What can we Infer from a Condemned Proposition?

What can we Infer from a Condemned Proposition?

Dear Professor,

I was hoping you could take some time out of your schedule and help me with a question.

1) How does one interpret those long lists propositions censured by Rome, usually in the form of a negative or affirmative proposition? Does one understand the contrary or the contradictory as the orthodox doctrine? Are there any dogmatic principles laid out in one of your manuals in dealing with the interpretation of these propositions?

2) For example, what would be the contrary and/or contradictory of the proposition?

Moreover, it is false that the civil liberty of every form of worship, and the full power, given to all, of overtly and publicly manifesting any opinions whatsoever and thoughts, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to propagate the pest of indifferentism.

Or, what more specifically would be the contrary and/or contradictory of this [condemned] proposition of Quanta Cura:

The best constitution of public society and civil progress altogether require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or, at least, without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

What do you make of this supposed contradictory formulation?

The best constitution of public society and civil progress DO NOT require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist, or at least without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones. [...]

It seems that this actually makes the proposition state the very thing the Pope was condemning as an actual possibility. It seems borderline nonsensical even. Would not the contradictory be posited in replacing "without" with the word "with"?

3) Could you take some time to break down the above proposition into it's constituent parts i.e. the subjects, objects, predicates, and so on.

4) And finally, how would you respond to this supposed exposition of logic:

This is why the condemnation of a proposition as false necessarily implies that the contradictory is true, but does not necessarily imply that the contrary is true. For example, from the condemnation of the proposition that human arguments opposed to the Catholic faith should always be allowed free room for discussion, it follows that at least sometimes they shouldn't, but not that they never should, nor even that they shouldn't as a rule with limited exceptions. From the condemnation of the proposition that no offenders against the Catholic religion should be penalized to a greater extent than public peace may require, it follows that at least some of them should, but not that all of them should, nor that any of them must be punished to a far greater extent than public peace may require.

To claim that the condemnation of a proposition establishes that the contrary of the proposition is true, rather than merely that the contradictory is true--like this: "Rather the contrary of the condemned doctrine would state [...]" [emphasis added]--is to perpetrate a fraud that will deceive only those who are not accustomed to employ even the rudiments of logic in comparing the teachings of Vatican II to prior teachings.

I would greatly appreciate your thoughtful response in this matter. Please let me know if you are still accepting donations as I know your time is valuable.

Thanks,
M.S.

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Dear M.,

1) I checked my best manual on Fundamental Theology (the Spanish Jesuit manual published by BAC in the 50's) and, although it does give an impressive treatment of the different notae theologicae, it does not seem to address the issue of deriving or inferring true propositions from condemned propositions. I am assuming that there must be many, much-more extensive, traditional monographs on Fundamental Theology that do go into the issue (after all, manuals are just summaries for seminarians), but I am not familiar with any (yet).

2) However, traditional logic does provide (almost) all the the tools that we need to make these inferences. The principles of making these inferences are not properly theological (that's why they are not likely to be found in theological textbooks) but philosophical. They belong to the discipline of logic.

The only distinction we need to import from theology is the obvious fact that there are different levels of condemned propositions (cf. the notae theologiae). Sometimes propositions are condemned as false. When a proposition is condemned as false, then we can utilize traditional logic to infer the truth of its contradictory. Sometimes, however, they are condemned in a "weaker" form, as doctrines that must not be taught or that sound offensive, or rash, etc., but not as doctrines that are necessarily "false" (the Magisterium will actually term them as doctrines that are "offensive to pious ears," or "rash," or something of the sort). When a proposition is condemned in one of these weaker ways, one cannot logically infer that its contradictory (or its "contrary" or whatever) is true. So let us find out how to derive the truth of the contradictory of a proposition that is condemned in the "stronger" way (i.e., as false).

[If you are not familiar with the traditional Square of Opposition, you might want to read this page before proceeding. You may ignore the last parragraph, as it pertains to "non-existent entities" (such are the trivial concerns of modern logic) and does not matter for our issue.]

It is ALWAYS the case that, if a proposition is false, its contradictory (not the same thing as its "opposite" or its "contrary" or its "sub-contrary" or its "sub-alternate") must be true. The question is what exactly is the contradictory of a given proposition. It ultimately depends on how the proposition is formulated. For simple categorical propositions of universal and particular quantity, it's quite easy: just refer to the Square of Opposition. However, not all propositions are simple (some are compound) and not all are universal or particular (some are singular and others indefinite); in these cases, the Square of Opposition does not apply. In fact, neither of the condemned propositions you gave me are simple universal or particular propositions and, therefore, we cannot use the Square of Opposition to derive the truth of their contradictories.

The first condemned proposition you cited is an example of a compound proposition:

It is false that the civil liberty of every form of worship, and the full power, given to all, of overtly and publicly manifesting any opinions whatsoever and thoughts, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to propagate the pest of indifferentism.

This proposition starts with the words "It is false that..." For this reason, it is not a simple proposition, but a compound one. It is one proposition inside another. For the sake of clarity and economy of words, we'll abbreviate it as "~P." ("~" = "it is false that"; "P" = "the civil liberty... indifferentism." I hope you don't mind my using symbols to demonstrate the principle.) Now, this whole, complex proposition "~P" is condemned as false; therefore, we can say that ~P is false. Remember that if a proposition is false, then its contradictory is true. The contradictory of ~P is ~(~P), or simply P. So, if ~P is false, then its contradictory, P, is true.

(You can look at it this way: "~P is false" is itself a compound proposition. "~P is false" can be written in the following way: ~(~P). Now, if ~(~P), then P. Therefore, P is true. Put in words, if it is false that P is false, then it must be true that P is true. Therefore, P must be true. The principle that is operative here is the Principle of the Excluded Middle: there is no middle ground between truth and falsity.)

How does this translate into? How do you formulate the truth (the contradictory of the condemned proposition) in English?

The civil liberty of every form of worship, and the full power, given to all, of overtly and publicly manifesting any opinions whatsoever and thoughts, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to propagate the pest of indifferentism.

Essentially, this means that civil liberty of worship and of opinion are conducive to the corruption of the people. This proposition (which is the contradictory of the condemned proposition) is true; we can safely derive this truth from the condemned proposition.


3) The second condemned proposition you cite is a simple proposition (not compound), but it is singular in quantity, not universal or particular, and, therefore, the Square of Opposition does not work either. It can be phrased this way (without loosing its essential meaning) so that it is clear that it is singular:

THE best constitution of public society [...] IS something that requires that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or, at least, without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

It essentially says that a certain S is P. (S = "the best constitution of public society and civil progress"; P = "things that require that human society be conducted... false ones.") So we could formulate it logically as:

The best constitution of public society and civil progress" are "things that require that human society be conducted... false ones.

This is an affirmative singular proposition (if we interpret "the best constitution of publich society and civil progress" as forming a single, individual subject). Singular propositions follow what can be called "secondary opposition" (not primary opposition, which is what is expressed in the square of opposition). This means that they only have a contradictory, not a contrary. The contradictory of "a certain S is P" is "a certain S is not P." So, given that if a proposition is false, its contradictory must necessarily be true, this means that, since "a certain S is P" is false, "a certain S is not P" must be true.

What does this mean? It means that, because the condemned proposition,

The best constitution of public society and civil progress ARE things that require that human society be conducted... false ones

is false, its contradictory,

The best constitution of public society and civil progress ARE NOT things that require that human society be conducted... false ones

must be true.

If it does not make much sense it is simply because it remains in "logical form." Let us translate it to normal English:

The best constitution of public society and civil progress DOES NOT altogether require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or [...] without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

In other words, the best constitution of society does not require indifferentism. This is the truth that we can logically infer from the condemned proposition.

4) The author you cite is right in saying:

The condemnation of a proposition as false necessarily implies that the contradictory is true, but does not necessarily imply that the contrary is true.

He seems to be presuptiously asserting a principle of theological interpretation, but in fact it is simply applying a fundamental truth of the logic of categorical propositions to the particular instance of condemned propositions. The fact that one can infer, from the falsity of a proposition, the truth of its contradictory (and nothing at all of its contrary) is a basic principle of Aristotelian logic. But however basic, it is an important one to remember when interpreting the condemnations. This is perhaps best illustrated by means of an example of a condemned proposition that does follow the rules of the square of opposition, for it is in the square of opposition that the relationship between the contradictory and the contrary of a proposition is most clearly seen. Take this condemned proposition, for example (taken from Pope St. Pius X's Lamentabili):

In all the evangelical texts the name 'Son of God'' is equivalent only to that of 'Messias'. It does not in the least way signify that Christ is the true and natural Son of God.

This is a simple proposition; a universal affirmative. In terms of the square of opposition, we say it is an A-proposition. It says that all S's are P's. (S = "evangelical texts that use the name 'Son of God'"; P = "texts that do not signify that Christ is God") In logical form:

ALL evangelical texts that use the name 'Son of God' ARE texts that do not signify that Christ is God.

Now, the contradictory of an A-proposition (universal affirmative) is the O-proposition (particular negative). In logical form, this would be:

SOME evangelical texts that use the name 'Son of God' ARE NOT texts that do not signify that Christ is God."

Therefore, since the condemned A-proposition is false, the corresponding O-proposition is necessarily true. What is extremely important here is that we must not confuse the contradictory of a proposition with its contrary. The contrary of an A-proposition is its corresponding E-proposition. So the contrary of "All S's are P's" is "No S's are P's." Whereas the principle governing the relationship betwen contradictories states that if one of two contradictories is true, then the other must be false; the principle governing the relationship betwen contraries states that they cannot both be true, but they can both be false. Therefore, if we know that one is false, we cannot conclude that the other is true; in fact, we will not be able to conclude anything from that fact. For instance, "All extraterrestrial life forms are rational" and "No extraterrestrial life forms are rational" cannot both be true, but they can both be false. Hence, if we were to find out that one of these is false, we won't be able to infer that the other is true.

Therefore, from the fact that the condemned proposition,

SOME evangelical texts that use the name 'Son of God' ARE NOT texts that do not signify that Christ is God.

is false, I cannot infer that:

NO evangelical texts that use the name 'Son of God' ARE texts that do not signify that Christ is God." (= "All evangelical texts that use the name 'Son of God' signify that Christ is God.")

I do not mean to say that this last proposition is false (I would think it's true, though I'm no biblical scholar). All I'm saying is that its truth cannot be inferred from the falsity of its contrary. To infer the truth of a proposition from the falsity of its contrary is a fallacy.

I hope this helps. I apologize for the length of the explanation. St. Thomas could have done it a million times better in about 1% of the space.

In Domino,
-FJR.

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Dear professor,

You stated that:

The second condemned proposition you cite is a simple proposition (not compound), but it is singular in quantity, not universal or particular, and, therefore, the Square of Opposition does not work either. It can be phrased this way (without loosing its essential meaning) so that it is clear that it is singular:

THE best constitution of public society [...] IS something that requires that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or, at least, without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

I thought that this was a universal proposition since it seems to refer to not any society in particular, but the concept of society in the abract viz. it's "best" constitution.

[You also said that:]

Because the condemned proposition,

The best constitution of public society and civil progress ARE things that require that human society be conducted... false ones.

is false, its contradictory,

The best constitution of public society and civil progress ARE NOT things that require that human society be conducted... false ones.

must be true.

If it does not make much sense it is simply because it remains in "logical form." Let us translate it to normal English:

The best constitution of public society and civil progress DOES NOT altogether require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or [...] without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

In other words, the best constitution of society does not require indifferentism. This is the truth that we can logically infer [from the condemned proposition.]

I thought that the contradictory of the proposition above would revolve around the word "without" in such a way that it would read:

The best constitution of public society and civil progress altogether require that human society be conducted and governed WITH regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or, at least, without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

Does this not seem to be the contradictory of the assertion that society ought to be governed "WITHOUT" those conditions?

It seems that the contradictory that you formed would be implicitly allowing for the fact that sometimes religious indifference is the best constitution of society, but I thought this was the very thing Pius IX was censuring. As such, a liberal could theoretically glean from the above contradictory proposition that since we have evolved to a certain point in history, religious indifference of governments is always the best constitution, much like Dignitatis Humanae asserted. Would not the whole force of the condemnation be vitiated?

Yours,
M.S.

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Matthew,

A few points:

1) It seems to me that the third condemned proposition is singular (not universal) because its subject refers to a singular entity, namely, "THE best constitution." If the subject were "ALL constitutions" then it would be a universal proposition. If it were "SOME constitutions" then the proposition would be particular. The quantity of a proposition is identical to the quantity (or distribution) of the subject.

It is true that sometimes we utilize an abstract term to mean the whole class. For instance, when we say "man is rational" we mean "all men are rational." However, if we qualify the subject "man" by saying it is the "best," as in "the best man will win," then we don't mean "all men will win" but "one man will win." Usually, "the best x" refers to a single x and not to the whole class. I think that is what is going on in this (condemned) proposition. That's why I interpreted it as a singular proposition.

2) Let us suppose the condemned proposition is universal (A). At least in the case of A, E, I, and O propositions, the way you find the contradictory of a proposition is by reversing BOTH its quantity and quality, and leaving the subject and predicate terms untouched.

So, imagining it was an A proposition, I will re-write it with QUANTITY AND QUALITY INDICATORS in caps and will bold the subject and predicate terms:

ALL constitutions of public society and civil progress ARE things that altogether require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or [...] without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

If that were the condemned proposition, then the only way I could find the contradictory is by changing the quantity from universal to particular (i.e., change "ALL" to "SOME") and changing the quality from affirmative to negative (i.e., change "ARE" to "ARE NOT"). Furthermore, I would absolutely have to leave the subject and predicate terms untouched. So the contradictory (O) would look like this:

SOME constitutions of public society and civil progress ARE NOT things that altogether require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or [...] without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

To put it more briefly and in logical form, if the condemned proposition were:

ALL constitutions ARE things that require indifferentism" (which would be condemned, i.e., false).

Then its contradictory would be:

SOME constitutions ARE NOT things that require indifferentism" (which would be true, because it is the contradictory of a false proposition).

And that's all that you would be able to infer from the condemned A proposition. To infer anything else would be a fallacy.

3) Now, there is something extremely important that you MUST understand. When you say that "Some s are not p" you are NOT implying that "Some s are p." That would also be a fallacy. These two types of proposition (I and O) are sub-contraries. You may not infer the truth of one subcontrary from the truth of the other (although you may infer the truth of one from the falsity of the other). For example, it is certainly true that "Some Thomists are not amoebas" (I, for one, am not), you may not thereby infer that "Some Thomists are amoebas." However, knowing that "Some Thomists are amoebas" is false, you could infer that "Some Thomists are not amoebas" is true.

Now, this applies even if the condemned proposition is singular, as I had interpreted it. In the same way that one cannot infer the truth of a particular affirmative (I) from the truth of a particular negative (O), one also cannot infer the truth of a particular affirmative (I) from the truth of a singular negative. I had said that the condemned proposition was singular:

"THE best constitution IS something that requires indifferentism" (false, i.e., condemned).

Then, to get the contradictory, I merely reversed the quality to negative; the quantity, however, being singular, cannot be reversed:

"THE best constitution IS NOT something that requires indifferentism." (true, i.e., the contradictory of a false proposition).

You were alarmed that I would affirm this last proposition (the contradictory), because you thought it would imply that SOME constitutions other than the best one DO require indifferentism. But to think that way is to commit the same fallacy. From the fact that SOME constitutions (for example, the best one) DO not require indifferentism (I), one cannot infer that SOME constitutions DO NOT require indifferntism (O).

In the end, it does not matter what how you interpret the quantity of the condemned proposition:

• a. If it is universal affirmative (A), then the contradictory will be a particular negative (O), from which you cannot infer a particular affirmative (I).
• b. If it is singular affirmative, then the contradictory will be a singular negative, from which you cannot infer a particular affirmative (I).

So, either way, you will not be able to infer the I statement:

"SOME constitutions ARE things that require indifferentism" (product of a fallacy).

Let me know what your thoughts are on this.

Best,
-FJR.

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Dear Professor,

You have hit the nail on the head, the fallacious inference of a particular affirmative. It's like a revelation! I was bothered by something, but I couldn't quite put my finger on it. Essentially this gentleman was trying to assert that since the contradictory of the condemned proposition didn't necessarily logically exclude all constitutions, we could infer that some constitutions require religious indifferentism. The universal call of Dignitatis Humanae for civil religious indifferentism, based upon the dignity of man, is what is under discussion. Now, if this is a practical pastoral judgment based upon historic facts, then we could merely quibble about the prudence of such an idea. But on the other hand, if it is a theoretical doctrine, universally valid, or the ideal form of government and it's relation to religion, then we have a real problem. If you have time, the discussion would be greatly enriched by your participation.

Yours,

M.S.

Manual Labor on Sunday

Manual Labor on Sunday

Is cooking forbidden on Sundays?

Canon law forbids only unnecessary manual labor. Hence, if you are a baker at a bakery, and you work five or six days per week, then you are forbidden to work there on Sunday, because it would be unnecessary. However, some necessary, daily manual chores in the home are permissible on Sunday, such as cooking, or cleaning the dinner table, etc. In fact, if your mother decides to cook a nice meal every Sunday for the family, she is not violating canon law; that is allowed. Her cooking would be ordered to a proper observance of the Lord's Day. Also, anything else that involves manual labor but is ordered to the propery observance of the Lord's day is also permissible; for example, if you decide to iron your Sunday clothes on Sunday morning because you do not want to wear wrinkly clothes to Mass; or if your car battery dies on Sunday morning before leaving for Mass, and you are allowed to "jump" the car so you can get to Mass.

However, any manual chores that need not be done every day, or need not be done on Sunday, may not be done on Sundays. For example, one should not do the weekly house cleaning on Sunday, or gardening, or washing one's car, or home improvement, other similar manual chores. (It is--or at least it used to be--a common practice among Catholics to utilize Saturday for such chores.)

Now, some public manual functions that are necessary for the proper functioning of society are also permissible on Sundays (for example, if there is a fire on Sunday, a firefigher should not wait until Monday to put it out!). Moreover, it may be that the ONLY way a man can find work is if he works on Sunday. Some jobs are such that they do not give you any other option. If that is the case, then one is exempt and may work. This situation is rather rare, but it is a possibility nonetheless.

Also, play, even of the more physical sort, such as sports, are permissible on Sundays because they are not considered labor. Hence, you may very well play baseball or football or whatever as a form of recreation.

Now, some people who have non-manual professions, such as myself as a professor, prefer also to abstain from working those days, even though the Church does not forbid it. This is a very laudable custom, although it is not mandatory. The prohibition is only with regards manual (physical) labor. Hence there are some (such as students and teachers) who customarily use Sunday afternoon to engage in their intellectual work, and this is not forbidden.

Finally, be aware that the fact that the sabbath rest must be done specifically on Sunday is from Church law, not from divine or natural law, and hence it does not apply to those who are outside the Church. Hence, a Jew or Muslim does not sin by working on Sunday (historically, it has been quite common, for example, for Jews and other non-Catholics to take up the functions that are necessary for the normal operation of society on Sundays, such as the firefighting example above).

For more, refer to the old, catechetical gem, My Catholic Faith (the section on the Third Commandment--I don't recall the page number). It has a nice, thorough explanation of all of this.

In Domino,
-FJR.

Interview: Aquinas on the Virtue of Religion

Interview: Aquinas on the Virtue of Religion

1) To what extent can one say that sacrifice to God is natural to man? Natural law prescribes that all men offer sacrifice to God. This is something that is knowable through reason, even when unaided by Divine Revelation. (Cf. ST II-II.85.1 & 4.)

2) Does the same apply to polytheistic sacrifice? No. What the natural law commands is the exercise of the virtue of religion, which is the habit that allows us to offer to God what is due to Him (Cf. ST II-II.81.2). (This, of course, presupposes that we can know the existence of the One, True God through natural reason. Cf. ST I.88.3.) Now, polytheism fails to offer due worship to God; it offers it to something other than God (Cf. ST II-II.85.2). Therefore, polytheism does not fall within the definition of religion. Rather, it falls within the definition of "superstition," the vice that opposes religion by way of excess; more precisely, it belongs to the type of superstition that we call "idolatry" (Cf. ST II-II.94.1).

3) Of the four ends of sacrifice (worship, expiation, thanksgiving, and petition), one seems to be lacking in pagan Greek religion, namely, worship. Is this due to the Greeks' lack of Divine Revelation? If they were not aware of the fact that the natural law prescribes worship, certainly this is not due to not having the means of knowing, for this can be discovered by unaided reason. I'm going off on a limb here, but perhaps it was due to their polytheism, which was simply a corruption of their natural knowledge of God--in which case it would have been directly due to their sinfulness, and thus indirectly due to their lack of Divine Revelation. The pagan Greeks seemed to have been aware of the motives for the three other forms of prayer, but perhaps not for worship. Each of the four ends of prayer has a motive (Cf. ST I-II.102.3 ad 10). The motive of petitionary prayer is the hope of benefits received; that of thanksgiving, the reception of benefits; and that of expiation, the commission of sin. The Greeks had hope of receiving benefits, received them, and sinned; so they practiced prayer of petition, and thanksgiving, and expiation. However, the motive for the prayer of worship is the Divine Majesty itself. Perhaps due to their polytheism, they were not aware of the Majesty of the One, True God (after all, their "gods" were not at all that impressive, especially as far as their moral character goes) and, therefore, found little motive for the prayer of worship.

4) How is sacrifice inherently part of latria? By reading ST II-II.85, you will already have the basics of what sacrifice is, namely, one of the exterior acts (the primary act, in fact) of the virtue of religion (i.e., latria). The context for this doctrine is ST II-II.81 (on the virtue of religion in general), which I recommend you read entirely, especially article 7 (on the exterior acts of the virtue of religion, one of which is sacrifice). Also, read SCG III.120, where Aquinas discusses latria as the worship due to God alone.

5) How is the Mass a perfect Sacrifice? Aquinas goes a bit into this in ST I-II.102.3c, with reference to the causes of the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law. He also talks about the immolation of Christ in the Mass in ST III.83.1.

6) How are the rubrics (particularly orientation and tone of voice) fundamental to the perfection of this sacrifice? Technically, the natural law prescribes that we offer sacrifice to God, but not how we offer sacrifice. How we offer sacrifice is a matter of divine or human positive law (i.e., Revelation or Ecclesiastical Law): ST II-II.81.2 ad 3. Now, Revelation does not specify, at least for the New Law, that we must worship facing East or that the priest should recite his prayers in a low voice. Ecclesiastical (liturgical) law has prescribed these from time immemorial, but these laws are not immutable. Therefore, it cannot be argued that these are essential. However, one can argue in many ways that these rubrics are "fitting." In ST III.83, Aquinas discusses the various elements of the rite of the Mass and argues for their fittingness.

7) Does man rely on externals that manifest spiritual realities? Yes, because we are body-soul composites, and there is nothing in the intellect which does not first come through the senses. Already in ST II-II.81.7c you will get the essentials of this doctrine, but he also has something very interesting to say in ST II-II.84.2c. Moreover, in SCG III.119 you will get a detailed explanation of how the mind is raised to God by means of sensible things.

Traditional Catholic Revival of the Knights Templar!

Traditional Catholic Revival of the Knights Templar!

Dear Friends,

Recently I became a postulant for the new order of Knights Templar, officially known as the Christi Pauperum Militum Ordo ("Order of the Poor Knights of Christ"), or simply the Ordo Militiae Templi ("Order of the Militia of the Temple") for short. It is a traditional Catholic revival of the Knights Templar, created in Siena, Italy, in 1979 and approved by the Archbishop of that city. Its mission, in general, is to fight for rights of God and of Catholicism; in our age of crisis, this means to fight for the restoration of the Latin tradition of the Church.

Please pray for me and for my wife (she is a postulant to become a Dame) in this exciting time in our lives, as we go through our formation process, which, after a brief, 30-day postulancy period, will consist of a two- to three-year novitiate, where we are required to recite the traditional Divine Office daily in Latin, to recite the (traditional) Rosary daily in Latin, to assist the traditional Mass as frequently as possible, to study assiduously and live out the spirituality and culture of Christian chivalry, and, in general to invest our energies in the restoration of Catholic tradition. At the end of the novitiate (in two or three years), "si Deus lo vult," we would travel to the Castello della Magione (near Siena) for my investiture as Knight in Obedience and for my wife's becoming a Dame.

If you are interested in learning more about the Militia Templi:

1) Read the article below, from Wikipedia.

2) Visit the Militia Templi website: www.ordo-militiae-templi.org/

3) Email your local preceptor (contact info in the website) about your interest. The Propreceptor for North America is Bro. Charles Adams, CPMO (usa@ordo-militiae-templi.org).

The Militia Templi

The Militia Templi is a Roman Catholic lay association of the faithful that celebrates its liturgy according to the traditional form in place in 1962, often referred to as the Tridentine Mass.

Founded under the authority of the Archdiocese of Siena, the Militia Templi's focus is knightly and monastic and members follow a modern adaptation of the Rule written by St. Bernard of Clairvaux for the ancient Knights Templar. The order makes no claims of direct descent from the old Knights Templar and holds that, when made, such self-styled claims are both historically and canonically false.

The Militia was formed civilly and with the approval of the local ordinary on September 21st, 1979. Its Constitutions were approved on Sept. 8, 1988 by the Archbishop of Siena Msgr. Mario Jsmaele Castellano. The next Archbishop, Msr. Bonicelli approved the Rule of the Militia in 1990. The Cardinal Protector of the Militia is Édouard Gagnon.

According to their Constitutions, the Militia has both married and celibate members. The knights with solemn profession (Doms), who consecrate themselves perpetually to the Militia with the investiture and the promise to observe the three classic evangelical counsels (poverty, chastity, and obedience) as well as the public testimony of faith (fourth promise), and the non-professed knights (Brothers or “Knights in Obedience”) who, with the investiture, commit themselves to strive for the perfection of Christian life.

The knights have no particular apostolate or pastoral engagement other than public testimony of the Catholic Faith. They are obliged to live by their Rule and recite daily the Hours of the traditional Divine Office. Their members include hundreds of Knights in Obedience, about 30 Knights with Solemn Profession, 10 national preceptories, many local priorates and scout groups.

Magistral See

The order's Magistral See, or headquarters, is situated in the Castello della Magione. It is a former Templar compound that lies in the village of Poggibonsi in the Tuscany region of Italy. Built in the 11th century, the castle was donated by it’s owners, Gottifredo di Arnolfo and Arnolfino di Cristofano, to the Monks of the Saint Michael Abbey in Poggio Marturi, who later bestowed it to the Templars for use as one of their numerous Mansiones or Domus Templi along the Via Francigena. After 1312, the Castello della Magione passed though many hands, including the Hospitallers and the Princess Corsini, until, in 1979 it was purchased by Count Marcello Alberto Cristofani della Magione, the founder and current Grand Master of the Militia Templi.

Attached to the castle is a church, also restored, with impressive Burgundian-Cistercian influence and is used daily by the order for the community recitation of Vespers and the celebration of the Tridentine Mass.

Symbol and Habit

The symbol of the Militiae Templi is a Red Octagonal Cross, symbol of the Eight Beatitudes of the Gospel, while the symbol is a white flag with Red Octagonal Cross. The cross is not to be confused with that of the medieval Knights Hospitaller, which is known as the Maltese Cross. The Grand Master has as its coat of arms just and symbol. The habit of the Professed Knights is white and consist of the tunic, the scapular with the octagonal red cross on the chest and a mantle with a cowl and the same cross on the left shoulder. The Knights in Obedience wear a mantle without cowl but with an octagonal cross on the left shoulder. The Ladies wear a white mantle and a white veil with the cross without the upper arm The Chaplains are dressed with a white Mozzetta with red edge, red buttons and an octagonal red cross on the left front part. The Oblati (Knights and Ladies of Devotion) have a gray mantle with the red octagonal cross on the left shoulder.

Spread in the world

The Militia Templi through Preceptories or Magistral Legations, is currently present in the following countries: Italy, Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Ireland, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Spain, United States of America, and Puerto Rico.

Translation of Nos cum prole...

Translation of Nos cum prole...

What does this mean? Nos cum prole pia benedicat Virgo Maria. Amen

-Rosario.

It means: "May the Virgin Mary with her Loving Offspring bless us. Amen."

But, if you ask me, it sounds a million times better in Latin.

-FJR.

Online "Sources of Catholic Dogma" in English!

Online "Sources of Catholic Dogma" in English!

A year ago I looked in vain all over the internet for an online version of Denzinger's Sources of Catholic Dogma in English. I found the Latin, French, Italian, and Spanish versions, but not the English. A friend just emailed me and sent me a link to what appears to be a new site that has it, plus much more:

http://www.catecheticsonline.com/Resources.php

Deo gratias!

Is Quo Primum Infallible?

Is Quo Primum Infallible?

Dear Mr. Romero,

I read Pope St. Pius V's bull Quo Primum and would like to know how it should be understood. Is the pope speaking ex cathedra or not? A Traditionalist, who doesn't appear to be exactly in line with the Church, says this:

Quo Primum is no 'merely ecclesiastical law' (can. 11) that can be revoked, but has been enacted into law and declared ex cathedra to be irreformable, and is therefore a solemnly defined moral doctrine which is also of itself infallible and irreformable (DB 1819). Quo Primum has been infallibly declared to be irreformable because the rite of Mass codified (canonized) in the Tridentine Missal is the 'received and approved rite' (the rite of Sacred Tradition) [iniunctum nobis] of the Roman Church that has been 'handed down by the Holy Roman Church' (a sacrosancta Romana Ecclesia ... tradita) [Quo Primum]. The statutes of Quo Primum,therefore, pertain to Divine Law insofar as they constitute a particular application of the divine law that hasbeen expressed in its general formulation in the Tridentine Profession of Faith [Iniunctum nobis]." Fr. Paul L.Kramer, B.Ph., S.T.B., M.Div., A Theological Vindication of Roman Catholic Traditionalism (Nazareth, India:Apostle Publications, [1997]).

What should one believe in this case?

JM.

-Dear JM,

Quo primum is not "infallible," in the sense in which a doctrinal statement is infallible, but Pope Pius V did intend it to be legally binding. Pope Benedict, in his recent Motu proprio "Summorum Pontificum" acted in conformity with it, as if it had never been abrogated. That's all I know.

I am not a canon lawyer but a theologian (an aspiring theologian, in fact). Not being a canonist I am incompetent to speak about what Quo primum IS (its canonical weight; whether it is still in force; whether it does ensure the perpetuity of the Traditional Mass), but I can certainly speak about what it is NOT (I know it is definitely not a dogmatic decree, for instance).

The pope speaks ex cathedra only when making a defining statement on faith or morals. The defined statements have to be clearly presented and enumerated in propositional form (cf., The Decrees and Canons of the Council of Trent) and the Pope must clearly intend to bind all the faithful to give their assent. Even if Quo primum posseses a very high level of authority (i.e., even if it is legally binding), it clearly does not attempt to make any definitions on faith or morals. Rather, it decrees laws governing the rite of Mass in the Roman Rite. In other words, it does not define a doctrine as true, or condemn an error as false, or even declare the moral law to be this or that; it intends to regulate the liturgical discipline of the Roman Rite. It would be a misunderstanding of the nature of papal infallibility to claim that such a document is "infallible" in the doctrinal sense. Law is not binding in the same sense in which doctrine is binding. Doctrine is true or false, and it cannot change; law is good or bad, and at least conceivably it can change. Maybe Quo primum can't be revoked, maybe it can; but doctrinal infallibility does not apply to it as when the pope speaks ex cathedra.

There is a sense in which the universal discipline of the Church is "infallible"; the Church will never impose on its faithful a universal discipline which is inherently evil. But this is something very different from what we mean when we say that a certain dogma was proclaimed ex cathedra and infallibly.

If you are interested in a layman-level explanation of the canonical details of Quo primum, see Michael Davies' Pope Paul's New Mass, pp. 571-580. Although Davies, like Fr. Kramer, wanted more than anything else in the world the full triumph of the Traditional Mass, he nonetheless acknowledged that Pope St. Pius V did not intend Quo primum as a limitation to the authority of any of his successors on liturgical matters. He also argues that Pope Paul VI never even intended to abrogate or invalidate Quo primum or the Traditional Mass. This view was proven correct by the recent Motu proprio "Summorum Pontificum," which openly admits that the Traditional Mass was never abrogated and echoes Quo primum by saying:

"...by these presents [this law], in virtue of Our Apostolic authority, We grant and concede in perpetuity that, for the chanting or reading of the Mass in any church whatsoever, this Missal is hereafter to be followed absolutely, without any scruple of conscience or fear of incurring any penalty, judgment, or censure, and may freely and lawfully be used."

The Athanasian Creed, "Extra ecclesiam nulla salus", and Invincible Ignorance

The Athanasian Creed, "Extra ecclesiam nulla salus", and Invincible Ignorance

Hello,

This is Adam. I was hoping that you could explain invincible ignorance in light of the Athanasian Creed. Thank you very much!

Enjoy Oregon!
Adam.

-Dear Adam,

The Athanasian Creed (aka, Quicumque vult) begins with the words: "Whoever wishes to be saved must, above all, keep the Catholic faith. For unless a person keeps this faith whole and entire, he will undoubtedly be lost forever. Now this is the Catholic faith..." Further, it continues with similar phrases such as: "Whoever wishes to be saved must have this conviction of the Trinity," and "It is furthermore necessary for eternal salvation truly to believe that our Lord Jesus Christ also took on human flesh." Finally, it concludes with the words, "This is the Catholic faith. Whoever does not faithfully and firmly believe this cannot be saved."

You ask how invincible ignorance comes into play here. You mean how invincible ignorance is related to the dogma that there is no salvation outside the Church.

First it must be affirmed that there is absolutely no way of being saved outside the Church (and I mean the Catholic Church, which is the only Church). This dogma allows no exceptions. This dogma has been recently put into question and many people in the Church (especially members of the hierearchy, unfortunately) have been trying to soften, qualify, and even to "take back," the teaching, which the Church has held since its Divine Foundation. But the truth is that it has been always believed in the Church in its pristine, "exeptionless" form, not only by the Fathers (notably St. Augustine), the theologians (notably St. Thomas), and the faithful, etc. (i.e., the "Witnesses of Tradition") but it has also been taught by the Pope, as well as by the Magisterium, both in ordinary and extraordinary manner, by the Creeds (as does the Athanasian Creed), the liturgy, and many other sources. It is even in Scripture. It would, therefore, be impossible to give you a positive exposition of this dogma, but just to give you an idea of how convinced the Church is of its truth, simply listen to the words of the Council of Florence:

The holy Roman Church believes, professes, and preaches that no one remaining outside the Catholic Church, not just pagans, but also Jews or heretics or schismatics, can become partakers of eternal life; but they will go to the 'everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels' (Matt. 25:41), unless before the end of life they are joined to the Church. For the union with the body of the Church is of such importance that the sacraments of the Church are helpful to salvation only for those remaining in it; and fasts, almsgiving, other works of piety, and the exercise of Christian warfare bear eternal rewards for them alone. And no one can be saved, no matter how much alms he has given, even if he sheds his blood for the name of Christ, unless he remains in the bosom and unity of the Catholic Church." (Pope Eugene IV, Council of Florence, 1438-45, From the Bull "Cantate Domino", February 4, 1441 (Florentine style) Decree for the Jacobites, Denz. 165.)

Now, to enter into the Church, one must receive baptism. Therefore, the Church affirms that Baptism is necessary for salvation. This is true with a necessity of means (a strict, metaphysical necessity, as in "Baptism is the only means to get there") and not merely a necessity of precept (a mere legalistic necessity, as in "Our Lord wants it to be that way, but he is ready to make exceptions because he is merciful"). So this is another matter in which the Church does not allow exceptions. You need baptism to be saved.

Now, despite what you may have heard from careless catechists, teachers, and even priests, we don't believe in three baptisms, but in one: Confiteor unum baptisma in remissionem peccatorum. "I confess one baptism for the remission of sins." However, the Church teaches that the graces of that one baptism, including sanctifying grace and the incorporation into the Church, can be participated by those who either give their life for the Catholic Faith even though they have not received baptism--commonly called "baptism of blood"--and by those who die with the desire of receiving the sacrament of baptism--a situation commonly known as "baptism of desire" but better translated simply as "the desire of baptism" (votum baptismi), so as not to give the impression that there are many "baptisms."

This truth, the possibility of receving the graces of baptism through the desire of the same, is exaggerated by modernists (they want to turn it into an open door for false religions to become "means of salvation"), denied by Feenyites (they want to affirm the dogma of "no salvation outside the Church" to such an extent that they want to obscure the other facets of the mystery), and little understood by the faithful today. However, it has been believed unanimously by the theologians of the Church, including St. Thomas (one unorthodox scholar in the middle ages, Peter Abelard, denied it, but he was attacked vehemently on this point by St. Bernard of Clairvaux), almost unanimously by the Fathers of the Church (one of them denied it), and by the faithful, as it is evidenced in a plethora of Catechisms and other catechetical material throughout the ages. It is even refered to by the liturgy of the Church and by the sacred monuments of Tradition. (Here is a good article on the subject--although I cannot agree with the author in other issues).

So there is no denying this doctrine, unless one wants to turn into a Protestant-like Feenyite who defends the false hermeneutical principle that what is not in Denzinger is heresy (although this is in Denzinger, namely D 796 [DS 1524] = the famous expression "re aut voto" in Trent, Sess. 6, Chap. 4 and Sess. 7, Can. 4.) This Feenyite hermeneutical principle I like to call Sola Denzinger (reminiscent of the Protestant Sola Scriptura).

So here is where invincible ignorance comes into play. I will let the Supreme Pontiffs (notably those who predate Vatican II and, therefore, are beyond the Feenyites' reproof) to explain this doctrine:

Blessed Pius IX wrote in Quanto conficiamur moerore:

There are, of course, those who are struggling with invincible ignorance about our most holy religion. Sincerely observing the natural law and its precepts inscribed by God on all hearts and ready to obey God, they live honest lives and are able to attain eternal life by the efficacious virtue of divine light and grace since God who clearly beholds, searches, and knows the minds, souls, thoughts, and habits of all men, because of His great goodness and mercy, will by no means suffer anyone to be punished with eternal torment who has not the guilt of deliberate sin."

Their situation is different from that of people "living in error and alienated from the true faith and Catholic unity … stubbornly separated from the unity of the Church and also from the successor of Peter, the Roman Pontiff."

He also admonishes us,

"the sons of the Catholic Church ... [that we] should always be zealous to seek them out and aid them, whether poor, or sick, or afflicted with any other burdens, with all the offices of Christian charity; and they should especially endeavor to snatch them from the darkness of error in which they unhappily lie, and lead them back to Catholic truth and to the most loving Mother the Church, who never ceases to stretch out her maternal hands lovingly to them, and to call them back to her bosom so that, established and firm in faith, hope, and charity, and 'being fruitful in every good work' (Colossians 1:10), they may attain eternal salvation."

Also, in his encyclical Mystici Corporis, Pope Pius XII said that:

Those who do not belong to the visible Body of the Catholic Church ... We ask each and every one of them to correspond to the interior movements of grace, and to seek to withdraw from that state in which they cannot be sure of their salvation. [Cf. Pius IX, Iam Vos Omnes, 13 Sept. 1868] For even though by an unconscious desire and longing have a certain relationship with the Mystical Body of the Redeemer, they still remain deprived of those many heavenly gifts and helps which can only be enjoyed in the Catholic Church.

I hope this helps,
-FJR.

Existentialist Thomism: What to Read?

Existentialist Thomism: What to Read?

Quaeritur:

I was wondering if you know of any works in English which deal with the problem of existentialist Thomism from a more classical Thomist perspective. I am ordering a copy of The Sacred Monster of Thomism, which seems it may get into this issue to some extent in analyzing Father Garrigou-Lagrange's conflicts with Maritain, Gilson, Chenu, etc., but any other books you are aware of may be helpful. I am particularly interested in any works which may help to emphasize the balance of essence and existence in authentic Thomism as opposed to both the overemphasis on existence in existential Thomism and the overemphasis on logic and essences in essentialist Thomism. No need to fall into the essentialist errors which some of the more existentialist Thomists like to accuse authentic Thomism of.

Respondeo: I don't know of any works that BOTH explicitly contrast "Existentialist Thomism" with the more traditional Thomism of the manuals AND present the latter in a positive light. It would make sense to me that the sole reason why modern authors (last century) bring up the distinction between "Existentialist" and"Essentialist" Thomism is to show that either traditional Scholastic Thomism (supposedly the same as"Essentialist Thomism"), or both traditional and "Existentialist Thomism," don't work.

It is false, and even presumptious, to think that for 600-or-so years Thomists always fell into the error of "essentialism" until Fabro et al came along and removed our blinders. But it is equally false and presumptious to think that the truth lies somewhere in between, as if for 700-or-so years Thomists have always fell into either extreme of essentialist or existentialist Thomism, and that no one has ever found a "balance."

Rather, the truth lies in the consensus of Scholastic Thomists--not in what Fabro taught, not in what Cajetan taught (at least not in the exact way he taught it), but in what most Thomists have always taught. You will find this consensus in the traditional scholastic manuals and other similar scholastic works. So rather than telling you to read some "centrist" neo-Thomist, I would point you towards some of the best examples of traditional Thomism.

As I have mentioned in a previous post, the best idea, in my view, is to start by reading the traditional Thomistic philosophical manuals in Latin (e.g., Hugon, Gredt, Zigliara, etc., which I have available through my Ite ad Thomam Out-of-Print Library in PDF format).

If you can't manage the Latin, then I would refer you to:

• H.D. Gardeil, Introduction to the Philosophy of St.Thomas Aquinas (vol. 4 is on Metaphysics; and unfortunately it is also out of print, but I also have it available through my Ite ad Thomam Out-of-Print Library in PDF format).
• Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality, Ch. 4-5 (available online as text, as well as through the Ite ad Thomam Out-of-Print Library in PDF format).

or, if you can read French:

• Garrigou-Lagrange, Le sens commun: La philosophie de l'etre et les formules dogmatiques (also available through my Ite ad Thomam Out-of-Print Library in PDF format).

If you can read Latin, once you've gotten a good summary from the manuals or from any/all of these works, I would recommend tackling:

• Ramirez, De analogia, 4 vols (also available through my Ite ad Thomam Out-of-Print Library in PDF format). Ramirez's work is the most thorough discussion on analogy ever written from the traditional Thomistic point of view (painfully thorough, in fact).

And notice I don't initially recommend Cajetan. While Cajetan is the most famous commentator of the Summa, by no means are his views the very definition of "Thomism of the strict observance" (or, as I prefer to call it, traditional Scholastic Thomism). He is number one in the existentialists' list of "essentialist Thomists." And the reason is that Cajetan is perhaps a bit more an "essentialist" than the average--and certainly moreso than the best--traditional Scholastic Thomists. But it is an illegitimate move to lump Cajetan and the rest of the traditional Scholastic Thomists into one group, and then thinking that by refuting Cajetan one is refuting the entire school of Scholastic Thomists. The reality is more nuanced than that. Most Thomists don't put things in Cajetan's exact terms.

In fact, Garrigou-Lagrange, whose thought I DO consider to be the most advanced and profound expression of traditional Scholastic Thomism, sides with Cajetan in a qualified way only. Garrigou praises Cajetan over and over throughout his writings for his profound sense of mystery and says of him that, "[his] glory lies in his recognition of the true grandeur of St. Thomas." However, Garrigou acknowledges that Cajetan sometimes gets a bit hung up on logical abstractions, and every now and then you'll see Garrigou saying things such as, "Cajetan conceived the matter too abstractly." So, overall, he sides with Cajetan, but although Cajetan was usually right in Garrigou's view, things could nonetheless be expressed or conceived in a better or more adequate way. A bit like Aquinas, who treats Augustine with reverence and hides the fact that he disagrees with him, so Garrigou will do with Cajetan, to a lesser degree. In fact, you won't really see Garrigou-Lagrange flat-out rejecting the views of too many Thomists (Suarez's views were a definite exception, as he didn't consider Suarez to be a Thomist at all!), and this is partly because he revered them, partly because he practiced the axiom: seldom affirm, never deny, always distinguish.

PS. Pictured above are Cajetan and Luther. Cajetan was the Apostolic Legate to Germany and was commissioned by the Pope to confront Luther.

Blog Update

Blog Update

Dear Friends,

After almost a month of inactivity in this blog, perhaps some of you may be thinking that I dissapeared from the planet. I answered (most of my) emails and replied to all PDF-file, book, and course requests, but I did not publish any new posts. So, in a way you could say I did dissapear. Once my final exams for the summer session were done, I invested my time in praying to St. Joseph and moving forward with my long-term plans.

As many of you know, my plans for this coming academic year were to move from Miami, FL to Pamplona (Navarra), Spain with my family to attend a graduate theology program at the University of Navarra. But, it turns out St. Joseph had something else in mind. I had great difficulties finding both a visa and means to supporiting my family while we lived there (it would have been illegal for me to work in Spain if I had a student visa). This meant that Spain was not an option for us.

In turn, I was offered a full-time position as Academic Dean at a small, independent, conservative Catholic school near Salem, Oregon--close to my wife's hometown and family, the place she has always dreamt of settling in. I decided to accept the position and move there. The trip was grueling (it took 7 days of driving--not counting Sunday, when we rested) and extremely expensive (most of my savings went into the gas tank). I can't deny, however, that it was quite exciting: we saw many incredibly-beautiful landscapes (the Rockies, WOW!) and visited many interesting places (including four more MLB stadiums!!!).

So here we are now, in Northwestern Oregon's gorgeous Willamette Valley. This is not Spain, but, ironically, it is, as it were, a virgin version of Aragón (Northeastern Spain, where the Romeros are originally from), with its rolling hills, winding rivers, luscious vineyards, ubiquitous evergreens, and fields after fields of green, with the snow-capped Pacific Crest Mountains in the distance. I didn't even know so many tones of green exist! My wife is terribly excited to be back here; she is finally home. She is very much acting herself--something she couldn't do in Miami. We will now be here for a good, long time, Deo volente.

So my plans to pursue theological studies have changed a bit. I will still do it but, for now, in a different way. I am still enrolled in a Distance Education program through which I will eventually earn an M.A. in theology. Perhaps when I finish that--and I'm doing it in a very much part-time fashion, as time allows--perhaps then I will reconsider plans to pursue an STD (a canonical Doctorate in Sacred Theology), but it will all depend on Divine Providence, through the intercession of the good St. Joseph. Close by I have Mount Angel Seminary, which offers an STB... who knows?!

Pope Benedict XVI to Puerto Rican Bishops: Faith is not Private

Pope Benedict XVI to Puerto Rican Bishops: Faith is not Private

Puerto Rico: Facing Challenges of this Moment of History
Posted in: Pope Benedict XVI, USA Features

Benedict XVI received in audience prelates from the Puerto Rican Episcopal Conference, who have recently completed their “ad limina” visit.

Addressing the bishops, the Pope noted how their reports had highlighted a “concern for the challenges and difficulties that have to be faced at this moment of history,” because “over the last few years many things have changed in the social, the economic and even the religious field, at times opening the way to religious indifference and to a certain moral relativism which influences Christian practices and which, indirectly, also affects the structures of society.”

“This religious situation,” he went on, “calls out to you as pastors and requires that you remain united in order to make the presence of the Lord more palpable among mankind through joint pastoral initiatives that respond to the new realities. … You bishops and priests in particular are called to an indispensable and profoundly committed mission: ensuring that the Church remains a place where the mystery of divine love is taught and lived.”

The Holy Father then went on to recall that “priests are in the front line of evangelization” and that, for this reason, bishops’ relationship with them must not “be merely institutional” but “animated above all by charity.” He also called for prayers that the Church in Puerto Rico may enjoy “many holy vocations, especially at the current time in which young people often find it difficult to follow the Lord’s call into priestly or consecrated life.”

Turning to consider Puerto Rican society, the Pope noted “the spread of a mentality inspired by laicism which, more or less consciously, gradually leads to derision or ignorance of the sacred, relegating faith to a merely private sphere. … A correct notion of religious freedom is not compatible with such an ideology which at times presents itself as the only voice of reason.”

Another “permanent challenge,” said the Holy Father, is the family which “finds itself beset by the many snares of the modern world, such as overriding materialism” or “the lack of stability and faithfulness in couples.” Hence “the need to intensify … an incisive form of pastoral care of families, to help Christian couples accept the fundamental values of the Sacrament they have received.”

“The aforementioned religious indifference and the temptation of an easy moral permissiveness, as well as ignorance of the Christian tradition, … exert a great influence over new generations. Young people have the right … to be educated in the faith. For this reason, in the integral education of the very young, religious education must not be neglected, also in schools.”

Benedict XVI concluded by recalling that Catholics, “called to concern themselves with worldly affairs so as to order them in accordance with the divine will, must be courageous witnesses of their faith in the various areas of public life. Their participation in ecclesial life is, furthermore, fundamental and, at times, without their collaboration your apostolate as pastors would not reach ‘all men in all times and places’.”
(VIS)

_______________________

Los desafíos de la Iglesia en Puerto Rico, según Benedicto XVI

Sábado, 30 junio 2007

ZENIT, IBLNEWS

Publicamos el discurso que dirigió Benedicto XVI este sábado a los obispos de la Conferencia Episcopal de Puerto Rico a quienes recibió con motivo de su quinquenal visita «ad limina apostolorum».

"Queridos hermanos en el Episcopado:

1. Con sumo gusto os recibo, Pastores de la Iglesia de Dios que peregrina en Puerto Rico, venidos a Roma para la visita ad Limina y para fortalecer los profundos vínculos que os unen con esta Sede Apostólica. A través de cada uno de vosotros envío mi cordial saludo y expreso mi afecto y estima a los sacerdotes, comunidades religiosas y fieles laicos de las respectivas Iglesias particulares.

Agradezco las amables palabras que me ha dirigido, en nombre de todos, Mons. Roberto Octavio González Nieves, Arzobispo de San Juan de Puerto Rico y Presidente de la Conferencia Episcopal, exponiendo las inquietudes y esperanzas de vuestro ministerio pastoral, orientado a guiar al Pueblo de Dios por el camino de la salvación y proclamando con vigor la fe católica para una mejor formación de los fieles.

2. Las relaciones quinquenales ponen de manifiesto la preocupación por los retos y dificultades que se han de afrontar en estos momentos de la Historia. En efecto, en los últimos años muchas cosas han cambiado en el ámbito social, económico y también religioso, dando paso a veces a la indiferencia religiosa y a un cierto relativismo moral, que influyen en la práctica cristiana y que, indirectamente, afecta también a las estructuras de la misma sociedad. Esta situación religiosa os interpela como Pastores y requiere que permanezcáis unidos para hacer más palpable la presencia del Señor entre los hombres a través de iniciativas pastorales conjuntas y que respondan mejor a las nuevas realidades.

Es fundamental preservar y acrecentar el don de la unidad que Jesús pedía al Padre para sus discípulos (cf. Jn 17,11). En la propia diócesis estáis llamados a vivir y dar testimonio de la unidad querida por Cristo para su Iglesia. Por otra parte, las eventuales diferencias de costumbres y tradiciones locales, lejos de amenazar esta unidad, contribuyen a enriquecerla desde la fe común. Y vosotros, como sucesores de los Apóstoles, tenéis que esforzaros en «mantener la unidad del Espíritu con el vínculo de la paz» (Ef 4,3). Por eso quiero recordar que todos, especialmente los Obispos y sacerdotes, estáis llamados a una misión irrenunciable y que os compromete profundamente: hacer que la Iglesia sea un lugar donde se enseñe y se viva el misterio del amor divino, que sólo será posible a partir de una auténtica espiritualidad de comunión, que tiene su expresión visible en la mutua colaboración y en la vida fraterna.

3. Un sector que reclama primordialmente vuestra atención pastoral son los sacerdotes. Ellos están en la primera línea de la evangelización y necesitan de manera especial vuestro cuidado y cercanía personal. Vuestra relación con ellos no ha de ser sólo institucional, sino que, como verdaderos hijos, amigos y hermanos vuestros, debe estar animada sobre todo por la caridad (cf. 1Pe 4,8), como expresión de la paternidad episcopal, que se ha de manifestar de modo especial con los sacerdotes enfermos o de edad avanzada, así como con los que se encuentren en circunstancias difíciles.

Los sacerdotes, por su parte, deben recordar que, ante todo, son hombres de Dios y, por eso, han de cuidar su vida espiritual y su formación permanente. Toda su labor ministerial "debe comenzar efectivamente con la oración", como dice san Alberto Magno (Comentario de la teología mística, 15). Todo sacerdote encontrará en este encuentro con Dios la fuerza para vivir con mayor entrega y dedicación su ministerio, dando ejemplo de disponibilidad y desprendimiento de las cosas superfluas.

4. Pensando en los futuros candidatos al sacerdocio y a la vida consagrada, hay que resaltar la importancia de orar sin cesar al Dueño de la mies (cf. Mt 9,38) para que conceda a la Iglesia en Puerto Rico numerosas y santas vocaciones, especialmente en la situación actual en la que los jóvenes encuentran frecuentemente dificultades para seguir el llamado del Señor a la vida sacerdotal o consagrada. Por eso, se ha de incrementar una pastoral vocacional específica, que mueva a los responsables de la pastoral juvenil a ser mediadores audaces del llamado del Señor. Sobre todo, no hay que tener miedo a proponerlo a los jóvenes, acompañándolos después asiduamente, en el ámbito humano y espiritual, para que vayan discerniendo su opción vocacional.

Respecto a la formación de los candidatos al sacerdocio, el Obispo ha de poner suma atención en elegir a los educadores más idóneos y mejor preparados para esta misión. Teniendo en cuenta las circunstancias concretas y el número de vocaciones en Puerto Rico, se podría tomar en consideración la confluencia de esfuerzos y recursos, de común acuerdo y con espíritu de unidad en la planificación pastoral, con el fin de obtener resultados mejores y más satisfactorios. Esto permitiría una mejor selección de los formadores y profesores que ayuden a cada seminarista a crecer con «una personalidad madura y equilibrada, [...] con honda vida espiritual y amante de la Iglesia» (Pastores gregis, 48). En esta delicada labor, todos los sacerdotes deben sentirse corresponsables, promoviendo nuevas vocaciones, sobre todo con el propio ejemplo y sin dejar de acompañar a aquéllos que han surgido de la propia comunidad parroquial o de algún movimiento.

5. En el ámbito social se va difundiendo una mentalidad inspirada en un laicismo que, de forma más o menos consciente, lleva gradualmente al desprecio o a la ignorancia de lo sacro, relegando la fe a la esfera de lo meramente privado. En este sentido, un recto concepto de libertad religiosa no es compatible con esa ideología, que a veces se presenta como la única voz de la racionalidad.

Un reto permanente para vosotros es también la familia, que se ve asediada por tantas insidias del mundo moderno, como son el materialismo imperante, la búsqueda del placer inmediato, la falta de estabilidad y de fidelidad en la pareja, influenciada continuamente por los medios de comunicación. Cuando el matrimonio no se ha construido sobre la roca firme del amor verdadero y de la mutua entrega, es arrastrado fácilmente por la corriente divorcista, soslayando además el valor de la vida, sobre todo la de los no nacidos. Este panorama muestra la necesidad de intensificar, como ya lo estáis haciendo, una pastoral familiar incisiva, que ayude a los esposos cristianos a asumir los valores fundamentales del Sacramento recibido. En este sentido, fieles a las enseñanzas de Cristo, a través de vuestro magisterio proclamáis la verdad de la familia como Iglesia doméstica y santuario de la vida, ante ciertas tendencias que, en la sociedad actual, tratan de eclipsar o confundir el valor único e insustituible del matrimonio entre hombre y mujer.

6. El mencionado indiferentismo religioso y la tentación de un fácil permisivismo moral, así como la ignorancia de la tradición cristiana con su rico patrimonio espiritual, influyen en gran manera sobre las nuevas generaciones. La juventud tiene derecho, desde el inicio de su proceso formativo, a ser educada en la fe y en las sanas costumbres. Por eso la educación integral de los más jóvenes no puede prescindir de la enseñanza religiosa también en la escuela. Una sólida formación religiosa será, pues, una protección eficaz ante el avance de las sectas o de otros grupos religiosos de amplia difusión actual.

7. Los fieles católicos, que están llamados a ocuparse de las realidades temporales para ordenarlas según la voluntad divina, han de ser testigos valientes de su fe en los diferentes ámbitos de la vida pública. Su participación en la vida eclesial es, además, fundamental y, en ocasiones, sin su colaboración vuestro apostolado de Pastores no llegaría a «todos los hombres de todos los tiempos y lugares» (Lumen gentium, 33).

A este respecto, quiero recordar unas significativas palabras de mi predecesor Juan Pablo II en su viaje pastoral a Puerto Rico: «Cuando en el ejercicio de vuestro ministerio encontréis cuestiones que tocan opciones concretas de carácter político, no dejéis de proclamar los principios morales que rigen todo campo de la actividad humana. Pero dejad a los laicos bien formados en su conciencia moral, la ordenación según el plan de Dios de las cosas temporales. Vosotros habéis de ser creadores de comunión y fraternidad, nunca de división en nombre de opciones que el pueblo fiel puede elegir legítimamente en sus diversas expresiones» (n. 3, 12-10-1984).

8. Algunos sectores de vuestra sociedad viven en la abundancia mientras otros sufren graves carencias, que no pocas veces rayan en la pobreza. En este sentido, es bien conocida la generosidad de los puertorriqueños, que responden de forma solidaria a los llamados de ayuda ante ciertas tragedias en el mundo. A este respecto, es de esperar que esta misma generosidad, coordinada por los servicios de Cáritas de Puerto Rico, se incremente también en aquellas circunstancias en las que grupos, personas o familias del lugar necesiten una verdadera asistencia.

9. Queridos Hermanos: la evangelización y la práctica de la fe en Puerto Rico han estado siempre unidas al amor filial a la Virgen María. Esto lo ponen de manifiesto los templos, santuarios y monumentos, así como las prácticas de piedad y fiestas populares en honor de la Madre de Dios. A Ella encomiendo vuestras intenciones y trabajos pastorales. Bajo su maternal protección pongo a todos los sacerdotes, comunidades religiosas, así como a las familias, a los jóvenes, a los enfermos y especialmente a los más necesitados. Llevadles a todos el saludo y el gran afecto del Papa, junto con la Bendición Apostólica."

Societas Scholasticorum

Societas Scholasticorum

Societas Scholasticorum

Dear Friends,

I am pleased to announce the forming of the Societas Scholasticorum, or "The Society of Schoolmen," a new organization created by traditional Thomists, with the support of Roman clergy and other contributors, for the restoration of Scholastic Thomism. This is the description from the website:

We are a fledgling foundation commited to restoring the philosophic doctrines, didactic principles, and scientific synthesis of the greatest masters of the medieval universities, the Scholastics. We hold Thomas of Aquin above all other philosophers as the most perfect thinker among the Scholastics and we apply ourselves to renewing the great tradition of Thomistic Philosophy forged by his Commentators throughout the centuries...

First founded among the students of the Roman Pontifical Universities, the Society of Scholastics is a union of philosophers brought together by fidelity to the principles, methods, and doctrines of Thomas Aquinas, Prince of Scholastics, which we hold inviolate, in order that, by association, we may promote the autonomous rights of philosophy as the highest and most universal science investigable by reason alone—a science which is not simply a handmaiden of theology nor a mere apologetic tool—and, thus, work for the reconciliation of philosophy with the partial sciences...

Visit the website and join the Society of Schoolmen!

Maritain, Garrigou-Lagrange, and Democracy

Maritain, Garrigou-Lagrange, and Democracy

Dear Sir,

I must object to your claim [in your previous post on Maritain] that "Aquinas and all of his traditional followers are obviously royalists/monarchists". I do not presume to speak for 'all of his traditional followers' but I have never seen any text or read of any text or heard of any text in which St Thomas endorses hereditary monarchy (the system espoused by 'royalists'). In the Summa Theologiae IaIIae.105.1 he explicitly states that a mixed monarchy elected by universal franchise is the best form of government. The most obvious example of such a constitution in the modern world is the constitution of the United States of America. In fact, the system endorsed by St Thomas is more or less what is meant when we use the word 'Democracy' today. In contrast, when St Thomas uses the term 'Democracy' he uses it in its ancient sense of a polity with no supreme executive magistrate in which the laws are enacted by plebiscite. To use Thomas's criticisms of Democracy as if they applied to the modern institution is quite wrong.

In general your verdict upon M. Maritain has much to commend it, however his disagreements with Garrigou-Lagrange are more complicated than your comments suggest. Garrigou was indeed a royalist and was rather disingenuous in his presentation of St Thomas's political doctrine going so far as to endorse Action Française, a movement subsequently condemned by the Church for 'Social and Political Modernism'. The essential ground of condemnation was that the movement sought to bracket the question of the truth or falsity of the Church's faith in order to use it as a buttress for a social order in which believers and non-believers could participate.

Maritain (who was also supportive of Action Française) persisted in this error after the condemnation but sought to use the Church's faith as a buttress for a pluralist rather than a conservative social and political order. His arguments for the logical dependency upon revealed truths of a 'Democratic' (in the modern sense) political order are worth consideration and are apparently endorsed by Pius XII in his 1944 Christmas Address 'Democracy and a Lasting Peace'. In this address Pius XII states that "If the future is to belong to democracy, an essential part in its achievement will have to belong to the religion of Christ and to the Church, the messenger of our Redeemer's word which is to continue His mission of saving men. For she teaches and defends supernatural truths and communicates the supernatural helps of grace in order to actuate the divinely-established order of beings and ends which is the ultimate foundation and directive norm of every democracy."

Obviously, the alleged dependency is one way. Democracy is said to imply certain truths of the faith, the faith does not require that all states be democracies. On the other hand, Maritain's willingness to bracket the question of the truth or falsity of the Church's faith, accepting as unproblematic and permanent (in his liberal incarnation) the separation of Church and state, is clearly contrary to the teaching of the Church and opens him to the charge of 'Social Modernism' as described by Pius XI in Ubi Arcano Dei §60-61. This is a very serious criticism of Maritain's political thought. Nevertheless, it has nothing to do with his preference for 'Democracy' in which he is a faithful disciple of the Angelic Doctor.

Yours in Christ,

Alan

Dear Alan,

In all truth, I must admit am no expert in political philosophy or in Catholic social thought. In point of fact, that is the one area of philosophy/theology which I have purposefully avoided throughout my formation. I now realize I must not ignore it.

Therefore, pardon my simplistic understanding of the concepts, but by "royalism" I meant no more than the belief that the best form of government is monarchy. Thus, by "royalist" I meant the same as "monarchist." I did not imply that monarchy should be inherited.

Given that this is what I meant, it is true that there are MANY texts, indeed entire works, by Aquinas and his followers where the point is to support "royalism" (in the sense I use it; i.e., where the point is to show that monarchy is the best form of government).

Moreover, I find the following points that you have made difficult to accept, at least prima facie:

1) that "the system endorsed by St. Thomas is more or less what is meant when we use the word 'Democracy' today"; this claim is seriously suspect of hermeneutical violence, and the 'more or less' is an indication that you're stretching it unduly.

2) that the United States is the most obvious example in the modern world of "a mixed monarchy elected by universal franchise," and especially the outstanding implication that the United States is, not only an example (as if that weren't doubtful enough), but an obvious example, of "the best form of government"!!!;

3) Your interpretation of Pius XII's address as implying your thesis and as being authoritative.

A. First, it does not imply your thesis; you are committing a logical error by reversing the order hypothetical statement. The statement means that:

1. "if the future is to belong to democracy, then Christianity must play a primary role."

It does not mean that:

2. "if Christianity is to play a primary role, then the future must belong to democracy."

Confusing the two is equivalent to confusing the following two statements:

3. "if a person is a bachelor, then that person is unmarried";

4. "if a person is unmarried, then that person is a bachelor."

The first one is true, but the second one is false, for an unmarried person could be a female or a child (which do not qualify as "bachelors").

Therefore, I agree with Pope XII's claim that "if the future is to belong to democracy, then Christianity must play a primary role." That is the essence of what traditionalists mean by the restoration of the social kingship of Christ in America today. However, I do not agree with the reverse, namely, that "if Christianity is to play a primary role [that automatically means that], the future must belong to democracy." That would mean that democracy is the type of government that best concords with Christianity.

B. Furthermore, the citation refers merely to an address, where the pope does not intend to teach anything new, and much less to bind anyone to believe it, but merely to communicate a fundamental truth of Christianity, namely, the need to implement Christian doctrine and morality in our modern democratic world ( i.e., nothing other than the implementation of the social kingship of Christ in our age).

4) I also find difficult to accept your gratuitous and unwarranted charge that "Garrigou was... rather disingenuous in his presentation of St Thomas's political doctrine" (if you would like to provide justification for this charge, I would like to hear it);

5) Finally, I am unmoved by your misleading statement that he went "so far as to endorse [my emphasis] Action Française," which confuses strategic support with endorsement of principles (as if my voting for Bush meant that I endorse everything he stands for--I simply voted for him because I thought that doing so was the best strategy to help minimize abortion: and it worked). Garrigou did not "endorse" the principles of L'Action Française; he thought that to promote its political leadership was good strategy to obtain the restoration of the traditional order in France!

Thank you for your constructive criticism. I am very grateful for taking the time to share your thoughts with me and point out the inadequacies of what I write on the blog. I will require further research to be able to evaluate/criticize these points.

In Domino,

-FJR.

Dear Dr Romero,

Thank you for your reply. I think you may have mistaken my meaning on a few points. I did not say that Pius XII's address bound in conscience or even had a particularly significant theological note. I was citing him as an individual authority rather than as the voice of the magisterium. I did say specifically that he is asserting a dependency of Democracy (Modern) upon the Gospel not a dependency of the Gospel upon Democracy. 'Democracy is said to imply certain truths of the faith, the faith does not require that all states be democracies.'

Pius says "[the Church] teaches and defends supernatural truths and communicates the supernatural helps of grace in order to actuate the divinely-established order of beings and ends which is the ultimate foundation and directive norm of every democracy." It would be strange to say 'is' if he meant 'ought to be'. Furthermore, as every state whatever its constitutional form ought to take these truths as their foundation and directive norm, it would be odd to single out democracy in this way if that was all that he meant. I suspect that the dependency he was asserting is that for which Maritain argued, though shorn of the secularist errors involved in Maritain's theory.

Maritain in his epistemological writings developed a theory which he called 'Moral Philosophy Adequately Considered'. If I understand him correctly he believes that the actual end of man in this order of providence functions as the first principle of moral philosophy and because that end cannot be deduced from natural reason (whatever de Lubac might think) there can be no truly adequate moral philosophy in this order of providence without supernatural faith. One of the consequences of this inadequacy of moral philosophy when it is not subalterned to sacred theology is that we cannot know by natural reason alone that we ought to love our enemies.

A fundamental characteristic of Democracy as the moderns understand it (in contrast to the ancient form) is universal enfranchisement and the preservation of certain inviolable rights for minorities. Maritain believes that this framework would not develop naturally on the basis of reason unaided by revelation. This is why Democracy in the modern sense requires certain truths to justify it which only the Church can furnish with certitude.

Whatever its deficiencies may be vis-à-vis its predecessor, this seems to be the point the recent Catechism is trying to make at CCC 2244.

"Every institution is inspired, at least implicitly, by a vision of man and his destiny, from which it derives the point of reference for its judgment, its hierarchy of values, its line of conduct. Most societies have formed their institutions in the recognition of a certain preeminence of man over things. Only the divinely revealed religion has clearly recognized man's origin and destiny in God, the Creator and Redeemer. The Church invites political authorities to measure their judgments and decisions against this inspired truth about God and man: Societies not recognizing this vision or rejecting it in the name of their independence from God are brought to seek their criteria and goal in themselves or to borrow them from some ideology. Since they do not admit that one can defend an objective criterion of good and evil, they arrogate to themselves an explicit or implicit totalitarian power over man and his destiny, as history shows."

In regard to nomenclature, just about nobody uses the term 'Monarchism' to mean merely 'rule by one' which is doubtless unfortunate but it is a fact. Even if it was used in this exact sense it would still be misleading to describe St Thomas as a 'Monarchist' as he did not advocate this form but a mixture of the three 'pure' forms. He could be most exactly described as a Republican. The Romans also believed that their Respublica was an ideal blend of the three pure forms. In ST IaIIae.95.4 St Thomas seems to endorse the Roman model in his discussion of Isidore's division of laws.

'Royalism' is never used other than to describe hereditary monarchy. In ordinary speech Monarchy is still distinguished from Aristocracy and Democracy as indicating the sovereignty of the one rather than the few or the many. That this is how Garrigou-Lagrange used it as is clear from the fact that he supported the restoration of the French Bourbon Monarchy. Thomas's mixed monarchy in which the three 'pure' forms were blended and the Monarchical and Aristocratic elements elected by the populace is very different from anything promoted by contemporary 'monarchists' or any royalist programme advanced in early 20 th Century France. It is clearly what we would now call a presidential democracy. I believe Sir John Fortescue (1394 – 1476) used St Thomas's authority to defend the Lancastrian parliamentary transfer of power from Richard II to Henry IV.

Personally, I am a fairly contented subject of HM Elizabeth II and inhabit a parliamentary democracy which does not match up to St Thomas's model, so I am not blinded by patriotic fervour in this matter. I am not saying that the constitution of the United States of America is an ideal. Obviously, it is marred by its failure to acknowledge the truth of the Catholic faith in its constitution and its laws violate Divine and Natural Law in many particulars (as do those of the United Kingdom). It does however match up to the specifications laid down by St Thomas in IaIIae.105.1. This is not to say that a number of other broadly similar systems could not do so too. The French constitution for example is also a presidential democracy with an elected legislature.

Garrigou's enthusiasm for Action Française is a matter of public record. In his own introduction to De Regimine Principium he even defends Charles Maurras's slogan "politique d'abord" which lies at the heart of Pius XI's objections to Action Française. Paradoxically, Garrigou was probably more uncomfortable with this aspect of the movement than Maritain even though Maritain appears to attack it in 'Primauté du Spirituel'.

If you wish to examine the disingenuous character of Garrigou's presentation of St Thomas's political philosophy I recommended that you read his introduction to De Regimine Principium and compare it to the following (which I have attached to this email)…

Aroney, Nicholas, "Subsidiarity, Federalism and the Best Constitution: Thomas Aquinas on City, Province and Empire" . Law and Philosophy, Vol. 26, pp. 161-228, 2007.

….and then chase up the references and judge for yourself!

Yours in Christ,
Alan

Alan,

Thanks for the info and the references. I will take a look!

In Domino,
-FJR.