in his notion of divine "glory," that is, the extrinsic manifestation of God's intrinsic goodness within the universe.

Recommended Citation

Francisco J Romero, The Finality of Religion in Aquinas' Theory of Human Acts. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Proquest Digital Dissertations, 2009